Crim Rev Atty Diwa Part 1 80-85

CRIM REV ATTY DIWA PART 1 80-85
Jeross Romano Aguilar
79. P vs. Deliola GR 200157 Aug 13 2016

80. P. vs. Padua GR 168546 July 23 2008
81. Disini vs. Sandiganbayan GR No. 169823 Sept. 11, 2013
82. Bautista vs. CA GR No. 121683, March 26 1998
83. Arches vs. Bellasillo GR No. L-1779 June 29, 1948
84. People vs. Layag GR No. 214875 Oct. 17, 2016
85. People vs. Feliciano GR No. 196735, Aug. 3, 2016
SECOND DIVISION
MICHAEL PADUA, G.R. No. 168546

Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent.
July 23, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision[1] dated April 19, 2005 and
Resolution[2] dated June 14, 2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86977
which had respectively dismissed Michael Paduas petition for certiorari and denied
his motion for reconsideration. Paduas petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals assailed the Orders dated May 11, 2004[3] and July 28, 2004[4]of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 168, Pasig City, which had denied his petition
for probation.
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:
On June 16, 2003, petitioner Michael Padua and Edgar Allan Ubalde were
charged before the RTC, Branch 168, Pasig City of violating Section 5,[5] Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165,[6]otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, for selling dangerous drugs.[7] The Information reads:
The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor,
charges Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez a.k.a. Allan and Michael Padua y
Tordel a.k.a. Mike, with the crime of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II, Republic Act No.
9165 in relation to R.A. [No.] 8369, Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i), committed as follows:
On or about June 6, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez and Michael
Padua y Tordel, a minor, seventeen (17) years old, conspiring and
confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one
another, not being lawfully authorized to sell any dangerous drug, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away
to PO1 Roland A. Panis, a police poseur-buyer, one (1) folded newsprint
containing 4.86 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, which was found
positive to the tests for marijuana, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said
law.
Contrary to law.[8]
When arraigned on October 13, 2003, Padua, assisted by his counsel de oficio,
entered a plea of not guilty.[9]
During the pre-trial conference on February 2, 2004, however, Paduas counsel

manifested that his client was willing to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a
plea of guilty to avail of the benefits granted to first-time offenders
under Section 70[10] of Rep. Act No. 9165. The prosecutor interposed no
[11] [12]
objection. Thus, the RTC on the same date issued an Order stating that the
former plea of Padua of not guilty was considered withdrawn. Padua was re-arraigned
and pleaded guilty. Hence, in a Decision[13] dated February 6, 2004, the RTC
found Padua guilty of the crime charged:
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Michael Padua y Tordel
guilty of [v]iolation of Sec. 5 Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 in relation to R.A. No. 8369
Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i) thereof, and therefore, sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
No subsidiary imprisonment, however, shall be imposed should [the]

accused fail to pay the fine pursuant to Art. 39 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Padua subsequently filed a Petition for Probation [15] dated February 10, 2004
alleging that he is a minor and a first-time offender who desires to avail of the
benefits of probation under Presidential Decree No. 968[16] (P.D. No. 968), otherwise
known as The Probation Law of 1976 and Section 70 of Rep. Act No. 9165. He
further alleged that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications under the said laws.
The RTC in an Order[17] dated February 10, 2004 directed the Probation
Officer of Pasig City to conduct a Post-Sentence Investigation and submit a report
and recommendation within 60 days from receipt of the order. The City Prosecutor
was also directed to submit his comment on the said petition within five days from
receipt of the order.
On April 6, 2004, Chief Probation and Parole Officer Josefina J. Pasana

submitted a Post-Sentence Investigation Report to the RTC recommending
that Padua be placed on probation.[18]
However, on May 11, 2004, public respondent Pairing Judge Agnes Reyes-
Carpio issued an Order denying the Petition for Probation on the ground that under
Section 24[19] of Rep. Act No. 9165, any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot
avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law. The court ruled thus:
Before this Court now is the Post-Sentence Investigation Report (PSIR) on
minor Michael Padua y Tordel prepared by Senior Parole and Probation Officer
Teodoro Villaverde and submitted by the Chief of the Pasig City Parole and
Probation Office, Josefina J. Pasana.
In the aforesaid PSIR, Senior PPO Teodoro Villaverde recommended that

minor Michael Padua y Tordel be placed on probation, anchoring his
recommendation on Articles 189 and 192 of P.D. 603, otherwise known as the
Child and Welfare Code, as amended, which deal with the suspension of sentence
and commitment of youthful offender. Such articles, therefore, do not find
application in this case, the matter before the Court being an application for
probation by minor Michael Padua y Tordel and not the suspension of his sentence.
On the other hand, Section 70 is under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 which
deals with the Program for Treatment and Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents.
Sections 54 to 76, all under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 specifically refer to violations
of either Section 15 or Section 11. Nowhere in Article VIII was [v]iolation of
Section 5 ever mentioned.
More importantly, while the provisions of R.A. 9165, particularly Section

70 thereof deals with Probation or Community Service for First- Time Minor
Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment, the Court is of the view and so holds that minor
Michael Padua y Tordel who was charged and convicted of violating Section 5,
Article II, R.A. 9165, cannot avail of probation under said section in view of the
provision of Section 24 which is hereunder quoted:
Sec. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug

Traffickers and Pushers.Any person convicted for drug trafficking
or pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the
Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Lawor
Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended. (underlining supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Probation filed by

Michael Padua y Tord[e]l should be, as it is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[20]
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the same was denied
on July 28, 2004.He filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of
Appeals assailing the order, but the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated April 19,
2005, dismissed his petition. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit and ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but
it was denied.Hence, this petition where he raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DENIAL OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATION WHICH DEPRIVED
PETITIONERS RIGHT AS A MINOR UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
NO. [02-1-18-SC] OTHERWISE KNOWN AS [THE] RULE ON JUVENILES IN
CONFLICT WITH THE LAW.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT [THE] ACCUSED[S] RIGHT [TO BE RELEASED
UNDER RECOGNIZANCE] HAS BEEN VIOLATED OR DEPRIVED IN THE
LIGHT OF R.A. 9344 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS AN ACT ESTABLISHING A
COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM,
CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND
OTHER PURPOSES.[22]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing public respondent,

opted to adopt its Comment[23] as its Memorandum. In its Comment, the OSG
countered that
I.
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS HAVE LEGAL BASIS
IN APPLYING SECTION 24, ARTICLE II OF R.A. 9165 INSTEAD OF
SECTION 70, ARTICLE VIII OF THE SAME LAW.
II.
SECTION 32 OF A.M. NO. 02-1-18-SC OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE RULE
ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW HAS NO APPLICATION TO
THE INSTANT CASE.[24]
Simply, the issues are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing Paduas
petition for certiorari assailing the trial courts order denying his petition for
probation? (2) Was Paduas right under Rep. Act No. 9344,[25] the Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006, violated? and (3) Does Section 32[26] of A.M. No. 02-1-
18-SC otherwise known as the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law have
application in this case?
As to the first issue, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in
dismissing Paduas petition for certiorari.
For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is
directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.[27]
Without jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute lack of
authority. There is excess of jurisdiction when the court transcends its power or acts
without any statutory authority. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. In other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and such exercise is so patent
or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either
to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[28]
A review of the orders of the RTC denying Paduas petition for probation shows
that the RTC neither acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion
because it merely applied the law and adhered to principles of statutory construction
in denying Paduas petition for probation.
Padua was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of Rep.
Act No. 9165 for selling dangerous drugs. It is clear under Section 24 of Rep. Act
No. 9165 that any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege
of probation, to wit:
SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and
Pushers. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act,
regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege
granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as
amended. (Emphasis supplied.)
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted
for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of
the privilege granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in
statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the
statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. [29] If a statute is clear, plain and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba
legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or speech is the index of
intention.[30] Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or
from the words of a statute there should be no departure.[31]
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the intention of the
legislators in Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to provide stiffer and harsher
punishment for those persons convicted of drug trafficking or pushing while extending
a sympathetic and magnanimous hand in Section 70 to drug dependents who are found
guilty of violation of Sections 11[32] and 15[33] of the Act. The law considers the users
and possessors of illegal drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and pushers as
predators. Hence, while drug traffickers and pushers, like Padua, are categorically
disqualified from availing the law on probation, youthful drug dependents, users and
possessors alike, are given the chance to mend their ways.[34] The Court of Appeals
also correctly stated that had it been the intention of the legislators to exempt from the
application of Section 24 the drug traffickers and pushers who are minors and first
time offenders, the law could have easily declared so.[35]
The law indeed appears strict and harsh against drug traffickers and drug pushers
while protective of drug users. To illustrate, a person arrested for using illegal or
dangerous drugs is meted only a penalty of six months rehabilitation in a government
center, as minimum, for the first offense under Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 9165,
while a person charged and convicted of selling dangerous drugs shall suffer life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) under Section 5, Rep. Act No.
9165.
As for the second and third issues, Padua cannot argue that his right under
Rep. Act No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 was violated. Nor
can he argue that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the Rule
on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law has application in this case. Section 68[36] of
Rep. Act No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC both pertain to
suspension of sentence and not probation.
Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 38[37] of Rep. Act No.

9344 could no longer be retroactively applied for petitioners benefit. Section 38 of
Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once a child under 18 years of age is found guilty
of the offense charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court
shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence. Section
40[38] of Rep. Act No. 9344, however, provides that once the child reaches 18 years
of age, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of
sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until
the child reaches the maximum age of 21 years. Petitioner has already reached 21
years of age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a child[39] for purposes
of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot
and academic as far as his case is concerned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated April

19, 2005 and the Resolution dated June 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 169823-24 September 11, 2013

HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 174764-65
HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action involving petitioner
notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering that his criminal prosecution is intimately
related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their immediate family, subordinates and
close associates.
The Case
Petitioner Herminio T. Disini assails via petition for certiorari there solutions promulgated by the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28001and Criminal Case No. 28002, both entitled People v.
Herminio T. Disini, on January 17, 2005 (denying his motion to quash the informations)1 and August
10, 2005 (denying his motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to quash),2 alleging that
the Sandiganbayan (First Division) thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated June 30,2004 charging Disini in the
Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials, penalized under Article 212 in relation to Article
210 of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case No. 28001), and with a violation of Section 4(a) of
Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Criminal
Case No. 28002).
The accusatory portions of the informations read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 28001
That during the period from 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with
the then President of the Philippines Ferdinand E. Marcos, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously offer, promise and give gifts and presents to said Ferdinand E. Marcos, consisting of
accused DISINI’s ownership of two billion and five hundred (2.5 billion) shares of stock in Vulcan
Industrial and Mining Corporation and four billion (4 billion)shares of stock in The Energy
Corporation, with both shares of stock having then a book value of ₱100.00 per share of stock, and
subcontracts, to Engineering and Construction Company of Asia, owned and controlled by said
Ferdinand E. Marcos, on the mechanical and electrical construction work on the Philippine Nuclear
Power Plant Project("Project") of the National Power Corporation at Morong, Bataan, all for and in
consideration of accused Disini seeking and obtaining for Burns and Roe and Westinghouse
Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse), the contracts to do the engineering and architectural design
and to construct, respectively, the Project, as in fact said Ferdinand E. Marcos, taking undue
advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to his office and in consideration of
the aforesaid gifts and presents, did award or cause to be awarded to said Burns and Roe and
Westinghouse, the contracts to do the engineering and architectural design and to construct the
Project, respectively, which acts constitute the crime of corruption of public officials.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Criminal Case No. 28002
That during the period 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
the Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with the
then President of the Philippines, Ferdinand E. Marcos, being then the close personal friend and
golfing partner of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, and being further the husband of Paciencia Escolin-
Disini who was the first cousin of then First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and family physicianof
the Marcos family, taking advantage of such close personal relation, intimacy and free access, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, in connection with the Philippine Nuclear Power
Plant (PNPP)Project ("PROJECT") of the National Power Corporation (NPC) at Morong, Bataan,
request and receive from Burns and Roe, a foreign consultant, the total amount of One Million U.S.
Dollars ($1,000,000.00),more or less, and also from Westinghouse Electric
Corporation(WESTINGHOUSE), the total amount of Seventeen Million U.S.
Dollars($17,000,000.00), more or less, both of which entities were then having business, transaction,
and application with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, all for and in consideration of
accused DISINI securing and obtaining, as accused Disini did secure and obtain, the contract for the
said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse to do the engineering and architectural design, and
construct, respectively, the said PROJECT, and subsequently, request and receive subcontracts for
Power Contractors, Inc. owned by accused DISINI, and Engineering and Construction Company of
Asia (ECCO-Asia), owned and controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, which stated amounts and
subcontracts constituted kickbacks, commissions and gifts as material or pecuniary advantages, for
securing and obtaining, as accused DISINI did secure and obtain, through the direct intervention of
said Ferdinand E. Marcos, for Burns and Roe the engineering and architectural contract, and for
Westinghouse the construction contract, for the PROJECT.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On August 2, 2004, Disini filed a motion to quash,5 alleging that the criminal actions had been
extinguished by prescription, and that the informations did not conform to the prescribed form. The
Prosecution opposed the motion to quash.6
On September 16, 2004, Disini voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment to obtain the
Sandiganbayan’s favorable action on his motion for permission to travel abroad.7 He then entered a
plea of not guilty to both informations.
As stated, on January 17, 2005, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated its first assailed
resolution denying the motion to quash.8
Disini moved for the reconsideration of the resolution dated January 17, 2005,9 but the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied his motion on August 10, 2005 through the second assailed
resolution.10
Issues
Undaunted, Disini commenced this special civil action for certiorari, alleging that:
A. THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THEOFFENSES

CHARGED.
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITRULED THAT

SECTION 4, PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) OFREPUBLIC ACT NO. 8249 DO NOT
APPLY SINCE THEINFORMATIONS WERE "FILED PURSUANT TO E.O. NOS. 1,2,
14 AND 14-A".
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITASSUMED

JURISDICTION WITHOUT HAVING MET THEREQUISITE UNDER SECTION 4 OF
R.A. 8249 THAT THEACCUSED MUST BE A PUBLIC OFFICER.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH SUCH GRAVEABUSE OF DISCRETION

WHEN IT EFFECTIVELY IGNORED, DISREGARDED, AND DENIED
PETITIONER’SCONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHT TOPRESCRIPTION.
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE

APPLICABLE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE

COMMENCEMENT OF THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE POINT

OF INTERRUPTION OF THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
C. BY MERELY ASSUMING THE PRESENCE OF GLARINGLYABSENT ELEMENTS IN

THE OFFENSES CHARGED TOUPHOLD THE ‘SUFFICIENCY’ OF THE INFORMATIONS
INCRIMINAL CASE NOS. 28001 AND 28002, THE RESPONDENTCOURT
DEMONSTRATED ITS PREJUDGMENT OVER THE SUBJECT CASES AND ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF ITSDISCRETION.
D. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION IN

REFUSING TO QUASH THE INFORMATIONSDESPITE THEIR UTTER FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH THEPRESCRIBED FORM, THUS EFFECTIVELY DENYING
THEACCUSED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTTO BE INFORMED OF
THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THEACCUSATION AGAINST HIM.11
Ruling
The petition for certiorari has no merit.
1.Preliminary Considerations
To properly resolve this case, reference is made to the ruling of the Court in G.R. No. 175730
entitled Herminio Disini v. Sandiganbayan,12 which involved the civil action for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages (Civil Case No. 0013 entitled Republic v. HerminioT.
Disini, et al.) filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government(PCGG) against Disini and
others.13 The amended complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 alleged that Disini had acted in unlawful
concert with his co-defendants in acquiring and accumulating ill-gotten wealth through them is
appropriation of public funds, plunder of the nation’s wealth, extortion, embezzlement, and other acts
of corruption,14 as follows:
4. Defendant HERMINIO T. DISINI is a close associate of defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos and the
husband of the first cousin of Defendant Imelda R. Marcos. By reason of this relationship xxx
defendant Herminio Disini obtained staggering commissions from the Westinghouse in exchange for
securing the nuclear power plant contract from the Philippine government.
xxxx
13. Defendants Herminio T. Disini and Rodolfo Jacob, by themselves and/or in unlawful concert,
active collaboration and willing participation of defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos, and taking undue advantage of their association and influence with the latter defendant
spouses in order to prevent disclosure and recovery of ill-gotten assets, engaged in devices,
schemes, and stratagems such as:
xxxx
(c) unlawfully utilizing the Herdis Group of Companies and Asia Industries, Inc. as conduits through
which defendants received, kept, and/or invested improper payments such as unconscionably large
commissions from foreign corporations like the Westinghouse Corporation; (d) secured special
concessions, privileges and/or benefits from defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos, such as a contract awarded to Westinghouse Corporation which built an inoperable nuclear
facility in the country for a scandalously exorbitant amount that included defendant’s staggering
commissions – defendant Rodolfo Jacob executed for HGI the contract for the aforesaid nuclear
plant;15
Through its letter dated April 8, 1991,16 the PCGG transmitted the records of Criminal Case No.
28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 to then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez for appropriate
action, to wit:
In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of EduardoM. Cojuangco, Jr. versus the
PCGG (G.R. Nos. 92319–92320) dated October 2, 1990, we are hereby transmitting to your Office
for appropriate action the records of the attached criminal case which we believe is similar to the
said Cojuangco case in certain aspects, such as: (i) some parts or elements are also parts of the
causes of action in the civil complaints[-]filed with the Sandiganbayan; (ii) some properties or assets
of the respondents have been sequestered; (iii) some of the respondents are also party defendants
in the civil cases.
Although the authority of the PCGG has been upheld by the Supreme Court, we are constrained to
refer to you for proper action the herein-attached case in view of the suspicion that the PCGG
cannot conduct an impartial investigation in cases similar to that of the Cojuangco case. x x x
Ostensibly, the PCGG’s letter of transmittal was adverting to the ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government (Cojuangco, Jr.),17 viz:
x x x The PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a prima facie basis filed a civil complaint against
petitioner and intervenors alleging substantially the same illegal or criminal acts subject of the
subsequent criminal complaints the Solicitor General filed with the PCGG for preliminary
investigation. x x x.
Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and freeze orders against petitioner’s
properties, it was on the basis of a prima facie finding that the same were ill-gotten and/or were
acquired in relation to the illegal disposition of coconut levy funds. Thus, the Court finds that the
PCGG cannot possibly conduct the preliminary investigation of said criminal complaints with the
"cold neutrality of an impartial judge," as it has prejudged the matter. x x x18
xxxx
The Court finds that under the circumstances of the case, the PCGG cannot inspire belief that it
could be impartial in the conduct of the preliminary investigation of the aforesaid complaints against
petitioner and intervenors. It cannot possibly preside in the said preliminary investigation with an
even hand.
The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be promoted if the PCGG would be
prohibited from conducting the preliminary investigation of the complaints subject of this petition and
the petition for intervention and that the records of the same should be forwarded to the
Ombudsman, who as an independent constitutional officer has primary jurisdiction over cases of this
nature, to conduct such preliminary investigation and take appropriate action.19 (Bold emphasis
supplied)
It appears that the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman, following its conduct of the
preliminary investigation on the criminal complaints thus transmitted by the PCGG, were reversed
and set aside by the Court in Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto,20
with the Court requiring the Office of the Ombudsman to file the informations that became the
subject of Disini’s motion to quash in Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.
2.
Sandiganbayan has exclusive and
original jurisdiction over the offenses charged
Disini challenges the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses charged in Criminal Case
No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.He contends that: (1) the informations did not allege that
the charges were being filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order (E.O.) Nos.1, 2, 14
and 14-A; (2) the offenses charged were not of the nature contemplated by E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
14-A because the allegations in the informations neither pertained to the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth, nor involved sequestration cases; (3) the cases were filed by the Office of the Ombudsman
instead of by the PCGG; and (4) being a private individual not charged as a co-principal, accomplice
or accessory of a public officer, he should be prosecuted in the regular courts instead of in the
Sandiganbayan.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
offenses charged because Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 were filed within
the purview of Section 4 (c) of R.A. No. 8249; and that both cases stemmed from the criminal
complaints initially filed by the PCGG pursuant to its mandate under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A to
investigate and file the appropriate civil or criminal cases to recover ill-gotten wealth not only of the
Marcoses and their immediately family but also of their relatives, subordinates and close associates.
We hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case
No. 28002.
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 was the law that established the Sandiganbayan and defined its
jurisdiction. The law was amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249. Under Section 4 of R.A.
No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan was vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases
involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:
xxxx
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by
the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to
their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. (Bold emphasis supplied)
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or
higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan
trial court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
xxxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public
officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations,
they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. x x x x
It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had initially filed the criminal complaints in the
Sandiganbayan, with the Office of the Ombudsman taking over the investigation of Disini only after
the Court issued in Cojuangco, Jr. the directive to the PCGG to refer the criminal cases to the Office
of the Ombudsman on the ground that the PCGG would not be an impartial office following its finding
of a prima facie case being established against Disini to sustain the institution of Civil Case No.
0013.
Also underscored is that the complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 and the informations in Criminal Case
No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002involved the same transaction, specifically the contracts
awarded through the intervention of Disini and President Marcos in favor of Burns & Roe to do the
engineering and architectural design, and Westinghouse to do the construction of the Philippine
Nuclear Power Plant Project (PNPPP). Given their sameness in subject matter, to still expressly aver
in Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 that the charges involved the recovery of
ill-gotten wealth was no longer necessary.21 With Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No.
28002 being intertwined with Civil Case No.0013, the PCGG had the authority to institute the
criminal prosecutions against Disini pursuant to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
That Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged from the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No.1, which tasked the PCGG with assisting the President in "the
recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or
abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or
controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue
advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or
relationship," expressly granted the authority of the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth covered
President Marcos’ immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, without distinction
as to their private or public status.
Contrary to Disini’s argument, too, the qualifying clause found in Section 4 of R.A. No. 824922
applied only to the cases listed in Subsection 4aand Subsection 4b of R.A. No. 8249, the full text of
which follows:
xxxx
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan

