The Strategy & Tactics of World War II

Number 3

The Bulge
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 contents

Number 3 Features
Dec/Jan 2009
6 The Battle of the Bulge: The Reich’s Last Chance
Publisher: Christopher Cummins Adolph Hitler launches the Reich’s last great offensive in the
Editor: Ty Bomba West—but did it actually have a chance to stop the Allies?
Assistant Editor: Joseph Miranda by Joseph Miranda
Copy Editors: Jason Burnett, Jon Cecil, and Dav
Vandenbroucke.
Design • Graphics • Layout: Callie Cummins
Map Graphics: Meridian Mapping

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should be sent to World at War after that time, to P.O. Box 20 The Battle of the Cherkassy Pocket
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On the Eastern Front, the Red Army surrounds several Ger-
World at War (©2008) reserves all rights on the contents of man divisions as the Wehrmacht races to rescue them.
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4 #3

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 The Strategy & Tactics of World War II

contents

Departments
41 I Remember: 19 mega feedback results
The Dyhernfurth Raid, Silesia, 1945
As the Third Reich comes crashing down in ruin, the 33 Observation Post
Germans launch a desperate raid with its target a On the Seas:
nerve gas factory. Japanese Theater Strategy & Transport
by Joachim-Karl Scholz Shipping, 1944
John Whitman
Elite Beat:
Franco’s Internationals:
Foreign Volunteers in the Nationalist
Army
Javier Romero Munoz
Strategic Backwaters:
Germany’s Assault on Kos
Carl Otis Schuster
Mysteries Revealed:
Mexico in World War II
Blaine Taylor
Technology Backdate:
The Lexington-Class Carriers
48 All the Way Went LBJ Russell Jennings
A future president of the United States takes a com-
bat tour of the South Pacific in the desperate days of
1942.
by Kelly Bell
Rules
56 Soviet Army Organization, 1942-45
The Red Army rises from the ashes with war-winning R1 The Bulge
tank and mechanized corps. by Ty Bomba
by Joseph Miranda
World at War 5

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 The Battle of the Bulge:
The Reich’s Last Chance
by Joseph Miranda
As
1944 ended, the military situation
looked disastrous for the Third
Reich. In the west the Allies had
landed in France and advanced to
the Rhine. In the east the Wehrmacht was driven out of
the Soviet Union and back to Germany. In Italy, Rome
had fallen and the Germans were preparing to make
their stand in the Po valley.
By the autumn of 1944 the Wehrmacht had run out
of reserves. The eastern front could barely be held even
by committing virtually all the mobile units available
to the line. On the western front, the panzer divisions
were largely destroyed in futile attempts to counter-
attack the Allied “Cobra” offensive and subsequent
breakout across France. There could no longer be any
shifting of forces between fronts, simply because all
German forces were being fully engaged by Allied
mobile units in the great lunges across Byelorussia and
France.
What made the situation all the worse was the Allies
had air superiority on all fronts. The Anglo-American
6 #3
WaW 3 Issue.indd 6
strategic bombing offensive shattered critical German
industries, such as petroleum. Allied tactical airpower
struck German forces on the ground before they could
even reach their fighting positions. Just west of the
Rhine, Gen. Patton’s Third Army was preparing to
drive into Germany itself. The Reich seemed to be a
hollow shell, waiting to be shattered, but Adolf Hitler
had a plan.
Several German generals proposed withdrawing
troops from some of the territories the Germans had
conquered in the opening years of the war and then
using those units to form a new strategic reserve. Both
Norway and Yugoslavia were proposed for evacu-
ation. Each tied down large numbers of divisions in
occupation duties—indeed, the German forces com-
mitted to fighting Yugoslav partisans amounted to an
army group.
But Hitler was reluctant to make any such with-
drawals. Part of the reason was economic. Norway was
needed to shield iron ore shipments from Sweden, and
Yugoslavia provided numerous raw materials to the
10/10/08 2:00:46 PM
 Reich’s economy. There was also a natural reluctance to
abandon territory that had been won through victorious
combat. Perhaps most important, Hitler feared the politi-
cal consequences of strategic withdrawal. He’d created
a reputation for invincibility. While he could no longer
win great battles, holding every piece of territory would
be a signal to the world that Germany and Hitler weren’t
going to go away. That attitude also reassured his few
allies he wasn’t going to abandon them.
Nonetheless, Hitler realized the need for creating a
new strategic reserve. He did so by ruthlessly depriving
the troops on the front line of replacements and instead
using them to build new divisions (or at least rebuild
WaW 3 Issue.indd 7
shattered units). By late 1944 he was able to concentrate
nine panzer divisions and numerous other units with
which he planned to make a decisive new strike in the
west. Operation Wacht am Rhein (“Watch on the Rhine”)
would be launched in December in the Ardennes. Its ob-
jective was to split the Allied armies in northern France
and Belgium.
Hitler equipped two panzer armies for the offensive:
Sixth, commanded by the Waffen SS’s Sepp Dietrich, and
Fifth, commanded by the veteran Hasso von Manteuffel.
(Incidentally, while Sixth Panzer Army had the prepon-
derance of SS divisions, it was not yet called the Sixth SS
Panzer Army—that additional designation didn’t come
World at War 7
10/10/08 2:00:48 PM
 until after the Bulge.) Additionally, the southern flank for
the new offensive would be covered by Seventh Army.
Hitler also amassed considerable Luftwaffe strength for
the offensive. Indeed, the number of aircraft the Germans
could fly over the Ardennes would compare with those
employed in the conquest of France in 1940. Whatever
criticisms might otherwise be made of Hitler as a military
commander, the fact he could create such a force at a time
8 #3
WaW 3 Issue.indd 8
when the Reich was collapsing on all fronts does show
a high degree of organizational ability. What made it all
the more remarkable was the Allies were unaware of the
preparations, their usually efficient ULTRA intelligence
system failing them this time around.
For the offensive’s locale, Hitler chose the Ardennes,
the region in southeastern Belgium and northern Lux-
embourg through which his panzers drove to victory in
10/10/08 2:00:50 PM
 1940. In making that choice, he was trying to repeat
his great victory in the west of four years prior by
breaking through a weakly defended sector of the Al-
lied front. He believed, once the enemy was thrown on
the defensive by that unexpected blow, psychological
factors would fully turn the situation in his favor. He
expected the Americans, in particular, to panic as his
opponents had done on the same front in 1940. Hitler
was also lucky in his choice in that the Allies consid-
ered the Ardennes to be a quiet sector, holding it with
only a thin screen of units.
The initial objective of Wacht Am Rhein was to
cross the Meuse River. From there, the Germans
would drive to Antwerp, the vital Allied supply port in
northwest Europe. Once Antwerp was taken, the Al-
lied armies in the west would be split, British in the
north and American to the south. The loss of Antwerp
would also force them to fall back on their overex-
tended logistical system, stretching all the way back
to Normandy. In retrospect, Hitler’s plan seems ridic-
ulously ambitious, but when the Ardennes offensive
began it did precipitate a crisis in the Allied high com-
mand.
Hasso von Manteuffel, commanding Fifth Panzer
Army, recommended a more reasonable plan: a lim-
ited offensive in the vicinity of Liege. If successful,
it would cut off and destroy some Allied divisions
and further stabilize the front. While that objective
might have been more attainable, in the longer run it
wouldn’t have made a difference. Given the overall
Allied superiority in the west, the Germans had to win
big or not at all. A tactical or operational victory would
only have delayed the inevitable invasion of Germany
itself, not stopped it. Hitler believed Germany had no
option but to gamble all at that stage of the war.
For the new offensive, Hitler pulled out all the
stops. Heavy tanks and assault guns were concentrated
in the lead units. The Luftwaffe was supposed to gain
control of the skies over the Ardennes using its new
jet fighters and bombers. Paratroopers and comman-
dos were formed into special units to infiltrate behind
enemy lines. Fuel was stockpiled and secrecy main-
tained.
Secrecy was vital because, were the Allies to gain
advance knowledge of the operation, they could rein-
force their positions in the Ardennes and use their air-
power to destroy the carefully hoarded supplies. But
the Allies remained in the dark, continuing to view the
Ardennes as a quiet sector in which to accustom new
divisions to the front.
Out of the Mist
The Ardennes offensive kicked off on 16 De-
cember 1944. The Germans quickly overran several
American units on the front and a salient (or “bulge”)
soon developed in the Allied line. Almost as soon as
it had begun, though, the offensive fell behind sched-
WaW 3 Issue.indd 9
ule. Massive traffic jams made it impossible for the
Germans to effectively deploy their units or bring up
supplies. Unexpectedly staunch US resistance delayed
the Germans at key points, such as St. Vith and Bas-
togne, and the rough terrain made it difficult to move
off-road and to infiltrate the gaps that occurred in the
American lines. Ironically, the Germans found their
force was over-mechanized for the task at hand. Ve-
hicles clogged the limited road net and soon reduced it
to a rutted mess.
Sixth Panzer Army put its infantry divisions up
front, planning to use them to make the breakthrough
the panzers would then exploit. But American resis-
tance, and the terrain, mitigated against any large
breakthrough. The SS panzer divisions waited impa-
tiently in reserve. Joachim Peiper, commanding a bat-
tlegroup of 1st SS Panzer Division, managed to push
his way through into the American rear area. But his
breakthrough couldn’t be supported by the rest of the
SS panzers, so he and his battlegroup were soon cut
off by US counterattacks. In the end, Peiper had to or-
der his men to abandon their vehicles and make their
way back to German lines on foot.
While American troops were fighting in the snow,
the Allied high command was dealing with the crisis.
Eisenhower and Montgomery were both surprised by
the extent of the offensive. Since Hitler had committed
a new army to a new offensive, at first no one really
knew how much strength there was behind both. Gen.
Hodges, commanding US First Army, suggested the
whole effort was really only a spoiling attack intended
to relieve the pressure elsewhere on the German line.
Others speculated that, if the Germans had the re-
sources to field jet aircraft and advanced tanks, the war
in the west might be indefinitely prolonged. Among
other things, the Allies weren’t sure of the offensive’s
ultimate objective. One reason, then, for Eisenhower’s
Armored infantry: GIs in a half-track.
World at War 9
10/10/08 2:00:51 PM
 order for strong points, such as Bastogne, to be held as
long as possible was to make time to determine the direc-
tion of the offensive and thereby allow him to shift forces
to defend its targets.
Eisenhower also acted more quickly than Hitler an-
ticipated in terms of ordering reinforcements. Allied mo-
torized units proved capable of speedily redeploying to
attack the bulge’s flanks. And, as is well known, the US
10 #3
WaW 3 Issue.indd 10
101st Airborne Division dug in at the town of Bastogne,
which dominated the road net across the area. Without
control of that town the Germans couldn’t move up units
and supplies in the southern sector of the offensive. Fifth
Panzer Army made several futile attempts to overrun the
101st, but failed.
continued on page 12
10/10/08 2:00:52 PM
 Volksgrenadiers
In late 1944 the Germans formed a new wave of infantry divisions
called Volkgrenadier (VG). Volksgrenadier means “People’s Grenadiers,”
the idea being those divisions represented the mass mobilization of the
German people in elite (“grenadier”) formations whose National Socialist
ardor would overcome all enemy resistance. Of course, the simple handing
out of grandiose titles doesn’t make up for things such as a lack of training
or equipment. In practice, Volkgrenadier units were largely formed from
recruits centered around a slim cadre of veterans.
The VG used the three regiment/two battalion organization that had
become common in German divisions a year prior. It was designed to
make up for manpower shortages by reducing the number of infantry units
in each division. Since normal practice was for a division to put two in-
fantry regiments in the line and keep one in reserve (and following the
same practice at each lower echelon), theoretically the reduction in units
didn’t necessarily mean a reduction in overall combat power. An increase
in infantry heavy weapons, such as 120mm mortars and anti-tank rocket
launchers, was supposed to substitute firepower for manpower.
Artillery shortages were made up, in part, by using captured 75mm
guns. The divisional reconnaissance unit was cut back to a single Fusilier
company. The Fusiliers weren’t only for scouting enemy positions; they
were also considered an elite assault unit within the division, as well as a
mobile reserve. Transportation in the division was largely by horse drawn
vehicles, though bicycles were also provided.
While weaker in men and materiel than the pre-1944 divisions, the VG
did have one edge at the tactical level: the infantry were equipped with
large numbers of automatic weapons, including new assault rifles. There
were also large numbers of anti-tank weapons, Panzerfaust and Panzer-
schreck rocket launchers. Assault guns were available for attacking enemy The high command plots: Hitler and von Runstadt
positions and for anti-tank work. Still, the new equipment couldn’t over- examine a map of the west.
come the other shortfalls. Many VG soldiers had only a couple months
training before they were committed to combat. The VG proved (at best)
mediocre in battle, and units often fell apart under fire.
All of which was broadly indicative of the overall German manpower
situation at that stage of the war. While in the past the Wehrmacht had been
able to pull together shattered units and reform them into combat-effective
formations, it now lacked the ability to put together another effective army
for the last stage of the war. The leaders who might once have done so
were long since casualties on the far-flung frontiers of the Reich. Germany
had run out of men—and time.

World at War 11

WaW 3 Issue.indd 11 10/10/08 2:00:53 PM


Thus the panzers ground to a halt still short of the
Meuse River. There, 2nd Panzer Division was destroyed
in a running engagement with US armor. Elsewhere
the elite Panzer Lehr Division was shot up trying to
break through the front. The loss of those two divi-
sions, on top of the crippling of 1st SS Panzer, ended all
chance of the Germans attaining their goals for their
offensive.
Patton’s Third Army then broke through to relieve
the 101st at Bastogne. By mid-January the Bulge had
been eliminated.
Hitler’s Last Chance
Why did the Ardennes Offensive fail? At the opera-
tional level everything worked against it. Antwerp, the
offensive’s ultimate objective, was simply unreach-
able. Even had the Germans somehow made a clean
breakthrough in the Ardennes, crossed the Meuse
River in strength and drove northwest, they still would
have had overextended flanks that could have been cut
off by Allied counterattacks.
The winter weather degraded mobile operations.
Precipitation and the cold adversely affected weap-
ons, equipment and morale, as well as inflicting losses
among exposed troops. The offensive was conducted
during the time of year of the shortest amount of day-
light. That further restricted German ground opera-
tions and Luftwaffe support.
The Ardennes contained many ridges, forests and
chokepoints; aside from restricting movement, they
made excellent defensive terrain. To be sure, the Ger-
mans had driven through the Ardennes in 1940, but
that was against an enemy who hadn’t been prepared
12 #3
WaW 3 Issue.indd 12
US DIVISIONS
These diagrams show the typical organization for com-
bat of the US 1st Infantry and 4th Armored Divisions during
the period of December 1944 through January 1945. The
attachments were typical for US divisions at that time in
the war. As can be seen, both divisions were thereby given
considerable additional combat power. The 1st Infantry had
sufficient additional armored fighting vehicles (including
self-propelled anti-tank guns) to make it the equivalent of an
“armored infantry” division. The anti-aircraft weapons in-
cluded many high-caliber automatic guns, which increased
divisional firepower tremendously.
for mobile warfare. In 1944 the Allies, after four years
of hard won experience, proved themselves more than
capable of reacting to the German thrust and then un-
leashing their own “blitzkrieg” against it.
The offensive also got off to a bad start. While the
US 106th Division was overrun and destroyed, the mo-
ment other American forces were able to reorient and
dig in, the German plan fell apart. Hitler continued to
insist the main weight of the attack remain in Sixth
Panzer Army’s sector, despite the unexpectedly heavy
resistance there. A better approach would have been
to reinforce Fifth Panzer Army, which had made the
deepest penetration. Its spearhead unit, 2nd Panzer
Division, actually came to within a few miles of the
Meuse.
Sixth Panzer Army used its infantry (“Volksgrena-
dier”) divisions to punch the initial hole in the Ameri-
can line, which the panzers were supposed to exploit.
That, however, led to massive traffic jams. While
the Germans had, initially, a great preponderance of
strength, they couldn’t deploy it effectively. Small
groups of US soldiers could hold up the advance of
much larger formations at vital crossroads. Finally,
there was the situation at St. Vith and Bastogne. The
American defense of those towns tied up large num-
bers of German men, guns and armor as they tried to
reduce them. Hitler’s initial instructions had been for
the panzers to bypass such strong points, but in the Ar-
dennes that was impossible because of the restrictive
terrain and sparse road net. The Germans were forced
to make a series of frontal assaults against well-de-
fended positions, which burned up not only units and
supplies but also precious time.
continued on page 14
10/10/08 2:00:54 PM
 US & German Corps
These diagrams show the organization of the US Army’s III
Corps during the Bulge, and the typical organization of a German
panzer corps as of 1 January 1945. For the Bulge, the panzer corps
would also have additional artillery and rocket launcher regiments
assigned to them, and there would also be additional heavy tank
and tank destroyer battalions available at army level. Those extra
units gave the panzer corps echelon about the same firepower as
the American; however, the US had superior fire-control proce-
dures. US fire-control allowed forward observers to call in fire
from virtually all guns within the corps, including divisional artil-
lery. The US also assigned at least one armored cavalry group to
each corps for reconnaissance, screening and exploitation.
The American corps had high levels of motorization in all its
units. In the German Army, only the panzer and panzergrenadier
units were similarly motorized. That gave American forces the
edge in mobile warfare. Patton’s flank move from Lorraine to the
relief of Bastogne was possible because of the high level of US
mechanization, supported by personnel who understood how to
utilize motor vehicles to their maximum effect. Still, given the
terrain and ground conditions in the Ardennes, motorization was
more of an operational advantage than tactical. US commanders
could get their divisions to the battle quickly, but once engaged it
became an infantryman’s fight.

The GI war: two American soldiers at Bastogne.

World at War 13

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Assault Guns
The Germans made extensive use of tank destroyers and
assault guns (armored self-propelled direct-fire artillery).
Both were essentially turretless tanks, with hull-mounted
guns. Assault guns could be more cheaply produced than
tanks (by a factor of one-third) and they could also be made
with heavier armor since the complications inherent in add-
ing a turret weren’t involved. The guns fired forward, usu-
ally having a limited traverse of 16 degrees. They could also
be laid on a target by the driver rotating the entire vehicle
by moving one tread forward and one to the rear (a process
which could also throw a track if done poorly).
Interestingly, assault guns (Sturmgeschutz) were part of
the artillery arm. Their original purpose was to provide di-
rect fire support to the infantry, though by 1944 they were
frequently used in the anti-tank role, the latter also being the
province of the Panzerjaeger (“tank hunters”). Additionally,
the Germans had self-propelled howitzers, such as the Wespe
(105mm gun) and Hummel (150mm), which conducted indi-
rect fire.
For the Ardennes offensive, the Germans employed some
of their heaviest assault guns and tank destroyers, such as
the Jagdpanther (88mm gun) and Jagdtiger (128mm). They
actually proved to be too heavy, tending to bog down in the
muddy terrain and unable to deploy off-road. Still, in open
terrain, they could beat just about any armored vehicle the
Allies could put against them.
14 #3
WaW 3 Issue.indd 14
Airpower also played its role. Both sides commit-
ted considerable numbers of aircraft to the fight. Allied
airpower was mainly used to interdict German supplies
outside the immediate battle zone. The reason for that
approach was, given the generally poor weather over
the battlefield, to avoid friendly fire incidents. That led
to some criticism from the troops on the ground about
the paucity of air cover. Deep interdiction missions
made sense, though, insofar as they were one more
factor making it impossible for the Germans to pro-
vide logistical support to their spearhead units.
While the Luftwaffe also had available large num-
bers of aircraft, their commitment was generally in-
effective. The Luftwaffe was a shadow of its former
self. The attrition of experienced aircrew over sev-
eral years of war, and the lack of petroleum, made it
difficult to train new pilots. Often, aerial formations
would be led by the few pilots trained well enough to
navigate, with the rest of the aircraft trailing behind.
Moreover, declining German aircraft maintenance and
fuel shortages limited the number of sorties that could
be flown. Finally, the air units weren’t trained for the
kind of combat in which they would be engaging over
the Ardennes. Rather than preparing for close air sup-
port and battlefield interdiction missions, the empha-
sis had been on intercepting Allied bombers. Aircrew
were suddenly thrown into situations for which they
weren’t prepared, leading to ineffective outcomes of
missions flown.
Probably the most critical factor in the German de-
feat came from the simple fact the Allied high com-
mand of 1944 wasn’t the Allied high command of
1940. By the time of the Ardennes offensive, the Allies
were led by men who had a solid grip on mechanized
warfare, and the armies they commanded were more
than prepared to meet the Germans in their own arena
of mobile operations. Despite the initial surprise of
the attack, Eisenhower and his staff correctly divined
the magnitude of the threat and acted accordingly. Re-
serves were shifted to the Ardennes. Critical positions,
such as Bastogne, were reinforced. The British also
cooperated, sending a corps to cover the north flank of
the Meuse. One of Hitler’s assumptions, that Anglo-
American cooperation would disintegrate in the face
of a major attack, was immediately disproved.
Interestingly, in the weeks prior to the “Bulge,”
Patton’s intelligence staff (G-2) anticipated something
of what was to come. Third Army’s G-2 had detected a
shift of German armor away from the Lorraine sector
to the north. While it’s overstating the case to suggest
Third Army knew what was coming, that report did
give Patton at least an inkling. Consequently, when he
was first notified of the attack in the Ardennes, he was
better prepared to take action.
Once given the word by Eisenhower, then, Patton
quickly led his army in a drive north from Lorraine
continued on page 16
10/10/08 2:00:56 PM
 Special Units
The German Panzer Lehr Division was a true elite,
having been originally formed from the “demonstration”
(“Lehr”) units of the armor training schools. It was generally
always kept equipped with Germany’s latest armor types, but
the Ardennes offensive found the division under-strength.
Panzer Lehr had taken heavy losses during the campaign in
France, and was in the process of being rebuilt when com-
mitted as one of the Fifth Panzer Army’s spearheads.
The Fuehrer Escort and Fuehrer Grenadier Brigades
were both guard units for Adolf Hitler. Both had fire support
equivalent to panzer divisions.
The von der Heydte Parachute Regiment, actually a bat-
talion-sized battlegroup named after the unit’s commander,
was the German airborne’s last gasp. Hitler had wanted to
include a parachute landing behind American lines as part
of the opening of the offensive. The dilemma was that by
that time in the war there were only a few thousand trained
paratroopers left in all of the German armed forces. Some
of them were thrown together into a unit under Col. von der
Heydte, and made their airborne assault on the evening of the
17th. In the event, they were scattered over the countryside,
and the landing wasn’t deep enough, nor in enough strength,
to cut off any American units.
The 150th Panzer Brigade was the German special forc-
es unit led by SS commando Otto Skorzeny. The brigade’s
original mission was to infiltrate American lines and seize
control of the critical Meuse bridges. It was supposed to be
equipped with captured US Army equipment, and its mem-
bers were all supposed to speak English.
WaW 3 Issue.indd 15
Wehrmacht mobility, 1944: German bicycle troops.
Of course, it didn’t quite happen that way. The equipment
proved difficult to obtain. While German officers frequently
made use of captured American Jeeps and other vehicles,
they were loathe to give them up for an unconventional war-
fare mission. So Skorzeny’s men tried to make do by us-
ing sheet metal to make German tanks look something like
American AFVs. The attempted ruse fooled no one, and the
150th ended up attacking as a conventional unit. Incidentally,
one of the brigade’s units was the 600 SS Airborne Battal-
ion. Elements of that battalion were from the former 500th SS
Airborne Battalion, which had made the daring parachute
assault on Yugoslav partisan leader Marshal Tito’s headquar-
ters earlier in 1944.
Where Skorzeny did accomplish something was with his
Einheit Steilau commandos. They were small teams of Eng-
lish-speaking Germans (most of them could speak at least
passable English). The commandos wore US uniforms and
drove the few Jeeps Skorzeny could scrounge up. While the
teams had little material effect on the battle, their psycho-
logical impact was incredible. Once one hapless team was
captured, the American rumor mill went into high gear. Sud-
denly, the Allied rear area seemed to be filled with thousands
of Skorzeny trained killers wearing American uniforms who
were capable of anything and everything, up to and includ-
ing attempting the assassination of Gen. Eisenhower. That
led to a number of episodes that might seem amusing in ret-
rospect—such as British Field Marshal Montgomery being
forced to obtain an American identification card, and Ameri-
can troops interrogating each other about the teams in vari-
ous sports leagues. At the time this created a brief paralysis
of the Allied command structure until the security situation
was sorted out. Even in failure, Skorzeny had managed to
grab a minor victory.
World at War 15
10/10/08 2:00:57 PM

