CASE No.

Cecilio M. Lino vs. Valerio E. Fugoso

(G.R. No. L-1159, January 30, 1947)

FACTS: This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in behalf of twelve persons alleged to be
unlawfully detained by respondents Valeriano E. Fugoso, Lamberto Javalera and John Doe in
their capacity as mayor, chief of police and officer in charge of the municipal jail of the City
of Manila, respectively. It is alleged in respondent's return that ten of the petitioners had
already been released, no sufficient evidence having been found to warrant their prosecution
for inciting to sedition, but that the remaining two, Pascual Montaniel and Pacifico Deoduco,
are being held in custody because of charges filed against them in the municipal court for
unjust vexation and disobedience to police orders, respectively.

ISSUE: WON the detention of Pascual Montaniel and Pacifico Deoduco were illegal so that they must
be released by virtue of a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

HELD: Yes. Even assuming that they were legally arrested without warrant on November 7 and 8,
1946, respectively, their continued detention became illegal upon the expiration of six hours
without their having been delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities pursuant to
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
CASE No. 2

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO,
DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Petitioner,
versus
WARDEN, QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX, BJMP BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA, TAGUIG
CITY and all other persons acting on his behalf and/or having custody of DATUKAN MALANG
SALIBO, Respondents.
(G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015)

FACTS: Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for allegedly
participating in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. He had a pending warrant of
arrest issued by the trial court in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.

On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in
Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang so that he presented himself before the
police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name. There, he explained that he was
not Butukan S. Malang and that he could not have participated in the November 23, 2009
Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time for the annual pilgrimage
for Muslims.

The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not arrest him because he was not
Butukan S. Malang. Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off
page two of his passport that evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009.
They then detained Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police Station for about three (3) days, then to the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Cotabato City, where he was detained for
another 10 days. Finally, he was transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City, where he is currently
detained, thus the Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: (1) Whether the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City on petitioner
Salibo’s Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals; and

(2) Whether petitioner Salibo’s proper remedy is to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

HELD: (1) Yes. Since the Court of Appeals is the court with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of
trial courts, respondent Warden correctly filed the appeal before the Court of Appeals.

(2) Yes. Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken
identity. In such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being
illegally detained.
CASE No. 3

MA. HAZELINA A. TUJANMILITANTE IN BEHALF OF THE MINOR CRISELDA M.

CADA, Petitioner,
vs.
RAQUEL M. CADA-DEAPERA, Respondent.
(G.R. No. 210636, July 28, 2014)

FACTS: On March 24, 2011, respondent Raquel M. Cada-Deapera filed before the RTC-Caloocan a
verified petition for writ of habeas corpus, praying for the immediate issuance of the special
writ, directing petitioner Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante to produce before the court
respondent's biological daughter, minor Criselda M. Cada (Criselda), and to return to her the
custody over the child.

RTC-Caloocan granted the Petition and issued the corresponding Writ.

Petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 130 in Caloocan City
(RTC-Caloocan) to hear and decide a special civil action for habeas corpus in relation to the
custody of a minor residing in Quezon City. Yet, the CA affirmed the decision of RTC-
Caloocan.

ISSUE: WON RTC-Caloocan has the jurisdiction to hear the Habeas Corpus filed by the respondent.

HELD: Yes. RTC-Caloocan has jurisdiction. Respondent filed the petition before the family court of
Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City and Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region,
the writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented in Quezon City. Whether
petitioner resides in the former or the latter is immaterial in view of the above rule.
Anent petitioner’s insistence on the application of Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, a plain
reading of said provision reveals that the provision invoked only applies to petitions for
custody of minors, and not to habeas corpus petitions.
Case No. 1 on ADOPTION.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR, EDWIN VILLA Y

MENDOZA. LUIS E. SANTOS, JR. and EDIPOLA V. SANTOS, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.
(G.R. No. L-22523, September 29, 1967)

Facts: The above-named spouses filed the petition before the court a quo on January 8, 1963,
praying that the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, be declared their
(petitioner's) son by adoption.

It was established that the petitioners are both 32 years of age, Filipinos, residing in the
City of Manila. They were married in 1957 and have maintained a conjugal home of
their own. They do not have a child of their own blood. Neither spouse has any
legitimate, legitimated, illegitimate, acknowledged natural child, or natural child by legal
fiction, nor has any one of them been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, is a child of Francisco Villa and Florencia
Mendoza who are the common parents of the petitioner-wife Edipola Villa Santos and
the minor. Luis E. Santos, Jr., is a lawyer, with business interests in a textile
development enterprise and the IBA electric plant, and is the general manager of Medry
Inc. and the secretary-treasurer of Bearen Enterprises. His income is approximately
P600.00 a month. His co-petitioner-wife, is a nurse by profession, with an average
monthly earning of about P300.00.

