LAMBINO et al. v COMELEC et al. GR No. 174153
XVIII as
October 25, 2006 CARPIO, J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Mandamus Digest By:amb
SUMMARY:The Lambino Group commenced gathering signatures for an
initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. Supposedly, it reached the
numbers required by the law, leading them to file a petition with the COMELEC
for the holding of a plebiscite. Instead of ruling on the sufficiency of the petition,
COMELEC merely stated that they have no jurisdiction to rule on the matter
because of the ruling of the SC in Santiago v COMELEC and PIRMA v
COMELEC, where the law that was supposed to provide procedure on people’s
initiative, RA 6735, was seriously lacking and inadequate, and cannot be used as
basis for the initiative. When brought up to the SC via rule 65 petition for
certiorari and mandamus, the Court found the COMELEC’s action to be justified as
COMELEC merely acted based on the Court’s ruling in Santiago and PIRMA.
Moreover, the petitions violated the Constitution and law since they did not state
the proposed changes in the signature sheets to be distributed in the plebiscite, and
since the changes amounted to a revision that cannot be covered by initiative.
DOCTRINE:
Grave abuse of discretion that may be the basis of rule 65 petitions is NOT
PRESENT if the body/tribunal challenged merely acted on the basis of a valid
ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court.
(It should be noted that the case did not touch upon mandamus as an issue, but
rather Rule 65 in general. However, the separate opinions discussed that there is a
ministerial action on the part of COMELEC [mandamus lies if the action is
MINISTERIAL in character]—should it find that the petitions are sufficient in
form and substance, it should call for a plebiscite. There is nothing left more to
their discretion.)
FACTS:
On February 15, 2006, the Lambino Group (petitioners in GR 174153) with other
groups and individuals (other petitioners in these consolidated cases) commenced
gathering signatures for an intiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On
August 25 of the same year, the group filed a petition with the COMELEC for the
holding of a plebiscite under Secs. 5(b), 5(c) and 7 of RA 6735 (the Initiative and
Referendum Act).
In their petition, the group alleges that the petition had the support and
COMELEC-verified signatures of around 6.3M individuals, or 12% of all registered
voters, with each legislative district represented by at least 3% of its registered
voters. Through this, they intend to modify Secs. 1-7 of Art. VI (legislative) and
Secs. 1-4 of Art.VII (executive), alongside the addition of Art.XVIII (transitory
provisions). These changes would shift the government to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary form. In the plebiscite, this would be through the response to a
single proposition: "Do you approve the amendment of Arts. VI and VII of the 1987
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Constitution, changing the form of government... and providing Art.
transitory provisions...?", without stating the actual provisions in the question.
The COMELEC denied due course to the petition, arguing that there is a lack of an
enabling law governing Constitutional initiative petitions, pertaining to the ruling
of the Court in Santiago v COMELEC (affirmed in PIRMA v COMELEC), where
RA 6735 was declared inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to
amend the Constitution.
This was questioned through multiple petitions, with several groups also defending
the COMELEC decision (these were treated as oppositions-in-intervention.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT(S):
a. Lambino Group: RULE 65, certiorari and mandamus, aiming to set aside the
COMELEC resolution, and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to the
initiative, arguing there was GAD in denying due course to their petition since
Santiago is not a binding precedent, and that the resolution on the plebiscite is a
MINISTERIAL act on the part of COMELEC. Alternatively, Santiago only bound
the parties to that case.
b. SolGen (via comment): The petition can be granted despite the Santiago ruling,
the same merely being temporary devises to implement the system of initiative.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT(S):
a. COMELEC: The Santiago ruling declared the pertinent provisions in RA 6735
inadequate to support a constitutional amendment by people's initiative. There is no
GAD as it merely followed the ruling in the said case.
b. Binay Group: Santiago was a permanent injunction as to the initiative AND all
acts connected thereto. COMELEC should never have verified the signatures, nor
should they have even entertained the petition in the first place.
c. Other intervenors: The Lambino group's petition had multiple defects: standing,
validity of signatures, compliance with the minimum voters requirement under Art.
XVII, Sec. 2, the changes as REVISIONS and not mere amendments (thus outside
the scope of initiative), and violation of Sec. 10(a) of RA 6735 (initiatives to only
have one subject).
ISSUE(S): Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition given the Santiago
ruling. (NO)
HELD: DENIED.
Summary of Main Opinion on the PoliLaw aspect (the main opinion relied on this
more than it did the GAD issue):
- In the first place, the basic Constitutional requirements were not met. First, the
changes were not directly proposed to the people because the proposed changes
were never laid out in the signature sheets that the voters would sign. Alleged, they
later included the same provisions, but this was not in all of the signature sheets,
and appeared to be a belated attempt at complying with the requirement. There is
clear reason to require the statement of the proposals given the breadth of changes
that will be introduced through the plebiscite; in fact, there were three particular
changes (lifting of term limits, indefinite terms of office, and power of the interim
Parliament to convene to propose further amendments/revisions to the
Constitution) that were considered highly controversial, and could have slipped by
the people's scrutiny given the omission in the signatuure sheets.
- Moreover, the changes amounted to a revision. Revisions, to the Court, altered
basic principles in the constitution, while amendments merely adds/reduces/deletes
without altering basic principles. Applying quantitative (number of provisions
