LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, et al. v. ERLINDA T.
Petitioners moved for a
CADAPAN, et al.
G.R. Nos. 184461-62, 184495, 187109, 31 May
2011, EN BANC, (Carpio Morales, J)
An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature
nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of individuals
or entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or
administrative suit. Rather, it is a remedial measure
designed to direct specified courses of action to
government agencies to safeguard the constitutional
right to life, liberty and security of aggrieved
individuals.
Command responsibility may be loosely
applied in amparo cases in order to identify those
accountable individuals that have the power to
effectively implement whatever processes
an amparo court would issue. In such application,
the amparo court does not impute criminal
responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it
considers to be in the best position to protect the
rights of the aggrieved party.
There is no need to file a motion for execution
for an amparo or habeas corpus decision. Since the
right to life, liberty and security of a person is at stake,
the proceedings should not be delayed and execution
of any decision thereon must be expedited as soon as
possible since any form of delay, even for a day, may
jeopardize the very rights that these writs seek to
immediately protect.
Following the abduction of Sherlyn Cadapan
(Sherlyn), Karen Empeño (Karen) and Manuel Merino
(Merino) by armed men from a house in San Miguel,
Hagonoy, Bulacan, spouses Asher and Erlinda
Cadapan (Spouses Cadapan) and Concepcion
Empeño (Empeño) filed a petition for habeas
corpus before the Court (habeas corpus case),
impleading then Generals Romeo Tolentino and Jovito
Palparan (Gen. Palparan), Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac (Lt.
Col. Boac), Arnel Enriquez and Lt. Francis Mirabelle
Samson (Lt. Mirabelle) as respondents. By
Resolution of the Court, a writ of habeas corpus was
issued, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court
of Appeals.
By Return of the Writ, the respondents in
the habeas corpus petition denied that Sherlyn, Karen
and Merino are in the custody of the military. To the
Return were attached affidavits from the respondents,
except Enriquez, who all attested that they do not
know Sherlyn, Karen and Merino; that they had
inquired from their subordinates about the reported
abduction and disappearance of the three but their
inquiry yielded nothing.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the habeas
corpus petition there being no strong evidence that the
missing persons are in the custody of the
respondents.
reconsideration of the appellate
court’s decision. They also moved
to present newly discovered
evidence consisting of the
testimonies of Adoracion Paulino,
Sherlyn’s mother-in-law who was
allegedly threatened by soldiers;
and Raymond Manalo who allegedly
met Sherlyn, Karen and Merino in
the course of his detention at a
military camp.
During the pendency of the motion for
reconsideration, Erlinda Cadapan and Empeño filed
before this Court a Petition for Writ of Amparo
(amparo case), with Prayers for Inspection of Place
and Production of Documents. The petition impleaded
the same respondents in the habeas corpus petition,
with the addition of then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, then Armed Forces of the Phil. (AFP) Chief of
Staff Hermogenes Esperon Jr., (Gen. Esperon) then
Phil. National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Avelino Razon
(Gen. Razon), Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado (Lt. Col.
Anotado) and Donald Caigas.
Then President Arroyo was eventually dropped
as respondent in light of her immunity from suit while
in office.
By Resolution, the Court issued a writ
of amparo returnable to appellate court, and ordered
the consolidation of the amparo petition with the
pending habeas corpus petition.
In the habeas corpus case, the appellate court
granted the Motion for Reconsideration and ordered
the immediate release of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino
in the amparo case.
In reconsidering its earlier decision in
the habeas corpus case, the appellate court relied
heavily on the testimony of Manalo. It held that there
is now a clear and credible evidence that the three
missing persons, (Sherlyn, Karen and Merino), are
being detained in military camps and bases under the
7th Infantry Division. Being not held for a lawful cause,
they should be immediately released from detention.