It was also shown that Edwin Villa y Mendoza was born on May 22, 1958, Exhibit C.
He was a sickly child since birth. Due to the child's impairing health his parents
entrusted him to the petitioners who reared and brought him up for the years thereafter,
and as a result, there developed between the petitioners and the child, a deep and
profound love for each other.

Issue: WON petitioners are qualified to adopt Edwin Villa y Mendoza.

Held: Yes. Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those persons who may not adopt, and it
has been shown that petitioners-appellants herein are not among those prohibited from
adopting. Article 339 of the same code names those who cannot be adopted, and the
minor child whose adoption is under consideration, is not one of those excluded by the
law.
Case No. 2 on ADOPTION.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO, in his

capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 69, Iba,
Zambales and SPOUSES ALVIN A. CLOUSE and EVELYN A. CLOUSE, Respondents.
(G.R. No. 94147 June 8, 1994)

Facts: On February 21, 1990, in a verified petition filed before the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales,
private respondents spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger
brother of private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned
to conduct the Home and Child Study, favorably recommended the granting of the petition for
adoption.

Finding that private respondents have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided
by law and that the adoption will redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor, respondent
judge rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners.

The Republic, thru the Solicitor General, appealed the decision granting the Adoption.

Issue: WON petitioners are qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala.

Held: No. Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as “The Family
Code of the Philippines”, private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon
Joseph Alcala.

There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon
Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he
is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second
place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his
spouse. In the third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt
Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a
Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United
States in 1988.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph
3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger
brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating
Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife.
Case No. 3 on ADOPTION.

HERBERT CANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

(G.R. No. 105308. September 25, 1998)
Facts: Spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano filed a Petition for Adoption of
minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang before the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu, Branch 14 under Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB, In the Matter of the
Petition for Adoption of the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang.
The Petition was granted by said Regional Trial Court and was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Issue: WON minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the
ground that the latter has abandoned them?
Held: No. Parental authority is a constitutionally protected State policy borne out of established
customs and tradition of our people. Thus, in Silva v. Court of Appeals, a case involving the
visitorial rights of an illegitimate parent over his child, the Court expressed the opinion that:

Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their children, see
to their upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare. This authority and
responsibility may not be unduly denied the parents; neither may it be renounced by them.
Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each other is lost, the attachment
and feeling for their offsprings invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts
allow this affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real, grave and imminent threat to the well-
being of the child.

Moreover, Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony have all grown up. Keith and Charmaine are
now of legal age while Joseph Anthony is approaching eighteen, the age of majority. For sure,
they shall be endowed with the discretion to lead lives independent of their parents. This is not
to state that this case has been rendered moot and academic, for their welfare and best interests
regarding their adoption, must be determined as of the time that the petition for adoption was
filed.[67] Said petition must be denied as it was filed without the required consent of their father
who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.
Case No. 1 on MODES OF DISCOVERY.

JONATHAN LANDOIL INTERNATIONAL CO., INC.,

vs.
SUHARTO MANGUDADATU, ET AL.
(G.R. No. 155010. August 16, 2004)
Facts: Respondent-Spouses Suharto and Miriam Sangki Mangudadatu filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of the 12th Judicial Region in Tacurong City, Sultan Kudarat, a Complaint for
damages against Petitioner Jonathan Landoil International Co., Inc. (JLI). The Complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. 537 and raffled to Branch 20. Initially, petitioner had countered
with a Motion to Dismiss; but when this was denied, it filed its Answer dated November 23,
1999. Thereafter, the parties submitted their respective Pretrial Briefs. Trial proceeded without
the participation of petitioner, whose absence during the pretrial on August 8, 2000, had led the
trial court to declare it in default.
On July 3, 2001, petitioner received a copy of the RTCs Decision dated June 19, 2001.
On July 18, 2001, it filed an Omnibus Motion for New Trial and Change of Venue. This
Motion was deemed submitted for resolution on August 7, 2001, but was eventually denied by
the trial court in an Order dated September 12, 2001.
On December 12, 2001, petitioner received a copy of a Writ of Execution dated December 4,
2001. Alleging that it had yet to receive a copy of an Order resolving the Omnibus Motion for
New Trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution on December 14, 2001.
Issue: WON Whether or not the trial court judge has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings, and the Court of Appeals has sanctioned such departure by the
trial court judge.
Held: No. A motion for new trial may be filed on the grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence that could not have been guarded against by ordinary prudence, and by
reason of which the aggrieved party’s rights have probably been impaired; or (2) newly
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the aggrieved party could not have
discovered and produced at the trial; and that, if presented, would probably alter the result. In
its Omnibus Motion for New Trial, petitioner argued that its counsel Atty. Mario was sick, a
fact that allegedly constituted excusable negligence for his failure to appear at the August 8,
2000 pretrial. With regard to Atty. Rogelio Fernandez, the collaborating counsel, it alleged that
the Board of Directors had terminated his legal services on August 4, 2000.
These grounds relied upon by petitioner cannot properly secure a new trial. Counsels are not
the only ones required to attend the pretrial. The appearance of the plaintiff and the defendant is
also mandatory.
Case No. 2 on MODES OF DISCOVERY.

