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The Strategy & Tactics of World War II #18 JUN–JUL 2011

SOUTH
SEAS
CAMPAIGN
1942
-1943

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 The South Seas Campaign,
1942
–1943
Analysis
by Joseph Miranda

6 World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011

Editor’s Note: Allied units are in
plaintext; Japanese units in italics.
War Plan Orange
S
ince the early decades of the 20th
century, US naval planners had
prepared for war in the Pacific.
The objective was to defend the US
possession of the Philippines. The
main threat was Japan, though US
planners also looked at contingences in
the event of belligerency with various
other powers. Under the Rainbow
War Plans system, each possible
opponent was given a color name,
and the color for Japan was orange.
War Plan Orange assumed an initial
Japanese attack that would involve,
among other things, an invasion of the
Philippines. In that event American
forces stationed there were to defend
in place while the US Navy’s (USN)
Pacific Fleet assembled at Pearl Harbor.
American forces would then launch
a counteroffensive across the Pacific
in a combined naval, land and air
effort. USN battleships, supported
by aircraft carriers, would establish
control of critical waters, allowing
amphibious forces from the US Marine
Corps (USMC) and Army to seize
islands. Those islands would then be
used as bases for further advances.
That approach was critical for
two reasons. One was logistical: the
new bases would provide facilities for
refueling, repair and replenishment of
the fleet. The islands were also needed
to base aircraft, a recognition of the
growing importance of aviation in the
military equation. Land-based planes
would provide cover for the fleet beyond
what the carriers could provide, as
well as support combat operations on
other islands within range. The USMC
promoted itself into the picture by creat-
ing an amphibious warfare doctrine
while also establishing its own air arm.
Initially, Plan Orange projected US
forces would reach the Philippines in
time to relieve the garrison, but that
estimate was soon revised. Throughout
the 1920s and 1930s, and right up to
the eve of war, the USN wargamed Plan
Orange. Among other things it found
initial assumptions had been unrealistic.
The Navy had begun with the idea
America could mobilize sufficient force
to launch a general counteroffensive
within the span of a few weeks. The
wargames showed mobilization might
take many months and, by extension,
it might then take up to three years
for the fleet to reach the Philippines.
The planners took seriously that
recalculation, and revamped the overall
strategy accordingly. One result was the
decision to move the main strength of
the Pacific Fleet, its battleships, from the
west coast to the base at Pearl Harbor.
In theory that would put the navy in a
position far enough forward to begin
operations soon after the opening of any
war. At the same time, Pearl Harbor was
still considered a secure position owing
to its distance from Japanese naval
bases. Meanwhile the US also built up
the Philippine ground force under the
command of Gen. Douglas MacArthur.
That would make the islands harder for
the Japanese to take. The US also wanted
World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011 7
to build up Guam as a major naval
base in the Central Pacific; however,
that plan was put off as it would’ve
violated the provisions of international
agreements intended to keep the Pacific
demilitarized. Effectively, then, the
Philippines would still be out of sup-
port range at the opening of a war.
In 1937 the Japanese began open
warfare in China. On 1 September 1939
Nazi Germany unleashed World War II
in Europe. Any war in the Pacific would
thereafter inescapably involve European
colonial powers, as Great Britain, France
and the Netherlands all had possessions
in the Far East. That seemed to have
turned the balance against Japan, as
it added more Western armed force to
any future Allied coalition; however,
Germany’s 1940 blitzkrieg victories
then had even more profound effects
on the strategic situation in the Pacific.
Both France and the Netherlands were
taken out of the Allied lineup, while
Britain had to concentrate its strength
in Europe. The subsequent Japanese
occupation of French Indochina put
them in a position to threaten both the
Dutch East Indies (still technically neu-
tral) and the British base at Singapore.
At the same time, a previously isola-
tionist US Congress was at last motivat-
ed to give the navy everything it wanted
in terms of a massive fleet build up. That
projected expansion (available for all to
read about in detail in the pages of the
Congressional Record) served as a further
and final signal to the Japanese that they
had to move as soon as possible against
the Western powers in general and
America in particular. It was clear that,
otherwise, by 1943 – 44 the USN in the
Pacific would be so large as to preclude
all hope of successful Japanese action.
With a major war clearly brewing
in the Far East, then, the US settled
on a final plan, Rainbow 5. It called
for American cooperation with other
Allied powers, as well as combined
USN and US Army operations. (At the
time the air force was part of the army.)
Rainbow 5 assumed an initial American
defensive stance in the event Japan
opened the war, with the Philippines
most likely having to be written off.
That defensive stage would be
followed by American mobilization and
then a counteroffensive. The main thrust
would be across the Central Pacific. The
campaign was to culminate with an
American air-naval siege of Japan that
would force Tokyo to capitulate. The
main constraints were the time needing
to be taken for the US to mobilize its
continued on page 10 »
8
 World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011 9
» continued from page 7 the Allied ABDA (American, British, of British Eighth Army. They were
industry and then to build up a chain Dutch, Australian) fleet in the Battles needed to defend Australia itself
of logistical bases across the Pacific. As of the Java Sea and Sunda Strait. Allied from a possible Japanese invasion.
the events following 7 December 1941 naval power in the Pacific had been As for the American armed forces,
demonstrated, Rainbow 5 had presented effectively smashed. Japanese ground they turned out to still be woefully
a realistic appraisal of the initial war forces then took Singapore, Burma, unprepared. Of the 34 US Army divisions
situation, though its projected US the Dutch East Indies, the naval base then in various states of mobilization,
counteroffensive was then executed in of Rabaul on New Britain, as well as there was only equipment for seven.
a way the planners hadn’t considered. various islands in the Central Pacific, Troops still needed to be trained and
all according to Tokyo’s plan. higher-echelon commands organized.
Turning South The destruction of Allied naval With the IJA marching toward India,
power, as well as the Japanese seizure and other Japanese units landing
The Japanese launched World War of forward bases, meant any major in New Guinea, the Allies were hard
II in the Pacific on 7 December 1941 (8 US counteroffensive was impos- pressed. Relieving the Philippines was
December west of the International Date sible in the short term. Indeed, it was therefore impossible, even had the
Line). The way they started the conflict proving difficult for the Allies simply US fleet still been intact. If nothing
had profound effects on American to defend what they still held. else, the logistics simply weren’t in
execution of Rainbow 5. At Pearl Harbor One reason for that overall weak- place for such a grand maneuver.
the planes of the Japanese carrier task ness came from the fact the war in It was the threat to Australia that
force sank or damaged all the American Europe had drawn off most of the drew the US into the South Pacific.
battleships. On 10 December, Japanese strength of the British Commonwealth. In April, Allied intelligence detected
land-based aviation sank the two Following Pearl Harbor the Australian IJN movement toward the Coral
battleships of the Royal Navy’s Force Z. government frantically recalled its Sea. One task group was to make
By the end of February 1942, Japanese units from North Africa, where they’d an amphibious assault against Port
surface naval units had destroyed been fighting against Rommel as part Moresby in southern New Guinea,
which was then being desperately
held by a small force of Australians.
Concentration Versus Dispersion Another IJN group was heading
toward the islands of Guadalcanal and
It wasn’t only in the Solomons the Japanese failed to concentrate ground forces. The Tulagi in the Solomons chain. At the
IJA’s infantry divisions were deployed, for the most part, in China, Manchuria and Southeast same time, an IJN carrier group was
Asia, and they weren’t seen in the opening stages of the Pacific fighting. The IJN used its own also on the move, trying to engage
Special Naval Landing Force (regiment-to-battalion-sized amphibious units), when it needed and sink the American carriers that
to seize forward bases. That subsequently meant most of the positions in their defensive escaped the carnage at Pearl Harbor.
perimeter were only thinly held, which also harkened back to the bigger strategic picture. Those USN carriers were the critical
Due to the ongoing disagreement between the IJA and IJN high commands as to where element for the Allies at that time in
the strategic emphasis needed to be placed — mainland Asia or the Pacific — those two the Pacific, as they were their only
services didn’t cooperate much at the start of the war. That resulted in Japanese operations remaining capital ships with offensive
being fragmented and lacking in overall coordination, with the army running the show on capability. The Americans committed
the mainland and in the East Indies, and the navy controlling operations in the Pacific. them in the Coral Sea, leading to the
One IJA unit that had been in the Pacific since the start of the war was the South Seas world’s first carrier versus carrier battle.
Detachment, a reinforced regiment. It was committed to New Guinea early in 1942, but it It resulted in one US carrier being sunk,
really wasn’t much stronger than the Australian defenders at Port Moresby it was supposed to as well as one Japanese light carrier
dislodge. Still, the Japanese pressed on with their attack, fruitlessly suffering large numbers going down. While that represented a
of casualties. It wouldn’t be until later the Japanese got around to landing full divisions on tactical victory for the IJN insofar as
New Guinea, and by that time they couldn’t compete with MacArthur’s larger buildup. the USN lost more tonnage, it was also
Part of the problem was the Japanese tended toward overconfidence. They’d won huge a strategic defeat for Japan due to the
victories in the first part of the war, and there seemed no reason to believe that wouldn’t fact their transports were recalled for
continue. A key advantage the Japanese had in those early campaigns in Malaya, Burma, fear of being attacked by USN surface
the East Indies and Philippines — and which was increasingly lacking afterward — was elements. Port Moresby was saved.
air and naval superiority. Japanese aero-naval forces had provided great combat power Still, one element of Japan’s Coral Sea
to their early land operations, as well operational maneuverability. Japanese forces could operation proved successful for them.
be quickly transported along coastlines to attack enemy positions from the rear. Allied The Guadalcanal-Tulagi group reached
lines of communication, meanwhile, were cut by the IJN’s dominance of the seas. their objectives, setting up a seaplane
In the New Guinea and Solomons campaigns, however, the Japanese at best base on the latter island and starting
had aero-naval parity with the Allies. The Allied victory at the Coral Sea meant the the construction of an airfield on the
Japanese landing at Port Moresby had to be cancelled; instead, the troops would former. Allied intelligence detected the
have to cross the Owen Stanley Mountains, a trek that wasted their strength. base construction and evaluated it as
To that must also be added the Japanese logistical shortfalls in supporting a potentially major threat. From that
their troops on the ground. Japanese forces frequently wasted away due to disease base the Japanese could attack Allied
and hunger, while shortages of ammunition forced a reliance on unsupported lines of communication between the
infantry attacks that turned suicidal. Conceivably, Japanese tactical skill might west coast of the US and Australia.
have won through anyway, at least in the early days of the campaign, but In response the US high command
their small numbers of men were never enough to gain a decision.  ★ decided to make a major effort to defeat
the Japanese in the South Pacific.

10 World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011

New Guinea & The Solomons to continue the offensive with the Solomons. The New Guinea campaign’s
objective of destroying the Allied forces objective was to establish the island
The American switch to a South then still in the field against them. The as a base for attacks on Australia.
Seas strategy reflected a major change Japanese had two reasons for making The entry into the Solomons was to
in Japanese strategy. The strategic plan that switch. First, it had already become establish bases that, in addition to
with which Japan had opened the war apparent the Americans weren’t going cutting Allied lines of communication,
can be summarized as: 1) destroy the to negotiate an end to the war. A could also be used as springboards
US fleet at Pearl Harbor; 2) conquer the continued offensive was therefore vital for further projected attacks against
resource area of Southeast Asia; 3) seize to further forestall future American the New Hebrides, Fiji and Samoa.
a chain of island bases in the Pacific and offensives. Second, further Japanese On the American side, the decision
build them up as a defensive perimeter; offensives would mean the seizure of to commit major forces to defeat the
and 4) then go to the strategic defensive, more island bases, thus adding more Japanese in the South Pacific wasn’t
concentrating IJN naval and airpower depth to their defensive perimeter. without controversy. For one thing,
for decisive counterattacks against Allied Those considerations led to Adm. there was still a lack of ground combat
attempts to penetrate that perimeter. Yamamoto’s ill-fated Midway campaign forces as most Army divisions were
Following their successes early in (May – June 1942), and also to Japanese still in training. Even the USMC had to
1942, however, the Japanese decided moves into New Guinea and the continued on page 14 »

