The Impact Of Building Failures On Building Regulations – Chew Keat Chuan, Thung Sek Kwan & Mui Chi

Ki Grace

THE IMPACT OF BUILDING FAILURES ON BUILDING REGULATIONS

- THE SINGAPORE EXPERIENCE

Er. Chew Keat Chuan*

Er. Thung Sek Kwang*
Mui Chi Ki Grace*
* Building Engineering Group, Building and Construction Authority, Singapore

ABSTRACT: Over the years, the Singapore building regulations has been enhanced through regular
review and the lessons learnt from past failure cases. The learning points from past failures have an
important impact in shaping the Singapore building control system. In particular, this paper presents a
few failure case studies relating to building structure, foundation and deep excavation works as well as
shows how the incidents led to regulatory review and enhancement of the building regulations to
prevent recurrence of similar incidents. Such reviews enable us to strengthen the Singapore building
control system to what it is today which is more robust throughout the entire building life cycle.

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Singapore is one of the most densely populated countries in the world, with a population density
of more than 7,400 per sq km1. Construction activities abound with new buildings being built and old
buildings demolished to make way for more intensified developments. In addition, the increase in
population requires the transportation network to be greatly expanded through the construction of
underground subways. The rapid and extensive building construction activities in Singapore require a
robust and progressive building control system to realise its vision of a safe, high quality, sustainable and
friendly built environment for Singapore.

2 THE SHAPING OF BUILDING CONTROL SYSTEM IN SINGAPORE

2.1 The Singapore building control system has evolved over the years to what it is today. In the past,
during the early days of Singapore’s independence (1965), only building plans (prepared by registered
Architect) were required to be submitted for approval. Structural plans and calculations were only
submitted for record purpose.

2.2 The first major review of the building laws came about in 1986 after the tragic collapse of a 6-
storey building called Lian Yak Building (also known as Hotel New World). The Building Control Act and
Regulations were repealed and re-enacted in May 1989 to incorporate the recommendations of the
Commission of Inquiry which was set up to investigate the cause of the collapse. The details of the
incident, the lesson learnt and the regulation review is covered in the next section.

3 LESSON LEARNT FROM LIAN YAK BUILDING COLLAPSE – Regulatory Review led to the introduction
of (a) The accredited checker system, (b) The requirement for amendment plan submission (c) The
site supervision requirement and (d) The mandatory periodic inspection

3.1 The 6-storey building with a basement at Serangoon Rd, which was commonly known as Hotel
New World, had stood for 15 years before it collapsed and killed 33 people in 1986. The building was a
reinforced concrete structure with conventional structural scheme of beams, columns and slabs,
founded on reinforced concrete piles. On the fateful day, the entire building from the ground level
upwards collapsed to the ground and basement levels with no wall or column upstanding on the ground

1
The population density for 2012 is reported as 7,422 per sq km in ‘Singapore in Figures 2013’, a publication by
Department of Statistics Singapore.
The Impact Of Building Failures On Building Regulations – Chew Keat Chuan, Thung Sek Kwan & Mui Chi Ki Grace

level (See figure 1 below). The collapse was swift, within a minute and the whole building was reduced to
a mammoth pile of rubble.

Figure 1: Aerial view of the collapsed Lian Yak Building

3.2 A Commission of Inquiry was set up to determine the cause of the collapse and make
recommendations for measures to prevent similar occurrence. The Commission found that:

Structural Design
 The structure of the building was under-designed. Analysis of the structural design showed that
the dead weights of many structural elements were underestimated and that a large number of
individual structural members were under-designed. This resulted in many of the columns and
beams having low factors of safety and barely able to take the loads imposed on them.
 The calculations and drawings submitted showed incompetence and shoddiness in the structural
design. The design was done by a draughtsman instead of a qualified person. The calculations
were sketchy and insufficient, the drawings show many discrepancies and ambiguities in the
technical details and other information given. In general, the drawings did not provide for what
were called for in the calculations, e.g. the reinforcements for many structural members as shown
in the drawings were substantially less than those derived from the calculations. In addition, there
were discrepancies between structural and architectural plans as well as many omissions in the
design.