REPUBLIC vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

(204 SCRA 212)

Facts: Private respondents Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago - together with
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria R. Tantoco, and
Maria Lourdes Tantoco-Pineda-are defendants in Civil Case No. 0008 of the Sandiganbayan.
The case was commenced on July 21, 1987 by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. The complaint which
initiated the action was denominated one "for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution
and damages," and was avowedly filed pursuant to Executive Order No. 14 of President
Corazon C. Aquino.
After having been served with summons, Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, instead of filing their
answer, jointly filed a "MOTION TO STRIKE OUT SOME PORTIONS OF THE
COMPLAINT AND FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS OF OTHER PORTIONS" dated Nov. 3,
1987. The PCGG opposed such motion.
Nonetheless, Tantoco filed a Motion for Leave to file Interrogatories, production and
inspection of documents pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. The PCGG opposed such
motion de nominating it as “queer”, “weird”, or procedurally “bizarre”. The PCGG opposed
such motion claiming that use of the documents is proscribed by Executive Order No.1.
Issue: WON the Motion for Interrogatories, production, and inspection of documents is proper.
Held: Yes. It is matters such as these into which inquiry is precisely allowed by the Rules of
Discovery, to the end that the parties may adequately prepare for pre-trial and trial. The only
other documents sought to be produced are needed in relation to the allegations of the
counterclaim. Their relevance is indisputable; their disclosure may not be opposed.
Case No. 3 on MODES OF DISCOVERY.

PEOPLE vs. WEBB

(312 SCRA 573)

Facts: As brief backgrounder, on June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela,
nineteen years old, and Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City.
The identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose
interests were aroused by the gripping details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde
massacre.

After exhaustive trial, the court rendered its decision against all the accused.

On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a
Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen
taken from Carmela’s cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping
of the NBI. The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA
Evidence6 to give the accused and the prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might
want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case.

Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of
the specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows,
however, that the specimen was not among the object evidence that the prosecution offered in
evidence in the case.

This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the
government’s failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to
due process.

Issue: WON the Court should acquit Webb and his co-accused outright, given the government’s
failure to produce the semen specimen that the NBI found on Carmela’s cadaver, as well as his
documented proof of alibi dfense.

Held: Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen specimen at
this late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v. Maryland that he cites has long be
overtaken by the decision in Arizona vs. Youngblood, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that
due process does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be
useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or
the police. However, Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not
only with respect to him, but also with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian,
Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when
the crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony will not hold together. Webb’s participation is the
anchor of Alfaro’s story. Without it, the evidence against the others must necessarily fall. All
the accused are ACQUITTED.
Case No. 1 on JUDICIAL TITLING.

Josefina C. Billonte vs Imelda Solis

(GR NO. 181057, June 17, 2015)

Facts: This case concerns a Petition for Issuance of New Owner’s Copy of an alleged lost title by
respondent Imelda Solis. After hearing, the RTC granted the petition.
Upon learning of the decision of the Court, William Billote went to the Register of Deeds and
learned that his title was already cancelled. Said land was subsequently sold to Spouses Victor
and Remedios Badar. Nonetheless, the land was previously titled in the name Willia C. Billote
and his sister Josefina C. Billote. William then filed before the CA a Petition for annulment of
the judgment of the RTC. Alleging from among others that it was not true that the title subject
of the petition was lost because it was still intact and in their possession.

Issue: WON the title issued to Imelda Solis is null and void as well as the subsequent title issued to
spouses Victor and Remedios Badar.

