B.
CONSENTED DISMISSALS
8. PEOPLE VS. OBSANIA
Facts:
On 22 November 1964, barely a day after the
occurrence of the alleged crime, Erlinda Dollente, the 14-
year old victim, and her parents, Ciriaco Dollente and
Carmelita Lureta, filed in the municipal court of
Balungao, Pangasinan a complaint for rape with robbery,
alleging
"That on or about 21st day of November 1964, at
around 2:00 to 3:00 in the afternoon, particularly in sitio
Cawakalan, barrio of Capulaan municipality of Balungao,
Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused
Willy Obsania, armed with a dagger, by means of
violence and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously did then and there have carnal knowledge of
the complainant Erlinda Dollente, against her will and on
the roadside in the ricefields at the abovementioned place
while she was alone on her way to barrio San Raymundo."
After the case was remanded to the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan for further proceedings, the
assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for rape
against the accused, embodying the allegations of the
complaint, with an additional averment that the offense
was committed "with lewd designs". Obsania pleaded not
guilty upon arraignment, and forthwith with his counsel
moved for the dismissal of the case contending that the
complaint was fatally defective for failure to allege "lewd
designs" and that the subsequent information filed by the
fiscal which averred "lewd designs" did not cure the
jurisdictional infirmity. On 8 January 1965, the trial court
granted the motion and ordered dismissal of the action,
ruling that "the failure of the complaint filed by the
offended party to allege that the acts committed by the
accused were with 'lewd designs' does not give this Court
jurisdiction to try the case." From this order, the fiscal
appealed.
Issue: Whether the appeal of the Government constitutes
double jeopardy.
Held:
An appeal by the prosecution in a criminal case is not
available if the defendant would thereby be placed in
double jeopardy.
Correlatively, Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Court provides that "When a defendant shall have been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed
or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a
valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction,
and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal
of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged
in the former complaint or information."
In order that the protection against double
jeopardy may inure in favor of an accused, the following
requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution:
(a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent
court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d)
the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
The complaint filed with the municipal court in
the present case was valid; the trial court was a competent
tribunal with jurisdiction to hear the case; the record
shows that the accused pleaded not guilty upon
arraignment. The particular aspect of double jeopardy, i.e.
dismissal or termination of the original case without the
express consent of the defendant, has evoked varied and
apparently conflicting rulings from the Supreme Court. In
People vs. Salico (1949), the Court held that "When the
case is dismissed with the express consent of the
defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense; because, his action in
having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his
constitutional right or privilege, for the reason that he
thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on
the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against
him."
The Salico doctrine was adhered to and affirmed
in People vs. Marapao (85 Phil 832, 30 March 1950),
Gandicela vs. Lutero (88 Phil 299, 5 March 1951), People
vs. Pinuela, et al. (91 Phil 53, 28 March 1952), Co Te Hue
vs. Encarnacion (94 Phil 258, 26 January 1954), and
People vs. Desalisa (GR L-15516, 17 December 1966).
On the other hand, the doctrine of estoppel in relation to
the plea of double jeopardy was first enunciated in Acierto
which held that when the trial court dismisses a case on a
disclaimer of jurisdiction, upon the instigation of the
accused, the latter is estopped on appeal from asserting
the jurisdiction of the lower court in support of his plea of
second jeopardy. The doctrine of estoppel is in
quintessence the same as the doctrine of waiver: the thrust
of both is that a dismissal, other than on the merits, sought
by the accused in a motion to dismiss, is deemed to be
with his express consent and bars him from subsequently
interposing the defense of double jeopardy on appeal or
in a new prosecution for the same offense. The Acierto
ruling was reiterated in People vs. Amada Reyes, et al.,
(96 Phil 927, 30 April 1955); People vs. Reyes, et al., (98
Phil 646, 23 March 1956); People vs. Casiano (GR L-
15309, 16 February 1961), and People vs. Archilla (GR
L-15632, 28 February 1961).
The case of Bangalao, Ferrer, and Labatete, did
not actually abandon the doctrine of waiver in Salico (and
not one of the said cases even implied the slightest
departure from the doctrine of estoppel established in
Acierto). In Diaz, Abaño, Tacneng and Robles, like in
Cloribel, the dismissals therein, all sought by the
defendants, were considered acquittals because they were
all predicated on the right of a defendant to a speedy trial
and on the failure of the Government to prosecute.
Therefore, even if such dismissals were induced
by the accused, the doctrines of waiver and estoppel were
obviously inapplicable for these doctrines presuppose a
dismissal not amounting to an acquittal. Here, the
controverted dismissal was predicated on the erroneous
contention of the accused that the complaint was defective
and such infirmity affected the jurisdiction of the trial
court, and not on the right of the accused to a speedy trial
and the failure of the Government to prosecute. The
appealed order of dismissal in the present case did not
terminate the action on the merits.
The application of the sister doctrines of waiver
and estoppel requires two sine qua non conditions: first,
the dismissal must be sought or induced by the defendant
personally or through his counsel; and second, such
dismissal must not be on the merits and must not
necessarily amount to an acquittal. Indubitably, the
present case falls squarely within the periphery of the said
doctrines which have been preserved unimpaired in the
corpus of our jurisprudence. The case was remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance
with law.
9. SALCEDO VS. MENDOZA
FACTS:
Leopoldo Salcedo was charged with reckless imprudence
before the CFI of Oriental Mindoro, Branch I. After his
arraignment, the trial was scheduled on Jan. 25, 1978 but
it was postponed on Feb. 22, 1978 upon motion of the
prosecution. On Feb. 22, the trial was again postponed
due to the absence of the Salcedo. The trial was again was
reset on March 25, 1978 but again, no trial proceeded
because no prosecuting fiscal was present. This time, the
accused, through Atty. Edgardo Aceron, invoking the
right of the accused to speedy trial, moved for the
dismissal of the case against Salcedo which was then
granted by the respondent Judge.
On the same day, the prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied. The prosecution filed a
second motion for reconsideration and the judge set the
hearing on April 20, 1978. After trial, the trial judge
issued an order directing both parties to submit their
respective pleadings within 5 days. Both parties failed to
comply with such order. Nevertheless, Judge Mendoza
issued an order setting aside its previous order dismissing
the criminal case against Salcedo.
