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Barbarossa:
The Russo-German War
Amerika Bombers:
Luftwaffe’s Plan to Bomb US
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6 Barbarossa: The Russo-German War
Nazi Germany and the USSR are locked in the greatest
land war of all time.
by Joseph Miranda
Number 1
Aug/Sep 2008 25 A Drop Zone Too Far: Operation Market Garden
The Allies launch a daring airborne assault behind German lines
Publisher: Christopher Cummins to try to win the war in September 44.
Editors: Ty Bomba & Joseph Miranda
by John Burtt
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Koenig and Dav Vandenbroucke. 44 Amerika Bombers: Luftwaffe Plans to
Design • Graphics • Layout: Callie Cummins Bomb the United States
Map Graphics: Meridian Mapping The Luftwaffe’s intercontinental bombers and the origins of the
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4 #1
First 12 Issues
East Front 1: Barbarossa 5: Finnish Front, 1941-42 9: Dest. Army Grp. Center
Pacific 2: Solomons Campaign 6: Great East Asia War 10: Coral Sea Solitaire
Western & 3: The Bulge 7: Greek Tragedy 11: Salerno
Mediterranean
Other 4: USAAF 8: Arriba Espana! 12: 1940: What if?
6 #1
From Blitzkrieg to Attrition head off a repeat of the German home front collapse of
As the 1941 campaign wore on toward winter, late 1918. And all this came full circle, as in 1941-42
Soviet strategy forced the Germans into a series of because Hitler did not commit the Reich’s economy to
battles of attrition. Generally the Germans used their “total war” status for fear it would undermine civilian
mechanized divisions to conduct breakthroughs and morale.
encircle enemy units. The infantry would then close At the end of Operation Barbarossa the Germans
and destroy trapped enemy forces, but surrounded had gained control of much of the European portion
Red Army troops would often fight on. That process of the Soviet Union, especially the economic and in-
worked to slow the German advance, as their infantry dustrial regions of the Ukraine, but the Wehrmacht
was marching about 50 miles behind the lead panzers. was vastly overextended. Most important, the Soviet
Once the infantry had closed the distance, they would peoples had been made more willing to fight for their
reduce the pockets by assault. The casualty count still country, largely as the result of the failure of German
usually favored the Germans. Encircled Soviet units political strategy. Stalin exploited those patriotic sen-
were cut off from their lines of communication and timents, rallying the Soviet peoples to defend their
were frequently disorganized. Mass Russian surren- homeland against the invaders with a call to basic
ders were often the result, but German losses gradu- “bourgeoisie” patriotism.
ally increased. Even more subtle was the effect those Turning Points
battles had on German logistics. Clearing the pockets
The Stalingrad battle, fought from late 1942 and
forced the Germans to consume much artillery ammu-
into the winter following, proved decisive not simply
nition, placing another burden on the already straining
because of the massive losses to Axis armed forces. It
supply system.
also represented a change in German strategy. Until
German soldiers themselves were starting to go Stalingrad, the Germans had won by winning cam-
ragged. Exhaustion and disease began to take their paigns, not individual battles. Once they had gained
toll. The wounded and sick couldn’t be left behind to operational ascendancy, enemy armed forces fell into
the mercies of the partisans. German columns started their grasp. After Stalingrad they were trying to win
to resemble medieval armies marching grimly forward battles in order to use them to gain the telling blow
to whatever destiny lay in the east. Their officers and for their campaigns. Given superior Soviet manpower,
troops became uneasy about the great distances that however, the Germans were bound to lose with that
had to be covered and the seemingly endless Soviet approach regardless of what happened in the working
armies resisting in front of them. out of the details. Fighting World War I type battles
That uneasiness also started to be felt in Germany made no sense in World War II.
itself. Classified intelligence reports from the Nazi By the time of the Kursk Offensive (July 1943),
Party Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst or SD) indi- the Soviets had figured out a counter to the blitzkrieg.
cated home front morale was starting to decline as it Defensively, the Soviets developed an organizational
was becoming apparent the war in Russia was not go- advantage with their numerous independent anti-tank
ing to end soon. New domestic propaganda measures brigades. These units allowed the Soviets to concen-
were recommended to keep the civilians motivated and continues on page 16
World at War 11
12 #1
Operation Uranus
On 19 November 1942, the Soviets struck back at Stal-
ingrad, with Marshal Zhukov in command. He launched two
powerful thrusts, one north of the city and the other to the
south. They overran the Axis-allied armies on the flanks and
then kept going. The Soviet spearheads converged to the
west of Stalingrad, trapping Paulus and 6th Army and forcing
the rest of Army Group B to fall back or face annihilation.
Zhukov’s move stunned the Germans. For the first time
in the war, an Allied army proved capable of launching a
mechanized double envelopment to trap a major German
force. Gen. Weichs, Army Group B’s commander, urged 6th
Army to immediately reverse its front and fight its way out,
but Hitler ordered Gen. Paulus to hold Stalingrad at all cost.
Hermann Goering promised that the Luftwaffe would keep
the Stalingrad pocket supplied and hurriedly organized an
airlift.
The Germans lacked the strength to break through to
Stalingrad. Field Marshal Manstein, in command of the re-
lief force, could only scrape together a few mobile divisions.
The lead elements of that force came to within 35 miles of
the city before being halted. In the air, the Luftwaffe failed
to deliver anywhere near sufficient supplies to maintain 6th
Army. Against Zhukov’s mechanized might, Manstein could
at best fight a delaying action. Paulus surrendered on 2 Feb-
ruary 1943. With the fall of Stalingrad, Zhukov increased the
pressure westward. The Soviets took Kharkov and seemed
about to sweep through the entire Ukraine.