In the amparo case, the appellate court
deemed it a superfluity to issue any inspection order
or production order in light of the release order. As it
earlier ruled in the habeas corpus case, it found that
the three detainees’ right to life, liberty and security
was being violated, hence, the need to immediately
release them, or cause their release. The appellate
court went on to direct the PNP to proceed further with
its investigation since there were enough leads as
indicated in the records to ascertain the truth and file
the appropriate charges against those responsible for
the abduction and detention of the three.
Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac, et al. challenged before
this Court, via petition for review, the Decision of the
appellate court.
 Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeño, on
the other hand, filed their own petition for review also
challenging the same Decision of the appellate court
only insofar as the amparo aspect is concerned.
Meanwhile, Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion
Empeño filed before the appellate court a Motion to
Cite Respondents in Contempt of Court for failure of
the respondents in the amparo and habeas
corpus cases to comply with the directive of the
appellate court to immediately release the three
missing persons. By Resolution, the appellate court
denied the motion, ratiocinating that while the Court,
ordered the respondents “to immediately RELEASE,
or cause the release, from detention the persons of
Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel
Merino,” the decision is not ipso facto executory. The
use of the term “immediately” does not mean that that
it is automatically executory. Neither did the decision
become final and executory considering that both
parties questioned the Decision/Resolution before the
Supreme Court.
Via a petition for certiorari filed before this
Court, Erlinda Cadapan and Empeño challenged the
appellate court’s Resolution denying their motion to
cite respondents in contempt.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Armed Forces Chief
of Staff then Hermogenes Esperon and
the Present Chief of Staff has
command responsibility in the enforced
disappearance and continued detention
of the three aggrieved parties, Sherlyn,
Karen and Merino
2. Whether or not there is a need to file a
motion for execution in a Habeas
Corpus decision or in an Amparo case
to cause the release of the aggrieved
parties.
HELD:
Petition DISMISSED.
There is no showing that Generals
Esperon, Razon and Tolentino were even remotely
accountable and responsible for the abduction
and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and
Merino.
On the issue of whether a military commander
may be held liable for the acts of his subordinates in
an amparo proceeding, a brief discussion of the
concept of command responsibility and its
application insofar as amparo cases already decided
by the Court is in order.
Rubrico v. Macapagal Arroyo expounded on
the concept of command responsibility as follows:
The evolution of the command
responsibility doctrine finds its context
in the development of laws of war and
armed combats. According to Fr.
Bernas, "command responsibility," in its
simplest terms, means the
"responsibility of commanders for
crimes committed by subordinate
members of the armed forces or other
persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic
conflict." In this sense, command
responsibility is properly a form of
criminal complicity. The Hague
Conventions of 1907 adopted the
doctrine of command responsibility,
foreshadowing the present-day precept
of holding a superior accountable for
the atrocities committed by his
subordinates should he be remiss in his
duty of control over them. As then
formulated, command responsibility is
"an omission mode of individual
criminal liability," whereby the
superior is made responsible forcrimes
committed by his subordinates for
failing to prevent or punish the
perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he
ordered). (citations omitted; emphasis
in the original; underscoring supplied)
It bears stressing that command responsibility
is properly a form of criminal complicity, and thus a
substantive rule that points to criminal or
administrative liability.
An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature
nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of individuals
or entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or
administrative suit. Rather, it is a remedial measure
designed to direct specified courses of action to
government agencies to safeguard the constitutional
right to life, liberty and security of aggrieved
individuals.
Thus Razon Jr. v. Tagitis enlightens:
[An amparo proceeding] does
nor determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal
culpability for the disappearance
[threats thereof or extrajudicial
killings]; it determines responsibility,
or at least accountability, for the
enforced disappearance…for purposes
of imposing the appropriate remedies
 to address the
disappearance… (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Further, Tagitis defines what constitutes
“responsibility” and “accountability,” viz:
x x x. Responsibility refers to
the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to
have participated in whatever way, by
action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the
remedies this Court shall craft, among
them, the directive to file the
appropriate criminal and civil cases
against the responsible parties in the
proper courts. Accountability, on the
other hand, refers to the measure of
remedies that should be addressed to
those who exhibited involvement in the
enforced disappearance without
bringing the level of their complicity to
the level of responsibility defined
above; or who are imputed with
knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the
burden of disclosure; or those who
carry, but have failed to discharge, the
burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced
disappearance. In all these cases, the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo is
justified by our primary goal of
addressing the disappearance, so that
the life of the victim is preserved and
his liberty and security are restored.