affected) and qualitative (effect on basic principles) tests, it is clear that the changes
would amount to a radical shift in our entire system of government such that it
cannot simply be an amendment.
Main Opinion on GAD (it was barely a paragraph):
As the Court resolved the case on the political law aspect (requirements of an
initiative petition), the Court no longer dwelled on the Santiago ruling, relying on
the principle that the courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if
the case can be resolved on some other grounds. With the Santiago ruling
remaining in place, COMELEC cannot be faulted for relying on it. There cannot be
grave abuse of discretion if the body/tribunal merely acted based on the law in
place.
SEPARATE OPINIONS (for the discussion pertinent to mandamus, see the
dissents; remember that mandamus only lies if the action required of the
body/tribunal is MINISTERIAL—that is, if the conditions required are present,
action must done and no further discretion is called for):
PANGANIBAN, concurring: Affirmed the majority, with more or less the same
reasoning.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, concurring: Focused on the distinction between
amendments and revisions.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, concurring: Expounded on the requirements for
GAD in order to justify Rule 65 petitions (she considered this to be the main issue):
An act of a court/tribunal may only be considered as committed in GAD when the
same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment. The abuse
of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an EVASION OF A
POSITIVE DUTY or to a VIRTUAL REFUSAL TO PERFORM A DUTY
ENJOINED BY LAW, or to ACT AT ALL in CONTEMPLATION OF LAW, as
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where the power is exercised in an abritrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility. In the present case, COMELEC's behavior can hardly
be GAD-- it relied on the ruling in Santiago, where the Court 'permanently
enjoined COMELEC from entertaining/taking cognizance of any petition for
initative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been
validly enacted.' It should be noted that while the Court in Santiago was divided,
when the Santiago doctrine was reaffirmed in a later case, PIRMA, it was a
unanimous court.
CALLEJO, SR., concurring:
A writ of certiorari may issue only when the following requirements are set out in
the petition and established:
(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions;
(2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
(And in cases of mandamus, that the duty of the tribunal is a MINISTERIAL
ACTION.)
The question in a rule 65 petition is that of jurisdiction, either the lack or excess
thereof, and abuse of discretion, and not that of judgment. COMELEC denied the
petition based on previous court rulings that interpreted RA 6735. That cannot
possibly be a grave abuse of discretion.
Although Santiago was resolved 8-5 (a majority of the members of the Court who
actually took part in the deliberations thereon), this is still a majority decision that
cannot be modified or reversed by the minority of the members of the Court. When
Santiago was affirmed in PIRMA, it was through a unanimous vote that no longer
needed to resolve the issue on the interpretation of RA 6735, citing precisely the
Santiago ruling. In fact, at the time this decision was rendered, there are pending
bills in both houses of Congress, most of which recognize the ruling in Santiago--
that there is no law sufficient to govern the process of people's initiative.
It should also be noted that the COMELEC's decision to hold/not to hold a
plebiscite is one based on the determination of whether or not the requirements
under the law are met. It only looks at the petition and supporting documents, and
is not authorized to perform any kind of hearing or reception of other evidence.
AZCUNA, concurring: Focused only on amendments and revisions.
PUNO, dissenting: Dissented on both the PoliLaw and RemLaw issues. As to rule
65:
Reliance on Santiago constituted GAD. Santiago did not establish firm doctrine on
the implementation of RA 6735. In the original decision, only 8 justices voted that
RA 6735 was not a suffuicient law; 5 voted it was, and 1 abstained. When an MR
was filed, only 6 reiterated the previous ruling, leading eventually to a 6-6 vote.
Precedent cannot arise from such an evenly-divided court. Given this, one cannot
simply rely on the Santiago ruling.
With stare decisis ruled out, it should also be noted that res judicata cannot set in.
In Santiago, there was a patently improper petition that did not even contain the
signatures of the required number of registered voters as per the pertinent
provision in the law. Here, there is an apparently valid and verified set of
signatures, with the issue being more on the contents of the signature sheet and the
extent of changes to be made. In PIRMA, on the other hand, the case was dismissed
because PIRMA was PARTY to the case in Santiago (through the Pedrosas, who
were representatives of PIRMA). Again, note the clear impropriety of the petition.
QUISUMBING, separate (it agrees with parts of both the majority opinion and
Puno's dissent): As to GAD, again reiterated the COMELEC's lack of GAD given
that it relied on the rulings of the Court.
The permanent injunction in Santiago referred merely to the petition filed in that
case, and not all subsequent petitions for initiative. The fallo, while declaring RA
6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments, merely ordered
the permanent lifting of the TRO issued against COMELEC, and ordered the
dismissal of the petition filed in Santiago. Prior to that, the statements relied on by
the majority were present in a paragraph denominated as the CONCLUSION of the
decision, but it is merely an opinion, since the executory portion is really the
FALLO.
As to the PIRMA ruling, there can be no res judicata with the present case.
Santiago, which was res judicata in PIRMA, was decided on the basis of an
improper petition that lacked proof of the required number of registered voters,
where the petitioners even imposed upon COMELEC the task of gathering more
signatures. Here, there is apparently a valid petition that called for the
determination of the sufficiency of the petition (especially as to the numbers
requirement), and prayed for actions leading to the plebiscite. COMELEC is
mandated under no less than Constitution to determine if such a petition is
sufficient to call for a plebiscite.