Held: Yes. The title issued to Imelda Solis is null and void. However, the subsequent title issued to
spouses Victor and Remedios Badar, who are buyers in good faith could not be declared void.

Although TCT No. 269811 in the names of Imelda Solis and Adelaida Dalope was fraudulently
secured, such facts cannot prejudice the right of spouses Victor and Remedios Badar absent any
showing that they had any knowledge or participation in such irregularity. Aforenamed spouses
cannot be obliged to look beyond the vendor's certificate of title which appeared to be valid on
its face and devoid of any annotation of any adverse claim. Spouses Badar appear to be
purchasers in good faith and for value.
Case No. 2 on JUDICIAL TITLING.

Faustina Camitan vs Fidelity Investment Corp

(GR No. 163684, April 16, 2008)
Facts: The case arose from the Petition for the issuance of another duplicate copy of Certificate of Title
No. T-(12110) T-4342 (TCT) filed in 1993 by herein petitioners, together with Alipio Camitan,
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba, Laguna. The case was raffled to Branch 37
of the said court and was docketed as SLRC Case No. 1198-93-C. After due proceedings, the
RTC, in its Order dated April 8, 1994, granted the petition, directed the Register of Deeds of
Calamba, Laguna to issue a second owners duplicate copy of the TCT, and declared void the
first owners duplicate copy thereof.

Later, on May 25, 1995, herein respondent Fidelity Investment Corporation (Fidelity) filed a
Petition] for annulment of judgment and cancellation of title before the CA. According to
Fidelity, on December 16, 1967, it purchased the property covered by the subject certificate of
title from the registered owners thereof pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale of the same date. It
said that upon execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the payment in full of the purchase
price, the vendors delivered to Fidelity their owners duplicate copy of the TCT, which has been
in its possession since. It also alleged that it had been in actual physical possession and
continuous occupation of the subject property and that it had been paying the real estate taxes
due thereon.

Issue: WON the title issued to Faustina Camitan is null and void.
Held: Yes. the principle that possession of a lost owners duplicate copy of a certificate of title is not
necessarily equivalent to ownership of the land covered by it. Registration of real property
under the Torrens System does not create or vest title because it is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. The certificate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership; it is merely an evidence of
title over the particular property described therein.

In a catena of cases, we have consistently ruled that if an owners duplicate copy of a certificate
of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title
is void, as the court rendering the decision never acquires jurisdiction. Consequently, the
decision may be attacked at any time.
Case No. 3 on JUDICIAL TITLING.

Spouses Cristano Alcaraz & Susana Villamayor vs Evelyn Arante

(G.R. No. 177042, Dec. 10, 2012)

Facts: On November 14, 2003, herein petitioner Crisanto Alcazar (hereinafter referred to as Alcazar)
filed a Petition for Reconstitution of Lost Owner's Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of
Title with the RTC of Pasig City.

When the case was called for initial hearing on December 9, 2003, there was no appearance
from the OSG, Pasig City Registry of Deeds and the Pasig City Prosecutor's Office. Upon
Alcazar's motion and there being no opposition, he was allowed to present evidence ex parte.
On January 6, 2004, the RTC issued a Decision5 in favor of Alcazar.

On February 8, 2005, herein respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Final
Decision contending that the RTC, sitting as a land registration court, had no jurisdiction to
entertain Alcazar's petition because the subject owner's duplicate certificate of title which was
allegedly lost was not, in fact, lost but actually exists, contrary to Alcazar's claim. Said
Certificate of title was delivered to the respondent by no less than the petitioner as a security for
a loan he obtained from the respondent.

Issue: WON the title secured by the Petitioner thru Judicial Petition for Reconstitution of Title is valid.
Held: No. The title was not lost. Respondent was able to prove that the subject owner's duplicate copy
of the TCT is not lost and is in fact existing and in her possession. Moreover, petitioners admit
that they entrusted the subject TCT to respondent. There is, thus, no dispute that the TCT in the
possession of respondent is the genuine owner's duplicate copy of the TCT covering the subject
property. The fact remains, then, that the owner's duplicate copy of the certificate of title has
not been lost but is in fact in the possession of respondent, with the knowledge of petitioners.
Case No. 1 on JUDICIAL PARTITION.

Rizal, et al. vs Leoncia Naredo, et al.