World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011 11

The Overall Campaign
1942
January – February:
Japanese Seize Rabaul.
Japanese amphibious forces capture the Australian naval
base at Rabaul and consolidate their hold on New Britain.
March: Japanese Land on Lae.
This begins their campaign to take New Guinea
and threaten northeastern Australia.
March:
Establishment of Allied Theater Commands.
Those include the Pacific Ocean Area (Nimitz), the Southwest Pacific
Area (MacArthur), and Southeast Asia. A Southeast Pacific command is
also established to guard the approaches to the Panama Canal. Those
are combined land-naval-air commands, including forces from all Allied
powers. The Pacific Ocean Area is further divided into North, Central and
South commands (the latter initially under Adm. Ghormley, then Halsey).
4 – 8 May: Battle of the Coral Sea.
Japanese and Allied forces clash in the first carrier versus carrier
battle. Japanese transports carrying amphibious forces for assault on
Australian-held Port Moresby turn back, but another Japanese amphibi-
ous group reaches Tulagi and Guadalcanal and begins building airbases.
4 – 7 June: Battle of Midway.
Yamamoto’s Combined Fleet attacks the American base at Midway;
Nimitz orders three USN carriers to the island. They ambush and
sink four IJN fleet carriers, ending Yamamoto’s offensive.
July – September:
Japanese forces cross the Owen Stanley Mountains for an
attack on Port Moresby; they’re stopped by a desperate Allied
defense. MacArthur sends reinforcements to New Guinea.
August:
American Landings on Guadalcanal & Tulagi.
1st US Marine Division establishes a beachhead and seizes Henderson
Field. Japanese launch air attacks on American ships, but they’re
largely ineffective. An IJN cruiser squadron inflicts serious losses
on an Allied naval force at Savo Island (9 August). As a result the
USN withdraws its carrier task force covering the landings.
August – February 1943: Cactus Air Force. USMC aircraft
begin operations from Henderson Field, followed by Army, Navy
and Allied air units. The Japanese counter with air raids from
bases on Rabaul and Bougainville. In the following months the Allies
gain local air parity, and then superiority, over the Solomons.
22 – 25 August:
Battle of the Eastern Solomons.
Japanese carrier group supporting operations on Guadalcanal
is attacked by US carriers. The IJN loses one light car-
rier while the USS Enterprise is damaged. That’s part of a larger
Japanese effort to reinforce their troops on the island.
August – September:
Japanese Submarine Successes.
An IJN submarine torpedoes the carrier Saratoga, forc-
ing it to return to base for repair. Other subs sink the
Wasp and damage the battleship North Carolina.
August – October:
IJA Counterattacks on Guadalcanal.
The Japanese have two divisions and a brigade on Guadalcanal.
The Americans commit reinforcements from several more
divisions. Japanese counterattacks tend are fragmented and
poorly supported owing to their logistical difficulties. The Japanese
attempt to maintain supply for their forces on the island via
what they refer to as “Rat Transport” (destroyer transports plus
submarines and barges, “rat” being a symbol of hoarding for the
Japanese); it’s known as the “Tokyo Express” to the Americans.
12 World at War 18
18 October: Halsey Takes Command.
Vice Adm. William “Bull” Halsey is placed in command of the South
Pacific Area. He brings a new aggressive policy to operations.
26 – 27 October:
Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands.
Yamamoto’s carriers engage Halsey’s, resulting in the sinking
of the Hornet and damage to the Enterprise; two IJN car-
riers are also damaged. Halsey withdraws, but Yamamoto
fails to follow up with an assault on Guadalcanal.
12 – 15 November:
Naval Battles of Guadalcanal.
The IJN attempts to support operations on Guadalcanal, committing
two battleships and other fleet units. Halsey responds aggressively.
American and Japanese naval and air forces engage each other over
a period of several days. Those actions result in the Japanese losing
two battleships to a combination of surface and land-based aviation
attacks. That ends IJN offensive operations in Guadalcanal waters.
November 1942 – January 1943: Allied
Counteroffensive on New Guinea.
US and Australian forces take Buna and Goa in
the face of fierce Japanese resistance.
January – February 1943:
US Ground Offensive on Guadalcanal.
USMC and Army units push back the Japanese. The Japanese high
command cancels a planned offensive and instead orders evacuation
of the island. IJN units withdraw land forces by 7 February.
1943
January – June:
Continued Allied Offensive on New Guinea.
MacArthur builds up US and Australian strength on the island.
1 – 4 March: Battle of the Bismarck Sea.
US land-based aircraft ambush and destroy a Japanese
troop convoy heading for New Guinea. Information for
the attack was provided by ULTRA intelligence.
April: Operation I-Go &
the Japanese Aerial Counteroffensive.
Yamamoto orders IJN carrier air groups transferred to land
bases as part of an attempt to gain air superiority over the
Solomons and New Guinea. Those operations gain little while
costing the Japanese many pilots and planes. Yamamoto is killed
in an ULTRA-assisted aerial ambush by US fighters on 18 April.
June: Operation Cartwheel Begins.
MacArthur begins the counteroffensive that will isolate
Rabaul and consolidate Allied control of the South Pacific.
July – December: the Solomons.
Allied forces take the islands of New Georgia and
Bougainville along with their critical airbases.
September: Allies Take Lae & Salamaua.
The New Guinea Force, now under Australian Gen. Thomas
Blamey, is in position to assault New Britain.
November:
USN Carrier Strikes on Rabaul.
They’re part of the American strategy of isolating and
neutralizing Japanese bases via aero-naval power.
December:
US Forces Land on New Britain.
The Allies isolate Rabaul. That effectively ends
Japanese operations in the South Pacific.  ★
| JUN–JUL 2011
 World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011 13
» continued from page 11 While there were numerous aircraft operations over water, as well as the
put together disparate units to form available, thanks to US industry having maintenance infrastructure to keep
1st Marine Division for the invasion of tooled up prior to Pearl Harbor for them flying. As for the USN, it would
Guadalcanal in August 1942. US land- Lend-Lease, what was lacking was have to commit its carriers without the
based airpower was also in poor shape. trained pilots and crew, especially for support of battleships, and that entailed
risk, especially since the Solomons and
New Guinea were both within range
Planning of Japanese land-based airpower. It
wouldn’t be until late in 1942 the US
One of the things the South Pacific campaign demonstrated was the difference could concentrate major combat power
between Japanese and American planning. When the Japanese high command — the in the new theater of operations.
Imperial General Staff, which was supposed to coordinate the operations of the IJA and There was also a debate over the
IJN — made the effort, it could develop efficient plans as well as provide the logistical direction of the counteroffensive: Adm.
support to make them work. The Pearl Harbor operation, the invasion of Malaya and Earnest King, Chief of Naval Operations,
Singapore and the 1942 Indian Ocean raid, saw the Japanese gain great victories against wanted to advance up the Solomons.
superior enemy forces. When it came to routine operations, though, the Japanese often Gen. Douglas MacArthur, in command
lacked the methodical approach their counterpart American staffs brought to war-fighting. of the newly designated Southwest
For example, Japanese intelligence operations frequently gained considerable informa- Pacific Area, wanted first to take the
tion about Allied forces and intentions, but that information was often ignored by combat Japanese base at Rabaul and thereby
commanders who discounted such staff work. Victory was instead to be attained by superior reverse the strategic situation in one
application of tactical ability and fighting spirit. In comparison, their American and British move. The final compromise plan thus
counterparts gave intelligence top priority. That had a huge payoff on the strategic level, came to involve elements of both a
as Midway demonstrated, where Adm. Nimitz acted on ULTRA intelligence that showed
the Japanese were moving on the island, allowing him to concentrate USN carriers there.
The Japanese intelligence system also had shortfalls on the tactical level.
The initial IJA decision to make a land attack against the Marines on Guadalcanal
with a single reinforced battalion (Ichiki Detachment) was predicated on
erroneous intelligence that asserted the American force on the island amounted
to only a single demoralized regiment instead of a full USMC division.
That kind of miscalculation also had operational significance. The Japanese
frequently overestimated losses they’d inflicted on Allied fleets. Conversely, it could
at times work to hugely exaggerate the threat posed by the USN, causing the IJN to
withdraw when victory might’ve been had by remaining on the offensive. That was
certainly the case after Yamamoto’s carrier victory at Santa Cruz (27 October 1942).
Had he pressed on then, the USN would’ve been unable to stop his Combined Fleet
from heavily bombarding Guadalcanal’s defenses and, combined with an attack
by IJA land forces then on the island, the tide might well have been turned.
To be sure, when the Japanese put their mind to it, they could pull off a coup.
Operation KE, the evacuation of their forces from Guadalcanal in February 1943,
was a masterpiece of planning, logistical effort and deception. Japanese troops
were off the island with the Americans barely aware of what was happening.
(US intelligence believed the Japanese transports involved were reinforcing the
island.) It took the intervention of the Japanese high command to get the IJN and
IJA to cooperate, however, with the emperor himself often having to give things a
push, and all to accomplish only what American staff planners found routine.
The Americans became relatively adept at combining naval, air and land forces,
as well as working with other Allied powers to attain their objectives. The lack of
IJA/IJN cooperation largely neutralized much of the advantage they’d won during the
first months of the war. For example, the IJN decided to go it alone for the invasion
of Guadalcanal, since the IJA thought the position there was overextended. Thus
the IJN landed only a couple thousand men, many of them construction troops. That
was enough to attract an American counteroffensive, but not enough to resist it.
The presence of a major IJA ground formation to defend the airfield on Guadalcanal,
perhaps just a single independent infantry brigade, might’ve made the whole
campaign go differently. Without control of that airfield the American position in
the Solomons would’ve been tenuous. Resupply would’ve been difficult (it was hard
enough with possession of the airfield), while the IJN would’ve had free reign in the
surrounding waters to bombard the Americans as well as bring in reinforcements.
With the Allies on the airfield, it was difficult for the Japanese to maintain a presence
on Guadalcanal, let alone have a chance of accomplishing the original objective of attacking
deeper into the South Pacific. The IJA had from the start rejected such a plan as unrealistic,
but the Navy went ahead anyway. The IJA wanted to fight and win the war on land in
Asia; the IJN wanted to fight and win it at sea in the Pacific. With the Japanese armed
services at loggerheads, an effective combined strategy remained out of the question.  ★

14 World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011

Solomons and a New Guinea campaign,
with Rabaul as the final objective.
Fortunately for the Allies, while the
Japanese invasions of New Guinea and
the Solomons had been daring, they
weren’t properly supported or consoli-
dated. The IJA wasn’t coordinating with
the IJN. Indeed, the IJA general staff
objected the move south would require
units and transport that simply weren’t
available, given the majority of the
army remained committed to the war
in China and Southeast Asia. Japanese
ground forces on New Guinea therefore
amounted to little more than a brigade,
and to hold the advanced position on
Guadalcanal-Tulagi the IJN had commit-
ted only a single Special Naval Landing
Force (SNLF) battalion along with some
construction troops. When the USMC’s
1st Division landed there in August 1942,
the Marines had little trouble in pushing
aside the defenders and seizing the
airfield. If Guadalcanal’s airfield had
been kept in Japanese hands by means
of a stouter defense, the American
position would’ve been untenable.
It was the American possession of
that airfield — renamed Henderson Field
by the Marines, after a USMC aviator
killed at Midway — which gave them
the edge in the Solomons. They quickly
reinforced it with planes, pilots and
ground crew, all nicknamed the “Cactus
Air Force” (after the codename for
Guadalcanal). The CAF gave the Allies
local air superiority, preventing the IJN
from maintaining a permanent presence
in the surrounding waters. Japanese
fleet units could move into the Solomon
Sea at night or when heavily escorted
by carriers, but they had to withdraw
out of range, or face strong aerial
attack, during daylight. The Japanese
lost two battleships in the waters off
Guadalcanal (the Hiei and Kirishima) in
1942 when they came under combined
surface-naval and aviation attack.
The Japanese attempted to build
up their airpower in bases that could
support Guadalcanal, such as Munda
on New Georgia. The Americans then
attacked those installations, neutralizing
them via aerial bombardment, all of
which, again, was made possible by
their possession of Henderson Field.
American airpower could interdict
and destroy Japanese shipping
attempting to reinforce Guadalcanal.
The Japanese were forced to rely on
emergency resupply measures — such
as the use of destroyers, barges and
submarines — to deliver supplies (the
“Tokyo Express”). Such measures
were stopgap at best. While the IJA
eventually committed the better part
of two divisions and an independent
brigade to Guadalcanal, their combat
effectiveness was kept degraded by
shortages of ammunition, food and
medical supplies. To the Japanese
soldiers on it, Guadalcanal became
known as “Starvation Island.”
The situation on New Guinea was
somewhat better for the Japanese.
That island was within closer range
of Japanese airpower than was
Guadalcanal. The dilemma there was in
coming to grips with the Allied forces
south of the Owen Stanley Range and
taking Port Moresby, the original objec-
tive of the invasion. The one overland
World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011 15
approach was via the Kokoda Trail, a
grueling march through jungles and up
and down nearly vertical slopes that
subjected attackers to heavy attrition.
Later in the campaign the Allies used
aerial transport to overcome those
difficulties, but that first required
securing air superiority. A major aerial
battle was thus also in the works.
In early 1943, Yamamoto made a
concerted effort to regain control of
the skies above the Solomons and New
Guinea, concentrating much of Japan’s
aerial power at bases on Rabaul and in
the northern Solomons, in an operation
codenamed I-GO. To do so he pulled
aircraft and crew off his carriers. The
carriers themselves were sent to the rear
to refit and rebuild their air groups. That
seemed a reasonable move to preserve
carrier strength, but in the end it proved
disastrous. The carrier pilots were the
best the Japanese had, but they were
lost in what became a war of attrition.
By that time in the war American
industrial power was kicking in,
providing ever-increasing numbers of
aircraft. Moreover, the US air services
were developing new tactics to take
advantage of their strengths while
exploiting Japanese vulnerabilities. The
Japanese certainly needed to take time
to reorganize and expand their air arm,
but that was time they didn’t actually
have. Japanese pilot training couldn’t
compete with that of the Americans,
as the Japanese veteran pilots who
should’ve served as instructors in that
expansion were being shot out of the
skies in the South Pacific. The result was,
not only did the Allies gain air superior-
 ity, the Japanese fleet air arm was also
Naval Logistics crippled for the remainder of the war.
With air superiority assured, the
America had the industrial capacity to supply modern war as well as the military capaci- Allies continued their offensive, taking
ty to secure access to resources such as petroleum. That meant it could build sufficient num- the remaining Solomon Islands,
bers of warships and aircraft to carry through plans for trans-oceanic war. Even so, those clearing New Guinea and neutralizing
weapons would’ve been useless without a massive logistical support system behind them. the Japanese bases on Rabaul and
The American industrial system produced not only the supplies to fight the war, but Truk. As with the Solomons, Allied
also the engineering capacity to build up the necessary basing infrastructure throughout air superiority over the Bismarck Sea
the Pacific Theater of Operations. Much of the Pacific War thus came to revolve around made it impossible for the Japanese
American efforts to seize island bases and then build them up to support further advances. to reinforce their positions on New
Such engineering was an area in which the Japanese were woefully behind. Guinea and New Britain. The Allies
For example, American engineers had available a range of power tools and thus broke through the southern flank
construction vehicles, such as heavy bulldozers, while their Japanese counterparts of the Japanese strategic perimeter.
had to rely on human labor, often provided by conscripted foreign nationals. That, in turn, opened the way for
What made the industrial aspect of the American war effort work was the efficient MacArthur’s landings in the Philippines
organization developed to employ it. Upon America’s entry into World War II there in late 1944 — three years after the open-
were serious organizational deficiencies. The US Navy and Army each had separate ing of the war, as had been projected by
logistical systems. Within the Army the US Army Air Corps (which became the US Rainbow 5. Meanwhile, Adm. Chester
Army Air Force) had its own system, while naval and Marine aviation also had their Nimitz began a Central Pacific drive
own systems. That led to a dissipation of resources as well as duplication of effort. with the landing on Tarawa (November
Fortunately, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized the situation and overhauled the 1943). That campaign would lead to the
logistical organization. That involved setting up joint logistical plans allocating support to seizure of Saipan (June 1944) and Iwo
all American forces in a rational manner. The Army also set up an entire sub-command, Jima (February 1945), bases from which
the Army Service Forces, to further coordinate and control logistical operations. American naval and air power would put
Combat commanders were also trained to take logistics seriously at all the Japanese home islands under siege.
levels. For example, Adm. Halsey made the build up of forward bases in the Both the South and the Central Pacific
South Pacific Area his top priority, and it was that base structure that allowed drives would meet at Okinawa (April
for the victories at Guadalcanal and in the northern Solomons. 1945), for the beginning of the final
American technical know-how also figured into the picture. The development of assault on Japan. Rainbow 5 had worked,
various specialized types of landing craft proved useful not only in assaults on enemy held though not precisely in the manner
shores, but also for the delivery of equipment. Vehicles could be driven off landing craft its pre-war planners had expected.
via ramps right onto the shore, along with the supplies they carried. That meant there was
less of a need for port facilities and human labor during the critical off-loading process.
As with strategy, the IJN and IJA rarely cooperated in logistical matters, often
refusing to support each other with available resources. Logistics were always considered
something of a second-rate activity in their overall military culture, which emphasized
warrior spirit. There were exceptions, such as the extensive support planning that
went into the 1941 – 42 Malaya campaign, but many Japanese ground operations
later in the war simply fell apart because of inadequate logistical arrangements.
All of that isn’t to say the US didn’t face shortfalls. Cargo, transport and oiler vessels
were always in short supply. That was exacerbated by the oceanography of the Pacific
Theater, where ships had
to travel long distances to
deliver their cargoes and
then steam just as long to
return to base, often with
empty hulls. That was
an altogether inefficient
situation that wasn’t fully
resolved until late in the
war. One USN innovation in
that effort was the mobile
base or “fleet train,” which
began to appear in 1943.
Fleet trains consisted of
service squadrons with
various logistical ships that
could replenish and refit
naval combat forces at sea.
That reduced the need for
advanced bases and also
extended the operational
range of the fleet.  ★

16 World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011

Conclusions

The American campaign in the South

Pacific had been unanticipated by both
the Japanese and US high commands
at the start of the war. A combination of
swiftly evolving circumstances, as well as
the American desire and ability to seize
an opportunity to reverse the tide of
the fighting, then led to that campaign
becoming the major turning point in the
Pacific. The South Pacific proved deci-
sive because it resulted in the destruc-
tion of both Japanese air and naval
strength. The elimination of Japan’s
naval aviation and many of its fleet
units, in turn, opened the way for the
American drive into the Central Pacific.
By late 1943 the Japanese no longer
had the forces with which to launch a
major counterattack. The IJN carriers
wouldn’t return to combat until the
Battle of the Philippine Sea (19 – 20 June
1944), and by that time it was too late.
By then the USN had attained a vast
superiority, not only in numbers of ships
but also in combat experience and logis-
tics. It could concentrate overwhelming
force and fight decisive battles on its
own terms. At the Philippine Sea the
Americans destroyed Japan’s carefully
hoarded carriers and naval aviation.
The USN then moved into Japan’s inner
defensive perimeter unchallenged.
The one remaining major surprise
came when the Japanese began
employing kamikaze suicide attacks
in October 1944. The kamikazes
would inflict considerable damage
on individual Allied ships, but by
themselves they were unable to stop
the overall American advance.  ✪