Armor in the snow: US Sherman tank and crew.
against the southern flank of the developing bulge. He
relieved Bastogne on Christmas Day and, with that
linkup, all chance for the German offensive to succeed
evaporated. As January 1945 opened, Hitler realized
the game was over and began ordering his spearheads
to withdraw. The Germans never got close to Antwerp,
and Hitler’s last chance in the west was gone.
Crisis
Despite the German defeat, the Ardennes offensive
did precipitate a crisis in the Allied high command.
US planners had built an army of 89 divisions, and
when the Germans struck in the Ardennes all but one
of those formations had already been committed to
combat in either the European or Pacific Theaters of
Operation. Reserves for dealing with this magnitude
of emergency simply didn’t exist.
The reason for the relatively low number of divi-
sions—compare that US number of 89 to the over 250
divisions the Germans would maintain in their overall
order of battle during 1944—was that US war plan-
ners didn’t want to repeat the mass battles of attrition
of the First World War. Consequently the US empha-
sized a mechanized and firepower-intensive approach
to war. Machines—tanks, aircraft and artillery—were
to take the place of ground troops. That approach
worked in the mobile campaigns in North Africa, Sic-
ily and France, but US armies really didn’t have the
infantry needed for intensively sustained combat, and
that shortfall finally and fully manifested itself in the
Ardennes. The US somewhat relieved the infantry
shortage by using non-divisional and support units to
bolster the combat divisions, and by keeping troops in
the line beyond their period of maximal combat effec-
tiveness. Even so, the overall manpower crunch was
never fully ended.
16 #3
WaW 3 Issue.indd 16
Similarly, the British had come into to their own
manpower crisis in 1944, and were beyond the point
where new units could be mobilized at all. In fact, they
broke up several divisions in order to provide combat
replacements to others.
The Ardennes offensive had the potential to cause
a serious setback to the Allies, in that in late 1944
they found themselves in the same position Germany
had been earlier in the year: facing a major enemy of-
fensive without a strategic reserve. The Ardennes of-
fensive was one of the few times late in the war the
Germans were able to concentrate sufficient mobile
divisions in one place to form a theater reserve. That
gave Hitler a transitory advantage, one that could have
been decisive had the rest of the overall balance also
been more in his favor.
The failure of the Ardennes offensive consumed
Germany’s last reserve. It guaranteed the Red Army
would be able to advance deep into Germany from the
east. From that time forward, even the most fanatic
German commanders also knew the war was lost, and
increasingly they looked to salvage something by re-
concentrating resistance in the east while surrendering
as much territory as possible to the Western Allies.
Politically, Hitler had expected some kind of read-
justment within the Anglo-American alliance due to
the Ardennes offensive. No such change occurred. The
irony is the Ardennes offensive was the kind of opera-
tion that might have been successful had Hitler been
fighting the Seven Years War, or even the Franco-Prus-
sian War. In those conflicts, traditional state leaders
looked to bring wars to an end once their countries had
gained limited advantages. The Allies, though, weren’t
trying to simply readjust the borders in Europe; they
were engaged in a crusade of national survival, one
predicated on the destruction of Nazi Germany. The
dilemma Hitler found himself in was, having made his
bid for world mastery, there was no way to avoid the
inevitable all-out counter-confrontation with those na-
tions he’d challenged.
at
10/10/08 2:00:58 PM
 World at War 17

WaW 3 Issue.indd 17 10/10/08 2:00:58 PM

 Drive your tanks through the Ardennes Forest
The Bulge is a redesign, by Ty Bomba, of the title originally published by old-SPI in 1979. That earlier ver-
sion was published under two titles, the other being Big Red One, as part of a marketing effort coinciding with
the release that same year of a motion picture of the same name. This design runs counter to the hobby trend
concerning the 1944 German counteroffensive in the Ardennes in that it’s not bigger and more complex than
the one published just prior to it.
First, it represents a major graphic improvement to the minimalist presentation of the first edition. The hexes
are now dramatically and cinematically huge, and the large counters are much easier to read and handle. Fur-
ther, you can choose the type of counters—NATO abstract or full iconic—with which you’ll play, mixing and
matching between sides and unit-types as you please. Second, we couldn’t resist making use of the expertise of
Joe Youst—surely this century’s leading expert on the Ardennes road net—to update the map in that way. Third,
systemic modernization has also been built in, along with some enhancements to the order of battle, which
work to bring the game’s original system up to the lofty level of today’s state-of-the-art. Last, the game has
been shortened to cover only the first part of the battle—the interesting part in terms of operational and strategic
potentiality—that of the German blitzkrieg offensive, which lasted from 16 through 25 December.
Each hex on the map equals five miles. Each game turn represents one day. Playing pieces represent divi-
sions, brigades, combat commands, regiments or Kampfgruppen. A full Volksartillerie Korps order of battle is
included for the Germans, along with special rules for: Allied airpower and corps support, the von der Heydte
paratroopers, Einheit Steilau, Skorzeny, Kampfgruppe Peiper, and much more.
The Bulge is a low-complexity two-player game that experienced players can count on finishing in about
three hours. A complete (176 total), large-size counter-set is included in both iconic and NATO-style.

To purchase the game that covers the campaigns

analyzed in this issue’s cover story, send your name
and address along with: All prices include postage for first class or airmail shipping.
$24 US Customers CA residents add $1.09 sales tax. Send to:
$27 Canadian Customers Decision Games
$29 Overseas Customers ATTN: World at War Game Offer
PO Box 21598
Bakersfield CA 93390
18 #3

WaW 3 Issue.indd 18 10/10/08 2:01:29 PM

 Mega Feedback Report: Results for #13-20

The Mega-Feedback survey for the games to
appear in #13-20 ran on the S&T Press web site con-
currently with the release of th first issue. Now that
World at War is up and running, we’ll run the future
MFB surveys both in the magazine and on the web
site. We appreciate all the feedback about what you’d
like to see in the magazine. We’ve compiled all the
article topic suggestions, and we’ll be sending that
list to our writers so they’ll know what the reader-
ship would like. Though we won’t get as formal with
article selection as we have with MFB game-picking
process, this does work to create a feedback loop for
articles. Thanks again for all the responses, sugges-
tions and letters of encouragement. We appreciate
your support!
Before we get to the results, we want to announce
it’s open season for game proposals to appear in the
next MFB, and we’re looking for new designers
to submit proposals. Proposals should be 100-125
words with a one or two sentence introduction of the
historical topic, a description of the game system,
and a list of any specific features or unusual focus of
the design, and a summary of the scale and compo-
nents. Prospective designers can contact the publisher
(“Doc” at ccummins@bak.rr.com) for additional
information and guidance. The next MFB will appear
in issue #5 for issues #21-24.
OK, let’s get down to the games we’re adding to
the schedule—below is a list of the issues and topics.

Issue # Month Game Topic & Lead Article

4 Feb 09 USAAF (Miranda/Bomba take to the skies over Germany, 1944)
5 Apr 09 The Finnish Front, 1941-42 (Miranda marches on in the Continuation War, 1941-1942)
6 Jun 09 The Great East Asia War (Miranda in the CBI, 1941-1945)
7 Aug 09 Greek Tragedy (Richard Berg on the Italo-Greek War of 1940)
8 Oct 09 Arriba Espana! (Brian Train; Spanish Civil War)
9 Dec 09 Destruction of Army Group Center (the Bulge system in the East, 1944)
10 Feb 10 Coral Sea Solitaire (solitaire game in which the player attempts to stop the Japanese)
11 Apr 10 Salerno (a sequel to the classic Sicily game from S&T#89)
12 Jun 10 1940: What If? (Bomba gives us a look at an Eastern alternative for 1940)
13 Aug 10 Leningrad (the Manila ‘45 system in a “What If?” in 1941)
14 Oct 10 Invasion Pearl Harbor (What if the Japanese had landed?)
15 Dec 10 Rommel’s War (Miranda covers the Western Desert, 1941-42)
16 Feb 11 Stalin’s War (What-if the Soviets struck first in 1941?)
17 Apr 11 East Front Battles (The first of a series of tactical games)
18 Jun 11 New Guinea Campaign (Uses the system from Red Dragon Rising)
19 Aug 11 Hardest Days (John Butterfield on the critical period of the Battle of Britain)
20 Oct 11 Partizan! (Resistance in Hitler’s Europe)