Hence, Salcedo appealed before the SC saying that the
dismissal of the case against him is considered as an
acquittal and thus the revival of the case would place him
in double jeopardy. This contention was supported by the
OSG.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of salcedo’s
constitutional right against double jeopardy
RULING:
In the present case, the respondent Judge dismissed the
case, upon the motion of the petitioner invoking his
constitutional right to speedy trial, because the
prosecution failed to appear on the day of the trial on
March 28, 1978 after it had previously been postponed
twice, the first on January 26, 1978 and the second on
February 22, 1978.
The effect of such dismissal is at once clear Following the
established jurisprudence, a dismiss predicated on the
right of the accused to speedy trial upon his own motion
or express consent, amounts to an acquittal which will bar
another prosecution of the accused for the same offense
This is an exception to the rule that a dismissal upon the
motion or with the express consent of the accused win not
be a bar to the subsequent prosecution of the accused for
the same offense as provided for in Section 9, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court. The moment the dismissal of a
criminal case is predicated on the right of the accused to
speedy trial even if it is upon his own motion or express
consent, such dismissal is equivalent to acquittal And any
attempt to prosecute the accused for the same offense will
violate the constitutional prohibition that "no person shall
be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense.
THE PETITION IS GRANTED BECAUSE THE
REVIVAL OF THE CASE AGAINST HIM PLACED
HIM IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
10. PEOPLE VS. ATIENZA
Facts:
In an Information filed on June 19, 2001,
respondents Aristeo E. Atienza (Mayor Atienza), then
Municipal Mayor of Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro,
Engr. Rodrigo D. Manongsong (Engr. Manongsong), then
Municipal Engineer of Puerto Galera and Crispin M.
Egarque (Egarque), a police officer stationed in Puerto
Galera, were charged before the
Sandiganbayan violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act
No. 3019 (RA 3019), or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act in Criminal Case No. 26678.
Duly arraigned, respondents entered their
respective pleas of not guilty to the crime charged against
them. After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.
To establish its case, the prosecution presented
the testimonies of Mercedita Atienza (Mercedita),
Alexander Singson (Alexander), Edmundo Evora
(Edmundo), and Acting Barangay Chairman Concepcion
Escanillas (Escanillas).
Mercedita testified that she was the caretaker of
Hondura Beach Resort, a resort owned by Edmundo in
Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. She narrated that
on July 3, 2000, Edmundo caused the construction of a
fence made of coco lumber and G.I. sheets
worth P5,000.00 on his resort. On July 4, 2000, she found
out that the fence that was just recently built was
destroyed. Upon the instruction of Edmundo, she reported
the incident to the barangay authorities. On July 5, 2000,
Edmundo again caused the construction of a second fence
on the same property worth P3,000.00. However, on the
day following, the fence was again destroyed. Mercedita
stated that she was informed by some people who were
there that a policeman and Engr. Manongsong were the
ones who destroyed the fence.
Mercedita further testified that Edmundo
instructed her to report the matter to the police. When she
inquired at the police station, Egarque admitted that he
destroyed the fence upon the order of Mayor
Atienza. When she asked Mayor Atienza about the
incident, the latter informed her that the fence was not
good for Puerto Galera since the place was a tourist
destination and that the land was intended for the
fishermen association. Mercedita added that Engr.
Manongsong admitted that he destroyed the fence upon
the order of the mayor for lack of municipal permit and
that the land was intended for the fishermen. Mercedita
also stated that she reported to acting Barangay Chairman
Escanillas that it was Engr. Manongsong and Egarque
who destroyed the fence upon the order of the mayor.
Alexander testified that he and a certain Reynaldo
Gumba constructed the fence twice on the subject
property. On the morning of July 6, 2000, he saw the
fence being destroyed by Engr. Manongsong and
Egarque. He said that he informed Mercedita about the
incident and he accompanied the latter to the police
station and the offices of Mayor Atienza and Engr.
Manongsong. They eventually reported the incident to
acting Barangay Chairman Escanillas.
Private complainant Edmundo corroborated the
testimony of Mercedita and further stated that due to the
incident, he requested the barangay chairman for a
meeting. On July 24, 2000, acting Barangay Chairman
Escanillas, the barangay secretary, Engr. Manongsong,
Mercedita, Alexander, and a certain Aguado attended the
meeting at the barangay hall. Edmundo stated that when
Engr. Manongsong was asked why Edmundo was not
notified of the destruction of the fence, Engr.
Manongsong replied, Sino ka para padalhan ng
Abiso? Edmundo said that they eventually failed to settle
the case amicably.
Acting Barangay Chairman Escanillas testified
that Mercedita and Alexander went to her on July 4,
2000 and July 6, 2000 to report that the fence constructed
on the property of Edmundo was destroyed by Engr.
Manongsong and Egarque upon the order of Mayor
Atienza. She added that upon the request of Mercedita,
she wrote Engr. Manongsong for a meeting with
Edmundo, but the parties failed to settle the dispute on the
scheduled meeting.
All the exhibits offered by the prosecution were
marked in evidence and were admitted on September 21,
2005, which consisted of, among others, machine copies
of transfer certificates of title, affidavits, and barangay
blotters.
Meanwhile, on September 22, 2004, petitioner
filed a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite, which
was opposed by Mayor Atienza and Engr.
Manongsong. On August 4, 2005, the Sandiganbayan
granted the motion. Mayor Atienza then filed a Motion
for Reconsideration,] which petitioner opposed.
 Thereafter, on October 11, 2005, Mayor Atienza
and Engr. Manongsong filed a Motion for Leave of Court
to File Motion to Acquit by Way of Demurrer to
Evidence, which petitioner opposed. On December 6,
2005, the court a quo issued a Resolution which granted
the motion. In the same resolution, the court a quo also
held in abeyance the resolution of Mayor Atienzas motion
for reconsideration of the resolution granting his
suspension from office.
On January 9, 2006, Mayor Atienza and Engr.
Manongsong filed a Demurrer to Evidence (Motion to
Acquit), which was anchored on the credibility of the
witnesses for the prosecution. Respondents maintain that
the evidence presented were not sufficient to hold them
guilty of the offense charged. On January 19, 2006,
petitioner filed its Comment/Opposition.
On January 23, 2006, albeit belatedly, Egarque
filed a Manifestation that he was adopting the Demurrer
to Evidence filed by his co-accused.