By that time, however, the Soviets had in turn overex-
tended themselves. Manstein then assembled a mobile force
and launched a counterattack against the Soviet southern
flank. Faced with that threat to his line of communication,
the Red Army fell back. The Germans retook Kharkov on
14 March 1943, shortly after which the spring thaw put an
end to further mobile operations. As in the year before, the German soldier and
front settled down; both sides again rebuilt, and the Germans
Russian civilians.
planned a new offensive for the upcoming summer.
World at War 13
World at War 15
could be fed into threatened sectors. Regardless of overall numbers, the Soviets could at-
When it came time for the Soviets to go over to the tain local superiority. It wasn’t so much that the Weh-
offensive, the Red Army was prepared. It had orga- rmacht lacked the divisions to counter the Red Army,
nized independent tank armies (essentially reinforced it was that the Red Army could concentrate its mobile
armored corps), which were used as strategic-level forces at critical points in the line, and back them up with
units, to be concentrated for major offensives. At the massed artillery formations. Soviet operational break-
same time, the Wehrmacht ended up employing its throughs forced the Germans to pull back their units or
mobile units simply to try to hold the line. be destroyed in envelopments, thus unhinging the entire
German organization in mid-war degraded their front. It was a vicious cycle from which the Wehrmacht
own mobility. At the start of Barbarossa, the panzer could never escape.
groups had been composed of panzer and motorized As 1944 opened, the Germans found themselves on
divisions. Starting in late 1941, they were reorganized the defensive in the East, and that defense was failing.
as full-blown panzer armies. While that upgrading of They lacked operational reserves to reinforce threatened
status gave them additional resources, it also created a sectors of the front. The reinforcements available usu-
shortfall. As armies, they were responsible for holding ally consisted of only a few units rushed in from other
entire sectors of the front; previously, the higher pan- fronts, or battlegroups reconstituted locally from recent-
zer formations were considered independent maneu- ly destroyed divisions. And the units on the front were
ver formations. The panzer armies acquired numerous stretched thin. During the Soviet summer offensive of
foot-mobile infantry divisions that couldn’t keep up 1944 (Operation Bagration), Army Group Center had 45
with the mechanized units. As the German Army be- divisions to hold a front of over 610 miles. Divisional
came strung out over the steppes, then, its ability to frontages were therefore stretched up to 15 miles, more
concentrate combat power diminished. than three times the doctrinal standard for defensive op-
World at War 17
World at War 19
Barbarossa:
The Russo-German War, 1941-45
Barbarossa is a two-player, low-to-intermediate com- the north, Maikop in the southeast, and Gorki in the north-
plexity, strategic-level simulation of the entire Russo-Ger- east. Expeditions may be launched into the Caucasus.
man War designed by Ty Bomba. The game was originally The primary units of maneuver for the German side are
designed and published by James F. Dunnigan back in 1969. corps, while for the Soviets they’re armies. The orders of
This new edition is an extensive redesign. battle have been extensively researched to ensure they’re
The German player begins on the offensive, attempting the most accurate ever presented for a game of this scale.
to win the game by seizing key areas on the map. The Soviet The counter-mix includes all 25 of the German Korpsgrup-
player is at first primarily on the defensive, but the situation pen, which were unheralded formations crucial to that side’s
requires he halt his opponent’s push to the east and then, in overall war effort during 1944-45. Beyond that, there are
turn, launch a series of counter-offensives that will eventu- also counters for: Army Detachments Hollidt, Fretter-Pico
ally move the Red Army to Berlin and the heart of Europe. and Lanz/Kempf; Provisional Panzer Corps Raus, the Kerch
The game may end sooner than the historic termination time Straits Command, and Group Mieth. On the Soviet side
if the German player is able to do significantly better than there’s a full corps-and-army OB, along with all the Guards
his historic counterparts. Likewise, if the Soviet player is and Guards Tank armies, as well as “Mechanized Group Pop-
able to carry out his strategic comeback more efficiently ov,” the single most elite Red Army formation ever to take
than did his historic counterparts, the game may again ter- the field during the war. There are 280 half-inch, NATO-style
minate earlier than it did historically. counters.
Each hexagon on the map represents 55 miles (90 kilo- Each full game turn represents one or two months, de-
meters) from side to opposite side. The large-hex map cov- pending on the time of year. Two experienced gamers can
ers from Berlin and Yugoslavia in the west to Leningrad in count on finishing the entire game in no more than 10 hours.
World at War 21
Allied units are in plain text; German units are in italics. Situation
O
On 1 September 1944, the mood in Supreme Headquarters
n the afternoon of 17 September 1944, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) was euphoric. Since the
a fleet of 1,545 transport aircraft and D-Day landings on 6 June, Allied success had exceeded their
478 gliders swarmed above the occu- wildest expectations. Pre-invasion timetables had expected 12
allied divisions to reach the Seine River on D+90 (4 Septem-
pied Netherlands and dropped 20,000
ber). But by that date, 16 divisions had penetrated 150 miles
Allied airborne troops behind German beyond the Seine, where planners hadn’t expected them to be
lines. Their goal was to hold bridges over major ca- for almost a year after the invasion. During the breakout from
nals and rivers and allow a British armored corps to Normandy and the pursuit across France, the German armies
pass through to breach the Rhine River. Success would in the west had lost over 23,000 dead, 67,000 wounded, and
open the way to the German industrial heartland of the almost 200,000 missing or taken prisoner.
