Concocted excuse

A LAW EAC H DAY (Keeps Trouble Away) By Jose C . Sison (The Philippine Star) Updated July 29,

(People vs. Tibon, G.R. 188320, June 29, 2010).

Every human is presumed sane (Article 800 C ivil C ode). So anyone who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity under Article 12(1) of the Revised Penal C ode has the burden of proving it by clear
and convincing evidence. He/she has the burden of proving insanity because he/she already admits to have
committed the crime but s till denies guilt due to insanity. This rule is illus trated in this case of Tino.

Since 1994, Tino had been living-in with his common law wife Naty at the third floor of a rented
house where his parents and siblings also lived. Tino and Naty had two children, 3 -year old Kit and 2-year
old Ron. Financial difficulties drove Na ty to work in Hong Kong as domestic helper, leaving behind their kids
under the care and custody of Tino. Sometime later Tino heard from his sister who was also working in HK
that Naty was having an affair with ano ther man. Since then Tino had been drinking and maltreating Kit and
Ron.

On December 12, 1998 at around 11:30 p.m. when Tino’s mo ther and two sisters went to his room,
they were shocked to see Kit and Ron lying on the floor with s tab wo unds on their body appearing to be
lifeless already. When Tino realized the presence of his mother and siblings, he stabbed himself on the chest
with a kitchen knife and then tried to end his life by jumping out of the window in the presence of his
horrified mother and sisters. Tino sus tained head injury and was broug ht to the hospital together with his
sons. He survived but his sons could not be revived anymore.

When told about the incident, Naty immediately f lew back to Manila the next day and confronted
Tino at the hospital. Tino confessed to stabbing his children and begged for her forgiveness. Subsequently,
the police investiga tor also interviewed Tino after informing him of his constitutio nal rights. Tino confided to
the investigator tha t he was despondent and voluntarily admitted that he stabbed his sons. O ne of his
sisters also told the police that Tino was responsible for the k illings.

When charged with double parricide, Tino pleaded not guilty and raised insanity as a defense. He
said he could not recall what happened on the night he supposedly stabbed his sons and could not
remember being taken to the hospital. He testified that he was only informed by his sisters that he had
killed them, causing him to jump off the window of their home. Aside from his tes timony, Tino presented his
medical record at the Natio nal C enter for Mental Health (NC MH) sho wing an uns table mind deprived of
intelligence. C oupled with his strange behavior and lack of recollection of the s tabbing incident, he said that
the killing of his children was thus involuntary.

But the Regional Trial C ourt (RTC ) still found Tino g uilty of two counts of parricide and s entenced
him to death on each count. This was affirmed by the C ourt of Appeals (C A with the modification as to
penalty which was reduced to reclusion perpetua. Were the RTC and C A correct?

Yes. The NC MH records about Tino’s mental condition only pertain to his ability to stand trial and
not to his mental s tate immediately before or during the commission of the crime. He acted out of jealous
rage at the thought of his wife having an affair. But uncontrolled jealously and anger or being despondent
are not equivalent to insanity. There is a vast difference between a genuinely insane person and one who
has worked himself up into such frenzy that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does. Only

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when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime should the
exempting circumstance of insanity be considered. The professed inability of the accused to recall events
before and after the stabbing incident does not necessarily indicate an aberrant mind but is more i ndicative
of a concocted excuse to exculpate himself. It is simply too convenient for Tino to claim that he cannot
remember anything rather than face the consequences of his terrible deed.

Hence the requirements for a finding of insanity have not been met by Tino. The presumption of
sanity has not been overcome. Tino voluntarily killed his children on the night of December 12, 1998. T he
commission of parricide is punished more severely than homicide since human beings are expected to love
and support those closest to them. The extreme response of killing one’s own flesh and blood is indeed
unnatural and tragic. Tino must thus be handed down the harshest penalty of reclusion perpetua for the
crimes against his innocent children.

Brazen move
A LAW EAC H DAY (Keeps Trouble Away) By Jose C . Sison (The Philippine Star) Updated August 12, 2010

12:00 AM C omments (2)

(Continental Steel Mfg. Corp vs. Montano et.al. e tc., G.R. 182836, October 13, 2009 )

As expected, and despite protestations to the contrary, they are now floating the ide a of legalizing abortion
or the taking of the life of an innocent, defenseless, unborn child in the mother’s womb. This la test move
just confirms the long held view that the so-called reproductive health and reproductive rights of women,
provided for in the RH bill, necessarily presupposes access not only to contraception but also to abortion.

This is indeed a brazen and aggressive move as it is directly in violation of the constitutional manda te
protecting the life even of an unborn child in the womb (Article 2, Section 12). In fact in this latest case, the
Supreme C ourt has clearly and categorically declared that the term “child ” as used in this Section includes
the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.

This is the case of Rolly, an employee of a steel manufa cturing company (C SMC ) and a member of a labor
union (Union) which has a collective bargaining agreement (C BA) with C MSC . Among the provisions in the
C BA are the grant of 7 to 11 days bereavement leave with pay and death and accident benefits amounting
to P11,550 to any employee in case of death of the employee’s legitimate (dependent) parents, spouse,
children brothers and sisters.

On January 5, 2006, Rolly’s wife Fe who was then on the 38th week of pregnancy had a premature delivery.
According to the C ertificate of Fetal Death dated January 7, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal
Anoxia secondary to utero-placental insufficiency.

So on January 9, 2006 Rolly filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident
Insurance for dependent pursuant to the C BA. C SMC granted Rolly’s claim for paternity leave but denied his
claims for bereavement and other death benefits particularly the death and accident insurance.

According to the C SMC , the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus without legal
personality. It reasoned out tha t a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all.

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Hence the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A fetus
that was delivered dead could no t be considered dependent since it never needed any support, nor did it
ever acquire the right to be supported. Was C SMC correct?

No. The rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the
parents of the unborn child upon the la tter’s death. While the C ivil C ode expressly provides that civil
personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired
juridical personality could die.

Death is the cessation of life. Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the
C onstitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the
life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation there of even prior to the child being
delivered, qualifies as death.

Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the C BA. Even an unborn child is a
dependent of its parents. Rolly’s child could not have reached 38 -39 weeks of its gestational life without
depending upon its mother for sustenance. The C BA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent,
such tha t the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality. Without such qualification,
then child should be understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s
womb. So Rolly is entitled to the bereavement leave pay of P4,939 and other death benefits amounting to
P11, 550.