On February 28, 2006, the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division) issued the assailed Resolution which, among
other things, granted the Demurrer to Evidence and
dismissed the case.
In granting the Demurrer to Evidence, the
Sandiganbayan ratiocinated that not all the elements of
the crime charged were established by the prosecution,
particularly the element of manifest partiality on the part
of respondents. The Sandiganbayan held that the evidence
adduced did not show that the respondents favored other
persons who were similarly situated with the private
complainant.
Petitioner argues that the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy does not apply in the
present case.
On their part, respondents argue that the
Sandiganbayan was correct in granting the Demurrer to
Evidence and dismissing the case. Respondents allege
that the prosecution was not denied due process of
law. Respondents maintain that the prosecution was given
every opportunity to be heard. In fact, the assailed
resolution was issued after the prosecution has rested its
case. Moreover, respondents insist their right against
double jeopardy must be upheld.
Ruling:
The petition is bereft of merit.
Double jeopardy has set in. The elements of
double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;
(2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been
arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was
convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without
his express consent.
The above elements are all attendant in the
present case: (1) the Information filed before the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26678 against
respondents were sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction; (2) the Sandiganbayan had
jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 26678; (3)
respondents were arraigned and entered their respective
pleas of not guilty; and (4) the Sandiganbayan dismissed
Criminal Case No. 26678 on a Demurrer to Evidence on
the ground that not all the elements of the offense as
charge exist in the case at bar, which amounts to an
acquittal from which no appeal can be had.
In People v. Sandiganbayan, this Court
elucidated the general rule that the grant of a demurrer to
evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and
unappealable, to wit:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such
as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested
its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an
appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution
and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond
reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on
the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the
accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant
of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so
would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The
verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.
Verily, in criminal cases, the grant of demurrer is
tantamount to an acquittal and the dismissal order may not
be appealed because this would place the accused in
double jeopardy. Although the dismissal order is not
subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only
through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. For the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown
to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case
or where the trial was a sham, thus, rendering the assailed
judgment void. The burden is on the petitioner to clearly
demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its
authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very
power to dispense justice. In the present case, no such
circumstances exist to warrant a departure from the
general rule and reverse the findings of the
Sandiganbayan.
C. ACQUITTAL, MOTIONS FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND APPEALS
11. PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
During the May 11, 1998 elections, Villapando
ran for Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan.
Orlando M. Tiape, a relative of Villapando’s wife, ran for
Municipal Mayor of Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte.
Villapando won while Tiape lost. Thereafter, on July 1,
1998, Villapando designated Tiape as Municipal
Administrator of the Municipality of San Vicente,
Palawan.
On February 2000, Solomon B. Maagad and
Renato M. Fernandez charged Villapando and Tiape for
violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code before
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The
complaint was resolved against Villapando and Tiape and
the two were charged for violation of Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code with the Sandiganbayan.
Upon arraignment on September 3, 2002,
Villapando pleaded not guilty. Meanwhile, the case
against Tiape was dismissed after the prosecution proved
his death which occurred on July 26, 2000. Villapando
filed his Demurrer to Evidence the Sandiganbayan found
with merit and acquitted him of the crime charged.
The Ombudsman filed a petition through the
Office of the Special Prosecutor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Villapando can be prosecuted despite of
his acquittal before the Sandiganbayan.
RULING:
Yes, because the Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Although this Court held that once a court grants the
demurrer to evidence, such order amounts to an
acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused
would violate the constitutional proscription on
double jeopardy, this Court held in the same case that
such ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the
absence of a grave abuse of discretion.
The Office of the Ombudsman argues that the
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
because its interpretation of Article 244 of the Revised
Penal Code does not complement the provision on the
one-year prohibition found in the 1987 Constitution and
the Local Government Code, particularly Section 6,
Article IX of the 1987 Constitution which states no
candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one
year after such election, be appointed to any office in the
government or any government-owned or controlled
corporation or in any of their subsidiaries. Section 94(b)
of the Local Government Code of 1991, for its part, states
that except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no
candidate who lost in any election shall, within one year
after such election, be appointed to any office in the
government or any government-owned or controlled
corporation or in any of their subsidiaries. Petitioner
argues that the court erred when it ruled that temporary
prohibition is not synonymous with the absence of lack of
legal qualification.
The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division held that the
qualifications for a position are provided by law and that
it may well be that one who possesses the required legal
qualification for a position may be temporarily
disqualified for appointment to a public position by
reason of the one-year prohibition imposed on losing
candidates. However, there is no violation of Article 244
of the Revised Penal Code should a person suffering from
temporary disqualification be appointed so long as the
appointee possesses all the qualifications stated in the
law.
In this case, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division,
in disregarding basic rules of statutory construction, acted
with grave abuse of discretion. Its interpretation of the
term legal disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised
Penal Code defies legal cogency. Legal disqualification
cannot be read as excluding temporary disqualification in
order to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions under the
1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of
1991.
Grave abuse of discretion generally refers to
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law,
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
12. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. TIRSO
D. C. VELASCO in his capacity as the Presiding
Judge, RTC-Br. 88, Quezon City, and HONORATO
GALVEZ
G.R. No. 127444, September 13, 2000, Bellosillo, J.
In cases where the accused was acquitted by the trial
court for insufficiency of evidence without grave abuse of
discretion on its part, the same case cannot be elevated
via petition for certiorari without violating the rule
against double jeopardy.
Facts:
Honorato Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and
Godofredo Diego, a municipal employee and alleged
bodyguard of the mayor were charged with murder and
frustrated murder before the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan. The trial court found the accused
Godofredo Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of murder and double frustrated murder. However,
it acquitted Mayor Honorato Galvez of the same charges
due to insufficiency of evidence. It also absolved him
from the charge of illegal carrying of firearm upon its
finding that the act was not a violation of law. Hence, this
present Petition for Certiorari.
It is the submission of the people that the exculpation of
the accused Galvez from all criminal responsibility by
respondent Judge Tirso Velasco constitutes grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether the elevation of the criminal case despite
acquittal violates the constitutional right of the accused
against double jeopardy.