and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department
heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city

treasurers, assessors engineers and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors
in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -

controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade‘27’ and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the

provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. b. Other offenses or felonies whether
simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office. (bold emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Unquestionably, public officials occupying positions classified as Grade 27 or higher are mentioned
only in Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b,signifying the plain legislative intent of limiting the
qualifying clause to such public officials. To include within the ambit of the qualifying clause the
persons covered by Subsection 4c would contravene the exclusive mandate of the PCGG to bring
the civil and criminal cases pursuant to and in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. In view
of this, the Sandiganbayan properly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case
No. 28002 despite Disini’s being a private individual, and despite the lack of any allegation of his
being the co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public official in the commission of the offenses
charged.
3.
The offenses charged in the

informations have not yet prescribed
In resolving the issue of prescription, the following must be considered, namely: (1) the period of
prescription for the offense charged;(2) the time when the period of prescription starts to run; and (3)
the time when the prescriptive period is interrupted.23
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleged that Disini had offered, promised and given gifts
and presents to Ferdinand E. Marcos; that said gifts were in consideration of Disini obtaining for
Burns & Roe and Westinghouse Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse) the contracts, respectively,
to do the engineering and architectural design of and to construct the PNPPP; and that President
Marcos did award or cause to be awarded the respective contracts to Burns & Roe and
Westinghouse, which acts constituted the crime of corruption of public officials.24
The crime of corruption of public officials charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 is punished by Article
212 of the Revised Penal Code with the" same penalties imposed upon the officer
corrupted."25 Under the second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (direct
bribery),26 if the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act that does
not constitute a crime, and the officer executes the act, he shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in
its medium and minimum periods and a fine of not less than three times the value of the gift.
Conformably with Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code,27 the period of prescription for this specie of
corruption of public officials charged against Disini is 15 years.
As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with a violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No.
3019. By express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg.
195, the offenses committed under R.A. No. 3019 shall prescribe in 15 years. Prior to the
amendment, the prescriptive period was only 10 years. It became settled in People v.
Pacificador,28 however, that the longer prescriptive period of 15years would not apply to crimes
committed prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on March 16,
1982, because the longer period could not be given retroactive effect for not being favorable to the
accused. With the information alleging the period from 1974 to February1986 as the time of the
commission of the crime charged, the applicable prescriptive period is 10 years in order to accord
with People v. Pacificador .
For crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof provides that prescription starts
to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents. As to offenses punishable by R.A. No. 3019, Section 2 of R.A. No. 332629 states:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and
shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double
jeopardy.
The ruling on the issue of prescription in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans v. Desierto30 is also enlightening, viz:
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is committed. That an
aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of
which his right arises," does not prevent the running of the prescriptive period. An exception to this
rule is the "blameless ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Under this
doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right
which will support a cause of action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of
limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence
of a cause of action." It was in this accord that the Court confronted the question on the running of
the prescriptive period in People v. Duque which became the cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130149), and
the subsequent cases which Ombudsman Desierto dismissed, emphatically, on the ground of
prescription too. Thus, we held in a catena of cases, that if the violation of the special law was not
known at the time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof,
i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.
Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the crime which is the subject herein,
commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992 after the Committee made an exhaustive
investigation. When the complaint was filed in 1997, only five years have elapsed, and, hence,
prescription has not yet set in. The rationale for this was succinctly discussed in the 1999
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, that "it was well-high impossible for
the State, the aggrieved party, to have known these crimes committed prior to the 1986EDSA
Revolution, because of the alleged connivance and conspiracy among involved public officials and
the beneficiaries of the loans." In yet another pronouncement, in the 2001 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130817), the Court held that during the
Marcos regime, no person would have dared to question the legality of these transactions. (Citations
omitted)31
Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that the prescriptive period began to run from 1974,
the time when the contracts for the PNPP Project were awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse.
Although the criminal cases were the offshoot of the sequestration case to recover ill-gotten wealth
instead of behest loans like in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto, the connivance and conspiracy among the public officials involved and the beneficiaries of
the favors illegally extended rendered it similarly well-nigh impossible for the State, as the aggrieved
party, to have known of the commission of the crimes charged prior to the EDSA Revolution in 1986.
Notwithstanding the highly publicized and widely-known nature of the PNPPP, the unlawful acts or
transactions in relation to it were discovered only through the PCGG’s exhaustive investigation,
resulting in the establishment of a prima facie case sufficient for the PCGG to institute Civil Case No.
0013 against Disini. Before the discovery, the PNPPP contracts, which partook of a public character,
enjoyed the presumption of their execution having been regularly done in the course of official
functions.32
Considering further that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to assail the legality
of the transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the unlawful
transactions was possible prior to 1986.
We note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed and their records transmitted by the PCGG to
the Office of the Ombudsman on April 8, 1991for the conduct the preliminary investigation.33 In
accordance with Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code34 and the ruling in Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice,35 the filing of the
criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman effectively interrupted the running of the period
of prescription. According to Panaguiton:36
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, which involved violations of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act(R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No.
8293),which are both special laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the
institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more recent case
of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, the Court ruled that the
nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on
violations of the Revised Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary
investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive
period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case is instructive, thus:

While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears
before" investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby
the investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the
executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood either executive or judicial in
character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial
and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the
guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of
delays that are not under his control.
The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense charged is punishable by
the Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of the complaint or information in the office
of the public prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary investigation that interrupts the period of
prescription. Consequently, prescription did not yet set in because only five years elapsed from
1986, the time of the discovery of the offenses charged, up to April 1991, the time of the filing of the
criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman.
The informations were sufficient in form and substance
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to constitute the
offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground that the complaint or
information charges no offense may be properly sustained. The fundamental test in determining
whether a motion to quash may be sustained based on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in the
law.37 Extrinsic matters or evidence aliunde are not considered.38
The test does not require absolute certainty as to the presence of the elements of the offense;
otherwise, there would no longer be any need for the Prosecution to proceed to trial.
The informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 (corruption of public officials) and Criminal Case No.
28002 (violation of Section 4(a) of RA No.3019) have sufficiently complied with the requirements of
Section 6, Rule110 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is sufficient if it

