Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
AGAINST
HONOR
Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
ERWIN TULFO, G.R.
No. 161032
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - QUISUMBING,
J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
NACHURA,* and
and ATTY. CARLOS T.
SO, BRION, JJ.
Respondents.
x--------------------------------
-----------x
SUSAN CAMBRI, REY
SALAO, G.R. No. 161176
JOCELYN BARLIZO,
and
PHILIP PICHAY,
Petitioners,
- versus -
COURT OF APPEALS,
PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
and Promulgated:
CARLOS SO,
Respondents. September
16, 2008
x--------------------------------
----------------------------------
-----------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The freedom of the press
is one of the cherished
hallmarks of our
democracy; but even as
we strive to protect and
respect the fourth estate,
the freedom it enjoys must
be balanced with
responsibility. There is a
fine line between freedom
of expression and libel,
and it falls on the courts
to determine whether or
not that line has been
crossed.
The Facts
On the complaint of Atty.
Carlos Ding So of the
Bureau of Customs, four
(4) separate informations
were filed on September 8,
1999 with the Regional
Trial Court in (RTC)
Pasay City. These were
assigned to Branch 112
and docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 99-1597 to 99-
1600, and charged
petitioners Erwin Tulfo,
as author/writer, Susan
Cambri, as managing
editor, Rey Salao, as
national editor, Jocelyn
Barlizo, as city editor, and
Philip Pichay, as president
of the Carlo Publishing
House, Inc., of the daily
tabloid Remate, with the
crime of libel in
connection with the
publication of the articles
in the column Direct Hit
in the issues of May 11,
1999; May 12, 1999; May
19, 1999; and June 25,
1999.[1] The four
informations read as
follows:
Criminal Case No. 99-
1598
That on or about the 11 th
day of May, 1999 in Pasay
City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the
above-named accused,
conspiring and
confederating together
and mutually helping one
another, being then the
columnist, publisher and
managing editor,
respectively of REMATE,
a tabloid published daily
and of general circulation
in the Philippines, did
then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously
and with malicious intent
to discredit or dishonor
complainant, ATTY.
CARLOS DING SO, and
with the malicious intent
of injuring and exposing
said complainant to public
hatred, contempt and
ridicule, write and publish
in the regular issue of said
publication on May 11,
1999, its daily column
DIRECT HIT, quoted
hereunder, to wit:
PINAKAMAYAMAN SA
CUSTOMS
Ito palang si Atty.
Ding So ng
Intelligence
Division ng
Bureau of
Customs and [sic]
pinakamayaman
na yata na
government
official sa buong
bansa sa
pangungurakot
lamang diyan sa
South Harbor.
Hindi matibag ang
gagong attorney
dahil malakas daw
ito sa Iglesia ni
Kristo.
Hoy, So! . .
nakakahiya ka sa
mga INC, ikaw na
yata ang
pinakagago at
magnanakaw na
miyembro nito.
Balita ko, malapit
ka nang itiwalag
ng nasabing
simbahan dahil sa
mga kalokohan
mo.
Abangan bukas
ang mga raket ni
So sa BOC.
WHEREIN said
complainant was
indicated as an
extortionist, a
corrupt public
official, smuggler
and having
illegally acquired
wealth, all as
already stated,
with the object of
destroying his
reputation,
discrediting and
ridiculing him
before the bar of
public opinion.[2]
Criminal Case No. 99-
1599
That on or about the 12 th
day of May, 1999 in Pasay
City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the
above-named accused,
conspiring and
confederating together
and mutually helping one
another, being then the
columnist, publisher and
managing editor,
respectively of REMATE,
a tabloid published daily
and of general circulation
in the Philippines, did
then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously
and with malicious intent
to discredit or dishonor
complainant, ATTY.
CARLOS DING SO, and
with the malicious intent
of injuring and exposing
said complainant to public
hatred, contempt and
ridicule, write and publish
in the regular issue of said
publication on May 12,
1999, in daily column
DIRECT HIT, quoted
hereunder, to wit:
SI ATTY. SO NG
BOC
LINTEK din sa
pangungurakot
itong Ding So ng
Bureau of
Customs
Intelligence Unit
sa .
Daan-daang
libong piso ang
kinikita ng masiba
at matakaw na si
So sa mga
importer na ayaw
ideklara ang
totoong laman ng
mga container
para makaiwas sa
pagbayad ng
malaking customs
duties at taxes.
Si So ang
nagpapadrino sa
mga pag-
inspection ng mga
container na ito.
Siyempre-
binibigyan din
niya ng salapi
yung ibang mga
ahensiya para
pumikit na lang at
itikom ang
kanilang nga [sic]
bibig diyan sa mga
buwayang taga
BOC.
Awang-awa ako sa
ating gobyerno.
Bankrupt na nga,
ninanakawan pa
ng mga kawatan
tulad ni So.
Ewan ko ba rito
kay Atty. So, bakit
hindi na lang
tumayo ng sarili
niyang robbery-
hold-up gang para
kumita ng mas
mabilis.
Hoy So.. hindi
bagay sa iyo ang
pagiging attorney .
. . Mas bagay sa
iyo ang pagiging
buwayang naka
korbata at
holdaper.
Magnanakaw ka
So!!
WHEREIN said
complainant was
indicated as an
extortionist, a
corrupt public
official, smuggler
and having
illegally acquired
wealth, all as
already stated,
with the object of
destroying his
reputation,
discrediting and
ridiculing him
before the bar of
public opinion.[3]
Criminal Case No. 99-
1600
th
That on or about 19 day
of May, 1999 in Pasay
City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the
above-named accused,
conspiring and
confederating together
and mutually helping one
another, being then the
columnist, publisher and
managing editor,
respectively of REMATE,
a tabloid published daily
and of general circulation
in the Philippines, did
then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously
and with malicious intent
to discredit or dishonor
complainant, ATTY.
CARLOS DING SO, and
with the malicious intent
of injuring and exposing
said complainant to public
hatred, contempt and
ridicule, write and publish
in the regular issue of said
publication on May 19,
1999, in daily column
DIRECT HIT, quoted
hereunder, to wit:
xxxx
Tulad ni Atty.
Ding So ng
Bureau of
Customs
Intelligence
Division, saksakan
din ng lakas itong
si Daniel Aquino
ng Presidential
Anti-Smuggling
Unit na
nakatalaga sa .
Tulad ni So,
magnanakaw na
tunay itong si
Aquino.
Panghihingi ng
pera sa mga
brokers, ang lakad
nito.
Pag hindi
nagbigay ng pera
ang mga brokers,
maiipit ang pagre-
release ng
kanilang
kargamento.
WHEREIN said
complainant was
indicated as an
extortionist, a corrupt
public official, smuggler
and having illegally
acquired wealth, all as
already stated, with the
object of destroying his
reputation, discrediting
and ridiculing him before
the bar of public opinion.
[4]
Criminal Case No. 99-
1597
th
That on or about 25 day
of June, 1999 in Pasay
City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the
above-named accused,
conspiring and
confederating together
and mutually helping one
another, being then the
columnist, publisher and
managing editor,
respectively of REMATE,
a tabloid published daily
and of general circulation
in the Philippines, did
then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously
and with malicious intent
to discredit or dishonor
complainant, ATTY.
CARLOS DING T. SO,
and with the malicious
intent of injuring and
exposing said complainant
to public hatred, contempt
and ridicule, write and
publish in the regular
issue of said publication
on June 25, 1999, its daily
column DIRECT HIT,
quoted hereunder, to wit:
xxxx
Nagfile ng P10 M
na libel suit itong
si Atty. Carlos So
ng Bureau of
Customs laban sa
inyong lingkod at
ilang opisyales ng
Remate sa Pasay
City Court.
Nagalit itong
tarantadong si
Atty. So dahil
binanatan ko siya
at inexpose ang
kagaguhan niya sa
BOC.
Hoy, So . . .
dagdagan mo pa
ang pagnanakaw
mo dahil hindi
kita tatantanan.
Buhay ka pa
sinusunog na ang
iyong kaluluwa sa
impyerno.
WHEREIN said
complainant was
indicated as an
extortionist, a
corrupt public
official, smuggler
and having
illegally acquired
wealth, all as
already stated,
with the object of
destroying his
reputation,
discrediting and
ridiculing him
before the bar of
public opinion.[5]
On November 3, 1999,
Tulfo, Salao, and Cambri
were arraigned, while
Barlizo and Pichay were
arraigned on December
15, 1999. They all pleaded
not guilty to the offenses
charged.
At pre-trial, the following
were admitted by
petitioners: (1) that
during the four dates of
the publication of the
questioned articles, the
complaining witness was
not assigned at South
Harbor; (2) that the
accused and complaining
witness did not know each
other during all the time
material to the four dates
of publication; (3) that
Remate is a
newspaper/tabloid of
general circulation in the
Philippines; (4) the
existence and genuineness
of the Remate newspaper;
(5) the column therein and
its authorship and the
alleged libelous statement
as well as the editorial
post containing the
designated positions of the
other accused; and (6) the
prosecutions qualified
admission that it is the
duty of media persons to
expose corruption.[6]
The prosecution presented
four witnesses, namely:
Oscar M. Ablan, Atty.
James Fortes, Jr., Gladys
Fontanilla, and
complainant Atty. So. The
prosecution presented
documentary evidence as
well.
Ablan testified that he
had read the four columns
written by Tulfo, and that
the articles were untrue
because he had known
Atty. So since 1992 and
had worked with him in
the Customs Intelligence
and Investigation Service
Division of the Bureau of
Customs. He further
testified that upon reading
the articles written by
Tulfo, he concluded that
they referred to Atty. So
because the subject
articles identified Atty.
Carlos as Atty. Ding So of
the Customs Intelligence
and Investigation Service
Division, Bureau of
Customs and there was
only one Atty. Carlos Ding
So of the Bureau of
Customs.[7]
Fontanilla, Records
Officer I of the Bureau of
Customs, testified that she
issued a certification in
connection with these
cases upon the request of
Atty. So.[8] This
certification stated that as
per records available in
her office, there was only
one employee by the name
of Atty. Carlos T. So who
was also known as Atty.
Ding So in the Intelligence
Division of the Customs
Intelligence and
Investigation Service or in
the entire Bureau of
Customs.[9]
Atty. Fortes testified that
he knew Atty. So as a
fellow member of the
Iglesia Ni Kristo and as a
lawyer, and that having
read the articles of Tulfo,
he believed that these
were untrue, as he knew
Atty. Carlos Ding So.[10]
Atty. So testified that he
was the private
complainant in these
consolidated cases. He
further testified that he is
also known as Atty. Ding
So, that he had been
connected with the
Bureau of Customs since
October 1981, and that he
was assigned as Officer-
in-Charge (OIC) of the
Customs Intelligence and
Investigation Service
Division at the Manila
International Container
Port since December 27,
1999. He executed two
complaint-affidavits, one
dated June 4, 1999 and
the other dated July 5,
1999, for Criminal Case
Nos. 99-1598 to 99-1600.
Prior to this, he also filed
14 cases of libel against
Raffy Tulfo, brother of
petitioner Erwin Tulfo. He
testified that petitioner
Tulfos act of imputing
upon him criminality,
assailing his honesty and
integrity, caused him
dishonor, discredit, and
contempt among his co-
members in the legal
profession, co-officers of
the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, co-members
and peers in the Iglesia ni
Kristo, his co-officers and
employees and superior
officers in the Bureau of
Customs, and among
ordinary persons who had
read said articles. He said
it also caused him and his
family sleepless nights,
mental anguish, wounded
feelings, intrigues, and
embarrassment. He
further testified that he
included in his complaint
for libel the officers of
Remate such as the
publisher, managing
editor, city editor, and
national editor because
under Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code
(RPC), they are equally
responsible and liable to
the same extent as if they
were the author of the
articles. He also testified
that Ding is his nickname
and that he is the only
person in the entire
Bureau of Customs who
goes by the name of Atty.
Carlos T. So or Atty.
Carlos Ding So.[11]
In his defense, petitioner
Tulfo testified that he did
not write the subject
articles with malice, that
he neither knew Atty. So
nor met him before the
publication of the articles.
He testified that his
criticism of a certain Atty.
So of the South Harbor
was not directed against
the complainant, but
against a person by the
name of Atty. Ding So at
the South Harbor. Tulfo
claimed that it was the
practice of certain people
to use other peoples
names to advance their
corrupt practices. He also
claimed that his articles
had neither discredited
nor dishonored the
complainant because as
per his source in the
Bureau of Customs, Atty.
So had been promoted. He
further testified that he
did not do any research on
Atty. So before the subject
articles, because as a
columnist, he had to rely
on his source, and that he
had several sources in the
Bureau of Customs,
particularly in the South
Harbor.[12]
Petitioner Salao testified
that he came to know
Atty. Carlos Ding So when
the latter filed a case
against them. He testified
that he is an employee of
Carlo Publishing House,
Inc.; that he was
designated as the national
editor of the newspaper
Remate since December
1999; that the duties of
the position are to edit,
evaluate, encode, and
supervise layout of the
news from the provinces;
and that Tulfo was under
the supervision of Rey
Briones, Vice President
for Editorial and Head of
the Editorial Division.
Salao further testified that
he had no participation in
the subject articles of
Tulfo, nor had he
anything to do with the
latters column.[13]
Petitioner Cambri,
managing editor of
Remate, testified that she
classifies the news articles
written by the reporters,
and that in the Editorial
Division, the officers are
herself; Briones, her
supervisor; Lydia Bueno,
as news and city editor;
and Salao as national
editor. She testified that
petitioner Barlizo is her
subordinate, whose duties
and responsibilities are
the typesetting, editing,
and layout of the page
assigned to her, the Metro
page. She further testified
that she had no
participation in the
writing, editing, or
publication of the column
of Tulfo because the
column was not edited.
She claimed that none
among her co-accused
from the Remate
newspaper edited the
columns of Tulfo, that the
publication and editing of
the subject articles were
the responsibility of Tulfo,
and that he was given
blanket authority to write
what he wanted to write.
She also testified that the
page wherein Tulfos
column appeared was
supervised by Bueno as
news editor.[14]
Petitioner Pichay testified
that he had been the
president of Carlo
Publishing House, Inc.
since December 1998. He
testified that the company
practice was to have the
columnists report directly
to the vice-president of
editorials, that the
columnists were given
autonomy on their
columns, and that the
vice-president for
editorials is the one who
would decide what articles
are to be published and
what are not. He further
testified that Tulfo was
already a regular
contributor.[15]
The Ruling of the RTC
In a Decision dated
November 17, 2000, the
RTC found petitioners
guilty of the crime of
Libel. The dispositive
portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court
finds the accused ERWIN
TULFO, SUSAN
CAMBRI, REY SALAO,
JOCELYN BARLIZO
and PHILIP PICHAY
guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of four (4) counts of
the crime of LIBEL, as
defined in Article 353 of
the Revised Penal Code,
and penalized by prision
correccional in its
minimum and medium
periods, or a fine ranging
from P200.00 Pesos to
P6,000.00 Pesos or both,
under Article 355 of the
same Code.
Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the Court hereby
sentences EACH of the
accused to suffer
imprisonment of SIX (6)
MONTHS of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to
FOUR (4) YEARS and
TWO (2) MONTHS of
prision correccional, as
maximum, for EACH
count with accessory
penalties provided by law.
Considering that the
accused Erwin Tulfo,
Susan Cambri, Rey Salao,
Jocelyn Barlizo and Philip
Pichay wrote and
published the four (4)
defamatory articles with
reckless disregard, being,
in the mind of the Court,
of whether it was false or
not, the said articles
libelous per se, they are
hereby ordered to pay,
jointly and severally, the
sum of EIGHT
HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P800,000.00) PESOS, as
actual damages, the sum
of ONE MILLION
PESOS (P1,000,000.00),
as moral damages, and an
additional amount of
FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00), by way of
exemplary damages, all
with subsidiary
imprisonment, in case of
insolvency, and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.[16]
The Ruling of the Court
of Appeals
Before the Court of
Appeals (CA), Tulfo
assigned the following
errors:
1. THE ERRED IN
IGNORING THE
UNREBUTTED
TESTIMONY OF THE
APPELLANT THAT HE
DID NOT CRITICIZE
THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT
WORKING AT THE
NAIA. HE CRITICIZED
ANOTHER PERSON
WORKING AT THE .
HENCE, THE
ELEMENT OF
IDENTITY IS
LACKING.
2. THE ERRED IN
IGNORING THE LACK
OF THE ESSENTIAL
ELEMENT OF
DISCREDIT OR
DISHONOR, AS
DEFINED BY
JURISPRUDENCE.
3. THERE WAS NO
MALICE AGAINST THE
PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT ATTY.
CARLOS DING SO.[17]
His co-accused assigned
the following errors:
A
The trial court seriously
erred in holding accused
Susan Cambri, Rey Salao,
Jocelyn Barlizo and Philip
Pichay liable for the
defamations contained in
the questioned articles
despite the fact that the
trial court did not have
any finding as to their
participation in the
writing, editing and/or
publication of the
questioned articles.
B
The trial court seriously
erred in concluding that
libel was committed by all
of the accused on the basis
of its finding that the
elements of libel have
been satisfactorily
established by evidence on
record.
C
The trial court seriously
erred in considering
complainant to be the one
referred to by Erwin Tulfo
in his articles in question.
[18]
In a Decision[19] dated
June 17, 2003, the Eighth
Division of the CA
dismissed the appeal and
affirmed the judgment of
the trial court. A motion
for reconsideration dated
June 30, 2003 was filed by
Tulfo, while the rest of his
co-accused filed a motion
for reconsideration dated
July 2, 2003. In a
Resolution dated
December 11, 2003, both
motions were denied for
lack of merit.[20]
Petitions for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45
Tulfo brought this petition
docketed as G.R. No.
161032, seeking to reverse
the Decision of the CA in
CA-G.R. CR No. 25318
which affirmed the
decision of the RTC.
Petitioners Cambri, Salao,
Barlizo, and Pichay
brought a similar petition
docketed as G.R. No.
161176, seeking the
nullification of the same
CA decision.
In a Resolution dated
March 15, 2004, the two
cases were consolidated
since both cases arise
from the same set of facts,
involve the same parties,
assail the same decision of
the CA, and seek identical
reliefs.[21]
Assignment of Errors
Petitioner Tulfo submitted
the following assignment
of errors:
I
Assuming that the
Prosecution presented
credible and relevant
evidence, the Honorable
CA erred in not declaring
the assailed articles as
privileged; the CA erred
in concluding that malice
in law exists by the courts
having incorrectly
reasoned out that malice
was presumed in the
instant case.
II
Even assuming arguendo
that the articles
complained of are not
privileged, the lower
court, nonetheless,
committed gross error as
defined by the provisions
of Section 6 of Rule 45 by
its misappreciation of the
evidence presented on
matters substantial and
material to the guilt or
innocence of the
petitioner.[22]
Petitioners Cambri, Salao,
Barlizo, and Pichay
submitted their own
assignment of errors, as
follows:
A - The Court of Appeals
Seriously Erred In Its
Application of Article 360
Of The Revised Penal
Code By Holding Cambri,
Salao And Barlizo Liable
For The Defamatory
Articles In The May 11,
12, 19 And June 25, 1999
Issues Of Remate Simply
Because They Were
Managing Editor,
National Editor And City
Editor Respectively Of
Remate And By Holding
Pichay Also Liable For
Libel Merely Because He
Was The President Of
Carlo Publishing House,
Inc. Without Taking Into
Account The Unrebutted
Evidence That Petitioners
Had No Participation In
The Editing Or
Publication Of The
Defamatory Articles In
Question.
B - The Court Of Appeals
Committed Grave Abuse
Of Discretion In
Manifestly Disregarding
The Unrebutted Evidence
That Petitioners Had No
Participation In The
Editing Or Publication Of
The Defamatory Articles
In Question.
C - The Court Of Appeals
Seriously Misappreciated
The Evidence In Holding
That The Person Referred
To In The Published
Articles Was Private
Complainant Atty. Carlos
So.[23]
Our Ruling
The petitions must be
dismissed.
The assignment of errors
of petitioner Tulfo shall be
discussed first.
In his appeal, Tulfo claims
that the CA erred in not
applying the ruling in
Borjal v. Court of Appeals.
[24] In essence, he argues
that the subject articles
fall under qualifiedly
privileged communication
under Borjal and that the
presumption of malice in
Art. 354 of the RPC does
not apply. He argues that
it is the burden of the
prosecution to prove
malice in fact.
This case must be
distinguished from Borjal
on several points, the first
being that Borjal stemmed
from a civil action for
damages based on libel,
and was not a criminal
case. Second, the ruling in
Borjal was that there was
no sufficient identification
of the complainant, which
shall be differentiated
from the present case in
discussing the second
assignment of error of
Tulfo. Third, the subject in
Borjal was a private
citizen, whereas in the
present case, the subject is
a public official. Finally, it
was held in Borjal that the
articles written by Art
Borjal were fair
commentaries on matters
of public interest.[25] It
shall be discussed and has
yet to be determined
whether or not the articles
fall under the category of
fair commentaries.
In passing, it must be
noted that the defense of
Tulfos articles being
qualifiedly privileged
communication is raised
for the first time in the
present petition, and this
particular issue was never
brought before either the
RTC or the CA. Thus,
neither the RTC nor the
CA had a chance to
properly consider and
evaluate this defense.