Ruling:
YES. The prosecution cannot appeal or bring error
proceedings from a judgment in favor of the defendant in
a criminal case in the absence of a statute clearly
conferring that right. The problem comes into sharper
focus when the defendant contends, in effect, that the
prosecution is attempting to accomplish by the writ what
it could not do by appeal, and that his constitutional rights
are being thus encroached upon.
Philippine jurisprudence has been consistent in its
application of the Double Jeopardy Clause such that it has
viewed with suspicion, and not without good reason,
applications for the extraordinary writ questioning
decisions acquitting an accused on ground of grave abuse
of discretion.
The petition at hand which seeks to nullify the decision of
respondent judge acquitting the accused Honorato Galvez
goes deeply into the trial court's appreciation and
evaluation in esse of the evidence adduced by the parties.
A reading of the questioned decision shows that
respondent judge considered the evidence received at
trial. These consisted among others of the testimonies
relative to the positions of the victims vis-à-vis the
accused and the trajectory, location and nature of the
gunshot wounds, and the opinion of the expert witness for
the prosecution. While the appreciation thereof may have
resulted in possible lapses in evidence evaluation, it
nevertheless does not detract from the fact that the
evidence was considered and passed upon. This
consequently exempts the act from the writ’s limiting
requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction. As such, it
becomes an improper object of and therefore non-
reviewable by certiorari.
D. SUPERVENING FACT DOCTRINE
13. MELO VS. PEOPLE
Facts:
Conrado Melo was charged in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, on 27 December 1949, with frustrated homicide,
for having allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo, with
a kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several serious
wounds on different parts of the body, requiring medical
attendance for a period of more than 30 days, and
incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for
the same period of time. On 29 December 1949, at 8:00
a.m., Melo pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, and
at 10:15 p.m. of the same day Benjamin Obillo died from
his wounds. Evidence of death was available to the
prosecution only on 3 January 1950, and on the following
day, 4 January 1950, an amended information was filed
charging Melo with consummated homicide. Melo filed a
motion to quash the amended information alleging double
jeopardy, motion that was denied by the court. Melo filed
the petition for prohibition to enjoin the court from further
entertaining the amended information.
Issue: Whether the second information, filed after the
death of the victim, violates the accused’s right against
double jeopardy.
Held:
Rule 106, section 13, 2d paragraph, is as follows:
If it appears at may time before the judgment that a
mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the
court may dismiss the original complaint or information
and order the filing of a new one charging the proper
offense, provided the defendant would not be placed
thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
Under this provision, it was proper for the court
to dismiss the first information and order the filing of a
new one for the treason that the proper offense was not
charged in the former and the latter did not place the
accused in a second jeopardy for the same or identical
offense.
"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense," according to article III,
section 1 (20) of our constitution. The rule of double
jeopardy had a settled meaning in this jurisdiction at the
time our Constitution was promulgated. It meant that
when a person is charged with an offense and the case is
terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other
manner without the consent of the accused, the latter
cannot again be charged with the same or identical
offense. This principle is founded upon the law of reason,
justice and conscience. It is embodied in the maxim of the
civil law non bis in idem, in the common law of England,
and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence, and
instead of having specific origin it simply always existed.
It found expression in the Spanish Law and in the
Constitution of the United States and is now embodied in
our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of
the citizen.
It must be noticed that the protection of the
Constitution inhibition is against a second jeopardy for
the same offense, the only exception being, as stated in the
same Constitution, that "if an act is punished by a law and
an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act."
The phrase same offense, under the general rule, has
always been construed to mean not only the second
offense charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in
the first information, but also that the two offenses are
identical. There is identity between the two offenses when
the evidence to support a conviction for one offense
would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other.
This so called "same-evidence test" which was found to
be vague and deficient, was restated by the Rules of Court
in a clearer and more accurate form. Under said Rules
there is identity between two offenses not only when the
second offense is exactly the same as the first, but also
when the second offense is an attempt to commit the first
or a frustration thereof, or when it necessary includes or
is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information. (Rule 113, sec. 9; U.S. vs. Lim Suco, 11
Phil., 484; U. S. vs. Ledesma, 29 Phil., vs. Martinez, 55
Phil., 6.) In this connection, an offense may be said to
necessarily include another when some of the essential
ingredients of the former as alleged in the information
constitute the latter. And vice-versa, an offense may be
said to be necessarily included in another when all the
ingredients of the former constitute a part of the elements
constituting the latter (Rule 116, sec. 5.) In other words,
on who has been charged with an offense cannot be again
charged with the same or identical offense though the
latter be lesser or greater than the former. "As the
Government cannot be with the highest, and then go down
step to step, bringing the man into jeopardy for every
dereliction included therein, neither can it begin with the
lowest and ascend to the highest with precisely the same
result." (People vs. Cox, 107 Mich., 435, quoted with
approval in U. S. vs. Lim Suco, 11 Phil., 484; see also U.
S. vs. Ledesma, 29 Phil., 431 and People vs. Martinez, 55
Phil., 6, 10.)
This rule of identity does not apply, however
when the second offense was not in existence at the time
of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such
case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first
prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then
inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with
physical injuries and after conviction the injured person
dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused
does not put him twice in jeopardy. This is the ruling laid
down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
Philippines case of Diaz vs. U. S., 223 U. S. 442, followed
by this Court in People vs. Espino, G. R. No. 46123, 69
Phil., 471, and these two cases are similar to the instant
case. Stating it in another form, the rule is that "where
after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which
the defendant is responsible, which changes the character
of the offense and, together with the fact existing at the
time, constitutes a new and distinct offense" (15 Am. Jur.,
66), the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy
if indicated for the new offense.
This is the meaning of "double jeopardy" as
intended by our constitution for was the one prevailing in
jurisdiction at the time the Constitution was promulgated,
and no other meaning could have been intended by our
Rules of Court.
Accordingly, an offense may be said to
necessarily include or to be necessarily included in
another offense, for the purpose of determining the
existence of double jeopardy, when both offenses were in
existence during the pendency of the first prosecution, for
otherwise, if the second offense was then inexistence, no
jeopardy could attach therefor during the first
prosecution, and consequently a subsequent charge for the
same cannot constitute second jeopardy. By the very
nature of things there can be no double jeopardy under
such circumstance, and our Rules of Court cannot be
construed to recognize the existence of a condition where
such condition in reality does not exist. General terms of
a statute or regulation should be so limited in their
application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an
absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be
presumed that exceptions have been intended to their
language which would avoid results of this character. (In
re Allen, 2 Phil., 641.)