World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011 17

Design Corner
Joseph Miranda
T
he South Seas Campaign (SSC)
is a wargame of the Allied
versus Japanese across the
South and Southwest Pacific Theaters
of Operation in 1942 and 43. That
campaign involved both sides’ navies,
armies and air forces, as well as
massive logistical and intelligence
support. It spanned the Pacific from
Australia to Fiji and Rabaul, and it
saw major battles such as Coral Sea,
Guadalcanal and New Guinea.
Designing SSC was a tall order, given
both the geographic and military scope.
I found myself going over ground (and
water) I’d trod (or sailed) in my design
of Solomons Campaign for World at
War number two, which covered the
fighting on and around Guadalcanal.
The approach I took with Solomons
Campaign was “systems intensive.” That
is, there were many rules to model the
specifics of naval, air and land opera-
tions as well as logistics. I considered
using a similar approach for SSC, but
then decided to adapt the Charles
S. Roberts Award-winning system
created by Ty Bomba for Red Dragon
Rising (RDR). RDR uses one major
subsystem to model many different
types of operations. Each operation is
conducted as a discrete “action” and,
by carrying out those actions, players
execute their overall strategy. It also
makes for a much faster playing game.
I modified the RDR system to allow
multiple operations to be conducted
sequentially, reflecting situations of
superior command-control by one
side over the other. Both sides have
markers that allow them to do that.
For the Allies it’s structured as one
additional action per major commander
(such as MacArthur) for the remainder
of the game after his appearance.
For the Japanese, it will generally
18 World at War 18
occur by playing particular operation
markers that temporarily grant more
actions per turn. That means the
Japanese will have surges of activity
in which a lot can be accomplished.
In the long run, though, the Allies
have a more methodical buildup of
operational capability. That represents
the greater coordination and logistical
support enjoyed by those forces, as
opposed to the occasional flashes of
brilliance and extraordinary effort
demonstrated by the Japanese. Similarly,
certain Japanese operations markers
allow them to utilize either Navy or Army
units but not both, which represents
the historic division between those two
services. The Allies also have an edge
there insofar as they were much better
at what is today called “joint warfare.”
Understanding those things is important
for optimum play, as each player needs
to utilize his own side’s advantages while
exploiting his opponent’s weaknesses.
The game has many types of actions.
I grouped them together according to
the American military staff system: G-1
(Administrative), G-2 (Intelligence),
G-3 (Operations), and G-4 (Logistics).
That’s realistic, since it models
actual practice, while it also makes
the actions more readily accessible to
the players, who can select them by
consulting the general categories.
All actions are critical to developing
a winning strategy, and players have
to think hard about their choices.
For example, you have to build up
your basing structure on the map in
order to project power; so logistical
operations can be just as important as
those dealing directly with combat.
Both sides in the game have their his-
toric advantages. The Japanese start with
an advantage in weapons (Long Lance
torpedoes) and training, especially in
| JUN–JUL 2011
night fighting. As a result they get an
attack bonus at sea in 1942. The Allies
get a special ULTRA mission, which gives
them enhanced intelligence operations.
(There are many intelligence operations
in the game other than those specifically
called for by the action menu, but they’re
simply factored into studying enemy
units on the map. What the intelligence
actions deal with are those deeper and
extraordinary factors that can give you a
strategic advantage when used properly.)
The units are rated for their combat
values against air, ground, surface and
submarine targets. I added movement
and range factors due to the great
differences in the abilities of the various
formations depicted here to deploy and
operate at range. I also gave aircraft
carriers a depleted side, representing
the tendency of World War II carriers,
even in otherwise successful battles,
to lose much of their air group and
thus suffer a reduction in strength.
There are also engineers, which
players will find useful for building up
that critical base structure mentioned
above. You have to look at “power
projection” in the game as a function of
how far forward you can get your bases.
There are counters representing
extraordinary situations, such as
the Tokyo Express and build-
ing the Kokoda Trail. They add
historical color to the game without
adding a lot of special rules.
The game is generally won by
accumulating victory points, which
covers the attritional aspect of the long
campaign; however, there’s also the
chance for a “sudden death victory”
if you can seize your opponent’s key
strategic bases or clear his major
fleet units from the map. That gives
you a reason to take bold actions
in pursuit of a big victory.  ✪
The South Seas Campaign: 1942 – 43
The South Seas Campaign, 1942-43 (SSC), designed by Joseph To purchase the game that covers the battles featured in
Miranda, is a two player, strategic-level wargame of intermediate this issue send your name and address along with:
complexity that covers the struggle for control of the naval, air
and land lines of communication between Australia and the US $30 US Customers
during those two years. Most ground units in the game represent $36 Canadian Customers
divisions, brigades or regiments. Aircraft units represent two $38 Overseas Customers
groups or air regiments (six to eight squadrons). Ship units mostly
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escort carriers, two battleships, four cruisers, squadrons of six to CA residents add $1.98 sales tax.
eight destroyers (plus Japanese light cruiser destroyer leaders),
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inch equals 90 miles. Each turn represents from two weeks to two Decision Games
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withdrawals, refits, fog of war, off-map bases, interceptions, Bakersfield, CA 93390
invading Australia, long-range bombers, protected targets, shore
bombardment, commandos, airborne units, seaplanes, and the
Tokyo Express. The game uses award-winning the system originally
created for our earlier-published game, Red Dragon Rising.

Detail of the The South Seas Campaign map

Samurai vs.
The Battle of Changkufeng Hill,
July – August 1938
Editor’s Note: Soviet units are shown in
plaintext; Japanese units are in italics.
C
hangkufeng Hill is a twin-peaked
promontory that sits at the
confluence of the Russian-Korean
border sandwiched between Lake
Khasan to the east and Korea to the west.
Changkufeng Hill was named by the
Korean natives of the area, as its shape
reminded them of the changgo, a type
of snare drum constricted in the center
and played by tapping on both ends. The
Soviets at first called it Zaozernaya (Hill
Behind the Lake); however, among the
Soviet troops who fought there it became
known as Sugar Loaf Hill, again due to its
shape. What was to become the overall
battle area ran about four miles, north to
south, from Shachaofeng Hill (elevation
450 feet) to Hill 52, along the western
bank of Lake Khasan, with Changkufeng
20 World at War 18
and Noguchi Hills at its center.
The Tumen River, which runs
through the area north to south, further
demarcated the border. The local
terrain was mainly forest and swamp
interspersed with small hills and
streams. In the battle area the Tumen
was a muddy 500 to 700 yards wide and
three to five yards deep, which made
crossing problematic. The Soviet roads
on the eastern bank were good; even
heavy vehicles could move easily along
them. On the Korean (west) side, the
roads were poor at best and became
impassable during the rainy season.
The tops of the hills were rocky
peaks many sharp angles that, while
still allowing tanks to move, restricted
their speed. The same was true of
the marshy terrain around the hills.
The area immediately around the
hills was treeless and generally sandy,
pg. 21
| JUN–JUL 2011
Bear:
by Terence Co
which meant there was little cover.
Changkufeng Hill was the most
militarily significant terrain feature in
the area because it had a commanding
view (elevation 550 yards), and it also
lay at the center of the larger chain of
hills. Whoever controlled Changkufeng
Hill tactically controlled the entire area.
After the signing of the Russo-
Chinese Hunchun Border Pact of 1886,
which had officially delineated the
Russo-Chinese (Manchurian) Korean
border, the Changkufeng Hill area
had remained obscure and remote.
Even with the Japanese conquest
of Manchuria and Korea, the area
continued to remain militarily
overlooked. Once strong Soviet sup-
port for the Nationalist Chinese
government began, in the aftermath
of the Japanese invasion of China
proper on 7 July 1937, that changed.
 The USSR and Japan then both
began to rapidly expand their military
forces along their shared border. The
Russians (and then the Soviets) had
viewed Japan as the most serious for-
eign military threat in the Far East since
Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese
War of 1904 – 1905 and their temporary
occupation of coastal Siberia during
the Russian Civil War. The Japanese
seizure of Manchuria (1931 – 32) and
the invasion of China (1937) further
increased tensions in the area, and
Stalin subsequently feared a Japanese
invasion of the Soviet Far East.
For their part, the Japanese were
becoming increasingly concerned over
growing Soviet military strength. By the
late 1930s the Red Army was the largest
ground force in the world in terms of
manpower, while it also fielded the
largest number of tanks and aircraft.
Japan therefore feared possible Soviet
intervention in China, which would
turn that theater of operations into an
unwinnable two front war for them.
The Changkufeng Hill area was
one of the places along the border
chosen by both nations for military
buildup, since its topography had
suddenly made it one of the most
tactically prominent points along the
entire Soviet-Korean border. Both sides
matched each other’s buildup to the
point that, by mid-1938, they each
had around 50,000 men in the area.
From 11 to 28 July 1938, then, a
series of small border incidents in the
area increased tensions. Those incidents
ranged from soldiers of both sides
shooting at each other across the border
to the pulling down of telegraph poles.
Casualties were reported on both sides.
The proximate cause of those inci-
dents remains obscure. There’s no doubt
local Japanese commanders were spoil-
ing for a fight, but their government in
Tokyo wasn’t. At the time the Japanese
Army was already heavily committed
in China, and was readying for what
its high command hoped would be a
final massive offensive to fully defeat
the Nationalists at Wuhan. Given
that overarching strategic situation,
World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011 21
Emperor Hirohito personally resisted
the idea of a broader war. Army Lt. Gen.
Seishiro Itagaki, the minister of war,
was all for committing major military
forces against the Soviets, but he was
overruled by the emperor in alliance
with Prince Kanin, Chief of the Army
General Staff. In line with that orienta-
tion, the Japanese therefore began to
withdraw units from the area as a signal
to Moscow they wanted to deescalate.
Stalin, however, had other ideas.
Since 1937 he’d sent supplies and other
support to the Nationalist Chinese to
aid them in their resistance against
the Japanese. With both sides in China
massing hundreds of thousands of
men in the Wuhan area, the situation
there appeared to the Soviet dictator
to be reaching its critical moment.
He therefore believed something
was needed to draw away Japanese
attention and strength from that
pending campaign. Accordingly, he
increased Soviet military strength in
the Changkufeng Hill area and ordered
those units to be ready for a clash.
pg. 22
29 July that fight galvanized into action Gen.
Suetaka Kamezo, commander of the
At 9:30 a.m. Japanese soldiers of nearby 19th Infantry Division. Without
the 2nd Company of the 76th Border informing his higher command, he
Garrison Battalion engaged and ordered all of his division’s 75th Infantry
killed a squad of Soviet soldiers from Regiment, along with some battalions
the 40th Rifle Division who they’d from the 76th Infantry Regiment and 38th
found entrenching on the west side Infantry Brigade, to deploy forward and
of Shachaofeng Hill. The report of to be ready to move to secure all the
Dramatis Personae
Gen. Vasilii Blucher.
Born in Yaroslavl Oblast on 19 November 1889, he began his adult
life as factory worker, joining the army of the Russian Empire in
1914. In 1918 he defected to the nascent Red Army and quickly rose
through its ranks to become one of the Russian Civil War’s most
outstanding generals. He successfully engaged the Czech Legion and
White Army Gen. Pyotr Wrangel in a series of battles. In 1921 – 22
he served as military commander of the Soviet Far Eastern Republic.
During 1924 – 27 he headed the Soviet military advisory team to the
Kuomintang. In 1929 he was again made overall military commander
of the Soviet Far East, but his less than stellar performance during the Battle of Changkufeng
Hill got him dismissed from that post. Arrested for treason on 22 October 1938, Blucher was
severely tortured in Lefortovo Jail in Moscow. He was executed on 9 November 1938.
Gen. Gregori M Shtern.
Born in Cherkassy Oblast in the Ukraine in 1900, he became
commissar in a Red Army brigade in 1919. He broadened his career
path by graduating from the Military Academy of the Red Army
in 1929. From 1937 to 1938 he was one of the Soviets’ military
advisors to the Republican high command in the Spanish Civil War.
He commanded 39th Rifle Corps during the Battle of Changkufeng
Hill and was overall commander of the Soviet Far East Front
during the subsequent Khalkin Gol campaign in 1939. During the
Winter War he commanded 8th Army. He was again appointed
commander of the Far East on 22 June 1940, only to become one of the last victims of
Stalin’s Red Army purges when he was arrested and executed on 28 October 1941.
Gen. Nakamura Kotaro.
Born on 28 August 1881 in Ishikawa Prefecture, Japan, he
graduated from the Imperial Army Academy in 1901. During
1920 – 21 he was military attaché to Sweden. During 1929 – 30
he was chief of staff of Chosen Army in Korea. In 1934 he was
made commander of 8th Infantry Division. From 1938 to 1941 he
commanded Chosen Army, leaving there to serve as a member
of the Tokyo government’s Supreme War Council. He retired
in 1943 and died of natural causes on 29 August 1947.
Gen. Suetaka Kamezo.
Born on 28 September 1884 in Saga Prefecture, Japan, he graduated
from the Imperial Army Academy in 1904. He fought as a second
lieutenant in the infantry during the Russo-Japanese War of
1904 – 05. Made commander of 19th Infantry Division in April 1936,
he was still serving in that capacity at the time of the Battle of
Changkufeng Hill. Due to the excellent performance of his division
there, he was promoted to command of the newly formed 12th Army
on 9 November 1938. Under his command (to September 1939),
the 12th served as the main Japanese garrison force in north China,
where it conducted a fierce counterinsurgency campaign against Chinese guerrillas. From
1939 to 1941 he commanded 3rd Army in Manchuria. He joined the Supreme War Council in
1941, but retired later that same year. He died of natural causes on 1 August 1953.  ★
22 World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011
Changkufeng Hill area. At 5:30 p.m. Hill
52 was occupied by Japanese troops,
while 1st and 3rd Battalions from 75th
Infantry Regiment were ordered to cross
the Tumen River and entrench imme-
diately in front of Changkufeng Hill.
30 July
About 300 men of the Soviet 59th
Border Guard Detachment were found
to be camped on top of Changkufeng
Hill. At 11:30 p.m. 350 men from the
Japanese 1st Battalion, with sapper
support, snuck up to those Soviet
soldiers’ barbed wire perimeter and
started to clear it. Along the rest of
the area other Japanese units readied
themselves to attack. The start of
combat on Changkufeng Hill was to
serve as the signal for a general advance.
31 July
By 1:10 a.m. the line of barbed wire
was penetrated, but those Soviet troops
were then alerted by the barking of their
sentry dogs. Soviet machineguns started
firing as numerous flares were launched
into the night sky. By 2:00 a.m. the
defenders ceased firing flares and their
machinegun fire also died out. In the
renewed darkness about 100 Japanese
troops managed to get fully inside the
Soviet perimeter, where they then fixed
bayonets and charged. While the Soviet
machineguns again blazed away, it was
inaccurate fire due to the darkness:
the defenders’ flares had apparently
run out. What followed was a savage
and confused melee as Japanese and
Soviets fought each other at close range
with bayonets, gunfire and grenades.
The rest of the Japanese 1st Battalion
had meanwhile spotted and taken
under fire some Soviet reinforcements Nonetheless, at day’s end the Japanese clash, within the headquarters of the
attempting to move onto the hill. By were in a commanding position across Army General Staff there was jubilation.
4:30 a.m. the Japanese had defeated the area and had captured a lot of Those officers believed their troops
that force (some 50 men with a few Soviet equipment. The engagement had had already delivered the decisive blow
trucks and tanks). By 5:00 a.m. the only been the first time the Japanese had that would end the border crisis while
Soviets remaining on Changkufeng tried a large-scale night attack. It had also making the Soviets refrain from
Hill were dead; the others had fled. worked and was to serve as the model further provocations. They were wrong.
Elsewhere, at 2:20 a.m. 10th Company for future efforts of the same kind. Starting at 12:30 p.m., Soviet planes
of 3rd Battalion had overrun the Soviet attacked the Japanese forward positions
position on Hill 24, two-thirds of a 1 August across the Changkufeng Hill area. Those
mile north of Changkufeng. At 4:00 aircraft came in eight waves (about 150
a.m. a Soviet counterattack by 100 The Japanese high command fighters and bombers in total). Bombing
troops and eight tanks was repulsed was taken by surprise by their army’s from high altitude, their accuracy was
with five tanks knocked out. At 6:30 offensive. The Japanese area com- poor and most of their bombs didn’t
a.m. the Soviets attacked again, this mander, Gen. Nakamura Kotaro, was hit their targets. Two planes were
time with an entire rifle battalion and only informed of the operation at 5:30 shot down, while the raids killed four
a machinegun company, only to again a.m. on 31 July. While in Tokyo the Japanese soldiers and one horse.
be repulsed with heavy losses. The various government ministries erupted At the same time the Soviets began
Soviets attacked yet again at 7:10 a.m. in chaos and surprise over the border concentrating 40th Rifle Division just
with another infantry company and
five tanks, and again were defeated.
Hill 52 was occupied by the 2nd
Platoon of 3rd Company of 1st Battalion
and was supported to the north by
a collection of heavy Japanese guns:
two 75mm mountain guns, three
20mm anti-tank guns and two 37mm
infantry guns. Hill 52 was critical
because, if it fell to the Soviets, they
would be able push their armor
north to envelop Changkufeng Hill.
A Soviet unit supported by a handful
of tanks openly advanced on Hill 52,
apparently unaware it was occupied
by the Japanese. Those defending
Japanese troops’ fire soon knocked
out a few of the tanks, causing the
surprised Soviets to retreat.
At 4:00 a.m. the Japanese 2nd
Company of 1st Battalion of 76th
Regiment had attacked the Soviet posi-
tion in front of Shachaofeng Hill. By 6:00
a.m. that company had secured that
hill, but Soviet artillery to the east then
opened up a heavy fire on the newly
won Japanese position. That wasn’t
enough, however, to prevent the rest
of 1st Battalion continuing the overall
Japanese advance. What followed was
a four-hour battle that, by 10:30 a.m.,
had resulted in the Japanese turning the
Soviet right flank north of Lake Khasan.
At 10:50 a.m. the Soviets again counter-
attacked with armor, which managed
to finally stop the Japanese offensive.
The price of that day’s fighting was
heavy for both sides. Soviet casualties
were estimated to be around 600 dead
and 17 tanks knocked out. The Japanese
lost only around 200 men; however,
many of those losses were officers (they
led the charges). It was soon found that
fully 80 percent of the Japanese officers
who’d participated in the fighting had
either been killed or seriously wounded.