(emphasis in the original; underscoring
supplied)
Rubrico categorically denies the application of
command responsibility in amparo cases to
determine criminal liability. The Court maintains its
adherence to this pronouncement as far
as amparo cases are concerned.
Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet
limited application of command responsibility
in amparo cases to instances of determining
the responsible or accountable individuals or entities
that are duty-bound to abate any transgression on the
life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.
If command responsibility were
to be invoked and applied to these
proceedings, it should, at most, be
only to determine the author who, at
the first instance, is accountable for,
and has the duty to address, the
disappearance and harassments
complained of, so as to enable the
Court to devise remedial measures
that may be appropriate under
the premises to protect rights
covered by the writ of amparo. As
intimated earlier, however, the
determination should not be pursued to
fix criminal liability on respondents
preparatory to criminal prosecution, or
as a prelude to administrative
disciplinary proceedings under existing
administrative issuances, if there be
any. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In other words, command responsibility may
be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to
identify those accountable individuals that have the
power to effectively implement whatever processes
an amparo court would issue. In such application,
the amparo court does not impute criminal
responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it
considers to be in the best position to protect the
rights of the aggrieved party.
Such identification of the responsible and
accountable superiors may well be a preliminary
determination of criminal liability which, of course, is
still subject to further investigation by the appropriate
government agency.
Relatedly, the legislature came up with
Republic Act No. 9851 (RA 9851) to include command
responsibility as a form of criminal complicity in crimes
against international humanitarian law, genocide and
other crimes. RA 9851 is thus the substantive law that
definitively imputes criminal liability to those superiors
who, despite their position, still fail to take all
necessary and reasonable measures within their
power to prevent or repress the commission of illegal
acts or to submit these matters to the competent
authorities for investigation and prosecution.
The Court finds that the appellate court erred
when it did not specifically name the respondents that
it found to be responsible for the abduction and
continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and
Merino. For, from the records, it appears that the
responsible and accountable individuals are Lt. Col.
Anotado, Lt. Mirabelle, Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac,
Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas. They should thus
be made to comply with the September 17, 2008
Decision of the appellate court to IMMEDIATELY
RELEASE Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.
 The petitions against Generals Esperon,
Razon and Tolentino should be dismissed for lack of
merit as there is no showing that they were even
remotely accountable and responsible for the
abduction and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen
and Merino.
There is no need to file a motion for execution for
an amparo or habeas corpus decision.
Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court,
there is no need to file a motion for execution for
an amparo or habeas corpus decision. Since the right
to life, liberty and security of a person is at stake, the
proceedings should not be delayed and execution of
any decision thereon must be expedited as soon as
possible since any form of delay, even for a day, may
jeopardize the very rights that these writs seek to
immediately protect.
The Solicitor General’s argument that the
Rules of Court supplement the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo is misplaced. The Rules of Court only find
suppletory application in an amparo proceeding if the
Rules strengthen, rather than weaken, the procedural
efficacy of the writ. As it is, the Rule dispenses with
dilatory motions in view of the urgency in securing the
life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. Suffice it
to state that a motion for execution is inconsistent with
the extraordinary and expeditious remedy being
offered by an amparo proceeding.
In fine, the appellate court erred in ruling that
its directive to immediately release Sherlyn, Karen and
Merino was not automatically executory. For that
would defeat the very purpose of having summary
proceedings in amparo petitions. Summary
proceedings, it bears emphasis, are immediately
executory without prejudice to further appeals that
may be taken therefrom..