Construction
 The quality of the construction works was inferior. The investigation revealed that the
construction of the basement substructure deviated considerably from the drawings which further
compounded the inadequacy of the structural design. The reinforcements provided in many
structural members were substantially less than what were specified in the drawings. There were
many other deviations from the drawings. It was also found that the positioning of many piles and
columns were haphazard and deviated significantly from its intended position. Starter bars of
some piles were not properly anchored to the pilecaps and in some cases, the starter bars were
absent altogether.
 The building works were not supervised by a professional engineer or site supervisor.
 No construction tests were carried out.

Further Loading
 When the building was in use, substantial load not provided for in the structural design were
added to the building and caused the overloaded and poorly constructed structure to be further
loaded. These loads were mainly due to the installation of the water tank on the open roof, and
addition of tiled façade to the building.
The Impact Of Building Failures On Building Regulations – Chew Keat Chuan, Thung Sek Kwan & Mui Chi Ki Grace

Maintenance
 No proper maintenance of the building during its life span, e.g. the signs of structural distress,
namely persistent cracks in columns, walls and floors were either ignored or superficially patched
up.
 No professional advice or assistance was sought by the owners.
 As a result, cracks that had developed in the structure were allowed to propagate. The process of
structural deterioration thus continued unimpeded towards the eventual collapse of the building.

3.3 Following the aftermath of the collapse and the investigation findings, Singapore has introduced a
series of measures to improve the building control system. A new Building Control Act 1989 was
formulated. The key changes were (a) the introduction of the Accredited Checker (AC) system, (b) the
requirement for amendment plan submission, (c) site supervision requirement and (d) mandatory
periodic structural inspection of completed buildings.

3.4 Introduction of the Accredited Checker (AC) system - The purpose of the AC system was to ensure
that structural designs prepared by Qualified Persons (who are professional engineers registered in the
civil or structural engineering discipline) were independently checked by competent Accredited Checkers
so as to minimise the risk of design errors due to lapses by the Qualified Persons. It may be viewed as
providing a form of private certification of the structural designs to ensure that they are safe before
submission of plans to BCA for approval of the plans. To qualify for registration as an AC, the applicant
must fulfil the following basic requirements:
 is a Professional Engineer (PE) registered under the Professional Engineers Act in civil or structural
engineering discipline;
 possesses practical experience after the registration as a PE in the design or construction of
buildings in Singapore at a professional level for a period of not less than 10 years;
 by virtue of his ability, has distinguished standing in the profession, or special knowledge or
practical experience in civil or structural engineering as evidence that he is deserving of such
distinction; and
 is insured against professional liability for a minimum sum of not less than $500,000.

3.5 Amendment Submission Requirement - If there is any change in the design affecting key structural
elements, amendment plans and design calculations have to be submitted.

3.6 Site Supervision Requirement - Construction site supervision was strengthened through the
requirement of full-time site supervision by a qualified site supervisor either a resident engineer or
technical officer (clerk-of-works), depending on the project cost. In addition, there was also prescribed
minimum qualifications to be a qualified site supervisor.

3.7 Introduction of the Mandatory Periodic Structural Inspection of Existing Buildings

(i) To ensure safety of the existing buildings, we have introduced the requirements for periodic
structural inspection. Buildings have to be inspected by a Professional Engineer (PE) (who is
registered in civil or structural discipline) at regular intervals so as to ensure that the buildings are
appropriately maintained to remain fit for occupation throughout their intended life span.
Buildings which are used solely for residential purposes (such as condominiums and apartments)
are required to be inspected every 10 years, while all the other buildings (such as offices, factories
and schools) are required to be inspected every 5 years.

(ii) The PE who is engaged by the building owner to carry out the periodic structural inspection
(PSI) will first conduct a visual inspection. The PE will inspect the condition of the building
structure (including identifying the types of structural defects, signs of structural distress /
deformation and materials deterioration), the loading on the structure and if there is any addition
or alteration works affecting the building structure. If no defect is found at this first stage of visual
inspection, the building will be certified safe by the PE as such, and the process will be completed.
The Impact Of Building Failures On Building Regulations – Chew Keat Chuan, Thung Sek Kwan & Mui Chi Ki Grace

If there are minor defect not affecting the key structural elements of the building, the PE could
recommend that repairs be carried out. However, if the visual inspection reveals defects such as
deformation or deterioration in the building which affect key structural elements, the PE, in
exercising his engineering judgement, could recommend that a full structural investigation be
carried out. After the full investigation, the PE would propose a set of appropriate actions to
adequately address the problems.