states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information.
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleging corruption of public officers specifically put forth
that Disini, in the period from 1974 to February 1986 in Manila, Philippines, conspiring and
confederating with then President Marcos, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously offered, promised and
gave gifts and presents to President Marcos, who, by taking undue advantage of his position as
President, committed the offense in relation to his office, and in consideration of the gifts and
presents offered, promised and given by Disini, President Marcos caused to be awarded to Burns &
Roe and Westinghouse the respective contracts to do the engineering and architectural design of
and to construct the PNPPP. The felonious act consisted of causing the contracts for the PNPPP to
be awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by reason of the gifts and promises offered by Disini
to President Marcos.
The elements of corruption of public officials under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code are:
1. That the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or presents to a public officer;
and
2. That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are given to a public officer
under circumstances that will make the public officer liable for direct bribery or indirect
bribery.
The allegations in the information for corruption of public officials, if hypothetically admitted, would
establish the essential elements of the crime. The information stated that: (1) Disini made an offer
and promise, and gave gifts to President Marcos, a public officer; and (2) in consideration of the
offers, promises and gifts, President Marcos, in causing the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe
and Westinghouse by taking advantage of his position and in committing said act in relation to his
office, was placed under circumstances that would make him liable for direct bribery.39
The second element of corruption of public officers simply required the public officer to be placed
under circumstances, not absolute certainty, that would make him liable for direct or indirect bribery.
Thus, even without alleging that President Marcos received or accepted Disini’s offers, promises and
gifts – an essential element in direct bribery – the allegation that President Marcos caused the award
of the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse sufficed to place him under circumstances of
being liable for direct bribery.
The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No.
3019 is similarly upheld. The elements of the offense under Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 are:
1. That the offender has family or close personal relation with a public official;
2. That he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such family or close personal relation
by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary
advantage from any person having some business, transaction, application, request or
contract with the government;
3. That the public official with whom the offender has family or close personal relation has to
intervene in the business transaction, application, request, or contract with the government.
The allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the elements of the offense, considering that: (1) Disini,
being the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini, the first cousin of First Lady Imelda Romualdez-
Marcos, and at the same time the family physician of the Marcoses, had close personal relations and
intimacy with and free access to President Marcos, a public official; (2) Disini, taking advantage of
such family and close personal relations, requested and received $1,000,000.00 from Burns & Roe
and $17,000,000.00 from Westinghouse, the entities then having business, transaction, and
application with the Government in connection with the PNPPP; (3) President Marcos, the public
officer with whom Disini had family or close personal relations, intervened to secure and obtain for
Burns & Roe the engineering and architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the construction of
the PNPPP.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari; AFFIRMS the resolutions
promulgated on January 17, 2005 and August 10, 2005 by the Sandiganbayan (First Division) in
Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002; and DIRECTS petitioner to pay the costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121683. March 26, 1998]
CORNELIO B. BAUTISTA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS; and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
This case affirms the constant stance of this Court regarding the ascendancy of an
eyewitness account over a bare denial. Such an account gains more credence when, as
in the case at bar, the witness is himself a victim.
On the night of March 6, 1987, a police officer who had been pursuing a suspected
felon was shot right in front of the heavily guarded Lopa Compound at No. 2300 Robert
St., Pasay City. Lt. Franklin Garfin was slain in the shooting incident but his companion,
Cpl. Cesar Garcia escaped unharmed. The man they were supposed to arrest, a certain
Joseph Williamson Dizon, was also shot and sustained back and arm injuries.Three
criminal informations were filed against the man who was allegedly responsible for all of
these. Thus, on March 7, 1987, petitioner Cornelio Bautista, the security guard on duty at
the Lopa Compound the previous night, was charged with murder, attempted murder and
frustrated murder. At the joint trial of these three cases, which were consolidated upon
order of the court, the prosecution relied on the eyewitness testimony of Cpl. Garcia, as
well as on the physical evidence.
According to Cpl. Garcia, on March 6, 1987, while responding to a report that a pot
session was in progress at the Pasay Sports Complex, he and several operatives of the
Pasay City Police heard somebody shout hold-up, then saw a man, later identified as
Dizon, fleeing from the site. Pat. Isidro Ramasamy and Lt. Garfin ran after Dizon, while
Cpl. Garcia commandeered a taxicab to intercept him. Just when they had cornered him
at Robert St. near Libertad St., a man holding a shotgun suddenly emerged from the Lopa
Compound and aimed his firearm at them. Lt. Garfin immediately informed the man,
herein petitioner, that they were policemen, to which petitioner allegedly retorted, E, ano
kung pulis ka! From a distance of about twenty meters, petitioner fired once and hit Lt.
Garfin who fell to the ground. Cpl. Garcia tried to aid his fallen superior but petitioner
trained the gun at him and fired two more shots. He managed to duck and hide behind
Dizon, using the latter as a shield. Amid the confusion, Dizon was able to escape Cpl.
Garcias clutches and even told petitioner that his captors were holdup men. The taxi
driver who had conveyed Cpl. Garcia to, and had lingered at, the crime scene yelled at
petitioner, telling him that he was firing at police officers and that the real holdup man was
the one beside him. Dizon ran and he, too, was shot by petitioner, hitting him in the back
and left arm. The diversion allowed Cpl. Garcia to jump into the taxicab and call for
help. When he returned, another police officer, Cpl. Ricardo Santos, was already talking
to the men at the Lopa Compound. He immediately pointed to petitioner as the assailant.
Petitioner was arrested and his service firearm was confiscated by the apprehending
officers. Later, Lt. Garfin was brought to the Manila Sanitarium Hospital where he was
pronounced dead on arrival.[1]
Autopsy conducted by National Bureau of Investigation Medico-Legal Officer Alberto
M. Reyes attributed Lt. Garfins death to severe hemorrhage secondary to shotgun
wounds.[2] Ballistics examination by the NBI further showed that the pellets recovered from
Lt. Garfins body matched the markings on the test shells fired from petitioners
shotgun.[3] The NBI also subjected petitioner, the victim, two other guards at the Lopa
Compound, and a civilian agent to paraffin tests, but only petitioner tested positive for
nitrates.[4]
Petitioner denied all the charges against him and claimed that he never left the Lopa
Compound during the shooting. He apparently heard somebody being chased outside so,
as the guard on duty, he grabbed his shotgun and went to the Vito Cruz side of the
compounds fence to investigate, while the other guards, who were also armed, proceeded
to the gate facing Robert St. When he heard shots being fired in the direction of his
companions, he immediately took cover. Responding policemen arrested him and his
fellow guards and confiscated their service firearms. Explaining the positive results of the
paraffin test on him, he said that it was because he cleaned all their firearms on March 6,
1987.[5]
The defense also presented the testimony of another security guard, Anastacio
Mangrubang, to corroborate petitioners tale of innocence.[6]
After trial on the merits, Judge Sergio I. Amonoy of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Branch 115, rendered judgment, the decretal portion of which reads thus:
All the premises considered, the Court finds the accused CORNELIO
BAUTISTA Y BAGALAYOS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code absent any modifying circumstance and applying the
indeterminate sentence law, penalized (sic) him as principal to suffer
the penalty of prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium or
10 years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months, to reimburse the heirs of
Franklin Garfin P25,000.00, (for) funeral expense(s,) and P15,000.00,
miscellaneous, (for) for food and drinks during (the) wake, and others,
to indemnify them P30,000.00 for his death, and to pay the cost of the
proceedings.
For insufficiency of the evidence the Court acquits the accused of the
charges of Frustrated Murder (2 counts).
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved by his conviction for murder, petitioner elevated his case to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the same with modification in its assailed decision promulgated
on April 5, 1995. Thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed
herefrom is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the sole modification that the
P25,000.00, P15,000.00 and P30,000.00 damages awarded to the
heirs of the deceased are all hereby deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of said decision was denied by the appellate
court in its Resolution of August 22, 1995.
He is now before this Court still proclaiming his innocence and insisting that the trial
courts factual findings were contrary to the Peoples evidence. He also claims that the
affidavit of desistance of Lt. Garfins widow should have been considered in his favor.
The petition must be denied.
Before proceeding any further, the Court reiterates its deference to the factual
findings of the trial court, especially when, as in this case, there appears no cogent reason
why its conclusions should not be upheld.
Petitioner maintains that he never went out of the Lopa Compound on the night in
question. Yet, he did not offer any reason why, among the guards in the compound, he
was the one resolutely pinpointed by Cpl. Garcia as the man who shot them and killed Lt.
Garfin. The fact that Cpl. Garcia changed his statement when he was recalled to the
witness stand does not affect the credibility of his earlier assertions, [7]considering that he
positively identified petitioner as the culprit in no less than three occasions. [8] Positive
identification, where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on
the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which if
not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative and self-serving
evidence undeserving of weight in law.[9] Neither did he convincingly explain why he was
the only one who tested positive for nitrates. His excuse - that he cleaned their firearms
that day - is too much of a coincidence to be believed. Moreover, he had absolutely no
answer for the States evidence matching the deformed shotgun pellets recovered from
Lt. Garfins body to his service firearm.
The failure of the prosecution to present other witnesses is not fatal to the Peoples
case. Cpl. Garcias testimony sufficiently enlightened the court on the circumstances
surrounding the death of Lt. Garfin. The physical evidence corroborated the material
points of his eyewitness account; hence, no other proof was necessary to convince the
court that petitioner, indeed, committed the crime of which he was charged.Certainly, the
prosecution cannot be faulted for not presenting more witnesses; criminals are convicted,
not on the number of witnesses against them, but on the credibility of the testimony of
even one witness who is able to convince the court of the guilt of the accused beyond a
shadow of a doubt; in other words, not quantitatively but qualitatively. It has the freedom
of strategy and exclusive choice of witnesses, whose testimony may either be relevant or
merely corroborative. Its failure to present witnesses whom the defense believes should
be questioned in court is no failure at all but a matter of prosecutorial discretion.
Petitioner further claims that the charges against him should have been dropped
when, on March 16, 1989, Lt. Garfins widow executed an affidavit of desistance,
withdrawing all proceedings had and all documentary evidence presented by the private
prosecution. This likewise deserves scant consideration. It must be remembered that
murder is a public crime, a crime committed as much on the victim as on the
State. Although a private prosecutor is at times allowed by the fiscal or public prosecutor
to handle a trial, it must not be forgotten that the latter retains control of the criminal
proceedings.
In the case at bar, nothing on record asserts that the public prosecutor assented to
the withdrawal by the private offended party. Mrs. Garfins desistance did not extinguish
the crime imputed to petitioner, for this is not one of the accepted modes of stifling criminal
liability enumerated in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. [10] If at all, such desistance
had the effect of, to use respondent courts language, voluntarily releasing petitioner from
the civil liability arising from his commission of the crime.
The Court is convinced that petitioner was correctly convicted of the crime of
murder. As alleged in the information, the shooting of Lt. Garfin was attended by
treachery, for, without any provocation on his part, he was suddenly shot while in the
lawful performance of his official duties. The attack came even when he had already
identified himself as a police officer. Lt. Garfin absolutely had no opportunity to put up a
defense against petitioner, and the physical evidence shows that only the latters firearm
was discharged. At no time was petitioners life ever put in peril. As we held in Dinglasan,
(a)n unexpected and sudden attack under circumstances which render the victim unable
and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack
constitutes alevosia, and the fact that the attack was frontal does not preclude the
presence of treachery.[11]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 08780 dated April 5, 1995, as well as its resolution
dated August 22, 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the P30,000.00
indemnity imposed by the lower court for the death of the victim, as well as the cost of the
proceedings, are restored.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Kapunan, and Purisima, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1779 June 29, 1948

JOSE A. ARCHES, recurrente-apelante,

vs.
ANACLETO I. BELLASILLO y EL FISCAL PROVINCIAL DE CAPIZ, recurridos-apelados.
Jose A. Arches en representacion del recurrente-apelante.

El Primer Procurador General Auxiliar Sr. Roberto A. Gianzon y el Procurador Sr. Luis R. Feria en
representacion de los recurridos-apelados.
BRIONES, J.:
Contra el recurrente y apelante, Jose A. Arches, el fiscal provincial de Capiz presento el 10 de

Enero de 1947 ante el juzgado de paz del municipio de Capiz, cabecera de la provincia, la querella
que se transcribe a continuacion:
That on or about the year 1939 up to this date, in the municipality of Capiz, Province of
Capiz, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, said accused did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously block the course of the Talaga River and Lacturan Creek
— both waterways are navigable and of public domain—by constructing therein three dikes
in the former and another 3 dikes in the latter without authority from the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, thereby causing prejudice to the inhabitants of barrios Tanza
and Banica of said municipality by obstructing their only shortest fluvial passage from said
barrios to the capital of Capiz. Contrary to law.
El acusado presento mocion de sobreseimiento (motion to quash) por dos fundamentos: (a) porque
a simple vista, leyendo la querella, el delito alegado en ella y su pena ya estaban presciritos; (b)
porque el juzgado de paz del municipio de Capiz carecia de jurisdiccion sobre la causa, habiendose
cometido la infraccion objeto de querella en la comprension territorial del municipio contiguo de
Panay. El Juzgado desestimo la mocion por inmeritoria.
Casi inmediatamente depues el acusado procedio a incoar un recurso de certiorari prohibicion, en

virtud de los mismos fundamentos, ante el Juzgado de Primera Instancia, con resultado igualmente
adverso. De la sentencia que desestima el recurso se ha interpuesto la apelacion que ahora
tenemos que decidir.
Es evidente que la apelacion carece enteramente de merito. El que en la querella se diga "en o
hacia el año 1939 hasta esta fecha ... el acusado, deliberada y maliciosamente, bloquea y obstrueye
el curso del rio Talaga y del riachuelo Lacturan mediante la construccion de 3 diques en el primero y
3 diques en el segundo, sin authorizacion del Secretario de Obras Publicas y Comunicaciones, con
grave perjuicio de los habitantes de los barrios de Tanza y Banica ...," no significa que el periodo de
4 años para la prescripcion de que habla el apelante deba hacerse partir del año 1939 en que, al
parecer, se levantaron por primera vez los diques, con infraccion de la Ley del Commonwealth No.
383 que prohibe y castiga tales actos de obstruccion. Tiene razon el Procurador General al decir
que se trata de una infraccion continua. Mientras los diques esten actualmente alli, obstrueyendo el
curso de rio y reachuelo de que se trata, no hay ninguna solucion de continuidad, el delito no cesa;
por tanto, mal puede corner el periodo de prescripcion, la cual tendria lugar solamente desde que el
delito se cometio y se acabo. en otros terminos, el periodo de prescripcion equivale al vacio que se
crea entra la fecha de la comision y consumacion del delito y la fecha de su prosecucion. El caso
seria diferente si en la querella se dijera que los diques existieron hasta tal fecha obstruyendo el
curso de los rios, y desde tal fecha hasta que se prsento la querella hubiese transcurrido el periodo
prescriptivo.
El segundo fundamento de la mocion de sobreseimiento es menos meritorio todavia. En la querella

se dice categorica y especificamente que la infraccion se cometio dentro de la jurisdiccion del
municipio de Capiz, y es elemental que lo que determina la jurisdiccion y competencia de nuestros
tribunales es lo alegado en la querella (E. U. contra Mallari, 24 Jur. Fil., 378; Pueblo contra co
Hiok,1 R.G. No. 43154, Nov. 7, 1935; y Pueblo contra Velez, R.G. No. 41234, Agosto 31, 1934). Se
habla de affidavits en que, al parecer, se insinua que los mencionados rios estan compredidos en el
municipio de Panay; pero no solo dichos affidavits no forman parte de la querella, sino en todo caso
este punto constitutye materia de prueba y no cabe suscitarlo en un recurso especial como el que
nos ocupa. La impropriedad de este recurso salta a la vista si se tiene en cuenta la considerable
demora a que da lugar en el despacho de la causa principal. Si se hubiese seguido la vista en el
juzgado de paz, planteandose alli en forma de defensa la scuestiones suscitadas en el certiorari y
prohibicion que no ocupa (de todas maneras le hubiera cabido al acusado el derecho de apelar),
acaso la causa principal estaria terminada actualmente, y no como ahora que hay comenzar de
nuevo.
Por lo expuesto, se confirma la sentencia apelada, con las costas a cargo del recurrente-apelante.
Asi se ordena.
Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Padilla, y Tuason, MM., estan conformes.