World at War 19

WaW 3 Issue.indd 19 10/10/08 2:01:52 PM

 The Battle of the Cherkassy Pocket
by Pat McTaggart
[Ed’s Note: in the following article, German units are in italics and
Soviet units are in plain text.]
During the last weeks of 1943 the German army in south-
ern Russia was in desperate straits. Inspired by their victory
at Kursk in July, the Soviet high command (STAVKA) had
launched its first summer offensive of the war, driving the
Wehrmacht back across the steppes of the Ukraine. By early
October a powerful force of four Red Army fronts (army
groups) was poised on the east bank of the Dnepr River,
waiting for orders to strike a deathblow against the depleted
German forces just beyond it. Guards mechanized corps, two Guards cavalry corps and 45
Field Marshal Erich von Manstein’s Army Group South’s
three armies (1st Panzer, 8th and 4th Panzer) had an average
infantry strength of just 1,000 men per division to defend
the west bank. To Manstein’s south, Field Marshal Ewald
von Kleist’s Army Group A (6th Army, 17th Army and 3rd
Romanian Army) had to make do with hastily constructed
earthen defenses, since its front-line was positioned south
of the Dnepr bend on the eastern side of the river. In reality,
Kleist had to rely on the 13 under-strength divisions of Gen.
Karl Hollidt’s 6th Army to meet the expected Soviet attack,
since 17th Army and the Romanians were tied up occupying
the Crimea.
The Soviet plan used staggered attacks by the four fronts
in the southern Ukraine, which would keep the Germans off
guard and prevent them from concentrating reinforcements
to meet each offensive. Lightning armored thrusts, followed
by motorized infantry reinforcements, would rip apart the
German line. Regular infantry would then follow, expanding
the gaps in the enemy line and encircling any German units
20 #3
WaW 3 Issue.indd 20
that remained. STAVKA also planned to isolate the Crimea,
trapping 17th Army and the Romanians. The more optimis-
tic Soviet strategists even talked about the possibility of en-
circling 1st and 4th Panzer Armies as well as the 6th and 8th
Armies.
Along the Dnepr front, then, Rodion Malinkovsky’s 3rd
Ukrainian Front was given the privilege of opening the attack.
On 1 October his forces attacked the German bridgehead on
the east bank around Zaporozhye. As the Germans shuffled
reinforcements to that area, Fydor Tolbukhin’s 4th Ukrainian
Front tore into 6th Army’s defenses with three tank corps, two
rifle (infantry) divisions on 9 October. He was supported by
400 batteries of artillery. Six days later, on 15 October, Lt.
Gens. Nikolai Vatutin and Ivan Konev opened their offensive
against Army Group South with 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts.
For almost a month the Soviets hammered at the German
line. Hitler ordered all troops stand their ground but, in the
face of overwhelming odds, the Germans were forced to re-
treat. Before the onset of the southern Russian rains in mid-
November, Tolbukhin had sealed off the Crimea; Vatutin had
captured Kiev, and Konev and Malinkovsky were creating
havoc on the flanks of 8th Army.
When the rains started to fall, the mud made it next to im-
possible for Soviet armored units to continue their advance.
German forces in the region had been stretched to the limit,
but they had prevented catastrophe. By falling back under
Soviet pressure, the German line had been shortened. How-
ever, their losses in men and equipment couldn’t be made
up by the trickle of replacements and reinforcements the two
army groups received.
10/10/08 2:01:53 PM
 On the other side, though the Soviets also suffered heavy
casualties, they had a ready supply of fresh manpower from
the population of the recently liberated areas. Their com-
manders used the lull to hastily train new recruits and bring
up supplies for a later continuation of the offensive.
While STAVKA’s original plan had been thwarted, there
was still the possibility of striking a serious blow against the
WaW 3 Issue.indd 21
Germans. The October offensive had created a bulge in the
German line, which was occupied by Lt. Gen. Otto Woe-
hler’s 8th Army and Lt. Gen. Erhard Raus’s 4th Panzer Army.
The opportunity seemed too good to pass up, so Konev and
Vatutin were ordered to plan an attack that would cut off and
destroy those two armies as soon as weather permitted.
World at War 21
10/10/08 2:01:54 PM
 Inching forward: Soviet troops advance on a German position.
Von Manstein Takes Control
In early December the ground froze solid enough for
the Soviet offensive to resume. Vatutin hit the left flank of
4th Panzer Army and swung southwest, heading for the Bug
River. Konev was ordered to take the communication hub
at Kirovograd, and then link up with Vatutin’s forces on the
Bug at Pervomaysk.
The battle developed into a free for all, with columns of
tanks and mechanized infantry dashing across the steppe in
blinding snowstorms and heavy winds. Air support for both
sides had to be careful in identifying the units they were to
attack because of the weather and the confused situation re-
ports that were being sent from the front.
Von Manstein repeatedly asked for permission to with-
draw, but Hitler would not hear of it. Faced with the pos-
sibility 4th Panzer Army might fall apart under Vatutin’s on-
slaught, the field marshal moved his meager reserves to the
front in an effort to avert disaster.
More pressure was placed on 4th Panzer Army when Vatu-
tin ordered his 40th Army to turn south, while his 3rd Guards
Tank, 1st Guards, 13th and 16th Armies advanced west and
northwest, hoping to capture Zhitomir. Von Manstein, seeing
a chance to cut into the flanks of those Soviet forces, ordered
Gen. Raus to counterattack with his XLVII Panzer Corps.
Raus replied the best he could do was slow the enemy.
Another stream of urgent messages was sent to Hitler’s
headquarters. Von Manstein realized the entire southern
wing of the Russian Front was in jeopardy, and he minced no
words in his communications to the Fuehrer. He reported the
Soviets had so far assaulted 4th Panzer Army with no fewer
than 47 rifle divisions and nine tank and mechanized corps,
and he emphasized the extreme danger the army was fac-
ing. Hitler flew into a rage when he was shown the message
but, after ranting against defeatist officers who only wanted
to retreat, said he would find a solution. While Hitler vacil-
lated, von Manstein acted. “It was imperative that energetic
measures be taken to counteract this danger,” he wrote in his
memoirs.
Acting on his own authority, he ordered Lt. Gen. Hans
Hube’s 1st Panzer Army to hand over its sector to 6th Army
and move north to Uman. Hube would then add XXIV Pan-
22 #3
WaW 3 Issue.indd 22
zer Corps and VII Corps to his army, taking them away from
4th Panzer. He also told Hube to create a ready reserve, using
III Panzer Corps headquarters, 6th and 7th Panzer Divisions
from 8th Army, 16th Panzergrenadier Division and the 101st
Light Division, which was transferred from Army Group A.
At the same time Hitler gave Raus XLVI Panzer Corps
Headquarters, the 16th Panzer Division from Army Group
Center, 1st Infantry Division from Army Group North, and 4th
Mountain Infantry Division from Army Group A. The move-
ment of all those units was to be completed by 1 January
1944.
Hitler grudgingly gave his approval to von Manstein’s
orders on New Year’s Day, while the movements were being
completed. Von Manstein’s decision was justified when, on
3 January, Soviet units were brought to a halt by elements of
III Panzer Corps 30 miles north of Uman.
As III Panzer Corps entered the battle, von Manstein
faced another threat in the area near Kirovograd. On 5
January, Konev’s 2nd Ukrainian Front renewed its offen-
sive, hurling Lt. Gen. Pavel Rotmistrov’s 5th Guards Tank
Army against a 20-mile front held by 2nd Parachute Divi-
sion. Following a devastating artillery barrage, about 500
tanks slashed through that formation’s front line. Though the
Germans claimed 180 enemy tanks destroyed, the Soviets
forced the division to retreat south. Rotmistrov immediately
ordered his 18th Tank and 8th Mechanized Corps to head west,
toward Kirovograd, while other units of his army continued
to harry the paratroopers.
By 6 January, four German divisions (3rd and 14th Pan-
zer, 10th Panzergrenadier and 376th Infantry) had been en-
circled in Kirovograd. Konev then faced a difficult decision.
He needed to take the city to secure his communication and
supply network; he also needed to keep his armies on the
heels of the retreating German forces west of there. Throw-
ing a shallow ring around the encircled German divisions,
the Soviet commander kept his advance elements heading
west, while reserve units were ordered forward to tighten the
noose around the besieged city.
Cut off and outnumbered, the defenders of Kirovograd
manned their shrinking perimeter and hoped for help; how-
10/10/08 2:01:55 PM
 ever, the commander of 3rd Panzer Division, Brig. Gen. Fritz
Bayerlein, had no intention of waiting for relief. On the after-
noon of 7 January he ordered his division to break out. In do-
ing so he was in direct violation of a “Fuehrer Order” that said
Kirovograd was to be held “to the last man and the last bullet.”
Caught off guard, the Soviets fell back, leaving Bayerlein
and his division an avenue of escape. The 3rd Panzer made con-
tact with 11th Panzer Division on 8 January. Almost immedi-
ately, the two panzer divisions were thrown into further action
against Konev’s flank.
WaW 3 Issue.indd 23
With Kirovograd still in German hands, Konev’s supply
problems were beginning to slow his advance. German rein-
forcements were reported to be gathering on both flanks, and
enemy forces to the west were building a defensive system that
threatened to grind his offensive to a complete halt.
On 9 January, Hitler finally approved a breakout for all the
units still in Kirovograd. During the night, the three divisions
broke through the Soviet lines and reached safety. With that,
von Manstein had enough units to stem the Soviet advance, but
he was still worried about the bulge in the Dnepr bend, which
Hitler steadfastly refused to evacuate.
World at War 23
10/10/08 2:01:59 PM
 Konev struggled to continue his advance in the face of
mounting German opposition. Vatutin was also still on the
move, forcing a gap between 1st and 4th Panzer Armies that
grew to 40 miles.
During the second half of January, von Manstein struck
back. Two well-timed counterattacks hit 1st Ukrainian Front,
causing heavy casualties among those Soviet troops. Lt.
Gen. Zhmachenko’s 40th Army and Lt. Gen. A.S. Zhadov’s
5th Guards Army took the brunt of the blow.
Zhmachenko was hit by VII Infantry Corps from the east,
XLVI Panzer Corps from the west, and III Panzer Corps
from the south. Slicing through the Soviet infantry, those
three German corps then fell on 5th Guards Army. Both So-
viet armies were forced to retreat.
Manstein then ordered II and XXVI Panzer Corps to
strike Gen. K.S. Moskalenko’s 38th Army and Gen. M.Y.
Katukov’s 1st Tank Army. The panzers roared into the enemy
and soon had the situation in hand. Von Manstein put Soviet
losses during that attack at 5,000 killed, 5,500 taken pris-
oner, along with 700 tanks, 500 anti-tank guns and 200 field
guns destroyed. The attack also drove back the Russians
some 20 miles. In spite of his success, there was little time
for celebration at von Manstein’s headquarters. The coun-
terattacks had bloodied the Russians, but the forces facing
him were still enormous. He knew the Soviets would strike
again, and another concentrated attack by Konev and Vatutin
could wipe out his gains and force his entire army group into
another desperate struggle for survival. A trickle of replace-
ments was arriving, but he needed time to strengthen his de-
fensive lines. All he could really do, then, was wait for the
next attack. The wait wasn’t long.
STAVKA
Having been thwarted, STAVKA ordered Vatutin and
Konev to shift their axes of attack. This time they were to
encircle the units that occupied defensive positions inside
a bulge near Cherkassy. It may seem difficult to understand
why STAVKA was so preoccupied with that area, when the
overwhelming superiority of the Red Army might have been
able to destroy the bulk of the German army across south-
ern Russia with just a few more blows. The answer is to be
found by examining the composition of the German forces
within the bulge.
Lt. Gen. Theobald Lieb’s XLII Corps was composed of
the 5th SS Panzer Division Wiking, the Wallonien SS Brigade,
and Corps Detachment B (remnants of the 112th, 132nd and
255th Infantry Divisions). The XI Corps, commanded by Lt.
Gen. Wilhelm Stemmermann, consisted of the 57th, 72nd and
remnants of the 139th Infantry Divisions. Col. Georg von
Rittberg’s 88th Infantry Division had also been pushed into
the bulge. Elements of the 167th, 168th and 323rd Infantry Di-
visions, the 213th Security Division and the 14th Panzer Divi-
sion were also in the area. As the Soviets captured troops
and examined the dead from those divisions, they came to
believe the bulk of 1st Panzer and 8th Armies occupied the
bulge.
Konev and Vatutin therefore devised a plan based on the
November 1942 Stalingrad operation. It called for a double
envelopment of the bulge, with rifle and some tank units
manning the inner cordon. Mobile armored and mechanized
corps, supported by a few rifle divisions, would form an
outer encirclement in order to fend off the expected German
counterattack. The Soviets had practiced the procedure time
and again in wargames, but an operation of that scale had not
24 #3
WaW 3 Issue.indd 24
presented itself since Stalingrad.
The Soviets had a massive materiel and manpower su-
periority against the German forces inside the bulge. Even
with the inclusion of other divisions of the 1st Panzer and
8th Armies that would be engaged, the Soviets enjoyed a 2:1
superiority in men, 5:1 in tanks and 7:1 in artillery.
The German commanders harbored no illusions about
the seriousness of their position. Stemmermann’s chief of
staff, Col. Heinz Gaedcke, noted XI Corps had no second
line of defense, which would have been common practice in
earlier years.
Konev opened the battle on 24 January, sending a recon-
naissance in force against a 12-mile sector held by no more
than one German infantryman for each 15 yards of front.
That force made several penetrations, finding gaps in the
German line for the main attack elements to exploit.
Soviet plans called for the left wing of 40th Army (1st UK
Front), the right wing of 53rd Army (2nd UK Front) and all
of 4th Guards Army (2nd UK Front) to breach the German
defenses. The 5th Guards Tank Army (2nd UK Front) and 6th
Tank Army (1st UK Front) would follow, racing to link up
and forming a ring of steel that would fight off German relief
attacks.
On the 25th, Konev unleashed Maj. Gen. A.I. Ryzhov’s
4th Guards Army. He’d hoped for a penetration of at least 18
miles on that first day, but the attack met fierce resistance.
With interior lines of communication, German artillery ob-
servers were able to call in heavy concentrations of fire on
the massed Guards units. That covering fire allowed the Ger-
mans to retreat in good order.
Konev hadn’t planned to use Rotmistrov’s 5th Tank Army
until Ryzhov had cleared the way, but he was forced to play
his armored trump card early. The added weight of Rotmis-
trov’s tanks forced the Germans back about two and a half
miles, but 5th Guards Tank Army paid a heavy price. The
success of German anti-tank gunners could be seen by the
smoldering T-34s that dotted the snow-covered landscape.
Vatutin joined the assault at 5:40 a.m. on the 26th, hit-
ting the junction of the 198th and 88th Infantry Divisions with
a tremendous artillery barrage. After softening the German
defenses, three and a half Soviet rifle divisions (167th, 180th,
359th and part of the 377th), supported by tanks, moved for-
ward to attack the 198th. Despite heavy losses the Soviets
pressed forward, digging the Germans out of their trenches
and forcing them to fall back. T-34s sped on, moving into the
enemy rear area, disrupting supply and communication lines
to the front.
Toward evening the 198th was forced to retreat west,
while the 88th Infantry Division was pushed northwest. As
the gap between them grew wider, Lt. Gen. A.G. Kravchen-
ko sent through more armor from his 6th Tank Army, effec-
tively severing the link between XLII Corps and the rest of
1st Panzer Army. In the south, Konev moved fresh forces
into the breaches that had been created the previous day. The
weight of that attack succeeded in widening the penetration
and threatened to collapse the southern sector of the bulge.
The Germans countered by sending 11th and 14th Panzer Di-
visions (III Panzer Corps) to stop the Soviet armor.
Counterattacks by the two panzer divisions actually be-
gan to seal the breach, but the German divisions were too de-
pleted to finish the job. While Panthers and T-34s dueled on
the flanks, Rotmistrov pushed his main armored and mecha-
10/10/08 2:01:59 PM
 nized forces deeper into the German line. He ordered his
20th Tank Corps to head for Shpola, disregarding its flanks,
while 29th Tank Corps was to turn south and begin forming
the outer encirclement. Maj. Gen. Nikolaus von Vormann,
commander of XLVII Panzer Corps, described the battle in
dramatic terms.
Regardless of losses—and I really mean regardless
of losses—masses of Soviets streamed west past the
German tanks, which were firing at them with every-
thing they had. The dam had burst, and a huge flood
was pouring off the flat land past our tanks that, sur-
rounded by a few grenadiers, were like rocks tow-
ering in a swirling flood. Our amazement was even
greater when, later in the afternoon, the cavalry for-
mations of three Soviet divisions galloped through
our defensive fire in close order. It was something I
hadn’t seen in a long time. It just seemed unreal.
Von Vormann was right. The Soviet flood of men and
machines couldn’t be stopped by a few German “rocks.” The
smell of victory was in the air for the Soviets as 5th Guards
Tank and 6th Tank Armies moved closer to each other. Stem-
mermann and Lieb still had a chance to evacuate, but the
odds were growing worse with each passing hour. Repeated
requests to withdraw fell on deaf ears. Von Manstein was
already at Hitler’s headquarters, pleading the case for with-
drawal, and facing the wrath of the Fuehrer. Earlier in the
month, von Manstein had sent a telegram laying the blame
for his army group’s predicament directly on the high com-
WaW 3 Issue.indd 25
mand. Hitler was again furious, and during the meeting on
the 27th he told von Manstein: “If the end should come one
day, it should really be the field marshals and generals who
stand by the flags to the last!”
While von Manstein pleaded his case, the fate of XI and
XLII Corps was about to be sealed. Though 11th and 14th
Panzer Divisions, supported by elements of the 189th In-
fantry Division, continued to nip at Rotmistrov’s flanks, 5th
Guards Tank Army continued forward. The 4th Guards Army
was also making progress, supported by 18th Tank Corps and
5th Guards Cavalry Corps, which had just been brought out
of reserve.
Rotmistrov’s lead elements continued to follow their or-
ders from the previous day. By evening, Shpola had been
occupied. The 20th Tank Brigade, supported by a regiment of
infantry, was then sent racing toward the town of Lisyanka,
on the banks of the Gniloy Tikich River. Other units fol-
lowed to protect the flanks of that column. By midnight the
198th Infantry Division had been pushed back to the western
bank of the Gniloy Tikich, and Lisyanka was firmly in So-
viet hands.
The 198th continued to be assaulted on 28 January, its left
flank being pushed back by combined armor and infantry
attacks. Meanwhile, Soviet forces crossed the Gniloy Tikich
and forced the division’s right and center back some nine
miles. At 1:00 p.m. the 23rd Tank Brigade met their comrades
from 5th Guards Tank Army. The Cherkassy bulge was ef-
World at War 25
10/10/08 2:02:00 PM
 fectively sealed off as more armor and infantry units poured
into the area and began to form the inner ring of the cordon.
On other nearby sectors, Soviet forces were also creat-
ing havoc. Count von Rittberg’s 88th Division was franti-
cally building defenses across its rear area, being forced to
fight off attacks from every side by units of Lt. Gen. S.G.
Trofimenko’s 27th Army. The 389th Infantry Division was
also forced to fight on all fronts when the Soviet 25th Tank
Brigade found a gap in the line and assaulted the division’s
supply and communication area.
Messages were flashed to higher headquarters informing
army commanders of the situation. The commander of 5th SS
Panzer Division (Wiking), Gen. Herbert Otto Gille, bypassed
normal channels and flashed the following message straight
to SS Chief Heinrich Himmler: “In three hours the encircle-
ment of my division will be accomplished.”
The men trapped inside the encirclement occupied what
became known as the Cherkassy Kessel, the German mil-
itary’s term for “cauldron” or “pocket.” Though the town
of Cherkassy itself had actually been occupied by Russian
troops for some time, German news releases still referred
to the battle site as “the area near Cherkassy.” In any case,
no witch’s cauldron ever contained such horrors as could be
found in the Kessel.
Inside the Pocket
By far, the strongest German division inside the pocket
was Wiking. Though its Norwegian and Danish regiments
had been detached from the 11th SS Division, just about ev-
ery European nation was represented in its ranks, including
Dutch, Flemish, Swiss and Swedish volunteers. Finns, Esto-
nians and Volksdeutsch (ethnic Germans) from every eastern
No Man’s Land, WWII: Soviet infantry under fire.
26 #3
WaW 3 Issue.indd 26
European country were also included in the 15,000 men of
the division. Those men, along with the division’s 90 tanks
and assault guns, would play a crucial role in defending the
pocket.
The final days of January found the fighting intensifying,
as the Soviet commanders consolidated their outer and inner
cordons. The 5th Guards Tank Army continued to pummel
the infantry of the 198th Infantry Division but, with the help
of the 34th Infantry Division, those Germans held. More gen-
erally, though, the noose was continuing to tighten as 18th
Tank Corps battled the elements of 14th Panzer Division that
had been trapped. The 57th and 389th Infantry Divisions also
began to give way under heavy attacks, and were gradually
pushed north, increasing the distance between themselves
and any would-be rescuers. Hitler had given Stemmermann
overall command inside the pocket, and the general imme-
diately began to consolidate and shorten the lines of both
trapped corps.
At von Manstein’s headquarters the situation was tense.
“What are the Russians going to do?” the field marshal
asked. “Are they going to sink their teeth into the pocket,
or are they going to push on?” Once the answer was known,
von Manstein breathed a sigh of relief and, true to form, be-
gan to marshal forces for a counterattack.
Konev and Vatutin had indeed decided to “sink their
teeth into the pocket,” and they were drawing blood. Con-
ditions for the trapped Germans continued to deteriorate as
the Soviets mounted attack after attack. Soviet reinforce-
ments were also beginning to arrive on the outer defensive
ring. The 49th Rifle Corps (53rd Army) was moving its one
airborne and two rifle divisions into position to support 5th
Guards Tank Army. Other units followed, further strengthen-
ing 5th Guards Tank and 6th Tank armies.
Meanwhile the Luftwaffe was supplying the pocket with
food and ammunition, using an airfield at Korsun. The stur-
dy Ju-52 transports braved Soviet fighter planes and ground
fire to deliver their cargos and evacuate wounded.
On the final day of January the Soviets made a concerted
effort to eliminate two defensive cornerstones of the pocket.
Tanks and infantry hit the Narwa Battalion (Estonian) of the
Wiking Division. Reinforced with a panzer unit, the Esto-
nians held their ground. In the northwest sector, 88th Infantry
Division came under heavy artillery fire followed by massed
infantry attack. The attack forced back the 88th, but didn’t
achieve a breach in its line.
During the previous day’s fighting the eastern sector of
the pocket had remained quiet. That area was held by the
2,000 men of the Wallonien Brigade, under Lt. Col. Lucien
Lippert. Its members were Belgian volunteers who’d seen
plenty of action in recent months. Aside from some snip-
ing and skirmishing, though, the Soviets had so far only re-
cently assaulted them with propaganda. Speaking over loud-
speakers in French, Russian propagandists promised good
treatment, good food, and women for any who surrendered.
There were no takers.
While the Soviets continued pounding the shrinking pe-
rimeter of the pocket, von Manstein prepared for its relief.
He planned a two-pronged attack, with III Panzer Corps
hitting the Russians 12.5 miles southwest of Lisyanka, and
XLVII Panzer Corps attacking from the south.
The III Panzer Corps was formed around Heavy Tank
Regiment Baeke, which was raised especially for the opera-
10/10/08 2:02:01 PM
 tion. Baeke’s command consisted of Heavy
Panzer Battalion 503, with 45 Tiger tanks,
a tank battalion with 45 to 50 Panther
tanks, a Panzergrenadier regiment and two
artillery battalions. Elements of the 1st, 6th,
16th, and 17th Panzer Divisions were also
included in the corps, bringing the total
number of its tanks to 250. Von Manstein
also ordered the Leibstandarte Adolf Hit-
ler (LAH) SS Panzer Division, which had
just finished mopping up an enemy break-
through northeast of Vinnitza, to reinforce
III Panzer Corps with all possible speed.
The XLVII Panzer Corps would even-
tually consist of the 3rd, 11th, 13th, 14th and
24th Panzer Divisions, which were all
heavily engaged elsewhere. Von Manstein
planned to use whatever elements he had
available to begin the attack, and reinforce
them with the rest of the units as soon as
they could disengage and reach the new
battlefront. Time was of the essence, as the
forces inside the pocket were being driven
ever farther away from the relief units. Hit-
ler approved the plan only after stating its
mission was to open a corridor to maintain
contact with the two encircled corps. He
still had no intention of giving up his last hold on the Dnepr Finally they broke off the engagement and moved to rejoin
River. Stemmermann was informed the relief operation was their adoptive division.
due to begin on 3 February. In the meantime he gave orders While Stemmermann continued to consolidate his lines,
to further shorten the line on the eastern side of the pocket. the relief forces began to arrive at their jump off points.
The weather in January had been frightful, with blizzard Having made their way through rivers of mud, those panzers
conditions and temperatures around five degrees Fahrenheit formed for the attack; however, situations on other sectors of
the norm. Then, on 1 February, the unpredictable Russian the front were forcing a change of plan.
winter gave both armies a surprise. Just as the order to short- The 24th Panzer Division, which von Vormann had
en the line went out, a sudden thaw made the movement of planned to use to spearhead the XLVII Panzer Corps attack,
heavy equipment almost impossible. The German infantry was ordered back to its original position near Nikopol be-
were also in bad shape. Many of them retreated with their cause of a new Soviet threat in that area. Also, the attack
boots tied around their necks, rather than having to stop and elements of both panzer corps were arriving piecemeal be-
retrieve them after the mud sucked them off their feet every cause many units were having problems disengaging from
few steps. the enemy.
Even so, as darkness fell each day, sub-freezing tem- Despite those problems, the relief operation began on 3
peratures returned. By morning the panzers and other heavy February, when 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions hit the Soviet
equipment, which had earlier sunk axle-deep in mud, were 104th Rifle Corps, piercing its line and making a significant
frozen solid into the ground. Torches, pick axes, and some- penetration into the defenses. Their objective was a cross-
times small amounts of explosives, had to be used to free the ing on the Gniloy Tikich. Elements of the LAH, 34th Infantry
vehicles before the withdrawal could continue. and 198th Infantry were used to shield the flanks from enemy
Soviet reconnaissance units soon reported the new with- counterattacks.
drawal. In the east, Lipper’s Walloons became the target of In the south, 11th Panzer and a battlegroup from 13th Pan-
a new assault. Infantry from Lt. Gen. K.A. Koroteev’s 52nd zer Division made slight progress against enemy positions;
Army hit a thinly defended sector along the Dnepr. The few however, knee-deep mud and stiffening resistance then
dozen men holding the line there were quickly overwhelmed. made further advances impossible. The 3rd Panzer Division
The Walloons then launched a counterattack to retake the claimed 35 enemy anti-tank guns and 10 mortars destroyed
area. They succeeded, after vicious fighting, but it was all in as well as 200 to 300 enemy soldiers killed. It then became
vain. As the last of the Soviets were ejected, the Walloons’ involved in heavy defensive fighting as the Soviets counter-
field telephone rang. The order was short and to the point: attacked with unnerving courage in an effort to retake lost
“[Make a] General retreat from that sector.” ground.
When the Walloons made their way back to their brigade Inside the pocket Stemmermann ordered the 88th Infan-
headquarters, they found themselves in the midst of a new try, Corps Detachment B, and Wiking Division to retake
battle. The brigade was under orders to hold in order to cover ground in the direction of the relief force. The German in-
the retreat of Wiking Division. For 10 hours they held off fantry suffered many casualties with little to show for it. So-
charge after charge by Koroteev’s troops, giving the SS di- viet soldiers tenaciously held on to every foot of ground and
vision time to establish a new defensive line farther west. stopped the attack in its tracks. A doctor in Wiking Division
World at War 27