3.8 To administer the new provisions pertaining to structural safety, a new Building Structural Branch
was formed within the Building Control Division of the Public Works Department. It was renamed as
Building Engineering Group when the Building and Construction Authority was set up in 1999.

4 LESSON LEARNT FROM THE COLLAPSE OF THE ROOF OF A PRIMARY SCHOOL HALL DURING
CONSTRUCTION - Regulatory Review led to the enhancement of the accredited checker system

4.1 Another case that brought about changes to the building control regulatory framework was the
collapse of the roof of a primary school hall during construction. In 1999, the steel roof trusses of the
multi-purpose school hall that was nearing completion collapsed (See photos in Figure 2). Seven workers
were injured in the incident. The roof of the hall was supported by 10 numbers of roof trusses, each
spanning 27m. These trusses were supported by 230mmx700mm reinforced concrete columns. The
columns were braced in one direction by the perimeter roof beams. The trusses were of inverted V-
shaped.

4.2 During the collapse, all the trusses came down and broke into sections. The supporting concrete
columns also snapped into two or three segments. The brick walls and the window frames alongside the
snapped columns were completely disintegrated. As a result, the collapse caused the whole roof to fall
onto the second floor.

Figure 2: Photos on the collapsed school hall building

Poor Fit-up
 The Impact Of Building Failures On Building Regulations – Chew Keat Chuan, Thung Sek Kwan & Mui Chi Ki Grace

Figure 3: Photos on poor weld connection (poor fit-up, large gap, poor quality of weld & low weld penetration,
filler rod prevent penetration of weld)

Branch member

P
Weld
D
L2
L1

Main member

4.3 Investigations showed that lateral forces from the steel roof trusses were not taken into account in
the design and hence the columns supporting the steel roof trusses were inadequate. The AC had failed
to spot the design error by the PE. The quality of the construction of the steel trusses was also inferior.
There were poor fit-up and large gap at the connections. The quality of the weld were poor, the
penetration of the weld was low which was caused by the presence of filler rods (See Figure 3 on photos
of poor weld quality). In this case, enforcement actions were taken against the builder, QP and AC who
were all fined. In addition, both the QP and AC had their PE registration revoked.

4.4 As the AC involved in this fairly large scale project was from a small firm with limited resources, it
was felt that large scale projects should be checked by AC from bigger firms. Therefore, there was a need
to strengthen the AC system further. The legislation was amended and it resulted in the categorisation of
ACs into 2 groups, namely ACs in Accredited Checking Organisation (ACO) and individual ACs. The
amended Act mandated that individual ACs shall only be permitted to check building works up to the
prescribed limit of $10 million (the value was raised to $15 million in 2008), whereas no limit is set for
projects which are permitted to be checked by ACs operating in ACOs. This was to ensure that larger and
more complex projects were checked by ACs who can rely on support within organizations with
adequate and appropriate resources. The requirements for ISO certification and professional liability
insurance were also introduced for registration of ACO. In addition, the provision for disciplinary action,
which could result in suspension or deregistration of ACs, had been put in place.

5 LESSON LEARNT FROM THE FOUNDATION FAILURE OF A HIGHRISE BUILDING AND THE COLLAPSE
OF DEEP EXCAVATION AT NICOLL HIGHWAY - Regulatory Review led to the:
 centralisation of the building control functions under BCA
 approval of underground building works
 adoption of supervision teams to supervise structural works
 introduction of the builders licensing system

5.1 The Foundation Failure of a Highrise Building

5.1.1 The 30-storey building was a reinforced concrete central core with post-tensioned and reinforced
concrete floor beams supported by reinforced and composite columns (See Figure 4 for elevation view
and the typical floor plan). The superstructure was originally designed to carry the gravity load by the
combination of a centrally located core wall and 16 external columns. The core wall also provided
stability against lateral forces. The structural floors were mainly cast in-situ slabs supported by post-
tensioned beams. The perimeter beams were set back at 3 sides of the building and there was a major
transfer in corewall at 3rd to 7th storey to comply with architectural requirement.
The Impact Of Building Failures On Building Regulations – Chew Keat Chuan, Thung Sek Kwan & Mui Chi Ki Grace

Figure 4: Elevation view and typical floor plan of the 30-storey

5.1.2 When the structural works had completed and the installation of the curtain wall system was in
progress, it was discovered that the building had settled unevenly. The maximum tilts measured at the
roof level were more than 300mm.