When the Rules of Court were drafted, there was
absolutely no intention of abandoning the ruling laid
down in the Diaz case, and the proof of this is that
although the said Rules were approved on December
1939, yet on January 30, 1940, this Court decided the
Espino case reiterating therein the Diaz doctrine. Had that
doctrine been abandoned deliberately by the Rules of
Court as being unwise, unjust or obnoxious, logically it
would have likewise been repudiated in the Espino case
by reason if consistency and as a matter of justice to the
accused, who should in consequence have been acquitted
instead of being sentenced to a heavy penalty upon the
basis of a doctrine that had already been found to be
wrong. There was absolutely no reason to preclude this
Court from repealing the doctrine in the Espino case, for
as a mere doctrine it could be repealed at any time in the
decision of any case where it is invoked, is a clear proof
that the mind of the Court, even after the approval of the
Rules, was not against but in favor of said doctrine.
For these reasons we expressly repeal the ruling
laid down in People vs. Tarok, 73 Phil., 260, as followed
in People vs. Villasis, 46 Off. Gaz. (Supp. to No. 1), p.
268. Such ruling is not only contrary to the real meaning
of "double jeopardy" as intended by the Constitution and
by the Rules of Court but is also obnoxious to the
administration of justice. If, in obedience to the mandate
of the law, the prosecuting officer files an information
within six hours after the accused is arrested, and the
accused claiming his constitutional right to a speedy trial
is immediately arraigned, and later on new fact
supervenes which, together with the facts existing at the
time, constitutes a more serious offense, under the Tarok
ruling, no way is open by which the accused may be
penalized in proportion to the enormity of his guilt.
Furthermore, such a ruling may open the way to
suspicions or charges of conclusion between the
prosecuting officers and the accused, to the grave
detriment of public interest and confidence in the
administration of justice, which cannot happen under the
Diaz ruling.
Before closing, it is well to observe that when a person
who has already suffered his penalty for an offense, is
charged with a new and greater offense under the Diaz
doctrine herein reiterated, said penalty may be credited to
him in case of conviction for the second offense.
14. PEOPLE VS. BULING
Facts:
On December 7, 1956, the accused was charged in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Cabalian, Leyte, with the
crime of less serious physical injuries for having inflicted
wounds on complaining witness Isidro Balaba, which
according to the complaint would "require, medical
attendance for a period from 10 to 15 days and will
incapacitate the said Isidro Balaba from the performance
of his customary labors for the game period of time." The
accused pleaded guilty to the complaint and was on
December 8, 1957 found guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced to 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor and to
pay damages to the offended party in the sum of P20.00,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On
the same day he began to serve his sentence and has fully
served the same.
However, Balaba's injuries did not heal within the period
estimated, and so on February 20, 1957, the Provincial
Fiscal filed an information against the accused before the
Court of First Instance of Leyte, charging him of serious
physical injuries. The information alleges that the wounds
inflicted by the accused on Isidro Balaba require medical
attendance and incapacitated him for a period of from 1 ½
months to 2 ½ months. After trial the accused was found
guilty of serious physical injuries and sentenced in the
manner indicated in first paragraph hereof. This is the
decision now sough to be set aside and reversed in this
appeal.
Issue:
Whether the prosecution and conviction of Balaba for less
serious physical injuries is a bar to the second prosecution
for serious physical injuries.
Ruling:
In Melo vs. People, supra, we expressly repealed our
ruling in the case of People vs. Tarok, supra, and
followed in the case of People vs. Villasis, supra. In the
Melo vs. People case, we stated the ruling to be that:
 . . . Stating it in another form, the rule is that
"where after the first prosecution a new fact
supervenes for which the defendant is
responsible, which changes the character of the
offense and, together with the facts existing at the
time, constitutes a new and distinct offense" (15
Am. Jur., 66), the accused cannot be said to be in
second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.
(85 Phil., 769-770).
Do the facts in the case at bar justify the
application of the new ruling? In other words, has a new
fact supervened, like death in the case of Melo vs. People,
which changes the character of the offense into one which
was not in existence at the time the case for less serious
physical injuries was filed? We do not believe that a new
fact supervened, or that a new fact has come into
existence. What happened is that the first physician that
examined the wounds of the offended party certified on
December 10, 1956 that the injury was as follows:
"wound, incised, wrist lateral, right, 3/4 inch long,
sutured" and that the same would take from 10 to 15 days
to heal and incapacitated (the wounded man) for the same
period of time from his usual work (Exh. 3). It was on the
basis of this certificate that on December 8, 1956,
defendant-appellant was found guilty of less serious
physical injuries and sentenced to imprisonment of 1
month and 1 day of arresto mayor, etc.
Counsel for the appellant claims that no fact had
supervened in the case at bar, as a result of which another
offense had been ommitted. It is argued that the injury and
the condition thereof was the same when the first
examination was made on December 10, 1956, as when
the examination was made on January 18, 1957, and that
if any new fact had been disclosed in the latter
examination failure of this new fact to be disclosed in the
previous examination may be attributed to the
incompetence on the part of the examining physician. We
find much reason in this argument. What happened is no
X-ray examination of the wounded hand was made during
the first examination, which was merely superficial. The
physician who made the first examination could not have
seen the fracture at the distal end of the right arm, and this
could only be apparent or visible by X-ray photography.
Under the circumstances above indicated, we are
inclined to agree with the contention made on behalf of
appellant that no new supervening fact has existed or
occurred, which has transformed the offense from less
serious physical injuries to serious physical injuries.
The decision appealed from is hereby reversed.
The judgment of conviction is set aside and the defendant-
appellant acquitted of the charge of serious physical
injuries. Without costs.
E. SAME OFFENSE, SAME ACT DICHOTOMY
15. NIERRAS VS. DACUYCUY
Facts:
Peter Nierras, a customer of Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation, purchased oil products from it.
Simultaneous with the delivery of the products, he issued
9 checks in payment thereof. Upon presentation to the
Philippine National Bank at Naval, Leyte, said checks
were dishonored for the reason that his account was
already closed.
Thereafter, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation repeatedly demanded of Nierras either to
deposit funds for his checks or pay for the oil products he
had purchased but he failed and refused to do either.