WaW 3 Issue.indd 27 10/10/08 2:02:03 PM

 wrote in his diary: “We had heavy casualties. My dressing
station was overflowing to the point we had to use all avail-
able transport to get the unattended wounded to the main
field hospital.”
Soviet commanders were far from idle during that phase
of the relief effort. Vatutin sent his front reserve, Gen. S.I.
Bogdanov’s 2nd Tank Army, to meet the assault of III Panzer
Corps. At the same time, Konev ordered 5th Guards Mecha-
nized Corps to move into position opposite XLVII Panzer
Corps, effectively halting the German attack in that sector.
Soviet psychological warfare efforts also increased in
intensity. Gen. Gille received a handwritten letter from Lt.
Gen. Walter von Seydlitz, who’d been captured at Stalingrad
and gone on to become president of the League of German
Officers. (That was a Kremlin-sponsored organization of
newly minted anti-fascists who, after having become Soviet
POWs, agreed to do propaganda and other such “psy ops”
for their erstwhile enemy.) He promised good treatment for
the soldiers and an early release from captivity after the war
if they surrendered.
Calls for surrender were also directed toward the lower
ranks. Former German enlisted men from the National Free
Germany Committee, another defector organization, spoke
through loudspeakers from the Soviet line. They promised
everything soldiers in combat dream of, if only they would
surrender.
The weather continued to hamper the German effort. By
5 February mud had caused both airfields inside the pocket
to close. Construction of a new airstrip was quickly started
on drier ground, but it wasn’t operational until the 9th. The
transport force tried to make good use of the respite because,
between 19 January and 4 February, no fewer than 44 air-
craft had been shot down or lost though accidents.
Despite the weather and the arrival of additional Soviet
reinforcements, III Panzer Corps continued to struggle for-
ward. Units arriving by rail and road were quickly thrown
into the battle. For example, most of the LAH was still strug-
gling to get to the battle area. It was ordered to advance with
all possible speed to reinforce the attacking forces of III
Panzer Corps, but the same conditions that had forced the
airfields to close also affected the division’s timetable.
The LAH reported the bulk of its units were stuck in the
mud on roads west of the battle zone. The mud was so deep
even the Panthers—the best cross-country tanks the Ger-
mans had—were mired down. The bridges throughout the
area were inadequate for heavy traffic, and the uneven terrain
and forests prevented easy off-road passage. Von Vormann’s
XLVII Panzer Corps was in even worse shape. A member of
3rd Panzer Division wrote that his division was “completely
mired in the mud. All movement is choked by the mire—all
vehicles are stuck fast.”
Soviet forces were also continuing to mount heavy coun-
terattacks in the XLVII Panzer Corps area of operations. That
salient, attacked on three sides, was itself in danger of being
cut off. Stemmermann could not soon expect help from von
Vormann.
The commanders inside the pocket followed the strug-
gles of the relief forces with growing concern. Their own
defensive perimeter continued to shrink as Soviet attacks
made slow but steady progress against the encircled corps.
As a result, the gains made by III Panzer Corps were all but
negated by enemy advances against the southern and west-
ern sectors of the pocket.
28 #3
WaW 3 Issue.indd 28
It became obvious to the field commanders both inside
and outside the pocket that Stemmermann would have to ad-
vance at least part way to meet the rescuers. The situation
was broadly the same as it had been at Stalingrad: the relief
force was too weak, and the encircled forces, with orders to
stand fast, couldn’t aid in their own rescue.
The thaw continued to worsen ground conditions, mak-
ing the timely movement of men and equipment to their
assigned assembly areas nearly impossible. Bodies of both
sides’ soldiers killed in the fighting simply disappeared into
the quagmire. A thoroughly frustrated Stemmermann was
forced to radio he would need more time to assemble his
units for a concerted breakout attempt.
On 8 February, Baeke’s panzers reached the Gniloy Ti-
kich, but those exhausted Germans could go no farther. The
Soviets had fortified the eastern bank of the river, making a
crossing impossible. Red Army commanders had learned a
great deal after two and a half years of warring against the
Germans, and the courage and determination of the Soviet
soldiers was at a peak. Realizing the plan had failed, III Pan-
zer Corps commander, Lt. Gen. Hermann Breith, ordered
Baeke to pull out of the salient and head south to assemble
for a new attack.
The Soviets had suffered heavy losses in their success-
ful bid to stop the German attack, but they had also inflicted
substantial casualties on III Panzer Corps. On 9 February,
16th Panzer Division reported having only four operational
tanks, despite its maintenance shops working around the
clock to return damaged armored vehicles to the fight.
As III Panzer Corps redeployed, the bulk of 1st Pan-
zer Division was finally arriving at the new assembly area,
bringing with it 80 tanks. The LAH had also finally gotten
most of its elements into position to support the infantry di-
vision that would guard the left flank in the new effort.
While III Panzer Corps reassembled for the next assault,
Stemmermann made still more adjustments to his defensive
perimeter. The weather seemed to be cooperating somewhat,
and he was able to shorten the line without many problems.
Maj. Gen. Hermann Hohn’s 72nd Infantry Division, the stron-
gest division inside the pocket except for Wiking, was taken
out of the line and placed in reserve. Stemmermann planned
to use that unit as a battering ram to breach the Soviet ring
when it came time for the final effort. Luftwaffe transports
were once again supplying the pocket; so he was certain he
would have the necessary ammunition for the upcoming
battle.
On 10 February more rain started to fall, making the mud
an even greater problem. Even so, the transport planes con-
tinued to land on the newly constructed airstrip near Korsun,
delivering their cargos and taking out wounded.
Breakout
Von Manstein would have liked to wait for the weather
to clear, but the casualties his divisions had suffered during
the past two weeks made further delay impossible. He could
expect no more replacements, and the Soviets were continu-
ing to assemble in ever-greater numbers on his flanks. If he
gave them time, they would surely attack anew, forcing his
depleted corps out of striking range of the pocket. There was
only one choice: attack on the 11th, before the Soviets could
marshal enough manpower to attack again.
The main effort of the new assault was to be aimed at
the center of the Soviet line. Soviet units had been moved
10/10/08 2:02:04 PM
 The end for some: German troops surrendering.
from that sector to counter the earlier attack of III and XLVI
Panzer Corps. German unit commanders were told the new
attempt would be an all or nothing proposition. If it failed,
the forces inside the pocket were doomed.
German artillery opened the assault at 6:00 a.m. on the
morning of 11 February with a brief, intense barrage. Be-
fore the surprised Soviets could recover, the tanks of 16th and
17th Panzer Divisions, as well as Baeke’s regiment, crushed
their first defensive line and continued east. To their right 1st
Panzer Division rolled forward under a barrage of its own.
On the left the LAH and 198th I.D. also fought to enlarge the
salient, taking two villages after heavy fighting.
Against fierce opposition, III Panzer Corps went for-
ward. In a surprise assault, a battlegroup of 1st Panzer Divi-
sion took a village on the Gniloy Tikich. That battlegroup
also managed to capture a bridge, and a bridgehead was
soon established on the eastern bank. Engineers were called
forward to strengthen the span so heavy tanks could cross.
The Soviets reacted quickly to the threat, however, rushing
reinforcements to the area. They used the nearby hilly terrain
to keep the bridgehead under fire, making further progress
impossible for those Germans.
Maj. Gen. Richard Koll, 1st Panzer Division commander,
ordered his men to turn south. After fighting all day, they
made a surprise assault on Lisyanka in the final hours of the
11th. That attack succeeded and, before the sun rose on the
12th, the southern part of the town was in German hands.
Lt. Ciliox, one of the German tank platoon leaders there,
was startled to hear his regimental commander’s voice over
the radio. “Ciliox,” the voice thundered, “Schnell vor an die
Brucke!” (“Get to the bridge quickly!”)
Under fire from the opposite shore, Ciliox led his tanks
through the burning town at full speed. He reached the river
but, just as his driver started across the first span, Soviet en-
gineers blew up the structure, turning it into a twisted mass
of steel.
WaW 3 Issue.indd 29
The Soviets many have been caught napping at Lisy-
anka, but Vatutin and Konev were again quick to react. The
4th Guards Army was ordered to move elements of its 21st
Rifle Corps into that sector with all possible speed. Other
units, including 5th Guards Cavalry Corps and elements of
1st Guards, 5th Guards, and 2nd Tank Armies were also rushed
to the area to set up a block to counter the German assault.
Marshal Georgi Zhukov, STAVKA’s representative, had
been overall coordinator of 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts’
earlier attacks. He now assumed direct control of the So-
viet forces stationed in the outer ring of the pocket, leaving
Konev in control of the inner ring.
While Koll’s men searched for another way to cross the
Gniloy Tikich, Zhukov ordered his forces to renew their at-
tack on the flanks of the salient. Early on the 12th, as 1st Pan-
zer was mopping up Soviet resistance in Lisyanka, Soviet
armored units began to hit the LAH on the German flank,
but that division managed to drive off each attack. Elements
of the LAH were also rushed to the aid of its neighbor in the
line, the 198th Infantry Division, which was also being hard
pressed. With the help of Stuka anti-tank aircraft, the So-
viet penetrations were sealed off and destroyed. As fighting
raged up and down the left flank of the German salient, the
LAH received the following message from III Panzer Corps
headquarters: “The Fuehrer expects the Leibstandarte to
hold fast under all circumstances! The continuation of the
III Panzer Corps thrust is not possible otherwise!”
Fortune smiled on the Germans on Sunday, 13 February,
when one enterprising tank commander in 1st Panzer Divi-
sion found a ford in the Gniloy Tikich near the blown bridge.
As his Panther made its way across the 30-yard-wide river,
other tanks of his platoon followed. Soviet tanks immedi-
ately opened fire, but the Germans continued to push onto
the enemy held shore. Before long two Panther companies,
along with men from the 113th Panzergrenadier Regiment,
were across the river. As the bridgehead expanded, the Ger-
mans’ luck held. They discovered an intact bridge, strong
World at War 29
10/10/08 2:02:05 PM
 enough to hold armor, on the very northern edge of Lisy-
anka. After the T-34s guarding it were destroyed, III Panzer
Corps finally had its crossing.
With one eye on Lisyanka, Zhukov kept pressure on the
German flanks. The Baeke Regiment and 16th Panzer Di-
vision were locked in brutal combat around the village of
Dzhurzhentsy. To the southeast, 17th Panzer Division was
also heavily engaged. Few elements of any of those units
could be spared to reinforce a deeper relief effort. There was,
though, only one more obstacle between the relief force and
the pocket. Near the village of Dzhurzhentsy was a hill iden-
tified as “Hill 239” on German maps.
On the 14th, 1st Panzer Division received orders to take
that promontory. The division was down to just 10 operation-
al panzers, and it had only two battalions of infantry inside
the bridgehead. Nevertheless, the attack was launched. The
Germans took the tiny village of Oktybar, midway between
Lisyanka and Hill 239. Once past there, however, they ran
into an impenetrable wall of Soviet fire. Elements of Baeke’s
regiment, the LAH and the 16th Panzer Division joined in the
attack, but they were also repulsed.
Soviet tanks counterattacked, forcing the Germans onto
the defensive. During the following two days attack was fol-
lowed by counterattack. Panthers and T-34s slugged it out
with little room to maneuver. It became increasingly appar-
ent III Panzer Corps had shot its bolt. At OKH (German high
command headquarters), a member of the staff wrote: “Feb-
ruary 14—the nervous strain becomes agonizing…A dis-
tance of only eight kilometers [five miles] separates Group
Stemmermann from liberation, and today it looks as if they
would not be made; there is not much time left. February
15—still eight kilometers [to go].”
While III Panzer Corps was desperately trying to reach
the pocket, Stemmermann’s troops were also engaged in
heavy combat. On 7 February he received orders from 8th
Army to “shorten your front lines and move the pocket in
the direction of [the relief force] in order to be able, when
the time comes, to break out toward the forces mounting the
relief attack from outside.”
He therefore ordered Wiking Division, the Wallonien Bri-
gade and 88th I.D. to abandon their positions in the north
of the pocket. The assembly point for the new retreat was
Korsun. As the Germans trudged through the mud, their way
was lit by burning vehicles that were destroyed after becom-
ing stuck.
Soviet artillery had a field day. Using the burning tanks
and trucks as aiming points, they fired barrage after barrage
at the struggling infantry. With their few remaining tanks and
assault guns, the Germans kept enemy armor at bay as the re-
treat continued. Units arriving at Korsun were sorted out and
formed into new ad hoc battlegroups. If the encircled troops
were to meet their rescuers, the villages of Komarovka, and
Khilki would have to be secured.
On the night of 11 February the men of the 72nd Infantry
Division moved silently forward. They halted just in front
of the enemy trenches. The plan was to take the enemy by
surprise, but an alert sentry sounded the alarm just as the
Germans started to attack. It was too late, however, for the
Soviets manning those forward defenses. The Germans took
those trenches in bloody hand-to-hand fighting. ately trying to dislodge the stubborn units of Rotmistrov’s 5th
Twelve February saw Wiking Division fortify the area
against the expected Soviet counterattacks. Meanwhile the
Walloons relived units of the 72nd I.D., which then moved
30 #3
WaW 3 Issue.indd 30
on Komarovka, which was in turn stubbornly defended by
entrenched Soviet troops. Nevertheless those Russians were
pushed back slowly, even as large amounts of Red Army ar-
tillery joined in the fight. It wasn’t until the following morn-
ing the village was fully controlled by the Germans. The
Germans had killed 96 of the enemy and captured 500 more.
They had also destroyed eight tanks, 11 mortars and three
anti-aircraft guns during the battle.
Stemmermann then faced a problem that had plagued
many east front generals during the war. The Germans
evacuated Korsun on the 13th, destroying the airfield there,
and also abandoning their main hospital. Lightly wounded
troops were loaded on trucks, horse drawn carts and tanks
for the impending breakout; however, there was no transport
for the severely wounded. Those men—there were more than
2,000 of them—were left behind with a volunteer doctor, in
the hope the Soviets would treat them properly. No one ever
found out what happened to them once they fell into Soviet
hands.
New Soviet counterattacks meanwhile threatened to wipe
out the recent German gains. Wiking Division in particular
had to withstand further heavy Soviet artillery and armored
attacks. The Walloons were also manning an increasingly
tenuous defense line. The brigade, down to less than half-
strength, was facing a vastly superior enemy. It had only
five tanks and four anti-tank guns to repel the new assaults.
On 14 February they were hit by several Soviet attacks. The
weather had turned much colder, and a layer of snow cov-
ered the men as they lay shivering in their foxholes.
At about 7:00 a.m. the much-feared rocket artillery of the
Red Army opened fire. Hot on the heels of the barrage, 15
T-34s, supported by infantry, quickly overran the Walloons’
outlying defenses and poured into their perimeter. One of
the two German tanks present was destroyed as it fired at
the enemy from pointblank range. The other withdrew so it
could better maneuver on the open steppe.
Inside the Walloons’ perimeter hell broke loose. Lip-
per organized his men into hunter-killer groups. Volunteers
stalked T-34s with Panzerfausts, and turned several into
blazing hulks. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting took place. Fi-
nally the Soviets were pushed back. In a bloody two-hour
battle, they lost six tanks and scores of dead. The Walloons
also paid a heavy price, suffering 200 casualties. Later in the
day Lippert fell, a bullet through the head, as he led his men
in an assault toward the southeast. Throughout the next two
days, against all odds, the Walloons held.
While the Walloons were locked in their desperate strug-
gle, the 72nd I.D. was engaged in two separate actions: one
offensive, the other defensive. Its 124th Infantry Regiment
was in Komarovka, dug in and defending against combined
armored and infantry attack. At the same time, Maj. Rob-
ert Kaestner’s 105th Infantry Regiment, took up positions at
Khilki. It seemed each new battle could not possibly exceed
the brutality of the last, but Khilki was just as bad, or worse,
than Komarovka. The 105th sustained heavy losses, but in-
flicted even greater losses on the Soviets. When the firing
ceased, the village was still in the hands of the bloodied,
weary Landser.
Throughout the 15th, III Panzer Corps had been desper-
Guards Tank Army from Hill 239; however, even the famed
“tank buster” Stukas of Maj. Hans Ulrich Rudel failed to
make a dent there. Finally, III Panzer Corps sent the follow-
10/10/08 2:02:05 PM
 Red armor: Soviet T-34/85 tank.
ing order to those in the pocket: “Capacity for action of III
Panzer Corps limited. Group Stemmermann must perform
breakthrough as far as Hill 239 by its own effort. There, link
up with III Panzer Corps.”
The wording of the order proved to be a catalyst for di-
saster, as it didn’t mention the fact Hill 239 was still in en-
emy hands. Perhaps those at III Panzer Corps headquarters
still believed they would soon take the hill, but their failure
to warn Stemmermann he could expect to run into heavy So-
viet troop concentrations in that area effectively meant death
for thousands of German soldiers.
Luftwaffe transports dropped their final supplies to
Group Stemmermann on the 16th. By that time the Kessel
had shrunk to an area of about three by four miles. Its inte-
rior was jammed with troops waiting for the breakout, while
Komarovka and Khilki remained the objects of bitter fight-
ing.
The breakout would start at 11:00 p.m. Three separate
avenues of attack, with Corps Detachment B on the right,
72nd I.D. in the center and Wiking on the left, would push
into the enemy defenses. Supply and rear echelon troops, the
wounded, and the remnants of the other shattered divisions,
would follow. A rearguard, provided by 57th and 88th Infantry
Divisions would hold the Soviets at bay. The password for
the operation was “Freiheit” (freedom).
A fierce wind was blowing as the lead elements moved
out, and snow stung the Germans’ faces as the temperature
plummeted. All weapons and equipment that couldn’t be
brought along had been destroyed, and the wounded were
crammed on trucks, tanks and horse drawn carts. Only as
the lead assault troops moved forward did III Panzer Corps
finally inform Stemmermann that Hill 239 was still in enemy
hands. Sadly for his trapped command, much of the radio
equipment inside the pocket had just been destroyed.
WaW 3 Issue.indd 31
The men were ordered to take the outlying Soviet de-
fense posts with cold steel, so as not to alert the enemy pre-
maturely. The artillery was actually positioned in front of the
infantry. In case the ruse failed, it was to blast an opening
for the infantry just before the gunners destroyed their own
weapons.
The lead German elements moved silently through the
night. It took them more than four hours to reach Hill 239,
which they believed was occupied by III Panzer Corps. Sud-
denly they saw the broad silhouettes of Soviet T-34s at the
top of the hill. Skirting the northern slope, the lead battalion
made contact with a Soviet trench line. The attack began and,
using bayonets, entrenching tools, knives and rifle butts, the
Germans overran the Soviet defenses. The rest of the 105th
Infantry Regiment quickly followed.
They were through the Soviet line, but the fleeing enemy
alerted their comrades on Hill 239. Flares lit the night as
tanks, mortars, machineguns and artillery caught the bulk of
the 72nd Infantry Division as it tried to follow its lead regi-
ment. All plans for an orderly escape fell apart as columns
of men searched for a way to escape the Soviet guns. The
105th pressed forward and, after a while, they saw another
group of tanks silhouetted against the snow. This time they
recognized them as German tanks. Tears of joy rolled down
their faces as they embraced their comrades from III Panzer
Corps. They had made it, but at a terrible cost. Only three
weeks before the 105th had a strength of 27 officers and
1,082 men. Only three officers and 216 men of the regiment
survived the pocket.
Zhukov and Konev were yet again quick to react. It was
clear to them a major breakout was underway. They flashed
orders to their corps and division commanders to stop the
escaping Germans at all costs.
World at War 31
10/10/08 2:02:06 PM
 The rest of 72nd Infantry Division wasn’t as lucky as the
105th Regiment. Trying to maneuver along a southerly route
around Hill 239, it ran a gauntlet of fire from entrenched
Soviet troops. Most of the division finally fought its way
through, but it also suffered high casualties in the process.
Corps Detachment B was also successful in the opening
stages of the breakout, as Soviet forward positions fell to
the bayonets of its assault troops. Several regimental groups
then found gaps on the both sides of Hill 239, and made it to
German lines.
As the Soviets across the area became fully alerted, how-
ever, many German battlegroups were pushed south by their
heavy fire. Intermingled with remnants of the 72nd Infantry
Division and the Wiking Division, the unlucky units left a
trail of dead and wounded on the snow-covered steppe as
they moved.
The grenadiers of the Wiking Division ran into the same
fierce resistance that had plagued the other assault groups.
Remnants of the division’s panzer force were heavily en-
gaged. With the reconnaissance battalion leading the way,
the division slipped south of Hill 239 at about the same time
the 105th Regiment made it out.
The temperature stood at 24 degrees Fahrenheit as dawn
broke. Blizzard conditions made the nightmare of the break-
out complete as German and Soviet soldiers fought each
other in the cold; the blowing snow making it almost impos-
sible to tell friend from foe until face-to-face.
Pure luck decided which German columns made it to
safety unscathed and which ones suffered heavy losses. Maj.
Gen. Lieb, in overall command of the assault, led his men
toward the Gniloy Tikich. Unknown to him, Stemmermann
was dead. He’d begun the fight leading the rearguard on
foot. When his strength gave out, he halted a horse drawn
cart and climbed aboard. A short time later an anti-tank shell
hit that vehicle, blowing it to pieces and killing everyone on
it.
Lieb and his staff reached the Gniloy Tikich at about
midday. The sight that greeted them was like a scene out of
Dante’s Inferno. Thousands of soldiers milled around on the
eastern bank of the river even as Soviet artillery continued to
pound the area. Wounded and dead lay everywhere.
The Gniloy Tikich, more than six feet deep, had a swift
current due to the earlier thaw and rain. Small ice flows,
formed during the recent freezing temperatures, also dotted
the river. It was the final barrier, but there wasn’t a bridge in
sight. A footbridge, as well as a heavier bridge built by engi-
neers of 1st Panzer Division, lay a mile and a half north.
Gen. Gille, after appraising the situation when his bat-
tlegroup arrived, ordered his last vehicles to drive into the