5.1.3 At the onset of the project, 5 boreholes were carried out, Figure 5 below showed the founding
stratum appears to be dipping from the southern side to the northern side. During the investigation of
the foundation failure later on, additional soil investigation was carried out and it showed that the highly
varying founding stratum poses much difficulty in the determination of the pile termination depth.
According to the additional soil investigation, there are 32 numbers of bored piles with socket length into
the bouldery clay layer. As the piles were not founded on sufficiently incompressible stratum, they have
settled excessively. As a result of the excessive settlement and the differential settlement of the
foundation, it had also caused the building to tilt. Nevertheless, the differential settlement had not
reached the level that will affect the structural integrity of the building.

Figure 5: Founding stratum based on original soil report and with additional boreholes

5.1.4 There were cracks detected on structural members: columns, walls, beams and slabs of the
building due to differential settlements between the peripheral columns and central core. An
independent firm was engaged to monitor the crack movements. The maximum crack widths measured
are less than 1 mm. The cracks on structural members had remained dormant since the commencement
The Impact Of Building Failures On Building Regulations – Chew Keat Chuan, Thung Sek Kwan & Mui Chi Ki Grace

of the crack monitoring. The crack patterns at soffit of slab and beams are plotted out in Figure 6. Cracks
occurred at the floor between the central core and peripheral columns along Gridline 6 and Gridline F
due to the differential settlements.

Figure 6: Crack patterns on 7th storey plan

5.1.5 The claddings to the buildings were installed when the building started to tilt. As a result, the joints
of some curtain wall panels were damaged as they could not accommodate the building movements.

5.1.6 The first step to restore the building was to carry out foundation underpinning works through the
installation of additional mini-piles and pressed in steel H-piles.
 The mini-piles were pre-bored piles comprising of an encased UC section of 305x305x198 kg/m
with a 558mm diameter steel casing of 8 mm thick. The method of installation was by the down-
the-hole equipment. The steel casing had a length of at least 2 metres below the existing bored
piles. Slurry was used to stabilize the borehole and the pile was completed by cement grout. The
installation of new remediation piles took almost one year. There were 81 numbers of mini piles.
The overall depth of the mini-piles below ground level varies from 47 m to 74 m.
 Due to installation difficulties, some of the mini-piles were substituted with pressed-in H piles. The
H-piles (UC 305x305x97 kg/m sections) were installed by silent piler. There were 80 numbers of
pressed-in H piles in groups of 3 piles, 6 piles, 7 piles, 9 piles and 14 piles.

5.1.7 Before the remediation mini-piles are connected to the pilecap, they were preloaded. When
locked, the original piles were unloaded according to the relative stiffness of the piles. The designer had
assumed that the original piles would be unloaded due to the preloading of the mini-piles. On reloading
after the occupation of the building, the original pile would not reach its previous capacity (before the
preloading).

5.1.9 The load transfer from the original piles to the new remedial piles was through the shear
connectors between the existing pilecaps and the new pilecaps. The transfer from the new remedial piles
to the pilecaps was by means of shear studs and friction between the concrete and the steel casings. The
diagonal shear connectors of T28 steel reinforcement bars were used. Together with the horizontal
reinforcement, the shear transfer could achieve up to 700T from the remedial piles. The shear
connectors provided were adequate for its intended function.

5.1.10 The underpinning works was successfully carried out. Monitoring showed that the building titled
backward by about 80mm.