(GR No. 151898, March 14, 2012)

Facts: Herein petitioners commenced Civil Case No. 7836 against the respondents involving the
accretion of two (2) hectares of land to Lot No. 454 of the Calamba Estate. The CFI ruled in
favor of the petitioners and ordering the defendants to vacate the said land.
On May 9, 1955, respondents instituted an action questioning the validity of the execution sale
of Lots Nos. 252 and 269 and the house of mixed materials on Lot No. 252. However, the CFI
declared the execution valid. However, the CIF did not ordered the eviction of Marcela and
Leoncia from Lot No. 252 since they were not parties to Civil Case No. 7836. After the
aforesaid judgment in Civil Case No. 9908, the petitioners filed a case for partition, accounting
and recovery of possession of Lot No. 252 against Marcela and Leoncia . The parties then
entered into a Compromise Agreement which was approved by the CFI.

Ten years later, Marcela and Leoncia, instituted a case assailing the Compromise Agreement,
which was dismissed by the court without prejudice to the plaintiffs failure to prosecute.
Thereafter, on September 26, 1984, Marcela and Leoncia instituted Civil Case for enforcement
of judgment, partition and segregation of shares with damages which was dismissed by the
court on ground of Prescription.

On September 21, 1987, the petitioners filed a Complaint for the immediate segregation,
partition and recovery of shares and ownership with damages, which was dismissed by the
court on the ground of res judicata.

Issue: WON the complaint is barred by Res Judicata.

Held: Yes. The partition of Lot No. 252 was the result of the approved Compromise Agreement in
Civil Case No. 36-C, which was immediately final and executory. Absent any showing that said
Compromise Agreement was vitiated by fraud, mistake or duress, the court cannot set aside a
judgment based on compromise. It is axiomatic that a compromise agreement once approved by
the court settles the rights of the parties and has the force of res judicata. It cannot be disturbed
except on the ground of vice of consent or forgery.
Case No. 2 on JUDICIAL PARTITION.

Heirs of Cesar Marasigan vs Court of Appeals

(G.R. No. 156078, March 14, 2012)

Facts: Alicia was survived by her siblings: Cesar, Apolonio, Lilia, and Benito; Marissa, a sister-in-law;
and the children of her brothers who predeceased her: Francisco, Horacio, and Octavio. She
died intestate without any issue.

On 17 December 1997, a Complaint for Judicial Partition of the Estate of Alicia Marasigan was
filed before the RTC by several of her heirs and private respondents herein, namely, Apolonio,
Lilia, Octavio, Jr., Horacio, Benito, Jr., and Marissa, against Cesar, stating in the complaint the
properties left by Alicia.

In answer to the private respondents Complaint, Cesar also enumerated Alicia’s several other
properties and assets which he also wanted to be included in the action for partition, but it was
contested by private respondents on the ground that the properties he enumerated had already
been previously partitioned and distributed to the appropriate parties.
As the parties could not agree on how they shall physically partition among themselves Alicias
estate, private respondents, a Commissioner was appointed by the court, who conducted the
ocular inspection and made a report. However, Cesar rebutted the finding of the
Commissioner. Nevertheless, the court approved the Commissioners recommendation that the
co-heirs/co-owners assign their shares to one of them in exchange for proper compensation.

Issue: WON the assignment of co-heirs of their shares to one of them in exchange for proper
compensation is tenable.
Held: Yes. The impracticality of physically dividing Alicias estate becomes more apparent,
considering that Hacienda Sta. Rita is composed of parcels and snippets of land located in two
different municipalities, Pili and Minalabac, Camarines Sur. Inasmuch as the parties continued
to manifest their desire to terminate their co-ownership, but the co-heirs/co-owners could not
agree on which properties would be allotted to each of them, assignment to any of them in
exchange for proper compensation is tenable.
Case No. 3 on JUDICIAL PARTITION.

Maria Soccoro Avelino vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 115181, March 31, 2000

Facts: In 1989, Antonio Avelino, Sr. died intestate. In 1991, his daughter, Maria Socorro Avelino filed
a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of his deceased father. All
the other heirs however opposed the petition and they moved that the petition be converted into
an action for judicial partition of the said estate. The trial court granted the opposition’s motion
and so Socorro’s petition was converted accordingly. Socorro’s motion for reconsideration was
denied. Socorro then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus alleging grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in
granting the other heirs motion. The Court of Appeals found no reversible error. Socorro
elevated the petition to the Supreme Court. She insists that a partition cannot be had because
the extent of the estate is not yet determined hence an administration proceeding is still needed.
She also insists that the Rules of Court does not provide for a conversion of a petition for
administration to an action for partition.