Tulfo now draws parallels
between his case and that
of Art Borjal, and argues
that the prosecution
should have proved
malice in fact, and it was
error on the part of the
trial and appellate courts
to use the presumption of
malice in law in Art. 354
of the RPC. This lays an
unusual burden on the
part of the prosecution,
the RTC, and the CA to
refute a defense that Tulfo
had never raised before
them. Whether or not the
subject articles are
privileged
communications must
first be established by the
defense, which it failed to
do at the level of the RTC
and the CA. Even so, it
shall be dealt with now,
considering that an appeal
in a criminal proceeding
throws the whole case
open for review.
There is no question of the
status of Atty. So as a
public official, who served
as the OIC of the Bureau
of Customs Intelligence
and Investigation Service
at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport
(NAIA) at the time of the
printing of the allegedly
libelous articles. Likewise,
it cannot be refuted that
the goings-on at the
Bureau of Customs, a
government agency, are
matters of public interest.
It is now a matter of
establishing whether the
articles of Tulfo are
protected as qualified
privileged communication
or are defamatory and
written with malice, for
which he would be liable.
Freedom of the Press v.
Responsibility of the Press
The Court has long
respected the freedom of
the press, and upheld the
same when it came to
commentaries made on
public figures and matters
of public interest. Even in
cases wherein the freedom
of the press was given
greater weight over the
rights of individuals, the
Court, however, has
stressed that such freedom
is not absolute and
unbounded. The exercise
of this right or any right
enshrined in the Bill of
Rights, indeed, comes
with an equal burden of
responsible exercise of
that right. The recognition
of a right is not free
license for the one
claiming it to run
roughshod over the rights
of others.
The Journalists Code of
Ethics adopted by the
National Union of
Journalists of the
Philippines shows that the
press recognizes that it
has standards to follow in
the exercise of press
freedom; that this
freedom carries duties
and responsibilities. Art. I
of said code states that
journalists recognize the
duty to air the other side
and the duty to correct
substantive errors
promptly. Art. VIII states
that journalists shall
presume persons accused
of crime of being innocent
until proven otherwise.
In the present case, it
cannot be said that Tulfo
followed the Journalists
Code of Ethics and
exercised his journalistic
freedom responsibly.
In his series of articles, he
targeted one Atty. Ding So
of the Bureau of Customs
as being involved in
criminal activities, and
was using his public
position for personal gain.
He went even further than
that, and called Atty. So
an embarrassment to his
religion, saying ikaw na
yata ang pinakagago at
magnanakaw sa miyembro
nito.[26] He accused Atty.
So of stealing from the
government with his
alleged corrupt activities.
[27] And when Atty. So
filed a libel suit against
him, Tulfo wrote another
article, challenging Atty.
So, saying, Nagalit itong
tarantadong si Atty. So
dahil binabantayan ko siya
at in-expose ang
kagaguhan niya sa
[Bureau of Customs].[28]
In his testimony, Tulfo
admitted that he did not
personally know Atty. So,
and had neither met nor
known him prior to the
publication of the subject
articles. He also admitted
that he did not conduct a
more in-depth research of
his allegations before he
published them, and
relied only on his source
at the Bureau of Customs.
In his defense before the
trial court, Tulfo claimed
knowledge of people using
the names of others for
personal gain, and even
stated that he had been
the victim of such a
practice. He argued then
that it may have been
someone else using the
name of Atty. So for
corrupt practices at the
South Harbor, and this
person was the target of
his articles. This
argument weakens his
case further, for even with
the knowledge that he
may be in error, even
knowing of the possibility
that someone else may
have used Atty. Sos name,
as Tulfo surmised, he
made no effort to verify
the information given by
his source or even to
ascertain the identity of
the person he was
accusing.
The trial court found
Tulfos accusations against
Atty. So to be false, but
Tulfo argues that the
falsity of contents of
articles does not affect
their privileged character.
It may be that the falsity
of the articles does not
prove malice. Neither did
Borjal give journalists
carte blanche with regard
to their publications. It
cannot be said that a false
article accusing a public
figure would always be
covered by the mantle of
qualified privileged
communication. The
portion of Borjal cited by
Tulfo must be scrutinized
further:
Even assuming that the
contents of the articles are
false, mere error,
inaccuracy or even falsity
alone does not prove
actual malice. Errors or
misstatements are
inevitable in any scheme
of truly free expression
and debate. Consistent
with good faith and
reasonable care, the press
should not be held to
account, to a point of
suppression, for honest
mistakes or imperfections
in the choice of language.
There must be some room
for misstatement of fact as
well as for misjudgment.
Only by giving them
much leeway and
tolerance can they
courageously and
effectively function as
critical agencies in our
democracy. In Bulletin
Publishing Corp. v. Noel
we held
A newspaper
especially one
national in reach
and coverage,
should be free to
report on events
and developments
in which the
public has a
legitimate interest
with minimum
fear of being
hauled to court by
one group or
another on
criminal or civil
charges for libel,
so long as the
newspaper
respects and keeps
within the
standards of
morality and
civility prevailing
within the general
community.
To avoid the self-
censorship that would
necessarily accompany
strict liability for
erroneous statements,
rules governing liability
for injury to reputation
are required to allow an
adequate margin of error
by protecting some
inaccuracies. It is for the
same reason that the New
York Times doctrine
requires that liability for
defamation of a public
official or public figure
may not be imposed in the
absence of proof of actual
malice on the part of the
person making the
libelous statement.[29]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Reading more deeply into
the case, the exercise of
press freedom must be
done consistent with good
faith and reasonable care.
This was clearly
abandoned by Tulfo when
he wrote the subject
articles. This is no case of
mere error or honest
mistake, but a case of a
journalist abdicating his
responsibility to verify his
story and instead
misinforming the public.
Journalists may be
allowed an adequate
margin of error in the
exercise of their
profession, but this
margin does not expand
to cover every defamatory
or injurious statement
they may make in the
furtherance of their
profession, nor does this
margin cover total
abandonment of
responsibility.
Borjal may have expanded
the protection of qualified
privileged communication
beyond the instances
given in Art. 354 of the
RPC, but this expansion
does not cover Tulfo. The
addition to the instances
of qualified privileged
communications is
reproduced as follows:
To reiterate, fair
commentaries on matters
of public interest are
privileged and constitute a
valid defense in an action
for libel or slander. The
doctrine of fair comment
means that while in
general every
discreditable imputation
publicly made is deemed
false, because every man
is presumed innocent until
his guilt is judicially
proved, and every false
imputation is deemed
malicious, nevertheless,
when the discreditable
imputation is directed
against a public person in
his public capacity, it is
not necessarily actionable.
In order that such
discreditable imputation
to a public official may be
actionable, it must either
be a false allegation of fact
or a comment based on a
false supposition. If the
comment is an expression
of opinion, based on
established facts, then it is
immaterial that the
opinion happens to be
mistaken, as long as it
might reasonably be
inferred from the facts.
[30] (Emphasis supplied.)
The expansion speaks of
fair commentaries on
matters of public interest.
While Borjal places fair
commentaries within the
scope of qualified
privileged
communication, the mere
fact that the subject of the
article is a public figure or
a matter of public interest
does not automatically
exclude the author from
liability. Borjal allows that
for a discreditable
imputation to a public
official to be actionable, it
must be a false allegation
of fact or a comment
based on a false
supposition. As previously
mentioned, the trial court
found that the allegations
against Atty. So were false
and that Tulfo did not
exert effort to verify the
information before
publishing his articles.
Tulfo offered no proof for
his accusations. He
claimed to have a source
in the Bureau of Customs
and relied only on this
source for his columns,
but did no further
research on his story. The
records of the case are
bereft of any showing that
Atty. So was indeed the
villain Tulfo pictured him
to be. Tulfos articles
related no specific details
or acts committed to
prove Atty. So was indeed
a corrupt public official.
These columns were
unsubstantiated attacks
on Atty. So, and cannot be
countenanced as being
privileged simply because
the target was a public
official. Although wider
latitude is given to
defamatory utterances
against public officials in
connection with or
relevant to their
performance of official
duties, or against public
officials in relation to
matters of public interest
involving them, such
defamatory utterances do
not automatically fall
within the ambit of
constitutionally protected
speech.[31] Journalists
still bear the burden of
writing responsibly when
practicing their
profession, even when
writing about public
figures or matters of
public interest. As held in
In Re: Emil P. Jurado:
Surely it cannot be
postulated that the law
protects a journalist who
deliberately prints lies or
distorts the truth; or that
a newsman may ecape
liability who publishes
derogatory or defamatory
allegations against a
person or entity, but
recognizes no obligation
bona fide to establish
beforehand the factual
basis of such imputations
and refuses to submit
proof thereof when
challenged to do so. It
outrages all notions of fair
play and due process, and
reduces to uselessness all
the injunctions of the
Journalists Code of Ethics
to allow a newsman, with
all the potential of his
profession to influence
popular belief and shape
public opinion, to make
shameful and offensive
charges destructive of
personal or institutional
honor and repute, and
when called upon to
justify the same,
cavalierly beg off by
claiming that to do so
would compromise his
sources and demanding
acceptance of his word for
the reliability of those
sources.[32]
The prosecution showed
that Tulfo could present
no proof of his allegations
against Atty. So, only
citing his one unnamed
source. It is not demanded
of him that he name his
source. The confidentiality
of sources and their
importance to journalists
are accepted and
respected. What cannot be
accepted are journalists
making no efforts to
verify the information
given by a source, and
using that unverified
information to throw wild
accusations and besmirch
the name of possibly an
innocent person.
Journalists have a
responsibility to report
the truth, and in doing so
must at least investigate
their stories before
publication, and be able to
back up their stories with
proof. The rumors and
gossips spread by
unnamed sources are not
truth. Journalists are not
storytellers or novelists
who may just spin tales
out of fevered imaginings,
and pass them off as
reality. There must be
some foundation to their
reports; these reports
must be warranted by
facts.
Jurado also established
that the journalist should
exercise some degree of
care even when writing
about public officials. The
case stated:
Clearly, the public interest
involved in freedom of
speech and the individual
interest of judges (and for
that matter, all other
public officials) in the
maintenance of private
honor and reputation
need to be accommodated
one to the other. And the
point of adjustment or
accommodation between
these two legitimate
interests is precisely found
in the norm which
requires those who,
invoking freedom of
speech, publish statements
which are clearly
defamatory to identifiable
judges or other public
officials to exercise bona
fide care in ascertaining
the truth of the statements
they publish. The norm
does not require that a
journalist guarantee the
truth of what he says or
publishes. But the norm
does prohibit the reckless
disregard of private
reputation by publishing
or circulating defamatory
statements without any
bona fide effort to
ascertain the truth
thereof. That this norm
represents the generally
accepted point of balance
or adjustment between
the two interests involved
is clear from a
consideration of both the
pertinent civil law norms
and the Code of Ethics
adopted by the journalism
profession in the .[33]
Tulfo has clearly failed in
this regard. His articles
cannot even be considered
as qualified privileged
communication under the
second paragraph of Art.
354 of the RPC which
exempts from the
presumption of malice a
fair and true report, made
in good faith, without any
comments or remarks, of
any judicial, legislative, or
other official proceedings
which are not of
confidential nature, or
any statement, report, or
speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any
other act performed by
public officers in the
exercise of their functions.
This particular provision
has several elements
which must be present in
order for the report to be
exempt from the
presumption of malice.
The provision can be
dissected as follows:
In order that the
publication of a report of
an official proceeding may
be considered privileged,
the following conditions
must exist:
(a) That it is a
fair and true report of a
judicial, legislative, or
other official proceedings
which are not of
confidential nature, or of
a statement, report or
speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any
other act performed by a
public officer in the
exercise of his functions;
(b) That it is
made in good faith; and
(c) That it is
without any comments or
remarks.[34]
The articles clearly are
not the fair and true
reports contemplated by
the provision. They
provide no details of the
acts committed by the
subject, Atty. So. They are
plain and simple baseless
accusations, backed up by
the word of one unnamed
source. Good faith is
lacking, as Tulfo failed to
substantiate or even
attempt to verify his story
before publication. Tulfo
goes even further to
attack the character of the
subject, Atty. So, even
calling him a disgrace to
his religion and the legal
profession. As none of the
elements of the second
paragraph of Art. 354 of
the RPC is present in
Tulfos articles, it cannot
thus be argued that they
are qualified privileged
communications under
the RPC.
Breaking down the
provision further, looking
at the terms fair and true,
Tulfos articles do not meet
the standard. Fair is
defined as having the
qualities of impartiality
and honesty.[35] True is
defined as conformable to
fact; correct; exact;
actual; genuine; honest.
[36] Tulfo failed to satisfy
these requirements, as he
did not do research before
making his allegations,
and it has been shown
that these allegations were
baseless. The articles are
not fair and true reports,
but merely wild
accusations.
Even assuming arguendo
that the subject articles
are covered by the shield
of qualified privileged
communication, this
would still not protect
Tulfo.
In claiming that his
articles were covered by
qualified privileged
communication, Tulfo
argues that the
presumption of malice in
law under Art. 354 of the
RPC is no longer present,
placing upon the
prosecution the burden of
proving malice in fact. He
then argues that for him
to be liable, there should
have been evidence that
he was motivated by ill
will or spite in writing the
subject articles.
The test to be followed is
that laid down in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
[37] and reiterated in Flor
v. People, which should be
to determine whether the
defamatory statement was
made with actual malice,
that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with
reckless disregard of
whether it was false or
not.[38]
The trial court found that
Tulfo had in fact written
and published the subject
articles with reckless
disregard of whether the
same were false or not, as
proven by the
prosecution. There was
the finding that Tulfo
failed to verify the
information on which he
based his writings, and
that the defense presented
no evidence to show that
the accusations against
Atty. So were true. Tulfo
cannot argue that because
he did not know the
subject, Atty. So,
personally, there was no
malice attendant in his
articles. The test laid
down is the reckless
disregard test, and Tulfo
has failed to meet that
test.
The fact that Tulfo
published another article
lambasting respondent
Atty. So can be considered
as further evidence of
malice, as held in U.S. vs.
Montalvo,[39] wherein
publication after the
commencement of an
action was taken as
further evidence of a
malicious design to injure
the victim. Tulfo did not
relent nor did he pause to
consider his actions, but
went on to continue
defaming respondent Atty.
So. This is a clear
indication of his intent to
malign Atty. So, no matter
the cost, and is proof of
malice.
Leaving the discussion of
qualified privileged
communication, Tulfo also
argues that the lower
court misappreciated the
evidence presented as to
the identity of the
complainant: that Tulfo
wrote about Atty. Ding So,
an official of the Bureau
of Customs who worked
at the South Harbor,
whereas the complainant
was Atty. Carlos So who
worked at the NAIA. He
claims that there has
arisen a cloud of doubt as
to the identity of the real
party referred to in the
articles.
This argument is patently
without merit.
The prosecution was able
to present the testimonies
of two other witnesses
who identified Atty. So
from Tulfos articles.
There is the certification
that there is only one Atty.
So in the Bureau of
Customs. And most
damning to Tulfos case is
the last column he wrote
on the matter, referring to
the libel suit against him
by Atty. So of the Bureau
of Customs. In this article,
Tulfo launched further
attacks against Atty. So,
stating that the libel case
was due to the exposs
Tulfo had written on the
corrupt acts committed by
Atty. So in the Bureau of
Customs. This last article
is an admission on the
part of Tulfo that Atty. So
was in fact the target of
his attacks. He cannot
now point to a putative
Atty. Ding So at South
Harbor, or someone else
using the name of Atty. So
as the real subject of his
attacks, when he did not
investigate the existence
or non-existence of an
Atty. So at South Harbor,
nor investigate the alleged
corrupt acts of Atty. So of
the Bureau of Customs.
Tulfo cannot say that
there is doubt as to the
identity of the Atty. So
referred to in his articles,
when all the evidence
points to one Atty. So, the
complainant in the
present case.
Having discussed the issue
of qualified privileged
communication and the
matter of the identity of
the person referred to in
the subject articles, there
remains the petition of the
editors and president of
Remate, the paper on
which the subject articles
appeared.
In sum, petitioners
Cambri, Salao, Barlizo,
and Pichay all claim that
they had no participation
in the editing or writing of
the subject articles, and
are thus not liable.
The argument must fail.
The language of Art. 360
of the RPC is plain. It lists
the persons responsible
for libel:
Art. 360. Persons
responsible.Any person
who shall publish, exhibit,
or cause the publication
or exhibition of any
defamation in writing or
by similar means, shall be
responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a
book or pamphlet, or the
editor or business
manager of a daily
newspaper, magazine or
serial publication, shall be
responsible for the
defamations contained
therein to the same extent
as if he were the author
thereof.
The claim that they had
no participation does not
shield them from liability.
The provision in the RPC
does not provide absence
of participation as a
defense, but rather plainly
and specifically states the
responsibility of those
involved in publishing
newspapers and other
periodicals. It is not a
matter of whether or not
they conspired in
preparing and publishing
the subject articles,
because the law simply so
states that they are liable
as they were the author.
Neither the publisher nor
the editors can disclaim
liability for libelous
articles that appear on
their paper by simply
saying they had no
participation in the
preparation of the same.
They cannot say that
Tulfo was all alone in the
publication of Remate, on
which the subject articles
appeared, when they
themselves clearly hold
positions of authority in
the newspaper, or in the
case of Pichay, as the
president in the
publishing company.
As Tulfo cannot simply
say that he is not liable
because he did not fulfill
his responsibility as a
journalist, the other
petitioners cannot simply
say that they are not liable
because they did not fulfill
their responsibilities as
editors and publishers. An
editor or manager of a
newspaper, who has active
charge and control of its
management, conduct,
and policy, generally is
held to be equally liable
with the owner for the
publication therein of a
libelous article.[40] On the
theory that it is the duty
of the editor or manager
to know and control the
contents of the paper,[41]
it is held that said person
cannot evade
responsibility by
abandoning the duties to
employees,[42] so that it is
immaterial whether or not
the editor or manager
knew the contents of the
publication.[43] In
Fermin v. People of the
Philippines,[44] the Court
held that the publisher
could not escape liability
by claiming lack of
participation in the
preparation and
publication of a libelous
article. The Court cited
U.S. v. Ocampo, stating
the rationale for holding
the persons enumerated in
Art. 360 of the RPC
criminally liable, and it is
worth reiterating:
According to the legal
doctrines and
jurisprudence of the
United States, the printer
of a publication
containing libelous matter
is liable for the same by
reason of his direct
connection therewith and
his cognizance of the
contents thereof. With
regard to a publication in
which a libel is printed,
not only is the publisher
but also all other persons
who in any way
participate in or have any
connection with its
publication are liable as
publishers.
xxxx
In the case of State vs.
Mason (26 L.R.A., 779; 26
Oreg., 273, , 629), the
question of the
responsibility of the
manager or proprietor of
a newspaper was
discussed. The court said,
among other things (pp.
782, 783):
The question then recurs
as to whether the manager
or proprietor of a
newspaper can escape
criminal responsibility
solely on the ground that
the libelous article was
published without his
knowledge or consent.
When a libel is published
in a newspaper, such fact
alone is sufficient evidence
prima facie to charge the
manager or proprietor
with the guilt of its
publication.
The manager and
proprietor of a newspaper,
we think ought to be held
prima facie criminally for
whatever appears in his
paper; and it should be no
defense that the
publication was made
without his knowledge or
consent, x x x.
One who furnishes the
means for carrying on the
publication of a
newspaper and entrusts
its management to
servants or employees
whom he selects and
controls may be said to
cause to be published
what actually appears,
and should be held
responsible therefore,
whether he was
individually concerned in
the publication or not, x x
x. Criminal responsibility
for the acts of an agent or
servant in the course of
his employment
necessarily implies some
degree of guilt or
delinquency on the part of
the publisher; x x x.
We think, therefore, the
mere fact that the libelous
article was published in
the newspaper without the
knowledge or consent of
its proprietor or manager
is no defense to a criminal
prosecution against such
proprietor or manager.
In the case of
Commonwealth vs.
Morgan (107 Mass., 197),
this same question was
considered and the court
held that in the criminal
prosecution of a publisher
of a newspaper in which a
libel appears, he is prima
facie presumed to have
published the libel, and
that the exclusion of an
offer by the defendant to
prove that he never saw
the libel and was not
aware of its publication
until it was pointed out to
him and that an apology
and retraction were
afterwards published in
the same paper, gave him
no ground for exception.
In this same case, Mr.
Justice Colt, speaking for
the court, said:
It is the duty of the
proprietor of a public
paper, which may be used
for the publication of
improper
communications, to use
reasonable caution in the
conduct of his business
that no libels be
published. (Whartons
Criminal Law, secs. 1627,
1649; 1 Bishops Criminal
Law, secs. 219, 221;
People vs. Wilson, 64 Ill.,
195; Commonwealth vs.
Damon, 136 Mass., 441.)
The above doctrine is also
the doctrine established
by the English courts. In
the case of Rex vs. Walter
(3 Esp., 21) Lord Kenyon
said that he was clearly of
the opinion that the
proprietor of a newspaper
was answerable
criminally as well as
civilly for the acts of his
servants or agents for
misconduct in the
management of the paper.
This was also the opinion
of Lord Hale, Mr. Justice
Powell, and Mr. Justice
Foster.
Lofft, an English author,
in his work on Libel and
Slander, said:
An information for libel
will lie against the
publisher of a papers,
although he did not know
of its being put into the
paper and stopped the
sale as soon as he
discovered it.
In the case of People vs.
