Power Control Unit, Hydraulic - Description

Hydraulic power control units (typically referred to as PCUs) are used to position primary (or
secondary) flight control surfaces. PCUs are a single assembly (i.e., single part number) that
combines individual hydraulic components into an assembly. PCUs perform two critical functions:
(1) they position the flight control surface in response to mechanical or electrical commands, and
(2) they represent a principle structural element capable of withstanding flight loads and providing
protection against flutter (unsteady, aerodynamic loads). The requirements of these two
functions make PCU design a challenging task.
At the heart of PCU is a servovalve and an actuator (servo actuator). The servovalve can be
controlled by a flapper nozzle, jet pipe, solenoid, torque motor or mechanical linkage. Some
PCUs contain only a servo actuator. However, PCUs often contain other components to meet
performance and failure mode performance criteria. Other components typically found in PCUs
are shutoff valves, pressure relief valves, input filter, check valves, and compensator. Another
component that is often part of a PCU is one or more servos whose control is based on some
performance criteria. These servos can be positioned electronically or by hydraulic pressure
(where loss of hydraulic pressure allows a spring to position the servo).
A simple PCU is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1 Simple PCU Diagram

This PCU shows the pressure input going through a filter to a shut off valve. If the shut off valve
is open (as shown), then pressure is applied to a solenoid operated servovalve. When closed,
the SOV ports pressure to return. The servovalve controls actuator position. (Typically, actuator
position is measured by a LVDT on the actuator piston and fed back to a controller that provides
closed loop position feedback – see position control system.) The pressure relief valves will
bleed off pressure if the pressure in the actuator chamber exceeds a certain level. Pressure can
increase above acceptable limits due to external loads or thermal expansion of the fluid.
As shown in Figure 1, PCUs are built from other hydraulic components, which are packaged into
an assembly. An understanding of PCU behavior and characteristics can be ascertained by
understanding each component in the system and how it interacts with other components. An
analysis or simulation model can be built using models for the individual components to better
understand behavior and performance characteristics (see Power Control Unit, Hydraulic –
Equations).
A more complex PCU is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2 Flight Surface PCU

In Figure 2, the hydraulic fluid flows through a filter and check valve before going to the
servovalve. The servovalve is positioned mechanically via a linkage from the cockpit. The
servovalve positions the actuator. Connecting the input link to the actuator piston rod provides
feedback and helps stabilize the PCU. Under normal operation, flow to and from an actuator
chamber is through the servovalve. If actuator chamber pressure exceeds a maximum allowable
level, then fluid is drained through the pressure relief valves at the bottom of the schematic.
These settings will be roughly 20% above nominal system pressure. The return line pressure
relief valve (top right portion of Figure 2) provides a constant backpressure to the actuator and
servo. This helps minimize variance from system back pressure to improve PCU performance.
In addition, should the main system hydraulics fail, the return line relief valve will help maintain
sufficient back pressure to push fluid through the anti-cavitation check valves (overcome spring
force) as the actuator moves in response to airloads. The relief valve setting will be above
system reservoir pressure setting, generally in the 100-200 psi range. The compensator acts like
an accumulator to help maintain a constant backpressure on the system under small
disturbances. The main function of the compensator, however, is to store sufficient fluid to
prevent cavitation after a main hydraulic system failure. The compensator must therefore be
sized to have sufficient volume so that there is enough fluid to maintain fluid in the actuator
chambers after considering worst case leakage losses over the length of the longest possible
flight.
A third example is shown in Figure 3. This PCU is similar to the PCU shown in Figure 2, except it
is now electrically actuated and has a mode control valve or mode control servo that is also
electrically actuated. The control valve is spring loaded to the center position but has two
solenoids to push the servo to the left or right. The three modes would be normal (center
position), damped bypass (left position) and blocked (right position). These are 3 common
modes used in flight surface PCUs (a 4th mode would be undamped bypass). In normal
operation, the PCU operates similarly to the PCU in Figure 2, except that the servovalve is
electronically controlled instead of via a mechanical linkage. In bypass mode, solenoid 1 would
be energized which would push the mode servo to the left. This would connect both chambers of
the actuator through a damped orifice which would limit the flow rate between the chambers. The
effect of the damped orifice is to significantly dampen the actuator so that movement is allowed
but at a rate such that the actuator is insensitive to flutter. In blocked mode, hydraulic fluid would
be trapped in the actuator chamber which would hold (lock) the actuator in the current position.
The pressure relief valves, compensator and anti-cavitation check valves would function the
same as described for the PCU in Figure 2. In this PCU example, both solenoid1 and solenoid 2
would be controlled by a digital controller. They would be two position solenoids (energized or
unenergized). The solenoid on the servovalve would be an infinitely positioned solenoid where
position is proportional to applied current. As mentioned above, but not shown in the Figure 3
PCU example is a bypass mode. A PCU that has a bypass mode connects both actuator
chambers through a fluid path without an orifice – if the orifice is removed in left side of the mode
valve this would indicate a bypass mode. Bypass mode allows hydraulic fluid to flow freely
between the actuator chambers. Bypass mode is normally seen on flight surfaces with 2 or more
PCUs connected to the surface. An actuator will be put into bypass mode when the actuator
controller senses a failure, which allows the other actuator(s) to control the surface with minimal
resistance from the failed actuator. Damped bypass mode (bypass with a orifice) is used when it
is acceptable for the surface to float at a controlled rate and be insensitive to flutter forces. Later
examples show PCUs with bypass and damped bypass modes.
 Figure 3 Flight Surface PCU with Electric Mode Control