Issue: WON Socorro’s petition for the issuance of letters of administration may be converted into an
action for judicial partition.

Held: Yes. This can be based on Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Where the more
expeditious remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of them
may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings. In this case, all the heirs, with
the exception of Socorro, agreed to judicial partition as they see it to be the more convenient
method. There is no merit to the contention of Socorro that a partition cannot be had because the
extent of the estate is not yet determined. The extent of the estate can actually be determined
during the partition proceedings. Therefore, the trial court made no error in converting Socorro’s
petition to an action for judicial partition.
Case No. 4 on JUDICIAL PARTITION.

Wilson A. Go vs Harry A. Go
(G.R. No. 183546, September 18, 2009)

Facts: Wilson instituted an action for partition with accounting against Harry Go in RTC Valenzuela
City. He alleged that they are among the five children of Spouse Sio Tong Go and they are the
registered owner of a parcel of land in Valenzuela City.
Harry countered that there was no co-ownership because he acquired the ownership of the land
through extra-judicial settlement between their father and certain Wendell Simsim.

RTC ruled in favor of Wilson and ordered Harry to deposit in court the receipt of all the
amounts collected by him from the leases. Harry moved for reconsideration but was denied by
the RTC. Harry filed then a petition for certiorari with CA, which ruled in his favor.

Issue: WON petitioner is entitled to the deposit of the entire monthly rentals on the warehouses, or
deposit of his alleged one-half (1/2) share therein pending final determination of the co-
ownership.

Held: Petitioner is entitled to his enchoate one-half (1/2) share, as prayed for. The Court emphasizes
that these are preliminary findings for the sole purpose of resolving the propriety of the subject
order requiring the deposit of the monthly rentals with the trial court. The precise extent of the
interest of the parties in the subject land will have to await the final determination by the trial
court of the main action for partition after a trial on the merits.

The said provision of one-half (1/2) share for the petitioner is merely preservatory or
provisional in nature. It does not amount to an adjudication on the merits of the action for
partition and accounting for the rentals are merely kept by the trial court until it is finally
determined who is lawfully entitled thereto.
Case No. 1 on JUDICIAL REGISTRATION.

Republic vs. Bantigue Point Dev’t Corp.

(G.R. No. 162322, MARCH 14, 2014)
Facts: On 17 July 1997, respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed an application for
original registration of title over a parcel of located at Barangay Barualte, San Juan, Batangas.
The RTC issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22 October 1997. On 7 August
1997, it issued a second Order setting the initial hearing on 4 November 1997. Petitioner
Republic filed its Opposition.

On 31 March 1998, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu proprio the records of the case to
the MTC of San Juan, because the assessed value of the property was allegedly less
than ₱100,000. Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General Default and commenced with
the reception of evidence. After hearing, the MTC awarded the land to the respondent. Republic
appealed from said decision arguing that the MTC has no jurisdiction in Land Registration
cases.

The CA ruled in favor of the respondent.

Issue: WON the MTC acquired jurisdiction of the Land registration case.

Held: Yes. the MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases in two
instances: first, where there is no controversy or opposition; or, second, over contested lots, the
value of which does not exceed ₱100,000. Clearly the value of the land sought to be registered
is even less than ₱100,000.
Case No. 2 on JUDICIAL REGISTRATION.

Republic vs. Carlos R. Vega

(G.R. No. 177790, Jan. 17, 2011)

Facts: Respondents Vega sought to register a parcel of land, claiming that they inherited the same from
their deceased mother. Respondent-intervenors Buhay claimed a portion of the lot in question.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the claim. The Republic
maintains that the parcel of land is public domain, and that respondents failed to substantiate
that such was alienable. Respondents presented as witness an officer from CENRO who
testified that the land in question is indeed alienable. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents
and ordered titles to be issued in favor of Vega and Buhay. The Republic appealed the case to
the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the findings of the lower court.

Issue: WON the parcel of land in dispute is part of public domain and WON the issue at hand is a
question of fact.

Held: The rule for registration of government land is that there must be open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable government land. Since respondents
sought certification from the CENRO before, they are in good faith in claiming the land. The
proof that they presented may be considered as competent and sufficient proof. It is to be noted,
however, that this ruling applies pro hac vice.

On the other hand, a question of fact requires the reexamination of the evidence on record. The
issue in the instant petition is the application of law, to the facts.
Case No. 3 on JUDICIAL REGISTRATION.