Ruhr and, according to Allied planners, end the war in There were two caveats to the ecstatic atmosphere. The first
1944. But weather, poor plans, misread intelligence, was logistics. Allied supply was still coming in through Nor-
and especially an underestimation of the enemy, com- mandy, far to the rear. The French railroad system, wrecked
bined to make Operation MARKET GARDEN a cost- during the pre-D-Day aerial campaign, was still being rebuilt.
ly failure. Whole divisions were being deprived of trucks after landing,
so their integral transport could push towards the movement
of supplies. Both Lt. Gen. Courtney Hodge’s First Army and
Lt. Gen. George Patton’s Third Army weregetting only about
half of what they needed to continue operations. The Common-
wealth Armies, Lt. Gen. H. D. G. Crerar’s Canadian First and
Lt. Gen. Sir Miles Dempsey’s British Second, were in similar
World at War 25
The Plan
The overall goal of MARKET GARDEN was to use the
airborne to seize a 95-mile-long corridor that would allow
British armor to traverse the roads and bridges from the
Meuse-Escaut Canal to beyond Arnhem, reaching the Zuider
Zee. Success would attain multiple objectives: German Fif-
teenth Army and all other Wehrmacht forces in western Hol-
land would be cut off; the German defense of the West Wall
would be outflanked; and Allied forces would be positioned
for a drive to the Ruhr.
In order to achieve those goals, eight major waterways
had to be crossed:
• three major rivers—Maas, Waal, and the lower Rhine
(Nieder Rijn);
• two minor rivers—Dommel and Aa;
• three major canals—Wilhelmina, Willems, and Maas-
Waal.
Allied intelligence was dismissive of Wehrmacht forces
in the operational zone. They estimated only 20 German di-
visions remained in the west and that reserves in the Nether-
lands were limited to low category troops backed by only 50
to 100 tanks. Those forces were not expected to be capable
of major resistance.
Rigged for action: Paratrooper preparing for a drop.
26 #1
82nd Airborne
Gen. Gavin’s division also dropped in two areas: the
505th and 508th east of the Mook-Groesbeek-Wyler roadway,
almost atop the Groesbeek Ridge. His third regiment, the
504th, dropped on both sides of the Graves Bridge. A total
of almost 7,300 paratroopers landed successfully, again with
only a two percent casualty rate.
The Graves bridge, attacked on both sides at once, fell
easily. The 504th’s other objectives were four bridges over
Maas-Waal Canal. They were able to capture one bridge at
Molenhoek, with help from the 505th Regiment attacking
from the other side. Two other bridges at Maiden and Hatert
were destroyed by their defenders. The fourth bridge at Ho-
inghutie was not attacked until the next day, when it too was
destroyed before the paratroops could capture it. A roadway
bridge next to the main bridge was damaged from the demo-
The defenders: German assault gun ready for action. lition weakening it too much for use by XXX Corps.
30 #1
XXX Corps
Horrocks’s armor hit the road an hour after the paratroops
dropped, following an intense preliminary bombardment.
Led by the Irish Guards armor group (2nd Armor Battalion
and 3rd Infantry Battalion, Irish Guards Regiment), Horrocks
didn’t expect much resistance. Intelligence estimated six
battalions of infantry and 20 anti-tank vehicles in front of
his corps. In fact, Kampfgruppe Walther, which barred the
way initially, deployed 10 battalions backed with 12 tank
destroyers. The Germans had set tank ambushes along the
road, facilitated by the terrain and treeline. The preliminary
bombardment took its toll on the defenders, but it was a hard
fight for Horrocks’s men to make it to Valkenswaard by the C-47 planes load for Holland.
end of the first day.
defending it, the town and bridges were taken by mid-morn-
The Germans ing. At 12:30 p.m., armored cars arrived from XXX Corps,
One of the key reasons for the failure of the MARKET but it was almost 7:00 p.m. when the Guards tanks arrived.
GARDEN operation was the speed of the German reaction, At mid-afternoon, Taylor’s first reinforcements arrived
aided significantly by a major error on the part of the Allies. in gliders, two battalions of the 327th Glider Infantry Regi-
The major error rested with a single unidentified Ameri- ment, and other units. Almost 2,600 troops were success-
can officer, killed in a glider crash. The officer carried with fully inserted, but they still had no artillery support.
him nearly complete plans for the whole MARKET portion 82nd Airborne
of the operation, which within hours were found and deliv-
In Nijmegen, Gavin reinforced l/508th with a single com-
ered to the desk of Student. Thereafter the Germans knew
pany of the 3/508, but as before, the assault was stopped
what the Allies were trying to do, and so could plan accord-
short of the bridge by the SS troops. The attack by G Compa-
ingly.
ny, 3/508 marked the third assault by 82nd troops against the
The air drop caught Model and his staff at lunch in Arn- bridge, one by a patrol, one by two companies of paratroops,
hem, and they quickly vacated the area to avoid falling into and one by a single company. Gavin planned a farther as-
enemy hands. Bittrich received initial reports about the para- sault that day with a battalion from the 504th, but Browning
troop attack a half hour after the air drop had started. Within chose to turn down the plan, wanting Gavin to put his efforts
10 minutes he had started issuing orders. The 9th SS Panzer into holding the high ground. Browning justified his odd
was to initially provide reconnaissance, then concentrate on decision, given the importance of the bridge, because he’d
defending Arnhem and destroying the British paratroops. heard nothing from XXX Corps at that time.