Mode valves can be controlled electrically or hydraulically. Manual (or linkage) control of mode
valves is not used in PCUs. The fourth example of a PCU shown in Figure 4 illustrates a PCU
with a hydraulically actuated mode valve. In this example, hydraulic pressure will put the mode
valve in normal position and loss of hydraulic pressure will allow the spring to push the mode
valve to the right, which would be damped bypass mode. So, this PCU has two modes: normal
and damped bypass. Note the PCU in Figure 3 has 3 possible mode settings. The configuration
in Figure 4 could be used where there is a single PCU installed on a surface. In the PCU shown,
when hydraulic power is lost, the PCU automatically switches to damped bypass mode to provide
surface damping and flutter protection. The pressure relief valves, anti-cavitation check valves
and compensator function as before. In some PCUs where hydraulic pressure is used to position
the mode valve (servo), an electrically controlled, two position servo will be used to control
hydraulic pressure to the valve. This is shown in Figure 5, where the two position, three way
control valve has been added.
Figure 4 Flight Surface PCU with Hydraulic Mode Control
 Figure 5 Flight Surface PCU with Electrical / Hydraulic Mode Control

The above examples of PCUs show a natural evolution of a PCU which are variations of the
same basic scheme. The PCUs shown in Figures 1 through 5 are more representative of
commercial aircraft PCUs, although there still is a wide variation in PCU designs between
manufacturers. A different type of PCU is shown in Figure 6, which is more representative of a
military application.
The PCU in Figure 6 shows a triplex redundant electrical, dual redundant hydraulic PCU. Not
shown is the dual redundant electronics that control the servo and contain the fault detection
logic. LVDTs (linear variable differential transducers) are shown notionally on the dual tandem
servo and the actuator ram. In normal operation, pressure from P1 and P2 are ported though the
dual tandem servo to the actuator. Position control is maintained using the dual tandem servo.
The two bypass valves are in the position shown under normal operation. The two mode valves
are powered open (valves close without power). Response to failure scenarios is as follows:
• Electronic failure associated with left side → Solenoid current is removed from left mode
valve, which removes hydraulic pressure from the left bypass valve, and the left bypass
valve goes into bypass mode (the right bypass valve remains in the position shown). The
left side actuator chambers are then in bypass mode.
• Electronic failure associated with right side → Solenoid current is removed from right
mode valve, which removes hydraulic pressure from the right bypass valve and the right
damped bypass valve. goes into damped bypass mode. The right bypass valve goes into
bypass mode, so the actuator right side actuator chambers are in bypass mode.
• Loss of P1 → Left side bypass valve loses its pilot pressure and goes into bypass mode.
The left side actuator chambers are then in bypass mode.
• Loss of P2 → Right side damped bypass valve loses its pilot pressure and goes into
damped bypass mode. Right side bypass valve loses its pilot pressure but stays in the
position shown due to pilot pressure from P1. The right side actuator chambers are then
in bypass mode.
• Loss of P1 and P2 or Loss of both electronic channels → Left side bypass valve goes to
bypass mode, right side damped bypass valve goes into damped bypass mode, and right
side bypass valve stays in the position shown (blocked position) due to spring. The
actuator is then in damped mode. Note that loss of one hydraulic source and the
opposite electronic channel has the same effect.
 Figure 6 Flight Surface PCU with Dual Redundant Command Inputs

The above examples show several different types of PCU designs. The examples are by no
means a thorough coverage of the possible options and ways to mechanize a PCU. The
examples are provided to assist you in gaining an understanding of some basic configurations of
PCU operation.