river, hoping to form a makeshift bridge. Most of the ve-
hicles were swept away. Next he formed his men into hu-
man chains, but those also broke in the heavy current. Some
of the more enterprising men found tree limbs, which they
clung to as they paddled across.
Suddenly a new alarm was raised: enemy tanks were ap-
proaching from the east. That cry set off a panic among the
Germans. Men stripped off their clothing and plunged into
the icy water. Some made three or four crossings, bringing
non-swimmers with them on each trip. As the Soviet tanks
approached, the last panzers of Wiking Division turned to
meet them. They engaged the T-34s at pointblank range until
they were destroyed by the mass of enemy armor. Once they
32 #3
WaW 3 Issue.indd 32
annihilated the panzers, the T-34s moved among the gullies
on the eastern bank, crushing wounded Germans as they
tried to crawl to cover. The river filled with human wreck-
age, as thousands of Germans swam for their lives.
The Other Side of the River
Once on the western shore, the Germans still had to move
through a storm of tank and artillery fire as they ran through
the snow. On reaching Lisyanka, the survivors told the men
of 1st Panzer Division of the tragedy occurring to the south.
That division’s engineers raced to the scene and began to
throw up footbridges, even as the Soviets continued to blast
away with artillery and tanks.
More men made it to the western bank, and by the end of
the day only the dead remained on the eastern shore. An esti-
mated 35,000 Germans escaped from the Cherkassy pocket,
but the divisions had lost almost all of their heavy weapons
and vehicles.
The Soviets had struck a severe blow to von Manstein’s
army group. Two corps had been effectively taken out, and
the path to the southwest Ukraine lay open. Soviet propa-
ganda at the time grossly inflated German casualties, but the
reality was indeed bad enough. One of the enlisted German
survivors wrote a letter to the author in 1989 in which he
summed up his feelings about the battle and the breakout:
“The [German] military commanders saw it as an excellent
operation—35,000 men escaped! However, the soldiers who
were there regarded it as sad, bestial massacre.”
at
Sources
Degrelle, Leon. Campaign in Russia. Torrance Institute for Historical
Review, 1985.
Dupuy, Trevor. Great Battles on the East Front. New York: Bobbs-Mer-
rill, 1982.
Kleine, Egon. Tiger. Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag, 1981.
Kurowski, Franz. Sturmartillerie, Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag, 1981.
Lehmann, Rudolf. The Leibstandarte, vol. IV. Winnipeg: J.J. Fedorow-
icz Publishing, 1993.
Seaton, Albert. The Russo-German War. New York: Praeger, 1970.
Steinhoff, Johannes. Voices from the Third Reich. Washington DC: Reg-
nery, 1989.
Strassner, Peter. European Volunteers. Winnipeg: J.J. Fedorowicz Pub-
lishing, 1988.
Ziemke, Earl. Stalingrad to Berlin. Washington, D.C.: Center of Mili-
tary History, 1968.
10/10/08 2:02:06 PM
 On the Seas
Japanese Theater Strategy &
Transport Shipping, 1944
In mid-1944, the Japanese high
commanded decided to fight another
“decisive battle,” this time in the Phil-
ippines. That defensive strategy was
easy to plan but hard to execute. For
example, the histories of two Japanese
reinforcement convoys intended for
the Philippines are proof that plan-
ning strategy and executing it are two
separate activities. In short, convoying
soldiers to the Philippines turned into
a nightmare, and one of the army units
that found itself in that nightmare was
the 23rd Infantry Division.
In November 1944, before the US
invasion of Luzon, Gen. Tomoyuki
Yamashita had planned on launching
a strong counterattack against that in-
evitable invasion. One of several staff
estimates determined the Philippines
needed 15 divisions and eight inde-
pendent mixed-brigades to fight and
win the decisive battle; however, by
the end of October there were only 10
divisions and four brigades in those is-
lands.
In November and December, Im-
perial General Headquarters sent
Yamashita three more infantry divi-
sions: 10th, 19th and 23rd, but each ar-
rived seriously under-strength. Two of
the divisions (10th and 23rd) lost large
numbers of men and tons of equipment
to American submarines and aircraft.
In all, then, administrative reductions
made prior to sailing, air and subma-
rine attack, and transport shortfalls left
Yamashita with less than two fully ar-
rived divisions.
The 23rd Division, also known as the
“Sunrise Division,” was a truly hard-
luck outfit. It had suffered 80 percent
casualties when the Soviets engaged it
at Nomonhan, Mongolia, in 1939. In
the ensuing years the army reconstitut-
ed it and, in late 1944, moved it from
southern Manchuria to Japan. The divi-
sion was then near full-strength, for it
hadn’t been reduced earlier in the year,
as had many other divisions, in order to
fill-out expeditionary units sent to the
Central Pacific.
WaW 3 Issue.indd 33
In Japan, escort carrier Shinyo—
actually the ex-German passenger
liner Scharnhorst renamed Divine
Hawk—with 14 aircraft, one brand
new destroyer escort sailing on her
first mission, and seven corvette-type
Kaibokans assembled to escort Con-
voy HI-81. On 14 November, five
large transports (three of which had
been completed during the war), five
large tankers (four of which were war-
built), and the nine escorts, with a rear
admiral commanding, departed Imari
Bay, Kyushu. The soldiers were to de-
bark at Manila, while the tankers were
to continue south to Singapore.
Had the Japanese organized things
differently, it could have been a fast
convoy, for all the transports were rated
at 17 knots or better. Because some of
the tankers were slower than 17 knots,
and two of the escorts cruised at 14
knots, HI-81 would maintain the stan-
dard convoy speed of only 12 knots.
The five transports were the 9,533-ton
Kibitsu Maru, the 11,000-ton Akitsu
Maru, the 9,433-ton Mayasan Maru,
the 8,108-ton Shinshu Maru, and
the 6,863-ton Kiyokawa Maru (that
last was an ex-seaplane carrier). The
Japanese had purpose-built the first
four ships as assault transport/landing
ships. The five maru altogether carried
some 18,000 soldiers.
During the first half of 1944, “fast
convoys” out of Japan averaged seven
days to Manila. Since then, the US
submarine threat had increased; so HI-
81 would require 19 days, due to cir-
cuitous routing and anchoring inshore
at night.
The convoy had hardly departed be-
fore it found itself in danger. American
MAGIC code breakers had deciphered
both the convoy’s port of origin and its
route. Two US wolfpacks, totaling six
submarines, headed into its path. Late
on the morning of 15 November, USS
Queenfish approached the convoy’s
port flank and spotted transport Akitsu
Maru (Dragonfly Transport). In Janu-
ary 1942, the Army had converted that
incomplete passenger liner into an
aircraft ferry with a flight deck. She
now carried soldiers of the 64th In-
fantry Regiment of the 23rd Division.
Also tucked below deck was the 20th
Sea Raiding Battalion and over 100
of their plywood suicide boats. That
unit’s unenviable mission was to crash
their munitions-loaded boats into
American invasion shipping.
Ignoring the presence of Japanese
anti-submarine aircraft aloft, the sub-
merged Queenfish stalked what her
skipper believed was an aircraft carrier
but that was, in fact, the Akitsu Maru.
Four stern tube torpedoes were soon
headed toward the transport. At 11:56
a.m. one of those torpedoes exploded
her magazine, which included depth
charges to be carried on the suicide
boats. She turned over and went down
in under three minutes, taking with her
over 2,300 men.
November 17 found Convoy HI-
81 in more trouble. At 6:15 p.m. sub-
merged USS Picuda put two torpedoes
into the two-year-old, 20.8-knot, at-
tack transport Mayasan Maru (Maya
Mountain Transport). One torpedo
hit an aft hold, while a second hit the
engine room. Aboard were 4,500 men
of the division, including two battal-
ions of the division’s 13th Field Artil-
lery Regiment. Large landing craft and
supplies of all kinds occupied space on
the vessel’s upper deck.
Mayasan Maru sank in two and
a half minutes, and 3,432 passengers
and crew and 204 horses perished.
The division’s headquarters personnel
were aboard, so the chief of staff and
most of the staff officers died. Today
one might sniff at recording the death
of 204 horses next to that of thousands
of men, but horses were important to
the foot-mobile Japanese.
Soon after Mayasan Maru sank,
the sun set. At that time of day there
wasn’t much an escort carrier could
do to protect herself, so Shinyo had
World at War 33
10/10/08 2:02:07 PM
 to trust to darkness, luck and her es-
corts. That trust was misplaced. USS
Spadefish lay in wait as the convoy ap-
proached. At 11:03 p.m. she executed a
surfaced and radar-directed attack that
sent four torpedoes for Shinyo. Three
touched off Shinyo’s fore and aft avia-
tion gasoline tanks. Huge explosions,
and the resulting fires, put her under in
30 minutes. Of the 1,160 aboard, some
1,100 died.
According to traditional calcula-
tions, Shinyo was the big prize, but
the two transports were actually much
more significant kills. Manpower loss-
es throughout the convoy were awful.
The Japanese lost 6,832 soldiers and
sailors killed, which number was al-
34 #3
WaW 3 Issue.indd 34
most identical to all US Marines and
sailors that would be killed during the
entire Iwo Jima campaign. Soldiers
rescued from Akitsu Maru and Mayas-
an Maru totaled about 1,800. Included
were wounded men who somehow
managed to stay afloat in the cold wa-
ter. Those still physically fit enough
to serve required complete re-outfit-
ting, from uniforms to weapons. Not
counting sailors and merchantmen,
over 7,000 soldiers had been killed or
rendered ineffective, about 40 percent
of the 23rd Division’s strength.
The 64th Infantry partly recon-
stituted itself after it reached Luzon,
but those 1,250 ill-trained newcomers
were poor substitutes for the long-ser-
vice veterans lost with Akitsu Maru.
Equipment for the replacements was
also much less satisfactory than that
lost on Akitsu Maru. Nor could the
Japanese depots in the Philippines ful-
ly reconstitute the artillery regiment,
for too many guns and too many ex-
pert artillerymen had been lost.
During the night of 17-18 Novem-
ber, when Shinyo went down, subma-
rines were simultaneously assaulting
nearby southbound Convoy MI-27.
MAGIC intercepts had also compro-
mised that convoy’s origin and rout-
ing. On 15 November, 10 maru gross-
ing 59,000 tons had departed Moji,
Kyushu, with an ultimate destination
of Miri, Borneo. MI-27 sailed in close
proximity to HI-81. At times MI-27
and HI-81 were so close together they
appeared to be one large convoy.
All five of MI-27’s escorts were
small. Two were tiny 130-ton, 11-
knot, war-built auxiliary sub-chasers,
each carrying just 22 depth charges. At
11 knots, actually chasing a submarine
was the last thing they could do, but
their silhouettes might deter a cautious
submarine skipper.
Because of wartime ship losses,
MI-27 contained a majority of war-
built maru, in this case, seven out
of 10. The yards had completed the
6,892-ton Type 2AT emergency tanker
Enkei Maru just two weeks earlier.
Poor construction on that cargo-ship-
converted-to-a-tanker meant she soon
suffered a steering failure and had to
fall out. The next day, the Type 2TL
10,238-ton tanker Kyokuun Maru had
a machinery breakdown, and she also
departed the convoy. The ship build-
ers had completed her just a week be-
fore she sailed, and neither she nor her
crew were actually ready to go to sea.
As fate would have it, though, those
two ships were the lucky ones.
At about 10:00 p.m. on the 17th,
USS Sunfish approached on the sur-
face and executed a radar-directed at-
tack against the six-month old, 6,968-
ton Type 2A freighter Edogawa Maru.
She was carrying 2,173 men of the 19th
Sea Raiding Battalion along with its
supporting base battalion. Other units,
150 horses, 200 war dogs, supplies,
fuel, 60 vehicles, 16 landing craft, and
10/10/08 2:02:08 PM
 assorted munitions packed her deck
and holds.
A Sunfish torpedo hit her amidships
and set her internal cargo on fire, a car-
go that included 50 depth charges. The
screams of trapped horses and terrified
dogs mingled with those of the men. A
second torpedo three hours later com-
pletely exploded the ship. Passengers
and crew lucky enough to get into the
cold water faced a bleak fate. Though
another maru rescued some survivors,
that ship was also subsequently sunk.
Escorts arrived at 7:00 a.m. and found
only 185 still alive. Another 2,113
soldiers and merchantmen had died
during the attack, or while aboard the
doomed rescue maru, or from hypo-
thermia.
At 2:00 a.m. on 18 November, the
USS Peto, operating on the surface and
tracking the convoy by radar, stalked
the 6,925-ton Type 2AT emergency
tanker Osakasan Maru. The ex-cargo
ship, converted to a tanker while on
the ways, was sailing on her maiden
voyage to pick up oil. The first torpedo
Elite Beat
Franco’s Internationals: Foreign Volunteers in the
Nationalist Army
The international brigades are the
most widely known foreign volunteers
who fought on the Republican side in
Spanish civil war; however, there were
also volunteers on the Nationalist side.
Their numbers can only be counted in
the hundreds, though, rather than in
the thousands as with the internation-
als.
There were also, of course, the tens
of thousands of Germans and Italians
who served, respectively, in the Le-
gion Kondor and the Corpo di Truppe
Volontarie (Volunteer Corps or CTV),
but they can’t really be considered true
volunteers. Most of the Italians were
conscripts, while the Germans were
WaW 3 Issue.indd 35
struck the Number 4 hold, and the sec-
ond hit below the bridge. Osakasan
Maru’s own fuel exploded, and she
went down with all hands, 142 passen-
gers and crew.
An hour after that attack, Sunfish,
operating on the surface using radar,
fired three torpedoes at the 5,463-ton
troop transport Seisho Maru. All three
hit, the maru sank, and 448 passengers
and crew died.
Earlier that evening, during the
first attacks, the convoy had scattered.
The yards had completed the 6,925-ton
Type 2AT emergency tanker Awakawa
Maru just 48 days earlier. It was her
maiden voyage. In the scramble to
scatter and avoid submarines, she col-
lided with Koshu Maru, which caused
Awakawa Maru medium damage.
To finish off the morning, Peto
tracked the 2,827-ton Chinkai Maru.
At 5:00 a.m. the submarine hit her
with one of three torpedoes. She went
down in three minutes carrying 39
crew and passengers, including men
of the 18th Sea Raiding Battalion. The
all highly specialized professionals,
mostly tank and gun crew, and pilots.
The same can be said for the Soviets,
who were also specialist troops pur-
pose-sent by their government. We can
also disqualify as true volunteers the
tens of thousands of Moroccans who
fought for Franco. Recruited among
the tribes of the Rif Mountains, they
fought within regular Spanish colonial
units as more or less pure mercenar-
ies.
In reality, then, the largest group
of true foreign volunteers in the Na-
tionalist ranks were the Portuguese.
When the Spanish Civil War began,
that country was under the dictator-
number of merchantmen and soldiers
killed throughout Convoy MI-27
reached 2,742. The Japanese dissolved
what remained of the convoy when it
reached Formosa, 22,000 tons lighter
than when it had started the journey.
The Americans couldn’t prevent all
reinforcements, or even a majority of
reinforcements, from reaching Luzon,
but they made that effort expensive for
the Japanese. In the case of Convoys
HI-81 and MI-27, 9,574 men died,
while about 3,000 more survived their
time in the water. The loss of war ma-
teriel was even more significant. The
delays the US submarines imposed
seriously slowed Japanese efforts to
reinforce the Philippines.
To Japanese strategists, selecting
the Philippines for the decisive battle
had seemed an easy choice. To the
tacticians and logisticians, however,
reinforcing the Philippines was a diffi-
cult matter of seaborne transportation,
escort tactics and submarine threats.
~John W. Whitman
Polish volunteers arrive in Spain.
World at War 35
10/10/08 2:02:08 PM
 ship of Marshall Antonio Salazar, who
gave full support to the Nationalist
rebellion. Consequently, his regime
allowed the recruitment of Portuguese
volunteers to fight in the Nationalist
ranks. Some 5,000 Portuguese joined
the Spanish Foreign Legion. Those
volunteers were called Viriatos, after
Viriatus, the leader of the ancient Lu-
sitanian tribe which had inflicted hu-
miliating defeats on the Romans dur-
ing the 2nd century BC.
There were also some 600 Irish
volunteers, led by the Irish-fascist
leader O’Duffy. They were integrated
in the Spanish Foreign Legion as its
15th Battalion, and were also known as
Saint Patrick’s Legion following the
tradition of Irish volunteer regiments
in the Spanish Army going back to the
17th century. After receiving training
from German advisers, the Irish saw
action at the Battle of the Jarama. Due
to the poor discipline and unsatisfacto-
ry combat performance they displayed
there, however, the unit was afterward
relegated to quiet sectors.
Another Foreign Legion unit, the
Jeanne d’Arc (Joan of Arc), was raised
from French volunteers. That unit also
fought at Jarama and at the Battle of
Cuesta de la Reina in October 1937.
During the latter engagement they
faced the French 14th Marsellaise in-
ternational brigade. As had happened
at Guadalajara in March 1937, when
the Italian internationals of the 12th
Garibaldi Brigade fought the Black-
shirts of the CTV, the Battle of Cuesta
de la Reina witnessed a mini civil war
among non-Spanish participants on
opposing sides.
~Javier Romero Munoz
36 #3
WaW 3 Issue.indd 36
Strategic Backwaters
Germany’s Assault on Kos
At dawn on 3 October 1943, a
2,000-man German assault force con-
ducted a combined airborne-amphibi-
ous assault onto the Aegean island of
Kos, preceded by a short but sharp aer-
ial bombardment. The combined Italo-
British defenders numbered nearly
5,000, but other than the Italians’
coastal defense guns and some British
light anti-aircraft artillery, they had no
heavy weapons. In fact, only one of
Britain’s four light infantry companies
present had their 3-inch mortars. None
had Bren carriers or anti-tank guns.
Their commander, Col. Kenyon,
believed the island’s defenses were
inadequate and he found the Italian
gunners to be all but untrained. With
the Allies enjoying air superiority and
naval supremacy across much of the
Mediterranean, and his headquarters
and nearly a full brigade less than 30
nautical miles away, he was confident
he could hold the island until rein-
forcements arrived, or at least deny
use of the island’s airfield by taking to
the hills overlooking it. He therefore
planned and executed a flexible de-
fense centered on holding key terrain.
He also fully understood the stakes
involved, though, for whoever con-
trolled Kos controlled the only major
airfield between the Aegean’s south-
ernmost islands and mainland Greece.
The fighting’s outcome would deter-
mine which side enjoyed air superior-
ity over that region.
Kos lies less than two nautical
miles from the Turkish coast. Measur-
ing some 28 statute miles long and ap-
proximately six wide, it was one of the
Dodecanese Islands Italy had wrested,
along with Libya, from the Ottoman
Empire in 1912. Its rocky terrain and
poor roads made it a difficult island
to traverse by land. The only signifi-
cant town, Kos, had a population of
some 10,000 and was located on the
island’s northern end, opposite Tur-
key. A single, poorly maintained, road
connected the port to Antimachia Air-
field 18 miles away to the southwest
and to the farming area farther south.
Antimachia could handle modern air-
craft up to medium bomber size. The
island’s topography was dominated
by a central spine of limestone ridges
and rocky promontories, the highest
of which reached 2,800 feet. Kos had
four broad and white sandy beaches
on its northern end, but steep cliffs
overlooked them, potentially creating
deadly traps for any landing force.
The Italian garrison consisted of
four serviceable fighter planes (two
MC202s, one G-50 and a single CR42
biplane), about a dozen coastal defense
guns in open positions, and 1,200 light
infantry. They’d done little to increase
the island’s defenses. There were
no trenches, bunkers or even sand-
bagged emplacements when a British
55-man-strong Special Boat Service
(SBS, roughly equivalent to US Navy
SEALs) occupied the island on 12
September, just days after Italy’s sur-
render. They were followed almost
immediately by the landing of two Cy-
prus-based Beaufighters and six South
African Air Force Spitfire Vs. By 16
September, the British garrison had
grown to include the 1st Battalion Dur-
ham Light Infantry, a parachute com-
pany (withdrawn on 30 September),
two fighter squadrons, and a squadron
(battalion) from an RAF regiment with
18 Bofors 40mm guns and twenty-four
20mm anti-aircraft guns. The RAF
contingent also included engineers
who immediately went to work build-
ing air defense emplacements around
Antimachia and adding two new air
strips, one outside the port near the
fishing village of Lambia and another
about six miles away at Marmari. On 1
October the British garrison numbered
1,511, of whom 800 were combat
troops (460 infantry).
Col. Kenyon requested the dis-
patch of an artillery battery and a me-
dium anti-aircraft artillery battalion,
and reported the island’s defense re-
quired a full infantry brigade. He also
reported he needed transport. There
was only one truck on the island, and
lack of air and sea lift had forced him
to leave behind his force’s trucks and
Bren carriers. Aviation fuel was also
10/10/08 2:02:09 PM
 in short supply, and its resupply was
slow in coming. Kenyon also didn’t
trust his Italian counterparts, and so
made no effort to incorporate them
in his plans. More, his troops treated
the Italians with open contempt. There
were almost daily fistfights between
the “allied” troops. Kenyon urged
Middle East Command to make rein-
forcing Kos a theater priority, but the
Germans struck before he received an
answer.
The German assault, code named
“Operation Polar Bear,” opened with
a series of airstrikes by over 30 Ju-88s
and nearly 100 Ju-87s. Sixteen Stu-
kas struck the emplacements around
Antimachia Airfield just minutes be-
fore two Ju-52 squadrons dropped a
company of paratroopers directly onto
that facility. Meanwhile other German
forces landed on four separate beaches
supported by three Kriegsmarine de-
stroyers providing gunfire support.
Kos was thus assaulted from two sides
while two battalions of German infan-
try drove on Antimachia. There the
airborne units severed the phone lines
connecting the northern and south-
ern ends of the island. Because of the
rugged terrain, radio communication
was unreliable despite Kenyon hav-
ing placed a wireless unit on a hilltop
north of the airfield. Stukas struck it
and the nearby Italian artillery unit
early that morning, then returned early
in the afternoon to repeat the strike.
The Germans landed 50mm anti-
tank guns, 81mm and 120mm mortars Losses on Kos
and some quadruple 20mm anti-air- Country Killed Wounded Captured Missing Aircraft Ships Sunk
craft guns, and used them to take out Downed or
strongpoints and suppress machinegun Destroyed
positions. The Luftwaffe established an
*Britain 65 50 600 0 8 Fighters 1 LCT
almost ubiquitous presence, destroy-
ing Italian artillery positions and strik- Italian 150+ 100+ 2,500 ? 2 0
ing any British units concentrating to German 30 55 0 0 4 2 Landing Craft
attack. The town of Kos was encircled
by 5:00 p.m. Believing airborne rein-
*South African casualties are included in the British casualty figures. The South African Air
forcements would arrive by morning,
Force (SAAF) lost six Spitfires on the ground, and several ground crewmen were killed and
Kenyon ordered his scattered detach-
wounded in the fighting around Arimachia Airfield. Unfortunately, none of the official histo-
ments outside Kos to retreat into the
ries about the battle, including the Italian, provide any information on Italian killed, wounded
hills and hold out there. He was cap-
and missing on Kos; however, we do know the Germans executed the Italian garrison com-
tured by a German patrol just minutes
mander and his staff officers.
later. By 10:30 p.m. the Germans con-
trolled all the high ground around An-
timachia as well as the airfield itself,
and most of the Italian troops had sur-
rendered. The garrison headquarters,
World at War 37