VDA. DE CATALAN V. CATALAN-LEE
G. R. No. 183622, [February 08, 2012]
DOCTRINE:
Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which maybe
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
ac-cording to their national law.
FACTS:
Orlando B. Catalan, a naturalized American
citizen,allegedly obtained a divorce in the United
States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor. He then
contracted a second marriage with petitioner.
When Orlando died intestate in the Philippines,
petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance
of letters of administration for her appointment as
administratrix of the intestate estate. While the case
was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one
of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed
a similar petition with the RTC. The two cases were
consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition filed
by the respondent on the ground of litis pendentia.
Respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered
an interested person qualified to filethe petition.
Respondent further alleged that a criminal case for
bigamy was filed against petitioner by Felicitas Amor
contending that petitioner contracted a second
marriage to Orlando despite having been married to
one Eusebio Bristol.
However, the RTC acquitted petitioner of bigamy and
ruled that since the deceased was a
divorced American citizen, and that divorce was not
recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage
between him and petitioner was not valid. The RTC
took note of the action for declaration of nullity then
pending filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased
and petitioner. It considered the pending action to be a
prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petition-
er for the crime of bigamy. The RTC also found that
petitioner had never been married to Bristol.
The RTC subsequently dismissed the Petition for the
issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner
and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its
findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that
the marriage between petitioner and
Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she
married Orlando. The RTC held that petitioner was not
an interested party who may file said petition. The CA
affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the acquittal of petitioner in the crim. case
for bigamy meant that the marriage with Bristol was
still valid.
2. Whether the divorce obtained abroad by Orlando
may be recognized under Philippine jurisdiction.
HELD:
It is imperative for the trial court to first determine the
validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to
be issued the letters of administration over the estate
of Orlando. Petition is partially granted. Case is
remanded to RTC.
1. No. The RTC in the special proceedings failed to
appreciate the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case that
petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. It
concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of
bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol still
existed and was valid.
2. Yes. Under the principles of comity, Philippine
jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a
spouse of for-eign nationality. Aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still
first be proven by the divorce decree itself. The best
evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. Under
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing
or document may be proven as a public
or official record of a foreign country by either (1)
an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by
the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office.
Moreover, the burden of proof lies with the “party who
alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in
the prosecution or defense of an action.” In civil cases,
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those are denied by
the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when
they introduce new matters. It is well-settled in our
jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice
of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be
alleged and proved.
It appears that the trial court no longer required
petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s divorce
under the laws of the United States and the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a
need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for
further reception of evidence to establish the fact of
divorce.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs.
CRISTOBAL (Evidence) G.R. No. 175768
Facts:
Spouses Edgardo M. Cristobal and Ma. Teresita S.
Cristobal obtained a loan from petitioner Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company in the amount of
P4,500,000.00. The loan was secured by two real
estate mortgages and its three amendments, which
respondents executed in favor of petitioner.
Respondents failed to pay their loan, resulting in the
extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale of their
mortgaged properties. Petitioner emerged as the
highest bidder, so a Certificate of Sale was issued in
its name. However the respondents refuse to vacate,
hence the MBTC’s petition seeking a Writ of
Possession over the foreclosed properties.
RTC: Denied. Petitioner failed to consolidate the
property in question. Also, petitioner did not submit
sufficient evidence from which it could base the
amount of bond required in an application for a writ of
possession done within the 12 month redemption
period required under Section 7 of Act 3135.
MTCB avers there is absolutely nothing in ACT 3135
which provides that consolidation of ownership over
the foreclosed property is required before a writ of
possession may be issued.
CA: concur with RTC decision. The claim is
premature. The record is bereft of any indication that
petitioner bank has consolidated its ownership over
the subject parcels of land. In accordance with Section
7 of Act 3135, the trial court has the duty to issue a
writ of possession before the lapse of the 12-month
redemption period; but this is qualified by the
receipt of an ex-parte application and the posting
of the required bond. Even if the 12-month
redemption period had already expired and the need
for a bond already dispensed with, possession could
not yet be given to petitioner until the ownership
is consolidated and a new transfer certificate of
title issued in its name. The court denied the
petitioner’s MR and advised MTBC that it is not
precluded from re-filing the petition for a writ of
possession in the Court a quo especially so since it
now meets the grounds for the issuance of the said
writ.