The 10th SS was to head to Nijmegen to defend the bridges
Gavin’s need to defend the high ground was in fact be-
there. Model joined Bittrich at 3:00 p.m., and while the SS
coming critical. In the east, the Germans had put together
units prepared to move, orders for more units went out. Stu-
an ad hoc division out of alarm units, non-commissioned
dent was put in charge of defeating the 101st Airborne. A full
officer school candidate, Luftwaffe, and “stomach” and “ear”
panzer brigade was diverted from a planned move to Aachen
battalions (manned by troops with assorted medical prob-
and given to him as reinforcement. Along with the 10th SS,
lems.) Most of these troops had no infantry training, but four
Model sent orders to the 406th Landeschuetzen Division, near
separate battalion-sized kampfgruppen (Stargaard, Fuer-
the Reichswald, to engage the 82nd Airborne, to be reinforced
stenberg, Greschick and Goebel), totaling about 3,400 men,
by the II Fallschirmjaeger Corps.
moved against the widely spaced paratroops. Gavin was in
D+l: Monday, 18 September 1944 need of more infantry, and the paratroops were inititally
driven back.
101st Airborne Fortunately, the second day’s parachute drop for the 82nd
During the night the Germans threw several weak attacks arrived literally on top of the German attackers. The attack
against the 501st troops defending Veghel, but they were eas- shattered, the Germans who retreating to their start lines. The
ily handled. airborne reinforcements included three battalions of artillery
At best, the secondary objective was fast becoming the and the division engineers—but no additional infantry.
battle for the paratroops. Taylor reinforced his company with
2/502 and 3/502 battalions to seal off the Germans and take
1st Airborne
the bridge. More troops from the German 59th Division ar- Early on the 18th, six battalions of Germans under the
rived and the battle raged through the day. The bridge itself, nominal command of Gen. Tettau attacked from the west
however, was blown up at 11:00 a.m.. and made slow progress against the defense put up by1st
After halting for the night south of the blown bridge at Air Landing Brigade. In the middle of the afternoon, 1st Air-
Zon, Taylor’s 506th Regiment continued to advance on Eind- borne’s reinforcements arrived with of three battalions of the
hoven and the bridges there. Though delayed by 88mm flak 4th Parachute Brigade. The new drop caught Tettau’s attack
guns and resistance from the single rear- echelon battalion from behind, and many of his ill-trained troops recoiled. The
World at War 33
World at War 35
36 #1
World at War 37
MARKET GARDEN cost the Allied over 11,000 casualties. the two commanders had in the Autumn of 1944. Mont-
German official sources list their own casualties during the gomery’s reasoning is that if Eisenhower had completely
fighting as 3,300, but more recent studies indicated their stopped Patton when Montgomery told him to, enough sup-
losses were closer to 6,000. plies would have been available to keep Second Army’s XII
and VIII Corps armed and active on the shoulders of XXX
Analysis Corps’ thrust to Arnhem, dissipating the German response
As with any failed operation, a litany of reasons has and allowing MARKET GARDEN to succeed.
been put forth from various sources. The United States Of- While that argument may have some merit, it doesn’t ad-
ficial History listed the weather, faulty intelligence, delays dress the two key problems with the operation—the abysmal
in ground force advance, and the presence of Student and planning, and the speed of the German reaction.
Model on the German side as the reasons for the failure,
The failure in the planning of the MARKET (airborne)
though the overall reason is identified as “over-ambition.”
portion of the attack stems from its maximizing a weakness
The British official history cites bad weather, bad fortune of airborne troops while minimizing one of their key ad-
and errors in planning as the primary reasons. It also cites vantages. Airborne troops are inherently slow once on the
the lack of speed from the ground force and the speed of the ground owing to their minimal motor transport. The usual
German reaction as keys. airborne advantage is surprise: placing troops where the en-
Montgomery himself cites the weather, the dropping of emy doesn’t expect them. Dropping airborne troops away
the airborne too far away from their objectives, and faulty from their objectives, like the 1st Airborne west of Ooster-
intelligence assessing the II SS Panzer Corps as ineffective. beek, is a misuse of airborne troops.
More importantly, he also cites the lack of Allied supreme The drops themselves also violated standard bridge-tak-
headquarters support as thenumber one reason. His memoirs ing tactics, well developed after the Normandy drops. Gen.
state emphatically that MARKET GARDEN, “if properly Gavin, in his memoir On to Berlin, said, “bridges must be
backed from inception, would have worked.” attacked at both ends simultaneously.” With two exceptions
In general, the official histories have it right. MARKET (the bridges at Veghel and Graves), that tactic was ignored in
GARDEN failed because a lot of things went wrong. The MARKET GARDEN. Of the nine bridge attacks from a sin-
weather was an obvious problem, as it delayed crucial re- gle side, only two (St. Oedenrode and Einhoven) succeeded;
inforcements and also inhibited the ability of the Allied air the other seven—Zon, Best, Nijmegen (initially), Hatert,
forces to interdict the battlefield, allowing the Germans to Maiden, Hoinghutie, and Arnhem—failed. The bridge at
reinforce easily. Intelligence was also a problem, especially Molenhoek was captured after the 504th attacked it from one
the threat of massed armor from the Reichswald, and the side, but only because troops from the 505th finally arrived to
dismissal of SS panzer remnants as a concern. Stupidity also help from the other side.
played its part, as in taking full operational plans into battle The reasons for that failure are difficult to ascertain. Gen.
where they could be captured by the enemy. Urquhart’s acceptance of the 1st Airborne’s drop zones can
Montgomery’s own assessment that SHAEF Eisenhower be excused, as he had little airborne experience prior to tak-
didn’t take the operation seriously enough is simply a final ing command of the Red Devils. Gen’s Browning, Brereton,
shot in the “Broad verses Narrow Thrust strategy” argument continues on page 40
38 #1
Ever since its sad ending, Market Garden has been one of
the most thoroughly studied and deeply analyzed operations
of all of World War II, both academically and in popular cul-
ture. In fact, since the ULTRA revelations of the early 1970s
and the hit movie later in that same decade, there seems to
have been nothing more to understand about the campaign.