Power Control Unit Qualification

See Qualification - Hydraulic Components for discussion on PCU qualification and required
qualification testing.
In addition to environmental qualification, PCUs will undergo significant functional testing to
validate all operating modes and that responses to failures are as required in the component
specification. This functional testing can be done under environmental conditions, such as at
temperature or at altitude.

FMEAs & Safety Analysis

Due to the numerous components installed in a PCU assembly an analysis of failure modes and
effects is an important analysis to complete. The failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA)
should examine all single potential failures associated with each component in the PCU. The
effects of the failures on PCU performance and operation should be established. Failures to
consider should include part jams, part runaways, excessive leakage, burst failures, loss of
hydraulic pressure, loss of electrical connection, misleading sensor inputs, loss of sensor inputs,
failed check valves, relief valves stuck closed or open, clogged filters, high friction levels, etc.
The failure effects within the PCU will then need to be examined at the airplane level and will also
be used in fault trees.
When creating the FMEA, latent failures (undetectable failures) should be identified. Latent
failures need to be analyzed separately to ensure they don’t create a hazardous condition or put
the actuator in a position where an additional failure would cause a hazardous/catastrophic
condition on the aircraft. An example of a latent failure would be a pressure relief valve failed to
the closed position (i.e., won’t relieve pressure when required).

Fault Detection
Fault detection and response can be done in the controller electronics (using appropriate sensors
and logic) or though mechanical means. An example of a mechanical response to a failure is
shown in PCU example of Figure 6. When hydraulic pressure is lost, a bypass valve
automatically slides to the bypass position. The controller may or may not know this has
occurred. However, the controller could be notified by either monitoring system pressure or
through a switch located in the bypass valve.
Electronic fault detection will be more comprehensive and more sophisticated. Examples of items
that the electronic controller will monitor include
• Open of shorted coils in torque motors and LVDTs
• Jam in a spool valve
• Jam of the actuator
• Hardover or uncommanded motion failures
• Broken wires
• Mechanical disconnect of an LVDT
• Failure to switch modes
Electronically failures are checked on power up BIT (PBIT) or through continuous BIT (CBIT),
where BIT is built in test. To minimize nuisance failures, most detection routines utilize a
threshold (must be outside of a range before flagging a fault) and persistence (must remain
outside range for a given time period). Threshold and persistence are used primarily due to
circuit noise and performance variation over temperature and loads. Multiple controller channels
(separate circuit cards and power supplies) are used for control and monitoring. Monitoring (fault
detection and isolation) may be done within a control channel or within a separate channel. The
controller and monitoring logic as well as the method for distributing decision making within the
processors is called redundancy management.
The benefit of using multiple channels for redundancy management of a PCU is illustrated in
Figure 7.
 Figure 7 Triplex Redundant Controller Channel Comparison Scheme

Figure 7 shows 3 compare monitors in the electronic controller. Each compare monitor looks at
the output command from two channels. If the channel outputs agree, then the compare flag is
set to, say, 1. If the channels disagree, then the compare flag is set to, say, 0. A truth table (or
other means for voting logic) exists in the voter. When the voter detects a failed channel, the
votor will remove power from the failed channel. With triplex controller voting logic as shown in
Figure 7, operation can continue with a failed channel. However, when operating with 2 channels
any miscompare between the 2 remaining channels will shut the system down. For a quadraplex
(4 channel) system, the voting is similar but more complicated with the additional channel. Using
a quadraplex controller, operation can continue with 2 failed channels.
Note that all failures that are not detected either mechanically or electronically are considered
latent failures. Latent failures are generally detected until either a specific functional test is run by
maintenance personnel or during a teardown inspection of the unit. Items checked through PBIT
are latent for one power down/power up cycle.

Functional Test Procedures

Functional test procedures will be done before, after and, in some cases, during environmental
and operational tests. The Functional Test Procedures will contain any critical performance
criteria that the actuator must meet – such as maximum friction levels, velocity, rate, loads, etc.
In addition functional testing will need to validate all modes of operation, mode switching,
operation under failure, etc as defined in the PCU specification. For complex PCUs, which
contain many features and modes, functional testing is a significant test activity.