5.1.11 Besides the foundation underpinning works, the building structure was also strengthened with
the following methods:
The Impact Of Building Failures On Building Regulations – Chew Keat Chuan, Thung Sek Kwan & Mui Chi Ki Grace

 Carbon Fibre Reinforced Polymer (CFRP) for the columns, post-tensioned beams and reinforced
concrete beams. The two governing principle used in the structural enhancement was that (i) the
stiffness of the members was not unduly increased as this would attract more loads than what was
assumed in the analysis and (ii) members would not fail if there was accidental loss of CFRP in the
event of accidental situation like fire, blast or vandalism.
 Section enlargement, this method was for beams and column where CFRP was not suitable
because of the criteria of ensuring that the ultimate moment and shear capacities without CFRP
had to be greater than the service moment and shear under sustained loads.
 Additional column to support the cantilever shear wall, one major transfer in the core wall took
place at the car park floors from the 3rd to the 7th storey. The reinforced concrete wall starting
from the 7th storey was supported by a cantilever wall extending from one face of the inner core
wall. The original analysis indicated that such a cantilever shear wall would create eccentricities in
the core wall system, generating a lateral tilt towards the north under the self-weight of the
building. In a bid to reduce the tilt, initially a temporary column Cl8 was constructed under the
cantilever shear wall before any foundation enhancement was carried out. The temporary column
was also preloaded. After the tilt had been stabilized, the temporary column was replaced with a
permanent column as this would reduce the impact of reversal of stresses if the temporary column
was taken out without a replacement. The addition of the permanent column would enhance the
robustness of the structure as well as improve serviceability. It could also reduce the building tilt
under live loads and wind loads as well as long term tilt.
 For slabs and non-structural elements, they were grouted for long term durability if the crack
width were greater than 0.2mm.

5.1.12 After occupation of the building, the building was monitored for 5 years and the maximum
movements recorded were: 3 mm settlements and 13mm laterally. From the long-term monitoring of
the building, it could be concluded that the building movements had stabilized. The foundation with
underpinning by 81 mini-piles and 80 pressed-in H-piles was adequate to support the building together
with its intended live load in the long term. The annual inspections conducted revealed that the various
strengthening measures were effective in the restoring the strength and capacities of the structural
members to fulfil their intended functions.

5.2 The Collapse of Deep Excavation at Nicoll Highway

5.2.1 Another case was relating to deep excavation works. In 2004, the temporary earth
retaining wall system for a 33 metres deep excavation adjacent to the Nicoll Highway collapsed
(See Figure 7). excavation was one of the deepest excavations in marine clay in Singapore.

Figure 7: Photos showing the Nicoll Highway before and after the collapse
The Impact Of Building Failures On Building Regulations – Chew Keat Chuan, Thung Sek Kwan & Mui Chi Ki Grace

It killed four workers, injured several others and caused a massive cave-in of the sides of the
excavation, which included a stretch of road along Nicoll Highway. The braced reinforced
diaphragm wall system, coupled with steel struts and jet grout piles, was for excavation to
construct a cut-and-cover tunnel for the Mass Rapid Transit project. The 33 metres deep
excavation was one of the deepest excavations in marine clay in Singapore.

5.2.2 A Committee of Inquiry was set up to determine the cause of the collapse and to make
recommendations for measures to prevent similar occurrence. A Review Committee was also
formed to review the existing regulatory systems on workplace safety and building control to
ensure that there is no gap in the regulatory systems. The Committee of Inquiry found that:
 There were 2 critical design errors, namely the under-design of the temporary diaphragm
wall (due to use of incorrect geotechnical parameters) and under-design of waler
connection in the strutting system.
 There were no proper and appropriate design reviews of temporary structures used for
excavations, as well as inadequate contingency and remedial measures.
 The builder did not adequately deal with insidious warning signs of approaching collapse.

5.3 The lessons learnt from the 2 cases described in section 5.1 and 5.2 showed the impact and
importance of geotechnical considerations, be it pile foundation or the earth retaining and stabilising
works. Therefore, we need to strengthen the building control framework in this area. The enhancements
included introducing a regime in the control of geotechnical building works, centralising the building
control for better monitoring as well as putting more stringent requirements in the site supervision
regime.