Paras, J., concurs in the result.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
GR No. L-1779 June 29, 1948
JOSE A. ARCHES, appellant-appellant,

vs.
ANACLETO I. BELLASILLO and THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF CAPIZ, appealed-appealed.
Jose A. Arches in representation of the appellant-appellant.

The First Assistant Attorney General Mr. Roberto A. Gianzon and the Attorney Mr. Luis R. Feria in
representation of the appealed-appeals.
BRIONES, J .:
Against the appellant and appellant, Jose A. Arches, the provincial prosecutor of Capiz presented on
January 10, 1947 before the court of peace of the municipality of Capiz, head of the province, the
complaint that is transcribed below:
That in or about the year 1939 up to this date, in the municipality of Capiz, Province of Capiz,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, said accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously block the course of the Talaga River and Lacturan Creek - both
waterways are navigable and public domain-by constructing therein three dikes in the former
and another 3 dikes in the latter without authority from the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, thereby causing prejudice to the inhabitants of Tanza and Banica of said
municipality by obstructing their only shortest river passage from said neighborhoods to the
capital of Capiz. Contrary to law.
The accused presented motion to quash for two reasons: ( a ) because at first glance, reading the
complaint, the crime alleged in it and its penalty were presciritos; ( b ) because the justice of the
peace of the municipality of Capiz lacked jurisdiction over the cause, having committed the
infringement that was the subject of a complaint in the territorial understanding of the contiguous
municipality of Panay. The court dismissed the motion by default.
Almost immediately after the accused proceeded to initiate an action for certiorari prohibition, by
virtue of the same grounds, before the Court of First Instance, with equally adverse results. From the
judgment that dismisses the appeal has been filed the appeal we now have to decide.
It is clear that the appeal is entirely without merit. The defendant, deliberately and maliciously, blocks
and obstructs the course of the Talaga river and the Lacturan stream by means of the construction
of 3 dykes in the first and third dykes in the second, without authorization from the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, with serious prejudice to the inhabitants of the neighborhoods of
Tanza and Banica ..., "does not mean that the 4-year period for the appellant's prescription must be
made from the year 1939 in which, for the first time, the levees were apparently erected, in violation
of Commonwealth Law No. 383, which prohibits and punishes such acts of obstruction. The Attorney
General is correct in saying that it is a continuing infraction. While the levees are presently there,
obstructing the course of the river and the way it is treated, there is no solution of continuity, the
crime does not cease ; therefore, can hardly corner the period of prescription, which would take
place only since the crime was committed and finished. in other terms, the period of prescription
equals the emptiness that is created between the date of commission and consummation of the
crime and the date of its prosecution. The case would be different if it were stated in the complaint
that the levees existed up to that date obstructing the course of the rivers, and from that date until
the complaint had been made, the prescriptive period had elapsed.
The second ground of the dismissal motion is less meritorious yet. In the complaint it is categorically
and specifically stated that the infraction was committed within the jurisdiction of the municipality of
Capiz, and it is elementary that what determines the jurisdiction and jurisdiction of our courts is what
was alleged in the complaint (US v Mallari, 24 Jur. Ph., 378; Pueblo contra co Hiok, 1 RG No. 43154,
Nov. 7, 1935; and Pueblo contra Velez, RG No. 41234, August 31, 1934). There is talk of affidavits
in which, apparently, it is implied that the mentioned rivers are compredidos in the municipality of
Panay; but not only said affidavits are not part of the complaint, but in any case this point is a matter
of proof and can not be raised in a special appeal such as the one at hand. The inappropriateness of
this remedy is obvious if one takes into account the considerable delay to which it gives rise in the
dispatch of the main cause. If the hearing had been followed in the court of peace, the defense
raised the issues raised in the certiorari and prohibition that it does not occupy (the accused would
have been entitled to appeal anyway), perhaps the main cause would have been terminated now,
and not as now that there is a fresh start.
For the foregoing, the appellant judgment is upheld, with costs being borne by the appellant. That is
how it is commanded.
Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Padilla, and Tuason, MM., Are satisfied.
Paras, J., concurs in the result.
G.R. No. 214875, October 17, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARIELLAYAG
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS., Respondent.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 214875, October 17, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARIELLAYAG ACCUSED-

APPELLANTS., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
In a Resolution1 dated August 3, 2015 (August 3, 2015 Resolution), the Court adopted in toto the
Decision2 dated January 29, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05383 finding
accused-appellant Ariel Layag (Layag) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of Qualified Rape by
Sexual Intercourse, two (2) counts of Qualified Rape by Sexual Assault, and one (1) count of Acts of
Lasciviousness, the pertinent portion of which reads:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the January 29, 2014
Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. [CR-H.C.] No. 05383 and AFFIRMS said Decision finding accused appellant
Ariel Layag GUILTY eyond reasonable doubt of committing one (1) count of Qualified Rape by Sexual
Intercourse, as defined and penalized under Article 266-A paragraph 1 in relation to Article 266-B (1) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), two (2) counts of Qualified Rape by Sexual Assault, as defined and penalized
under paragraph 2, Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B (1) of the RPC, and one (1) count of Acts of
Lasciviousness, as defined and penalized under Article 336 of the RPC, WITH MODIFICATION as to the
award of damages, sentencing him to suffer the following penalties: (a) in Crim. Case No. 2007-9591-MK for
Qualified Rape by Sexual Intercourse, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole, and ordered to pay the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as
moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; (b) in Crim. Case Nos. 2007-9592-MK and 2007-
9593-MK for Qualified Rape by Sexual Assault, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for the
indeterminate period of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to pay the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count; and (c) in Crim.
Case No. 2007-9594-MK for Acts of Lasciviousness, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
for the indeterminate period of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum, and ordered to pay the amounts of P20,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. In addition, all monetary
awards shall earn legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum, to be reckoned from the date of finality of
this Resolution until full payment.3
Subsequently, the Court issued an Entry of Judgment4 dated October 14, 2015 declaring that the aforesaid
Resolution had already become final and executory. However, the Court received a Letter5dated July 18,
2016 from the Bureau of Corrections informing us of the death of accused appellant on July 30, 2015, as
evidenced by the Certificate of Death6 attached thereto.
In light of the foregoing circumstances, the Court is constrained to reopen the case despite the finality of the
August 3, 2015 Resolution. In Bigler v. People,7 the Court explained that it has the power to relax the
doctrine of immutability of judgment if, inter alia, there exists a special or compelling circumstance
warranting the same, viz.:
Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification
is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that
rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be
struck down. NVS.: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor, or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of
the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory; and (j) that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.8 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this case, Layag's death which occurred prior to the promulgation of the Resolution dated August 3, 2015
- a matter which the Court was belatedly informed of - clearly shows that there indeed exists a specfal or
compelling circumstance warranting the re-examination of the case despite its finality.
As will be explained hereunder, there is a need to reconsider and set aside said Resolution and enter a new
one dismissing the criminal cases against Layag.
Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, Layag's death prior to his final conviction by the Court renders
dismissible the criminal cases against him. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal
liability is totally extinguished by the death of the accused, to wit:
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxxx
In People v. Egagamao,9 the Court thoroughly explained the effects of the death of an accused pending
appeal on his liabilities, as follows:
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability[,] as well as
the civil liability[,] based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from
and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also
be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these
other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the
private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations
on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription. 10
Thus, upon Layag's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as
there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of
the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, it is
well to clarify that Layag's civil liability in connection with his acts against the victim, AAA, may be based on
sources other than delicts; in which case, AAA may file a separate civil action against the estate of Layag, as
may be warranted by law and procedural rules.11 chan roble slaw
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to: (a) SET ASIDE the Court's Resolution dated August 3, 2015 in
connection with this case; (b) DISMISS Crim. Case Nos. 2007-9591-MK, 2007-9592-MK, 2007-9593-MK,
and 2007-9594-MK before the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 156 by reason of the death of
accused-appellant Ariel Layag; and (c) DECLARE the instant case CLOSED and TERMINATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin,and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

GR. No. 196735, August 03, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANILO FELICIANO,
JR., JULIUS VICTOR MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA, WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, AND ROBERT MICHAEL
BELTRAN PROMULGATED: ALVIR, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS., Respondent.
SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION
GR. No. 196735, August 03, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANILO FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR

MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA, WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, AND ROBERT MICHAEL BELTRAN
PROMULGATED: ALVIR, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Even as the judiciary strives to bring justice to victims of fraternity-related violence, the violence continues
to thrive in universities across the country. Mere weeks after our Decision dated May 5, 2014 was
promulgated, various news agencies reported the death of an 18-year-old student of De La Salle-College of
St. Benilde.1 The death was allegedly caused by hazing.
While this Court is powerless to end this madness, it can, at the very least, put an end to its impunity.
This resolves the separate Motions for Reconsideration of our Decision dated May 5, 2014, which were filed
by accused-appellants Christopher Soliva (Soliva),2 Warren L. Zingapan (Zingapan),3 and Robert Michael
Beltran Alvir (Alvir).4 cha nrob leslaw
To recall, we affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision5 dated November 26, 2010 finding accused-appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the murder of Dennis Venturina. However, we modified its finding that
accused-appellants were only guilty of slight physical injuries in relation to private complainants Leandro
Lachica, Cristobal Gaston, Jr., and Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. Instead, we upheld the trial court's
Decision6 dated February 28, 2002, which found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
attempted murder of private complainants Leandro Lachica (Lachica), Arnel Fortes (Fortes), Mervin Natalicio
(Natalicio), Cristobal Gaston, Jr. (Gaston), and Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. (Mangrobang, Jr.).
Alvir, Zingapan, and Soliva separately filed their Motions for Reconsideration on-July 1, 2014, July 2, 2014,
and July 9, 2014, respectively. The Office of the Solicitor General was directed to file a Consolidated
Comment on these Motions.7 chan robles law
Atty. Estelito Mendoza, counsel for Zingapan, through a letter8 dated May 22, 2014, requested information
on the composition of the Division trying this case. At that time, our May 5, 2014 Decision was not yet
published in the Supreme Court website. Atty. Estelito Mendoza's request was denied9 under Rule 7, Section
3 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court,10 which mandates that results of a raffle, including the
composition of the Division, are confidential in eriminal cases where the trial court imposes capital
punishment.
Undaunted, Zingapan moved to elevate the case to this Court En Bane.11 The Motion was denied for lack of
merit.12cha nrob leslaw
On November 10, 2014, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Consolidated Comment13 on the Motions
for Reconsideration.
Meanwhile, Alvir moved for modification of judgment,14 arguing on his innocence and praying for his
acquittal.
The only issue to be resolved is whether accused-appellants presented substantial arguments in their
Motions for Reconsideration as to warrant the reversal of this Court's May 5, 2014 Decision.
Soliva argues that his conviction was merely based on private complainant Natalicio's sole testimony, which
he alleges was doubtful and inconsistent.15 He points out that prosecution witness Ernesto Paolo Tan (Tan)
was able to witness the attack on Natalicio, but was unable to identify him as the attacker.16 chanro bleslaw
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that Natalicio's testimony was sufficient to
identify Soliva.17 It argues that Tan's testimony did not contradict Natalicio's testimony since Tan was able
to state that he saw the assailants who were not masked, though he did not know their names.18 chanrobles law
The testimony of a single witness, as long as it is credible and positive, is enough to prove the guilt of an
accused beyond reasonable doubt.19 chan robles law
Soliva argues that Natalicio was not able to identify his attackers since he was seen by Tan" lying face down
as he was being attacked. On the contrary, Natalicio's and Tan's testimonies were consistent as to Natalicio's
position during the attack. Natalicio testified: Cha nRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
Q With respect to the first group that attacked you, Mr. Natalicio, while
they were beating you up, what else if anything happened?
A I was able to recognize two (2) among those [sic] first group of
attackers.
COURT
What group, first group?
....
A While I was parrying their blows, two (2) of these attackers had no
mask, they had no mask anymore.
....
Q So, Mr. Natalicio, who were these two (2) men that you recognized?
A They were Warren Zingapan and Christopher Soliva.20
Cross-examination
Q Imagine, Mr. Witness, there were ten (10) people ganging up on you,
you stood up, faced them, just like that?
A Yes.
Q You did not cover your head with your arms as they were pounding
on you?
A Not yet. When I was standing up, no. I was parrying their blows. I
covered my head when I fell down already, because I was defenseless
already.
Q And there were people [who] attacked you from behind?
A When I was standing up, none.
Q All of them were in froRt of you?
A Front, yes.21
Natalicio explained that he was attacked twice. During the first attack, he tried to stand up and was able to
identify two (2) of his attackers. He fell to the ground when he was attacked the second time. This is
consistent with Tan's testimony, where he stated: ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry
A During the second waive [sic], your honor, [Natalicio] tried to get up
but immediately after the first waive [sic] another group of persons
attacked, your honor.
COURT
Q When he tried to get up, he was still facing the ground?
A He was a bit tilted, your honor. He was no longer lying face down or
"nakadapa, " your honor.22 (Emphasis supplied)
Soliva also misconstrues Tan's testimony that he could not identify Natalicio's attackers. Tan testified: ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
Q You stated that while you were inside the beach house canteen
observing the events outside thru the door and in that couple of
seconds, you could not establish the identity of persons, is it not?
A I could see them although I do not know their names.23 (Emphasis

supplied)
Tan failed to identify the attackers only because he did not know their names. His testimony corroborates
Natalicio's testimony that some of the attackers were masked and some were not,24although Tan could not
identify them because he was not familiar with their names.
Tan was a fourth year student of the University of the Philippines College of Business Administration at the
time of the incident. He was not part of the Sigma Rho Fraternity and was merely one of the students eating
at Beach House Canteen on December 8, 1994.25 cralaw redc hanro bleslaw
Another witness, Darwin Asuncion (Asuncion), was a third year student at the University of the Philippines
and was also at Beach House Canteen during the incident.26 He testified that some attackers were wearing
masks while some were not.27 On cross-examination, he stated: ChanRoblesVirtualawli bra ry
Q And many of these people who were in beach house canteen who
were there to probably eat or probably lining up to eat were not
wearing mask? [sic]
A Yes sir.
Q And there is a great possibility that you could have mistaken the
unmasked people as part of the attacking group?
A No sir.
Q Why?
A Because they were carrying lead pipes and baseball bats

sir.28 (Emphasis supplied)
Asuncion's testimony corroborates that of defense witness Frisco Capilo, who testified that before the
incident, the attackers were wearing masks, but after the incident, he saw some wearing masks and some
who did not.29chan robles law
Alvir argues that Lachica's identification of him was "uncorroborated and hazy."30 He argues that Lachica
admitted that while he was attacked, he covered his head with his forearms, which created doubt that he
was able to see his attackers. He argues that Lachica's statement that he was still able to raise his head
while parrying blows was impossible. Alvir also argues that when Lachica ran away and looked back at the
scene of the crime, Lachica was only able to identify Julius Victor Medalla (Medalla) and Zingapan.31 chanroble slaw
It is in line with human experience that even while Lachica was parrying the blows, he would strive to
identify his attackers. As has been previously stated by this Court: ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry
It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the looks and faces of their
assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the face of the assailant
and body movements thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from their
memory.32
Lachica clearly and categorically identified Alvir as one of his attackers: ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary
Q And during these attacks of these five (5) men and according to you,
you were parrying their blows, what happened?
A At that time, one of the mask [sic] of those who attacked us fell off
and I was able to recognize one of them.
Q Who did you recognize whose mask fell?
A He was Mike Alvir.33

Alvir also misinterprets Lachica's testimony that Lachica was unable to see Alvir as he was running away.
Lachica testified: ChanRoble sVirtualawl ibra ry
Q What happened after as you said you parried the blows of the men
who attacked you and you recognized one of them to be Mike Alvir.
What happened next?
A As I said, I was able to elude these five armed men and run towards
the College of Education and prior to reaching the College of
Education, I tried to look back.
Q And what happened when you looked back?
A I was able to see also, identify two more of them. Two of the
attackers.
Q Who are these persons?
A Warren Zingapan and Victor Medalla.34 (Emphasis supplied)

Lachica testified that he was able to identify Alvir while he was being attacked. When Lachica ran away and
looked back at the scene of the crime, he was also able to identify two (2) more of the attackers, Zingapan
and Medalla. He did not deny seeing Alvir, but only added that he was able to identify two (2) more people.
U
Accused-appellants were positively identified by private complainants. Private complainants' testimonies