Nierras was charged for for estafa under Article 315 (2-d)
of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Cases 4379, 4380,
4381, 4382, 4383, 4384, 4385, 4386 and 4387) and
similarly for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law or
Batas Pambansa 22 (Criminal Cases 3790, 3791, 3792,
3793, 4085, 4122, 4123, 4124, and 4125).
In both sets of criminal cases, Nierras entered a
plea of not guilty upon arraignment before the lower
court. However, immediately after his plea of not guilty
in these estafa cases, petitioner moved in open court to be
allowed to withdraw his plea of not guilty upon his filing
of a motion to quash, which was denied by Judge
Auxencio C. Dacuycuy in a resolution dated 17
September 1981. Nierras filed the petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction.
Issue: Whether Nierras may be held liable for the
9 criminal cases for violation of BP 22, and separately
also be held liable for the crime of estafa under Article
315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code for the issuance of
the same bouncing checks.
Held:
Nierras is charged with 2 distinct and separate
offenses, first under Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 and, second, under Article 315, (2-d) of the Revised
Penal Code. Deceit and damage are essential elements in
Article 315 (2d) Revised Penal Code, but are not required
in BP 22.
Under the latter law, mere issuance of a check
that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of
knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the
same without sufficient funds and hence punishable
which is not so under the Penal Code.
Other differences between the two also include
the following: (1) a drawer of a dishonored check may be
convicted under BP 22 even if he had issued the same for
a pre-existing obligation, while under Article 315 (2-d) of
the Revised Penal Code, such circumstance negates
criminal liability; (2) specific and different penalties are
imposed in each of the two offenses; (3) estafa is
essentially a crime against property, while violation of BP
22 is principally a crime against public interest as it does
injury to the entire banking system; (4) violations of
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are mala in se,
while those of BP 22 are mala prohibita.
Furthermore, Section 5 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 provides that "Prosecution under this Act shall
be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any
provision of the Revised Penal Code." While the filing of
the two sets of Information under the provisions of BP 22
and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts committed
by Nierras, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to
one offense, because a single criminal act may give rise
to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance
or differences between the elements of an offense in one
law and another law, there will be no double jeopardy
because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers
to identity of elements in the 2 offenses.
Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is
not prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution for the
same offense. Hence, the mere filing of the 2 sets of
information does not itself give rise to double jeopardy
16. DIAZ VS. DAVAO LIGHT AND POWER
CO,.INC.
FACTS:
Antonio G. Diaz was the president of Diaz and Co., Inc.
He was also vice-president of Diaz Realty Inc. which, in
turn, owned the Doña Segunda Hotel, formerly known as
the Davao Imperial Hotel (Imperial Hotel Building)
located along C.M. Recto Avenue, Davao City. Davao
Light and Power Co., Inc. (DLPC), on the other hand, is
a public utility duly franchised to provide light, heat and
power to its customers in Davao City and the
municipalities of Panabo, Santo Tomas and Carmen, in
Davao del Norte.5 Manuel Orig was the resident
manager/vice-president for Administration of
DLPC,6 while Eliseo R. Braganza was its in-house
lawyer.7 DLPC supplied the Doña Segunda Building
(Imperial Hotel Building) with electricity service8 under
Account No. 087-10669 and with Meter No. 36510.9
On July 25, 1983, DLPC sent a Notice of
Disconnection10 to Diaz and Co., Inc. informing it that, as
of June 13, 1983, the hotel’s unpaid electric consumption
bill amounted to P190,111.02.11 It also warned that if the
amount was not paid, DLPC would be impelled to
discontinue its service. Since Diaz and Co., Inc. ignored
the letter, Meter No. 36510 was disconnected on July 29,
1983.12
DLPC then filed a complaint for collection before the
RTC, Cebu City, which case was docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-1049.
Meanwhile, in 1984, the National Food Authority (NFA)
established its KADIWA13 store at C.M. Recto Avenue,
Davao City.14 It leased a portion of the ground floor of the
Imperial Hotel Building from Diaz and Co.,
Inc.15NFA/KADIWA also applied for electricity service
with DLPC, and a contract16 was later executed between
the parties. On March 15, 1984, DLPC connected the area
leased by NFA/KADIWA to its electric grid17 under
Account No. 091-12643,18 and installed Meter No.
8473819 to measure NFA/KADIWA’s monthly electric
consumption.
In August 1986, the Kadiwa Center IV closed, and
NFA/KADIWA vacated the Doña Segunda Building.20 In
a letter21 dated August 11, 1986, NFA/KADIWA
Provincial Manager, Roberta R. Melendres, informed
DLPC that the light and power connection of
NFA/KADIWA would be left behind; its right to the
connection would be transferred to Diaz.22 She also
informed DLPC that the P1,020.00 deposit of
NFA/KADIWA for the power connection had been
refunded to it by Diaz.23
In a letter24 dated September 2, 1986, Diaz informed
respondent Manuel Orig that he had leased the untenanted
portions of the Doña Segunda Building from Diaz and
Co., Inc., and requested that a new electrical connection
for the building in his name be installed, separate from the
one assigned to him by NFA.25
On September 15, 1986, DLPC denied the request on the
ground that since Diaz and Co., Inc. is a closed family
corporation whose stockholders are the immediate
members of the Diaz family, the lease in favor of Diaz
could be simulated.26 DLPC, however, reminded Diaz
that it would be too happy to grant his request "if he and/or
Diaz and Co., Inc. would pay what is due and owing to
it."27
Diaz and Co., Inc. sent a letter28 to DLPC dated
September 17, 1986 declaring that it had assumed the
electrical bills of NFA/KADIWA under Account No.
091-12643, and requested that the monthly
bills/statements be sent to it. In its reply, DLPC rejected
the request and declared that it was not aware that Diaz
and Co., Inc. had refunded the NFA/KADIWA
its P1,020.00 deposit.29
On September 26, 1986, Diaz filed a petition for
mandamus30 before the RTC, Davao City. He alleged that
as a holder of a certificate of public convenience, DLPC
is mandated by law to provide him with electric service;
the grounds relied upon by respondent Orig in denying his
application are anchored on bias and prejudice, since he
(Diaz) is one of the stockholders of Diaz and Co. Inc., the
owner of the Davao Imperial Hotel; and the civil case
filed by DLPC is against Diaz and Co., Inc. and not
personally against him.31 The complaint was docketed as
Civil Case No. 18,288.