Clay (86 , 147) the court
held that
A person who makes a
defamatory statement to
the agent of a newspaper
for publication, is liable
both civilly and
criminally, and his
liability is shared by the
agent and all others who
aid in publishing it.[45]
Under Art. 360 of the
RPC, as Tulfo, the author
of the subject articles, has
been found guilty of libel,
so too must Cambri,
Salao, Barlizo, and
Pichay.
Though we find
petitioners guilty of the
crime charged, the
punishment must still be
tempered with justice.
Petitioners are to be
punished for libel for the
first time. They did not
apply for probation to
avoid service of sentence
possibly in the belief that
they have not committed
any crime. In Buatis, Jr. v.
People,[46] the Court, in a
criminal case for libel,
removed the penalty of
imprisonment and instead
imposed a fine as penalty.
In Sazon v. Court of
Appeals,[47] the accused
was merely fined in lieu of
the original penalty of
imprisonment and fine.
Freedom of expression as
well as freedom of the
press may not be
unrestrained, but neither
must it be reined in too
harshly. In light of this,
considering the necessity
of a free press balanced
with the necessity of a
responsible press, the
penalty of a fine of PhP
6,000 for each count of
libel, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of
insolvency, should suffice.
[48] Lastly, the
responsibilities of the
members of the press
notwithstanding, the
difficulties and hazards
they encounter in their
line of work must also be
taken into consideration.
The award of damages by
the lower court must be
modified. Art. 2199 of the
Civil Code provides,
Except as provided by law
or by stipulation, one is
entitled to an adequate
compensation only for
such pecuniary loss
suffered by him as he has
duly proved. Such
compensation is referred
to as actual or
compensatory damages.
There was no showing of
any pecuniary loss
suffered by the
complainant Atty. So.
Without proof of actual
loss that can be measured,
the award of actual
damages cannot stand.
In Del Mundo v. Court of
Appeals, it was held, as
regards actual and moral
damages:
A party is entitled to an
adequate compensation
for such pecuniary loss
actually suffered by him
as he has duly proved.
Such damages, to be
recoverable, must not only
be capable of proof, but
must actually be proved
with a reasonable degree
of certainty. We have
emphasized that these
damages cannot be
presumed, and courts, in
making an award must
point out specific facts
which could afford a basis
for measuring whatever
compensatory or actual
damages are borne.
Moral damages, upon the
other hand, may be
awarded to compensate
one for manifold injuries
such as physical suffering,
mental anguish, serious
anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded
feelings and social
humiliation. These
damages must be
understood to be in the
concept of grants, not
punitive or corrective in
nature, calculated to
compensate the claimant
for the injury suffered.
Although incapable of
exactness and no proof of
pecuniary loss is
necessary in order that
moral damages may be
awarded, the amount of
indemnity being left to the
sound discretion of the
court, it is imperative,
nevertheless, that (1)
injury must have been
suffered by the claimant,
and (2) such injury must
have sprung from any of
the cases expressed in
Article 2219 and Article
2220 of the Civil Code. A
causal relation, in fine,
must exist between the act
or omission referred to in
the Code which underlies,
or gives rise to, the case or
proceeding on the one
hand, and the resulting
injury, on the other hand;
i.e. the first must be the
proximate cause and the
latter the direct
consequence thereof.[49]
It was the articles of Tulfo
that caused injury to Atty.
So, and for that Atty. So
deserves the award of
moral damages.
Justification for the
award of moral damages
is found in Art. 2219(7) of
the Civil Code, which
states that moral damages
may be recovered in cases
of libel, slander, or any
other form of defamation.
As the cases involved are
criminal cases of libel,
they fall squarely within
the ambit of Art. 2219(7).
Moral damages can be
awarded even in the
absence of actual or
compensatory damages.
The fact that no actual or
compensatory damage
was proven before the
trial court does not
adversely affect the
offended partys right to
recover moral damages.
[50]
And while on the subject
of moral damages, it may
not be amiss to state at
this juncture that Tulfos
libelous articles are
abhorrent not only
because of its vilifying and
demeaning effect on Atty.
So himself, but also
because of their impact on
members of his family,
especially on the children
and possibly even the
childrens children.
The Court can perhaps
take judicial notice that
the sense of kinship runs
deeply in a typical
Filipino family, such that
the whole family usually
suffers or rejoices at the
misfortune or good
fortune, as the case may
be, of any of its member.
Accordingly, any attempt
to dishonor or besmirch
the name and reputation
of the head of the family,
as here, invariably puts
the other members in a
state of disrepute, distress,
or anxiety. This reality
adds an imperative
dimension to the award of
moral damages to the
defamed party.
The award of exemplary
damages, however, cannot
be justified. Under Art.
2230 of the Civil Code, In
criminal offenses,
exemplary damages as a
part of the civil liability
may be imposed when the
crime was committed with
one or more aggravating
circumstances. Such
damages are separate and
distinct from fines and
shall be paid to the
offended party. No
aggravating
circumstances
accompanied the
commission of the libelous
acts; thus, no exemplary
damages can be awarded.
Conclusion
The press wields
enormous power. Through
its widespread reach and
the information it
imparts, it can mold and
shape thoughts and
opinions of the people. It
can turn the tide of public
opinion for or against
someone, it can build up
heroes or create villains.
It is in the interest of
society to have a free
press, to have liberal
discussion and
dissemination of ideas,
and to encourage people
to engage in healthy
debate. It is through this
that society can progress
and develop.
Those who would publish
under the aegis of
freedom of the press must
also acknowledge the
corollary duty to publish
responsibly. To show that
they have exercised their
freedom responsibly, they
must go beyond merely
relying on unfounded
rumors or shadowy
anonymous sources. There
must be further
investigation conducted,
some shred of proof found
to support allegations of
misconduct or even
criminal activity. It is in
fact too easy for
journalists to destroy the
reputation and honor of
public officials, if they are
not required to make the
slightest effort to verify
their accusations.
Journalists are supposed
to be reporters of facts,
not fiction, and must be
able to back up their
stories with solid research.
The power of the press
and the corresponding
duty to exercise that
power judiciously cannot
be understated.
But even with the need for
a free press, the necessity
that it be free does not
mean that it be totally
unfettered. It is still
acknowledged that the
freedom can be abused,
and for the abuse of the
freedom, there must be a
corresponding sanction. It
falls on the press to wield
such enormous power
responsibly. It may be a
clich that the pen is
mightier than the sword,
but in this particular case,
the lesson to be learned is
that such a mighty
weapon should not be
wielded recklessly or
thoughtlessly, but always
guided by conscience and
careful thought.
A robust and
independently free press is
doubtless one of the most
effective checks on
government power and
abuses. Hence, it behooves
government functionaries
to respect the value of
openness and refrain from
concealing from media
corruption and other
anomalous practices
occurring within their
backyard. On the other
hand, public officials also
deserve respect and
protection against false
innuendoes and
unfounded accusation of
official wrongdoing from
an abusive press. As it
were, the law and
jurisprudence on libel
heavily tilt in favor of
press freedom. The
common but most unkind
perception is that
government institutions
and their officers and
employees are fair game
to official and personal
attacks and even ridicule.
And the practice on the
ground is just as
disconcerting. Reports
and accusation of official
misconduct often times
merit front page or
primetime treatment,
while defenses set up,
retraction issued, or
acquittal rendered get no
more, if ever, perfunctory
coverage. The unfairness
needs no belaboring. The
balm of clear conscience is
sometimes not enough.
Perhaps lost in the
traditional press freedom
versus government
impasse is the fact that a
maliciously false
imputation of corruption
and dishonesty against a
public official, as here,
leaves a stigmatizing
mark not only on the
person but also the office
to which he belongs. In
the ultimate analysis,
public service also unduly
suffers.
WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing, the
petitions in G.R. Nos.
161032 and 161176 are
DISMISSED. The CA
Decision dated June 17,
2003 in CA-G.R. CR No.
25318 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that
in lieu of imprisonment,
the penalty to be imposed
upon petitioners shall be a
fine of six thousand pesos
(PhP 6,000) for each count
of libel, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of
insolvency, while the
award of actual damages
and exemplary damages is
DELETED. The Decision
dated November 17, 2000
of the RTC, Branch 112 in
Pasay City in Criminal
Case Nos. 99-1597 to 99-
1600 is modified to read
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court
finds the accused ERWIN
TULFO, SUSAN
CAMBRI, REY SALAO,
JOCELYN BARLIZO,
and PHILIP PICHAY
guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of four (4) counts of
the crime of LIBEL, as
defined in Article 353 of
the Revised Penal Code,
and sentences EACH of
the accused to pay a fine
of SIX THOUSAND
PESOS (PhP 6,000) per
count of libel with
subsidiary imprisonment,
in case of insolvency.
Considering that the
accused Erwin Tulfo,
Susan Cambri, Rey Salao,
Jocelyn Barlizo, and
Philip Pichay wrote and
published the four (4)
defamatory articles with
reckless disregard
whether it was false or
not, the said articles being
libelous per se, they are
hereby ordered to pay
complainant Atty. Carlos
T. So, jointly and
severally, the sum of ONE
MILLION PESOS (PhP
1,000,000) as moral
damages. The claim of
actual and exemplary
damages is denied for lack
of merit.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 115239-40.
March 2, 2000]
MARIO C.V.
JALANDONI, petitioner,
vs. HON. SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE
FRANKLYN M. DRILON,
HONORABLE
PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR OF
RIZAL, ROBERT
COYIUTO, JR., JAIME
LEDESMA, RAMON
GARCIA, ANTONIO
OZAETA, AMPARO
BARCELON and
CARLOS DYHONGPO,
respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This is a petition for
certiorari seeking to
nullify and set aside
the orders of the
Honorable Secretary of
Justice Franklin M.
Drilon, to wit: DOJ
Resolution No. 211
Series of 1994 dated
March 15, 1994 and the
letter-order dated April
20, 1994. DOJ
Resolution No. 211
Series of 1994
instructed the
Provincial Prosecutor
of Rizal to withdraw the
informations in I.S.
Nos. 93-6228 and 93-
6422 while the letter-
order denied the
motion for
reconsideration filed by
herein petitioner Mario
C.V. Jalandoni. Miso
The antecedent facts of
the case are as follows:
(a)......In I.S. No. 93-
6228
On July 15, 1992, Jaime
Ledesma, private
respondent herein,
filed an administrative
complaint for violation
of the Revised Penal
Code and the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices
Act against the
petitioner with the
Presidential
Commission on Good
Government (PCGG).
On the two succeeding
days, July 16 and July
17, 1992, news articles
thereon appeared in
various daily
newspapers. [1]
A full-page paid
advertisement was
caused to be published
on July 16, 1992 by
private respondents
Robert Coyiuto, Jr.,
Jaime Ledesma,
Ramon Garcia, Amparo
Barcelon, Antonio
Ozaeta, and Carlos
Dyhongpo. The
advertisements were
published in five (5)
major daily
newspapers, to wit:
Manikx
1.......The Manila
Chronicle
2.......Business
World
3.......Malaya
4.......Philippine
Daily Globe, and
5.......The Manila
Times
Exactly a year
thereafter or on July
16, 1993, petitioner
Jalandoni filed a
complaint for the crime
of libel before the
Provincial Prosecutor
of Rizal designated as
I.S. No. 93-6228 against
officials/directors of
Oriental Petroleum &
Minerals Corporation
(OPMC, for brevity),
namely, Coyiuto, Jr.,
Ledesma, Garcia,
Barcelon, Ozaeta, and
Dyhongpo.
The publication in
question was the July
16, 1992 full-page
advertisements
simultaneously
published in five major
dailies. These
advertisements
contained allegations
naming herein
petitioner who was
then a PCGG
Commissioner of
having committed
illegal and
unauthorized acts, and
other wrongdoings
constituting graft and
corruption, relative to
the dacion en pago
financing arrangement
entered into by Piedras
Petroleum Co., Inc.
with Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation.
Quoted in full below is
the said advertisement:
"My administration
will prove that
government is not
avoidly corrupt and
that bureaucracy is
not necessarily
corrupt. Graft and
corruption, we will
confront more with
action than with
words.
-- PRESIDENT
FIDEL V. RAMOS,
Inaugural Address,
June 30, 1992
"AN URGENT
APPEAL TO
JUSTICE
SECRETARY
FRANKLIN DRILON
(and) PCGG
CHAIRMAN
MAGTANGGOL
GUNIGUNDO
"Please stop the
unauthorized and
illegal acts of PCGG
officials led by
former Chairman
DAVID CASTRO and
Commissioner
MARIO JALANDONI
which will allow the
attempt of hostile
vested interest
groups to gain entry
into the board of
Oriental Petroleum
& Minerals
Corporation.
"1. The PCGG
openly defied
Malacaang orders
issued by former
Executive Secretary
Franklin Drilon on
the sale of Oriental
Petroleum shares.
"In spite of its
claims that the
disposal of OPMC
shares held by
Piedras Petroleum
was approved by
the Office of the
President,
documented proofs
belie the PCGGs
statements. Maniks
"No less than
Justice Secretary
Franklin Drilon, who
was Executive
Secretary at the
time PCGG
Chairman David
Castro sought
approval for the
OPMC-Piedras
Petroleum deal,
thumbed down
Castros request.
Clearly, the sale of
OPMC shares held
by Piedras
Petroleum to the
RCBC-Yuchengco
Group for P101
million was
unauthorized and
illegal.
"2. The PCGG
officials involved in
the unauthorized
and illegal sale of
Oriental Petroleum
shares committed
grave abuse of
authority. Their acts
defrauded
government of
better prices for
Oriental Petroleum
shares which they
undervalued and
sold to favored
buyers Pacific
Basin and RCBC,
both identified with
the Yuchengco
group.
"At the time the
Piedras deal was
closed the PCGG as
evidenced by the
minutes of the
Board Meeting of
Piedras Petroleum
on October 31,
1991, with PCGG
Commissioner
Mario Jalandoni as
acting Chairman,
the sale of 2.054
billion OPMC Class
A shares and 789.45
million B shares,
OPMC shares were
sold for the give-
away price of
P0.035/share. This
compares with
prevailing market
price of P0.042 for A
shares and P0.049
for the B shares.
This means that the
RCBC-Yuchengco
Group already
earned P25 million
at the time of the
transaction.
"3. The PCGG
proceeded without
any legal authority
to sell Oriental
Petroleum shares in
total violation of the
Public Bidding Law
and other
government rules
and regulations
pertaining to the
disposal of
government assets.
"The PCGG,
particularly
Commissioner
Mario Jalandoni,
should be made to
account for the
PCGG-Piedras-
RCBC transaction
as it was
consummated
without
transparency, in
violation of the
Public Bidding Law
and without
approval from the
government.
"4. The PCGG last
year illegally used
Philcomsat cash
dividends to avail
itself of an OPMC
stock subscription
to pay for the
subscription rights
of JY Campos and
Piedras Petroleum.
"Even before the
PCGG transacted
the questionable
Piedras-RCBC deal,
it was sued by a
Philcomsat
stockholder before
the Sandiganbayan
for diverting P76
million in cash
dividends. The anti-
graft court ordered
the cash dividends
deposited in an
escrow account in
1989. However, the
funds were used by
the PCGG to pay for
subscription rights
for OPMC shares.
"This case is
related to the
Piedras deal
because the
additional OPMC
shares were part of
those sold to the
RCBC-Yuchengco
Group. Manikanx
"5. The PCGG
diverted the
proceeds on the
authorized sale of
Oriental Petroleum
shares in violation
of the law requiring
proceeds of the sale
of assets by the
PCGG going to the
Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP).
"In addition to the
litany of illegal
transactions
entered into by the
PCGG, the officials
of the anti-graft
body also violated
provisions of the
Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988,
specifically Section
63, which states
that the following
shall serve as
source of funding
or appropriations
for the
implementation of
the said law;
"b) All receipts from
assets recovered
and sales of ill-
gotten wealth
recovered through
the Presidential
Commission on
Good Government."
"The Management &
Board of Directors
of Oriental
Petroleum and
Minerals
Corporation believe
that the fruits of oil
exploration and
development in the
country must be
shared by the
largest possible
number of Filipinos.
It urgently seeks the
intervention of the
National Leadership
to immediately step
in and prevent a
large-scale take-
over attempt on the
Company by selfish
and hostile vested
interest groups
under highly-
questionable,
unauthorized and
illegal
circumstances."[2]
Oldmiso
After the affidavits and
counter-affidavits were
filed, 3rd Assistant
Prosecutor Edgardo C.
Bautista issued a
Memorandum dated
November 26, 1993 in
I.S. No. 93-6228,
approved by Rizal
Provincial Prosecutor
Mauro M. Castro on
December 13, 1993,
recommending the
indictment of private
respondents Coyiuto,
Jr., Ledesma, Garcia,
Ozaeta, Barcelon and
Dyhongpo in
complicity in the crime
of libel. An information
[4]
libel docketed as
Criminal Case No. 93-
10986 was filed
thereafter with the
Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 137.
All of the respondents
in the two
aforementioned cases
appealed to then
Secretary of Justice,
Franklin M. Drilon. [6]
dispositive portion
thereof reads as
follows:
"WHEREFORE,
premises
considered, the
questioned
resolutions are
hereby SET ASIDE
and the complaints
DISMISSED. You are
hereby directed to
immediately
withdraw the
informations filed in
court against
respondents Robert
Coyiuto, Jr., Jaime
L. Ledesma, Ramon
Garcia, Amparo
Barcelon, Antonio
Ozaeta and Carlos
Dyhongpo. Report
of action taken
within ten (10) days
from receipt hereof
is desired."
[8]
A motion for
reconsideration was [9]
an abuse to be grave
the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by
reason of passion or
personal hostility.
This petitioner failed to
prove. Scsdaad
Moreover a petition for
certiorari, in order to
prosper, must be based
on jurisdictional
grounds because, as
long as the respondent
acted with jurisdiction,
any error committed by
him or it in the exercise
thereof will amount to
nothing more than an
error of judgment
which may be reviewed
or corrected only by
appeal. Even an abuse
of discretion is not
sufficient by itself to
justify the issuance of
a writ of certiorari.
[22]
"Once a complaint
or information is
filed in court, any
disposition of the
case such as its
dismissal or its
continuation rests
on the sound
discretion of the
court. Trial judges
are thus required to
make their own
assessment of
whether the
secretary of justice
committed grave
abuse of discretion
in granting or
denying the appeal,
separately and
independently of
the prosecution's or
the secretary's
evaluation that such
evidence is
insufficient or that
no probable cause
to hold the accused
for trial exists."
It is therefore
imperative upon the
trial judge to make an
assessment of the
motion to withdraw
before granting or
denying the same for
he is in the best
position to rule on the
same.
Finally, we have to
make the
pronouncement that
public respondent was
not remiss in his sworn
duty to prosecute
violators of the law and
to keep the innocent
from behind bars.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW
OF THE FOREGOING,
the petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G. R. No. 156747.
February 23, 2005]
ALLEN A. MACASAET,
NICOLAS V. QUIJANO,
JR., and ALFIE
LORENZO, petitioners,
vs. THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES and
JOSELITO TRINIDAD,
respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for
Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court of
the Decision dated 22
[1]
On 22 August 1997,
petitioners filed before the
court a quo an Urgent
Motion to Suspend
Arraignment and/or Defer
Proceedings dated 21
August 1997 claiming that
they intended to elevate
the adverse Resolution of
the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City
to the Department of
Justice (DOJ) for review.
Despite this motion, the
scheduled arraignment of
petitioners pushed
through on 27 August
1997. During said
proceeding, petitioners
Lorenzo and Quijano, Jr.,
together with their co-
accused Parajes and
Castillo, refused to enter
any plea and so the trial
court ordered that a plea
of not guilty be entered
into the records on their
behalf. As for petitioner
[4]
Macasaet, his
arraignment was
rescheduled to 20 October
1997 due to his failure to
attend the previously
calendared arraignment.
On 12 September 1997,
petitioners filed a Motion
to Dismiss the libel case
on the ground that the
trial court did not have
jurisdiction over the
offense charged.
According to petitioners,
as the information
discloses that the
residence of private
respondent was in
Marikina, the RTC of
Quezon City did not have
jurisdiction over the case
pursuant to Article 360 of
the Revised Penal Code,
to wit:
The criminal and civil
action for damages in
cases of written
defamations as provided
for in this chapter, shall
be filed simultaneously or
separately with the Court
of First Instance of the
province or city where the
libelous article is printed
and first published or
where any of the offended
parties actually resides at
the time of the
commission of the offense [5]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently, on 23
September 1997, the trial
court received by way of
registered mail,
petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration and to
Withdraw Plea dated 3
September 1997. [6]
On 16 October 1997,
petitioners and their
fellow accused filed a
Supplemental Reply [11]
attaching thereto
certifications issued by
Jimmy Ong and Pablito
C. Antonio, barangay
captains of Barangay
Malaya, Quezon City and
Barangay Sto. Nio,
Marikina City,
respectively. The pertinent
portion of the barangay
certification issued by
[12]
Barangay Captain
Antonio, reads in part:
This is to certify that
JOSELITO TRINIDAD
of legal age,
single/married/separate/w
idow/widower, a resident
of Karen Street, Sto. Nio,
Marikina City is a
bonafide member of this
barangay.
...
This is being issued upon
request of the above-
named person for
IDENTIFICATION.
During the hearing on 20
October 1997, the trial
court received and
marked in evidence the
two barangay
certifications. Also
marked for evidence were
page 4 of the information
stating the address of
private respondent to be
in Marikina City and the
editorial box appearing in
page 18 of Abante
indicating that the tabloid
maintains its editorial and
business offices at Rm.