WaW 3 Issue.indd 37 10/10/08 2:02:10 PM

 under the command of Lt. Col. Rich-
ard Kirby, transmitted its last message
shortly after midnight. By dawn on 4
October, the Germans had gained con-
trol of the entire island and all but a
handful of the British troops were in
their hands.
The loss of Kos doomed Churchill’s
plan to take the Dodecanese Islands
and use them as a springboard into the
Balkans. Lacking long-range fighters
of their own, and denied American
support because of the Italian cam-
paign’s higher priority, the British also
couldn’t provide air cover over their
garrisons on Leros and Samos. As was
the case in the distant Pacific Ocean
campaigns, it was the island’s airfield,
more than its size or political signifi-
cance, which made it a key military
objective.
The Germans won at Kos because
they concentrated their forces quickly
and attacked resolutely. Recognizing
the threat posed by the Allies gaining
control of the Dodecanese, the Ger-
man commander in what they termed
the “Southeast Area,” Field Marshal
Maximilian von Weichs, requested
and received temporary aerial rein-
forcement from units from the Russian
front. He then organized ad hoc units
from Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine and
army formations to take control of the
islands. He realized Kos was second in
importance only to Rhodes, which had
the largest airfield in the Dodecanese,
and he acted accordingly once he had
Rhodes firmly in hand.
He covertly dispatched Branden-
burger commandos to Kos as early as
28 September, sending them to report
on Allied defenses and conduct beach
reconnaissance while he built the as-
sault force and finalized his opera-
tional plan. At the same time, shipping
limitations and distance from their pri-
mary logistics hubs prevented the Brit-
ish from matching the German effort.
Those factors, and Kenyon’s failure to
integrate the Italian garrison into his
force, facilitated the German success.
As the later Battle on Leros would
show, Italian forces would indeed fight
effectively for the Allied cause when
well led, trained and supported.
~Carl Otis Schuster
38 #3
WaW 3 Issue.indd 38
Mysteries Revealed
Mexico in World War II
Mexico’s neutrality during World
War II ended when the United States
declared war on Japan on 8 December
1941. At that time our neighbor to the
south not only signed economic and
defensive alliance agreements with us,
she simultaneously also cut relations
with the Axis powers. It wasn’t until a
Mexican tanker ship was sunk by a U-
Boat in May 1942, however, that she
fully and officially declared war and
the next month signed the United Na-
tions Declaration. Mexico’s most sig-
nificant contribution to the overall war
effort was to increase exports of raw
materials—then primarily meat, other
food stuffs, timber and leather—to her
traditional enemy, the US.
At the same time, the current and
ongoing wave of immigration of Mex-
ican workers into the western US also
began. That movement was initiated
under the jointly sponsored Bracero
program, in order to supply labor for
US farms and railways and to gener-
ally help ease wartime manpower
shortage. In addition, fully 250,000
Mexican residents of the US joined
the armed forces, and of those, 14,000
saw combat. Mexico even sent its own
small expeditionary unit to help liber-
ate the Spanish-speaking Philippines,
while a Mexican air squadron saw ac-
tive service during the final months of
the Pacific War.
Thus, after having gone to war
against the US in 1846-48, after hav-
ing been invaded by Gen. John J.
Pershing’s Expeditionary Force in
1916, and after having almost become
embroiled in the First World War on
the side of the Central Powers, Mexi-
co stood with the United States during
World War II.
~Blaine Taylor
Technology Backdate
The Lexington-Class
Carriers
The US Navy’s Lexington-class
aircraft carriers were built as a result
of an exclusionary clause in the Wash-
ington Naval Treaty of 1921. The spe-
cific text allowed any of the six major
signatories to choose two hulls cur-
rently under construction and convert
them to use as aircraft carriers of no
more than 33,500 tons. Only the US
and Japan met that specific clause, and
the former took advantage of it to con-
vert two of its six Lexington-class bat-
tlecruisers, then just being built, into
aircraft carriers. The 43,500-ton bat-
tlecruisers were far from ideal for their
new role, but were converted over a
six year period and emerged as 47,000
ton CVs.
At 822 feet long, they were driven
by four turbo-electric motors fed by
eight boilers that generated a whop-
ping 180,000 horsepower for a cruis-
ing speed of 31 knots. Such was the
output of their power trains that, dur-
ing December 1929, while the Lexing-
ton was docked in Tacoma, Washing-
ton, she provided electrical power to
the entire city for 12 hours a day for
over a month while that city’s hydro-
electric reservoirs were refilled during
a drought.
Carrying 80 aircraft and 2,150
men, the ships were considered overly
large by most of the USN establish-
ment. They were built in a time of op-
erational experimentation and debate
over the role of carriers within the na-
val community. The traditionalists saw
the carriers’ role as that of a scout that
would accompany the cruisers of the
fleet as they searched for the enemy. As
such, they needed to be fast and armed
with a cruiser’s guns; hence they were
fitted with four dual-gun eight-inch
turrets. And fast they were: set on long
and lean battlecruiser hulls, they were
capable of bursts of speed up to 34
knots.
There were also a series of compro-
mises that required 1,000 tons of fuel
oil be kept on their starboard sides, lest
they list due to the 80-foot tall funnel
10/10/08 2:02:10 PM
 assembly, command island, and 8-
inch gun batteries on their port sides.
The turbo-electric propulsion also left
the carriers prone to drive-train dam-
age when stuck underwater, and they
were limited in the number of aircraft
they could carry by their original bat-
tlecruiser hull layouts (though, with a
complement of 80 aircraft, they were
far from deficient on that score). Their
long hulls also kept their flight decks
dry, and limited the amount of verti-
cal hull motion, which made air opera-
tions easier during heavy weather. At
the time of their completion they were
the largest ships in the world.
Compared to the Japanese Akagi
and Kaga, built under the same re-
strictions, the US Lexington-class
carriers were a more cohesive design
and able to operate together or as part
of any mixed task force. (In fairness
to the Japanese, though, it should be
noted the slow Kaga was a poor sec-
ond choice, forced on their navy by the
destruction of the Amagi during the
Kobe earthquake of 1923. The six knot
difference in speed between her and
her sisters was always an operational
consideration that had to be taken into
account in any sorties.)
As built, the Lexington’s proved
useful and clearly established the
role of the aircraft carrier as a strik-
ing force. During fleet exercises in
1929, the Saratoga made a high-speed
run from south of the Panama Canal,
the opposite direction from which an
attack was anticipated, and thereby
managed to make a surprise attack on
the opposing blue forces. She repeated
that same maneuver nine years later
when she successfully surprise at-
tacked Pearl Harbor from 100 miles
away in another exercise. The two car-
riers helped to define air operations for
the USN during the 1930s, and each
underwent overhaul and moderniza-
tion late in that decade.
The Lexington was at sea carry-
ing Marine aircraft to Midway Island
when Pearl Harbor was attacked. She
searched for the Japanese task force
without luck, even joining the Enter-
prise later in the week to continue the
mission. She also attempted to relieve
Wake Island, along with the Saratoga,
WaW 3 Issue.indd 39
later that month, but the mission was
cancelled when the island fell. Early in
1942 she raided Rabaul and New Brit-
ain, and it was during that attack one
of her pilots, Butch O’Hare (name-
sake of today’s Chicago airport), shot
down five enemy aircraft in one sortie
and won the Medal of Honor. In late
March she attacked the Japanese base
at Lae in New Guinea, her aircraft fly-
ing over the Owen Stanley Mountains
to surprise the ships anchored in the
harbor. She returned to Pearl Harbor
in April to refit, and was back in the
Coral Sea by May, where she met her
fate.
On 7 May 1942, her aircraft lo-
cated and sank the Japanese light air-
craft carrier Shoho, and then fought off
a counterattack by 27 planes later in
the day. The next morning her planes
located and attacked the Shokaku,
heavily damaging that big carrier. She
was in turn attacked barely a half hour
later, however, taking two torpedo
hits on her port side and three bomb
hits, one of which blew out the fires in
her boilers when it entered her funnel
structure. She took on a seven-degree
list and was dead in the water. Two
hours later her damage control par-
ties had her back underway on an even
keel, making 25 knots and recovering
aircraft.
Shortly thereafter, though, gas
fumes began to accumulate in the
hanger deck from broken lines that
had been ruptured when the ship’s
long hull was knocked back and forth
by the torpedo hits. Eventually that ac-
USS Lexington.
cumulation was set off by sparks from
one of her generators. A series of ex-
plosions then wracked the carrier, and
within two hours she was abandoned
as fires raged out of control. Despite
all that, it took two more torpedoes
from the destroyer Phelps to finally
put the “Lady Lex” under the waves.
Her sister ship, the Saratoga, lead a
less-jinxed life, but still always manag-
ing to miss the major battles of the war
through a series of unlucky encounters
with torpedoes. She caught her first in
early January 1942, just after return-
ing from the aborted relief attempt of
Wake Island. She had been carrying
the Marine aircraft originally sched-
uled for that island but, accompanied
by a slow oiler, she’d been prevented
from reaching the island in time. Three
of her fire rooms were flooded by the
torpedo hit, but she managed to make
it to Pearl Harbor on her own. There
her 8-inch gun turrets were removed
for use in shore defense and, after
temporary repairs, she was sent on her
way to Bremerton Navy Yard on Puget
Sound in the state of Washington.
She was there until late May 1942,
which was too late to make it to the
Battle of Midway, though she did
participate in the Guadalcanal opera-
tion later that year. She took part in
the First Battle of Eastern Solomon
Sea in late August, her aircraft sink-
ing the light carrier Ryujo and heavily
damaging the seaplane tender Chitose.
The next day she was hit by a subma-
rine-launched torpedo, which knocked
out the circuits controlling her turbo-
World at War 39
10/10/08 2:02:11 PM
 electro propulsion, and she slid to a complete stop. She was
towed out of the battle area by the heavy cruiser Minneapo-
lis, and eventually was sent back to Pearl Harbor for repair.
Saratoga then operated for nearly a year as a covering
force, sometimes in concert with the British carrier Victo-
rious, protecting minor Allied operations in the Eastern
Solomons. She helped cover the invasion of Bougainville,
striking at Japanese surface forces concentrated on Rabaul,
damaging so many their planned sortie against the invasion
had to be cancelled. After that the big carrier provided air
cover for Tarawa, before returning to San Diego for a major
overhaul, having spent over a year in continuous action. Her
medium AA armament was doubled, all of her 20mm can-
non being replaced by 40mm, and the number of guns going
from 30 to 60.
Saratoga was again ready for action in January 1944,
covering the landing in the Marshall Islands and then be-
ing dispatched to join the British Pacific Fleet in the far
east for strikes on Japanese oil facilities in Java. She was
refitted again in Bremerton that summer and began the task
of training naval nightfighter squadrons for the rest of the
year. In January 1945, she was put back on the front lines,
in conjunction with the Enterprise, to provide nightfighter
cover for the invasion of Iwo Jima. She also launched night
strikes on the Japanese main islands before returning to Iwo,
where she was surprised by Japanese planes and suffered
five heavy bomb hits, damaging her extensively. She was
eventually returned to Bremerton and repaired, ready for de-
ployment by May 1945, but was considered so worn out she
was only utilized for training purposes.
Immediately after the war, she took part in Operation
Magic Carpet, carrying upward of 4,000 homeward-bound
troops from Pearl Harbor to the US at one time. Eventu-
ally she returned nearly 30,000 troops during that operation,
more than any other ship that participated.
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charts booklet covers the additional rules needed to continue
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40 #3
WaW 3 Issue.indd 40
By then considered to have been made obsolete by the
large number of Essex-class carriers on the navy’s opera-
tional list, Saratoga was designated for use in the “Cross-
roads” nuclear tests carried out at Bikini Atoll in the summer
of 1946. She survived the initial test—an air burst above the
simulated task force –but finally sank during the second test
later that month. Barely 500 feet from the underwater blast,
her bow was lifted 50 feet by the initial wave from the explo-
sion. Her funnel was flattened across her deck, and much of
her superstructure was crushed by the over-pressure. Seven
hours later she sank, and she was officially struck from the
navy list two weeks later.
The Lexington-class had ushered in the new age of naval
aviation, proving many of the theories on the use of air pow-
er at sea. The Saratoga had conducted more carrier landings
than any other ships afloat, nearly 100,000 by the time she
was done. In her own way she had ushered in the beginning
of another new era, helping demonstrate that the A-bomb
had put an end to large numbers of ships concentrated into
tightly spaced task forces, a tactic that had helped win the
Pacific War.
~Russell G. Jennings
Attention readers: We’re always looking
for authors for FYI for Strategy & Tactics
and Observation Post for World at War.
If you’d like to try your hand at writing
short (under 2,000 words), pithy articles
for this column, on virtually any aspect of
WWII military history, contact Ty Bom-
ba, FYI editor, at: WhiteRook@att.net.
Next Issue
The game in issue number four will be “USAAF,”
which covers the climactic year (1944) of the
US strategic bomber offensive against Nazi Ger-
many. Articles will include: “Special Operations
Group Polesie,” “The SAS,” “Wake Island,”
“The Thai-French War of 1941,” “Patton’s Mo-
selle River Crossing,” and “Allied Military In-
telligence During the Munich Crisis.”
10/10/08 2:02:11 PM
 I Remember:
The Dyhernfurth Raid,
Silesia, 1945
By Joachim-Karl Scholz
[Ed’s Note: the author was one of the Hitler Youth auxiliary scouts mentioned in the article.]
It’s
become the common wisdom
that, by the start of 1945, the
German Army had already been
entirely beaten and its further op-
erations amounted to nothing more than an ongoing
and increasingly disorderly retreat. As both an eyewit-
ness to, and participant in, the events on the Oder Riv-
er front in Silesia at that time, I offer a view contrary
to that common wisdom.
The town of Dyhernfurth lay just west of the city
of Breslau, in what was then the eastern German prov-
ince of Silesia (modern day Wroclaw, in what is now
southwestern Poland). In January 1945, in the face of
the onrushing Soviet offensive into the area, the lo-
cal magistrate managed to organize the evacuation of
the town’s civilian population just before the avenging
Red Army arrived. On its outskirts, though, a chemical
plant was haphazardly left deserted and intact. There
had been no time taken to gather or destroy the top
secret documents and other war materials kept there.
Shortly after that too-rapid evacuation, the scien-
tists from the plant notified the local German Army
headquarters the abandoned materials in Dyhernfurth
WaW 3 Issue.indd 41
were part of a classified chemical weapons develop-
ment project by the I.G. Farben Corporation. Specifi-
cally, the plant had been the site of a successful project
aimed at developing a new nerve gas, the acquisition
of which by the Soviets could only work to increase
their already advantageous military position. The
plant in fact contained large quantities of the deadly
material that, if the Soviets wanted to do so, could be
immediately turned to use against the Germans in the
area and, if shipped to other areas, could then become
a front-wide threat in the near future.
Not willing to risk the alternative, the German gen-
eral staff immediately ordered a mission to destroy the
factory and its contents, no matter the cost. Destruc-
tion via artillery bombardment was ruled out, as that
would make the Soviets in the area inquisitive, and
they might then still have found the means to acquire
and use whatever remained of the nerve gas even after
the artillery had finished.
The resultant ground operation, then, is interesting
in that it demonstrated the continued capability of Ger-
man troops and their tactical commanders vis a vis their
Soviet enemy, even at that late stage of the war. Plan-
World at War 41
10/10/08 2:02:13 PM
 ning and executing the mission also involved the ‘poli-
tics’ of the German Army at the time, in that securing
complete operational freedom of action—something
then seldom granted by higher authority—was essen-
tial to making the operation a success. Independent
action and initiative had become rare by 1945, when
a firing squad could easily become the reward for any
officer who exercised his judgment only to still suffer
some reversal.
The key figure in the resultant Kampfgruppe (battle
group) operation was Gen. Maj. Max Sachsenheimer,
who was then the youngest general in the entire Ger-
man Army and who commanded the 17th Infantry Di-
vision. He was a “soldiers’ general,” and had fought
in the line with his men in order to try to block the
Soviet breakout from their Pulawy bridgehead across
the Vistula River on 12 January. He then continued to
fight among his infantrymen during the continuous
engagements that followed, against overwhelming
numbers of Soviet tanks as they pushed in a westerly
and southerly direction toward Fortress Breslau and
the Oder River. Army Group A headquarters also ap-
pointed him commandant of Fortress Glogau, in Low-
er Silesia, which was located 60 miles northwest of
(downstream) of Dyhernfurth on the same river.
42 #3
WaW 3 Issue.indd 42
On 3 February, then, the chief of staff of 4th Panzer
Army, Col. Knuppel, summoned Sachsenheimer to a
meeting at army headquarters. He briefed the general
on the situation that required the raid. He stressed in
his briefing the mission had to be entirely successful
in order to avoid possibly dire consequences for the
whole German nation. After presenting all the available
data, Knuppel requested Sachsenheimer to prepare an
operational plan as quickly as possible. Knuppel also
gave him a written order, the contents of which were
as follows.
Form a battle group to execute an unexpected raid on
the Dyhernfurth chemical plant. This operation must
provide for an opportunity for a chemical officer with
civilian volunteers, two scientists and 18 employees of
this chemical factory, to destroy the top secret poison-
ous gases stored therein. These materials remained
behind enemy lines in underground vessels, in liquid
form, at the time of the area’s evacuation. The engi-
neers have suggested pumping this material into the
Oder River, where it would dissolve harmlessly, using
the factory’s pump facilities and piping. Further, army
group [headquarters] wants all remaining poison gas
chemicals [rendered] unidentifiable.
Dynamiting the vessels would be neither practical
nor advisable. It would adversely affect the person-
10/10/08 2:02:15 PM
 nel involved in the raid and leave sufficient residue
for analysis by the enemy. Further, the battle group
is to destroy all the raw materials in the nine storage
bunkers by using explosives or torches. Circumstanc-
es considered, the bulk of that material would be too
large for evacuation.
Gen. Sachsenheimer is to be totally responsible for
leading the raid. He is to penetrate the immediate Rus-
sian-held area, engage the enemy to provide an op-
portunity for the civilians to accomplish the destruc-
tion of the prior-described material. He then should
withdraw with the entire battle group, returning to the
south side of the Oder River.
Even while that meeting was still going on, the
corps staff had already begun working to assemble
the troops necessary for such an operation. They were
then deployed as closely as possible to Dyhernfurth,
getting into a jump off position at a nearby railroad
bridge across the Oder. Other than that infantry force,
the headquarters also promised to make available
additional support and heavy weapons units. Spe-
cifically, they promised two companies of airdropped
WaW 3 Issue.indd 43
paratroops, one battery of 88 mm FLAK, and one light
assault engineer company, as well as 81 assault boats.
The corps staff recommended an early morning
surprise attack, launched immediately after a short ar-
tillery bombardment of the nearby enemy positions.
They suggested airdropping the paratroopers atop the
factory, to secure it immediately, while the artillery
bombardment was still going on. That would allow for
the smooth occupation of the chemical factory by the
ground force raiding party soon after they’d crossed
the river with the civilian specialists.
Sachsenheimer had his own plan, though, which
he considered more practical. He based his analysis
on his reading of the most recent reconnaissance and
intelligence reports. They revealed the Soviets were
then moving large numbers of troops and tanks along
the main east-west road that ran just 3.75 miles north
of the town. Sachsenheimer feared that any airdrop—a
rare event no matter its small size—would immedi-
ately alert the Soviets something important was go-
ing on nearby, and that would therefore give them the
World at War 43
10/10/08 2:02:16 PM

time they needed to divert large amounts of armor to
Dyhernfurth. He also believed securing the factory
was really only the beginning of the overall operation.
He further realized the time the civilians would likely
have to accomplish their task might prove to be insuf-
ficient. He therefore requested the paratroop drop be
cancelled.
Sachsenheimer discussed his apprehensions with
the headquarters staff and then left to conduct a per-
sonal reconnaissance of the area in which the raid
would be taking place. On his arrival at the forward
command post, he summoned the scouts available to
him. They included local Volksturm (people’s militia)
and Hitlerjugend (Hitler Youth), some as young as 14,
but all of them volunteers. They had detailed knowl-
edge of the local area, and they typically conducted
their reconnaissance missions in groups of two or
three. They described the Soviet positions in the near-
by area as “almost harmless” and “easily bypassed.”
That opinion was challenged, though, when the
general and two of his line officers moved up to the
river’s flood control embankment. An enemy light
machinegun immediately opened fire from across the
river, and both the men accompanying Sachsenheimer
fell wounded to the ground. Still showing no anxi-
ety, the general continued his reconnaissance. Then
he low-crawled back to the command post and gave
instructions to the medics there to go forward and re-
cover the two wounded men.
While still at the river bank, the general saw that
the previously dynamited railroad bridge in fact re-
mained mostly intact. That is, all but one section was
intact, which hung twisted into the river, with its drift-
ing ice chunks, on the German side. The bridge was
useable, then, provided the assault force could wade
across that first open area. He believed they could only
accomplish that under cover of complete darkness.
He also saw the Russians had placed two twin-bar-
reled 20 mm automatic guns at some distance on each
side of the bridge’s northern end. The next identifiable
Soviet position lay some 200 yards beyond that gun
44 #3
WaW 3 Issue.indd 44
emplacement. The area between, he concluded, was
most likely mined. Beyond there, the railroad embank-
ment made a wide left turn toward Dyhernfurth, and
from that point a feeder line branched off to run direct-
ly into the chemical factory. That feeder line into the
factory would be the landmark that would allow his
men to find their target in the dark, even though they
were otherwise ignorant of the terrain and unfamiliar
with the area.
Much would depend on the quick and silent dis-
posal of the Russian sentries and crews at the forward
emplacements. An unknown number of other Russian
troops could be heard occupying Dyhernfurth castle
and the adjacent cloister. They were obviously drunk,
laughing and singing at a volume that could easily be
heard across the river.
The general had an unobstructed view for about
1.75 miles to the north. Light snow cover made the
patches of forest easy to see. Such visibility would be
sufficient to allow for resisting any attacking Soviet
armor. Still, Sachsenheimer shook his head thought-
fully; he knew the clock was already running on the
operation even though it hadn’t yet begun. The mis-
sion had to be run with, and succeed with, troops he’d
never yet seen and who also hardly knew each other.
He also dreaded the problems inherent in taking along
civilians, most of them likely unfit for any kind of
military service, on a combat operation. He could only
hope the Soviets in the nearby castle would remain in
a drunken state for some time to come.
Sachsenheimer again reviewed his decisions when
he got back to 4th Panzer Army headquarters. There,
his immediate superior, Gen. Grasser, approved his
plan, even authorizing him not to wait for the still
deploying engineer and FLAK units if he deemed it
was best not to do so. Both men agreed everything
hinged on surprise. Grasser also agreed not to airdrop
the paratroopers, but to instead move them close-by
on the ground to use as a reserve. They then wired
the revised plan to headquarters in Berlin, which, in
turn, sent back its approval on the stipulation Sach-
senheimer personally guaranteed the success of the
mission. (Everyone agreed, when there was no debate
from Hitler’s headquarters, that “someone important”
must be happening.)
Maj. Joos, a regimental commander in Sachsen-
heimer’s 17th Infantry Division, was to lead the charge.
His first task was to overcome the two heavy weapons
that guarded the north end of the bridge. Next he had
to get a sizeable number of infantry across a partially
destroyed bridge as quickly as possible in complete
darkness. It would then become instantly and equally
important to engage and overpower the second defen-
sive position 200 yards beyond the bridge. Finally,
then, all the men had to race along the railroad and
into the target area, the chemical factory.
10/10/08 2:02:17 PM
 World at War 45

WaW 3 Issue.indd 45 10/10/08 2:02:18 PM

 One small group from among the raiders was
tasked to continue along the rail line to the village of
Wahren, to form a blocking force there. Another larger
group was to go north toward the village of Seifers-
dorf, to form another blocking position there. Both
groups were to quickly set up a defensive line from
which they were to repel any Soviet counterattacks.
The FLAK unit arrived at the last minute and was
deployed immediately south of the railroad bridge, in
such a way as to keep them out of sight behind the
flood-control embankment. Being short of ammuni-
tion, it was understood they would fire only when they
could effectively strike at any close-approaching ene-
my infantry or tanks. The combat engineers, with their
assault boats, were also to contribute by engaging any
enemy who counterattacked toward the bridgehead
area.
After completing the briefing, Sachsenheimer flew
back to the jump off area in his Fiesler-Storch observa-
tion plane. During that flight he further explained the
operation to 1st Lt. Rohrig, commander of the combat
engineers. He stated he intended to keep one platoon,
along with 25 assault boats, near the bridge as final
reserve. The other boats were to cross the river in
two groups, starting 30 minutes after the infantry had
crossed and the moment the German mortars were to
open fire against the Russian revelers in the castle and
cloister. He intended that barrage to divert attention
away from the river and to thereby support the cross-
ing of the engineers.
One party of engineers was to cross the river at
kilometer marker 286, while the other went across at
marker 288. Once on the other bank, they were to de-
ploy into defensive positions from which they would
repel any Russians who might advance along the river.
The barrage was then to continue to fire on targets of
opportunity in order to cause as much damage and con-
The other side of the river: Soviet tank crews conferring.
46 #3
WaW 3 Issue.indd 46
fusion as possible among the enemy. Sachsenheimer
then also brought in part of the staff from his division
headquarters, including a communications platoon
and a few experienced line officers and NCOs.
In spite of only having had a short time for plan-
ning and issuing orders, deploying equipment and
troops, all came together in good order. That must be
taken as a sign of good soldiering, considering most of
the participants hadn’t yet been briefed, nor had they
ever before fought together as a cohesive unit. More
generally, it’s also noteworthy this entire operation
took place only 11 weeks before the end of the war.
On the night of 5/6 February, then, Maj. Joos and
his infantry moved silently across the bridge in total
darkness. They quickly and soundlessly disposed of
the Russian heavy weapons crews. The raiders then
kept moving atop the railroad in order to avoid the
mines the Soviets had likely laid on both its flanks.
They jumped into the next Russian position still on
the run. Those surprised Russians, who’d fallen asleep
atop pilfered civilian mattresses and bedding, offered
no effective resistance. The advancing Germans could
still hear singing and drunken yelling coming from
within the castle.
Sixty-five minutes into the raid, the civilian techni-
cians began working to make the factory generators
and pumps operational in order to complete their part
of the mission. Their work actually progressed faster
than had been anticipated. All the involved higher
headquarters were kept current on developments via
radio communications. At one moment, Field Marshal
Schorner requested Sachsenheimer come to the radio,
apparently either to personally wish him success or to
restate the importance of the mission.
Sachsenheimer had gone ahead, though, to join
the civilians in the chemical plant, and he remained
there until he saw that job had indeed been completed.
At that time he ordered his adjutant to sit down at a
nearby desk that had a typewriter. He then dictated a
statement that, in essence, verified all the gas, sensi-
tive documents and other materials, had been properly
and thoroughly disposed of. He then had the two chief
civilian technicians sign that paper.
All during that time there were fire-fights—small,
disorganized but savage engagements—going on all
around the perimeter of the operation. It wasn’t un-
til 1:00 p.m. the Soviets finally seemed to figure out
what was going on. They then immediately ordered up
a concentrated counterattack, with several well placed
thrusts, toward the chemical plant. From Seifersdorf
to the north, 18 tanks began to advance at good speed.
They quickly spread out to move cross-country from
the main road.
From the very beginning, Sachsenheimer had de-
cided not to deploy the FLAK guns north of the river.
It would have taken too much time, and he couldn’t be
certain he would have the time to retrieve those valu-
10/10/08 2:02:19 PM
 able guns once the retreat began back to the river. In-
stead, he’d brought two Hetzers (self-propelled 75 mm
assault guns) onto the enemy side of the river. They
had a clear line of sight against the advancing Rus-
sians, and immediately opened fire.
German scouts, who’d moved ahead of the two
forward blocking positions, then began returning in
haste. They reported to the dug-in blocking forces
the approach direction and strength of still other So-
viet forces that had begun advancing. The Panzerjagd
Kommandos (tank destroying specialists) among the
infantry immediately spread out for action. They were
all volunteers. (Each tank destroyed by an individual
infantryman meant one week’s furlough as a reward. Guards mortar: Soviet solider loads a multiple rocket launcher.
Of course, such rewards had to be “deferred” at that
late stage of the war.) The tactics they used involved
That short but sharp engagement apparently para-
letting enemy tanks approach to within 30 yards before
lyzed the Russian commander in the area. As darkness
firing their Panzerfausts (handheld anti-tank rockets),
fell, the Battle of Dyhernfurth came silently to an end,
preferably at the rear of the vehicle.
with dead Russians and their burning tanks dotting the
Those weapons left smoke telltales when fired, scene. The German raiders prepared to withdraw, care-
though, and wise soldiers using them preplanned their ful to bring with them all their equipment as well as all
getaway routes. At the same time, Russian tank com- their dead and wounded, of which there were only a
manders had the habit of keeping open their turret few.
hatches, with at least their heads sticking up and out.
The raid had been almost a complete success. In
Whenever they spotted a German approaching their
one instance, there were some unexpected casualties
vehicles, they’d fire at them with their own sub-ma-
as they pumped the liquid from the underground stor-
chineguns or the on-board heavy machineguns. Even
age containers. During the process one of the valves
so, the German tank-hunting teams proved successful.
broke, spraying the nearby civilian technicians with
It wasn’t long before all the Russian tanks were burn-
mist. Those men were instantly blinded and had to be
ing and destroyed, or had otherwise simply come to a
rushed out of the area to get medical help back across
standstill.
the river. It was later reported they all regained their
Everyone remained alert, knowing “Ivan” wasn’t sight after a few days.
going to give up so easily. Later in the afternoon, then,
The much discussed paratroopers never actually
just as the winter daylight started to fail, seven more
showed up anywhere in the area, not even to act as a
Russian tanks, this time with accompanying infantry,
reserve force as Sachsenheimer wanted.
began a new attack from the village of Kranz. They
moved toward, and fired on, the railroad embankment. The Russians were apparently enraged by their de-
If the Russians succeeded in their advance, it would feat. They torched Dyhernfurth castle and part of the
mean all the deployed German troops would be cut adjacent cloister, including its priceless library. They
off without an escape route. The Russians had indeed then also forced open the cloister and church mausole-
figured out what was going on, and had moved as ef- ums, plundering and destroying the remains of the lo-
ficiently as possible to defeat the entire German ef- cal nobles buried there. They stole everything of value
fort. If was for just such a circumstance, though, the while scattering the remains of the dead. They kept
88 mm FLAK had been placed in concealment near undisturbed, though, the nearby brewery and schnapps
the bridge. factory, which still exists today, still producing spirits
for the now Polish inhabitants of the area. The chemi-
In record time, the battery opened up. They raised
cal factory was left in ruins until 1960, when it was
their guns’ barrels just above the top of the river em-
reconstituted, and it’s still operational now, though it’s
bankment. They then fired as fast as they could load
not making nerve gas.
and aim. The long red-yellow flashes from the muz-
zles of those 88s meant death for the advancing Rus- at