That changed more recently, though, when an important new
interpretation as to what ultimately caused the defeat of the
Allied plan was offered. The revelation came in the publica-
tion of historian Walter S. Dunn’s book, Heroes or Traitors:
The German Replacement Army, the July Plot, and Adolf
Hitler (Praeger, 2003).
In brief, the German Replacement Army was the admin-
istrative mechanism through which both new recruits and Plane formation on the way to Market Garden.
recuperating wounded veterans were brought, respectively,
from civilian life and military hospitals into the ranks of ac-
In aid of the plot, Fromm then clandestinely began hold-
tive-duty military units. Throughout the war, depending on
ing manpower within the Replacement Army. He had Hit-
the tempo of fighting and the call-up and formation cycle for
ler’s trust, and had set up his army so its weekly and monthly
recruits and new units, manpower within the Replacement
manpower reports came directly and exclusively to his own
Army usually varied between 100,000 and 300,000. Until
desk. The Replacement Army’s new role, of course, was go-
mid-1943, however, the Replacement Army was really an
ing to be to allow the plotters to rapidly seize control across
“army” only in name. Its manpower was spread over Ger-
Germany as soon as Hitler was killed. By the time the bomb
many in company and battalion-sized packets.
went off, then, there were more than 600,000 men (approxi-
That changed, though, at the end of July 1943, when the mately 50 divisional equivalents) awaiting Fromm’s orders.
Replacement Army’s chief, Gen. Erich Fromm, issued an or-
Of course, those men’s absence from the front had been
der to his subordinates throughout that organization calling
keenly felt during the summer fighting in 1944. The inter-
on them to set up combat-capable regiments. It seems that
pretation taken then—by the replacement and reinforcement
after the aerial destruction of Hamburg earlier that year, Hit-
starved German commanders at the front and the Allied
ler had become fearful that trouble might be brewing across
intelligence analysts—had been that the Reich was simply
Germany, either in the form of a rebellion of the millions
running out of manpower. Thus, when the Allies launched
of foreign slave-laborers who worked across the country, or
Operation Cobra in the west, and the Soviets attacked from
even a 1918-style uprising among the increasingly dispirited
the east in Operation Bagration, the German front in both
citizenry. Fromm’s order, on the surface at least, was issued
cases was nothing more than a thin shell. Huge and rapid
to provide the Fuehrer assurance sufficient and well-orga-
Allied breakthroughs followed.
nized military force would be on hand to deal with any such
emergency. When Hitler survived the Bomb Plot, and Fromm’s par-
ticipation was soon revealed and he was arrested, the Fueh-
The Replacement Army’s up-organizing, however, took
rer assumed direct command of the Replacement Army. That
on an entirely different, and much more significant, meaning
was how Hitler suddenly found himself in command of what
when Fromm secretly joined the anti-Hitler conspiracy that
amounted to two army groups’ worth of reinforcements in
ultimately went into the history books as the “July Bomb
August 1944. It was those ‘new’ units that stabilized the
Plot.” Until his coming on board, the great operative weak-
German situation on both fronts when they were belatedly
ness of that plot stemmed from the fact it was one put to-
rushed forward.
gether almost exclusively by staff officers. None of them
commanded any actual military units they could order into Looked at broadly, then, it wasn’t the Germans’ rapid
action once the bomb went off and Hitler was (presumably) reaction that surprised the Allied command during Market
dead. That changed when Fromm came into the cabal, bring- Garden. Ever since Moltke the Elder had set in place the
ing with him his home-based army. concept of “mission-oriented orders” in the mid-19th cen-
tury, the Germans had been well known as past masters of
military improvisation. The surprise came from the fact they
had so much on hand with which to react—and that was due
to the peculiar circumstances surrounding the failure of the
July Bomb Plot and Fromm’s role in it.
~Ty Bomba
World at War 39
40 #1
42 #1
In World War I, the fledgling German air force ex- Enter Hitler
perimented with the use of bombers to attack the Brit- With the end of the World War on 11 November
ish Isles. While the Royal Navy guarded the sealanes 1918, those plans were largely forgotten. Germany
against the German High Seas Fleet, the skies were open was disarmed by the Versailles Treaty, but Gen. Hans
to intruders. The idea was a series of bombing attacks von Seeckt, commander of the German armed forces
against British cities would cause a homefront morale in the 1920s, the Reichswehr, encouraged new ways
collapse and thereby break the trench deadlock on the of thinking about warfare. In 1929, Maj. Wilberg, an
Western Front. Initial German strategic bombing efforts army weapons officer, created a report on require-
used Zeppelins, but they proved less than effective. In ments for the building of a strategic bomber. That re-
1917 the Germans began using their Gotha and “Giant” port remained secret until 1933, surfacing with the rise
bombers to attack Britain. Initially the effects were elec- of Adolf Hitler. He supported the building of a new
trifying. Small numbers of biplane bombers making day- German air force, the Luftwaffe, and the Luftwaffe’s
light attacks caused considerable panic in London and first chief of staff, Gen. Walther Wever, was a strategic
other cities, but British air defense efforts were quickly bombing enthusiast.
ramped up, frustrating the German intruders. The proposed intercontinental bomber was to be a
The entry of the United States into the Great War in four engine aircraft with a crew of eight. It was to be
1917 caused far-thinking German airmen to consider the armed with two 20mm cannon and five machineguns.
possibility of using the aeroplane as a means to attack Its operational altitude was to be 19,700 feet with a top
the otherwise unreachable American mainland. That speed of 186 miles per hour. Its range would be 1,242
would require the use of large biplanes to reach the east- miles. It was not a particularly impressive aircraft by
ern seaboard. Aircraft technology was unable at the time World War II standards, but for the early 1930s, if it
to produce a bomber that could cross the Atlantic, de- could have been built, the bomber would have been
liver its bombs, and return to Europe. ahead of its time.