301/305, 3/F BF
Condominium Bldg.,
Solana cor. A. Soriano
Sts., Intramuros, Manila.
The prosecution was then
given five (5) days within
which to submit its
comment to the evidence
submitted by the
petitioners and their
fellow accused.
In his Rejoinder to
Supplemental Reply, [14]
private respondent
contended that the
certification issued by the
barangay captain of
Barangay Malaya was
issued after he had
already moved out of the
apartment unit he was
renting in Sikatuna
Village, Quezon City; that
owners of residential
houses do not usually
declare they rent out
rooms to boarders in
order to avoid payment of
local taxes; and that there
is no showing that a
census was conducted
among the residents of
Barangay Malaya during
the time he resided
therein.
As regards the
certification issued by the
barangay chairman of Sto.
Nio, Marikina City,
private respondent argued
that it is of judicial notice
that barangay and city
records are not regularly
updated to reflect the
transfer of residence of
their constituents and that
a perusal of said
certification reveals that
the barangay captain did
not personally know him
(private respondent).
Finally, private
respondent claimed that
his receipt of the copy of
petitioners Appeal to the
DOJ, which was sent to
his alleged address in
Sikatuna Village, Quezon
City, proved that he did,
in fact, reside at said
place.
On 24 November 1997,
the trial court rendered
an Order dismissing the
case due to lack of
jurisdiction. The court a
[15]
memorandum for
preliminary investigation[26]
In his
Comment/Opposition
dated 25 April 2003,[28]
private respondent
reiterated his position that
the RTC of Quezon City
had jurisdiction over this
libel case. According to
him, the affidavit executed
by Del Rosario, the
alleged owner of the house
he leased in Sikatuna
Village, Quezon City,
established, beyond
doubt, that he resided in
said place during the time
the claimed defamatory
article appeared on the
pages of Abante. In
addition, he draws
attention to the fact that
petitioners and their co-
accused furnished him a
copy of the petition for
review, filed before the
DOJ, at the
aforementioned address in
Quezon City.
Anent the affidavit of Del
Rosario, private
respondent maintains that
the prosecution exerted
efforts to present the
affiant before the trial
court. Unfortunately, Del
Rosario was out of town
when she was supposed to
be presented and so the
public and the private
prosecutors decided to
submit for resolution their
motion for
reconsideration sans the
affiants testimony. Citing
the case of Joseph
Helmuth, Jr. v. People of
the Philippines, et al.,
[29]
In criminal actions, it is a
fundamental rule that
venue is jurisdictional.
Thus, the place where the
crime was committed
determines not only the
venue of the action but is
an essential element of
jurisdiction. In the case
[35]
of , this
Uy v. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines [36]
In these instances, it is
incumbent upon the trial
court to conduct a
preliminary trial to
determine the merit of the
motion to dismiss. As the
present case obviously
does not fall within any of
the recognized exceptions,
the trial court correctly
dismissed this action.
In the assailed decision,
the Court of Appeals
likewise put premium on
the affidavit executed by
Del Rosario which was
attached to private
respondents supplemental
motion for
reconsideration.
According to the appellate
court, said document
supports private
(respondents) claim that
indeed, he was a resident
of Quezon City at the time
the alleged libelous article
was published. The
[45]
Explicit in the
aforequoted provision of
the Rules of Court is the
requirement that the
contents of a
supplemental pleading
should deal with
transactions, occurrences
or events which took place
after the date of the
pleading it seeks to
supplement. A reading of
the supplemental motion
for reconsideration filed
by private respondent
discloses no additional or
new matters which
transpired after he filed
his original motion for
reconsideration. The fact
that he attached thereto
the affidavit of his alleged
lessor fails to persuade us
into giving to said
supplemental motion the
same evidentiary value as
did the Court of Appeals.
For one, private
respondent did not even
bother to explain the
reason behind the belated
submission of Del
Rosarios affidavit nor did
he claim that he exerted
earnest efforts to file it
much earlier in the
proceedings. He must,
therefore, bear the
consequences of his own
lethargy.
Finally, we come to the
issue of whether the
private prosecutor and the
public prosecutor had the
personality to file the
notice of appeal before the
trial court. Petitioners
insist that the OSG should
have been the one to file
said notice in its capacity
as the sole representative
of the [g]overnment in the
Court of Appeals in
criminal cases.[47]
circulation, and
publication to the public
conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping with
one another together with
John Does, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and
publicly and maliciously
with intention of attacking
the honesty, virtue, honor
and integrity, character
and reputation of
complainant Malayan
Insurance Co. Inc.,
Yuchengco Family
particularly Ambassador
Alfonso Yuchengco and
Helen Dee and for further
purpose exposing the
complainant to public
hatred and contempt
published an article
imputing a vice or defect
to the complainant and
caused to be composed,
posted and published in
the said websitewww.pepcoalition.com
attached as Annex
F of the complaint.
That the keyword
and password to
be used in order to
post and publish
the above
defamatory article
are known to the
accused as trustees
holding legal title
to the above-cited
website and that
the accused are
the ones
responsible for the posting
and publication of the
defamatory articles that
the article in question was
posted and published with
the object of the
discrediting and ridiculing
the complainant before
the public.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[12]
Several of the accused
appealed the Makati City
Prosecutors Resolution by
a petition for review to the
Secretary of Justice who,
by Resolution of June 20,
2007,[13] reversed the
finding of probable cause
and accordingly directed
the withdrawal of the
Informations for libel
filed in court. The Justice
Secretary opined that the
crime of internet libel was
non-existent, hence, the
accused could not be
charged with libel under
Article 353 of the RPC.
[14]
Petitioners, as co-accused,
[15] thereupon filed on
June 6, 2006, before the
public respondent, a
Motion to Quash[16] the
Information in Criminal
Case No. 06-876 on the
grounds that it failed to
vest jurisdiction on the
Makati RTC; the acts
complained of in the
Information are not
punishable by law since
internet libel is not
covered by Article 353 of
the RPC; and the
Information is fatally
defective for failure to
designate the offense
charged and the acts or
omissions complained of
as constituting the offense
of libel.
Citing Macasaet v. People,
[17] petitioners
maintained that the
Information failed to
allege a particular place
within the trial courts
jurisdiction where the
subject article was printed
and first published or that
the offended parties
resided in at the time the
alleged defamatory
material was printed and
first published.
By Order of October 3,
2006,[18] the public
respondent, albeit finding
that probable cause
existed, quashed the
Information, citing
Agustin v. Pamintuan.[19]
It found that the
Information lacked any
allegations that the
offended parties were
actually residing in
Makati at the time of the
commission of the offense
as in fact they listed their
address in the complaint-
affidavit at Yuchengco
Tower in Binondo,
Manila; or that the
alleged libelous article
was printed and first
published in Makati.
The prosecution moved to
reconsider the quashal of
the Information,[20]
insisting that the
Information sufficiently
conferred jurisdiction on
the public respondent. It
cited Banal III v.
Panganiban[21] which
held that the Information
need not allege verbatim
that the libelous
publication was printed
and first published in the
appropriate venue. And it
pointed out that Malayan
has an office in of which
Helen is a resident.
Moreover, the prosecution
alleged that even
assuming that the
Information was deficient,
it merely needed a formal
amendment.
Petitioners opposed the
prosecutions motion for
reconsideration,
contending, inter alia, that
since venue is
jurisdictional in criminal
cases, any defect in an
information for libel
pertaining to jurisdiction
is not a mere matter of
form that may be cured
by amendment.[22]
By Order of March 8,
2007,[23] the public
respondent granted the
prosecutions motion for
reconsideration and
accordingly ordered the
public prosecutor to
amend the Information to
cure the defect of want of
venue.
The prosecution
thereupon moved to admit
the Amended Information
dated March 20, 2007,[24]
the accusatory portion of
which reads:
circulation, and
publication to the public
conspiring, confederating
together with John Does,
whose true names,
identities and present
whereabouts are still
unknown and all of them
mutually helping and
aiding one another, did
then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously
and publicly and
maliciously with intention
of attacking the honesty,
virtue, honor and
integrity, character and
reputation of complainant
Malayan Insurance Co.
Inc., Yuchengco Family
particularly Ambassador
Alfonso Yuchengco and
Helen Dee and for further
purpose exposing the
complainant to public
hatred and contempt
published an article
imputing a vice or defect
to the complainant and
caused to be composed,
posted and published in
the said website ,a
www.pepcoalition.com
website accessible in
Makati City, an injurious
and defamatory article,
which was first published
and accessed by the
private complainant in
Makati City, as follows:
x x x x (emphasis and
underscoring in the
original; italics supplied)
Petitioners moved to
quash the Amended
Information[25] which,
they alleged, still failed to
vest jurisdiction upon the
public respondent because
it failed to allege that the
libelous articles were
printed and first
published by the accused
in ; and the prosecution
erroneously laid the venue
of the case in the place
where the offended party
accessed the internet-
published article.
By the assailed Order of
April 22, 2008, the public
respondent, applying
Banal III, found the
Amended Information to
be sufficient in form.
Petitioners motion for
reconsideration[26]
having been denied by the
public respondent by
Joint Resolution of August
12, 2008, they filed the
present petition for
Certiorari and
Prohibition faulting the
public respondent for:
1. NOT FINDING THAT
THE ACTS ALLEGED
IN THE INFORMATION
ARE NOT PUNISHABLE
BY LAW;
2. ADMITTING AN
AMENDED
INFORMATION
WHOSE
JURISDICTIONAL
ALLEGATIONS
CONTINUES TO BE
DEFICIENT; and
3. NOT RULING THAT
AN AMENDMENT IN
THE INFORMATION
FOR THE PURPOSE OF
CURING
JURISDICTIONAL
DEFECTS IS ILLEGAL.
[27]
With the filing of
Gimenezs Comment[28]
to the petition, the issues
are: (1) whether
petitioners violated the
rule on hierarchy of
courts to thus render the
petition dismissible; and
(2) whether grave abuse of
discretion attended the
public respondents
admission of the Amended
Information.
The established policy of
strict observance of the
judicial hierarchy of
courts,[29] as a rule,
requires that recourse
must first be made to the
lower-ranked court
exercising concurrent
jurisdiction with a higher
court.[30] A regard for
judicial hierarchy clearly
indicates that petitions for
the issuance of
extraordinary writs
against first level courts
should be filed in the RTC
and those against the
latter should be filed in
the Court of Appeals.[31]
The rule is not iron-clad,
however, as it admits of
certain exceptions.
Thus, a strict application
of the rule is unnecessary
when cases brought before
the appellate courts do
not involve factual but
purely legal questions.[32]
In the present case, the
substantive issue calls for
the Courts exercise of its
discretionary authority,
by way of exception, in
order to abbreviate the
review process as
petitioners raise a pure
question of law involving
jurisdiction in criminal
complaints for libel under
Article 360 of the RPC
whether the Amended
Information is sufficient
to sustain a charge for
written defamation in
light of the requirements
under Article 360 of the
RPC, as amended by
Republic Act (RA) No.
4363, reading:
Art. 360. Persons
responsible.Any person
who shall publish, exhibit
or cause the publication
or exhibition of any
defamation in writing or
by similar means, shall be
responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a
book or pamphlet, or the
editor or business
manager of a daily
newspaper, magazine or
serial publication, shall be
responsible for the
defamations contained
therein to the same extent
as if he were the author
thereof.
The criminal action and
civil action for damages in
cases of written
defamations, as provided
for in this chapter shall be
filed simultaneously or
separately with the Court
of First Instance of the
province or city where the
libelous article is printed
and first published or
where any of the offended
parties actually resides at
the time of the
commission of the offense:
Provided, however, That
where one of the offended
parties is a public officer
whose office is in the City
of Manila at the time of
the commission of the
offense, the action shall be
filed in the Court of First
Instance of the City of
Manila or of the city or
province where the
libelous article is printed
and first published, and in
case such public officer
does not hold office in the
City of Manila, the action
shall be filed in the Court
of First Instance of the
province or city where he
held office at the time of
the commission of the
offense or where the
libelous article is printed
and first published and in
case one of the offended
parties is a private
individual, the action shall
be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the
province or city where he
actually resides at the
time of the commission of
the offense or where the
libelous matter is printed
and first published x x x.
(emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Venue is jurisdictional in
criminal actions such that
the place where the crime
was committed
determines not only the
venue of the action but
constitutes an essential
element of jurisdiction.
[33] This principle
acquires even greater
import in libel cases, given
that Article 360, as
amended, specifically
provides for the possible
venues for the institution
of the criminal and civil
aspects of such cases.
In Macasaet,[34] the
Court reiterated its earlier
pronouncements in
Agbayani v. Sayo[35]
which laid out the rules on
venue in libel cases, viz:
For the guidance,
therefore, of both the
bench and the bar, this
Court finds it appropriate
to reiterate our earlier
pronouncement in the
case of Agbayani, to wit:
In order to obviate
controversies as to the
venue of the criminal
action for written
defamation, the complaint
or information should
contain allegations as to
whether, at the time the
offense was committed,
the offended party was a
public officer or a private
individual and where he
was actually residing at
that time. Whenever
possible, the place where
the written defamation
was printed and first
published should likewise
be alleged. That
allegation would be a sine
qua non if the
circumstance as to where
the libel was printed and
first published is used as
the basis of the venue of
the action. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
It becomes clear that the
venue of libel cases where
the complainant is a
private individual is
limited to only either of
two places, namely: 1)
where the complainant
actually resides at the
time of the commission of
the offense; or 2) where
the alleged defamatory
article was printed and
first published. The
Amended Information in
the present case opted to
lay the venue by availing
of the second. Thus, it
stated that the offending
article was first published
and accessed by the
private complainant in .
In other words, it
considered the phrase to
be equivalent to the
requisite allegation of
printing and first
publication.
The insufficiency of the
allegations in the
Amended Information to
vest jurisdiction in
becomes pronounced
upon an examination of
the rationale for the
amendment to Article 360
by RA No. 4363. Chavez v.
Court of Appeals[36]
explained the nature of
these changes:
Agbayani supplies a
comprehensive
restatement of the rules of
venue in actions for
criminal libel, following
the amendment by Rep.
Act No. 4363 of the
Revised Penal Code:
Article 360 in its original
form provided that the
venue of the criminal and
civil actions for written
defamations is the
province wherein the libel
was published, displayed
or exhibited, regardless of
the place where the same
was written, printed or
composed. Article 360
originally did not specify
the public officers and the
courts that may conduct
the preliminary
investigation of
complaints for libel.
Before article 360 was
amended, the rule was
that a criminal action for
libel may be instituted in
any jurisdiction where the
libelous article was
published or circulated,
irrespective of where it
was written or printed
(People v. Borja, 43 Phil.
618). Under that rule, the
criminal action is
transitory and the injured
party has a choice of
venue.
Experience had shown
that under that old rule
the offended party could
harass the accused in a
libel case by laying the
venue of the criminal
action in a remote or
distant place.
Thus, in connection with
an article published in the
Daily Mirror and the
Philippine Free Press, Pio
Pedrosa, Manuel V.
Villareal and Joaquin
Roces were charged with
libel in the justice of the
peace court of San
Fabian, Pangasinan
(Amansec v. De Guzman,
93 Phil. 933).
To forestall such
harassment, Republic Act
No. 4363 was enacted. It
lays down specific rules as
to the venue of the
criminal action so as to
prevent the offended
party in written
defamation cases from
inconveniencing the
accused by means of out-
of-town libel suits,
meaning complaints filed
in remote municipal
courts (Explanatory Note
for the bill which became
Republic Act No. 4363,
Congressional Record of
May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5;
Time, Inc. v. Reyes, L-
28882, May 31, 1971, 39
SCRA 303, 311).
x x x x (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the evil sought to
be prevented by the
amendment to Article 360
was the indiscriminate or
arbitrary laying of the
venue in libel cases in
distant, isolated or far-
flung areas, meant to
accomplish nothing more
than harass or intimidate
an accused. The disparity
or unevenness of the
situation becomes even
more acute where the
offended party is a person
of sufficient means or
possesses influence, and is
motivated by spite or the
need for revenge.
If the circumstances as to
where the libel was
printed and first
published are used by the
offended party as basis for
the venue in the criminal
action, the Information
must allege with
particularity where the
defamatory article was
printed and first
published, as evidenced or
supported by, for
instance, the address of
their editorial or business
offices in the case of
newspapers, magazines or
serial publications. This
pre-condition becomes
necessary in order to
forestall any inclination to
harass.
The same measure cannot
be reasonably expected
when it pertains to
defamatory material
appearing on a website on
the internet as there
would be no way of
determining the situs of its
printing and first
publication. To credit
Gimenezs premise of
equating his first access to
the defamatory article on
petitioners website in with
printing and first
publication would spawn
the very ills that the
amendment to Article 360
of the RPC sought to
discourage and prevent. It
hardly requires much
imagination to see the
chaos that would ensue in
situations where the
websites author or writer,
a blogger or anyone who
posts messages therein
could be sued for libel
anywhere in the that the
private complainant may
have allegedly accessed
the offending website.
For the Court to hold that
the Amended Information
sufficiently vested
jurisdiction in the courts
of simply because the
defamatory article was
accessed therein would
open the floodgates to the
libel suit being filed in all
other locations where the
pepcoalition website is
likewise accessed or
capable of being accessed.
Respecting the contention
that the venue
requirements imposed by
Article 360, as amended,
are unduly oppressive, the
Courts pronouncements
in Chavez[37] are
instructive:
For us to grant the
present petition, it would
be necessary to abandon
the Agbayani rule
providing that a private
person must file the
complaint for libel either
in the place of printing
and first publication, or at
the complainants place of
residence. We would also
have to abandon the
subsequent cases that
reiterate this rule in
Agbayani, such as Soriano,
Agustin, and Macasaet.
There is no convincing
reason to resort to such a
radical action. These
limitations imposed on
libel actions filed by
private persons are hardly
onerous, especially as they
still allow such persons to
file the civil or criminal
complaint in their
respective places of
residence, in which
situation there is no need
to embark on a quest to
determine with precision
where the libelous matter
was printed and first
published.
(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
IN FINE, the public
respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioners
motion to quash the
Amended Information.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED.
The assailed Order of and
the Joint Resolution of are
hereby SET ASIDE. The
Regional , 149 is hereby
DIRECTED TO QUASH
the Amended Information
in Criminal Case No. 06-
876 and DISMISS the
case.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
CRISTINEL G.R. No.
LI S. 157643
FERMIN, Present:
Petitio AUSTRI
ner, A-
- versus - MARTIN
PEOPLE OFEZ, J.,
THE Acting
PHILIPPIN Chairpers
ES, on,
ResponTINGA,*
dent.
CHICO-
NAZARI
O,
NACHU
RA, and
REYES,
JJ.
Promulga
ted:
March
28, 2008
x------------------------
--------------------------
--------------------------
--------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition[1]
for review on certiorari,
under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, of the
Decision[2] dated
September 3, 2002 and the
Resolution[3] dated
March 24, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 20890
entitled People of the
Philippines v. Cristenelli S.
Fermin and Bogs C.
Tugas.
On complaint of spouses
Annabelle Rama
Gutierrez and Eduardo
(Eddie) Gutierrez, two (2)
criminal informations for
libel[4] were filed against
Cristinelli[5] S. Fermin
and Bogs C. Tugas before
the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 218. Except for
the name of the
complainant,[6] the
informations uniformly
read
FERIA, J.:
Petitioner, Newsweek,
Inc., a foreign corporation
licensed to do business in
the Philippines, in this
special action for
certiorari, prohibition
with preliminary
injunction, seeks to annul
the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate
Court dated December 17,
1982 sustaining the Order
of the then Court of First
Instance of Bacolod City
which denied petitioner's
Motion to Dismiss the
complaint for libel filed by
private respondents (Civil
Case No. 15812), and the
Resolution dated March
10, 1983 which denied its
Motion for
Reconsideration.
It appears that on March
5, 1981, private
respondents, incorporated
associations of sugarcane
planters in Negros
Occidental claiming to
have 8,500 members and
several individual sugar
planters, filed Civil Case
No. 15812 in their own
behalf and/or as a class
suit in behalf of all
sugarcane planters in the
province of Negros
Occidental, against
petitioner and two of
petitioners' non-resident
correspondents/reporters
Fred Bruning and Barry
Came. The complaint
alleged that petitioner and
the other defendants
committed libel against
them by the publication of
the article "An Island of
Fear" in the February 23,
1981 issue of petitioner's
weekly news magazine
Newsweek. The article
supposedly portrayed the
island province of Negros
Occidental as a place
dominated by big
landowners or sugarcane
planters who not only
exploited the
impoverished and
underpaid sugarcane
workers/laborers, but also
brutalized and killed them
with imprunity.
Complainants therein
alleged that said article,
taken as a whole, showed
a deliberate and malicious
use of falsehood, slanted
presentation and/or
misrepresentation of facts
intended to put them
(sugarcane planters) in
bad light, expose them to
public ridicule, discredit
and humiliation here in
the Philippines and
abroad, and make them
objects of hatred,
contempt and hostility of
their agricultural workers
and of the public in
general. They prayed that
defendants be ordered to
pay them PlM as actual
and compensatory
damages, and such
amounts for moral,
exemplary and corrective
damages as the court may
determine, plus expenses
of litigation, attorney's
fees and costs of suit. A
photo copy of the article
was attached to the
complaint.
On November 5, 1981,
petitioner filed a motion
to dismiss on the grounds
that (1) the printed article
sued upon is not
actionable in fact and in
law; and (2) the complaint
is bereft of allegations that
state, much less support a
cause of action. It pointed
out the non-libelous
nature of the article and,
consequently, the failure
of the complaint to state a
cause of action. Private
respondents filed an
Opposition to the motion
to dismiss and petitioner
filed a reply.