Secretary of DENR vs. Mayor Jose S. Yap

(G.R. 167707, Oct. 8, 2008)

Facts: Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and
warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination.The island is also
home to 12,003 inhabitants who live in the bone-shaped islands three barangays.

On April 14, 1976, the DENR approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay island,
which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons. On November
10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801
declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines,
as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism
Authority (PTA).

Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 precluded them from filing an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, respondents-claimants filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief.
The Republic, thru the Solicitor General opposed the petition.

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered decision in favor of the respondents- claimants, which
was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: WON Boracay island remained an unclassified land of the public domain and is considered
State property.

Held: Yes. The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not
automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a
title to the land they are presently occupying. Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and
Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The
island remained an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine,
is considered State property.
Case No. 1 on Certiorari, Prohibiton, and Mandamus

Alfredo Tagle vs. Equitable PCI

(G.R. No. 172299, April 22, 2008)

Facts: This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioner
Alfredo Tagle (petitioner Alfredo) stemmed from the following Resolutions promulgated by the
Court of Appeals: (1) the 6 September 2005 Resolution dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari filed by petitioner Alfredo, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90461, assailing the 4
April 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82, City of Malolos, Bulacan, in
LRC Case No. P-71-2004; (2) the 16 February 2006 Resolution denying petitioner Alfredos
Motion for Reconsideration; and (3) the 11 April 2006 Resolution denying petitioner Alfredos
Second Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioner Alfredo urges the Supreme Court to set aside said decisions, on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Issue: WON the special civil action for Certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner.

Held: No. Basic is the rule that a writ of certiorari will not issue where the remedy of appeal is
available to an aggrieved party. A remedy is considered "plain, speedy and adequate" if it will
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the
lower court or agency.[38] In this case, appeal was not only available but also a speedy and
adequate remedy.[39] Moreover, petitioner Alfredo failed to show circumstances that would
justify a deviation from the general rule as to make available to him a petition for certiorari in
lieu of making an appeal.

Petitioner Alfredo failed to show any valid reason why the issue raised in his petition
for certiorari could not have been raised on ordinary appeal by certiorari. He simply argued that the
appellate court gravely abuse its discretion which amounted to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 and not finding that the subject property
covered by the Writ of Possession was a Family Home, hence, exempt from execution or
forced sale. He did not give a single explanation as to why the errors committed by the Court of
Appeals cannot possibly be cured by ordinary appeal under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The remedies of appeal in the ordinary course of law and that of certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. Time and
again this Court has reminded members of the bench and bar that the special civil action
of Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal where the latter remedy is available;
especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by ones own negligence or error in the choice of
remedies.
Case No. 2 on Certiorari, Prohibiton, and Mandamus

Madrigal Transport, Inc. vs. Lapanday Holdings, Corp.

(G.R. No. 156067, August 11, 2004)
Facts: On February 9, 1998, Petitioner Madrigal Transport, Inc. (Madrigal) filed a Petition for
Voluntary Insolvency before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 49.
Subsequently, on February 21, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for damages against
Respondents Lapanday Holdings Corporation (Lapanday), Macondray and Company, Inc.
(Macondray), and Luis P. Lorenzo Jr. before the RTC of Manila, Branch 36.
On February 23, 1998, the insolvency court (RTC Branch 49) declared petitioner insolvent. On
March 30, 1998 and April 6, 1998, Respondents Lapanday, Lorenzo and Macondray filed
their respective Motions to Dismiss the case pending before the RTC Branch 36.
On December 16, 1998, Branch 36 granted the Motion, for failure of the Complaint to state a
cause of action. Applying Sections 32 and 33 of the Insolvency Law, the trial court opined
that upon the filing by Madrigal of a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency, the latter lost the
right to institute the Complaint for Damages. The RTC ruled that the exclusive right to
prosecute the actions belonged to the court-appointed assignee.
On January 26, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was later denied
on July 26, 1999. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, seeking to set aside the December 16, 1998 and the July 26, 1999 Orders of the trial
court. On September 29, 1999, the CA issued a Resolution requiring petitioner to explain
why its Petition should not be dismissed outright, on the ground that the questioned Orders
should have been elevated by ordinary appeal.
Issue: WON the special civil action for Certiorari is availing under the facts of the case.
Held: No. The special civil action for certiorari and appeal are two different remedies that are
mutually exclusive; they are not alternative or successive. Where appeal is
available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
Basic is the rule that certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of appeal.
Case No. 3 on Certiorari, Prohibiton, and Mandamus