Meanwhile, on September 23, 1986, the portion of the
building formerly leased by NFA/KADIWA was leased
to Matias Mendiola.32 Because he needed more electricity
than what could be provided by the existing electrical
wirings, Mendiola opted to change the electrical
installation from a one-phase meter to a three-phase meter
connection.33 Mendiola’s application was approved by
DLPC. On December 19, 1986, DLPC and Mendiola
executed a service Contract34 for electricity service.
On January 7, 1987, Diaz filed an application for
preliminary injunction in Sp. Civil Case No. 18,28835 to
enjoin DLPC from disconnecting the electric connections
to Meter No. 84738 under Account No. 091-12643. Also,
an Inter-Office Memo36 dated January 7, 1987, signed by
Officer-in-Charge, Rebecca Madrid, was issued to all
security guards of the Doña Segunda Building who were
ordered to prevent anyone from disturbing Meter No.
84738.37 Because of this, DLPC failed to substitute its
single-phase meter with a three-phase meter. DLPC’s
linemen thus installed the three-phase meter without
removing the single-phase meter.
On March 12, 1987, the RTC in Sp. Civil Case No.
18,288, denied the motion for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction39 filed by Diaz. He moved for a
reconsideration, which was, however, denied in the
Order40 dated August 20, 1987. DLPC then removed its
single-phase meter on November 20, 1987, which
rendered almost half of the building without
power.41 That same day, Diaz went to the DLPC building
and threw stones at it, breaking four glass windows in the
process.42 He then bought his own electric meter, Meter
No. 86673509,43 had it calibrated by the Board of Energy,
and unilaterally replaced Meter No. 84738. The electricity
in the building was then restored.44
On November 24, 1987, Diaz filed a Complaint for
Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Prohibitory and
Mandatory Injunction and Restraining Order45 before the
RTC, Davao City, docketed as Civil Case No. 18,855-87.
In the said complaint, Diaz claimed that DLPC arbitrarily
and illegally removed Meter No. 84738 in violation of
their business franchise and Article 19 of the New Civil
Code, and had threatened to remove Meter No.
86673509.46
DLPC, for its part, filed a counter-application for
preliminary mandatory injunction47 in the same case to
compel the removal of Meter No. 86673509 which Diaz
had installed without DLPC’s consent and
authority.48 The RTC issued an Order49 dated March 30,
1988 denying Diaz’s application for prohibitory and
mandatory injunction, and granting DLPC’s counter-
application for preliminary mandatory injunction. The
RTC ordered Diaz to immediately remove Meter No.
86673509 and disconnect the electrical wirings he had
unilaterally connected to the upper floor rooms. Diaz filed
a motion for reconsideration but was denied. On June 13,
1998, the sheriff, with the aid of DLPC personnel, caused
the removal of Meter No. 86673509.50
Aggrieved, Diaz assailed the orders via petition for
certiorari before the CA. The petition was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 14909. On October 19, 1988, the CA
rendered a Decision51 granting Diaz’s petition
DLPC elevated the decision before this Court, via petition
for review on certiorari. The petition was docketed as
G.R. No. 85445.
Meanwhile, on December 19, 1998, the parties in Civil
Case No. CEB-104954 executed a Compromise
Agreement.
The RTC, in Civil Case No. CEB-1049, rendered a
Decision56 approving the compromise on January 5, 1989.
In Sp. Civil Case No. 18,288, the parties also filed a Joint
Motion to Dismiss57 based on the Compromise
Agreement, and the RTC thereafter ordered the dismissal
of the case.58
On April 17, 1989, this Court in G.R. No. 85445, issued a
Resolution,59 denying the petition for review on certiorari
questioning the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 14909
for being moot and academic. The resolution reads:
After deliberating on the allegations made, the issues
raised, and the arguments advanced in the Petition, the
Comment and the Reply, and it appearing that petitioner
is now providing electrical service to private respondent’s
entire building, the Court RESOLVED to DENY the
petition for having become moot and academic. The
Court makes the admonition, however, that connections
of electrical service and installations of electric meters
should always be upon mutual contract of the parties, and
that payments for electrical consumption should also be
made promptly whenever due. Contracts lay down the law
between the parties and obligations arising therefrom
should be complied with.
Meanwhile, on June 30, 1997, the RTC rendered a
Decision60 in Civil Case No. 18,855-87 dismissing the
case filed by Diaz.61
Diaz appealed the decision with the CA in CA-G.R. CV
No. 63236,62 which appeal is still pending before the
appellate court.
Based on the aforestated facts, on July 11, 1988, DLPC
filed a complaint for theft of electricity against Diaz with
the City Prosecutor’s Office, Davao City; respondent
Braganza submitted an Affidavit63 to support the charge.
In defense, Diaz alleged the following: (1) that the
complaint was intended to harass him; (2) he was entitled
to electric service by virtue of his subrogation to the right
of NFA/KADIWA; (3) the installation of Meter No.
86673509 was made with the knowledge and consent of
DLPC; (4) there is a pending case between the parties
regarding Meter Nos. 84738 and 86673509; and (5) the
filing of the action is premature. The complaint was
docketed as I.S. No. 593.
On March 21, 1989, Lolito O. Evangelino, 4th Asst. City
Prosecutor, City Prosecutor’s Office of Davao City,
issued a Resolution64 recommending the dismissal of the
charge. He opined that the correspondence to DLPC
Manager Orig negated DLPC’s claim of lack of consent
and knowledge, and since the issue is still pending
litigation in court, the determination of whether there is
theft of electricity is premature (Sp. Civil Case No. 18288
and Civil Case No. 18,855-87).
DLPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration65 which the
City Prosecutor denied on the ground that DLPC failed to
establish the elements of unlawful taking and intent to
gain. DLPC appealed the dismissal to the Secretary of
Justice,66 who, however, dismissed the appeal in a
letter67 dated August 2, 1990. The Motion for
Reconsideration68 filed by DLPC was likewise denied in
the letter69 dated September 6, 1990.
Undaunted, DLPC filed a criminal complaint70 against
Diaz for Violation of P.D. 401,71 as amended by B.P. Blg.
87672 with the City Prosecutor’s Office, Davao
City.73 The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 92-4590.