World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011 23

to the east the combat area. Their next
counterattack was planned for 2 August,
with the main effort to be delivered
by that division’s 119th and 120th Rifle
Regiments, supported by two artillery
battalions and a tank battalion detached
from 32nd Rifle Division. In a supporting
effort the 118th Rifle Regiment would
be launched against Hill 52. The total
effort took in some 5,000 men in 10 rifle
battalions along with 40 guns, 80 tanks
and about 150 supporting aircraft.
With those Soviet troops observed
to be massing nearby, Gen. Suetaka
was given permission by Army
High Command Headquarters to
reinforce the 75th Infantry Regiment
with the rest of his division’s infantry
(76th and 77th Regiments).
2 & 3 August
At 7:00 a.m. Soviet artillery began
firing on Hill 52 and Shachaofeng Hill.
The bombardment was so heavy the
Japanese found it difficult to move at
all and to continue to observe enemy
movement. At 9:00 a.m. Soviet planes
again started bombing the hills.
By 10:00 a.m. two Soviet infantry bat-
talions, along with 10 tanks and many
heavy weapons, had advanced to within
875 yards of Hill 52. As the spearheading
infantry reached a dip in the ground, the
Soviet artillery and heavy machineguns
stopped giving them cover fire. Col.
Tamenori Sato, commander of 73rd
Regiment, took that opportunity to call
in a barrage on the Red Army troops
inside the dip. The Soviet attackers were
then unable to move out of the dip, and
their advance stalled at 10:30 a.m.
Japanese reinforcements arrived and
immediately launched a counterattack
that, by 3:00 p.m., had forced the Soviets
to retreat. At 5:00 p.m. the Soviets tried
to attack again, this time with two
battalions backed by 50 tanks. Fire
from Japanese artillery stopped that
effort cold. By the time darkness came
at 7:00 p.m., the Soviets were 450 yards
from Hill 52. At 8:30 p.m. they tried
a night attack. That effort got them
to within 15 yards of the hill. There,
however, massed Japanese fire from
machineguns and mortars mowed
down the attackers. The Soviet night
attack collapsed into chaos. They fell
back to their start line and dug in.
Elsewhere, at 7:00 a.m. Soviet artil-
lery had opened up on Shachaofeng Hill
while a dozen Soviet planes bombed
it. Shortly after that a Soviet rifle
battalion backed up by several tanks
attacked. Well-coordinated Japanese
artillery fire stalled that effort.
At 6:00 p.m. several dozen Soviet
aircraft again bombed and strafed
Shachaofeng and Changkufeng Hills. At
8:30 p.m. a battalion of Soviet troops that
had been attacking Shachaofeng Hill
tried to move off it toward Changkufeng
Hill. Heavy Japanese fire from
Changkufeng Hill stopped that advance.
Nothing significant happened
on 3 August, as the Soviets con-
tented themselves with making a
few probes along with artillery and
aerial bombardment of the hills.
The 40th Rifle Division’s effort
had failed because its attacks were
poorly prepared and uncoordinated.
The Soviet riflemen hadn’t been able to
bring forward with them a significant
number of heavy weapons to support
their advance. The aerial attacks also

Divisional Histories

Japanese 19th “Tiger” Infantry Division. Activated on 24 December 1915 in North

Hamgyong, Korea, to serve as a garrison force. The division participated in the Japanese inva-
sion of Manchuria (September 1931 – February 1932) and stayed on to conduct pacification and
garrison duty there. From 1938 to 1943 it served on the USSR-Korean border. In 1944, minus
its 74th Infantry Regiment, the division was sent to the Philippines as part of 14th Area Army,
where it was destroyed fighting US and Philippine forces in the mountains of Central Luzon.

Soviet 32nd Rifle Division. Activated in 1934 in Vladivostok as part of 39th Rifle
Corps. During the Germans’ Operation Typhoon (October — December 1941), the division
fought as part of 5th Army in the Mozhaisk Defense Line in front of Moscow. As part of
that campaign, from 13 – 18 October 1941, the division fought a bruising battle against
the 10th Panzer and 2nd SS “Das Reich” Motorized Infantry Divisions. While mauled, the
32nd also inflicted heavy losses on its attackers and delayed their advance. The division
was subsequently reformed into 29th Guards Rifle Division. In 1944 – 45 it served in the
Ukraine and then ended the war as part of 10th Guards Army on the Baltic coast.

Soviet 39th Rifle Division. Activated on 1922 as 1st Transbaikal Rifle

Division. From July to September 1929 it fought the KMT-aligned Chinese troops
of Manchurian warlord Zhang Xueliang. In 1936 it was renamed the 39th “Pacific
Ocean” Rifle Division. The division remained stationed in the Soviet Far East
through 1945, and it participated in the invasion of Manchuria that August.

Soviet 40th Rifle Division. Formed in 1919 as the Expeditionary Division, dur-
ing the Russian Civil War it fought in the Ukraine. In 1920 it was redesignated 40th
Rifle Division. The division remained stationed in the Soviet Far East through 1945,
and it participated in the invasion of Manchuria that August.  ★

24 World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011

mostly missed their marks due to
the poor weather. The Red Army lost
around 600 men and seven tanks; the
Japanese lost 29 men, mostly to Soviet
artillery bombardment and bombs.
Gen. Suetaka requested authoriza-
tion for an attack during the night of
3/4 August, to be aimed at trying to
envelop and destroy the most forward
Soviet positions. That idea was
vetoed by the Army High Command,
however, as being overly ambitious.

4 – 5 August

Gen. Gregori M. Shtern, com-

mander of 39th Rifle Corps, realized his
forces in the area were inadequate to
take the disputed hills. He therefore
ordered up reinforcements. Those
reinforcements included the entirety
of 32nd and 40th Rifle Divisions, along
with the 2nd Motorized Rifle Brigade
and supporting artillery units.
The new plan was to have the 32nd
attack Changkufeng and Shachaofeng
Hills while the 40th went in against
Hill 52. It was to be a double-envelop-
ment maneuver aimed at nothing
less than trapping and destroying
all the Japanese units between Lake
Khasan and the Tumen River.
To facilitate the new effort, each
attacking Soviet rifle regiment was
assigned its own artillery regiment.
The attack was scheduled to start
at 2:00 p.m. on 6 August, after a
45-minute artillery bombardment.
As the Soviets massed their forces
they began a steady artillery and aerial
bombardment of the hills. Due to poor
preparation that effort resulted in only a
few Japanese killed. The Japanese troops
did note with foreboding, however, the
increased volume of ordnance hitting

World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011 25

their positions. Gen. Suetaka reacted
by requesting reinforcement, but he
was turned down. In the meantime
his men fortified their positions.
6 & 7 August
At 3:30 p.m. the Soviets began
rapidly firing every heavy weapon
they had on the scene, from artillery
to tank guns. That effort was aided by
further aerial bombardment. Due to the
delays in getting forward their attack
formations and vehicles, the start of
the assault was set back to 4:15 p.m.
At Shaochaofeng Hill, 32nd Rifle
Division deployed three battalions and
60 tanks. Those Soviets advanced on
the entrenched Japanese, but heavy fire
from the hill and well-aimed and coor-
26 World at War 18
dinated artillery stopped them about 30
yards from the defenders’ perimeter.
At Hill 52, 40th Rifle Division deployed
four battalions and 50 tanks. That
attack was also repulsed, even though
some Red Army units managed to
temporarily reach the crest of the hill.
At Changkufeng Hill, 32nd Rifle
Division deployed two battalions and 15
tanks. While the Soviet effort there was
initially held off, at 8:30 p.m. an attack by
two rifle companies managed to break
onto the crest of the hill. Hundreds of
other Soviet troops then rushed forward
to exploit that hole. By 10:30 p.m. all of
Changkufeng Hill had been overrun,
and the surviving handful of Japanese
troops there had retreated off it. In
desperation, at 2:00 a.m. (7 August), with
most of his force still engaged in fighting
| JUN–JUL 2011
on the other hills, Col. Kotoku Sato,
commander of 75th Infantry Regiment,
ordered a counterattack by his cooks,
mechanics and all other support troops.
After hand-to-hand fighting, those
Japanese managed to again eject all Red
Army troops from Changkufeng Hill.
The rest of 7 August was quiet except for
more artillery and aerial bombardment.
Taken together, 6 and 7 August were
the bloodiest days of the campaign.
The Soviets lost around 2,000 men and
50 tanks; the total of Japanese losses
isn’t known, but they had at least 150
killed on Changkufeng Hill alone.
While the Soviets had lost a lot of
men and equipment and had again
been unsuccessful in taking the
hills, they were observed bringing
forward even more units. The Japanese
brought in the 74th Infantry Regiment
as forward reserve, along with more
heavy artillery and anti-aircraft guns.
8 & 9 August
During these two days the Soviet 39th
Rifle Corps continued to bombard and
probe the Japanese positions across the
front. The corps also moved forward
more reinforcements in preparation
for another attempt to take the hills.
With Soviet troops now about 500 yards
from the hillcrests and well dug in, they
began to achieve a better look at their
objectives. While bad weather continued
to hamper Soviet aerial operations, their
artillery fire thus became more accurate.
The Japanese positions were pounded
around the clock. The Japanese field
works were being wrecked, and their
casualties were mounting. Gen. Suetaka
again requested reinforcement, and
again his request was denied.
10 & 11 August
During 10 and 11 August the
Soviets conducted numerous small
night attacks on Shaochaofeng and
Changkufeng Hills. Those efforts
failed while suffering heavy casualties;
none reached their hilltop objec-
tives. Due to intense and successful
diplomatic activity, a mutual ceasefire
was announced at noon on 11 August.
Conclusion
Between 29 July and 11 August
the Soviets suffered around 4,500
total casualties, with 96 tanks
disabled or destroyed outright
and seven planes shot down. The
Japanese lost around 1,500 men.
While both sides claimed victory in
their propaganda, the Soviets clearly
lost the campaign. While their military
forces were still strong in the area (with
more coming in as reinforcements),
they hadn’t achieved their objective of
evicting the Japanese from the hills. The
Japanese had conducted a successful
defense, losing far fewer casualties
than their foe, even in the face of Soviet
superiority in artillery, aircraft and tanks.
Soviet troops fought bravely and
were well armed, but their units’ com-
mand-control was poor. Coordination
among infantry, armor and artillery
was lacking. That was exacerbated by
a poor Soviet intelligence appreciation
of the whole battle area. They failed to
conduct any effective reconnaissance
in preparation for their attacks.
While there were lots of Soviet
tanks on hand, they were used poorly
and were only committed as infantry
support. Japanese anti-tank weapons
easily pierced the thin armor of the
T-26 and BT tanks, while many others
were destroyed by close-in Japanese
infantry when the vehicles were left
without protection by Soviet infantry.
Despite the fact almost all Japanese
aircraft then available in China were
concentrated far off to the south for
the Wuhan offensive, the performance
of Soviet airpower was laughable.
While they had air superiority and
constantly attacked the Japanese, most
of their bombs missed their marks
and caused no damage. While some
of that could be blamed on the poor
weather, the Soviets also attempted
to bomb from high altitude, which
severely affected their accuracy.
Soviet artillery, while numerous,
wasn’t accurate. That was at first due to
the gunners being unable to observe
and bracket their targets on the hills.
Even so, the sheer volume of the falling
Soviet artillery shells was so great it awed
the Japanese. As one officer remarked:
“Soviet artillery fired like machineguns,
our own artillery [fired] like rain drops.”
The Japanese fought fanatically and
were well trained and well armed. Their
leadership and inter-unit coordination
was excellent. They also prepared their
defenses well and had excellent battle-
field intelligence. (They’d thoroughly
reconnoitered the area about two weeks
prior to the start of the campaign.)
The Japanese had no tanks on
hand, but had an adequate number of
anti-tank guns. They also had only a
few aircraft. While they were vastly out-
numbered in terms of artillery, Japanese
artillery fire was better-coordinated
and more accurate than that of the
Soviets. The terrain also helped the
Japanese, as the Soviets often had to
advance across open ground clear of all
vegetation. Even so, the great number
of Soviet guns hampered the Japanese,
as they weren’t able to conduct effective
counter-battery fire. Soviet artillery often
managed to pin down Japanese troops
on the hills and limited their mobil-
ity between the hills. With increased
accuracy later in the battle, Soviet
artillery began to attrition the Japanese
and demolish their defensive works.
The Battle of Changkufeng Hill didn’t
have the effect Stalin had sought. In fact,
it not only failed to hamper Japanese
World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011 27
operations in China, it actually dealt
the Red Army an embarrassing defeat.
Most of the Soviet commanders in the
campaign would later be purged, and
it was their poor performance here that
was used as evidence against them. For
the Japanese it was a victory, and most
of their on-scene commanders were
afterward decorated and promoted.
The combat result reinforced the
Japanese high command’s belief in
the overall tactical superiority of their
infantry, while the poor performance of
Soviet tanks particularly enhanced the
view that military mechanization was
an unnecessary Western affectation.
Japanese success in 1938 led directly to
their to willingness to be even bolder
in confronting the Red Army, and that
would lead to a disastrous rematch for
them the next year on the Mongolian
steppes at Khalkin Gol.  ✪
Sources
Coox, Alvin D. The Anatomy of a Small War:
The Soviet Struggle For Changkufeng/Khasan, 1938.
Greenwood Press, 1977.
Glantz, David. Lecture Notes:
Stalin’s Purges, the Spanish Civil war, the Czech Crisis,
Lake Khasan, Retreat From Deep Operations &
Expansion of the Red Army 1937 – 1938.
Seaton, Albert. Men At Arms #29: The Soviet Army.
Osprey, 1972.
Jowett, Philip. Men At Arms #362:
The Japanese Army 1931 – 1945 (1). Osprey, 2002.
28 World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011
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recon battalion
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ort fire will be
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LEVEL II III X XX XXX

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 Hell in a Cold, Small Place:
The Battle of Hatten-Rittershoffen
by Allyn Vannoy

Editor’s Note: Allied units are in
plaintext; German units are in italics.
North Wind
fire from American artillery. By the
afternoon the Americans had been
driven back, but the Germans still
hadn’t penetrated the Maginot Line.
The assault continued during the
valley limited visibility to 100 yards.
On 8 January the German high
command issued new orders. Two days
earlier a separate attack had forced a
bridgehead over the Rhine near the town

T
he plan for Hitler’s winter night of 6/7 January and into the next of Gambsheim, north of Strasbourg.
offensive into Alsace-Lorraine, day, as thick mist across the Rhine From that crossing a westward thrust
Fall Nordwind (Operation North
Wind), called for breaking through
American positions along the old
Maginot Line near Wissembourg with
a panzer kampfgruppe (battlegroup),
and then advancing along the fringe
of the Vosges Mountains in an effort to
link up with the German 19th Army’s
bridgehead on the Rhine to the south
at Colmar, France. At the same time,
five divisions of infantry were to push
through the Vosges directly into the
Rhine valley. One of the units assigned
to exploit any breakthrough was 21st
Panzer Division. After taking heavy
losses in Normandy that division had
received replacements; its armored
strength had been brought up to a
total of 74 Panthers and Mark IVs.
Nordwind made little initial progress
in the snow-covered Vosges; so a pg. 33
new plan was quickly conceived. The
21st Panzer and 25th Panzergrenadier
Divisions, under the commands of Lt.
Gen. Edgar Feuchtinger and Col. Arnold
Burmeister, respectively, were directed
to move east of Wissembourg, break
through the Allied front there, trap the
Americans in that area around the town
of Haguenau, close the outlets across the
Vosges, and thus effectively set the stage
for the German recapture of Strasbourg.
Before that larger move could take place,
however, the German effort was fatally
delayed, in an 11-day close-in fight
of unparalleled savagery and bloody
mayhem, for two otherwise obscure
villages: Hatten and Rittershoffen.