On March 17, 1982, the
trial court denied the
motion to dismiss, stating
that the grounds on which
the motion to dismiss are
predicated are not
indubitable as the
complaint on its face
states a valid cause of
action; and the question
as to whether the printed
article sued upon its
actionable or not is a
matter of evidence.
Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was
denied on May 28, 1982.
On June 18, 1982,
petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari with
respondent Court (CA-G.
R. No. 14406) seeking the
annulment of the
aforecited trial court's
Orders for having been
issued with such a grave
abuse of discretion as
amounting to lack of
jurisdiction and praying
for the dismissal of the
complaint for failure to
state a cause of action.
As earlier stated,
respondent Court
affirmed the trial court's
Orders in a Decision
dated December 17, 1982
and ordered the case to be
tried on the merits on the
grounds that -(1) the
complaint contains
allegations of fact which
called for the presentation
of evidence; and (2)
certiorari under Rule 65
cannot be made to
substitute for an appeal
where an appeal would lie
at a proper time.
Subsequently, on March
10, 1983, the respondent
Court denied petitioner's
Motion for
Reconsideration of the
aforesaid decision, hence
this petition.
The proper remedy which
petitioner should have
taken from the decision of
respondent Court is an
appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court and not the special
civil action of certiorari
and prohibition under
Rule 65 of said Rules.
However, since the
petition was filed on time
within fifteen days from
notice of the Resolution
denying the motion for
reconsideration, we shall
treat the same as a
petition for review on
certiorari. The two (2)
issues raised in the
petition are: (1) whether
or not the private
respondents' complaint
failed to state a cause of
action; and (2) whether or
not the petition for
certiorari and prohibition
is proper to question the
denial of a motion to
dismiss for failure to state
a cause of action.
First, petitioner argues
that private respondents'
complaint failed to state a
cause of action because
the complaint made no
allegation that anything
contained in the article
complained of regarding
sugarcane planters
referred specifically to
any one of the private
respondents; that libel can
be committed only against
individual reputation; and
that in cases where libel is
claimed to have been
directed at a group, there
is actionable defamation
only if the libel can be
said to reach beyond the
mere collectivity to do
damage to a specific,
individual group
member's reputation.
We agree with petitioner.
In the case of Corpus vs.
Cuaderno, Sr. (16 SCRA
807) this Court ruled that
"in order to maintain a
libel suit, it is essential
that the victim be
identifiable (People vs.
Monton, L-16772,
November 30, 1962),
although it is not
necessary that he be
named (19 A.L.R. 116)."
In an earlier case, this
Court declared that" ...
defamatory matter which
does not reveal the
Identity of the person
upon whom the
imputation is cast, affords
no ground of action unless
it be shown that the
readers of the libel could
have Identified the
personality of the
individual defamed."
(Kunkle vs. Cablenews-
American and Lyons 42
Phil. 760).
This principle has been
recognized to be of vital
importance, especially
where a group or class of
persons, as in the case at
bar, claim to have been
defamed, for it is evident
that the larger the
collectivity, the more
difficult it is for the
individual member to
prove that the defamatory
remarks apply to him.
(Cf. 70 ALR 2d. 1384).
In the case of Uy Tioco vs.
Yang Shu Wen , 32 Phil.
624, this Court held as
follows:
Defamatory remarks
directed at a class
or group of persons
in general language
only, are not
actionable by
individuals
composing the
class or group
unless the
statements are
sweeping; and it is
very probable that
even then no action
would lie where the
body is composed
of so large a
number of persons
that common sense
would tell those to
whom the
publication was
made that there was
room for persons
connected with the
body to pursue an
upright and law
abiding course and
that it would be
unreasonable and
absurd to condemn
all because of the
actions of a part.
(supra p. 628).
It is evident from the
above ruling that where
the defamation is
alleged to have been
directed at a group or
class, it is essential
that the statement must
be so sweeping or all-
embracing as to apply
to every individual in
that group or class, or
sufficiently specific so
that each individual in
the class or group can
prove that the
defamatory statement
specifically pointed to
him, so that he can
bring the action
separately, if need be.
We note that private
respondents filed a
"class suit" in
representation of all
the 8,500 sugarcane
planters of Negros
Occidental. Petitioner
disagrees and argues
that the absence of any
actionable basis in the
complaint cannot be
cured by the filing of a
class suit on behalf of
the aforesaid sugar
planters.
We find petitioner's
contention meritorious.
The case at bar is not a
class suit. It is not a
case where one or
more may sue for the
benefit of all (Mathay
vs. Consolidated Bank
and Trust Company, 58
SCRA 559) or where the
representation of class
interest affected by the
judgment or decree is
indispensable to make
each member of the
class an actual party
(Borlaza vs. Polistico,
47 Phil. 348). We have
here a case where each
of the plaintiffs has a
separate and distinct
reputation in the
community. They do
not have a common or
general interest in the
subject matter of the
controversy.
The disputed portion of
the article which refers
to plaintiff Sola and
which was claimed to
be libelous never
singled out plaintiff
Sola as a sugar planter.
The news report merely
stated that the victim
had been arrested by
members of a special
police unit brought into
the area by Pablo Sola,
the mayor of
Kabankalan. Hence, the
report, referring as it
does to an official act
performed by an
elective public official,
is within the realm of
privilege and protected
by the constitutional
guarantees of free
speech and press.
The article further
stated that Sola and the
commander of the
special police unit were
arrested. The Court
takes judicial notice of
this fact. (People vs.
Sola, 103 SCRA 393.)
The second issue to be
resolved here is
whether or not the
special civil action of
certiorari or prohibition
is available to
petitioner whose
motion to dismiss the
complaint and
subsequent motion for
reconsideration were
denied.
As a general rule, an
order denying a motion
to dismiss is merely
interlocutory and
cannot be subject of
appeal until final
judgment or order is
rendered. (Sec. 2 of
Rule 4 1). The ordinary
procedure to be
followed in such a case
is to file an answer, go
to trial and if the
decision is adverse,
reiterate the issue on
appeal from the final
judgment. The same
rule applies to an order
denying a motion to
quash, except that
instead of filing an
answer a plea is
entered and no appeal
lies from a judgment of
acquittal.
This general rule is
subject to certain
exceptions. If the court,
in denying the motion
to dismiss or motion to
quash, acts without or
in excess of
jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of
discretion, then
certiorari or prohibition
lies. The reason is that
it would be unfair to
require the defendant
or accused to undergo
the ordeal and expense
of a trial if the court
has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter or
offense, or is not the
court of proper venue,
or if the denial of the
motion to dismiss or
motion to quash is
made with grave abuse
of discretion or a
whimsical and
capricious exercise of
judgment. In such
cases, the ordinary
remedy of appeal
cannot be plain and
adequate. The
following are a few
examples of the
exceptions to the
general rule.
In De Jesus vs. Garcia
(19 SCRA 554), upon
the denial of a motion
to dismiss based on
lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter, this
Court granted the
petition for certiorari
and prohibition against
the City Court of Manila
and directed the
respondent court to
dismiss the case.
In Lopez vs. City Judge
(18 SCRA 616), upon
the denial of a motion
to quash based on lack
of jurisdiction over the
offense, this Court
granted the petition for
prohibition and
enjoined the
respondent court from
further proceeding in
the case.
In Enriquez vs.
Macadaeg (84 Phil.
674), upon the denial of
a motion to dismiss
based on improper
venue, this Court
granted the petition for
prohibition and
enjoined the
respondent judge from
taking cognizance of
the case except to
dismiss the same.
In Manalo vs. Mariano
(69 SCRA 80), upon the
denial of a motion to
dismiss based on bar
by prior judgment, this
Court granted the
petition for certiorari
and directed the
respondent judge to
dismiss the case.
In Yuviengco vs.
Dacuycuy (105 SCRA
668), upon the denial of
a motion to dismiss
based on the Statute of
Frauds, this Court
granted the petition for
certiorari and
dismissed the
amended complaint.
In Tacas vs. Cariaso (72
SCRA 527), this Court
granted the petition for
certiorari after the
motion to quash based
on double jeopardy
was denied by
respondent judge and
ordered him to desist
from further action in
the criminal case
except to dismiss the
same.
In People vs. Ramos
(83 SCRA 11), the order
denying the motion to
quash based on
prescription was set
aside on certiorari and
the criminal case was
dismissed by this
Court.
Respondent Court
correctly stated the
general rule and its
exceptions. However, it
ruled that none of the
exceptions is present
in the case at bar and
that the case appears
complex and
complicated,
necessitating a full-
blown trial to get to the
bottom of the
controversy.
Petitioner's motion to
dismiss is based on the
ground that the
complaint states no
cause of action against
it by pointing out the
non-libelous nature of
the article sued upon.
There is no need of a
trial in view of the
conclusion of this
Court that the article in
question is not
libelous. The specific
allegation in the
complaint, to the effect
that the article
attributed to the
sugarcane planters the
deaths and
brutalization of
sugarcane workers, is
not borne out by a
perusal of the actual
text.
The complaint contains
a recital of the
favorable working
conditions of the
agricultural workers in
the sugar industry and
the various
foundations and
programs supported by
planters' associations
for the benefit of their
workers. Undoubtedly,
the statements in the
article in question are
sweeping and
exaggerated; but,
paraphrasing the ruling
in the Uy Tioco case
above quoted, it would
be unreasonable and
absurd to condemn the
majority of the
sugarcane planters,
who have at heart the
welfare of their
workers, because of
the actions of a part.
Nonetheless, articles
such as the one in
question may also
serve to prick the
consciences of those
who have but are not
doing anything or
enough for those who
do not have.
On the other hand,
petitioner would do
well to heed the
admonition of the
President to media that
they should check the
sources of their
information to ensure
the publication of the
truth. Freedom of the
press, like all
freedoms, should be
exercised with
responsibility.
WHEREFORE, the
decision of the
Intermediate Appellate
Court is reversed and
the complaint in Civil
Case No. 15812 of the
Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental is
dismissed, without
pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the
Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 76565
November 9, 1988
BULLETIN
PUBLISHING
CORPORATION,
represented by its
President, MARTIN
ISIDRO and its
Publisher, APOLONIO
BATALLA, BEN F.
RODRIGUEZ, FRED J.
REYES, JAMIL MAIDAN
FLORES and JOHN
DOES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE
EDILBERTO NOEL, in
his capacity as
Presiding Judge of
Branch VIII of the
Regional Trial Court,
12th Judicial Region
with station in Marawi
City, ATTY.
DIMATIMPOS
MINDALANO, ATTY.
MANGORSI A.
MINDALANO, SHIEK
EDRES MINDALANO,
SULTAN GUINAR
MINDALANO, FAROUK
CALIPA MINDALANO,
SULTAN MAHADI
MINDALANO, SULTAN
KHALID MINDALANO,
SULTAN MA-AMOR
MINDALANO, DR.
TAHER MINDALANO,
DATU MAGUIDALA
MINDALANO, SOBAIDA
MAGUMPARA VDA. DE
MINDALANO, RAISHA
MINDALANO
MANDANGAN, ATTY.
KIMAL M. SALACOP,
DATU KAMAR M.
MINDALANO, MAYOR
RASLANI MINDALANO,
VICE-MAYOR ALIDADI
A. MINDALANO, ENG.
RASHDI A.
MINDALANO, MRS.
PAISHA MINDALANO
AGUAM, DATU AZIS
MINDALANO AGUAM,
MRS. MOOMINA
MINDALANO OMAR,
DATU AMINOLA
MINDALANO OMAR, in
behalf of the Mindalano
Clan, respondents.
Siguion Reyna,
Montecillo and
Ongsiako for
petitioners.
Kimal M. Salacop,
Mahadi Pimping,
Dimatimpos Mindalano,
Mangorsi Mindalano,
Linang Mandangan,
Abdul S. Aguam and
Dagoroan Q.
Macarambon for
private respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 3 July 1986 the
twenty-one (21) private
respondents (plaintiffs
below), claiming to be
the nearest relatives of
the late Amir
Mindalano, suing on
their own behalf and on
behalf of the entire
Mindalano clan of
Mindanao, filed a
Complaint 1 for
damages (docketed as
Civil Case No. 81-86)
before Branch 8 of the
Regional Trial Court of
Marawi City charging
petitioners with libel.
Private respondents'
action was anchored
on a feature article
written by Jamil Maidan
Flores entitled "A
Changing of the
Guard," which
appeared in the 22
June 1986 issue of
Philippine Panorama, a
publication of
petitioner Bulletin
Publishing
Corporation. In
particular, exception
was taken to the
following excerpt:
The division of
Lanao into Sur and
Norte in 1959 only
emphasized the
feudal nature of
Maranaw politics.
Talk of Lanao
politics and you find
yourself confined to
a small circle of the
Alonto, Dimaporo,
Dimakuta, Dianalan,
Lucman families
and a few more.
These are big, royal
families. If you are a
Maranaw with
aspirations for
political leadership,
you better be a
certified bona fide
member of one or
several of these
clans.
xxx xxx xxx
About the only time
that one who was
not of any royal
house became a
leader of
consequence in the
province was during
the American era
when the late Amir
Mindalano held
some sway. That
was because
Mindalano had the
advantage of
having lived with an
American family
and was therefore
fluent and literate in
English. But as
soon as the datus
woke up to the
blessings of the
transplanted
American public
school system, as
soon as they could
speak and read and
write in English,
political leadership
again became
virtually their
exclusive domain.
There must be some
irony in that. 2
(Emphasis
supplied)
Private respondents
alleged in their
complaint that,
contrary to the above
portion of the article,
the Mindalanos "belong
to no less than four (4)
of the 16 Royal Houses
of Lanao del Sur."
Private respondents
likewise objected to the
statement that the late
Amir Mindalano, grand
patriarch of the
Mindalano clan, had
lived with an American
family, a statement
which, they alleged,
apart from being
absolutely false, "has a
distinct repugnant
connotation in Maranao
society." Contending
finally that petitioners
had with malice
inflicted "so much
damage upon the
social standing of the
plaintiffs" as to
"irreparably injure" the
Mindalano name and
reputation, private
respondents
interposed a claim for
the award of moral and
exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, and
litigation expenses, all
in the aggregate
amount of
P2,350,000.00.
Reacting to the
complaint, petitioners
filed on 6 August 1986
a Motion to Dismiss 3
urging that (a) venue
had been improperly
laid, (b) the complaint
failed to state a cause
of action, and (c) the
complainants lacked
the capacity to bring
the suit. In an Order 4
dated 30 October 1986,
however, respondent
Judge denied the
Motion to Dismiss and
directed petitioners
(defendants below) to
file their answer to the
complaint.
In the present Petition
for certiorari and
Prohibition, petitioners
assail the 30 October
1986 order of
respondent Judge,
reiterating basically the
arguments raised in
their Motion to Dismiss
filed with the trial court.
On 4 December 1986,
the court issued a
Temporary Restraining
Order enjoining
respondent Judge from
conducting further
proceedings in Civil
Case No. 81-86. 5
Petitioners and private
respondents have
since then filed
responsive pleadings.
On the question of
venue raised by
petitioners, paragraph
2 of Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic
Act No. 4363, provides
in part:
The criminal and
civil action for
damages in cases
of written
defamations, as
provided for in this
Chapter, shall be
filed simultaneously
or separately with
the court of first
instance (now
Regional Trial
Court) of the
province or city
where the libelous
article was printed
and first published
or where any of the
offended parties
actually resides at
the time of the
commission of the
offense ...
(Emphasis
supplied)
The law specifically
designates as proper
venue in criminal and
civil actions for libel
the Regional Trial Court
of the province or city
"where any of the
offended parties
actually resides at the
time of the commission
of the offense;" upon
the other hand, the
record of this case
shows that at the time
the allegedly libelous
Panorama article was
published, nine (9) of
the twenty-one (21)
complainants (private
respondents) were then
residents of Marawi
City. Filing of the
complaint (Civil Case
No. 81-86) with the
Marawi Regional Trial
Court thus did not
result in any
procedural infirmity as
would vitiate the
proceedings
undertaken there.
Petitioners' argument
that venue was
improperly laid simply
because the twelve (12)
other complainants
were non-residents of
Marawi at the time of
publication is,
therefore, without
merit. It is to the benefit
of petitioners that the
twelve (12) non-
residents of Marawi
chose to go along with
the suit in Marawi
instead of commencing
a separate suit
elsewhere. The Court is
not, however, to be
understood as saying
that the 21
complainants, if
residents in 21 different
places, could have
sued in 21 differing
courts and still claim
that venue had been
properly laid in each
instance. Such a
situation may well
indicate a pattern of
harassment of the
defendant newspaper
which could justify
intervention on the part
of this Court to avoid a
potential paralysing
effect upon the
exercise of press
freedom.
Coming now to the
principal issue of
whether or not the
complaint states a valid
cause of action, the
Court finds that libel
has not here been
committed; the civil
suit for damages must
fail.
It is axiomatic in
actions for damages
for libel that the
published work alleged
to contain libelous
material must be
examined and viewed
6
as a whole. We have
accordingly examined
in its entirety the
subject article "A
Changing of the Guard"
which is in essence a
popular essay on the
general nature and
character of Mindanao
politics and the recent
emergence of a new
political leader in the
province of Lanao del
Sur. We note firstly that
the essay is not
focused on the late
Amir Mindalano nor his
family. Save in the
excerpts complained
about and quoted
above, the name of the
Mindalano family or
clan is not mentioned
or alluded to in the
essay. The
Identification of Amir
Mindalano is thus
merely illustrative or
incidental in the course
of the development of
the theme of the article.
The language utilized
by the article in general
and the above excerpts
in particular appears
simply declaratory or
expository in character,
matter-of-fact and
unemotional in tone
and tenor. No
derogatory or derisive
implications or
nuances appear
detectable at all,
however closely one
may scrutinize the
above excerpts. We
find in the quoted
excerpts no evidence
of malevolent intent
either on the part of the
author or the publisher
of the article here
involved.
Private respondents,
however, argue that
petitioners had in the
article falsely and
maliciously ascribed to
the late Amir
Mindalano, and to the
rest of the extended
Mindalano family, an
inferior status or
condition—i.e., that of
not belonging to any of
the royal Muslim
houses of the Lanao
provinces which
respondents assert
substantially injured
their good family name
and reputation. In their
complaint before the
trial court, private
respondents asserted
their affiliations with at
least five (5) royal
houses:
11. The late Amir
Mindalano, as well
as plaintiffs from
their heritage from
the Mindalano
genealogy, belong
to no less than four
(4) of the 16 royal
Houses of Lanao
del Sur, namely; (1)
the Sultanate of
Ramain; (2) the
Sultanate of Butig,
(3) the Sultanate of
Masiu and (4) the
Sultanate of
Bayang. They also
are distinctly
favored for being
scions of the Royal
House of Noron of
Kapatagan, Lanao
del Norte. Noron
was the sister of
Pagayawan and
Diwan of the Royal
Houses of
Pagayawan and
Bayang
respectively;
12. Intermarrying
with the Mindalano
clan, who are also
represented in this
suit, are scions of
the other royal
families of the two
Lanao provinces, all
of whom, together
with the nominal
plaintiffs and the
others represented
in this suit, have
been provoked to
wrath, exposed to
public contempt
and ridicule, and
their social standing
and reputation
besmirched and
humiliated by the
defamation subject
matter of this suit
that blackened and
vilified the memory
of their departed
patriarch, the late
Amir Mindalano;
xxx xxx xxx 7
It is also claimed by
private respondents
that the excerpts
objected to falsely
asserted that—
the late Amir
Mindalano has
acquired his fluency
and literacy by
living with an
American family
[which] has a
distinct repugnant
connotation in
Maranao society in
that during the
American time the
royal families of
Lanao hid their
children from the
public school
system and the
Americans. Only the
lowliest commoners
were sent to school
or allowed to live
with any American
family. Amir
Manalao Mindalano
has received his
education at the
Lumbatan High
School, was a
student leader
thereat, and has not
lived with an
American family. 8
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be
set aside in this petition
forreview 1 under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court is
the decision 2 dated
January 25, 2001 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 52240
which reversed and set
aside an earlier decision 3
of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati
City, Branch 64, in Civil
Case No. 88-1952, an
action for damages
thereat commenced by the
herein respondents Jesus
G. Bustos, Teodora R.
Ocampo, Victor V.
Buencamino, Cesar F.
Villafuerte, Artemio T.
Ordinario and Virgilio C.
Basilio, all physicians by
profession and the former
chairman and members,
respectively, of the Board
of Medicine, against the
herein petitioners GMA
Network, Inc. (formerly
Republic Broadcasting
System, Inc.) and Rey
Vidal.
The facts:
In August 1987, the Board
of Medicine of the
Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC)
conducted the physicians’
licensure examinations.
Out of the total two
thousand eight hundred
thirty-five (2,835)
examinees who took the
examinations, nine
hundred forty-one (941)
failed.
On February 10, 1988, a
certain Abello and over
two hundred other
unsuccessful examinees
filed a Petition for
Mandamus before the
RTC of Manila to compel
the PRC and the board of
medical examiners to re-
check and reevaluate the
test papers. As alleged,
mistakes in the counting
of the total scores and
erroneous checking of
answers to test questions
vitiated the results of the
examinations.
As news writer and
reporter of petitioner
GMA Network, Inc.
assigned to gather news
from courts, among other
beats, its co-petitioner Rey
Vidal covered the filing of
the mandamus petition.