In his counter-affidavit dated September 19, 1992, Diaz
alleged that a similar complaint (I.S. No. 593) had been
filed by DLPC against him.74 In a Resolution75 dated
October 23, 1992, Calixto A. Esparagoza, 2nd Asst. City
Prosecutor, dismissed the case. The Public Prosecutor
likewise denied the motion for reconsideration of DLPC
on November 26, 1992.
Meanwhile Diaz, Ramos, and Arguellas, as complainants,
filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Davao del Norte charging the officers
of DLPC with estafa through falsification of public
documents. They also alleged that the officers of DLPC
exacted additional and illegal profits from its consumers
by devising a deceptive Varying Discount Formula; based
on the alleged misrepresentation of said officers, the
Board of Energy (BOE) granted DLPC provisional
authority to apply the formula, thereby resulting in losses
of more or less P300,000.00 to Diaz, Ramos, and
Arguelles.76 As regards the charge of falsification, the
complainants alleged that DLPC had its properties
appraised by the Technical Management Services,
Philippines, Inc. (TAMSPHIL), and included non-
existent properties that did not belong to it; it also
recorded the TAMSPHIL appraisal in its books of account
even before it had been approved by the BOE; and
submitted financial statements containing the appraisal to
the Securities and Exchange Commission and the BOE.77
The Investigating Prosecutor found probable cause
against the respondents. An Information was filed before
the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tagum, Davao
del Norte, docketed as Crim. Case No. 5800. Respondents
appealed the resolution of the public prosecutor finding
probable cause against them. The appeal was granted. On
motion of the Prosecutor, the RTC dismissed the case in
an Order dated July 13, 1983.78
On August 9, 1983, the officers of DLPC, Eduardo J.
Aboitiz, Luis Aboitiz, Jr., Roberto E. Aboitiz, Jon R.
Aboitiz, and Edson H. Canova, as plaintiffs, filed a
Complaint against Diaz, Isagani T. Fuentes (Provincial
Fiscal of Davao del Norte), Petronilo D. Ramos
(Municipal Mayor of Carmen, Davao del Norte), Gabriel
Arguelles (Municipal Attorney of Panabo, Davao del
Norte) before the RTC, Cebu City, for damages and
attorney’s fees against the defendants for malicious
prosecution.79
The case was docketed as CEB Case No. 1055. After trial
on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision80 on April 30,
1992, dismissing the complaint.
RULING:
While the institution of separate criminal actions under
the provisions of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 876,
and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
theft may refer to identical acts committed by petitioner,
the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense
because a single criminal act may give rise to a
multiplicity of offenses; and where there is variance or
difference between the elements of an offense in one law
and another law, as in the case at bar, there will be no
double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy
prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2)
offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is
not prohibited; what is forbidden is prosecution for the
same offense. Hence, no fault could be attributed to
respondent DLPC when it instituted the two separate
actions.
17. JASON IVLER y AGUILAR v. HON. MARIA
ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and
EVANGELINE PONCE
G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010, Carpio, J.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365
is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means
to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal
of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the
same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting
acts.
Facts:
Following a vehicular collision, Jason Ivler was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
71, with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained
by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce);
and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s
husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses
Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary
release in both cases.
Ivler pleaded guilty to the charge for Reckless
Imprudence resulting in Slight Physical Injuries and was
meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this
conviction, Ivler moved to quash the Information in the
criminal case for Reckless Imprudence resulting to
Homicide for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of
offenses in the two cases. Later, MeTC issued a resolution
denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and
postponing his arraignment until after his arrest.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner’s constitutional right under the
Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in the
criminal case for Reckless Imprudence resulting to
Homicide.
Ruling:
YES. The accused’s negative constitutional right not to
be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense" protects him from, among others, post-
conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the
prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
upon a valid information. It is not disputed that
petitioner’s conviction in criminal case for Reckless
Imprudence resulting in Slight Physical Injuries was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
charge.
Reckless imprudence is a single crime, its consequences
on persons and property are material only to determine the
penalty. The two charges against petitioner, arising from
the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article
365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365
is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means
to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal
of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the
same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting
acts. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal
negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that,
if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony.
The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not
the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only
taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not
qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless
act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one
person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split
into different crimes and prosecutions.”
18. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE
HONORABLE BENJAMIN RELOVA, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, Second Branch, and MANUEL
OPULENCIA
G.R. No. L-45129, March 6, 1987, Feliciano, J.
The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is
available so long as the acts which constitute or have
given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance
are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to
the offense charged under a statute.
Facts:
Opulencia was charged with violation of Ordinance No.
1, Series of 1974 due to the unauthorized installation of
electric devices and contraptions that were "designed
purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric
current consumption in the electric meter of the electric
ice and cold storage plant owned by him. Later, Opulencia
filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the
grounds that the crime there charged had already
prescribed. The City Court granted the motion to dismiss
on the ground of prescription.
Fourteen days later, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas
City filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
another information against Manuel Opulencia, this time
for theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation to
Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code.
However, before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel
Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, alleging that he had
been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the
second information and that the filing thereof was
violative of his constitutional right against double
jeopardy. The respondent Judge granted the accused's
Motion to Quash and ordered the case dismissed. A
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner was
denied by the respondent Judge. Hence, this present
petition for certiorari and mandamus.
Issue:
Whether the filing of the second information violates
accused’s right against double jeopardy.
Ruling:
YES. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the
general rule: the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is
for an offense that is different from the offense charged in
the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and
second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of
acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an
exception to the general proposition: the constitutional
protection, against double jeopardy is available although
the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different
from the offense charged subsequently under a national
statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both
offenses spring from the same act or set of acts.
The first sentence of Clause 20, Section 1, Article III of
the Constitution, ordains that "no person shall be twice
put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." The
second sentence of said clause provides that "if an act is
punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act." Thus, the first sentence
prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense, whereas the second contemplates double
jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first
sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
of the same act provided that he is charged with different
offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not
included in or does not include, the crime charged in the
other case. The second sentence applies, even if the
offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that
one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a
violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one
and the same act conviction or acquittal under either the
law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the
other. Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not
indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has
attached under one of the informations charging said
offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case
involving the same offense, even if there has been neither
conviction nor acquittal in either case.”