sians. Most of their tanks were quickly blown up, one

at a time. Even as the fire of the 88s came in on them,
though, they kept advancing as long as possible toward
the railroad embankment. They apparently thought it
was from there they were drawing the fire. Only one
Russian tank managed to turn around and race behind
the cover of some nearby trees before it could be hit.
World at War 47

WaW 3 Issue.indd 47 10/10/08 2:02:20 PM

 All the Way Went LBJ
by Kelly Bell
On
11 December 1941, the US
House of Representatives as-
sembled to attend to monumen-
tal matters. Four days prior, the
Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor, then the govern-
ments of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy had also de-
clared war on the United States of America. The mood
was grim in the House, and soon after the opening roll
call a tall young congressman by the name of Lyndon
Baines Johnson got to his feet and requested recogni-
tion from the chair. House Speaker Sam Rayburn nod-
ded to his fellow Texan. Johnson loudly drawled: “I
ask unanimous consent for an indefinite leave of ab-
sence.”
None of the assembly objected to their colleague’s
entreaty; so Johnson gathered his papers and departed
for his office to set his affairs in order before embark-
ing on a mission to the tumultuous Pacific Theater of
Operations. For several years Johnson (or “LBJ” as he
would be called) had been a lieutenant commander in
the US Naval Reserve—now he became the first mem-
ber of the House of Representatives to request active
duty. There was a great deal Congress needed to know
about what was happening in the Pacific, and a fact-
finding tour would provide badly needed answers.
48 #3
WaW 3 Issue.indd 48
The US Navy high command was pleased by the
turn of events. They believed they could use Johnson’s
experience as a legislator to assist in the channeling
of troops and materiel to the Pacific, which already
looked like it was going to turn into a full-scale naval
war. Johnson’s political background would also aid in
any diplomatic problems that might arise between the
reeling US, British, Dutch, Australian and New Zea-
land authorities with whom he’d be dealing. A skilled
arbitrator and mediator was needed as much as a mili-
tary observer.
Johnson was ordered to report to 12th Naval District
Headquarters in San Francisco. His assignment was
under the authority of the Office of the Chief, United
States-New Zealand Navy Command. That wasn’t
what he’d intended. He had specifically requested as-
signment to active duty, so he could observe problems
in front-line military operations and report on them to
Washington. But his initial orders shunted him to an
obscure desk job in the San Francisco Navy Yard. For
a while he was unable to get himself sent overseas.
It seemed nobody wanted to be responsible for trans-
ferring a congressman to the front. Should Johnson
be killed or captured, the signer of his posting orders
might be in for rough passage.
10/10/08 2:02:20 PM
 Washington
In April 1942, Johnson returned to Washington to
confer with President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The dis-
mal state of affairs in the Pacific was being exacerbat-
ed not only by further Japanese military successes, but
also by factionalism, ineptitude and differing opinions
among Allied military leaders about how to pursue the
war. Objective, accurate and comprehensive reports
from the combat zones were rare in Washington at the
WaW 3 Issue.indd 49
time, and Roosevelt needed a man who could provide
him with a clear picture of what was happening on that
far side of the world. Johnson’s qualifications were
clear to Roosevelt, and the president wasted no time
in assigning the young man as his personal representa-
tive on a lengthy fact-finding mission to the Southwest
Pacific.
World at War 49
10/10/08 2:02:24 PM
 Townsville Harbor, Australia.
On 21 May, Vice Adm. Robert L. Ghormley
touched down on New Caledonia Island en route to
his new post as commander of the South Pacific Area.
Aboard his huge PBY flying boat was Johnson, who’d
hitched a ride with the admiral. On the ground, watch-
ing the ponderous craft land, were Lt. Col. Samuel E.
Anderson, US Army Air Force (USAAF), and Lt. Col.
Francis R. Stevens, US Army. Both had been ordered
to report to Gen. Douglas MacArthur in Melbourne,
Australia. They were tasked with establishing a work-
able rapport between MacArthur and the general staff
in Washington. They were also to obtain the general’s
word-for-word account of the situation in the Pacific’s
various combat zones.
The two colonels had arrived on New Caledonia
eight days earlier, and had their brand-new B-17E
bomber-transport snatched away from them by the gar-
rison commander, who was delighted to add the splen-
did warplane to his barebones aerial fleet. Stevens and
Anderson had been languishing there ever since, but
with the PBY’s appearance they saw an opportunity
to continue their mission. Sure enough, while ground
crews refueled and serviced the big plane, the pair
managed to talk the admiral into giving them a lift.
After landing for the night in Auckland, New Zea-
land, Johnson had the chance to become acquainted
with Anderson and Stevens. They discovered that not
only were their missions almost identical, but their
eventual destination, Melbourne, was the same. They
50 #3
WaW 3 Issue.indd 50
decided to stick together and carry out their assign-
ments as a team, helping each other in any way they
could.
On the evening of 23 May the PBY put down at
Sidney, Australia. The next day the trio boarded a
Lockheed commercial airliner that carried them to
Melbourne, landing late that afternoon. The following
morning they met with MacArthur, and were relieved
when he offered them assistance rather than presenting
them with a pre-set itinerary. A tour up the Australian
coast, to New Guinea, over to Darwin in northwest Aus-
tralia, then back to Melbourne would give the officers
leeway and opportunities for unfettered observation of
military installations and operations. MacArthur was
aware of the communication difficulties between his
command and Washington, but his grasp of the overall
situation was nevertheless firm, his guests noted.
Afterward, the supreme commander’s staff provided
the observers with additional data on communications,
operational, supply and counterintelligence troubles.
With such a revealing array of information laid before
them, Anderson, Johnson and Stevens could see that
Allied fears of an imminent invasion of Australia were
warranted. The Japanese had gained naval superior-
ity for the moment; the best Australian divisions were
fighting against Rommel in North Africa, and Allied
airpower was woefully short in modern aircraft and
plagued with inadequate logistical support. All that
impressed on them the significance of their task. They
10/10/08 2:02:25 PM
 would spare no effort in their data gathering.
One of the first problems noted by Johnson and his
companions was how Australian stevedores adamantly
refused to work more hours than their union contracts
stipulated, would not work on weekends or holidays,
and stopped whatever they were doing, regardless of
its importance, at the first drop of rain—all in accor-
dance with union rules. At the same time, American
ground crews toiled extra shifts in drenching mon-
soons to assemble the few crated aircraft that made it
to Australian ports. Yard-deep mud, clouds of raven-
ous mosquitoes, dysentery and malaria could not deter
the resolute mechanics and aircrew who frenetically
prepared themselves for combat. Meanwhile, Japa-
nese air raids were becoming an increasing threat.
Embarking on the northward leg of their odyssey
was difficult because of the dearth of military aircraft
available for transportation. But on the morning of 4
June, as the American and Japanese fleets were getting
down to business at faraway Midway, the three set out
aboard an elderly commercial airliner for the US Navy
base at Brisbane.
There was little to see. The harbor contained half
a dozen submarines and sub-tenders, and again the
chronic communication problems across the sprawl-
ing Pacific were emphasized and noted. Though the
submariners had little idea of what was happening
outside their immediate area, they displayed excel-
lent morale and an eagerness to throw everything they
had, regardless of how little that might be, against the
enemy. Yet nothing could hide the fact the lack of co-
ordination between naval units and land-based aircraft
was the result of Brisbane’s being so isolated from its
far-flung military forces. That had proved almost fatal
in the recent Battle of the Coral Sea.
North to Townsville
On 6 June, buoyed by war dispatches from Mid-
way, the men boarded another old airliner for a visit
to the northern Queensland community of Townsville
and the 22nd Bomb Group’s headquarters at Garbutt
Field. Only two of the three observers would leave
there.
After arriving at Garbutt, Anderson was loaned a
Lockheed C-40, so he and his companions no longer
had to forage for transport. With several B-26 Maraud-
er airfields to visit, the dedicated plane was a relief
to the threesome and, with Anderson’s piloting skill
and familiarity with this outfit (he’d served with them
before the war) the scene was set for a successful so-
journ.
The B-26 Marauder was a swift, durable and sleek
aircraft to look at, but was unforgiving when handled
indelicately. At one point there were so many non-
combat crashes and mid-air collisions involving the
bomber that the Army ordered the entire fleet ground-
ed until the problems could be located and rectified.
WaW 3 Issue.indd 51
It turned out there were no structural or mechani-
cal defects contributing to the Marauder’s growing
reputation as a widow-maker. It was just that, with its
short wings, powerful engines and huge propellers,
the plane demanded the absolute best skills possible
from its pilots. Yet once an aviator grew accustomed
to the craft, the Marauder was a dream to fly: fast, du-
rable and maneuverable. Anderson later recalled how
veteran pilots like Walt Krell and Jerry Crosson could
“make the 26 sit up and sing songs to them.”
Garbutt Field was strewn with planes grounded
by a lack of spare parts. The uncaring stevedores and
the Allies’ preoccupation with the war in Europe were
choking the flow of essentials to units trying to operate
along the northern Australia coast. Tasked with wrest-
ing air superiority from the Japanese, the 22nd and the
B-17 equipped 19th Bomb Group were flying continu-
ous unescorted missions against well defended targets.
Japanese squadrons were manned by seasoned fighter
pilots flying dreaded Mitsubishi A6M Zeros. Ander-
son, Johnson and Stevens were shocked to learn half
of the two groups’ bombers were inoperative because
of battle damage the ground crews couldn’t repair ow-
ing to the shortage of spare parts.
The aircrews and mechanics told the observers
there weren’t even enough tools to go around when
parts were available. Blistering heat, biting insects, the
miserable combination of sweltering humidity mixed
with lung- and engine-clogging dust from dirt run-
ways, added to incessant Japanese air raids to make
Garbutt Field among the most wretched postings in the
Pacific Theater.
Johnson asked the crews about some of their less
obvious problems. He learned many of them had
been posted to that war zone on 8 December 1941
and hadn’t left it since. They’d deployed from their
stateside bases in such haste that some pilots flew their
planes overseas clad only in bathrobes and slippers.
Many still wore patchwork outfits unrecognizable as
military uniforms. There was little medicine for the
sick and wounded, and few trained medical personnel.
The command staff in Washington weren’t receiving
official reports from the area because the necessary
forms had been used up long before. Forced to fly into
enemy controlled skies bereft of escorts, the Maraud-
ers and Fortresses were being lost at a rate of 15 to 25
percent per mission.
Into Enemy Territory
During the initial inspections of the area’s airfields,
Anderson had discovered the first coordinated bomb-
ing raid against the pivotal Japanese Lae Airfield was
slated for 9 June. He shared that with his friends, and
the three decided to go along on the mission despite
Maj. Gen. William Marquat’s attempts to dissuade
them. Johnson made it clear he’d come to that part of
the world to learn everything there was to know about
the air and sea war being waged against the Japanese,
World at War 51
10/10/08 2:02:25 PM
 On the ground: Allied troops fight their way through the New Guinea jungle.
and tagging along on a mission was the only way for
him to accomplish that task.
Though MacArthur and Marquat were dismayed
at the observers’ determination to participate in the
perilous flight, they also knew, should Johnson inform
Roosevelt they were interfering with his fact-finding,
both would have explaining to do directly to the chief
executive. So they relented, figuring if Johnson were
killed they could honestly state they’d done their best
to talk him out of risking his life. And there was no
changing Johnson’s mind.
Lae was home to the notorious Tainan Fighter
Wing, the elite of imperial Japanese air units. That unit
was wreaking havoc on US bomber formations that
were trying to put counter-pressure on the Japanese
juggernaut. When there was a fighter escort, it was
provided by outmoded Bell P-39 Airacobras, which
were inadequate versus the nimble Zero. Attacking the
nerve center of the Tainan Wing was a sound tactical
move, but it was also as dangerous as it was useful.
The 2,600-mile flight was made in two legs: the
Marauders would cross the open sea to Port Moresby
in New Guinea, land for refueling at Seven-Mile Air-
drome, and then resume the flight to Lae. The 2,400
miles of the flight would be over the ocean, and the sea
in the area was so thick with sharks that, when return-
ing from missions, pilots would sometimes drop low
and their gunners would shoot a few bursts downward.
52 #3
WaW 3 Issue.indd 52
The surface would quickly churn bloody red as sharks
attacked those among them that had been killed or
wounded by the bullets. The Tainan Wing’s best flier,
Saburo Sakai, once watched in horrified fascination
just off Lae as four crewmen from a B-26 shot down
during a reconnaissance flight managed to bail out and
inflate their life raft, but before they could clamber
into it they were ripped apart by predatory fish.
B-17s from Horn Island would precede the B-26s,
taking off at 9:30 a.m. on the 22nd to overfly Lae at
30,000 feet in an attempt to draw away interceptors.
At 9:45 a.m. a formation of B-25 Mitchells, also from
Horn, would strike the airdrome from 18,000 feet. Fif-
teen minutes later the 22nd’s Marauders would come in
at 10,000 feet and rain bombs on the Tainan base as
well as on another airfield on nearby Salamaua. It was
hoped all the interceptors would still be off chasing the
earlier-arriving bombers, or returning out of ammuni-
tion and low on fuel.
Anderson, Johnson and Stevens kept inspecting in-
stallations throughout the region up to the last moment
before the mission, when they embarked on a flight
too lengthy for their C-40. The B-17 ferrying them
back to Garbutt, in the predawn of 9 June, went astray
when its navigator got lost. Under direct orders not to
take off on the Tainan mission without the inspectors,
the airmen chafed as time slipped away, throwing off
the critical coordination between the three flights of
10/10/08 2:02:27 PM
 bombers. The 8:00 a.m. liftoff time passed, and anx-
ious crews scanned the horizon for the tardy plane. Fi-
nally, just before 8:15 a.m., the Fortress flew into view
and swooped onto the gravel runway. Ground crews
instantly began final preparations on the B-26s while
their pilots revved cold engines.
After the trio clambered from the overdue aircraft,
Johnson was assigned to fly with Lt. Willis G. Bench
aboard the Wabash Cannonball (Marauder #01508),
but before he could climb on board Stevens heaved
himself into the fuselage and plopped into the seat that
would have been Johnson’s. When the Texan tried to
take his place, Stevens merely grinned and refused to
move, forcing the angry congressman to find another
aircraft. He rode with Lt. Walter H. Greer on the Heck-
ling Hare (Marauder #01488).
Johnson queried the crew on what they most need-
ed. Heckling Hare’s men, especially tail gunner Harry
Baren, were delighted to oblige as they poured out
their woes about the lack of effective fighter protec-
tion, inadequate intelligence gathering, and of how
spare parts were so scarce mechanics would start can-
nibalizing battle-wrecked planes for usable compo-
nents literally before the dust from the crash landings Ace pilot Saburo Sakai
settled.
The time came for the young men to board the Zero during the chaotic scramble. Clawing for alti-
planes and, in accordance with orders from MacArthur, tude, the Japanese pilots were just drawing within gun
the congressman asked for a parachute. Baren helped range of the incoming B-26 flight when they spotted
him on with one whose harness had been designed an approaching flock of silver specks that they at first
for someone several inches shorter than Johnson. He thought were American fighters coming to the bomb-
didn’t tell the tall passenger that he, Baren, would be ers’ aid. It took only a few seconds for them to realize
flying the mission with no chute because Johnson was they weren’t fighters—it was the Marauder forma-
wearing his. Tightly ensconced in the small compart- tion.
ment for the navigator and radio operator, Johnson sat The Japanese interceptors flew head-on toward the
next to a small porthole that would enable him to wit- B-26s as they approached their airfield. There was no
ness aerial combat. longer any point in trying to remain undetected; so the
Assuming the Zeros would be low on fuel and Americans dropped to just 6,000 feet for their bomb
ammo, or already on the ground re-arming and re-fu- run. The bombardiers dumped their 100 and 500 lb.
eling after chasing the earlier-arriving B-17s and B- bombs with lethal accuracy, thoroughly cratering the
25s, the Marauder crewmen were anticipating an easy installation. The Zeros momentarily broke off their
and devastating attack. As the initial wave of US war- passes as anti-aircraft gunners opened fire from their
planes neared Lae, the pilots of the Tainan Wing were pits at the end of the runway. Those shots missed, and
clustered around a war correspondent in an isolated the bombers wheeled and headed for the open sea as
corner of their installation. They were merrily giving the interceptors again lined up on them.
interviews and posing for photographs when ground Going into shallow dives, the Americans wrung
personnel began hammering on drums, buckets and every ounce of power from their machines, topping
hollow logs while screaming: “Alert! Alert! Enemy out at 400 miles per hour and forcing the Japanese to
planes!” come after them in direct paths rather than the arcing
Running for their Zeros, they were relieved to see pursuit curves that gave the best shooting angle. Pilots
the small bomber formation—only two B-17s had dropped their aircraft to just above the waves, denying
been able to get airborne; the others were scrubbed for their bombers’ vulnerable unarmed undersides to the
mechanical reasons—unload their bombs only to miss fighters.
the line of parked fighters. The Japanese tumbled into Sakai swooped through the descending B-26s and
cockpits and cranked cold engines as the first wave of then pulled up violently, climbing almost vertically
Americans turned for home. through the formation before topping out and coming
Sakai was nearly killed on the runway when his back in a dive with all his guns blazing at one of the
plane came within inches of colliding with another raiders. His machineguns and 20mm cannon stitched
World at War 53