CORONA, dissenting: Agreed with Puno's decision on stare decisis (hence VELASCO, JR, dissenting: Like Tinga, he discussed the fallo of Santiago and
Santiago should only be limited to the petition in that case), expounded on res ruled similar to Tinga.
judicata (but the argumentation is similar to Puno-- he did add a discussion on how
the petitions are effectively different in this case, as to content). He also stressed
that RA 6735 should not have been relied upon by the COMELEC in the first place
as the people are the supreme body politic represented only by the Congress and
possible constitutional conventions. Treating RA 6735 as a condition precedent for
the exercise of people's initiative unreasonably restrained the people's right to
directly propose changes to the Constitution (it should be noted that Santiago's
discussion of insufficiency focused on the LACK OF SUB-HEADINGS and
PRESENCE OF INSIGNIFICANT GRAMMATICAL OMISSIONS).

TINGA, dissenting: Added to the GAD issue.

The functions of COMELEC are essentially executive and administrative in nature,
including the determination of sufficiency of the petitions. It should just have
determined if the petitions were sufficient in form and substance, without refusing
to EVEN make that determination because of the Santiago ruling. At any rate,
granting the petitions, if ever, will not mean a grant of the changes. Should the
petitions be found sufficient, it only brings about plebiscite, where it is the
PEOPLE who will make the final decision on whether or not the changes should be
made. If there are any issues with the changes made, it should simply be placed in
the sphere of public debate-- it should be campaigned for.

CHICO-NAZARIO, dissenting: Added to the GAD issue; discussed the Santiago

and PIRMA rulings and why they should not be binding. Their reliance on these
clearly inapplicable decisions constitutes GAD.
Page 3 of 7