Despite the advised of CA, MTCB still
Issue:
Whether or not consolidation of title is necessary
before possession may be automatically given to
petitioner.
Held:
YES.
We rule that a remand of this case to the trial court is
necessary for the reception of evidence to determine if
consolidation has taken place, this being a necessary
requisite to the issuance of a writ of
possession. Petitioner can only demand possession
after the consolidation of ownership in his name and
the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title.
Jurisprudence articulates that "[t]he purchaser can
demand possession at any time following the
consolidation of ownership in his name and the
issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of
title. After the consolidation of title in the buyer’s
name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the
property, the writ of possession becomes a matter
of right. Consequently, the purchaser, who has a right
to possession after the expiration of the redemption
period, becomes the absolute owner of the property
when no redemption is made. In this regard, the bond
is no longer needed. The purchaser can demand
possession at any time following the consolidation of
ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a
new TCT. After consolidation of title in the purchaser’s
name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the
property, the purchaser’s right to possession ripens
into the absolute right of a confirmed owner. At that
point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon
proper application and proof of title becomes merely a
ministerial function. Effectively, the court cannot
exercise its discretion. The issue of whether or not
petitioner has consolidated ownership in its name is a
question of fact best left to the determination of the
lower court. A question of law arises when there is
doubt as to what the law is. on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises
as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a
question to be one of law, the same must not involve
an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them. The
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the
law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once
it is clear that the issue invites a review of the
evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.
Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of
fact is not the appellation given to such question by
the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the
appellate court can determine the issue raised without
reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it
is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.
Here, no question of law is involved, for it is clear that
petitioner has the right to possession once it has
established that ownership has been consolidated in
its name. Consolidation is essentially factual in
nature, as it requires the presentation of evidence.
REMANDED.
ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G.
IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-
KUWAIT Petitioners, vs. MA. JOSEFA ECHIN,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 178551
October 11, 2010
FACTS:
Respondent Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI in
behalf of its principal co-petitioner, Ministry of Public
Health of Kuwait, for the position of medical
technologist under a two-year contract with a monthly
salary of US$1,200.00.Within a year, Respondent was
terminated for not passing the probationary period
which was under the Memorandum of Agreement.
Ministry denied respondent‘s request and she
returned to the Philippines shouldering her own fair.
Respondent filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) a complaint against ATCI for
illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in
favor of respondent and ordered ATCI to pay her
$3,600.00, her salary for the three months unexpired
portion of the contract.
ATCI appealed Labor Arbiter‘s decision, however,
NLRC affirmed the latter‘s decision and denied
petitioner ATCI‘s motion for reconsideration. Petitioner
appealed to the Court Appeals contending that their
principal being a foreign government agency is
immune from suit, and as such, immunity extended to
them.
Appellate Court affirmed NLRC‘s decision. It noted
that under the law, a private employment agency shall
assume all responsibilities for the implementation of
the contract of employment of an overseas worker;
hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the
foreign principal for any violation of the recruitment
agreement or contract of employment.
Petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration was denied;
hence, this present petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners be held liable
considering that the contract specifically stipulates that
respondent‘s employment shall be governed by the
Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait.
Ruling:
Court denied the petition. According to RA 8042: “The
obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement
entered into by and between the local agent and its
foreign principal are not coterminous with the term of
such agreement so that if either or both of the parties
decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of
such parties towards the contracted employees under
the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends
up to and until the expiration of the employment
contracts of the employees recruited and employed
pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. In
international law, the party who wants to have a
foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. Where a foreign law
is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the
presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours.
Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining
the issues presented before us.