WaW 3 Issue.indd 53 10/10/08 2:02:28 PM


Marauder: USAAF B-26 bomber.
a burning line along the cockpit, fuselage and onto
the port engine, which exploded in orange flame. The
plane spiraled down, trailing smoke and chunks of alu-
minum for the few seconds it took to hit the water,
where it disintegrated on the ocean’s surface. It was
the Wabash Cannonball. Francis Stevens was dead,
and his refusal to give up his seat had saved Johnson’s
life.
Sakai looked around for more victims, and spot-
ted a lone bomber lagging behind the rest. It had de-
veloped engine trouble and was dangerously alone as
the rest of the flight pulled away from it. Rocking his
wings as a signal to any nearby Zeros to follow him,
Sakai set a straight course for the laggard. It was Heck-
ling Hare, and Johnson was about to get a pointblank
look at one of the greatest fighter pilots in history.
The bomber’s starboard generator had malfunc-
tioned. Greer switched power from autopilot to manual
in order to reduce strain on the overtaxed port genera-
tor, but that precipitated a power loss that cut Heckling
Hare’s airspeed.
A different kind of campaign: LBJ senatorial election poster.
54 #3
WaW 3 Issue.indd 54
Greer had watched as the fighter shot down Wa-
bash Cannonball; so, when Sakai went soaring high
over his next intended kill, his target knew better than
to be passive. As the Japanese plunged downward,
he lined up on the American’s cockpit and starboard
engine, but the Marauder abruptly sheered to the left,
ruining that point of aim. The bullets drummed into a
non-vital section of the wing and fuselage, doing little
damage.
Years later Sakai recounted how he’d never seen a
bomber flown like that. Greer was whipping his ailing
bird around the sky in barnstormer fashion, and the
swarm of Zeros that had caught up with it couldn’t
land a killer blow. All the while Greer’s gunners were
spraying them with 50-caliber shells.
There were so many Zeros circling the B-26 that
Sakai had to break to his right to get clear of his com-
rades. At that point Heckling Hare flew into a cloud-
bank, and Sakai realized he and the rest of the Tainan
Wing had allowed the solitary bomber to draw them
away from another American formation. Looking
over his shoulder he saw the second group of Maraud-
ers bearing down unmolested on adjacent Salamaua.
Yanking his plane around, he shoved its engine into
over-boost and roared flat-out for that line of B-26s,
whose bomb bay doors were already open. Johnson,
meanwhile, was almost as busy as Sakai.
LBJ in Action
When the fighters first swarmed his plane, Johnson
had been standing on a small stool so he could have a
360-degree vista of the air-land battlefield through the
transparent Plexiglas bubble atop the fuselage. When
the shooting started, he crawled throughout the plane
to ensure he saw everything that was happening. By
then Greer had despaired of reaching the target in his
crippled aircraft; so he ordered his bombardier to jet-
tison their load to lighten the bomber to better enable
them to make it back to Seven-Mile. The Zeros kept
tearing at the B-26 for a couple more minutes, then
turned back to pursue the second Marauder flight.
Heckling Hare was still airborne, and her observant
passenger had overlooked nothing.
Sakai managed to catch up with the second bomber
flight just after they pounded Salamaua. He poured
his remaining ammunition into a Marauder flown by
Lt. Col. Dwight Divine, but lost his quarry in overcast
without seeing if it crashed. He was given credit for
two bombers shot down that day, but Divine had not
crashed. He nursed his plane back to Seven-Mile and
belly-landed safely.
Trailing along at the back of the scattering forma-
tion was a bomber flown by Lt. Walt Krell. Sam Ander-
son had hitched a ride with him that day and, 50 miles
into the return trip from Lae, Lt. Hiroshi Nishizawa
made the day’s last attack on the Americans. Lining
up on Krell’s plane, Nishizawa was unable to inflict a
mortal wound before his ammo ran out; so he did what
10/10/08 2:02:28 PM
 he considered the next best thing and tried to ram the
B-26. Bouncing Anderson around like a pinball, Krell
managed to duck under the fanatic’s suicidal swoop,
almost crashing into the ocean before pulling up. Lev-
eling out, Krell made it home. The mission was over.
Road to Victory
For two more days Anderson and Johnson toured
bomb-damaged air and naval installations along Aus-
tralia’s northeast coast. On the morning of the 11th
they lifted off from Darwin aboard a B-17 called The
Swoose, bound for Cloncurry and the first leg of the
journey home. The plane’s octant, used for navigation
without ground reference, suddenly went inoperative
and the crew became lost over the featureless Austra-
lian desert. At 5:00 p.m. they landed safely near an
isolated ranch house. The rancher telephoned the sher-
iff in the closest town, 40 miles distant Winton, and
informed him of the situation. At midnight the lawman
pulled in front of the house and informed the Ameri-
cans he was there to provide transport. The sheriff also
got lost, but the party finally made it to Winton at 7:00
a.m.
It was a portent of how the rest of the homeward trip
would go for Anderson and Johnson. They made a few
more inspections of military installations, spoke with
more rank-and-file personnel, attended a final brief-
ing with MacArthur on the 18th, and made a weather-
delayed departure from Australia aboard Ghormley’s Future president: Lyndon Baines Johnson addressing the
PBY on 19 June. The first day out, Johnson developed nation in the 1960s.
a fever that almost killed him before the plane’s crew
While we have fighting to do abroad, we have
could get him to a hospital in New Zealand. There he
scrapping to do at home. Scrapping of dead-
was diagnosed with pneumonia, and it was 16 July,
wood in thinking, of inefficiencies in methods—
following a lengthy medical layover at Pearl Harbor,
yes, and of ineffectiveness in men; men who have
before he made it home and was released from active
become entrenched in power, men who love their
duty.
country and would die for it, but not until their
Later that month, almost 30 pounds lighter than own dangerously outmoded notions have caused
when he’d left the country, LBJ stood before an at- others to die for it first.
tentive Congress and railed against the inefficiency,
complacency and overall inadequacies he’d seen in
the Pacific Theater’s fields of communications, coun- He also spoke of how the men at the Pacific War’s
terintelligence and supply. His ringing words were ef- sharp end needed more and better weapons with which
fective. to fight the enemy. They needed the means to keep
those weapons in working order, and enough well-
We are going to have to give our men leader-
trained, well-equipped men to maintain them so they
ship and equipment superior to that of any in the
could be wielded in combat. Despite the recent US
world. We are going to have to move quickly to
victory at Midway it was, as he put it, “Still possible
coordinate dive-bombers and domestic policies,
for us to lose this war.”
tanks and military strategy, ships and the will of
the people. Management and manpower are go- at

ing to have to be closely woven into a smoothly

functioning machine devoid of departmental
squabbles and petty jealousies. Sources
Caidin, Martin & Edward Hymoff. The Mission, J.B. Lippincott
Co., 1964.
Jackson, Robert. Fighter Pilots of World War II, Barnes & Noble
Books, 1976.
Mayo, Lida. Bloody Buna.

World at War 55

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 SOVIET ARMY
ORGANIZATION 1942-45
by Joseph Miranda
Soviet Mobile Units, 1942-45
Prior to the Soviet entry into World War II, the
Red Army had one of the largest mechanized forces
in the world. But the shock of Operation Barbarossa,
the German invasion of the Soviet Union beginning 22
June 1941, caused that organization to disintegrate. By
the end of 1941 the Soviets had fully dissolved their
pre-war tank and motorized divisions. The component
units were then used as independent tank and motor-
ized brigades. The main reason for that reorganization
was the Soviets lacked the personnel and logistics to
command and support large-scale mechanized forma-
tions. It wouldn’t be until mid-1942 the Soviets once
again formed divisional tank and mechanized units.
56 #3
WaW 3 Issue.indd 56
The Soviets used the term “corps” to designate two
different types of formations. The first type of corps
was responsible for operational control over units on
a sector of the front. That corps echelon consisted of
infantry divisions as well as supporting tank brigades
and artillery. Effectively it was a combined-arms for-
mation with foot-mobile infantry divisions predomi-
nating. The second type of corps were composed of
mobile units. Those mobile corps consisted of three or
more tank or motorized infantry brigades plus artillery
and support units under a single headquarters. Opera-
tively, then, the Red Army designated what Western
armies would consider an armored or mechanized di-
vision as a “corps.”
10/10/08 2:02:30 PM
 Tank corps organization remained much the same
throughout the war. It consisted of three tank brigades,
a motorized infantry brigade, and various support
units. In 1942 those support units would include some
scarce reconnaissance, rocket and anti-aircraft battal-
ions, plus some engineers. Logistical services were
minimal. By 1943 the support units were upgraded
to two recon regiments (actually battalion-sized), a
rocket launcher regiment, a mortar regiment, two anti-
tank units (a regiment of 76mm guns and a battalion
of 45mm), two anti-aircraft regiments (actually bat-
talion-sized), an engineer battalion, and two self-pro-
pelled gun regiments (again, actually battalion-sized
units). There was also a corps reserve of 40 tanks. By
1944-45, a tank corps might have added to it a 76mm
gun regiment and an additional heavy tank or self-pro-
pelled gun regiment. The latter replaced towed anti-
tank guns.
The mechanized corps was intended to hold ter-
rain captured by the tank corps. In 1943 it consisted
of three mechanized brigades, a tank regiment or two,
and mortar, light artillery, anti-tank, anti-aircraft and
recon battalions. As with the tank corps, the mecha-
nized corps gained additional units as the war pro-
gressed. The tank regiments were replaced with a
tank brigade, and supporting units equivalent to those
assigned to tank corps were also assigned. Since the
mechanized brigades each included an organic tank
regiment, the armored fighting vehicle (AFV) strength
of the mechanized corps was about equal to that of the
tank corps.
Soviet mobile units stressed combined-arms, with
infantry, tanks and various kinds of artillery at all
echelons. Tank brigades consisted of three small tank
battalions (65 tanks, total), a battalion of motorized
infantry armed with submachineguns (who rode on
the tanks and provided protection from enemy infan-
try and anti-tank guns), plus anti-tank and machine-
gun companies. Motorized brigades consisted of three
infantry battalions, plus mortar, 76mm gun, anti-tank
and recon/submachinegun units. Mechanized brigades
were basically the same as the motorized, except they
had a tank regiment assigned to them. Tank and self-
propelled gun (assault gun) regiments were the size of
small battalions and included an infantry escort. The
assault guns were intended to act as direct fire weap-
ons, and the units shown on the organization chart
should be considered to be the equivalent of divisional
artillery, thought they could also be effective in the
anti-tank role.
The next higher mobile echelon above corps was
the tank army, which in 1942 consisted of two or so
tank corps, plus some cavalry and foot-mobile infantry
divisions. That organization proved unwieldy, as the
infantry couldn’t keep up with the tanks. The infantry
divisions were dropped; the 1943 tank army consisted
of two tank corps and one mechanized corps, plus
World at War 57

WaW 3 Issue.indd 57 10/10/08 2:02:31 PM

 several self-propelled gun and heavy tank regiments.
There were also engineer, anti-tank, anti-aircraft, rock-
et launcher and artillery brigades. Other units might
also be added, including reconnaissance and aviation
regiments.
The Red Army made much use of forward detach-
ments and operational maneuver groups. There were
tank, mechanized and cavalry units detached from
higher-echelon units and used as the advanced guard
in breakthroughs. The forward detachments and oper-
ational maneuver groups could operate independently,
moving up to 30 miles (50 kilometers) ahead of the
front, bypassing enemy centers of resistance and seiz-
ing key territory in the enemy rear. The main body
would follow, consolidating gains and mopping up
enemy pockets. The Red Army maintained its rifle divisions at
58 #3
WaW 3 Issue.indd 58
Red Rifles
The Soviets used the term “rifle” for their infan-
try units as a morale building device, referring back
to the elite rifle units of the old Imperial army and
Russian Civil War. Soviet infantry divisions went
through several reorganizations during 1942-45. Rifle
divisions were reduced in size and equipment, from
a May 1941 strength of 14,400 men down to around
9,500 in late 1942. That reduction was mainly due to
the lack of commanders and staff officers, as well as
the need to simplify organization. Owing to the lack of
fire-control specialists, the Soviets would concentrate
their indirect fire guns into separate artillery divisions
and corps, leaving the divisions mainly with direct-fire
guns and mortars.
three different levels of strength. That included “A”
or “shock” divisions of about 12,000, reinforced with
extra men and equipment. There was the standard “B”
division of 9,000 or so men. Then there were the “V”
or static divisions of 6,000 men, mainly deployed for
duty in quiet sectors. Additionally, there were Guards
rifle divisions. Guards were units that had demon-
strated excellence in combat and were then assigned
additional men and better equipment. There were also
Guards tank and aviation units.
Throughout much of the war, the Soviets main-
tained a two-to-one superiority in infantry divisions
over the Axis on the eastern front; however, those
numbers are deceptive. Soviet infantry divisions were
much smaller than the German in strength. On pa-
per, at least, German infantry divisions had 14,000 to
17,000 men. The Germans also had an edge in train-
ing and leadership, at least up until 1944. Then there
was the issue of firepower. A critical Soviet deficiency
lay in the lack of effective indirect-fire technique. So-
viet divisional artillery therefore had to be used in the
much less efficient direct-fire role. The result was the
Germans could inflict proportionately more casualties
by concentrating their own much more efficient artil-
lery.
10/10/08 2:02:32 PM
 On paper the Soviet infantry regiment seemed to
have an edge over its German opponent, owing to its
numerous support units, including additional subma-
chinegun, recon, artillery and anti-tank companies.
That, again, is deceptive. Soviet support units tended
to be considerably smaller than their German equiv-
alents, with battalions having the strength of one or
two Western companies. Moreover, Wehrmacht units
usually had several times as many radios as their Red
Army equivalents. So the Germans could control oper-
ations better and maintain the tactical edge even when
outmaneuvered on the operational level.
Guns
The Red Army concentrated the majority of its It was here the Red Army had a real advantage over
heavy guns in artillery and anti-aircraft divisions and the Wehrmacht. The Germans didn’t organize artillery
anti-tank brigades. Aside from simplifying the prob- into units much larger than brigades. There was one
lems of coordinating large numbers of heavy weap- abortive attempt to form an artillery division in 1943-
ons, that practice also allowed the Soviets to maintain 44, but the Germans had to break it up to provide re-
a large operational reserve of artillery that could be placements for losses on the front. The Soviet ability
committed to key sectors of the front. Artillery divi- to concentrate large numbers of guns did much to pave
sions, for example, would be used to support major the way for their drive across eastern Europe.
offensives while anti-tank brigades would reinforce
armies expected to come under German armored as- at
sault, such as at Kursk. The Soviets made much use
of multiple rocket launchers; those units were termed
“Guards Mortar.”

World at War 59

WaW 3 Issue.indd 59 10/10/08 2:02:33 PM

 A Fast & Easy Playing Series of Card Games
Poland
This game depicts the German campaign against Poland in September, 1939. Historically,
it was a stunning victory but the blitzkrieg strategy was untested and Poland expected to hold
on long enough for other countries to intervene. In the game, the Germans strive to
force the Polish surrender quickly by capturing Polish cities including the Polish
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Cards depict the combat forces, objectives, and events of the campaign. $23.00

D-Day
June 6, 1944, the day that decided the fate of World War II in Europe. Now you command
the Allied and Axis armies as each struggles to control the five key beaches along the
Normandy coastline. If the Allied troops seize the beaches, Germany is doomed. But
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positions, and create heroic sacrifices so others can advance to victory! $20.00

Midway
From June 4th to June 6th of 1942, a massive battle raged around
the tiny Pacific island of Midway that changed the course of World
War II. The victorious Imperial Japanese Navy was poised to capture
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United States. The only obstacle in their path was an outnumbered
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torpedo bombers and dive bombers in this epic battle! $20.00

North Africa
Covering the great battles of Erwin Rommel from 1941 to 1943, as he fought his way back and forth
4TH INDIAN DIV. across the deserts of North Africa. LNA uses cards to represent the military units, supply convoys and
objectives of the historic campaign. To win, you must consider your units’ combat power and maneuver
options as well as their supply situation. The game features: the Afrika Korps, Tobruk, the Desert Rats, Malta,
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MOTORIZED ADVANCE
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009

Starts Game in
WESTERN DESERT events, in which smaller forces were often able to defeat and rout larger ones by using better tactics and
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037

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All games include 110 full color playing

cards and one sheet of rules.

PO Box 21598, Bakersfield CA 93390-1598 • (661) 587-9633 •fax 661/587-5031 • www.decisiongames.com

60 #3

WaW 3 Issue.indd 60 10/10/08 2:02:40 PM

 Decision Games…
Games
your full line game publisher.
Ancient to Renaissance
QTY Issue #/Game Title Price TOTAL
Battles of the Ancient World $80
China the Middle Kingdom $60
Empires of the Middle Ages $100
Americana
Rebels & Redcoats $80
Battle Cry of Freedom $40
War Between the States $110
Seven Days Battles $28
Blue & Gray $35 Sub Total
Antietam Campaign $35 Sub Total
The Alamo $15 TAX (CA. RES.)
Lords of the Sierra Madre $40
Shipping from Chart below
Gunpowder & Napoleonic TOTAL ORDER
Napoleon’s Last Battles $35
Emperor’s First Battles &
Napoleon’s First Battles $40
Thirty Years War Quad $35 Shipping Charges
Empires at War $35 1st unit Adt’l units Type of Service
The ‘45 $35 $10 $2 UPS Ground/USPS Prior‑ity Mail
The Sun Never Sets $40 20 2 Canada

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Nine Navies War $50 28 5 Asia, Australia

Over The Top! $38

Storm of Steel $140
Name
World War II
Battles for the Ardennes $38
Address
Battle for Germany $15
Battle Over Britain $20
City, State Zip
Beyond the Urals $25
Cherkassy Pocket: country
Encirclement at Korsun $45 Phone email
Drive on Stalingrad $48
Highway to the Reich $160 VISA/Mc (ONLY)#
Land without End $50 Signature Exp.
Luftwaffe $50
NUTS! $40
Operation Kremlin $35
Pacific Battles, Vol. 1:
The Rising Sun $48 Decision Games
USN Deluxe $70 PO Box 21598
Modern Bakersfield CA 93390
Firefight $15 661/587-9633
The Forgotten War: Korea $40 Fax- 661/587-5031
www.decisiongames.com
World at War 61

WaW 3 Issue.indd 61 10/10/08 2:02:41 PM

 available now!
China: The Middle Kingdom
China: The Middle Kingdom covers the full scope of
Chinese history, from its beginnings as a collection of warring
feudal states, to the current cold war between China and Taiwan.
In this epic game based on the classic Avalon Hill Britannia
system, four players each control several factions simultaneously,
with each faction having their own objectives and situations, such
as conquering certain provinces. The winner is the player who
scores the most points by the end of the game. This breathtaking
game unfolds on an illustrated map of China with 432 counters,
covering 50 separate countries and peoples, including all of the
major dynasties of Chinese history, the arrival of the European
powers, both World Wars and the Japanese invasion, right up
to the end of the civil war between the Communists and the
Nationalists. The game occurs over 24 turns, starting from 403 BC, during the
“Warring States” period as China begins to rise from its feudal age. The game
has two shorter campaign scenarios covering the first half and second half of
the full campaign game.
Battles between armies can be dramatically affected by the presence
of mountains, emperors, heroes, new inventions, and even the Great Wall.
Rebellions, barbarian invasions, and uprisings may spring up from anywhere,
and signal the end of one dynasty and the birth of a new dynasty. Diplomacy
is as important as military strength. Each player continually must defend
against multiple enemies on multiple fronts. $60

Highway to the Reich

Highway to the Reich is a tactical simulation of the largest airborne operation in
history. Over 35,000 men belonging to 1st Allied Airborne Army dropped from
the skies of Holland. Their objective: capture and hold a highway. The result:
a salient into German territory that lacked only the last objective, and was thus
a tragic defeat.
The 2,000-plus counters detail Gen. Brereton’s airborne corps of three divi-
sions, the units of 30th Corps, and Model’s scattered and disheveled forces at
company level for infantry; battery level for artillery, anti-tank and anti-air, and
troop-level for tanks and armored cars.
The four maps cover from the front along the Meuse-Escaut Canal to
the area, nearly 200 hexes away, surrounding Arnhem Highway Bridge.
Each map is positioned to cover the operational area of one airborne
division in order to allow one-division scenarios.
All the activities of each formation are completed before those of
another are begun. Attacks start with a preliminary barrage, followed
by fire attack by maneuver companies, and then close action with tanks
and assault troops. All activities involve comparisons of involved units’
capabilities. Optional rules focus on hidden movement and multi-player
variations, as well as giving the Allied player the opportunity to execute
his own operational plan. The revisions have made this classic game
easier and faster to play than ever before. $160

Contents:
Four 22” x 34” maps Player Aid Cards
2,520 die-cut counters Campaign Analysis
Rule & scenario books Six-sided Dice
6 Organization Charts

62 #3

WaW 3 Issue.indd 62 10/10/08 2:02:46 PM

 available now!
Flying Circus:
Aerial Combat in WWI
Flying Circus: Aerial Combat in WWI depicts the fun and flavor of World War I aerial dogfight-
ing. You fly the colorful and agile aircraft of WWI as you make history in the world’s first use of
aircraft in a military role.
This is the basic game. You have everything you need to play single aircraft duels to multi-air-
craft dogfights. Each aircraft has its own unique characteristics reflected in its ratings and special
abilities. The basic game rules cover all the maneuvers that made WWI aerial combat: barrel rolls,
stall turns, Immelmanns, vertical rolls and Chandelles. Outmaneuver your opponent to line up your
guns and watch his planes go down in flames!
Gamers who have played the Down in Flames game series will find many similarities in game
play, however, previous experience is not necessary. The basic game rules can be read in less than
20 minutes and you can play your first game immediately. Includes: 110 full color playing cards & rules sheet. $
23

This is the deluxe game. You will need the basic game
card deck to play this expanded version. Then you will have
everything you need to play single aircraft duels and team
play with multiple flights in swirling dogfights. This deluxe
game adds rules for altitude, pilot abilities—including a
Shipping Charges
deck of 25 pilot cards for historical campaigns—bombers, 1st unit Adt’l units Type of Service
rear gunners, scouts and other optional rules. This deluxe $10 $2 UPS Ground/USPS Priority Mail
game also includes cards and rules for playing multi-mis- 20 2 Canada
sion games of famous WWI campaigns such as Cambrai
26 4 Europe, South America
and Meuse-Argonne, along with a “Campaign Analysis”
article detailing the development of the aircraft, their tactics 28 6 Asia, Australia

and strategy. $40

QTY Title Price Total
Contents: China The Middle Kingdom $60
110 Deluxe deck cards (bombers, scouts, plus more fighters & action cards)
Deluxe Game rules booklet Highway to the Reich $160
6 Campaign Cards Flying Circus-Basic $23
Pilot Log
36 Pilot & altitude cards Flying Circus-Deluxe $40
Dice marker Shipping

Name
Address
City/State/Zip
Country
V/MC # Exp.
PO Box 21598 Signature
Bakersfield CA 93390
661/587-9633 • fax 661/587-5031 • www.decisiongames.com Phone #
World at War 63

WaW 3 Issue.indd 63 10/10/08 2:02:50 PM

 Strategy & Tactics magazine covers all of military history
and its future possibilities. The articles focus on the ‘how’ and
‘why’ of war, and are richly illustrated with maps, diagrams
and photos. Use the subscription card or order online.
Don’t miss a single issue!

Each issue is packed full of:

• In-depth analysis
• Detailed maps
• Orders of Battle

Diagram from article on Colombian

Troops in Korea, #255.

Map portion from upcoming article on Hannibal’s War, issue #254.

P.O. Box 21598
Bakersfield, CA 93390-1598
ph: (661) 587-9633 • Fax: (661) 587-5031
www.StrategyAndTacticsPress.com

64 #3

WaW 3 Issue.indd 64 10/10/08 2:02:56 PM