After securing a copy of
the petition, Vidal
composed and narrated
the news coverage for the
ten o’clock evening news
edition of GMA’s Channel
7 Headline News.
The text of the news
report, 4 as drafted and
narrated by Vidal and
which GMA Network, Inc.
aired and televised on
February 10, 1988, runs:
Some 227 examinees in
the last August
Physician Licensure
Examinations today
asked the Manila [RTC]
to compel the [PRC]
and the Medical Board
of Examiners to recheck
the August 1987 test
papers. The petitioners
[examinees] today went
to the Presiding Judge
to also ask for a special
raffling of the case
considering that the
next physicians
examinations have been
scheduled for February
[1988] …. They said that
the gross, massive,
haphazard, whimsical
and capricious checking
that must have been
going on for years
should now be stopped
once and for all.
The last examination
was conducted last
August … at the PRC
central offices, the Far
Eastern University and
the Araullo High School,
the exams on multiple
choice or matching type
involve 12 subjects
including general
medicine, biochemistry,
surgery and obstetrics
and gynecology.
21 schools participated
in the examination
represented by some
2,835 medical student
graduates, 1,894 passed
and 141 failed.
The results of the exams
were released December
9 and were published
the following day in
metropolitan papers last
years (sic).
A group of failing
examinees enlisted the
help of the Offices of the
President and the Vice
President and as a result
were allowed by PRC …
to obtain the official set
of test questions. The
students then
researched … and
produced the key
answers to the key
questions.
The petitioners were
also allowed to see their
own test papers, most of
them copying the papers
….
With these copies, they
were able to match the
scores and the correct
answers in the
examinations. They
found that the errors in
checking were so
material that they
actually lowered the
scores that formed the
individual ratings of the
examinees in the various
subjects.
Examples of the
discrepancies are to be
found in identical
answers being rated as
incorrect in one
examinee’s paper but
correct in another.
There is also the case of
two different answers
being rated as correct.
There are indications of
wrong counting of total
scores per subject so
that the totals are either
short by two up to four
points.
Finally, there are raw
scores that have been
transmuted incorrectly
so that a passing score
was rendered a failure.
The petitioners said that
the haphazard and
whimsical and
capricious checking
should now be stopped
once and for all. They
said that the nine years
formal studies and the
one year internship not
to mention the expenses
and the blood, sweat,
and tears of the students
and their families will
have been rendered
nugatory. The
petitioners also noted
that Com. Francia had
promised last January
12 to rectify the errors
in the checking and yet
they have not received
the appropriate action
promised whereas the
next exams have been
set for Feb. 20, 21, 27
and 28. (Words in
bracket added.)
Stung by what they claim
to be a false, malicious
and one-sided report filed
and narrated by a
remorseless reporter, the
herein respondents
instituted on September
21, 1988 with the RTC of
Makati City a damage
suit against Vidal and
GMA Network, Inc., then
known as the Republic
Broadcasting System, Inc.
In their complaint, 5
docketed as Civil Case No.
88-1952 and raffled to
Branch 64 of the court,
the respondents, as
plaintiffs a quo, alleged,
among other things, that
then defendants Vidal and
GMA Network, Inc., in
reckless disregard for the
truth, defamed them by
word of mouth and
simultaneous visual
presentation on GMA
Network, Inc.’s Channel
7. They added that, as a
measure to make a
forceful impact on their
audience, the defendants
made use of an unrelated
and old footage (showing
physicians wearing black
armbands) to make it
appear that other doctors
were supporting and
sympathizing with the
complaining unsuccessful
examinees. According to
the plaintiffs, the video
footage in question
actually related to a 1982
demonstration staged by
doctors and personnel of
the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH) regarding
wage and economic
dispute with hospital
management.
In their answer with
counterclaim, the
defendants denied any
wrongdoing, maintaining
that their February 10,
1988 late evening telecast
on the filing of the
mandamus petition was
contextually a concise and
objective narration of a
matter of public concern.
They also alleged that the
press freedom guarantee
covered the telecast in
question, undertaken as it
was to inform, without
malice, the viewing public
on the conduct of public
officials. And vis-à-vis the
particular allegation on
the film footages of the
PGH demonstration,
defendants tagged such
footages as "neutral."
Pressing the point,
defendants hastened to
add that the footages were
accompanied, when
shown, by an appropriate
voiceover, thus negating
the idea conjured by the
plaintiffs to create an
effect beyond an
obligation to report.
In the course of trial, the
plaintiffs presented
testimonial evidence to
prove their allegations
about the Vidal report
having exposed them, as
professionals, to hatred,
contempt and ridicule.
And in a bid to establish
malice and bad faith on
the part of the defendants,
the plaintiffs adduced
evidence tending to show
that the former exerted no
effort toward presenting
their (plaintiffs’) side in
subsequent telecasts.
In a decision 6 dated
October 17, 1995, the trial
court found for the herein
petitioners, as defendants
a quo, on the postulate
that the Vidal telecast
report in question is
privileged. Dispositively,
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view
of the foregoing
considerations,
plaintiffs’ complaint for
damages against
defendants Republic
Broadcasting System
Incorporated and Rey
Vidal is hereby
DISMISSED.
The defendants’
counterclaim for
damages is likewise
dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Following the denial of
their motion for
reconsideration, 7 herein
respondents went on
appeal to the CA in CA-
G.R. CV No. 52240. As
stated at the threshold
hereof, the appellate
8
court, in its decision of
January 25, 2001,
reversed and set aside that
of the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the
Decision dated October
17, 1995 is hereby
REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and [petitioners]
are hereby ordered to
pay, in solidum, the
following:
a) the amount of
P100,000.00 for each of
the [respondents] as
moral damages;
b) the amount of
P100,000.00 for each of
the [respondents] as
exemplary damages;
c) the amount of
P20,000.00 as attorney’s
fee;
d) and cost of suit.
SO ORDERED. (Words
in brackets added.)
Hence, petitioners’
present recourse,
submitting for the Court’s
consideration the
following questions:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT
THE CA, AFTER
DECLARING THE
NEWS TELECAST OF
FEBRUARY 10, 1988
AS QUALIFIEDLY
PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATION,
COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR
AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN
INJECTING ACTUAL
MALICE TO THE
NEWS TELECAST OF
FEBRUARY 10, 1988
JUST SO THAT
RESPONDENT
BOARD OF
MEDICINE COULD
RECOVER MORAL
AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT
THE CA COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR
AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN
COMPLETELY
REJECTING
PETITIONERS’
EVIDENCE THAT
THE CHARACTER
GENERATED WORDS
‘FILE VIDEO’ WERE
INDICATED ON
SCREEN TO
IDENTIFY THE
SHOWING OF THE
OLD FILM FOOTAGE
IN THE NEWS
TELECAST OF
FEBRUARY 10, 1988.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT
THE CA COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR
… IN IMPUTING
MALICE UPON
PETITIONERS FOR
NOT PRESENTING A
TAPE COPY OF THE
NEWS TELECAST OF
FEBRUARY 10, 1988
ON THE
GRATUITOUS
DECLARATION THAT
A TAPE COPY COULD
BE EASILY SECURED
FROM THE
NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATI
ONS COMMISSION
(NTC) WHICH
ALLEGEDLY KEEPS
FILE COPIES OF ALL
SHOWS FOR A
CERTAIN PERIOD OF
TIME.
D.
WHETHER OR NOT
RESPONDENT
BOARD OF
MEDICINE
CHAIRMAN AND
MEMBERS THEREOF,
WHO NEVER
QUESTIONED THE
COURT OF APPEALS’
DECISION DATED
JANUARY 25, 2001 IN
A SEPARATE AND
INDEPENDENT
PETITION BEFORE
THE HONORABLE
COURT, CAN ASK
FOR AN INCREASED
AWARD IN DAMAGES
FROM THE
HONORABLE COURT
UNDER THEIR
COMMENT DATED 7
MAY 2001.
Summed up, the issues
tendered in this petition
boil down to the
following: (1) whether or
not the televised news
report in question on the
filing of the petition for
mandamus against the
respondents is libelous;
and (2) whether or not the
insertion of the old film
footage depicting the
doctors and personnel of
PGH in their 1982
demonstrations
constitutes malice to
warrant the award of
damages to the
respondents.
It bears to stress, at the
outset, that the trial court
found the disputed news
report not actionable
under the law on libel,
hence no damages may be
recovered. Wrote that
court:
This Court finds the
telecast of February 10,
1988 aired over Channel
7 by [petitioner] Rey
Vidal as a straight news
report of the acts and
conduct of the members
of the Medical Board of
Examiners who are
public officers, devoid of
comment or remarks,
and thus privileged, and
recognized under the
1987 Constitution.
A comparative
examination of the
telecast of the disputed
news report with the
Petition for Mandamus
entitled Abello, et al., vs.
Professional Regulation
Commission … filed
before the [RTC] by the
medical examinees
reveals that the disputed
news report is but a
narration of the
allegations contained in
and circumstances
attending the filing of
the said Petition for
Mandamus. In the case
of Cuenco vs. Cuenco,
G.R. No. L-29560,
March 31, 1976 …, [it
was] … held that the
correct rule is that a fair
and true report of a
complaint filed in Court
without remarks nor
comments even before
an answer is filed or a
decision promulgated
should be covered by
the privilege. xxx. This
Court adopts the ruling
[in Cuenco] to support
its finding of fact that
the disputed news
report consists merely of
a summary of the
allegations in the said
Petition for Mandamus,
filed by the medical
examinees, thus the
same falls within the
protected ambit of
privileged
communication.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, [petitioners], in
consideration of the
foregoing observations
… cannot be held liable
for damages claimed by
[respondents] for simply
bringing to fore
information on subjects
of public concern. 9
(Words in brackets
supplied.)
The CA, too, regarded the
text of the news telecast as
not libelous and as a
qualifiedly privileged
communication, "[it
having been] merely lifted
or quoted from the
contents and allegations in
the said petition [for
10
mandamus]." But unlike
the trial court, the CA saw
fit to award damages to
the respondents, it being
its posture that the
insertion to the news
telecast of the unrelated
1982 PGH picket film
footage is evidence of
malice. Without quite
saying so, the CA viewed
the footage insertion as
giving a televised news
report otherwise
privileged a libelous
dimension. In the precise
words of the appellate
court:
While it is the duty of
the media to report to
the public matters of
public concern and
interest, the report
should be a fair,
accurate and true report
of the proceedings. The
subject telecast failed in
this aspect. The
insertion of the film
footage showing the
doctors’ demonstration
at the PGH several
times during the news
report on the petition
filed by the board
flunkers undoubtedly
created an impression
that the said
demonstration was
related to the filing of
the case by the board
flunkers. The insertion
of the film footage
without the words ‘file
video’, and which had
no connection
whatsoever to the
petition, was done with
the knowledge of the
[petitioners], thus, in
wanton and reckless
disregard of their duty
to the public to render a
fair, accurate and true
report of the same.
xxx xxx xxx
The findings of malice
on the part of the
[petitioners] should not
be construed as a
censure to the freedom
of the press since their
right to render a news
on matters of public
concern was not the
issue but rather the
misrepresentation made
when they inserted a
film footage of the
doctors’ demonstration
which created a wrong
impression of the real
situation.
Unquestionably, the
news reporting,
interview and the
showing of [the
flunkers] filing the case
were fair reporting. At
this point, that would
have been sufficient to
inform the public of
what really happened.
However, for reasons
only known to
[petitioners], they
inserted the questioned
film footage which had
no relation to the news
being reported. There is
no other conclusion that
there was motive to
create an impression
that the issue also
affected the doctors
which forced them to
demonstrate. xxx.
(Words in brackets
supplied).
With the view we take of
this case, given the
parallel unchallenged
determination of the two
courts below that what
petitioner Vidal reported
was privileged, the award
of damages is untenable
as it is paradoxical.
An award of damages
under the premises
presupposes the
commission of an act
amounting to defamatory
imputation or libel, which,
in turn, presupposes
malice. Libel is the public
and malicious imputation
to another of a
discreditable act or
condition tending to cause
the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or
juridical person. 11
Liability for libel attaches
present the following
elements: (a) an allegation
or imputation of a
discreditable act or
condition concerning
another; (b) publication of
the imputation; (c)
identity of the person
defamed; and (d)
existence ofmalice. 12
To be sure, the
enumeration under the
aforecited Article 354 is
not an exclusive list of
conditional privilege
communications as the
constitutional guarantee
of freedom of the speech
and of the press has
expanded the privilege to
include fair commentaries
on matters of public
interest. 16
.
In the case at bench, the
news telecast in question
clearly falls under the
second kind of privileged
matter, the same being the
product of a simple
narration of the
allegations set forth in the
mandamus petition of
examinees Abello, et al.,
devoid of any comment or
remark. Both the CA and
the trial court in fact
found the narration to be
without accompanying
distortive or defamatory
comments or remarks.
What at bottom
petitioners Vidal and
GMA Network, Inc., then
did was simply to inform
the public of the
mandamus petition filed
against the respondent
doctors who were
admittedly the then
chairman and members of
the Board of Medicine. It
was clearly within
petitioner Vidal’s job as
news writer and reporter
assigned to cover
government institutions to
keep the public abreast of
recent developments
therein. It must be
reiterated that the courts
a quo had determined the
news report in question to
be qualifiedly privileged
communication protected
under the 1987
Constitution.
This brings us to the more
important question of
whether or not the
complaining respondents,
in their effort to remove
the protection accorded
by the privilege,
succeeded in establishing
ill-will and malice on the
part of the petitioners in
their televised
presentation of the news
report in dispute, thus
committing libel.
The CA, adopting the
respondents’ line on the
matter of malice, resolved
the question in the
affirmative. As the CA
noted, the insertion of an
old film footage showing
doctors wearing black
armbands and
demonstrating at the
PGH, without the
accompanying character-
generated words "file
video," created the
impression that other
doctors were supporting
and sympathizing with the
unsuccessful examinees.
The Court disagrees.
Contrary to the CA’s
findings, the identifying
character-generated
words "file video"
appeared to have been
superimposed on screen,
doubtless to disabuse the
minds of televiewers of the
idea that a particular
footage is current. In the
words of the trial court,
the phrase "file video"
was "indicated on screen
purposely to prevent
misrepresentation so as
not to confuse the viewing
17
public." The trial court
added the observation
that "the use of file
footage in TV news
reporting is a standard
18
practice." At any rate,
the absence of the
accompanying character-
generated words "file
video" would not change
the legal situation insofar
as the privileged nature of
the audio-video
publication complained of
is concerned. For, with the
view we take of the state
of things, the video
footage was not libel in
disguise; standing without
accompanying sounds or
voices, it was meaningless,
or, at least, conveyed
nothing derogatory in
nature.
And lest it be overlooked,
personal hurt or
embarrassment or
offense, even if real, is not
automatically equivalent
to defamation. The law
against defamation
protects one’s interest in
acquiring, retaining and
enjoying a reputation "as
good as one’s character
and conduct warrant" in
19
the community. Clearly
then, it is the community,
not personal standards,
which shall be taken into
account in evaluating any
allegations of libel and
any claims for damages on
account thereof.
So it is that in Bulletin
Publishing Corp. v. Noel, 20
we held:
The term "community"
may of course be drawn
as narrowly or as
broadly as the user of
the term and his
purposes may require.
The reason why for
purposes of the law on
libel the more general
meaning of community
must be adopted in the
ascertainment of
relevant standards, is
rooted deep in our
constitutional law. That
reason relates to the
fundamental public
interest in the protection
and promotion of free
speech and expression,
an interest shared by all
members of the body
politic and territorial
community. A
newspaper … should be
free to report on events
and developments in
which the public has a
legitimate interest,
wherever they may take
place within the nation
and as well in the
outside world, with
minimum fear of being
hauled to court by one
group or another
(however defined in
scope) on criminal or
civil charges for libel, so
long as the newspaper
respects and keep within
the general community.
Any other rule on
defamation, in a
national community like
ours with many, diverse
cultural, social, religious
an other groupings, is
likely to produce an
unwholesome "chilling
effect" upon the
constitutionally
protected operations of
the press and other
instruments of
information and
education.
It cannot be over-
emphasized furthermore
that the showing of the
1982 film footage,
assuming for argument
that it contained
demeaning features, was
actually accompanied or
simultaneously voiced
over by the narration of
the news report lifted
from the filing of the
mandamus petition. As
aptly put by the
petitioners without
controversion from the
respondents, there was
nothing in the news report
to indicate an intent to
utilize such old footages to
create another news story
beyond what was
reported. 21
SLANDER
Republic of the
Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-
21529 March 28,
1969
ROSAURO REYES,
petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Jose F. Mañacop for
petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor
General Arturo A. Alafriz,
Assistant Solicitor General
Pacifico P. de Castro and
Solicitor Antonio M.
Martinez for respondent.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This case is before us on
appeal by certiorari, from
the decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming that
a the municipal court of
Cavite City, convicting
Rosauro Reyes of the
crimes of grave threats
and grave oral
defamation, and
sentencing him, in the
first case (Criminal Case
No. 2594), to four (4)
months and ten (10) days
of arresto mayor and to
pay a fine of P300, with
subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency; and
in the second case
(Criminal Case No. 2595),
to an indeterminate
penalty of from four (4)
months of arresto mayor
to one (1) year and eight
(8) months of prison
correccional and to pay
Agustin Hallare the sum
of P800 as moral
damages, with costs in
both cases.
The petitioner herein,
Rosauro Reyes, was a
former civilian employee
of the Navy Exchange,
Sangley Point, Cavite
City, whose services were
terminated on May 6,
1961. In the afternoon of
June 6, 1961, he led a
group of about 20 to 30
persons in a
demonstration staged in
front of the main gate of
the United States Naval
Station at Sangley Point.
They carried placards
bearing statements such
as, "Agustin, mamatay
ka;" "To, alla boss con
Nolan;" "Frank do not be
a common funk;"
"Agustin, mamamatay ka
rin"; "Agustin, Nolan for
you;" "Agustin alla bos
con Nolan;" "Agustin,
dillega, el dia di quida rin
bo chiquiting;" and
others. The base
commander, Capt.
McAllister, called up Col.
Patricia Monzon, who as
Philippine Military
Liaison Officer at Sangley
Point was in charge of
preserving harmonious
relations between
personnel of the naval
station and the civilian
population of Cavite City.
Capt. McAllister
requested Col. Monzon to
join him at the main gate
of the base to meet the
demonstrators. Col.
Monzon went to the place
and talked to Rosauro
Reyes and one Luis
Buenaventura upon
learning that the
demonstration was not
directed against the naval
station but against
Agustin Hallare and a
certain Frank Nolan for
their having allegedly
caused the dismissal of
Rosauro Reyes from the
Navy Exchange, Col.
Monzon suggested to
them to demonstrate in
front of Hallare's
residence, but they told
him that they would like
the people in the station to
know how they felt about
Hallare and Nolan. They
assured him, however,
that they did not intend to
use violence, as "they just
wanted to blow off
steam."
At that time Agustin
Hallare was in his office
inside the naval station.
When he learned about
the demonstration he
became apprehensive
about his safety, so he
sought Col. Monzon's
protection. The colonel
thereupon escorted
Hallare, his brother, and
another person in going
out of the station, using
his (Monzon's) car for the
purpose. Once outside,
Col. Monzon purpose
slowed down to
accommodate the request
of Reyes. He told Hallare
to take a good look at the
demonstrators and at the
placards they were
carrying. When the
demonstrators saw
Hallare they shouted,
"Mabuhay si Agustin."
Then they boarded their
jeeps and followed the car.
One jeep overtook passed
the car while the other to
led behind. After Hallare
and his companions had
alighted in front of his
residence at 967 Burgos
St., Cavite City, Col.
Monzon sped away.
The three jeeps carrying
the demonstrators parked
in front of Hallare's
residence after having
gone by it twice Rosauro
Reyes got off his jeep and
posted himself at the gate,
and with his right hand
inside his pocket and his
left holding the gate-door,
he shouted repeatedly,
"Agustin, putang ina mo.
Agustin, mawawala ka.
Agustin lumabas ka,
papatayin kita."
Thereafter, he boarded his
jeep and the motorcade
left the premises.
Meanwhile, Hallare,
frightened by the
demeanor of Reyes and
the other demonstrators,
stayed inside the
house.lâwphi1.ñet
On the basis of the
foregoing events Rosauro
Reyes was charged on
July 24 and 25, 1961 with
grave threats and grave
oral defamation,
respectively (Criminal
Cases Nos. 2594 and 2595,
Municipal Court of Cavite
City), as follows;
The undersigned
City Fiscal of the
City of Cavite
accuses Rosauro
Reyes of the crime of
Grave Threats, as
defined by Article
282 of the Revised
Penal Code and
penalized by
paragraph 2 of the
same Article,
committed as
follows:
That on or about
June 6, 1961, in the
City of Cavite,
Republic of the
Philippines and
within the
jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the
above named
accused, did then and
there, willfully,
unlawfully and
feloniously, orally
threaten to kill, one
Agustin Hallare.
Contrary to
law.
Cavite City,
July 24, 1961.
DEOGRACIAS S.
SOLIS
City Fiscal
BY: (SGD.) BUEN N.