5.4 Centralisation of the building control functions under BCA

 The building control system applies to all private and public developments projects; except that
for projects by the Housing and Development Board (responsible for public housing
developments), the Land Transport Authority (responsible for road and railway projects) and the
Jurong Town Corporation (responsible for industrial development projects) the building control
units of these 3 agencies were authorised by the BCA to administer the building control system for
their own projects in view of the intensive scale of their developments. As a result of the review of
the system in 2004, all the building control functions which were performed by the building
control units of these 3 agencies were returned to the BCA since the intensity of their
developments has slowed down and to improve the regulatory framework by allowing one
centralised authority, i.e. BCA to oversee all building works.
The Impact Of Building Failures On Building Regulations – Chew Keat Chuan, Thung Sek Kwan & Mui Chi Ki Grace

5.5 Approval of Earth Retaining and Stabilising Structures and Geotechnical Building Works
 Following the recommendations of the Committee of Inquiry into the Nicoll Highway Incident,
there was a need to regulate the design and construction of temporary earth-retaining structures
in the same rigor as permanent works. BCA now requires the design of temporary Earth Retaining
and Stabilising Structures (ERSS) to be submitted for approval. Previously, the temporary ERSS
were only submitted for record.
 In addition, geotechnical aspects of critical underground works (namely, ERSS for excavations that
are more than 6m deep, tunnelling works of more than 2m in diameter, and foundation works for
buildings of more than 30 storey high) have to be carried out by a Qualified Person who is a
professional engineer registered in the specialised branch of geotechnical engineering, and
checked by an Accredited Checker who is also a professional engineer registered in the specialised
branch of geotechnical engineering.
 During the construction of geotechnical building works (GBW), the PE (Geotechnical) have to
supervise the construction and the AC (Geotechnical) have to review the performance of the GBW
at critical stages of construction.

5.6 Adoption of supervision teams to supervise structural works

 Before the enhancement, the law required the QP to appoint at least 1 qualified site supervisor to
help him supervise the construction of structural works. This provision for the mandatory
appointment was insufficient for larger work sites. We had therefore introduced the requirement
for supervision teams to be appointed. The provision of supervision teams under the QP should
take into account the number and composition of supervisors (i.e. number of Resident Engineers
and Resident Technical Officers) and their work experience.

5.7 Introduction of the builders licensing system

 The licensing of builders aims to raise the competency and professionalism in the construction
industry. This had been implemented since 2009. All builders who carry out building works, the
plans of which are subject to approval under the Building Control Act, have to be licensed by the
BCA. There are 2 types of licenses, Licensed General Builder and Licensed Specialist Builder.
Licensed General Builder is allowed to carry out all building works, except 6 types of specialist
works which have to be carried out by Licensed Specialist Builder. The 6 specialist work areas are
piling, ground support and stabilisation, site investigation, structural steel, precast concrete and
post-tensioning work. The licensing scheme requires firm to have an Approved Person (who is
responsible for the management of the firm) and a Technical Controller (who is responsible for
execution and performance of building works undertaken by the firm) and both of them must
possess prescribed qualifications and experience.

6 NEW CHALLENGES AND EFFORTS TO CONTINUALLY STRENGTHEN THE BUILDING CONTROL

SYSTEM

6.1 The building control system had been enhanced over the years through vigorous review and
incorporating lessons learnt from past failure cases. Today we have a more robust and comprehensive
system than before (Annex A gives a summary of today’s Singapore building control system). However,
this is not the end yet, going forward we have to continue to be vigilant in bracing ourselves for the new
challenges ahead. We had identified two key future challenges:

Demolition
6.2 In the process of Singapore’s urban renewal, more and more buildings were torn down and rebuilt
even if they have not reached their intended design life. Structural failures occur during demolition stage
which presents a new challenge to Singapore, e.g. In 2012, during the demolition of a 4-storey reinforced
concrete carpark building in the Central Business District, part of the 3rd storey carpark structure
collapsed due to overloading of debris on the slab. As a result, it had caused progressive collapse of all
The Impact Of Building Failures On Building Regulations – Chew Keat Chuan, Thung Sek Kwan & Mui Chi Ki Grace

the floors below it (See Figure 8). Another case, during the demolition of an existing 19-storey office
building, a piece of concrete slab fell from 17-storey to the ground and killed the operator who was
inside the excavator (See Figure 9).