5 – 8 January

On the night of 5/6 January, after

a difficult move over icy and snow-
packed roads, 21st Panzer arrived at
its assembly area near Wissembourg.
The next day the division set off south;
however, before it reached the first
bunkers of the old French fortifications,
it came under fierce and concentrated

30 World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011

was to be made to cut Allied com- rapid succession. The panzer went up Grenadier, but they then found the
munications with Haguenau. The 25th in flames as the American shells ignited southern part of the village fiercely
Panzergrenadier Division was to move its fuel and ammunition. All the panzers defended by American infantry.
west on 9 January, breakthrough the were then quickly knocked out without On the evening of 9 January, even
American lines and advance down the any of them having gotten off a shot. though the attacking German units
eastern slopes of the Vosges. The 21st For the next several hours Woodard’s had achieved only a small breach in
Panzer Division was to assemble on its platoon continued to knock out any the American line, their command
right and move into the breakthrough. German vehicles that ventured into their pressed for a continuation of the
That same day the panzer division was sights, including three more panzers assault. During the night, von Luck’s
reinforced with an assault gun brigade and a self-propelled gun that was blown kampfgruppe, which included the
with some 20 of those vehicles. to bits. The platoon later received a 125th Panzergrenadier Regiment,
In the path of the German attack presidential citation for that day’s action. moved up on the right of the panzer
were units of the American 79th and Meanwhile 2nd Platoon, Company division’s other panzergrenadier
42nd Infantry Divisions. As units of A, was placed southwest of Hatten, regiment, the 192nd. With the failure
the 42nd were driven back during the as Lt. William Kidd of 3rd Platoon, of the 25th Panzergrenadier Division
previous day’s fighting, a portion of Company A, moved north and then to force its way into Rittershoffen,
the 79th became cut off near Hatten- east of Rittershoffen. When his tanks 21st Panzer prepared its own attack
Rittershoffen. The 14th Armored began receiving fire, Kidd spotted an to take the town the next day.
Division, under Brig. Gen. Albert C. enemy anti-tank gun and directed his
Smith, was ordered to restore the gunner to destroy it. His first round fell 10 January
situation. The 14th was composed short. The Germans returned fire, the
of Combat Command A, under Col. round passing under Kidd’s tank. Kidd’s On 10 January elements of 48th
Charles H. Karlstad, with the 48th Tank second round put the gun out of action. Tank Battalion and the 315th Infantry
and 68th Armored Infantry Battalions; In a coordinated assault, Company Regiment, 79th Division, launched an
CCB, under Col. Francis J. Gillespie, with A, 48th Tank, along with elements of the attack to the east to try to restore the
the 25th Tank and 62nd Armored Infantry 242nd Infantry Regiment, 79th Division, main line of resistance. The weather
Battalions; and CCR, under Col. Daniel pushed east on both sides of Hatten. was cold and the ground frozen hard.
H. Hudelson, with the 47th Tank and 19th In the meantime a kampfgruppe from Companies B and C of the 48th led the
Armored Infantry Battalions. The com- 21st Panzer Division under Col. Hans effort. The tanks moved forward on
panies of the division’s 125th Armored von Luck moved forward with the both sides of the railway, but soon ran
Combat Engineer Battalion, under Lt. intention of pushing through Hatten; into murderous anti-tank, artillery
Col. John R. Morrison, were parceled however, several of his panzers struck and small arms fire. Three tanks
out among the combat commands. mines and the advance made little were knocked out. Lt. John A. Stair,
progress. One of von Luck’s battalions Company C, 48th Tank, spotted three
9 January did enter Hatten from the north, where panzers as his Shermans neared the
it relieved elements of 25th Panzer edge of the village. Within minutes
In the early hours of 9 January
the 125th Panzer Battalion of the 25th
Panzergrenadier Division attempted a
double-envelopment of the American
forces in Hatten with 15 Mark IV panzers
on the north side of the town and a
similar group, followed by a company
of mounted panzergrenadiers, to the
south. To stop the Germans the 14th
sent forward Company A of the 48th
Tank Battalion, Troop C of the 94th
Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron
(Mechanized), and 3rd Platoon of
the Assault Gun Troop, 94th Cavalry,
from positions west of the villages.
At 2:20 p.m. Lt. Edgar D. Woodard
of 1st Platoon, Company A, 48th Tank,
was ordered to take his four medium
tanks to a position east of Rittershoffen,
there to blunt the southern arm of the
German pincer. Woodard’s tanks took
up positions in front of the town. They
didn’t have long to wait. Six panzers
moved along the railroad track from
Hatten on Woodard’s left. They appar-
ently didn’t see the Americans, as they
got to within 600 yards when Woodard’s
men opened fire. A Mark IV, leading the
advance, was hit with four rounds in

World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011 31

those panzers were flaming coffins,
but the Germans struck back, knocking
out three of the American tanks.
At the same time Company B, 48th
Tank, moved south and then east over
the flat and treeless landscape between
the villages. Their objective was the
main east-west road that Company A
had cut the first night. As the Shermans
moved, the Germans began laying on
artillery. When one platoon went as far
as the railway, a section of tanks crossed
in line covered by another section.
The 1st Platoon was moving east, to the
south of the tracks, at the same time.
Fire then erupted from the southwest
edge of Hatten and five tanks were hit.
At 5:40 p.m. Company B was ordered
back to the edge of Rittershoffen.
“Screaming Meamies,” — rockets from
multi-barreled launchers — began
to shriek in. That barrage was
used to cover new movement by
German panzers and infantry.
In Rittershoffen the Americans
mounted an attack that struck 2nd
Battalion, 125th Panzergrenadiers, in
the center of the village. In some places
opposing vehicles were only 20 yards
apart. In other places only the floor of
a house separated antagonists. House-
to-house fighting raged. Both sides used
artillery non-stop as well as flamethrow-
ers. Almost all the buildings were in
ruins. Burning houses lit the night sky
and the streets were littered with bodies.
of Rittershoffen. There the Germans
opened up with a mortar and artillery
barrage. Then small arms fire slashed
across the ground at knee-level.
By nightfall the 68th had pushed
to a line approximately 500 yards
northeast of Rittershoffen. During
the night, patrols from Company
C contacted the 315th informing
them relief would be coming in the
morning. As dawn approached, the
weather was cold with a freezing mist.
Company A, 68th, was to lay down
protective fire while Companies A
and C, 48th Tank, drove forward.
The attack progressed slowly against
small arms, automatic weapon and artil-
lery fire. The nearby German positions
had been stiffened by tanks and assault
guns. Company C gained the houses
on the south side of the village, then
Company A, after being bogged down
Photos of the battle area taken the previous autumn
by artillery and small arms fire, moved
forward. Tank-and-infantry teams pro-
vided mutual protection as they inched
along the streets. The infantry moved
beside the vehicles, running and dodg-
ing from building to building, throwing
grenades into cellar windows, moving
through each structure room by room.
Retreating Germans set fire to each
building before pulling back from it.
In the meantime the balance of 48th
Tank Battalion also made another attack
into Rittershoffen from the south with
infantry of Company B, 68th, attached.
At the end of the day’s fighting,
elements of CCA held about half of
Rittershoffen. Positions were consoli-
dated and preparations were made to
continue the attack the next day.
While the fighting in Rittershoffen
was in progress, CCB of 14th
Armored Division moved out from

11 – 12 January

On the morning of 11 January,

at about 6:30, the positions in
Rittershoffen of Company C, 48th
Tank, were attacked by a company
of German panzers and 300 infantry
after a heavy artillery barrage. The
Shermans fought back, repelling the
attack, but not without losses: five were
put out of action. The 1st Platoon was
down to two tanks; the 2nd had only
one left and the 3rd had just three. The
company was ordered to pull back.
That same day the 68th Armored
Infantry Battalion moved up from
assembly areas two miles west of
Rittershoffen. At 3:45 p.m. the 68th
was ordered to attack in order to
relieve the pressure on 3rd Battalion,
315th Infantry. The assault jumped
off with two platoons of Company
A on the left; Company C was on
the right while a platoon of the
125th Engineers stood in reserve.
The tanks ground slowly forward.
All went well until they began to move
through an orchard on the west edge

32 World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011

Woerth‑Biblisheim-Gunstett, 11 miles
west of Rittershoffen, and launched
an attack at 11:30 a.m. That effort
was intended, first, to secure the area
west of Hatten and Rittershoffen.
Once the lead units had secured an
opening, the trailing units were to
pass through it and seize the ground
northeast of Hatten. Companies A
and C, 62nd, along with Company C
of the 25th, led the assault. The 1st and
2nd Platoons, Company A, advanced
with the anti-tank platoon following at
about 700 yards. The rest of the 25th and
Company B, 62nd, followed at 500 yards.
The lead elements managed to
advance 1,000 yards beyond their
line of departure. The GIs, in olive
drab uniforms, stood out against the
snow-covered fields. The Germans
waited until the Americans were in
the open and then opened fire, stop-
ping the attack cold. The companies
began to fall back. The commander
of Company A, Capt. Daniel Iannella,
was lost along with 70 of his men.
Many of the men of Company
C, 62nd, took up a position in a ditch
and began to dig in. The 1st Platoon
radioed the company commander, Capt.
Howard Trammell, to report they were
receiving heavy artillery fire. Trammell
could only advise them to dig deeper.
He was unable to contact the battalion
command post, even as his unit was
being torn to pieces. He therefore
ordered his command to fall back,
bringing along the men of Company A.
Company C, 25th, also ran into trou-
ble. Artillery and mortar fire began to
fall around their tanks, where they were
situated on the reverse slope of a small
ridge north of Rittershoffen. Lt. Fred H.
Gisse, 2nd Platoon’s leader, moved over
the crest of the ridge and started down
the slope toward Rittershoffen. His tank
received three direct hits and started to
burn. Staff Sgt. James E. Knight brought
his tank over the top of the ridge
and was also hit. Knight was killed
instantly as his tank burst into flames.
Company B, 25th, was ordered to
pass through Company C, but ran into
vicious fire. The Company B tanks pulled
back and then moved to skirt the ridge.
Once more, however, as soon as they hit
exposed ground, artillery and anti-tank
fire fell on them. After three tanks were
hit, orders were issued to pull back.
13 – 14 January
By the morning 13 January the
entire 14th Armored Division had been
committed to the confused fight; all
three of its combat commands were
engaged along with two infantry
battalions of 79th Infantry Division.
Companies A and B, 62nd, took
up a defensive line along the reverse
World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011 33
slope of a ridge near Rittershoffen.
The 1st and 2nd Platoons, Company
B, tied in with Company A and the
68th Armored Infantry, while the 3rd
and Anti-Tank Platoons remained to
the west. Arrangements were made
to rotate personnel off the line every
eight hours in order to keep the men
from freezing in their foxholes.
The Germans held most of
Hatten, and a battalion from 79th
Infantry Division was cut off at
its western end. Elements of 25th
Panzergrenadier Division had also
become bogged down in Rittershoffen.
CCR prepared to attack. The plan was
to establish a new line east of Hatten,
advancing with 47th Tank on the left and
19th Infantry on the right. CCA was to
clear Rittershoffen while CCB remained
in reserve. Artillery was to shell Hatten
and mask Rittershoffen with smoke.
Capt. Harold D. Persky, commander
of Company C, 47th Tank Battalion,
directed the attack. The 3rd Platoon,
under 2nd Lt. Seth Sprague, Jr., was
attached to 19th Infantry. Company A,
under Capt. Richard A. Tharpe, was to
provide support along with a platoon
of assault guns under Lt. Robert C.
Harper. In reserve were the light tanks of
Company D under Capt. Henry P. Tilden.
The units set out at 8:00 a.m. The 19th
Infantry was on the south side of the
railway with Company A on the left, B
on the right, and C in reserve. Attached
to Company A was a three-tank section
of Company C, 47th Tank. Company B
had two tanks from the 47th. Assault
guns, under Lt. Robert C. Harper,
provided support by laying fire on the
railroad station just south of Hatten.
The battalion’s machinegun and mortar
platoons provided further support.
With smoke cover, Companies A and
B, 19th, moved across the flat ground.
Slow but steady progress was made
until they got to within 300 yards of
the southern edge of Hatten, where a
devastating hail of automatic weapons
fire stopped them. Tanks were called
up to engage the enemy, but three of
them were soon knocked out. Company
C, coming up, was caught in a barrage.
As casualties mounted, the companies
were unable to move forward. They
were ordered to withdraw at 10:55 a.m.
At 8:00 a.m. CCA launched an attack
to clear Rittershoffen. That push made
slow house-to-house progress, knocking
out two panzers in the process. After
laying a smoke screen on the southeast
edge of Rittershoffen, elements of
48th Tank advanced to a church in the
eastern part of the town. Seven tanks
reached a point midway between
Rittershoffen and Hatten, cutting the
road there. A supporting attack by 3rd
Battalion, 315th Infantry, made little
progress against heavy resistance.
The Germans then counterattacked
with infantry and flame-throwing tanks
west out of Hatten. CCA responded
by calling on every available artillery
unit to meet the attack. The sup-
porting artillery battalions fired an
estimated 23,000 rounds, repulsing
the Germans by midnight. Soldiers of
Company C, 68th, moved into cellars
in Rittershoffen. The records of the
125th Engineer’s described the scene:
[There was] shouting and stifled screams
and the identifying ‘brrrrrrrp! brrrrrrrp!’
of Jerry guns, the steady cracking of
machineguns and small arms fire
coming from the windows, crevices, the
church steeple and the deep rumble of
tanks. Some tanks no longer moved,
black hulks among the charred ruins of
homes. White phosphorous shells burst
in the streets, with sudden yellow flames
and smoke pouring from half-timber
dwellings. Buildings that only smoked
because there was nothing more to burn
made the town look like a ghost town,
and still the shells came in. The mortars
never gave a warning, endlessly plopped
in, scattering mortar and rubble. There
was the catching voice, crying “Medic!”
The surrounding fields no longer had a
mantle of clear white snow, it was stained
with soot from powder, pock-marked
with shell craters and soiled with blood.
Companies B and C, 25th Tank,
conducted support operations
firing on enemy positions, while 3rd
Platoon, Company C, moved to cut
the roads leading out of Hatten. Sgt.
Phillip R. Ternan spotted two tanks.
Before he could fire on them his own
tank was hit, killing the commander
while wounding him and another
crewman. Sgt. Felix J. Neff’s Sherman
knocked out the enemy vehicles, a
Panther and a self-propelled gun, as
Ternan got down on the ground, still
exposed to fire. Sgt. William J. O’Brien
dismounted his tank and worked his
way to Ternan. In trying to get Ternan
to safety, however, O’Brien was killed.
In the meantime, Lt. Robert
Chrisman tried to move forward his
tank platoon. The Germans waited
until the Americans were in the open,
then laid on heavy fire. One tank was
put out of action, but three panzers
were knocked out in return. Company
C then pulled back behind a ridge.
34 World at War 18
The GIs endured freezing
temperatures in their tanks and
foxholes. Company A suffered so many
cases of frostbite and trench foot
that Company C had to relieve it.
The dug-in 62nd Armored Infantry
held open a route between Rittershoffen
and Hatten. Company B was continually
pounded by German artillery. Platoons
were down to half-strength. Then word
came that regular infantry were to be
used for that task instead of the armored
infantrymen. The men of Company B
watched with relief as the “stand-in”
force moved through, supported by
tanks. No sooner had those infantrymen
disappeared over the rise of ground
to their front than the crescendo of
shelling increased. The infantrymen
soon began to drift back to Company
B’s lines. The move had failed.
Lt. Robert L. Palecek, an artillery
observer with the 499th Armored Field
Artillery Battalion, spotted men pinned
down by murderous fire, but his radio
failed; so he crawled several hundred
yards across open terrain to get to
another working radio. He had a smoke
screen laid down, enabling the infantry
to pull back. Palecek was killed later
in an exchange of fire near Hatten.
CCR was then brought back into
action. Company C, 47th Tank, had
moved into positions from which they
could fire into Hatten. Two platoons
of Company A, 47th Tank, in support,
advanced east and then turned north.
They encountered anti-tank fire from
the south edge of Hatten and from posi-
tions to the east. Lt. Francis E. Marshall,
3rd Platoon, Company B, reported the
location of the German guns to his
artillery and watched the shells land.
The bursts seemed to knock out the
guns, but after a few minutes they
opened up again. Two tanks were lost
as Company A made it into the village.
During the afternoon, 19th Armored
Infantry was ordered into Hatten to
reinforce 3rd Battalion, 315th Infantry,
in the western end of the town. After
dark, Company A climbed on the back
of the tanks and headed for the village
with Companies B and C set to follow
as rapidly as possible. The battalion’s
mortar, assault gun, machinegun
and reconnaissance platoons were
to establish a line from the railroad
to some woods off to the south.
As the battalion started across the
open fields north of the railroad tracks,
heading for the west end of Hatten,
they came under small arms, mortar
and artillery fire. Many casualties were
sustained, including the commander
| JUN–JUL 2011
of Company C, Lt. Joseph M. Murphy,
who was wounded. He was replaced
by Lt. Richard M. Young. The tanks
dropped the infantrymen near the
town’s edge. A reconnaissance party was
sent forward to contact friendly troops
and let them know the 19th was in the
area. The companies then moved in for
the night, occupying buildings where
the men of the 315th had been hold up.
Just before dusk, Capt. Tilden,
Company D, led his light tanks across
the open fields near the railroad station
carrying infantry to the outskirts of
Hatten. The Stuarts of 2nd Platoon
did yeoman service, also bringing
up ammunition and supplies.
CCR continued the attack the next
morning. At 11:00 a.m. Company A, 19th
Armored Infantry, supported by two
medium tanks of 47th Tank Battalion,
moved along the road from the west
end of the village. Company E, 315th,
moved east and then north toward
the junction with a road leading north
out of town. The men of Company A,
harassed by mortar and artillery fire,
reached the road and began fighting
their way along it. They ran into intense
small arms, sniper, anti-tank and
tank fire. Houses were assaulted and
taken using bazookas to blast holes in
the walls, clearing rooms with hand
grenades while “mouse-holing” from
house to house. The two M4s fired
their main guns into the houses and
sprayed the streets with machinegun
fire. When a panzer was encountered,
infantrymen used grenades and
bazookas to put it out of action.
Under heavy fire, the attack
progressed slowly. The two companies
of infantrymen made continued
progress down the street until dark.
The Germans fought back, launching a
counterattack with tanks and infantry.
By evening, 2nd Platoon, Company C of
the 19th and the remnants of Company
A, were still hanging on in Hatten.
The remainder of Company C took
up positions in the field just outside
Rittershoffen, along with Company D.
15 & 16 January
At 6:00 a.m. on 15 January, Company
E, 315th Infantry, was ordered to attack
through Company C of the 19th Armored
Infantry. At 8:15 a.m. Company E
advanced to Company C’s position,
where E’s officers were informed of the
situation and cautioned to stay close
to the protection of the buildings. The
315th men moved along the street for
about 50 yards, where they ran into
machineguns and flamethrowers. Taking
heavy casualties, they withdrew under
the supporting fire of Company C.
The battalion commander next
ordered Company C to retake the
ground that had been lost the night
before. With reluctance and resent-
ment, the GIs of Company C moved
out. Taking advantage of the cover
available, 1st and 3rd Platoons attacked
while the 2nd and Anti-Tank Platoons
provided covering fire. The infantrymen
rooted out the enemy and recaptured
the objective — a cluster of ruined
buildings — without loss. Half an hour
later the Germans again counterattacked
and again drove back the Americans.
Ammunition and supplies were
running low. The Americans had a
small supply dump on the west edge of
Hatten, but they could only replenish
themselves by making nighttime supply
runs. The Germans also found they
could only re-supply their units after
dark, and then only by using armored
vehicles — von Luck’s 1st Battalion
removed wounded and brought
in provisions and ammunition.
It was estimated as many as 60
German artillery batteries were within
range of Hatten. The Germans used every
tactical trick they knew, even firing a few
rounds on the GIs when American artil-
lery was barraging, so those men would
think friendly fire was falling short.
Meanwhile the 47th received orders
the attack was to continue, with infantry
supported by tanks, in the west end of
the village driving east to clear it. That
fighting was bitter, but little headway
was made and stalemate again ensued.
On the afternoon of the 15th the 19th
Armored Infantry received orders to
launch an attack along the main street
of Hatten in order move to the east end
48th Tank Battalion, 14th Armored Division,
outside of Rittershoffen, January 1945
of the village and there meet elements
of the 47th coming from the south.
Company C was to lead the attack, with
two medium tanks of the 47th providing
support. As the company attempted
to assemble, a mortar barrage came
in across the area, causing the troops
to take cover. Two more attempts to
organize for the assault were made, each
coming under similar disruptive fire.
Each time the GIs moved onto the street,
mortar fire scattered them. Then one
of the supporting tanks was knocked
out, blocking the street. Finally, without
tank support, the infantry moved
down the street to the first intersection.
There 3rd Platoon was forced to fall
back after running into heavy fire.
In order to strengthen the infantry,
Troop A, 94th Recon Squadron, was
dismounted and sent into Hatten
to reinforce the 19th. Before those
cavalry troopers could make the link-
up, however, they were caught by yet
another counterattack. Also on the 15th,
1st Platoon, Company C, 47th Tank, and
the one remaining tank of 2nd Platoon,
were brought up to fire into the village.
That same day the 125th Engineers
were ordered to lay a minefield, the
largest they would ever build during
the war, across the entire division front.
In biting wind and drifting snow, the
engineers worked through the night.
Company B placed approximately
1,900 mines; Company C, laid 2,000
mines, and Company A nearly 2,300.
One man carrying four mines stumbled
and fell: the resulting explosion killed
him instantly and wounded two others.
Some mines were laid within 200 yards
of German positions. The engineers
also prepared bridges for demolition,
notched trees and placed blocks of TNT
in them to blow them down in order to
World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011 35
block the roads. They also laid barbed
wire in front of infantry positions. It
was apparent 14th Armored Division
was shifting over to the defense.
Despite the change in strategy,
however, that night plans were made to
again attack Hatten from the west and
south. The new effort developed into an
inferno. Company C’s Capt. Persky, 47th
Tank Battalion, attacked the southern
edge of the town with all its remaining
tanks but without supporting infantry. At
dusk, with visibility poor due to smoke
from fires, Persky’s Shermans penetrated
two blocks while losing three of their
number. Persky was wounded. The com-
pany was a shadow of its former self: 1st
and 2nd Platoons each had just one tank.
On the morning of 16 January,
Company C, 19th Armored Infantry,
continued its assault, using bazookas
in an effort to advance against tank
fire, automatic weapons, small
arms and snipers. By 1:00 p.m.
the company had spent itself.
17 January
On 17 January it snowed heavily,
reducing visibility to 100 yards. At dawn
the Americans again launched assaults
on Rittershoffen and Hatten with
tanks and infantry supported by heavy
artillery fire. The fighting shifted back
and forth. In Rittershoffen, members
of the regimental and battalion staffs
of 25th Panzergrenadier Division were
captured. Using men from an attached
parachute battalion and the panzer
division’s reconnaissance battalion,
the Germans then counterattacked
and freed those men while in turn
taking prisoner over 80 Americans.
The 47th Battalion, less Company A,
then launched another attack. Company
B’s 1st Platoon moved to the southeast of
Hatten in an effort to relieve pressure on
the troops there. As the M4s crept along
the wood line, they passed the light tanks
of Company D dispersed to provide
harassing fire on the town. Those Stuarts
were ordered out of the woods and told
to begin moving toward Hatten. They
fired as they passed a graveyard where
some Germans were hold up. A number
of the vehicles were hit. Sgt. William C.
Summers, Company C, saw one of the
light tanks take a hit and moved to help
its crew. He dismounted and helped
evacuate them. While under small arms,
mortar and artillery fire, he treated the
driver and loaded the wounded onto
his tank and managed to get away.
Meanwhile the mediums were also
36 World at War 18
having trouble. Lt. John Perkins’ tank was
hit and set on fire. As he climbed to the
rear deck and attempted to extinguish
the flames, he was killed and then the
rest of the tanks were ordered to fall back.
At 8:00 a.m. Company A, 19th, began
receiving heavy small arms fire from the
east. Fifty minutes later the fire turned
into a full-blown assault, with German
troops moving against Company C as
well. That company was forced back, but
a combination of US artillery, mortar,
small arms and bazooka fire in turn
brought the German attack to a halt.
A section of 2nd Platoon, Company
B, 48th Tank, was assigned the mission
of supporting an attack by an infantry
company. The lead tank of Sgt. Leonard
Sutherland was hit by an anti-tank
| JUN–JUL 2011
rocket, killing the gunner and wounding
two other crewmen. The knocked out
tank blocked the road, preventing the
other from advancing. Moving it proved
an ordeal. Sgt. Harry Hockensmith
and another man mounted the
damaged vehicle, started it up, then
managed to get it to the edge of town.
Command then ordered a number
of changes in the deployment. During
the night the Assault Gun Platoon, 47th
Tank, moved up and set up outposts
across the open ground between the bat-
talion headquarters and Rittershoffen.
Company B replaced Company C on the
eastern perimeter, with C then moving
to take position on the southern flank.
In the meantime the panzer
commander, Col. von Luck, had
become disillusioned with the entire
engagement. After eight days of intense
combat, he wasn’t sure whether he
was being ordered to continue to fight
“for prestige or tactical significance.”
He would later write: “In Hatten and
Rittershoffen we were hopelessly bogged
down. Artillery duels on a colossal scale
took place every day, heavier than we
had ever experienced in Normandy.”
18 – 20 January
The 18th was relatively quiet, though
toward dusk German paratroopers
and members of 2nd Battalion, 125th
Panzergrenadier, were involved in a short
but bitter fight inside Rittershoffen.
During the night German Army
Group G headquarters sent new orders
for an attack on 19 January, to be
launched south of the Haguenau Forest
with panzer and paratroop reinforce-
ments sent from the Rhine bridgehead
at Gambsheim. The 21st Panzer Division
was also to have been detailed for the
effort, but it proved impossible to dis-
engage it from the Hatten-Rittershoffen
area. The two German divisions that had
been fighting in Hatten-Rittershoffen
were effectively burned out, and so
were instructed to conduct feints
in order to keep the American force
there tied down. The goal of the larger
operation was to push past Haguenau
to the west and then surround all the
Americans north of the Moder River.
At 7:20 a.m. on 19 January a sudden
barrage of artillery, mortar and tank fire
hit 19th Armored Infantry’s positions.
Several buildings simply crumbled.
The battalion command post suffered
eight direct hits. The bombardment
was continuous until 9:00 a.m.
Little in the way of additional
damage was done to Hatten in general,