Esquivel v. Ombudsman G.R. No. 137237
September 17, 2002 Quisumbing, J.
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Certiorari--Mandamus Digest By: Bries
SUMMARY: Several police officers filed complaint-affidavits against Antonio
Esquivel, municipal mayor of Jaen, Nueva Ecija and his brother, Mark Anthony,
brgy. captain of Brgy. Apo, Jaen. They were charged with illegal arrest, arbitrary
detention, maltreatment, attempted murder and grave threats. After preliminary
investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued a resolution
recommending that petitioners be indicted for less serious physical injuries and
Mayor Esquivel alone for grave threats. The Ombudsman approved the resolution.
Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners pleaded not guilty and
filed an SCA for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with prayer for preliminary
injunction and/or TRO to annul and set aside the Ombudsman resolution. SC: NO
GAD BY OMBUDSMAN, CAN’T AVAIL OF MANDAMUS.
DOCTRINE: Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of
a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary duty. The duty is
ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of
official discretion nor judgment. When a decision has been reached in a matter
involving discretion, a writ of mandamus may not be availed of to review or correct
it, however erroneous it may be. Where another remedy is available in the ordinary
course of law, mandamus will not lie
PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS: SCA for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or TRO to annul and set
aside the Ombudsman resolution, and the order denying petitioners’ MR .
FACTS: PO2 Eduardo and SPO1 Catacutan are residents of Brgy. Dampulan,
Jaen, Nueva Ecija, but assigned with the Regional Intelligence and Investigation
Division, Police Regional Office 3, Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. In their
respective complaint-affidavits, filed before the PNP Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group, Third Regional Office, Eduardo and Catacutan charged Antonio
Esquivel, municipal mayor of Jaen and his brother, Mark Anthony, brgy captain of
Apo, Jaen, with alleged illegal arrest, arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted
murder, and grave threats. Also included in the charges were SPO1 Espiritu, SPO2
Almayda, and LTO Officer Diaz. Eduardo and Catacutan likewise accused P/S Insp.
Padua and SPO3 Bautista of the Jaen Municipal Police Force of dereliction of duty.
The initial investigation conducted by the PNP-CIDG showed that at about 12:30
p.m. of March 14, 1998, Eduardo was about to eat lunch at his parents house at Sta.
Monica Village, Jaen, when petitioners arrived. Espiritu, Almayda, Diaz, and
several unidentified persons accompanied them. Petitioners disarmed Eduardo of
his Cal. 45 service pistol, which was covered by a Memorandum Receipt and
COMELEC Gun Ban Exemption. They forced him to board petitioners’ vehicle and
brought him to the Jaen Municipal Hall.
Page 4 of 7
Eduardo stated that while they were on their way to the town hall, Mayor Esquivel
mauled him with the use of a firearm and threatened to kill him. Mayor Esquivel
pointed a gun at PO2 Eduardo and said “You son of a bitch! I will kill you, I will
create an accident for you. Why are you against me?” Upon reaching the municipal
hall, Mark Anthony shoved Eduardo inside an adjacent hut. Mayor Esquivel then
ordered Espiritu to kill him, then create a scenario and make a report
Catacutan arrived to verify what happened to his teammate, Eduardo, but Mayor
Esquivel threatened him. Mayor Esquivel then ordered P/S Insp. Padua to file
charges against Eduardo. The mayor once again struck Eduardo in the nape with a
handgun, while Mark Anthony was holding the latter. Eduardo then fell and lost
consciousness. When he regained his consciousness, he was told he would be
released. Prior to his release, however, he was forced to sign a statement in the
police blotter that he was in good physical condition.
Eduardo told the PNP-CIDG investigators that he was most likely maltreated and
threatened because of jueteng and tupada. He said the mayor believed he was
among the law enforcers who raided a jueteng den in Jaen that same day. He
surmised that the mayor disliked the fact that he arrested members of crime
syndicates with connections to the mayor. In support of his sworn statement, he
presented a medical certificate showing the injuries he suffered and other
documentary evidence.
After the initial investigation, the PNP-CIDG Third Regional Office forwarded the
records to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for appropriate action.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon conducted a preliminary
investigation and required petitioners and their companions to file their respective
counter-affidavits. In their joint counter-affidavit, petitioners denied the charges
against them. Instead, they alleged that Eduardo is a fugitive from justice with an
outstanding warrant of arrest for malversation. They alleged that the gun
confiscated from Eduardo was the subject of an illegal possession of firearm
complaint.
The Deputy Ombudsman issued a resolution recommending that Mayor Esquivel
and Mark Anthony be indicted for the crime of less serious physical injuries, and
Mayor Esquivel alone for grave threats. The charges against the others were
dismissed, either provisionally or with finality. Ombudsman Desierto approved the
resolution. Separate informations for less serious physical injuries against Mayor
Esquivel and Mark Anthony, and for grave threats against Mayor Esquivel, were
filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman.
As directed by the Sandiganbayan, they filed an MR/reinvestigation with the Office
of the Special Prosecutor. That was denied by the OSP, which the Ombudsman
approved. Petitioners were arraigned in both cases, and they pleaded not guilty to
the charges. With their failure to extend the suspension of proceedings previously
granted by the Sandiganbayan by virtue of their MR, petitioners elevated the
matter to the SC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of public
respondents in rendering the resolution and the order. SC denied their petition for
the issuance of a TRO directing public respondents to refrain from prosecuting
criminal cases.
ISSUES: WON Ombudsman commit GAD in directing the filing of the
informations against petitioners?
WON Sandiganbayan commit GAD in assuming jurisdiction?
HELD: NO to both. The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there
exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding
information with the appropriate courts. Settled is the rule that the SC will not
ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.
Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate and the courts will
not interfere in its exercise. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper
the functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that courts will be
swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public
prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by
a private complainant.
There was no abuse of discretion in disregarding Eduardo’s admission that he was
in good physical condition when he was released from the police headquarters. Such
admission was never brought up during the preliminary investigation. The records
show that no such averment was made in petitioners counter-affidavit nor was
there any document purporting to be the exculpatory statement attached therein as
an annex or exhibit. Petitioners only raised in their MR. In his opposition, Eduardo
did admit signing a document to the effect that he was in good physical condition
when. However, the admission applied to the execution of the document—not the
truthfulness of its contents. Here, certiorari is not the proper remedy. The SC is not
a trier of facts and it is not its function to examine and evaluate the probative value
of all evidence presented to the concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its
impugned decision, resolution or order.
Petitioners theorize that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over their persons
as they hold positions excluded in R.A. No. 7975, as the positions of municipal
mayors and barangay captains are not mentioned. Municipal mayors fall under the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Nor can Mark Anthony
claim that since he is not a municipal mayor, he is outside the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction. R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, provides that it is only in
cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
Page 5 of 7
grade 27 or higher that exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper
RTC, MeTC, MTC, and municipal circuit court, as the case may be, pursuant to
their respective jurisdictions as provided in BP 129, as amended. Under the 1991
LGC, Mayor Esquivel has a salary grade of 27. Since Brgy. Captain Esquivel is the
co-accused of Mayor Esquivel in a criminal case, whose position falls under salary
grade 27, the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion in assuming
jurisdiction over both criminal cases involving them. Hence, the writ of certiorari
cannot issue in petitioners favor.
Petitioners’ prayer for a writ of prohibition must also be denied. A writ of
prohibition is directed to the court itself, commanding it to cease from the exercise
of a jurisdiction to which it has no legal claim. The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction
over criminal cases is clearly founded on law.
Being an extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot be resorted to when the
ordinary and usual remedies provided by law are adequate and available.
Prohibition is granted only where no other remedy is available or sufficient to
afford redress. That the petitioners have another and complete remedy at law,
through an appeal or otherwise, is generally held sufficient reason for denying the
issuance of the writ. In this case, petitioners could have filed a motion to quash the
informations at the first instance but they did not. They have only themselves to
blame for this as they have not shown any adequate excuse for failure to do so.
Petitioners did make a belated oral motion for time to file a motion to quash the
informations, during their arraignment, but its denial is not a proper subject for
certiorari or prohibition as said denial is merely an interlocutory order.
A writ of prohibition will not be issued against an inferior court unless the
attention of the court whose proceedings are sought to be stayed has been called to
the alleged lack or excess of jurisdiction. The foundation of this rule is the respect
and consideration due to the lower court and the expediency of preventing
unnecessary litigation; it cannot be presumed that the lower court would not
properly rule on a jurisdictional objection if it were properly presented. Petitioners
only raised the issue of the alleged lack of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan.
Nor can petitioners claim entitlement to a writ of mandamus. Mandamus is
employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being
its chief use and not a discretionary duty. The duty is ministerial only when the
discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
judgment. Hence, the SC cannot issue a writ of mandamus to control or review the
exercise of discretion by the Ombudsman, for it is his discretion and judgment that
is to be exercised and not that of the SC. When a decision has been reached in a
matter involving discretion, a writ of mandamus may not be availed of to review or
correct it, however erroneous it may be. Petitioners had another remedy available
in the ordinary course of law. Where such remedy is available in the ordinary
course of law, mandamus will not lie.
 Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of
DOLOT v. PAJE GR No. 199199 1995, and the Local Government Code.
August 27, 2013 Reyes, J.  The case was referred to the Executive Judge to Br. 53 of RTC Sorsogon,
TOPIC IN SYLLABUS: Mandamus Digest By: Abu being designated as the Environmental Court.
SUMMARY: Petitioners filed a petition for Continuing Mandamus with the RTC  The case was SUMMARILY DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
against respondents (secretary of DENR and the pertinent mining companies) to
stop the mining operations in their community, and to undertake the rehabilitation RESPONDENT’S (RTC) ARGUMENT(S):
of the mining site. This was summarily dismissed by the RTC for lack of  No final court decree, order or decision yet that the public officials
jurisdiction. The SC held otherwise. allegedly failed to act on, which is a condition for the issuance of a writ of
continuing mandamus
DOCTRINE: The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may  The case was prematurely filed; petitioners failed to exhaust administrative
be availed of "to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law." The remedies
petition should mainly involve an environmental and other related law, rule or
regulation or a right therein. There is no requirement for a previously-rendered ISSUE(S):