44 #1
World at War 45
bombing capability. Nonetheless, Britain was under so the air offensive against America could begin the
siege from U-Boats, and with Hitler dominating the moment the United States entered the war. They were
continent, the United States became actively involved to be capable of flying 7,450 miles with a bombload of
in supporting the Allied cause. The US Navy patrolled up to 22,050 lbs.
the Atlantic; American bases were established in Ice- In a conference on 22 May 1941, Hitler was in-
land, and Washington provided material support to the formed that if Germany seized the Azores in the mid-
Allies via Lend-Lease. It was becoming apparent the dle of the Atlantic, the islands could provide a base
United States would eventually become an active bel- from which the He-177s and FW-200s could bomb
ligerent. America. The invasion never happened and the Brit-
Luftwaffe chief Hermann Goring considered vari- ish negotiated a further agreement with the Portuguese
ous plans for attacking the east coast of the US in the government in 1943 that turned the Azores into an Al-
event of open hostilities. Again, his purpose was pri- lied military stronghold.
marily political, to show the American people they Still, the Air Ministry was not deterred. The He-
were vulnerable to attack. By mid-1940 the Luftwaffe 177, by refueling in mid-air, could be given a range of
had detailed plans for long-range bombers. They had 5,900 miles. But the He-177’s engines malfunctioned
to be able to fly non-stop 7,450 miles with 4,400 lbs. an average every five hours; so long-range flying was
of bombs. The intent was to use airbases on the Atlan- rendered problematic at best. Beyond the engine is-
tic coast of occupied France to launch aircraft against sue, aerial refueling was a largely untested technology
New York; however, the only operational long-range at the time. It would have meant coordinating aircraft
bombers the Germans had were the FW-200 (2,170 over the often stormy Atlantic with the primitive ra-
mile combat range) and He-177 (4,036 mile range, not dio navigation aids of the day. Another alternative
operational until late 1942). Hitler liked New York as was the use of drop tanks. The FW 200 with extra fuel
a target because, aside from it being one of the Ameri- tanks had a range of 2,795 miles carrying 4,630 lbs. of
can cities closest to Europe, it was also in his mind a bombs.
symbol of American power and wealth. More practi- Regardless of the technical solution—aerial refuel-
cally, there was considerable industry in the New York ing, drop tanks, a longer-range bomber—the question
area, and 20 manufacturing sites had been identified as becomes, what would any actual bombing campaign
targets. accomplish? In a best case scenario, 12 to 30 bomb-
The Luftwaffe’s problem was not a lack of aircraft ers might reach the US east coast. They would lack
designs, or even airframes. They were both plentiful fighter escort, and US pursuit squadrons available at
and valid. What was lacking were engines. In April the time flew P-39s, P-40s, P-47s and P-36s. Five US
1941, the Air Ministry demanded that 50 Me-264s be interceptor squadrons were based at Mitchell Air Base
built and tested, with 10 aircraft to have top priority in New York, three squadrons at Norfolk, Virginia,
World at War 47
and seven squadrons at Savannah, Georgia. The first istry ordered six Me-264s (the re-designated P-1061),
wave of bombers would have the element of surprise, later reducing that to three aircraft. The first prototype
but once alerted, subsequent attacks would become in- Me-264 flew on 23 December 1942. The aircraft was
creasingly risky. Air defenses, including radar, fighters difficult to handle owing to its high wing loading (the
and antiaircraft guns, would be quickly built up. ratio of aircraft mass to wing area, the lower the wing
Then, too, navigation shortfalls and weather condi- loading, the more lift). Still, the design showed prom-
tions might make it difficult for the bombers to find ise. It was to be only lightly armored in order to give
their targets. However, the shock value of a Nazi at- it more range. But, alas for the Reich, the Me-264 was
tack on the United States itself would be consider- not to be.
able, though that might also backfire by producing In October 1943, the Air Ministry halted the Me-
even more American public opinion for prosecution 264 program in order to transfer resources into jet
of the war until total victory, as had been the result of fighter production, needed to stem the growing Allied
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December strategic bombing menace. In July 1943 all three Me-
1941. 264 prototypes were destroyed or damaged in an Al-
Enter the Me-264 lied air raid, and the program was officially cancelled
The Luftwaffe did not have much faith in the He- in September of that year.