since it had already been reduced to
rubble. Each incoming shell made
it rain shrapnel, timbers, stones and
other debris. When the noise of the
shelling subsided, it was replaced
by the sound of crying civilians and
the moans of wounded soldiers.
Immediately after the German
artillery lifted, a Panther, supported
by some infantry, began to move west
on the main street of Hatten. At the
same time another Panther prepared to
flank the American position from the
southeast. The American outposts were
at first pushed back, but those troops
then held as Staff Sgt. David Mathias,
Company B, 47th Tank, brought forward
his Sherman, firing at the advancing
Germans and preventing them from
moving farther along the main street.
The Panther to the south of town
worked its way into an orchard and then ordered to pull south of the Moder River.
toward a barn where some American
infantry were hold up. Using its main
gun, it fired directly into the barn. The the GIs of the US 14th Armored Division,
Americans inside scattered. The Panther, along with elements of the 79th and 42nd
by then only 35 yards from the barn,
fired another round that set the building struggle for two villages neither side had
on fire. When artillery began to fall
again, however, the Panther withdrew.
As night fell, 19th Armored Infantry German mechanized divisions, units
was nearing the end of its strength.
Not only had casualties been heavy,
the men were exhausted. Ammunition
was also running critically low. Even
so, bloody, chaotic and back-and-
forth fighting continued with no
significant gains by either side.
CCA, meanwhile, had been continu-
ing to fight inside Rittershoffen. There
the 68th launched an attack employing
tank-infantry teams supported by
artillery, assault guns and mortars.
In house-to-house fighting the unit
met stubborn resistance. The 68th
did manage to clear a small patch
of woods just outside the village.
During the night a German patrol,
clad in American uniforms, penetrated to 14th Armored Division fought one of the
a cellar occupied by Lt. Charles F. Bailey greatest defensive battles of the war.”
and part of his platoon. The Germans
killed the guard on duty and then called
into the cellar, inquiring as to whether
there were any Americans inside. That
query was almost immediately followed
by a hail of German submachinegun
fire and grenades. Bailey was wounded,
but his men fought back, eventually
entirely wiping out the German patrol.
In the meantime the 48th was
assigned the mission of using tank
fire to cut the Hatten-Rittershoffen
road while also detaching five of its
mediums to 3rd Battalion, 315th Infantry,
to support yet another attack inside
Proud
Rittershoffen. Like so many times
before, the Germans fought back
fiercely, launching their own immediate
counterattack. That engagement lasted
for two hours before both sides broke off.
During the evening, advance
Monster
parties of the 47th Volksgrenadier
Division arrived to relieve the German
units in and around the two villages,
allowing the reduced elements of 25th
Panzergrenadier Division to pull out. The
next day passed relatively quietly, with
little action on the part of either party. deluxe
Conclusion
On the morning of 21 January a
strange calm lay over the remains of the
two villages. The Germans soon learned
the Americans had evacuated during the
night: 14th Armored Division had been
For 11 days the German 21st Panzer
and 25th Panzergrenadier Divisions and
Infantry Divisions, had been locked in a
been willing to abandon. The American
infantry and tankers had held up two
that had been intended to swiftly break
through the Allied line. Those spearhead
units were heavily worn down while US
7th Army reorganized and formed a new
line to the south. The time bought during
the fighting at Hatten-Rittershoffen Experience the vastness of
was crucial to bringing on the eventual Russia in this broad sweeping
overall defeat of Fall Nordwind. treatment of the War in Russia.
From 13 through 20 January, the 14th
Armored Division’s losses amounted This is a redesigned and
to 104 killed, 899 wounded and 112 developed edition of the original
missing. Material losses totaled 39
Proud Monster and Death and
tanks, five halftracks, an armored car, six
57mm guns and two 105mm howitzers.
Destruction, originally published
Gen. Jacob Devers, commander of the in Command Magazine.
Allied 6th Army Group, declared after the
action: “At Hatten and Rittershoffen the Both games have been
retooled to work seamlessly
as one monster game.
In a few weeks the Allies regained all
Coming
the lost ground and prepared to launch
their final drive into Germany.  ✪
SpRing 2011
Sources
Burke, Col. Martin J. Memoirs of a Liberator:
Anecdotes of the 14 Armored Division.
th
Self-published, 1988. Visit
Burke, Martin J., Jr. Letter to the author of 23 February 1996.
Carter, Capt. Joseph. The History of the 14 Armored Division.
th
www.compassgames.com
14 Armored Division Assoc., 1977.
th
Kurtz, Col. Maurice K. Field Artillery in the Battle of Hatten- noW to order this game.
Rittershoffen. Headquarters, 14 Armored Division
th
Artillery Records, 15 February 1945.
Laffan, Vincent. Letter to the author of 2 August 1995.
Von Luck, Col. Hans. Panzer Commander.
Dell, New York, 1991.
World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011 37
The Conquerors
The Macedonians
Alexander in Persia, 334−331 BC
In the Spring of 334 B.C., young king
Alexander of Macedon with an army
40,000 strong, set out to fulfill the
centuries old dream of his countrymen
by launching the invasion of the Persian
Empire, the largest and most powerful
empire in the Mediterranean world.
The Romans
Mediterranean Expansion, 200−189 BC
A century and a half later, the Roman
Republic was just emerging from its 2nd
and most debilitating conflict with the
Mediterranean trading power — Carthage.
Philip V was on the throne of Macedon,
and his interventions in Greek politics
would soon draw Rome’s response
and eventual advance to become an
Eastern Mediterranean power.
Even after several years of conflict with
Philip, Rome would not rest. Rome found
herself again involved in an immense con-
flict — this time in Asia. The great Seleucid
King, Antiochus, threatened the very exis-
tence of Rome’s two key allies — Rhodes
and Pergamum — and threatened to
march into Europe itself on a mission of
conquest. Thus began the Syrian War.
The Conquerors is a double game
that covers both of these theatres of
conquest at a grand strategic level.
Each game in this Twin-Pack has its
own counters, rules and game map.
However, the rules of both games are
based upon the same system so that
having played one it is quite simple
to play the other. Also introduced is
an optional Tactical Battle System.
Game components include:
Two large rules books; two large
playing maps, 1,200 die-cut counters;
plus numerous player aids.
Battle for Stalingrad
In the autumn of 1942, 14 German
divisions of the Sixth Army and Fourth
Panzer Army were poised to attack
the vital city of Stalingrad. Facing the
German forces were dozens of divi-
sions and brigades of the Soviet 62nd
army. For seven weeks the Germans
would hammer at the city in a seesaw
conflict for control of the Volga River.
Battle for Stalingrad simulates the cam-
paign that would halt the German drive to
the east in the Soviet Union. The playing
map represents the terrain in and around
Stalingrad, and the colorful cardboard
playing pieces reflect the sizes and
strengths of the opposing military units.
Battle for Stalingrad is a classic game
design by noted game designer John Hill.
Game components include:
Two rule booklets (standard and optional),
600 die cut cardboard playing pieces, one
22 x 34 inch map and various player aids.