final order that the public officials failed to act upon. A writ of continuing WON the petition was dimissible on the ground that there is no final court decree
mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance with a final
that public officials failed to act on  NO.
judgment as it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to
ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court’s
HELD:
decision.
Continuing Mandamus: Concept
The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of
PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS:
"to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law." The
RTC Sorsogon dismissed a petition for Continuing Mandamus. Rule 45 to the SC.
petition should mainly involve an environmental and other related law, rule or
regulation or a right therein. The RTC’s mistaken notion on the need for a final
FACTS:
judgment, decree or order is apparently based on the definition of the writ of
September 15 - petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the parish priest
continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit: (c) Continuing
of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish and the officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina
mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or
saMatnog (petitioners), filed a petition for continuing mandamus, damages and
instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts
attorney’s fees with the RTC of Sorsogon, alleging that:
decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied.
(1) sometime in 2009, they protested the iron ore mining operations being
The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC
conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development
actually pertains to the judgment or decree that a court would eventually render in
Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-otDaco, located in the
an environmental case for continuing mandamus and which judgment or decree
Municipality of Matnog, to no avail;
shall subsequently become final.
(2) Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon and there is a need to protect,
A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance
preserve and maintain the geological foundation of the municipality;
with a final judgment as it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment
(3) Matnog is susceptible to flooding and landslides, and confronted with the
in order to ensure the successful
environmental dangers of flood hazard, liquefaction, ground settlement, ground
implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court’s decision.
subsidence and landslide hazard;
(4) after investigation, they learned that the mining operators did not have the
After the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8, Section 7 and
required permit to operate;
such judgment has become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the
(5) Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the
case to ensure that the government agency concerned is performing its tasks as
operators a small-scale mining permit, which they did not have authority to issue; mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance of said tasks. It is only
(6) the representatives of the Presidential Management Staff and the Department upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a final return of
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did not do the writ shall be made to the court and if the court finds that the judgment has
anything to protect the interest of the people of Matnog;and
been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be
(7) the respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the People’s
Page 6 of 7
entered in the court docket.
Procedural Defects
Form and Substance There is nothing in Rule 8 that compels the inclusion of judicial affidavits, albeit
Similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special civil actions not prohibited. Finally, failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents is
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules requires not a fatal defect such that the case should be dismissed .
that the petition filed should be sufficient in form and substance before a court may
take further action. PETITION GRANTED
Sufficiency in form: the petition must be verified and must contain supporting
evidence as well as a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. It is also necessary
that the petitioner must be one who is aggrieved by an act or omission of the
government agency, instrumentality or its officer concerned.
Sufficiency of substance: the petition must contain substantive allegations
specifically constituting an actionable neglect or omission and must establish, at the
very least, a prima facie basis for the issuance of the writ, viz: (1) an agency or
instrumentality of government or its officer unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right; (2) the
act to be performed by the government agency, instrumentality or its officer is
specifically enjoined by law as a duty; (3) such duty results from an office, trust or
station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law,
rule or regulation or a right therein; and (4) there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the course of law.

Jurisdiction
By virtue of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
is vested in the RTC.

A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 was issued pursuant to Section 18 of
B.P. Blg. 129, which gave the Court authority to define the territory over which a
branch of the RTC shall exercise its authority. These administrative orders and
circulars issued by the Court merely provide for the venue where an action may be
filed.

In this case, it appears that the alleged actionable neglect or omission occurred in
the Municipality of Matnog and as such, the petition should have been filed in the
RTC of Irosin. But even then, it does not warrant the outright dismissal of the
petition by the RTC as venue may be waived.

Non-exhaustion of administrative remedies

Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when there is a
disagreement between the parties as to some provisions of the contract between
them, which needs the interpretation and the application of that particular
knowledge and expertise possessed by members of that Panel. It is not proper when
one of the parties repudiates the existence or validity of such contract or agreement
on the ground of fraud or oppression as in this case.
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