SUPREME COURT AS THE FINAL ARBITER

As a creation of the Constitution, the respondent Commission should be the last to

trivialize the judiciary, one of the three most important touchstones of our democratic
government. Regardless of the views of the respondent Commission, it is this court that
has been endowed with the exclusive and ultimate authority to interpret the laws of the
land, including the fundamental law itself, which often times requires throwing light to
the many intersecting shadows that blur the boundaries of power of our different
branches of government. Our people have entrusted to this Court the power to be the final
arbiter of all questions of law and the rule of law demands that as disputes ought to reach
an end in the interest of societal peace, submission should follow this court's final fiat. To
undermine the authority of this Court as the final arbiter of legal disputes is to foster
chaos and confusion in our administration of justice.

MAUNA vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 97794, May 13, 1994 citing
Felipa Guieb vs. Civil Service Commission, et. al., G.R. No. 93935, February 9, 1994.

_________________________________________________________________

The present controversy could have been easily settled by public respondent had it
referred to ample jurisprudence which already provides the solution. Stare decisions et
non quiet movere. Once a case is decided by this Court as the final arbiter of any
justifiable controversy one way, then another case involving exactly the same point at
issue should be decided in the same manner. Public respondent had no choice on the
matter. It could not have ruled any other way. This Court having spoken in a string of
cases against public respondent, its duty is simply to obey judicial precedents. Any
further disregard, if not defiance, of our rulings will be considered a ground to hold
public respondent in contempt.

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 108031,

March 1, 1995

It need not be emphasized that in our judicial hierarchy, this Court reigns supreme. All
courts, tribunals and administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions are obliged
to conform to its pronouncements. It has the last word on what the law is; it is the
final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. In other words, there is only one
Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings.

Concurring Opinion of Justice Angelina Sandoval-Guitterez in LAMBINO vs.

COMELEC, G.R. NO. 174153, October 25, 2006
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Judicial decisions of the Supreme Court, as the final arbiter of any justiciable
controversy, assume the same authority as the law itself.

MAGDIWANG REALTY CORPORATION vs. MANILA BANKING

CORPORATION, G.R. No. 195592, September 5, 2012

ANG PING and CARMEN PIMENTEL vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF

MANILA, Branch 40, citing Tugade v. Court of Appeals (85 SCRA 226, 230-231)

There is relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera (34 SCRA 98):
'The delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to a
constitutional or statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural norm
or a municipal ordinance is committed to the judiciary. It thus discharges a
role no less crucial than that appertaining to the other two departments in
the maintenance of the rule of law. To assure stability in legal relations and
avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It does so with finality,
logically and rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court. What it
says then should be definitive and authoritative, binding on those
occupying the lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy. They have to defer and
to submit.' (Ibid. 107. The opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Vera, 65
Phil. 56 [1937] was cited.) The ensuing paragraphs of the opinion in
Barrera further emphasizes the point: 'Such a thought was reiterated in an
opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these words:
'Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court,
by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word
on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy.
There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions any other courts
should take their bearings. (Justice J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v.
Court of First Instance of Manila [Br. VI], 23 SCRA 948, 961).

Lastly, we are dismayed by respondent RTC's adherence to the Dissenting Opinion,

instead of the Majority Opinion, of the members of this Court in G.R. No. 63018, as well
as its temerity to declare a Resolution of this Court "null and void" and "cannot be
considered as valid judgment that will be a bar to the present action."

A lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court,
especially of this Court, for to do so will negate the principle of hierarchy of courts and
nullify the essence of review. A final judgment, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole
world. Thus, it is the duty of the lower courts to obey the Decisions of this Court and
render obeisance to its status as the apex of the hierarchy of courts. "A becoming
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modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy
in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation." "There
is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their
bearings," as eloquently declared by Justice J. B. L. Reyes.

Respondent RTC, and for this matter, all lower courts, ought to be reminded that a final
and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how
erroneous it may be. Although judicial determinations are not infallible, judicial error
should be corrected through appeals, not through repeated suits on the same claim. In
setting aside the Resolution and Entry of Judgment of this Court in G.R. No. 63018,
respondent court grossly violated basic rules of civil procedure.

In fine, we stress that the rights of Meralco under P.D. No. 551, as determined by the
BOE and sustained by this Court, have acquired the character of res judicata and can no
longer be challenged.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS

FOUNDATION, INC., G.R. No. 101783, January 23, 2002

On the other hand, if respondent judge deliberately disregarded the doctrine laid down
in Ingco v. Sanchez and reiterated in the succeeding cases of Luciano v. Provincial
Governor, Oliveros v. Villaluz and Aguinaldo v. Santos, it may then be said that he
simply wished to enjoy the privilege of overruling this Courts doctrinal
pronouncements. On this point, and as a reminder to all judges, it is apropos to quote
what this Court said sixty-one years ago in People v. Vera:

As already observed by this Court in Shioji vs. Harvey [1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and
reiterated in subsequent cases if each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the
privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to
litigation, and judicial chaos would result. A becoming modesty of inferior courts
demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and
operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation.

Likewise, in Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Court of Appeals:

The spirit and initiative and independence on the part of men of the robe may at times be
commendable, but certainly not when this Court, not once but at least four times, had
indicated what the rule should be. We had spoken clearly and unequivocally. There was
no ambiguity in what we said. Our meaning was clear and unmistakable. We did take
pains to explain why it must be thus. We were within our power in doing so. It would not
be too much to expect, then, that tribunals in the lower rungs of the judiciary would at the
very least, take notice and yield deference. Justice Laurel had indicated in terms too clear
for misinterpretation what is expected of them. Thus: A becoming modesty of inferior
court[s] demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the
interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation. In the
constitutional sense, respondent Court is not excluded from such a category. The grave
abuse of discretion is thus manifest.
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In Caram Resources Corp. v. Contreras, this Court affirmed that by tradition and in our
system of judicial administration, this Court has the last word on what the law is, and that
its decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution and laws form part of this countrys
legal system. All other courts should then be guided by the decisions of this Court. To
judges who find it difficult to do so, Vivo v. Cloribel warned:

Now, if a Judge of a lower Court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases,
that the application of a doctrine promulgated by this Superiority is against his way of
reasoning, or against his conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter, but rather
than disposing of the case in accordance with his personal views he must first think that it
is his duty to apply the law as interpreted by the Highest Court of the Land, and that any
deviation from the principle laid down by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a sequel,
unnecessary inconveniences, delays and expenses to the litigants. And if despite of what
is here said, a Judge, still believes that he cannot follow Our rulings, then he has no other
alternative than to place himself in the position that he could properly avoid the duty of
having to render judgment on the case concerned (Art. 9, C.C.), and he has only one legal
way to do that.

Finally, the last sentence of Canon 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics directs a judge to
administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself,
remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction
of law.

CONDUCTO vs. JUDGE MONZON, A.M. MTJ-98-1147, July 2,1998