SOCORRO CHUA vs. ROMULADO SANTOS

(G.R. No. 132467, October 18, 2004)
Facts: Before the Court is an alternative petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, or a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the reversal of the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46034, dismissing the petition for
certiorari of the petitioners and the resolution of the appellate court denying their motion for
reconsideration.
Issue: WON the special civil action for Certiorari is availing concerning the facts of the case.
Held: No. The petitioners cannot delegate upon the Court the task of determining under which rule the
petition should fall. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or successive. Under Rule 56, Sec. 5(f) of the Revised Rules of Court, a wrong or
inappropriate mode of appeal, as in this case, merits an outright dismissal.
Here, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated January 15, 1998 denying the motion for
reconsideration of its Resolution dated November 28, 1997 was received by petitioners on
February 4, 1998. Thus, they had until February 19, 1997 within which to perfect their appeal.
The petitioners failed to do so.
For the writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to issue, the petitioners must show
that they have no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against their
perceived grievance. A remedy is considered plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly
relieve the petitioners from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court
or agency. In this case, appeal was not only available but also a speedy and adequate remedy.
Case No. 4 on Certiorari, Prohibiton, and Mandamus

DARAB vs. Josefina Lubrica

(G.R. No. 172299, April 22, 2008)

Facts: On August 4, 2000, Federico Suntay, now deceased, filed a petition for fixing and payment of
just compensation under Presidential Decree No. 27 against the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), the DAR Regional Director for Region IV and the Land Bank of the
Philippines (Land Bank). Docketed as DARAB Case No. V-0405-0001-00, the case was filed
before the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) and raffled to
Adjudicator Conchita Mias.

The DAR and Land Bank determined its value of his land at Four Million Two Hundred Fifty-
One Thousand One Hundred Forty-One Pesos and 68/100 (P4,251,141.68) or Four Thousand
Four Hundred Ninety-Seven Pesos and 50/100 (P4,497.50) per hectare, which valuation
according to Suntay, was unconscionably low and tantamount to taking of property without due
process of law. The RARAD favored Suntay. On the other hand, the Landbank questioned the
decision of the RARAD that it was not supported by evidence in the determination of the
valuation of Suntay’s property so that it filed a Petition for Just Compensation before the
Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. It also filed a Petition for Certiorari with
Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction before the
DARAB Meanwhile, Federico Suntay’s successor-in-interest filed before the CA a Petition for
Prohibition impleading DARAB and Land Bank as respondents and arguing that DAR, does
not grant DAR jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari.

Issue: WON the DAR has the jurisdiction over special civil action for Certiorari.
Held: No. DARAB’s exercise of jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari had no constitutional or
statutory basis. Although the statutes allowed the DARAB to adopt its own rules of procedure,
it does not permit it with unbridled discretion to grant itself jurisdiction ordinarily conferred
only by the Constitution or by law. Procedure, as distinguished from jurisdiction, is the means
by which the power or authority of a court to hear and decide a class of cases is put into action.
Rules of procedure are remedial in nature and not substantive. They cover only rules on
pleadings and practice.
Case No. 5 on Certiorari, Prohibiton, and Mandamus

RELAMPAGOS vs. CUMBA

(243 SCRA 690, April 27, 1995)

Facts: In the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992, the petitioner and private respondent were
candidates for the position of Mayor in the municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The
latter was proclaimed the winning candidate. Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an
election protest with the RTC of Agusan del Norte. On June 29, 1994, the trial court, per Judge
Rosario F. Dabalos, found the petitioner to have won with a margin of six votes over the private
respondent and rendered judgement in favor of the petitioner.

The private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC which was later on given a due
course by the trial court. The petitioner then filed with the trial court a motion for execution
pending appeal. The trial court granted the petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal
despite the opposition of the private respondent. The corresponding writ of execution was
forthwith issued. Thereafter, the private respondent filed a motion for a reconsideration which
was later on denied. The private respondent then filed with the respondent COMELEC a
petition for certiorari to annul the aforesaid order of the trial court granting the motion for
execution pending appeal and the writ of execution. The COMELEC granted the petition on
February 9, 1995, ordering the petitioner Rosita Cumba is ordered restored to her position as
Municipality Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte, upholding its exclusive authority to
decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus where the COMELEC maintains that
there is a special law granting it such jurisdiction Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which remains in
full force as it was not expressly repealed by the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881).

Issue: WON the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over petitions for, certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction.

Held: Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under
paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs
of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.