A Mighty Fortress
Between 1531 and 1555 the world
shook to the reverberations of a
struggle whose resolution was to
chart the course of Europe’s religious
and political alliances for centuries. It
was in these years that the conflicting
ideologies of Lutheran Reformation
and Catholic Counter-Reformation
inexorably drew the disparate empires,
nations, and leaders of Europe into a
maelstrom of religious war and dispute.
A Mighty Fortress simulates this major
historical conflict on a beautifully illustrat-
ed political map of Europe. Colorful card-
board playing pieces move, position. And
engage in battle upon this map through
a superimposed hexagonal grid, which
functions like a chessboard’s squares.
Game components include:
One rules booklet, 200 die cut
playing pieces, one 22 x 34 inch
map and various player aids.
Classic
History
Classic
Games
Ancient Conquest
Ancient Conquest is a classic and highly
rated multiplayer game covering at a
grand strategic level the rise and fall of
empires and peoples in the ancient near
east. Ancient Assyria, Egypt, Babylon
and the Hittites are all included, as
well as numerous other powers.
Historically, a highly accurate game,
while yet designed with elegantly
simple game mechanics; Ancient
Conquest is sure to be a favorite. A
must for any game enthusiast.
Game components include:
Full color rule booklet, one map and 200
die cut counters and numerous charts.
Coming in 2011
available from:
Decision Games
(661) 587-9633 | (661) 587-5031 fax
P.O. Box 21598 | Bakersfield CA 93390
decisiongames.com
The Soviet Air Force in World War II:
1941-45
by Joseph Miranda

O
n 22 June 1941 Nazi Germany
invaded the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Air Force (Voyenno
Vozdushnye Sily or VVS) was unprepared.
While it had almost 10,000 aircraft,
many were obsolete. Further, the VVS
command system was disorganized,
its logistics inadequate, and its
crews not trained for the type of war
being fought. Even so, just two years
later, Soviet airpower was able to seize
control of the skies over Russia and
lead the way in the drive on Berlin.
The Germans drove east all during
the summer and autumn of 1941, with
the Luftwaffe ruling the skies overhead.
The VVS adapted to that reality of
German air supremacy by looking to
its own strengths. One of them was in
its reserves. There were 10,000 trained
Soviet pilots. While they weren’t trained
to Luftwaffe standards, they were
nevertheless a large and functioning
cadre around which a potent air force
could eventually be built. There was
also a Soviet civil air fleet that provided
additional aircrew and aircraft, the
latter for transport and training.
Behind all that was the immense
Soviet industrial system. While Axis
armies were overrunning much of west-
ern Russia and the Ukraine, the Soviets
were gearing up production complexes
on both sides of the Ural Mountains.
Moreover, much factory equipment
was evacuated from the west to be
reestablished in factories in the east.
Another advantage the Soviets had
was in POL (petroleum, oil, lubricants).
That came from their oilfields,
notably in the Caucasus, as well as
from the reserves controlled by their
new allies, the British in the Middle
East and the US in North America. In
contrast, Germany and its partners
were operating on a slender reserve
of petroleum production, one that
later in the war proved inadequate
to fully support their armed forces.
The Soviet Union also had a strategic
advantage in that it was fighting a single
front war. Its airpower could therefore
be concentrated against the Germans.
The Luftwaffe was fighting not only on
the eastern front; it was also conduct-
ing campaigns in the Mediterranean
and over the Atlantic. Further, as the
Anglo-American strategic bombing
campaign began in earnest in 1943,
another aerial front, that one in the
skies above Germany itself, also drew
away Luftwaffe strength from the east.
Just as critically, the VVS was fighting
only a single kind of air war, one in
support of its nation’s ground force.
Unlike the British and American Air
Forces, there was no need to create
separate tactical, strategic and naval
branches. Production and training
could remain concentrated.
In 1941, however, all that still lay in
the future. To deal with the situation
as it was then, the VVS implemented
emergency reforms. One was to disperse
aircraft to as many fields as possible
and then camouflage them. Maskirova
(deception) measures became a major
part of passive ground defense in
order to avoid a repeat of the disaster
that had taken place at the opening
of Operation Barbarossa, when the
Luftwaffe caught the VVS on the
ground and destroyed its aircraft by the
thousands. An air warning system was
set up to alert interceptor squadrons
and get them in the air before attackers
struck. Air regiments were reduced to
holding a smaller number of aircraft,
making such units easier to manage.
The VVS was thus prepared for
a minor comeback as the Germans
launched their final lunge toward
Moscow in late 1941. By the first

Comparative Aircraft Specifications

Model Type Date in Speed Range Ceiling Armament Payload

service (mph) (miles) (feet) (cannon in mm + machineguns) (lbs bombs + rockets)
Soviet
I-16 Fighter 1934 326 435 31,825 2 x 20mm, 2 x mg 1102
Yak-1 Fighter 1940 360 530 32,810 1 x 20mm, 2 x mg 440 or 6 x rockets
La-5FN Fighter 1941 400 475 31.100 2 x 20mm 440
Yak-3 Fighter 1943 405 560 35,430 1 x 20mm, 2 x mg —
Pe-2 Dive bomber 1941 335 930 29,000 3 x mg 2650
Il-2m3 Ground attack 1942 250 475 19,700 2 x 23mm, 3 x mg 1320 or 8 x rockets
Sturmovik
IL-4 DB-3F Bomber 1940 270 2350 31,800 4 x mg 5500
Tu-25 Bomber 1944 340 1240 31,200 2 x 20mm, 3 x mg 6600
German
Me-109F Fighter 1941 373 547 36,089 1 x 20mm, 2 x mg —
FW-190 A-9 Fighter 1943 400 495 33,800 4 x 20mm, 2 x mg —
Ju-87 D-1 Dive bomber 1941 255 950 23,900 3 x mg 4000
Stuka
Hs-129B Ground attack 1943 250 430 29,500 1 x 37mm + 2 x 20mm, 2 x mgs 770
Ju-88 A-4 Bomber 1940 290 1700 26,900 5 x mg 7900

40 World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011

week of December their spearheads the ground force; the latter could keep in touch with current combat
were approaching the outskirts of the be committed in bulk anywhere in conditions. Mock air battles were staged
Soviet capital city, but that was as far order to concentrate airpower. to ensure formations didn’t fragment
as they got before the Red Army threw Each Red Army Front (equivalent when coming into contact with the
them back. The Soviets mustered to an army group) was henceforth enemy. Meanwhile Soviet industry was
every available aircraft to defend supported by at least one corresponding turning out new and better aircraft on
Moscow, approximately 1,200. Air Army. The air army commander its assembly lines, and a new logistics
By that time in the campaign the became the chief airpower advisor to system was also becoming better at
Luftwaffe was coming to the end of his front commander. Together, both keeping them flying. The shortfalls of
its capacities. German industry could were responsible for coordinating the prior year were effectively addressed
no longer produce sufficient aircraft planning and establishing joint and remedied, or so it appeared.
to replace losses; spare parts were army-air force command posts. On 28 June 1942 the Germans
running low and Luftwaffe schools Training became more realistic. launched their second summer
couldn’t train enough pilots to keep Experienced pilots and aircrew were offensive against the USSR, this time
up with attrition. Operational rates given roving assignments to lecture on toward the Caucasus oilfields and
for German aircraft were reduced their experiences in combat. Training the city of Stalingrad. The VVS thus
to almost 50 percent, meaning only officers were rotated to air units on had to face a major new challenge.
about half could fly on any given day. the front in order to enable them to
The Germans could therefore put
up only about 500 aircraft to support
one of the most decisive battles of the
war. Making matters worse was the
extreme cold, which made it difficult
simply to start aircraft engines. The
weather and atrocious road conditions
also rendered many Luftwaffe trucks
unusable, making proper airfield sup-
port operations impossible. Exhausted,
the Germans came to a halt on both
the ground and in the air. They dug in
and held on grimly as the Soviet winter
counteroffensive ran its course.

Enter Novikov

In April 1942 Marshal Alexander

A. Novikov was put in place by Stalin
as overall Soviet air force commander.
He immediately began implementing
further reforms. Command-control
issues were addressed. He divided Soviet
airpower into two general echelons:
Frontal and STAVKA Reserves. The
former provided direct support to

World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011 41

Stalingrad
On 19 November 1942 the Red Army
launched Operation Uranus, the envel-
opment of the Axis forces in and around
Stalingrad. Hitler ordered Sixth Army
to hold on at all costs inside the newly
formed pocket, while forces under Field
Marshal Erich von Manstein assembled
for a relief operation. The Luftwaffe
became involved when Hermann
Goering committed an armada of air
transports to supply the beleaguered
city. Novikov was ready, however, setting
up what he termed an “air blockade.” He
created four air zones around Stalingrad
in which to interdict the flow of
transports while also attacking German
airfields. Fierce air battles raged.
The blockade had good effect in
slowing down the resupply effort,
but in the end it was the Red Army
that stopped Manstein’s relief effort,
thereby dooming Sixth Army. Soviet
ground forces also took the critical
airfields on which the German resupply
effort was based. VVS performance,
while improved over that of 1941,
still showed deficiencies.
Upon analysis, Novikov found faulty
tactics were primarily to blame. VVS
fighter pilots tended to want to attack
Axis fighters, thereby letting enemy
42 World at War 18
transports and bombers get through.
While there was more glory in taking
on fighters, that hadn’t accomplished
the mission of fully interdicting the
airlift in and out of the Stalingrad
pocket. Nonetheless, Luftwaffe losses
at Stalingrad were large enough — on
top of further losses suffered while
supporting Field Marshal Erwin
Rommel’s last-stand campaign in
Tunisia — as to cripple its air transport
branch for the remainder of the war.
1943: Kuban & Kursk
With the encirclement of Sixth
Army at Stalingrad, the Axis position
in the Caucasus became untenable.
The Germans there fell back, but still
maintained a bridgehead east of the
Crimea in the Kuban peninsula. It
would become the scene of a major air
battle early in 1943, one that proved
another benchmark test for the VVS.
Novikov ordered a concerted effort
to gain air superiority over the Kuban,
and the VVS rose to the challenge.
Soviet air units could by then operate
in larger formations thanks to the
revamped command-control system.
More command posts, better signal
systems and more efficient ground
control kept air units coordinated.
| JUN–JUL 2011
Soviet flyers also implemented a new
altitude echeloning tactic, sometimes
called the “Kuban Bookshelf,” flying
different units at different heights.
When the Luftwaffe tried to intercept
planes at lower attitudes, Soviet
fighters higher up would dive down
and attack them. Emphasis was put
on VVS fighters engaging enemy
bombers, thereby undermining the
Luftwaffe’s ability to support German
ground forces. That contrasted with
the German system, wherein fighter
pilots went hunting enemy fighters
in order to gain status as Experten
(aces). While the Germans were able to
maintain favorable kill ratios, over the
Kuban the VVS demonstrated it could
henceforth challenge the Luftwaffe.
The next major air battle was at
Kursk, above the last German strategic
offensive in the USSR, codenamed
Operation Citadel. On the ground
their plan was for the panzers to break
through the flanks of the Kursk salient
and then engage and destroy Soviet
reserves beyond it. The Luftwaffe was
to secure air superiority above the
battlefield and support the follow on
ground drive. New tank-busting aircraft
were employed in large numbers, such
as the Hs-129, armed with a cannon
that fired armor-piecing ammunition.
Since the offensive was to take place
in the summer within easy range
of German airfields, the Luftwaffe
expected to have the advantage.
Soviet intelligence had determined,
however, that Kursk was to be the locale
of the German offensive. Accordingly,
their ground forces heavily fortified the
salient, and the high command moved
in armored reserves to back it up. For
its part the VVS built up a network of
camouflaged airfields. It also conducted
extensive photo-reconnaissance of
German positions and Luftwaffe
airbases. Just prior to the Germans
kicking off their ground attack, the
VVS launched massive pre-emptive air
strikes against those Luftwaffe bases.
The strikes largely fizzled, as German
early warning radar detected the intrud-
ers and Luftwaffe interceptors had a field
day downing them. Even so, the effort
again demonstrated the VVS could oper-
ate in large formations on the offensive.
Initially, then, the Luftwaffe
was able to accomplish its mission
within Operation Citadel. That was
due to the factors that had given it
advantages in the past. Superior com-
mand-control allowed the Germans
to swiftly concentrate airpower above
the decisive part of the front, while a
high operational tempo multiplied the
number of sorties flown. As the battle
developed, though, the system broke
down. Loss of aircraft, damage, and pilot
fatigue reduced the operational rate.
Meanwhile VVS resistance increased
and German ground forces found
themselves under increasing air attack.
The turning point came when the
Red Army launched its Orel counterof-
fensive on 12 July, striking into the
German northern flank. The German
high command pulled Luftwaffe units
off the southern flank of the offen-
sive — where von Manstein, commander
of Army Group South, was gaining some
ground — in order to help shore up the
collapsing front at Orel. Hitler then
cancelled Citadel outright on 17 July.
Kursk is usually considered to have
been Germany’s last chance to gain
a decision in the east. One reason
for that failure, on the Soviet side of
the line, was the fact the Kursk-Orel
operation marked the ascendancy of
the VVS. Henceforth Soviet airpower
could face the Luftwaffe head-on
and win. The Luftwaffe was itself
increasingly reduced to the status of
an emergency “fire brigade,” with its
planes simply having to be rushed
from crisis to crisis along the front.
Organizational Factors to keep operations under control.
In 1942, Novikov stabilized air
Throughout 1941 the VVS had regiment strength at 32 machines
found itself unable to concentrate each. Multi-regiment air divisions
large numbers of planes in the air. were in turn massed into air corps and
That inability negated the edge it air armies. Some air divisions were
would otherwise have had by virtue of retained under direct control of the high
the number of aircraft available. VVS command (STAVKA) to act as a central
organization was adjusted to reflect reserve. That system guaranteed there
that reality. Air regiments (the basic were large air formations available
air force unit of operational maneuver for both tactical ground support and
and combat) were reduced in size, large-scale operational missions.
often down to mere squadron strength. Long-range bombers were organized
That made it easier for commanders into the Long Range Air Force (Aviatsiis
The Air Armies
Air Army When Formed Fronts Supported
First June 1942 West, Third Byelorussian
Second July 1942 Southwest, Stalingrad, Voronezh, First Ukrainian
Third May 1942 Kalinin, First Baltic
Fourth May 1942 South, North Caucasus, Second Byelorussian
Fifth May 1942 North Caucasus, Second Ukrainian
Sixth May 1942 Northwest, Second Byelorussian, First Byelorussian
Seventh June 1942 Karelia
Eighth November 1942 Stalingrad, First Ukrainian, Fourth Ukrainian
Ninth August 1942 First Far Eastern
Tenth August 1942 Second Far Eastern
Eleventh August 1942 Second Far Eastern (merged with Tenth Air Army)
Twelfth August 1942 Transbaikal
Thirteenth November 1942 Leningrad
Fourteenth June 1942 Volkhov, Third Baltic
Fifteenth July 1942 Bryansk, Second Baltic
Sixteenth August 1942 Don, Central, First Byelorussian
Seventeenth November 1942 Southwest, Third Ukrainian
Eighteenth December 1944 Former Long Range Bomber Command
The Technical Side
While the VVS started the war with large numbers of aircraft, there were techni-
cal deficiencies that undermined its effectiveness. For instance, many aircraft didn’t
have radios, which made coordinating operations difficult. There was also a lack
of the other basic services required to make an air force work. For example, there
was little in the way of meteorological units. Weather forecasting is vital to flying:
cloud cover obscures targets; wind conditions affect fuel expenditure; rain and snow
make flying difficult, and high temperatures create anomalous flying conditions.
The reorganization of the VVS saw the creation of a weather service to deal
with that issue. There was also the provisioning of more radios, and not only in
aircraft: a ground-based radio direction finding network was set up. That improved
navigation and also allowed for flying in conditions of less than optimal weather.
Another early war deficiency in the VVS was poor navigation. Air units often couldn’t
find their assigned targets, and fighters often failed to link up with bombers they were
supposed to escort. Accordingly, navigational training was upgraded; senior navigators were
assigned to units in the field, and a system of control points was established on the ground.
Research produced new bombsights that improved chances of hitting targets. All that worked
to produce an air force that could operate in the conditions of modern warfare.  ★
World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011 43
Dalnego Deistviia or ADD), which was
placed directly under the control of
STAVKA. Those ADD bombers were
supposed to be used for attacks
against targets deep in the enemy
rear area, but the exigencies of the
war caused them to be used primarily
in support of ground operations.
Another reform was the implementa-
tion of what was euphemistically termed
“one man authority.” It ended the
commissar system, in which political
officers had the final say on operations.
Instead, the new approach placed
reliance on an all-military chain
of command. That didn’t end the
influence of the Communist Party
on the air force; there were still party
meetings and propaganda, but they
were used to maintain morale and
explain the war’s goals to the rank and
file rather than to plan operations.
Other steps were also taken to raise
morale, such as awarding commenda-
tions for extraordinary performance and
giving units that had proven themselves
in combat the title of “Guards.” With that
title also came the assignment of better
equipment and top-line personnel.
In 1943, Novikov again raised the
aircraft strength of the regiments, this
time to 40 machines, as commanders
and pilots became more proficient. As
44 World at War 18
noted, the action the VVS fought over
the Kuban ironed out many tactical
deficiencies in its operations, with
large formations regularly taking to
the air. On the ground, tank armies
and cavalry-mechanized groups
were assigned fighter and bomber
divisions to support them in their
drives deep into German territory.
That became a common feature of Red
Army operations following Kursk.
Logistics
The VVS was quick to respond to the
collapse of its logistics system in 1941.
In August it established the VVS Rear
Service Command. The basic unit in that
command was the Area Basing Region
(abbreviated RAB in Russian), which
could function in mobile operations.
Each RAB was built around airfield
service battalions, capable of supporting
a range of aircraft up to a corps’ worth.
There were also various construction
and repair outfits in the organization.
Airbases were built 10 to 20 miles
behind the front, where they were
maintained by the RAB. Behind them
were additional support units, and
behind them were depots for major
overhauls and stockpiling supplies.
Prior to a ground offensive, construc-
| JUN–JUL 2011
tion troops would build airfields from
which supporting air units would
operate. After a breakthrough occurred,
air service battalions would follow
advancing ground troops in order to refit
captured airfields. Planes would then be
flown into them and begin operations
from them. That helped maintain the
tempo of an offensive by ensuring air
cover was always moving forward.
Tactics & Training
VVS fighter pilots started the war
using a “V” or “Vic” formation of three
aircraft: a leader and two wingmen;
however, they soon switched to a
system similar to that of the Luftwaffe’s
Rotte-Schwarm. In that system the
basic flight element was a para of two
aircraft, one the flight leader and the
other the wingman. Two para would
form a zveno, and three or four of them
would in turn form into a gruppa. The
flight leader would attack while the
wingman provided protection and
follow-through, or one para would
attack while a second provided cover.
In the first two years of the war,
putting together large aerial formations
was difficult owing to the breakdown
in command-control. Large formations
also attracted Luftwaffe interceptors
and ran up high loss rates while
ultimately accomplishing little. The
VVS solution in 1941 was to have many
small formations penetrate enemy air
space, thereby overloading the ability of
German interceptors to react. Bombers
flew only at night to avoid interception.
That reduced their effectiveness, but
it also cut losses while allowing those
pilots and crew to gain experience.
Fighters made use of echeloned for-
mations. One element would fly at low
or middle altitude, with other elements
higher up. When the enemy engaged the
lower element, the higher ones would
dive down on them. The combination
of altitude, speed, diving attack and
firepower were decisive in aerial combat.
The Soviets also had specialized
ground attack aircraft, such as the Il-2
Sturmovik. They attacked in waves of
regiments and divisions, pounding
enemy units and supply columns.
Most Soviet air operations were in
support of ground offensives. An attack-
ing front’s air army would be reinforced
by additional air divisions and corps
from the STAVKA reserve. That required
extensive coordination, involving setting
up mutual army and air force command
posts and communication networks.
An air campaign was executed in
three phases: 1) fighters gained air
superiority over the critical sector of the
front; 2) ground attack craft provided
support to breakthrough units while
bombers hit targets in the rear; and 3)
all air units continued the offensive by
attacking retreating enemy forces to
keep them from reforming. That could
include aerial blockade: using airpower
to cut enemy lines of communication
and to prevent his use of aerial resupply.
Those tactics proved increasingly
effective in 1943 – 45, as they fit well
into Red Army doctrine for “deep
operations.” Aviation was no longer
simply there to add firepower; it had
become a vital component of the
entire operational force. The ultimate
objective was to destroy the enemy
within the entire area of a campaign,
and the Soviets largely accomplished
that in the summer of 1944.