GUTIERREZ
Special Counsel
The undersigned
complainant, after
being duly sworn to
an oath in
accordance with law,
accuses Rosauro
Reyes of the crime of
Grave Oral
Defamation, as
defined and
penalized by Article
358 of the Revised
Penal Code,
committed as
follows:
That on or about
June 6, 1961, in the
City of Cavite,
Republic of the
Philippines and
within the
jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the
above named
accused, without any
justifiable motive but
with the intention to
cause dishonor,
discredit and
contempt to the
undersigned
complainant, in the
presence of and
within hearing of
several persons, did
then and there,
willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously utter
to the undersigned
complainant the
following insulting
and serious
defamatory remarks,
to wit: "AGUSIN,
PUTANG INA MO".
which if translated
into English are as
follows: "Agustin,
Your mother is a
whore."
Contrary to
law.
Cavite City,
July 25, 1961.
(SGD.) AGUSTIN
HALLARE
Complainant
Subscribed and
sworn to before me
this. 25th day of July,
1961, in the City of
Cavite, Philippines.
(SGD.) BUEN N.
GUTIERREZ
Special Counsel
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for
certiorari filed by the
City Fiscal and
Assistant City Fiscal of
Cagayan de Oro City
praying that the order
of the respondent
Judge, Hon. Antonio A.
Orcullo, dismissing
Criminal Case No.
40117 be set aside and
that said case be
ordered reinstated and
tried on the merits.
The petition alleges
that on September 4,
1978, a special counsel
in the Office of the City
Fiscal of Cagayan de
Oro City filed an
information with the
City Court of Cagayan
de Oro, Branch I,
charging the
respondent Venida
Peralta alias Edat
Peralta with oral
defamation committed
as follows:
That on or about
August 17, 1978, at
7:00 o'clock in the
evening, at
Gumamela
Extension Street,
Carmen, Cagayan
de Oro City,
Philippines, and
within the
jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court,
the above-named
accused, with
deliberate intent to
cast undue shame,
public ridicule,
discredit, disrepute
and contempt
against one Lydia
Flores, did then and
there wilfully,
unlawfully and
feloniously speak
and shouted the
following words
towards the latter:
"Hostess ug
nangabit, bisan
unsa lang oten and
nakapaslak "; which
approximately
means in English.-
"A hostess and has
a paramour, any
kind of penis had
penetrated your
vagina", or words of
similar import,
directed to the said
Lydia Flores, in the
presence and with
the hearing of many
people, well-
knowing that what
she uttered were
not only defamatory
but downright false,
causing the
offended party by
said utterance to
suffer undue
shame, public
ridicule, disrepute,
discredit and
contempt, to the
great damage and
prejudice of the said
Lydia Flores.
Contrary to Article
358 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Cagayan de Oro
City, September 1,
1978.
(SGD)
EFRE
N L.
LAMPI
OS
Specia
l
Couns
el 1
INCRIMINATIN
G AN
INNOCENT
PERSON
Republic of the
Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20721
April 30, 1966
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellant,
vs.
MARTIN ALAGAO, et
al., defendants-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor
General Arturo A. Alafriz,
Assistant Solicitor General
Antonio A. Torres and
Solicitor R. Pronove, Jr.
for plaintiff-appellant.
De Santos and Delfino for
defendants-appellees.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
This is an appeal by the
City Fiscal of Manila from
an order of the Court of
First Instance of Manila
sustaining the motion to
quash the information in
its Criminal Case No.
66655.
On October 20, 1962 the
City Fiscal of Manila filed
an information against the
defendants-appellees
charging them of having
committed the complex
crime of incriminatory
machinations through
unlawful arrest, as
follows:
That on or about the
28th day of February,
1961, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, being then
members of the Manila
Police Department,
conspiring and
confederating together
and helping one another,
did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously incriminate
or impute to one
Marcial Apolonio y
Santos the commission
of the crime of bribery
through unlawful arrest,
in the following manner,
to wit: the said accused,
on the aforesaid date,
without reasonable
ground therefor and for
the purpose of
delivering said Marcial
Apolonio y Santos to the
proper authorities, did
then and there willfully,
unlawfully and
feloniously arrest said
Marcial Apolonio y
Santos; that after the
said Marcial Apolonio y
Santos had been
arrested in the manner
aforestated, and while
the latter was
supposedly being
investigated by the said
accused, the said
accused did then and
there place or
commingle a marked
P1.00 bill together with
the money taken from
said Marcial Apolonio y
Santos, supposedly
given to the latter by
one Emerita Calupas de
Aresa, so that he
(Marcial Apolonio y
Santos), then an
employee of the Local
Civil Registrar's Office
of Manila, would appear
to have agreed to
perform an act not
constituting a crime, in
connection with the
performance of his
(Marcial Apolonio y
Santos') duties, which
was to expedite the
issuance of a birth
certificate, thereby
directly incriminating or
imputing to said
Marcial Apolonio y
Santos the commission
of the crime bribery.
On October 25, 1962 the
defendants, through
counsel, moved to quash
the information against
them on the grounds that
(1) the facts charged in
the information do not
constitute an offense; and
(2) the court trying the
case has no jurisdiction
over the offense charged.
Later on, the defendants
filed a supplemental
motion to quash, alleging
that the information
charges more than one
offense.
The contention of the
defense in the motion to
quash is that "... the
information would seem
to indicate that the
accused are charged with
a complex crime, that is,
the accused without
reasonable ground
arrested Marcial Apolonio
y Santos for the purpose
of incriminating him by
planting on his person a
marked P1.00 bill. We
have searched the penal
laws in vain for a crime
such as set out in the
information at bar." Then
the motion to quash
further states: "... there
would either be only the
singular crimes of
incriminatory
machinations or unlawful
arrest, or perhaps two
crimes, incriminatory
machinations and
unlawful arrest. If such
would be the case then
this Honorable Court
would not have any
jurisdiction over any
crime or crimes charged.
For certainly,
incriminatory
machinations and
unlawful arrest would
come within the
jurisdiction of the inferior
court.
The City Fiscal opposed
the motion to quash,
contending that "A
perusal of the information
will readily conclude that
it is a complex crime in
the sense that unlawful
arrest was used as a
means for incriminatory
machination." The City
Fiscal further contended
that the motion to quash
raises a question of fact
which should be raised
during the trial and not
during the stage of the
proceedings when the
allegations in the
information should be
controlling. The City
Fiscal also contended that
the crime of unlawful
arrest, being punishable
by arresto mayor and a
fine of not exceeding
P500.00, the same falls
within the jurisdiction of
the Court of First
Instance.
On November 9, 1962, the
Court of First Instance of
Manila issued an order
sustaining the motion to
quash, the pertinent
portion of which order
reads as follows:
A careful perusal of the
information quoted
above shows clearly that
it is defective. Assuming
the truth of the
allegations of the
information, the Court
is of the opinion that
there is no complex
crime involved. The
alleged unlawful arrest
committed by the
defendants cannot be
said to have been used
as a necessary means to
commit the crime of
incriminatory
machination. The latter
crime could be
committed without the
unlawful arrest. The
acts constituting the two
offenses — unlawful
arrest and
incriminatory
machination — are two
separate and
independent acts that
preclude the concept of
a complex crime. The
alleged planting of
evidence took place
while the victim was
already under
investigation, long after
the consummation of the
alleged unlawful arrest.
It is true that under an
information charging a
complex crime the
Court may convict the
defendant of two
component crimes, if the
evidence of record does
not establish the
complexity of the crime.
This cannot be done,
however, in the case at
bar for the simple
reason that one of the
component offenses of
the alleged complex
crime, that is, —
incriminatory
machination, — does
not fall within the
concurrent, much less
original exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance.
Consequently, the
motion to quash is
granted and the case is
hereby dismissed,
without prejudice for
the prosecution to file
the proper informations
against the defendants
in the proper court.;
The City Fiscal of Manila,
on November 28, 1962,
filed a motion for
reconsideration of the
foregoing order, but on
December 19, 1962 the
Court of First Instance of
Manila denied the motion
for reconsideration. Hence
this appeal of the City
Fiscal of Manila to this
Court.
In the present appeal, the
main question to be
resolved is whether the
information filed in the
court below alleges the
complex crime of
"incriminatory
machinations through
unlawful arrest." It is the
view of the court a quo
that the information
alleges the commission of
two distinct crimes, one,
for unlawful arrest, and,
the other, for
incriminatory
machinations. The lower
court discarded the theory
of the prosecution that the
offense of unlawful arrest
was a necessary means to
commit the crime of
incriminatory
machinations, because of
the allegation in the
information that the
accused had first
unlawfully arrested the
offended party Marcial
Apolonio y Santos and
after the arrest he was
investigated and it was
during the investigation
that the accused had
commingled the marked
P1.00 bill among the
paper bills that were
taken from the possession
of the said offended party.
The trial court is of the
opinion that "the alleged
planting of evidence took
place while the victim was
already under
investigation, long after
the consummation of the
alleged unlawful arrest." 1
QUASI
OFFENSES
Republic of the
Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 172716
November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y
AGUILAR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA
MODESTO-SAN
PEDRO, Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 71, Pasig City,
and EVANGELINE
PONCE, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The petition seeks the
1 2
review of the Orders of
the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City affirming
sub-silencio a lower
court’s ruling finding
inapplicable the Double
Jeopardy Clause to bar a
second prosecution for
Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property.
This, despite the accused’s
previous conviction for
Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries arising
from the same incident
grounding the second
prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular
collision in August 2004,
petitioner Jason Ivler
(petitioner) was charged
before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 71 (MeTC), with
two separate offenses: (1)
Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries
(Criminal Case No.
82367) for injuries
sustained by respondent
Evangeline L. Ponce
(respondent Ponce); and
(2) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property
(Criminal Case No.
82366) for the death of
respondent Ponce’s
husband Nestor C. Ponce
and damage to the
spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for
his temporary release in
both cases.
On 7 September 2004,
petitioner pleaded guilty
to the charge in Criminal
Case No. 82367 and was
meted out the penalty of
public censure. Invoking
this conviction, petitioner
moved to quash the
Information in Criminal
Case No. 82366 for
placing him in jeopardy of
second punishment for the
same offense of reckless
imprudence.
The MeTC refused
quashal, finding no
identity of offenses in the
two cases. 3
After unsuccessfully
seeking reconsideration,
petitioner elevated the
matter to the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 157 (RTC), in a
petition for certiorari
(S.C.A. No. 2803).
Meanwhile, petitioner
sought from the MeTC
the suspension of
proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366, including
the arraignment on 17
May 2005, invoking
S.C.A. No. 2803 as a
prejudicial question.
Without acting on
petitioner’s motion, the
MeTC proceeded with the
arraignment and, because
of petitioner’s absence,
cancelled his bail and
4
ordered his arrest. Seven
days later, the MeTC
issued a resolution
denying petitioner’s
motion to suspend
proceedings and
postponing his
arraignment until after
his arrest. 5 Petitioner
sought reconsideration
but as of the filing of this
petition, the motion
remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest
order against petitioner,
respondent Ponce sought
in the RTC the dismissal
of S.C.A. No. 2803 for
petitioner’s loss of
standing to maintain the
suit. Petitioner contested
the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial
Court
In an Order dated 2
February 2006, the RTC
dismissed S.C.A. No.
2803, narrowly grounding
its ruling on petitioner’s
forfeiture of standing to
maintain S.C.A. No. 2803
arising from the MeTC’s
order to arrest petitioner
for his non-appearance at
the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366.
Thus, without reaching
the merits of S.C.A. No.
2803, the RTC effectively
affirmed the MeTC.
Petitioner sought
reconsideration but this
proved unavailing. 6
Accused continued
medications to alleviate
JR's abdominal spasms
and diarrhea. By
midnight, JR again
vomitted twice, had loose
bowel movements and was
unable to sleep. The
following morning, June
17,2000, JR's condition
worsened, he had a
running fever of 38°C.
JR's fever remained
uncontrolled and he
became unconscious, he
was given Aeknil (1
ampule) and Valium (1
ampule). JR's condition
continued to deteriorate
that by 2 o'clock in the
afternoon, JR's
temperature soared to
42°C, had convulsions and
finally died.
The Death Certificate 10
On June 4, 2004, in
affirming the accused'
conviction, the Court of
Appeals gave similar
observations, to wit:
The foregoing expert
testimony clearly revealed
such want of reasonable
skill and care on the part
of JR's attending
physicians, appellants Dr.
Cabugao and Dr. Ynzon
in neglecting to monitor
effectively and sufficiently
the developments/changes
during the observation
period and act upon the
situation after said 24-
hour period when his
abdominal pain subsisted,
his condition even
worsened with the
appearance of more
serious symptoms of
nausea, vomiting and
diarrhea. Considering the
brief visit only made on
regular rounds, the
records clearly show such
gross negligence in failing
to take appropriate steps
to determine the real
cause of JR's abdominal
pain so that the crucial
decision to perform
surgery (appendectomy)
had even been ruled out
precisely because of the
inexcusable neglect to
undertake suchefficient
diagnosis by process of
elimination, as correctly
pointed out by the trial
court. As has been
succinctly emphasized by
Dr. Mateo, acute
appendicitis was the
working diagnosis, and
with the emergence of
symptoms after the 24-
hour observation (high
fever, vomiting, diarrhea)
still, appellants ruled out
surgery, not even
considering exploratory
laparoscopy. Dr. Mateo
also expressed the opinion
that the decision to
operate could have been
made after the result of
the ultrasound test,
considering that acute
appendicitis was the
initial diagnosis by Dr.
Cabugao after he had
conducted a rectal
examination.
Medical records buttress
the trial court's finding
that in treating JR,
appellants have
demonstrated indifference
and neglect of the
patient's condition as a
serious case. Indeed,
appendicitis remains a
clinical emergencyand a
surgical disease, as
correctly underscored by
Dr. Mateo, a practicing
surgeon who has already
performed over a
thousand appendectomy.
In fact, appendectomy is
the only rational therapy
for acute appendicitis; it
avoids clinical
deterioration and may
avoid chronic or recurrent
appendicitis. Although
difficult, prompt
recognition and
immediate treatment of
the disease prevent
complications. Under the
factual circumstances, the
inaction, neglect and
indifference of appellants
who, after the day of
admission and after being
apprised of the ongoing
infection from the CBC
and initial diagnosis as
acute appendicitis from
rectal examination and
ultrasound testand only
briefly visited JR once
during regular rounds
and gave medication
orders by telephone –
constitutes gross
negligenceleading to the
continued deterioration of
the patient, his infection
having spread in sofast a
pace that he died within
just two and a half (2 ½)
days’ stay inthe hospital.
Authorities state that if
the clinical picture is
unclear a short period of 4
to 6 hours of watchful
waiting and a CT scan
may improve diagnostic
accuracy and help to
hasten diagnosis.Even
assuming that JR's case
had an atypical
presentation in view of the
location of his appendix,
laboratory tests could
have helped to confirm
diagnosis, as Dr. Mateo
opined thatthe possibility
of JR having a retrocecal
appendicitis should have
been a strong
consideration.
Lamentably, however, as
found by the trial court,
appellants had not taken
steps towards correct
diagnosis and
demonstrated laxity even
when JR was already
running a high fever in
the morning of June 17,
2000 and continued
vomiting with diarrhea,
his abdominal pain
becoming more intense.
This is the reason why
private complainants were
not even apprised of the
progress of appellants'
diagnosis – appellants
have nothing to report
because they did nothing
towards the end and
merely gave medications
to address the symptoms.12
cross-examination that he
would perform surgery on
JR:
ATTY. CASTRO:
Q. Given these data soft
non-tender abdomen,
ambulatory, watery
diarrhea, Exhibit C which
is the ultrasound result,
with that laboratory
would you operate the
patient?
A Yes, I would do surgery.
Q And you should have
done surgery with this
particular case?"
A Yes, sir.
16
xxxx
COURT:
Q You stated a while ago
doctor thatyou are going
to [do] surgery to the
patient, why doctor, if you
are notgoing to do
surgery, what will
happen?
A If this would be
appendicitis, the usual
progress would be that it
would be ruptured and
generalized peritonitis
and eventually septicemia,
sir.
Q What do you mean by
that doctor?
A That means that
infection would spread
throughout the body, sir.
Q If unchecked doctor,
what will happen?
A It will result to death.
17
xxxx
Q And what would have
you doneif you entertain
other considerations from
the time the patient was
admitted?
A From the time the
patient was admitted until
the report of the
sonologist, I would have
made a decision by then.
Q And when to decide the
surgery would it be a
particular exact time,
would it be the same for
all surgeons?
A If you are asking acute
appendicitis, it would be
about 24 hours because
acute appendicitis is a 24-
hour disease, sir.
Q. And would it be correct
to say that it depends on
the changes on the
condition of the patient?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So, are you saying
more than 24 hours when
there are changes?
A. If there are changes in
the patient pointing
towards appendicitis then
you have to decide right
there and then, sir.
Q. So if there are changes
in the patient pointing to
appendicitis?
A. It depends now on
what you are trying to
wait for in the observation
period, sir.
Q. So precisely if the
change is a condition
which bring you in doubt
that there is something
else other than
appendicitis, would you
extend over a period of 24
hours?
A. It depends on the
emergent development,
sir.
Q. That is the point, if you
are the attending
physician and there is a
change not pointing to
appendicitis, would you
extend over a period of 24
hours?
A. In 24 hours you have to
decide, sir.
xxxx
Q. And that is based on
the assessment of the
attending physician?
A. Yes, sir.
18
On cross-examination, Dr.
Villaflor affirmed:
Cross Exam. By Atty.
Marteja:
Q. x x x However, there
are corrections and
admissions made at that
time, your Honor, do I
understand thatT/C does
not mean ruled out but
rather to consider the
matter?
A. Yes, now that I have
seen the records of the
patient, it says here,
impression and T/C
means to consider the
appendicitis.
Q. Isn't it that it is worth
then to say that the initial
working diagnosis on
Rodolfo Palma, Jr.,
otherwise known as JR, to
whom I shall now refer to
as JR, the primary
consideration then is
acute appendicitis, is that
correct to say Doctor?
A. I think so, that is the
impression.
Q. x x x Now if it is to be
considered as the primary
consideration in the initial
working diagnosis, isn't it
a fact that it has tobe
ruled out in order to
consider it as not the
disease of JR?
A. Yes. Sir.
Q. Isn't it a fact thatto
rule out acute appendicitis
as not the disease of JR,
surgery or operation must
be done, isn't it Doctor?
A. You have to correlate
all the findings.
Q. Is it yes or no, Doctor?
A. Yes.
Q. So, you are saying then
that in order to rule out
acute appendicitis there
must be an operation, that
is right Doctor?
A. No, sir. If your
diagnosis is toreally
determine if it is an acute
appendicitis, you have to
operate.21
xxxx
Q. Now Doctor,
considering the infection,
considering that there was
a [symptom] that causes
pain, considering that JR
likewise was feverish and
that he was vomiting, does
that not show a disease of
acute appendicitis
Doctor?
A. Its possible.
Q. So that if that is
possible, are we getting
the impression then
Doctor what you have
earlier mentioned that the
only way to rule out the
suspect which is acute
appendicitis is by surgery,
you have said that earlier
Doctor, I just want any
confirmation of it?
A. Yes, sir.
22
Verily, whether a
physician or surgeon has
exercised the requisite
degree of skill and care in
the treatment of his
patient is, in the
generality of cases, a
matter of expert opinion.
The deference of courts to
the expert opinions of
qualified physicians stems
from its realization that
the latter possess unusual
technical skills which
laymen in most instances
are incapable of
intelligently evaluating. 23
Neither do we find
evidence that Dr. Cabugao
has been negligent or
lacked the necessary
precaution in his
performance of his duty
as a family doctor. On the
contrary, a perusal ofthe
medical records would
show that during the 24-
hour monitoring on JR, it
was Dr. Cabugao who
frequently made orders
on the administration of
antibiotics and pain
relievers. There was also
repetitive instructions
from Dr. Cabugao to refer
JR to Dr. Ynzon as it
appeared that he is
suspecting appendicitis.
The referral of JR to Dr.
Ynzon, a surgeon, is
actually an exercise of
precaution as he knew
that appendicitis is not
within his scope of
expertise. This clearly
showed that he employed
the best of his knowledge
and skill in attending to
JR's condition, even after
the referral of JR to Dr.
Ynzon. To be sure, the
calculated assessment of
Dr. Cabugao to refer JRto
a surgeon who has
sufficient training and
experience to handle JR’s
case belies the finding that
he displayed inexcusable
lack of precaution in
handling his patient.31
the accused-doctors to be
found guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in
homicide, it must be
shown that both accused-
doctors demonstratedan
act executed without
malice or criminal intent –
but with lack of foresight,
carelessness, or
negligence. Noteworthy,
the evidence on record
clearly points to the
reckless imprudence of
Dr. Ynzon; however, the
same cannot be said in Dr.
Cabugao's case.
AS TO CIVIL
LIABILITY
While this case is pending
appeal, counsel for
petitioner Dr. Ynzon
informed the Court that
the latter died on
December 23, 2011 due to
"multiorgan failure" as
evidenced by a copy of
death certificate. Thus,
33
the effect of death,
pending appeal of his
conviction of petitioner
Dr. Ynzon with regard to
his criminal and
pecuniary liabilities
should be in accordance
to People v. Bayotas, 34
or omission complained of
arises from quasi-delict,as
in this case, a separate
civil action must be filed
against the executor or
administrator of the estate
of the accused, pursuant
to Section 1, Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court:38
On September 3, 1992,
petitioner and the
accused filed a notice
of appeal from the joint
decision.[10]
predicated on Article
103 of the Revised
Penal Code, provides
that an employer may
be held subsidiarily
civilly liable for a felony
committed by his
employee in the
discharge of his duty.