were clear and categorical. On this issue, we find no cogent reason to reverse our May 5, 2014 Decision.
II
Zingapan's main argument hinges on the sufficiency of the Information filed against him, which, he argues,
violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.35 His
arguments, however, have already been sufficiently addressed in our May 5, 2014 Decision.
For an information to be sufficient, Rule 110, Section 6 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that it
state:ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry
the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
The purpose of alleging all the circumstances attending a crime, including any circumstance that may
aggravate the accused's liability, is for the accused to be able to adequately prepare for his or her
defense: ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry
To discharge its burden of informing him of the charge, the State must specify in the information the details
of the crime and any circumstance that aggravates his liability for the crime. The requirement of sufficient
factual averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the charge against him in order
to enable him to prepare his defense. It emanates from the presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant
to which he is always presumed to have no independent knowledge of the details of the crime he is being
charged with. To have the facts stated in the body of the information determine the crime of which he
stands charged and for which he must be tried thoroughly accords with common sense and with the
requirements of plain justice[.]36 (Emphasis supplied)
Here, the aggravating circumstance of "masks and/or other forms of disguise"37 was alleged in the
Informations to enable the prosecution to establish that the attackers intended to conceal their identities.
Once this is established, the prosecution needed to prove how the witnesses were able to ft identify the
attackers despite the concealment of identity. In our May 5, X 2014 Decision: ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry
In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the accused to
remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused were
masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an aggravating
circumstance. What is important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was
a concealment of identity by the accused. The inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore,
enough to sufficiently apprise the accused that in the commission of the offense they were being charged
with, they tried to conceal their identity.38 (Emphasis in the original)
To recall, the Information for murder filed against accused-appellants reads: ChanRoble sVirtualawli bra ry
That on or about the 8th day of December 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise, conspiring, confederating with other persons whose true
names, identities and whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained, and mutually helping one another,
with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, and with evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior
strength, armed with baseball bats, lead pipes, and cutters, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of DENNIS F. VENTURINA, by then
and there hitting him on the head and clubbing him on different parts of his body thereby inflicting upon him
serious and mortal injuries which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of said DENNIS F. VENTURINA.39
Zingapan was sufficiently informed that he was being charged with the death of Dennis Venturina,
committed through the circumstances provided.
Based on this Information, Zingapan's counsel was able to formulate his defense, which was that of alibi. He
was able to allege that he was not at Beach House Canteen at the time of the incident because he was
having lunch with his cousin's husband in Kamuning.40 His defense had nothing to do with whether he might
or might not have been wearing a mask during the December 8, 1994 incident since his main defense was
that he was not there at all.
Zingapan's right to be informed of the cause or nature of the accusation against him was not violated. The
inclusion of the aggravating circumstance of disguise in the Informations did not prevent him from
presenting his defense of alibi.
III
Accused-appellants argue that the testimony of University of the Philippines Police Officers Romeo Cabrera
(Cabrera) and Oscar Salvador (Salvador) and Dr. Carmen Mislang (Dr. Mislang) from the University of the
Philippines Infirmary should have been given credibility by this Court.41 They also insist that the victims'
delay in reporting the incident casts doubt in their credibility as witnesses.42Unfortunately, these arguments
fail to persuade.
Natalicio testified that he was unable to answer the queries of Cabrera and Salvador since he was more
concerned with his injuries and the injuries of his companions.43 He also denied that Dr. Mislang questioned
him on the identity of his attackers.44
chanrob leslaw
Even if it were true that Natalicio denied knowing his attackers when he was interviewed by Cabrera,
Salvador, and Dr. Mislang, it did not cast doubt on accused-appellants' guilt. The conditions prevailing within
the campus at the time of the incident must also be taken into account.
At the time of the incident, the University of the Philippines-Diliman had an existing policy that all students
involved in fraternity rumbles would be expelled.45 Cabrera, Salvador, and Dr. Mislang were employees of
the University.46 Reporting the incident as a fraternity rumble was risking expulsion.47 chan robles law
The investigation conducted by the University of the Philippines Police was met with the same difficulty,
since the witnesses interviewed were reluctant to speak on fraternity matters: ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry
As of this date, operatives of the UP Diliman Police have already interviewed sixty (60) persons, twenty five
(25) of them mostly students, refused to comment or to give their names. Most of those who refused to
comment said that they don't want to get involved in fraternity matters[.]48 (Emphasis supplied)
Under these circumstances, private complainants chose to report the matter to the National Bureau of
Investigation as an ordinary crime rather than to report it to school authorities. The University would have
treated the matter as a fraternity-related campus incident where all parties involved, including private
complainants who were also fraternity members, risk academic sanctions. At that time, private complainants
decided that reporting to the National Bureau of Investigation, rather than to university officials, was the
more prudent course of action.
The alleged delay in reporting the crime also does not cast doubt on private complainants' credibility. The
trial court stated: ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
[O]n the evening of December 8, 1994, the victims, upon the advice of their senior fraternity brothers, had
agreed that the NBI would handle the investigation. This was reached during the fellowship of the Sigma
Rho brothers in a racetrack in Makati which Lachica and Gaston attended. Lachica preferred the NBI because
he wanted a thorough investigation in view of the gravity of the offense.
So, on the very next day, December 9, 1994, the Vice Grand Archon, Redentor Guerrero, went to the NBI
and inquired about the procedure in filing a complaint. Thereafter, their then Grand Archon Jovy Bernabe,
with Redentor Guerrero, informed them that they would be going to the NBI together. They were advised to
rest and told that they would just be informed when they would go to the NBI. On the 11th, the two
informed them that they would go to the NBI the next day and they did.49
The incident happened on a Thursday. On the evening of the incident, private complainants agreed that they
would report the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation. On Friday, December 9, 1994, they were
advised by their senior fraternity brothers to recuperate first from their injuries while their Grand Archon
and Vice Grand Archon went to the National Bureau of Investigation to inquire on the procedure. They could
not report the incident on December 10 and 11, 1994 because this was a Saturday and a Sunday. They
were able to report to the National Bureau of Investigation on December 12, 1994, the Monday following the
incident.50cha nrob leslaw
The alleged delay in reporting was caused by the gravity of private complainants' injuries, their desire to
report to the proper authorities, and the weekend. These circumstances are not enough to disprove their
credibility as witnesses.
Soliva also takes exception to this Court's characterization that the University of the Philippines Police have
become desensitized to fraternity-related violence.51 chan roble slaw
It is not disputed that the University of the Philippines has served as a common battleground for fraternity-
related violence. In 2007, GMA News compiled a list of casualties of fraternity-related violence at the
University of the Philippines.52 Six (6) students were reported to have died from fraternity-related violence
before the December 8, 1994 incident at Beach House Canteen.
Even after the promulgation of our May 5, 2014 Decision, fraternity-related violence remained prevalent
within the University. On July 4, 2014, the Office of the Chancellor issued a statement confirming another
fraternity-related incident involving students of the University.53 Another fraternity rumble was reported to
have occurred on university grounds.54 Although no casualties were reported in both incidents, these
incidents only amplify the reality that fraternity-related violence continues to be rampant within the
University.
The presence of the University of the Philippines Police or the severe sanctions imposed by university
officials have done little to deter these crimes. The frequency of these incidents has become the University's
cultural norm, where its students—and even university employees—simply regard it as part of university life.
IV
Alvir argues that this Court erred in finding conspiracy among all the accused since the trial court acquitted
those who were identified by Mangrobang, Jr.55 This argument, however, is non sequitur.
The trial court, in acquitting the other accused, stated: ChanRobles Virtuala wlibra ry
The foregoing should not be misinterpreted to mean that the testimony of Mangrobang was an absolute
fabrication. The Court is not inclined to make such a declaration. The four accused were exonerated merely
because they were afforded the benefit of the doubt as their identification by Mangrobang, under tumultuous
and chaotic circumstances were not corroborated and their alibis, not refuted.56
In contrast, Lachica's identification of Alvir was given credibility by the trial court.57 Alvir's alibi was also
found to be weak.58 chanroble slaw
Conspiracy does not require that all persons charged in the information be found guilty. It only requires that
those who were found guilty conspired in committing the crime. The acquittal of some of the accused does
not necessarily preclude the presence of conspiracy.
Of the 10 accused in the Informations, four59 (4) were acquitted. The trial court was convinced that they
were not present during the commission of the crime. Conspiracy cannot attach to those who were not
properly identified.
However, Alvir, Zingapan, Soliva, Medalla, and Danilo Feliciano, Jr. (Feliciano) were positively identified by
eyewitnesses before the trial court. The prosecution's evidence was enough to convince the trial court, the
Court of Appeals, and this Court that they were present during the December 8, 1994 incident and that they
committed the crime charged in the Informations. We have also exhaustively examined the evidence on
hand, as well as the assessments of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals, to determine that all five (5)
of them conspired to commit the crimes with which they were charged. The trial court's acquittal of some of
those charged in the Informations has no bearing on our finding that Alvir, Zingapan, Soliva, Feliciano, and
Medalla are guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Soliva, however, argues that our May 5, 2014 Decision did not apply to those who did not appeal to this
Court, namely: Feliciano and Medalla.60 At this point, a re-examination of the rules of appeal in criminal
cases may be in order.
To recall the procedural incidents in this case, the trial court's Decision61 dated February 28, 2002 found
Alvir, Zingapan, Soliva, Feliciano, and Medalla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the murder of Dennis
Venturina and the attempted murder of Lachica, Fortes, Natalicio,
Gaston, and Mangrobang, Jr.62 They were meted the death penalty, and the case was brought to this Court
on automatic review.63 cha nrob leslaw
In view, however, of People v. Mateo64 and the Amended Rules to Govern Review of Death Penalty
Cases,65 this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for review. A notice of appeal in this instance
was unnecessary. Rule 122, Sections 3(d) and 10 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, state:
RULE 122
APPEAL
SEC. 3. How appeal taken.—
....
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the Regional Trial Court imposed the death penalty. The
Court of Appeals shall automatically review the judgment as provided in Section 10 of this Rule. (3a)
SEC. 10. Transmission of records in case of death penalty. —In all cases where the death penalty is imposed
by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Court of Appeals for automatic review and
judgment within twenty days but not earlier than fifteen days from the promulgation of the judgment or
notice of denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten
days after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court of Appeals was mandated to review the case with regard to all five (5) of the accused, now
referred to as accused-appellants, regardless of whether they filed a notice of appeal. The review is
considered automatic.
During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, Congress enacted Republic Act No.
9346,66 which prohibited courts from imposing the death penalty. In its November 26, 2010 Decision,67the
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that accused-appellants were guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the murder of Dennis Venturina. In view of the proscription on death penalty, the Court of Appeals
modified the imposable penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.68 chan roble slaw
However, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants were likewise
guilty of attempted murder with regards Lachica, Mangrobang, Jr., and Gaston.69 It stated that the gravity
of their injuries was not indicative of accused-appellants' intent to kill.70 Instead, the Court of Appeals
modified the offense to slight physical injuries.71 In other words, it found accused-appellants guilty of the
murder of Dennis Venturina, the attempted murder of Fortes and Natalicio, and the slight physical injuries of
Lachica, Mangrobang, Jr., and Gaston.72 chanrobles law
Only three (3)—namely: Soliva, Alvir, and Zingapan—of the five (5) accused-appellants filed their respective
Notices of Appeal before this Court. The Court of Appeals forwarded the records of the case to this Court,
and the entire case was again opened for review under Rule 124, Section 13(b) and (c) of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure:
RULE 124
SEC. 13. Certification or appeal of case to the Supreme Court.—
(b) Where the judgment also imposes a lesser penalty for offenses committed on the same occasion or
which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more severe offense for which the penalty of
death is imposed, and the accused appeals, the appeal shall be included in the case certified for review to,
the Supreme Court.
(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it
shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme
Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)
In our May 5, 2014 Decision,73 we reversed the Court of Appeals' modification of the offense from attempted
murder to slight physical injuries.74 We explained that the liabilities of accused-appellants arose from a
single incident where the intent to kill was already evident from the first swing of the bat, and that intent
was shared by all when the presence of conspiracy was proven. In effect, we affirmed the trial court's ruling
that accused-appellants were guilty of the attempted murder of Lachica, Fortes, Natalicio, Gaston, and
Mangrobang, Jr.75 chanroble slaw
According to Article 24876 in relation to Article 5177 of the Revised Penal Code, attempted murder is
punishable by prision mayor. Slight physical injuries, on the other hand, is punishable by arresto menor. The
Court of Appeals, in modifying the offenses with regard to victims Lachica, Gaston, and Mangrobang,
Jr., lowered some of the imposable penalties of accused-appellants. On appeal to this Court, however, we
reverted to the findings of the trial court and brought back the higher offense of attempted murder. In this
instance, the application of the higher penalty to accused-appellants becomes problematic when only three
(3) of them actually appealed to this Court.
The problem lies with the effect of the prohibition of death penalty on the current rules on appeal in the
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The amendments introduced in the Amended Rules to Govern Review of Death
Penalty Cases still stand even if, as this Court has previously mentioned, "death penalty cases are no longer
operational."78 chanro bleslaw
In People v. Rocha,79 this Court encountered a similar problem. The issue for resolution was whether the
accused's Motion to Withdraw Appeal before this Court could be granted if the Court of Appeals imposed a
penalty of reclusion perpetual80 The People were of the opinion that the appeal could not be withdrawn since
this Court was mandated by the Constitution to review all cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher.81 c hanro bles law
However, this Court ruled that the appeal could still be withdrawn as cases where the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or higher is not subject to this Court's mandatory review. Thus: ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry
The confusion in the case at bar seems to stem from the effects of the Decision of this Court in People v.
Mateo. In Mateo, as quoted by plaintiff-appellee, it was stated that "[w]hile the Fundamental Law requires a
mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed an intermediate review." A closer study
of Mateo, however, reveals that the inclusion in the foregoing statement of cases where the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment was only for the purpose of including these cases within the
ambit of the intermediate review of the Court of Appeals: "[this] Court now deems it wise and compelling to
provide in these cases [cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death]
review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court."
We had not intended to pronounce in Mateo that cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment are subject to the mandatory review of this Court. In Mateo, these cases were grouped
together with death penalty cases because, prior to Mateo, it was this Court which had jurisdiction to directly
review reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment and death penalty cases alike. The mode of review, however,
was different. Reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment cases were brought before this Court via a notice of
appeal, while death penalty cases were reviewed by this Court on automatic review.
....
After the promulgation of Mateo on 7 June 2004, this Court promptly caused the amendment of the
foregoing provisions, but retained the distinction of requiring a notice of appeal for reclusion perpetua and
life imprisonment cases and automatically reviewing death penalty cases. .
Neither does the Constitution require a mandatory review by this Court of cases where the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. The constitutional provision quoted in Mateo merely gives this
Court jurisdiction over such cases[.]
....
Since the case of accused-appellants is not subject to the mandatory review of this Court, the rule that
neither the accused nor the courts can waive a mandatory review is not applicable. Consequently, accused-
appellants' separate motions to withdraw appeal may be validly granted.82 (Emphasis supplied)
Here, the trial court's ruling mandated an automatic review and the case was forwarded to the Court of
Appeals per Mateo and the Amended Rules to Govern Review of Death Penalty Cases. As the death penalty
was abolished during the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the highest penalty the Court
of Appeals could impose was reclusion perpetua. Any review of the Court of Appeals Decision by this Court
will never be mandatory or automatic.
In effect, while we can review the case in its entirety and examine its merits, we cannot disturb the
penalties imposed by the Court of Appeals on those who did not appeal, namely, Feliciano and Medalla. This
is consistent with Rule 122, Section 1 l(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure:
RULE 122
APPEAL
SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. —
(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except
insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter[.]
As our May 5, 2014 Decision was unfavorable to accused-appellants, those who did not appeal must not be
affected by our judgment. The penalty of arresto menor imposed by the Court of Appeals on Feliciano and
Medalla in Criminal Case Nos. Q95-61134, Q95-61135, and Q95-61136 stands.
In view, however, of People v. Jugueta83 the damages previously awarded must also be increased. In
Jugueta, we stated that "civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a fine; hence, it can be increased by
[this] Court when appropriate."84 We also explained that the Civil Code did not fix the amount of moral
damages, exemplary damages, and temperate damages that may be awarded; thus, the amount is within
this Court's discretion to determine.85 cha nro bleslaw
In Criminal Case No. Q95-61133, the award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages are
increased to P100,000.00,86 respectively. The amount of temperate damages to be awarded is increased to
P50,000.00.87 In Criminal Cases Nos. Q95-61134, Q95-61135, Q95-61136, O95-61137, and Q95-61138, the
award of moral damages and exemplary damages are increased to P50,000.00,88respectively.
Soliva takes exception to this Court's statements on fraternity culture and argued that these have no basis
on facts or evidence.89 Unfortunately, our May 5, 2014 Decision was not the first time that this Court
expressed its sentiments on the issue of fraternity-related violence.
In Villareal v. People,90 this Court found five (5) promising young men guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
reckless impudence resulting in homicide for the death of Lenny Villa, an Ateneo law student and a neophyte
of Aquila Legis Fraternity. This Court could only lament on accused-appellants' fate and the senseless loss of
life in the name of a so-called "brotherhood," stating: ChanRoblesVi rtualaw lib rary
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly — or unwittingly — impose the misery of hazing and employ
appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There must be a better way to establish "kinship." A neophyte
admitted that he joined the fraternity to have more friends and to avail himself of the benefits it offered,
such as tips during bar examinations. Another initiate did not give up, because he feared being looked down
upon as a quitter, and because he felt he did not have a choice. Thus, for Lenny Villa and the other
neophytes, joining the Aquila Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By giving consent under the
circumstances, they left their fates in the hands of the fraternity members. Unfortunately, the hands to
which lives were entrusted were barbaric as they were reckless.91 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the blind loyalty held by fraternity members to their "brothers" defies logic or reason.
In People v. Colana,92 an innocent college student, Librado De la Vega (De la Vega), became collateral
damage between two rival fraternities in Far Eastern University. When De la Vega passed Phi Lambda
Epsilon officer Leonardo Colana's (Colana) group on his way to school, the head of Colana's fraternity told
him that De la Vega was a member of Alpha Kappa Rho, their rival fraternity. The group approached De la
Vega as Colana, armed with an ice pick, stabbed De la Vega repeatedly. They left De la Vega on the street
to die.
On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court's finding that Colana was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder, stating that "[m]otive for the killing was revenge. On a prior occasion some members of the Epsilon
fraternity were beaten allegedly by members of the Alpha fraternity."93 chanrobles law
This Court likewise briefly mentioned the senselessness of De la Vega's death: ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary
What is lamentable is that De la Vega was not an FEU student, much less a member of the Alpha fraternity.
He used to be an engineering student at the Feati University. At the time of his death, he was studying
typing.94
Death or injuries caused by fraternity rumbles are not treated as separate or distinct crimes, unlike deaths
or injuries as a result of hazing. They are punishable as ordinary crimes of murder, homicide, or physical
injuries under the Revised Penal Code.
The prosecution of fraternity-related violence, however, is harder than the prosecution of ordinary crimes.
Most of the time, the evidence is merely circumstantial. The reason is obvious: loyalty to the fraternity
dictates that brods do not turn on their brods. A crime can go unprosecuted for as long as the brotherhood
remains silent.
Perhaps the best person to explain fraternity culture is one of its own. Raymund Narag was among those
charged in this case but was eventually acquitted by the trial court. In 2009, he wrote a blog entry outlining
the culture and practices of a fraternity, referring to the fraternity system as "a big black hole that sucks
these young promising men to their graves."95 This, of course, is merely his personal opinion on the matter.
However, it is illuminating to see a glimpse of how a fraternity member views his disillusionment of an
organization with which he voluntarily associated. In particular, he writes that: ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry
The fraternities anchor their strength on secrecy. Like the Sicilian code of omerta, fraternity members are
bound to keep the secrets from the non-members. They have codes and symbols the frat members alone
can understand. They know if there are problems in campus by mere signs posted in conspicuous places.
They have a different set [sic] of communicating, like inverting the spelling of words, so that ordinary
conversations cannot be decoded by non-members.
It takes a lot of acculturation in order for frat members to imbibe the code of silence. The members have to
be a mainstay of the tambayan to know the latest developments about new members and the activities of
other frats. Secrets are even denied to some members who are not really in to [sic] the system. They have
to earn a reputation to be part of the inner sanctum. It is a form of giving premium to become the "true blue
member".
The code of silence reinforces the feeling of elitism. The fraternities are worlds of their own. They are
sovereign in their existence. They have their own myths, conceptualization of themselves and worldviews.
Save perhaps to their alumni association, they do not recognize any authority aside from the head of the
fraternity.96
The secrecy that surrounds the traditions and practices of a fraternity becomes problematic on an
evidentiary level as there are no set standards from which a fraternity-related crime could be measured.
In People v. Gilbert Peralta,97 this Court could not consider a fraternity member's testimony biased without
any prior testimony on fraternity behavior:ChanRoble sVirtualawl ibra ry
Esguerra testified that as a fraternity brother he would do anything and everything for the victim. A witness
may be said to be biased when his relation to the cause or to the parties is such that he has an incentive to
exaggerate or give false color or pervert the truth, or to state what is false. To impeach a biased witness,
the counsel must lay the proper foundation of the bias by asking the witness the facts constituting the bias.
In the case at bar, there was no proper impeachment by bias of the three (3) prosecution
witnesses. Esguerra's testimony that he would do anything for his fellow brothers was too broad and general
so as to constitute a motive to lie before the trial court. Counsel for the defense failed to propound questions
regarding the tenets of the fraternity that espouse absolute fealty of the members to each other. The
question was phrased so as to ask only for Esguerra's personal conviction[.]98 (Emphasis supplied)
The inherent difficulty in the prosecution of fraternity-related violence forces the judiciary to be more
exacting in examining all the evidence on hand, with due regard to the peculiarities of the circumstances. In
this instance, we have thoroughly reviewed the arguments presented by accused-appellants in their Motions
for Reconsideration and have weighed them against the evidence on hand. Unfortunately, their Motions have
not given us cause to reconsider our May 5, 2014 Decision.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to DENY with FINALITY the Motions for Reconsideration, both dated July
1, 2014, of accused-appellants Robert Michael Beltran Alvir and Warren L. Zingapan. The Motion for
Modification of Judgment dated October 30, 2014 filed by accused-appellant Robert Michael Beltran Alvir
is DENIED.
The Motion for Reconsideration of accused-appellant Christopher Soliva, however, is PARTLY GRANTED.
Judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED as follows: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
(1) In Criminal Case No. Q95-61133, accused-appellants Robert Michael