Figure 8: Collapse of 4-storey reinforced concrete carpark building during demolition

Figure 9: Collapse of 19-storey office building during demolition

6.3 To prevent the recurrence of such incidents, BCA had led a review of the demolition code and a
new code SS 557: 2010 Code of Practice for Demolition was introduced. In addition, to apply for
demolition permit, the project parties are required to submit method statement on the demolition
works, which includes the site plans, sequence of works, safety precautionary measures, instrumentation
and monitoring plans. Going forward, to better manage this challenge, BCA is exploring the need to
require the submission of demolition plans for approval before the application of demolition permit. We
are also considering registering a new class of specialist builders who has experience and capabilities in
carrying demolition works. Thereafter only registered specialist builder are allowed to carry out
demolition works.

Complex Building Designs

The Impact Of Building Failures On Building Regulations – Chew Keat Chuan, Thung Sek Kwan & Mui Chi Ki Grace

6.4 Over the years, BCA also observed that there is an increasing trend of buildings being built with
complex structural layout and systems, such as inclined columns, cantilevered or multiple levels of
transfer structures. Such complex structural system could have substantial impact on the building
robustness and may lead to disproportionate collapse, if not carefully designed. Often, structural
engineers have to use complex modelling methods in the design of these structures. In addition, they are
also more challenging to be built and may pose higher safety risks during construction. Refer to figure 10
for examples of complex structures.

Figure 10: Examples of complex structures

Condominium development

Commercial development

_
_
L
3
_2
_
L
2
2
_
_
L
1
1
The Impact Of Building Failures On Building Regulations – Chew Keat Chuan, Thung Sek Kwan & Mui Chi Ki Grace

6.5 BCA has advised that the professional engineers should be involved early in the discussion with the
architect and developer (during the conceptual design stage), to avoid the use of cantilevered or multiple
level transfer structures in buildings. BCA is also exploring other measures, e.g. requiring approval of in-
principle design concept, so as to get the design team to consider the structural concept of such complex
building design as early as possible and to address any design issues upfront.
The Impact Of Building Failures On Building Regulations – Chew Keat Chuan, Thung Sek Kwan & Mui Chi Ki Grace

7 CONCLUSION

7.1 Singapore is a densely built-up city with numerous high-rise buildings and massive underground
works. There is zero tolerance for structural failure. Therefore, we need to regularly review and update
the building control system to take into considerations new challenges that may pose safety risks to our
built environment. Ensuring structural safety is never easy. Besides having a robust building control
system, BCA need the support of the whole construction industry to play their part on ensuring safety.
 The Impact Of Building Failures On Building Regulations – Chew Keat Chuan, Thung Sek Kwan & Mui Chi Ki Grace

Annex A Singapore Building Control System

CORENET e-Submission
SINGAPORE BUILDING CONTROL PROCESS CORENET BIM e-Submission
IT Enablers
Integrated Submission
Processing System
Pre-Construction Construction Post-Construction

Building Plan Structural Plan Permit To Carry Out Occupation on Usage and maintenance
Approval Approval Works completion

 Design by Qualified
Person (QP)
 Pre-submission
consultation
 Submission for Building
Plan (BP) Approval
 Waiver Application Panel
 Clearance from Technical
Departments
BP Meeting
 
 Lapsing of Plan Approval
 Design by Qualified  Joint Application by All Parties  Compliance with Periodic Structural Inspection
Person (QP) Before Work Commences Technical Departments’
Checking by Accredited Requirements  Residential buildings - every
  One Permit System
Checker (AC) & 10 years
 Site Inspection
Accredited Checking  Appointment of Supervision
 All others - every 5 years
Organisation (ACO) Team  Issuance of Temporary
System Occupation Permit and/or
Certificate of Statutory
Design and Checking by Dangerous Buildings
 Construction Control Measures Completion Before
geotechnical specialist Occupation
 Closure Orders
 Submission for Structural  Licensing of Builders
Plan (ST) Approval  Emergency Measures
Prescribed duties of QP,
 Design Audit Qualified Site Supervisors and
Builder
 Presentations by QP and Unauthorised works
AC/ACO  Carrying out of tests &
keeping of records  Enforcement actions
 Written Directions
 Instrumentation & monitoring  Demolition orders
 Enforcement Actions for specialized structures
 Revocation of Permit for
infringements Control of advertisement
display
 Audit Site Inspections by BCA
 Enforcement actions  Licensing scheme

 Public feedback system  Permit for mounting on

structures