177, due to all its technical shortfalls. The FW-200, One other aircraft is of interest in the Amerika
while a good aircraft, lacked the bombload capacity Bomber program. That was the Ju-390, a six-engined
and range. So the Air Ministry finally decided to build long-range bomber and recon aircraft. Only two pro-
the Me-264. The Me-264 had its origins in Messer- totypes were built, but its range of 6,023 miles would
schmitt‘s P-1061, a reconnaissance aircraft. In 1940, have allowed it to fly from Europe to the US east
as part of its long-range bomber program, the Air Min- coast. There are claims one of the Ju-390 prototypes
actually did make such a flight in January 1944, com-
ing to within 12 miles of New York, sighting the city’s
lights before turning back. If true, that was the closest
the Nazis ever came to bombing America.
at
Iron Hammer
In 1943 the Luftwaffe was preparing for a last-ditch
strategic bombing campaign against the Soviet Union to
salvage the disintegrating military situation on the Eastern
Front. That was Operation Eisenhammer (Iron Hammer),
which was to employ He-177s to carry out attacks against
Soviet power generation and industrial facilities east of
Moscow. The bombers were to have launched guided
bombs/missiles that had already proven their worth in the
Mediterranean. But Iron Hammer was called off owing to
the Red Army’s capture of the forward airfields from which
the bombers were to have been based.
—Joseph Miranda
From the pilot’s seat: the Me-264 intercontinental bomber’s cockpit
48 #1
Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s New Guinea campaign has been hailed by some historians as a
brilliant operation. Sidestepping large Japanese forces and striking where they were weak, the Allied Southwest Pacific (SW-
PAC) forces moved swiftly up the 1,000-mile-long New Guinea coastline on a direct path to the Philippines.
One step in the campaign, however, became controversial almost immediately. The invasion of Biak in May 1944 ran into
severe problems and ultimately failed to meet MacArthur’s promises for the campaign. Two regiments of the US 41st Infantry
Division assaulted Biak, an island off Western New Guinea, on 27 May 1944. The objective was to capture its three airfields
and use them to support the Central Pacific attack on the Marianas Islands, scheduled for 15 June. Despite the eventual rein-
forcement by two more regiments, the first airfield wasn’t captured until 22 June and the island itself wasn’t declared secure
until August.
50 #1
World at War 51
The Japanese
The Japanese position on Biak was far stronger than the
Americans expected. The main defense force came from the
222nd Infantry Regiment/36th Infantry Division, commanded
by Col. Kuzume Naoyuki, which had been on the island for
five months. In addition, there were three airfield construction
units, a field antiaircraft battery, and some 1,500 naval troops
The new intelligence generated an immediate reaction under Rear Adm. Senda Sadatoshi. The defense also included
on the island. Offensive operations were interrupted as ar- some 30 Type-95 light tanks with 37mm cannon and machine-
tillery batteries were dug in and re-sited to face out to sea. guns. There were close to 11,000 Japanese on Biak, half of
Supplies stockpiled in the Bosnek area had to be dispersed them trained combat troops, double what SWPAC expected.
in the event of Japanese bombardment. Effectively, the inva- Kuzume broke with traditional Japanese doctrine to defend
sion was halted. his island. Japanese tactics in May 1944 demanded the anni-
On 3 June, Allied recon aircraft sighted the KON force hilation of the enemy at the waterline instead of a defense in
700 miles short of its goal. Surprise had been lost. Then Jap- depth. That doctrine did not officially change until after Saipan
anese reconnaissance erroneously reported US carriers off had fallen in July 1944. Rather than put his troops up front,
Biak, as their inexperienced airmen apparently had mistaken where they could be suppressed by US firepower, Kuzume
LSTs for carriers. The Japanese high command, having little positioned his main defenses so he could deny the use of the
in the way of effective air support, chose not to continue the airfields with artillery interdiction fire for the longest possible
counterattack. The 2nd Amphibious Brigade was unloaded at time. Tht approach was totally unexpected by US planners.
Sorong, and Fuso and her escort sailed back to Tawi Tawi. Japanese airpower supporting Biak was poor, because
The Americans had dodged a major bullet. aircraft were being conserved for the A-Go operation in the
Marianas. Responsibility for air defense in the region rested
Back on Biak with the 23rd Air Flotilla, based in Sorong on the western tip of
The near miss at sea failed to dent US overconfidence, the Vogelkop Peninsula, some 325 air miles from Biak. On 27
which led to tactical sloppiness. On the night of 4-5 June, May it had just nine fighters and four bombers ready for opera-
the airfield at Wadke had over 100 aircraft lined up wing- tions; however, there were 21 airfields within range of Biak re-
tip to wingtip, a situation Kenney remembers as “inviting inforcements were to be shifted that way. On paper some 1,600
trouble.” Two Japanese bombers raided the island, destroy- aircraft were available for A-Go and potentially for Biak, in
ing 30 to 60 aircraft (depending on who was counting) and the First Air Fleet under Vice Admiral Kakuta Kakuji, but only
putting Wadke Airfield out of commission for several days. about 20% were actually available. The rest were lost to poor
That seriously affected American air cover for Biak. maintenance and enemy action.
Along with the Japanese efforts, other outside influences The Japanese had two major naval anchorages at Davao and
were building up to delay the island’s capture. At Hollandia, Tawi Tawi, which were within 60 hours sailing time from Biak.
MacArthur announced Biak was being “mopped up,” essen- With the IJN concentrating the fleet for A-Go, the Japanese had
tially declaring a victory where none existed. The Australian temporary naval superiority. The First Task Force, under Vice
press picked up on the line and had a field day, seriously Adm. Ozawa Jisaburo, was organized into two sections. The
embarrassing MacArthur. That, in addition to the possibility 2nd Fleet included two battleship divisions with the 69,000-ton
his promise to Nimitz for air support against the Marianas super-battleships Yamato and Musashi, three cruiser divisions
would go unfulfilled, made MacArthur push Krueger for re- with 10 heavy cruisers and a screen of four destroyer divisions.
sults. Krueger responded with pressure on Fuller, sending Third Fleet, the carrier strike force, included three carrier divi-
his staff to investigate the situation. On 6 June the pressure sions (six heavy and three light carriers) and some 450 aircraft.
led Fuller to make a bad tactical error. By 16 May, Ozawa’s task force was at Tawi Tawi.