Beltran Alvir, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor
Medalla, and Warren L. Zingapan are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and are sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, without parole.
In addition, the accused-appellants are ordered to jointly and

severally pay the heirs of Dennis Venturina the following amounts:
(a) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(b) PI39,642.70 as actual damages;
(c) P5 0,000.00 as temperate damages;
(d) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
(e) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
(2) In Criminal Cases No. Q95-61134, Q95-61135, Q95-61136, Q95-

61137, and Q95-61138, accused-appellants Robert Michael Beltran
Alvir, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor Medalla,
and Warren L. Zingapan are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of attempted murder.
Accused-appellants Robert Michael Beltran Alvir, Christopher Soliva, and Warren L. Zingapan are sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, six (6) months, and one (1) day of prision
correctional as minimum and twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum. A
Danilo Feliciano, Jr. and Julius Victor Medalla are sentenced to suffer arresto menor, or thirty (30) days of
imprisonment.
In addition, all accused-appellants are ordered to jointly and severally pay private complainants Leonardo
Lachica, Cesar Mangrobang-Jr., Cristobal Gaston, Jr., Mervin Natalicio, and Arnel Fortes the following
amounts: ChanRoblesVi rtualaw lib rary
(a) P50,000.00 as moral damages; and

(b) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Accused-appellants Robert Michael Beltran Alvir, Christopher Soliva, and Warren L. Zingapan are additionally
ordered to jointly and severally pay private complainant Mervin Natalicio P820.50 as actual damages.
All awards of damages shall earn 6% legal interest per annum from the finality of this judgment until its full
satisfaction.
SO ORDERED. chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry
Sereno, C.J.,* Del Castillo,*** and Perez,**** JJ., concur.

Peralta, J., (Acting Chairperson),** I dissent and maintain my original opinion.

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Crim Rev Atty Diwa Part 1 80-85

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CRIM REV ATTY DIWA PART 1 80-85

Jeross Romano Aguilar

79. P vs. Deliola GR 200157 Aug 13 2016

MICHAEL PADUA, G.R. No. 168546

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:

During the pre-trial conference on February 2, 2004, however, Paduas counsel

No subsidiary imprisonment, however, shall be imposed should [the]

On April 6, 2004, Chief Probation and Parole Officer Josefina J. Pasana

In the aforesaid PSIR, Senior PPO Teodoro Villaverde recommended that

More importantly, while the provisions of R.A. 9165, particularly Section

Sec. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Probation filed by

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing public respondent,

Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 38[37] of Rep. Act No.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated April

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. Nos. 169823-24 September 11, 2013

HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner,

G.R. Nos. 174764-65

HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner,

The accusatory portions of the informations read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 28001

Criminal Case No. 28002

A. THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THEOFFENSES

1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITRULED THAT

2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITASSUMED

B. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH SUCH GRAVEABUSE OF DISCRETION

1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE

2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE

3. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE POINT

C. BY MERELY ASSUMING THE PRESENCE OF GLARINGLYABSENT ELEMENTS IN

D. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION IN

The petition for certiorari has no merit.

Sandiganbayan has exclusive and

original jurisdiction over the offenses charged

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the

The offenses charged in the

The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case is instructive, thus:

The informations were sufficient in form and substance

Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is sufficient if it

[G.R. No. 121683. March 26, 1998]

CORNELIO B. BAUTISTA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-1779 June 29, 1948

JOSE A. ARCHES, recurrente-apelante,

Jose A. Arches en representacion del recurrente-apelante.

Contra el recurrente y apelante, Jose A. Arches, el fiscal provincial de Capiz presento el 10 de

Casi inmediatamente depues el acusado procedio a incoar un recurso de certiorari prohibicion, en

El segundo fundamento de la mocion de sobreseimiento es menos meritorio todavia. En la querella

Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Padilla, y Tuason, MM., estan conformes.

Republic of the Philippines

GR No. L-1779 June 29, 1948

JOSE A. ARCHES, appellant-appellant,

Jose A. Arches in representation of the appellant-appellant.

G.R. No. 214875, October 17, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARIELLAYAG ACCUSED-

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary

Sereno, C.J.,* Del Castillo,* and Perez,** JJ., concur.