This liability attaches
when the employee is
convicted of a crime
done in the
performance of his
work and is found to be
insolvent that renders
him unable to properly
respond to the civil
liability adjudged.
[26]
Pursuant to the
provision of Rule 111,
Section 1, paragraph 3
of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure,
when private
respondents, as
complainants in the
criminal action,
reserved the right to
file the separate civil
action, they waived
other available civil
actions predicated on
the same act or
omission of the
accused-driver. Such
civil action includes the
recovery of indemnity
under the Revised
Penal Code, and
damages under Articles
32, 33, and 34 of the
Civil Code of the
Philippines arising
from the same act or
omission of the
accused. [28]
However, petitioner as
defendant in the
separate civil action for
damages filed against
it, based on quasi
delict, may be held
liable thereon. Thus,
the trial court
grievously erred in
dismissing plaintiffs
civil complaint. And the
Court of Appeals erred
in affirming the trial
courts decision.
Unfortunately private
respondents did not
appeal from such
dismissal and could
not be granted
affirmative relief.
[30]
The Court, however, in
exceptional cases has
relaxed the rules "in
order to promote their
objectives and assist
the parties in obtaining
just, speedy, and
inexpensive
determination of every
action or proceeding" [31]
or exempted "a
particular case from
the operation of the
rules."
[32]
As a final note, we
reiterate that "the
policy against double
recovery requires that
only one action be
maintained for the
same act or omission
whether the action is
brought against the
employee or against
his employer. The[36]
injured party must
choose which of the
available causes of
action for damages he
will bring.
[37]
Unfortunately, we can
no longer correct this
judgment even if
erroneous, as it is,
because it has become
final and executory.
Under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code,
criminal negligence "is
treated as a mere quasi
offense, and dealt with
separately from willful
offenses. It is not a
question of
classification or
terminology. In
intentional crimes, the
act itself is punished;
in negligence or
imprudence, what is
principally penalized is
the mental attitude or
condition behind the
act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of
care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible.
Much of the confusion
has arisen from the
common use of such
descriptive phrase as
homicide through
reckless imprudence,
and the like; when the
strict technical sense
is, more accurately,
reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide;
or simple imprudence
causing damages to
property."[39]
There is need,
therefore, to rectify the
designation of the
offense without
disturbing the imposed
penalty for the
guidance of bench and
bar in strict adherence
to precedent.
WHEREFORE, the
Court GRANTS the
petition and SETS
ASIDE the amended
decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G. R. CR No.
14448, promulgated on
January 6, 1997, and
the joint decision of the
Regional Trial Court,
Isabela, Branch 19,
Cauayan, in Criminal
Case No. Br. 19-311 and
Civil Case No. Br. 19-
424, dated June 6,
1992.
IN LIEU THEREOF, the
Court renders
judgment as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No.
Br. 19-311, the Court
declares the accused
Romeo Dunca y de
Tumol guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of
reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide
and damage to
property, defined and
penalized under Article
365, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code,
with violation of the
automobile law (R. A.
No. 4136, as amended),
and sentences him to
suffer two (2)
indeterminate penalties
of four (4) months and
one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to
three (3) years, six (6)
months and twenty (20)
days of prision
correccional, as
maximum, without
[40]
attending physicians
summoned Dr. Bartolome
Angeles, head of the
Obstetrics and
Gynecology Department
of the San Pablo District
Hospital. However, when
Dr. Angeles arrived, Lydia
was already in shock and
possibly dead as her blood
pressure was already 0/0.
Dr. Angeles then informed
petitioner and Dr. Ercillo
that there was nothing he
could do to help save the
patient. While petitioner
[20]
In convicting the
petitioner, the MTCC
found the following
circumstances as
sufficient basis to
conclude that she was
indeed negligent in the
performance of the
operation:
"x x x, the clinic was
untidy, there was lack of
provision like blood and
oxygen to prepare for any
contingency that might
happen during the
operation. The manner
and the fact that the
patient was brought to the
San Pablo District
Hospital for reoperation
indicates that there was
something wrong in the
manner in which Dra.
Cruz conducted the
operation. There was no
showing that before the
operation, accused Dr.
Cruz had conducted a
cardio pulmonary
clearance or any typing of
the blood of the patient. It
was (sic) said in medical
parlance that the
"abdomen of the person is
a temple of surprises"
because you do not know
the whole thing the
moment it was open (sic)
and surgeon must be
prepared for any
eventuality thereof. The
patient (sic) chart which is
a public document was
not presented because it is
only there that we could
determine the condition of
the patient before the
surgery. The court also
noticed in Exh. "F-1" that
the sister of the deceased
wished to postpone the
operation but the patient
was prevailed upon by
Dra. Cruz to proceed with
the surgery. The court
finds that Lydia Umali
died because of the
negligence and
carelessness of the
surgeon Dra. Ninevetch
Cruz because of loss of
blood during the
operation of the deceased
for evident
unpreparedness and for
lack of skill, the reason
why the patient was
brought for operation at
the San Pablo City
District Hospital. As such,
the surgeon should
answer for such
negligence. With respect
to Dra. Lina Ercillo, the
anaesthesiologist, there is
no evidence to indicate
that she should be held
jointly liable with Dra.
Cruz who actually did the
operation."[23]
Immediately apparent
from a review of the
records of this case is the
absence of any expert
testimony on the matter of
the standard of care
employed by other
physicians of good
standing in the conduct of
similar operations. The
prosecution's expert
witnesses in the persons of
Dr. Floresto Arizala and
Dr. Nieto Salvador, Jr. of
the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) only
testified as to the possible
cause of death but did not
venture to illuminate the
court on the matter of the
standard of care that
petitioner should have
exercised.
All three courts below
bewail the inadequacy of
the facilities of the clinic
and its untidiness; the
lack of provisions such as
blood, oxygen, and certain
medicines; the failure to
subject the patient to a
cardio-pulmonary test
prior to the operation; the
omission of any form of
blood typing before
transfusion; and even the
subsequent transfer of
Lydia to the San Pablo
Hospital and the
reoperation performed on
her by the petitioner. But
while it may be true that
the circumstances pointed
out by the courts below
seemed beyond cavil to
constitute reckless
imprudence on the part of
the surgeon, this
conclusion is still best
arrived at not through the
educated surmises nor
conjectures of laymen,
including judges, but by
the unquestionable
knowledge of expert
witnesses. For whether a
physician or surgeon has
exercised the requisite
degree of skill and care in
the treatment of his
patient is, in the
generality of cases, a
matter of expert opinion. [30]
presumption is rebuttable
by expert opinion which is
so sadly lacking in the
case at bench.
Even granting arguendo
that the inadequacy of the
facilities and untidiness of
the clinic; the lack of
provisions; the failure to
conduct pre-operation
tests on the patient; and
the subsequent transfer of
Lydia to the San Pablo
Hospital and the
reoperation performed on
her by the petitioner do
indicate, even without
expert testimony, that
petitioner was recklessly
imprudent in the exercise
of her duties as a surgeon,
no cogent proof exists that
any of these
circumstances caused
petitioner's death. Thus,
the absence of the fourth
element of reckless
imprudence: that the
injury to the person or
property was a
consequence of the
reckless imprudence.
In litigations involving
medical negligence, the
plaintiff has the burden of
establishing appellant's
negligence and for a
reasonable conclusion of
negligence, there must be
proof of breach of duty on
the part of the surgeon as
well as a casual
connection of such breach
and the resulting death of
his patient. In Chan
[33]
Lugay v. St Luke's
Hospital, Inc., where the
[34]
(Underscoring supplied.)
Dr. Arizala who
conducted an autopsy on
the body of the deceased
summarized his findings
as follows:
"Atty. Cachero:
Q. You mentioned about
your Autopsy Report
which has been marked as
Exh. "A-1-b". There
appears here a signature
above the typewritten
name Floresto Arizala, Jr.,
whose signature is that?
A. That is my signature,
sir.
Q. Do you affirm the truth
of all the contents of Exh.
"A-1-b"?
A. Only as to the autopsy
report no. 91-09, the time
and place and everything
after the post mortem
findings, sir.
Q. You mentioned on your
"Post Mortem Findings"
about surgical incision,
14:0 cm., infraumbilical
area, anterior abdominal
area, midline, will you
please explain that in your
own language?
A. There was incision
wound (sic) the area just
below the navel, sir.
Q. And the last paragraph
of the postmortem
findings which I read:
Uterus, pear-shaped and
pale measuring 7.5 x 5.5 x
5.0 cm, with some surface
nodulation of the fundic
area posteriorly. Cut-
section shows diffusely
pale myometrium with
areas of streak induration.
The ovaries and adnexal
structures are missing
with the raw surfaces
patched with clotted
blood. Surgical sutures
were noted on the
operative site.
Intestines and mesenteries
are pale with blood clots
noted between the
mesentric folds.
Hemoperitonium: 300 s.s.,
right paracolic gutter,
50 c.c., left paracolic
gutter
200 c.c., mesentric area,
100 c.c., right pelvic
gutter
stomach empty.
Other visceral organs,
pale.',
will you please explain
that on (sic) your own
language or in ordinary
A. There was a uterus
which was not attached to
the adnexal structures
namely ovaries which
were not present and also
sign of previous surgical
operation and there were
(sic) clotted blood, sir.
Q. How about the ovaries
and adnexal structures?
A. They are missing, sir.
Q. You mean to say there
are no ovaries?
A. During that time there
are no ovaries, sir.
Q. And there were
likewise sign of surgical
sutures?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How about the
intestines and mesenteries
are place (sic) with blood
clots noted between the
mesenteric folds, will you
please explain on (sic)
this?
A. In the peritoneal
cavity, they are mostly
perritonial blood.
Q. And what could have
caused this blood?
A. Well, ordinarily blood
is found inside the blood
vessel. Blood were (sic)
outside as a result of the
injuries which destroyed
the integrity of the vessel
allowing blood to sip (sic)
out, sir.
Q. By the nature of the
postmortem findings
indicated in Exh. A-1-B,
can you tell the court the
cause of death?
A. Yes, sir. The cause of
death is: Gross findings
are compatible with
hemorrhagic shock.
Q. Can you tell the us
what could have caused
this hemorrhagic shock?
A. Well hemorrhagic
shock is the result of
blood loss.
Q. What could have the
effect of that loss of
blood?
A. Unattended
hemorrhage, sir.
[36]
(Underscoring supplied.)
The foregoing was
corroborated by Dr. Nieto
Salvador:
"Q. And were you able to
determine the cause of
death by virtue of the
examination of the
specimen submitted by
Dr. Arizala?
A. Without knowledge of
the autopsy findings it
would be difficult for me
to determine the cause of
death, sir.
Q. Have you examined the
post mortem of Dr.
Arizala?
A. Yes, sir, and by virtue
of the autopsy report in
connection with your
pathology report.
Q. What could have
caused the death of the
victim?
A. This pathologic
examination are (sic)
compatible with the
person who died, sir.
Q. Will you explain to us
the meaning of
hemorrhagic compatible?
A. It means that a person
died of blood loss.
Meaning a person died of
non-replacement of blood
and so the victim before
she died there was shock
of diminish of blood of the
circulation. She died most
probably before the actual
complete blood loss, sir.
Court: Is it possible
doctor that the loss of the
blood was due on (sic)
operation?
A. Based on my pathology
findings, sir.
Q. What could have
caused this loss of blood?
A. Many, sir. A patient
who have undergone
surgery. Another may be a
blood vessel may be cut
while on operation and
this cause (sic) bleeding,
or may be set in the
course of the operation, or
may be (sic) he died after
the operation. Of course
there are other cause (sic).
Atty. Cachero:
Q. Especially so doctor
when there was no blood
replacement?
A. Yes, sir."
[37]
(Underscoring supplied.)
The testimonies of both
doctors establish
hemorrhage or
hemorrhagic shock as the
cause of death. However,
as likewise testified to by
the expert witnesses in
open court, hemorrhage
or hemorrhagic shock
during surgery may be
caused by several
different factors. Thus,
Dr. Salvador's elaboration
on the matter:
"Atty. Pascual:
Q. Doctor, among the
causes of hemorrhage that
you mentioned you said
that it could be at the
moment of operation
when one losses (sic)
control of the presence, is
that correct? During the
operation there is lost (sic)
of control of the cut
vessel?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Or there is a failure to
ligate a vessel of
considerable size?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Or even if the vessel
were ligated the knot may
have slipped later on?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you also
mentioned that it may be
possible also to some
clotting defect, is that
correct?
A. May be (sic)."
[38]
(Underscoring supplied).
Defense witness, Dr. Bu C.
Castro also gave the
following expert opinion:
"Q. Doctor even a patient
after an operations (sic)
would suffer hemorrage
what would be the
possible causes of such
hemorrage (sic)?
A. Among those would be
what we call
Intravascular Coagulation
and this is the reason for
the bleeding, sir, which
cannot be prevented by
anyone, it will happen to
anyone, anytime and to
any persons (sic), sir.
COURT:
What do you think of the
cause of the bleeding, the
cutting or the operations
done in the body?
A. Not related to this one,
the bleeding here is not
related to any cutting or
operation that I (sic) have
done.
Q. Aside from the DIC
what could another causes
(sic) that could be the
cause for the hemorrhage
or bleeding in a patient by
an operations (sic)?
A. In general sir, if there
was an operations (sic)
and it is possible that the
ligature in the suture was
(sic) become (sic) loose, it
is (sic) becomes loose if
proven.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. If the person who
performed an autopsy
does not find any untight
(sic) clot (sic) blood vessel
or any suture that become
(sic) loose the cause of the
bleeding could not be
attributed to the fault of
the subject?
A. Definitely, sir."
[39]
(Underscoring supplied.)
According to both
doctors, the possible
causes of hemorrhage
during an operation are:
(1) the failure of the
surgeon to tie or suture a
cut blood vessel; (2)
allowing a cut blood vessel
to get out of control; (3)
the subsequent loosening
of the tie or suture applied
to a cut blood vessel; and
(4) and a clotting defect
known as DIC. It is
significant to state at this
juncture that the autopsy
conducted by Dr. Arizala
on the body of Lydia did
not reveal any untied or
unsutured cut blood vessel
nor was there any
indication that the tie or
suture of a cut blood
vessel had become loose
thereby causing the
hemorrhage. Hence the
[40]
following pertinent
portion of Dr. Arizala's
testimony:
"Q: Doctor, in examining
these structures did you
know whether these were
sutured ligature or plain
ligature
A: Ligature, sir.
Q: We will explain that
later on. Did you recall if
the cut structures were
tied by first suturing it
and then tying a knot or
the tie was merely placed
around the cut structure
and tied?
A: I cannot recall, sir.
Q: As a matter of fact, you
cannot recall because you
did not even bothered (sic)
to examine, is that
correct?
A: Well, I bothered
enough to know that they
were sutured, sir.
Q: So, therefore, Doctor,
you would not know
whether any of the cut
structures were not
sutured or tied neither
were you able to
determine whether any
loose suture was found in
the peritoneal cavity?
A: I could not recall any
loose sutured (sic), sir."
[41]
as testified to by defense
witness, Dr. Bu C. Castro,
hemorrhage due to DIC
"cannot be prevented, it
will happen to anyone,
anytime." He testified
[43]
further:
"Q. Now, under the
circumstance one of the
possibility as you
mentioned in (sic) DIC?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you mentioned
that it cannot be
prevented?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Can you even predict if
it really happen (sic)?
A. Possible, sir.
Q. Are there any specific
findings of autopsy that
will tell you whether this
patient suffered among
such things as DIC?
A. Well, I did reserve
because of the condition
of the patient.
Q. Now, Doctor you said
that you went through the
record of the deceased
Lydia Umali looking for
the chart, the operated
(sic) records, the post
mortem findings on the
histophanic (sic)
examination based on
your examination of
record, doctor, can you
more or less says (sic)
what part are (sic)
concerned could have
been the caused (sic) of
death of this Lydia
Umali?
A. As far as the medical
record is concern (sic) the
caused (sic) of death is
dessimulated (sic) Intra
Vascular Coagulation or
the DIC which resulted to
hemorrhage or bleedings,
sir.
Q. Doctor based on your
findings then there is
knowing (sic) the doctor
would say whether the
doctor her (sic) has been
(sic) fault?
ATTY. MALVEDA:
We will moved (sic) to
strike out the (sic) based
on finding they just read
the chart as well as the
other record.
ATTY. PASCUAL:
Precisely based on this
examination.
ATTY. MALVEDA:
Not finding, there was no
finding made.
COURT:
He is only reading the
record.
ATTY. PASCUAL:
Yes, sir.
A. No, sir, there is no fault
on the part of the surgeon,
sir."[44]
When arraigned, he
pleaded not guilty.
The facts established
during trial by the
prosecution is
summarized by the
appellee in its brief,
thus:
"In the evening of
February 16, 1990,
appellant Pat.
Domingo Belbes
and Pat. Jose
Pabon were
assigned by the
Bacacay Station
Commander to
maintain peace and
order at the Junior
and Senior Prom of
Pili Barangay High
School, Pili,
Bacacay, Albay.
Around 9:00 p.m.
while Teacher-In-
Charge Mila Ulanca,
appellant, Pat.
Pabon and Elmo
Bes were watching
the dance, two
students, Riselle
Banares and
Juliana Basaysay,
approached Mrs.
Ulanca and said
"Mam, it seems that
there is somebody
making trouble."
Appellant and Pat.
Pabon, armed with
an armalite rifle and
a .38 caliber
revolver,
respectively,
responded
forthwith. Moments
after the two police
officers left, bursts
of gunfire-- "Rat-tat-
tat-tat-tat" filled the
air. Fernando
Bataller, a
graduating student
of Pili Barangay
High School, was
hit on different
parts of his body
and died.
Moments before the
gruesome incident,
Fernando Bataller,
then drunk, was in
the company of
Carlito Bataller and
Rosalio Belista.
While Fernando was
vomiting and
holding on to the
bamboo wall of the
schools temporary
building, the
bamboo splits
broke. At this
instance, appellant
and Pat. Pabon
appeared. Without
warning, appellant
fired his gun.
Fernando slumped
on the ground,
bathed with his own
blood. Appellant
and Pat. Pabon fled
from the crime
scene.
Fernando was
pronounced dead
on arrival at the
hospital. As shown
in the autopsy
report, Fernando
suffered the
following gunshot
wounds: (1) head,
located at the right
lower face, skin,
muscles, blood
vessels, nerves,
bone torn away; (2)
chest (front, located
at left, antero lateral
approximately 5 cm.
below but lateral to
the left nipple,
another gunshot
wound on the same
location with
tattooing located at
left lateral waistline;
(3) chest (back)
located at the
middle back at the
level of the lowest
rib, skin and
superficial muscles
torn away, another
gunshot wound
located at the left
back, lateral level of
the lowest rib, with
tattooing. (Citations
omitted)" [2]
The relationship of a
witness to the victim
does not necessarily
diminish the formers
credibility.
[7]
It is a settled rule that
the findings and
conclusions of the trial
court on the credibility
of a witness deserve
respect because it is in
a better position to
determine whether the
witness was telling the
truth or not, having
observed the demeanor
of the witness while
testifying on the
witness stand. In the
[8]
self-defense, the
accused must show
with clear and
convincing evidence,
that: (1) he is not the
unlawful aggressor; (2)
there was lack of
sufficient provocation
on his part; and (3) he
employed reasonable
means to prevent or
repel the aggression.
Self-defense, like alibi,
is a defense which can
easily be concocted. It
is well settled in this
jurisdiction that once
an accused had
admitted that he
inflicted the fatal
injuries on the
deceased, it was
incumbent upon him, in
order to avoid criminal
liability, to prove the
justifying circumstance
claimed by him with
clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence.
He cannot rely on the
weakness of the
prosecution but on the
strength of his own
evidence, "for even if
the evidence of the
prosecution were weak
it could not be
disbelieved after the
accused himself had
admitted the killing."
[10]
person incurs no
criminal liability when
he acts in the
fulfillment of a duty or
in the lawful exercise of
a right or office. But we
must stress there are
two requisites for this
justifying
circumstance: (a) that
the offender acted in
the performance of a
duty or in the lawful
exercise of a duty or in
the lawful exercise of a
right: and (b) that the
injury or offense
committed be the
necessary
consequence of the
due performance of
such right or office. In
[14]
protestation of
innocence is
unavailing, his offense
could only be
characterized as
homicide, not murder,
as hereafter shown.
On one hand, treachery
did not attend the
commission of the
crime as to rule out
murder. Treachery
cannot be presumed
but must be proved by
clear and convincing
evidence as
conclusively as the
killing itself. For the
same to be considered
as a qualifying
circumstance, two
conditions must
concur: (a) the
employment of means,
method or manner of
execution which would
ensure the safety of the
malefactor from
defensive or retaliatory
acts on the part of the
victim, no opportunity
being given the latter to
defend himself or to
retaliate; and (b) the
means, method or
manner of execution
were deliberately or
consciously adopted
by the offender. There
[16]
Illustrations of reckless
imprudence resulting
in homicide are: (1)
exhibiting a loaded
revolver to a friend,
who was killed by the
accidental discharge
brought about by
negligent handling; or
[19]
(2) discharging a
firearm from the
window of ones house
and killing a neighbor
who just at the moment
leaned over the
balcony front; or (3)
[20]
where the defendant, to
stop a fist fight, fired
his .45 caliber pistol
twice in the air, and, as
the bout continued, he
fired another shot at
the ground, but the
bullet ricocheted and
hit a bystander who
died soon thereafter.[21]