World at War 57
58 #1
Complex Combat
On the other side of the jungle, the Japanese situation
was deteriorating rapidly. Kuzume’s troops had enough am-
munition, but little food or water. The loss of the coastal
wells meant the only source of water for them was located
some 14 miles inland.
Communications among the defenders was limited. Ku-
zume had his headquarters in a cave complex called the West
Caves, some 1,200 yards from Mokmer Airfield. Adm. Sen-
da was headquartered in a complex called the East Caves, In the air: USAAF B-24 bomber.
located east of Mokmer. Finally, there was a major center of
resistance in a cave/bunker complex called the Ibdi Pocket. The major difference between Eichelburger’s plan and
There was little communication among those complexes Fuller’s was the new Hurricane force commander put more
and no coordination. What limited reinforcements that actu- emphasis on reconnaissance, preparation and coordination
ally made it to the island, some 1,200 troops from the 219th than had Fuller. What Eichelburger could also do that Fuller
and 221st Regiments of the 35th Division, were immediately could not was ignore Krueger until he was ready to move.
thrown into defensive positions. Krueger kept up a blistering barrage of demands for action.
Still, each Japanese complex was strong and well de- Eichelburger responded that he needed time to correct his
fended. The West Caves were actually an interlocking series “complete ignorance of the situation” and to rest the troops
of three large sumps (that is, holes in the ground), connected for a well-coordinated effort.
by tunnels and caverns. It could hold over 1,000 troops. The On 19 June the coordinated attack jumped off. With
area was also ringed by pillboxes and bunkers. The East 1/162 engaging the West Caves directly and 3/163 taking
Caves were located in the face of a 240-foot high cliff. There the high ground directly behind the caves,, the 186th, with
were two large caverns with pillboxes and defenses above 2nd Battalion leading, pushed north and west against limited
and below the entrances. The caves held mortars, 20mm opposition, and by the end of the day had taken the ridge
guns and heavy machineguns. More significantly, the East behind the caves and completed its isolation.
Caves could observe everything from Parai to Mokmer Air- The next day the 34th infantry jumped off to the west and,
field and thereby fire on approaching Americans. Finally, the against moderate resistance, overran Sorido and Borokoe
Ibdi Pocket was a 400 by 600 yard position with some 21 Airfields as well as Sorido village. While aviation engineers
natural caves and over 75 pillboxes within the position. Each began work on Mokmer, 1/162 attacked the West Caves with
position would have to be reduced by the Americans if they tank support. The troops made it to the edge of the sumps
wanted to secure the island. and began a three-day trial by fire to find a way to reduce the
Eichelburger’s plan was straightforward and similar to position. Massed artillery, pointblank tank fire, air bombard-
the one Fuller had been developing. The 186th would punch ment, and poured gasoline were used against the position.
through and envelop the Japanese right flank, while the 163rd The Japanese refused to surrender. The 41st Infantry was
and 162nd operated against the rear and left, respectively. The beginning to invent the “blowtorch and corkscrew” tactics
primary objective was the high ground north of the airfield. that would dominate island combat throughout the rest of the
Once the Japanese positions were suppressed, the work on war, the combination of flame weapons and demolitions to
the airfield could be re-started. The newly arrived 34th Infan- dig out cave defenders. Still, the day ended with little prog-
try was to move west against Sorido and Borokoe airfields. ress and the battalion pulled back for the night.
World at War 59
Endgame at
The reduction of the West Caves and the opening of Mok-
mer Airfield marked the effective end of the Biak campaign,
though the battle would continue for two more months. The
Sources
East Caves were finally reduced on 4 July, after bombers Books
struck it using skip bombing. The Ibdi Pocket was surround- Barbey, Daniel E., MacArthur’s Amphibious Navy: Seventh Amphibious
ed and reduced position by position and finally inundated Force Operations, 1943-1945, Annapolis: USNI, 1969.
with firepower. From 10-20 July, some 6,000 rounds of artil- Chwialkowski, Paul, In Caesar’s Shadow: The Life of General Robert
lery were pumped into the pocket, followed by a B-24 strike Eichelberger, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993.
on 22 July with 1,000 lb. bombs. Troops finished the sweep Craven W. F. and Cate, J. L., The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume
on 28 July. The 3/163 was amphibiously transported to Ko- IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, Washington: Office of Air
Force History, 1983.
rim Bay on the north shore to sweep that area. On 20 August,
Drea, Edward J., MacArthur’s ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War against
Krueger declared the campaign over. Japan, 1942-1945, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992.
The final casualty figures had 400 US dead and 2,000 Hayashi, Saburo, Kogun: the Japanese Army in the Pacific War, Westport,
wounded; there were also some 7,200 non-battle casualties CT: Greenwood Press, 1978.
due to sickness. It is estimated over 8,000 Japanese were James, D. Clayton, The Years of MacArthur, Volume II, 1941-1945, Bos-
ton: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1975.
killed.
Kenney, George C., General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the
What If? Pacific War, Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1949.
Krueger, Walter, From Down Under to Nippon: The story of the Sixth Army
Based on a review of the forces available to both sides, in World War II, Washington, DC: Combat Forces Press, 1953.
only their naval resources appeared to be adequate for the Long, Gavin, MacArthur as Military Commander, New York: D. Van Nos-
task, had they pushed their naval advantage. Without deter- trand Company, 1969.
60 #1
62 #1
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World at War 63
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64 #1