continued on page 47 »

World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011 45

Industrial Warfare

As the table below indicates, Soviet aircraft production exceeded that of the Germans throughout the war. Making matters worse for the
Luftwaffe was the fact its production also had to provide planes to fight against Allied forces in Western Europe and the Mediterranean.
Many German shortcomings went back to decisions made prior to the war. For example, Luftwaffe planners had expected a short war, and they
therefore failed to have industry gear up for longer-term production. The production of models nearing obsolesce was often continued because it
was believed, by the time assembly lines were changed to make newer types, the war would be over. Later, aircraft approaching obsolescence
were still produced because the time to change over production lines would’ve cut deliveries to front line units. For example, the Luftwaffe
continued building Ju-87 Stukas instead of the much better Hs-129 because the ground forces desperately needed combat support aircraft now.
Another decision that undermined the Luftwaffe in the mid- and late-war periods was its pre-war emphasize on bombers. The Luftwaffe
had originally been intended as an offensive force, and its fast medium bombers were at first able to operate in the face of enemy intercep-
tors. There was the defeat in the Battle of Britain, but that was seen as an anomaly at the time. By 1943, however, the Luftwaffe was
facing both growing Allied air strength around the periphery of Europe and Allied bombers over the cities of Germany itself. Fighters
were therefore needed everywhere, but there weren’t enough to go around. So they were pulled from Russia and the Mediterranean
to be used as interceptors at home, thereby surrendering any chance of contesting Allied airpower over the front lines.
It wasn’t until the German defeat at Stalingrad in February 1943 that planners gave consideration to fighting a total war, and even then it
would take another year to fully achieve mass production. By that time it was too late. Aside from the growing Allied air armadas, the Luftwaffe
also had to face fuel shortages that grounded aircraft and paralyzed training. Much of the 1944 – 45 production simply couldn’t be utilized.
On the Soviet side, mass production allowed not only for greater front line aircraft strength, but also the buildup
of aerial reserves. Individual aircraft losses could be replaced and STAVKA could also maintain air divisions and corps
for major operations. All of that demonstrates an air force can’t rise far from its industrial base.  ★

Aircraft Production 1939-45

Soviet German Soviet German Soviet German Soviet German
Fighters Fighters Ground Attack Ground Attack Bombers Bombers Transports Transports
1939 ? 605 ? 134 ? 737 ? 145
1940 4574 2746 ? 603 3571 2852 1691 388
1941 7,086 3744 1543 507 3748 3373 3091 502
1942 9,924 5515 8219 1249 3537 4502 3298 573
1943 14,590 10,898 11,177 3266 4074 4789 3744 1028
1944 17,813 26,326 11,110 5496 4186 1982 5508 443
1945 c. 9000 5883 5500 1104 c. 2000 ? ? ?

Notes: The figures include not only new aircraft built, but also damaged aircraft repaired and returned to service. Additionally, the Soviets
received the following aircraft from the US and UK via Lend-Lease: 11,594 fighters and ground attack craft; 3,770 medium bombers.
? = number not known.

46 World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011

» continued from page 45

On to Berlin

On 22 June 1944 the Red Army

launched Operation Bagration, attacking
German forces in Byelorussia and effec-
tively destroying Army Group Center.
Bagration was supported in full by the
VVS, which deployed over 13,000 aircraft
in that effort. In accordance with doc-
trine, the VVS first swept what Luftwaffe
aircraft there were from the skies, then
supported the ground force in shattering
the German line, and finally joined in
the pursuit, adding combat power to
the maneuver groups driving west. At
the same time, successful VVS attacks
on German reserves and logistics made
mobile defense impossible. As at Kursk,
it was no longer simply the number of
Soviet aircraft that mattered; rather, it
was the improvement in command-
control and tactics that gave the VVS
the ability to act as an arm of decision.
Bagration ended in a resounding
success for both the Soviet ground and The Luftwaffe in the East
air forces conducting it. In the following
year the Soviets would drive all the way The Germans committed three Luftflotten (air fleets) to support Operation
to Berlin, with the VVS ruling the skies Barbarossa in 1941: one each in support of Army Groups North, Center and South
above. Soviet airpower had come a long (respectively Luftflotten One, Two and Four). There were also elements of Luftflotte
way from the dark days of 1941.  ✪ Five flying from Norway in support of Axis operations on the Finnish front. During the
Battle of Moscow the Germans transferred much of Luftflotte Two to the Mediterranean
Sources to attack the British island fortress of Malta and support Rommel in North Africa.
Dear, I.C.B. The Oxford Companion to World War II.
For 1942, Luftflotte Four was reinforced for the drive into the Caucasus.
Oxford: Oxford Univ., 1995. Luftwaffekommando Ost was formed to support Army Group Center, and
Ellis, John. World War II: A Statistical Survey.
New York: Facts on File, 1993.
was administratively upgraded to become Luftflotte Six in July 1943.
Higham, Robin & Joseph Kipp. Soviet Aviation and Airpower. In 1942 the Luftwaffe could still concentrate sufficient strength to gain air superiority
Boulder: Westview, 1978.
Kozhernikov, M. N. The Command and Staff of the Soviet
in southern Russia in support of the drive to the Caucasus. Later that year it would be
Army Air Force in the Great Patriotic War. committed to airlifting supplies to the surrounded Sixth Army at Stalingrad. In 1943,
Moscow, 1977.
Muller, Richard. The German Air War in Russia. Baltimore:
by concentrating all available airpower over central Russia, the Luftwaffe gained air
Nautical & Aviation, 1992. superiority over the Kursk salient, at least for a couple weeks. In the face of the growing
Murray, Williamson. Strategy for Defeat:
The Luftwaffe, 1933 – 45. Secaucus: Chartwell, 1986.
strength of the VVS, the Luftwaffe was increasingly reduced to the status of a “fire
Neulen, Hans Werner. In the Skies of Europe. brigade,” providing emergency support to German units being overrun on the ground.
Verlag: Crowood, 1998.
Sterrett, James. Soviet Air Force Theory.
In late 1943, Fliegerkorps IV became an independent strategic bombing
London: Rutledge, 2007. formation preparatory to conducting Operation Iron Hammer, a planned air
Wagner, Ray, ed. The Soviet Air Force in World War II.
Garden City: Doubleday, 1973 (originally published by
campaign against Soviet war industries. Iron Hammer was canceled, though,
the Ministry of Defense of the USSR). when Soviet ground forces overran its base area during Operation Bagration.
By mid-1944 the Luftwaffe was no longer able to provide effective resistance to the VVS.
While the Germans still had some 2,100 aircraft in the east, only 500 of them were fighters
(compared to over 1,000 German fighters on the eastern front in 1941). Most of the other
fighters had been pulled back to defend Germany from the Anglo-American bombing offensive.
Added to that were petroleum shortages that paralyzed what otherwise would’ve been much
of the Luftwaffe’s operational capability. The Soviets were therefore left with increasingly
unchallenged control of the sky. Effectively, Luftwaffe units in the east had become the aerial
reserve for the rest of the Third Reich, a situation that couldn’t be sustained for long.  ★

World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011 47

Observation
Game PreviewPost
Gross Deutschland Panzer
T
he Famous Divisions series, featur-
ing Gross Deutschland Panzer
(GDP) in this installment, is the
first in a new evolution in design that
brings tactical elements to an otherwise
operational simulation. Recreating four
battles of the GDP from the eastern front
in 1943 and 1944, this first game of the
series includes: Lutchessa Valley, Kursk,
Akhtyrka and Mischurin Rog (each
played on its own detailed and histori-
cally accurate map). It was designed by
John Schettler and has been thoroughly
developed by Eric Harvey and Ty Bomba.
The Famous Divisions Series offers
a new concept: play is governed by
the drawing of “Event Chits” during
combat. Combat is not simply resolved
by comparing the attack strengths and
48 World at War 18
defense strengths of units as effected by All HQ activation chits are placed in a
terrain; rather, it’s modified by random cup, and each is drawn one at a time to
chit draws of over 140 possible “events” initiate the activation (movement and
that introduce the elements of chaos combat) of a particular headquarters
and unpredictability to combat resolu- and its associated companies.  ✪
tion. Event Chits can be nullified by
other Event Chits; so players never
know how an attack may be resolved WaW Upcoming
based solely on odds ratios and terrain. Features
The number of chits a given side may
hold and draw also serves as an easy #
19: Hardest Days
measure of its elite (or non-elite) status. #
20: Gross Deutschland Panzer
Each hex represents approximately #
21: Rhineland ‘36
500 meters from side to opposite side. #
22: Minsk 1944
Each game turn represents approximately
six hours; however, the game turns aren’t
#
23: Guadalcanal
divided into separate friendly and enemy Visit STRATEGYandTACTICSpress.com
player turns. Rather, each is made up of for previews of these issues.
numerous individual HQ activations.
| JUN–JUL 2011
 WACHT am Rhein

CO
Go
to

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es
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om

SO fo
rp
ON 16 December 1944 the “ghost front” of the First US Army in the Ardennes suddenly erupted as 20 German divisions embarked on Hitler’s

le
dg

ON
last attack in the west. The objective was Antwerp, which provided Allied supply for the drive into Germany. Most Americans believed the

ei
nf
war against Germany would be over by Christmas; yet Hitler was convinced it could still be decided in his favor. The German armies destroyed

or
m
in France were reorganized. A massive surprise against the weakly held Ardennes sector of the American front was prepared.

at

! io
n.
WACHT am Rhein is a grand-tactical simulation of that enormous battle. The more than 2,380 counters represent every formation, at company and battalion
levels, which fought there, including US, German, British, French, Canadian and Belgian units. Infantry, armor, anti-tank, reconnaissance, engineer, assault
gun, howitzer, rocket, parachute, ranger, glider and headquarters units are all fully represented. The four maps are an accurate representation of the region.
Compiled from 1944 German staff maps and 1943-44 1:50,000 US Army maps, they shows all roads, trails and other types of terrain, along with all the towns
and villages that became bastions of the American defense, as well as every creek and river that couldn’t be crossed by wheeled vehicles without a bridge.

PLAYERS may use single maps for six smaller scenarios. There is also a campaign game that utilizes all four sections and portrays three
weeks (50 game turns). In that one the Germans race for the Meuse, the last hurdle before the open country leading to Antwerp, in the face
of increasing concentrations of Allied infantry, armor and air power. Extensive supply, weather and air power rules are included.

THIS edition of Wacht am Rhein presents modifications to the combat, artillery and supply systems of the first edition in order to better
depict tactical and operational warfare. For example, an “exploitation mode” has been added in order to allow mechanized units to take
advantage of breakthroughs in the enemy line. Exploitation is interleaved with the opposing player’s movement, recreating the fluid situation
that existed in the first week. Other changes include the addition of “vantage points,” which function as high ground, enabling units to spot
more effectively for artillery, as well as “constricted terrain,” which represents the channeling caused by steep gullies and ravines.

THE orders of battle have also been redone to provide an accurate depiction of the armies of both sides. Units are now in the organizations
within which they fought, not the administrative formations that were discarded due to the requirements of combat.

GAME COMPONENTS
• 4 22x34” Four Color Mapsheets
• 2,380 Die-Cut Playing Pieces
• One Rule Booklet
• One Scenario Booklet
• Assorted Player Aid Charts
• Two 10-sided Dice
• Storage Bags

GAME SCALE
• Map: 1 mile per hex
• Time: 3 Game Turns per day
• Units: Infantry and Artillery units are battalions.
Armor is depicted at the company level.
• Each strength step is equal to a company.

P.O. Box 21598 | Bakersfield, CA 93390-1598 | (661) 587-9633 phone | (661) 587-5031 fax | decisiongames.com
Observation Post

Mysteries Nevertheless, there were still major
Revealed problems involved in fighting off an
attack from the mainland. For one,
Myths of the Singapore Guns while the Fixed Defences (as the totality
of the batteries were then termed) had
for the batteries capable of hitting
Singapore Island. So, in the final days
of the fighting, when the 15-inch and
9.2-inch guns did fire on the mainland
and on northern Singapore Island,

O
n the eve of World War II, the been provided with armor-piercing they had no appreciable effect.
great Singapore Naval Base at shells for use against warships, only Further, as weapons designed to
the southern end of the Malay some of the smaller guns had even shoot over water, Singapore’s naval
Peninsula was widely believed to be just a few of the high-explosive rounds rifles fired their rounds on relatively
an impregnable fortress. Its powerful necessary for use against troops flat trajectories, ones inappropriate
heavy coast defense batteries — “more and other ground targets. Even then for counter-battery missions or for
guns than plums in a Christmas the topography and jungle cover in striking dug-in or defiladed troops.
pudding,” wrote one Australian southern Malaya precluded easy There was discussion, once the fight-
journalist at the time — protected the observation of Japanese activity on ing had begun, of firing rounds with
island bastion from attack. It was, the mainland; so Singapore’s gunners reduced charges in order to produce
claimed the British, invincible against would have no clear idea of exactly higher trajectories, but nothing came
any foe. That it was hardly so was what they were targeting or where of it. In the absence of high-explosive
quickly demonstrated by the Japanese their shells were landing. Nor had any ammunition and adequate observation
forces that conquered Malaya and fire-control system been developed of targets, it would’ve done little good.
Singapore in some 70 days immediately
after the start of hostilities.
Those British fortifications and
their heavy guns are long since gone,
replaced by a new naval base con-
structed by the independent Republic
of Singapore. While the former base
is no more, however, three myths still
persist about the famously powerful
naval rifles that failed to prevent the
Japanese conquest. The best known
of those legends is, of course, that
they faced the wrong way and were
thus incapable of firing on enemy
forces advancing from the mainland.
Two other historical myths concern
the source of the guns and what
happened to them after their capture
by the Japanese. Each of those myths
has been refuted, but all continue to
reappear in stories about Singapore.
That first and most familiar myth
about the guns’ facing came to life
shortly after Singapore’s surrender.
The truth, however, is that all of the
15-inch guns had 360 degree traverse,
and three of the 9.2-inch guns and
two of the 6-inchers had arcs of fire
allowing them to cover the northern
approach to Singapore. Three of the 6- One of
inch batteries and a few of the heavier Singapore’s
ones could in fact also strike targets 15-inch coastal
within Singapore itself. The guns, it’s defence guns
elevated for
clear, didn’t “face the wrong way.”
firing.

50 World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011

 Considering all those difficulties,
which way the guns “faced” was
irrelevant. Perhaps more important
is the fact those weapons, like other
pre-World War II coastal artillery instal-
lations, had been rendered outmoded
by the development of advanced
aircraft dive-bombing techniques.
Lacking overhead cover and anti-
aircraft defenses, they were exposed to
whatever aerial attack an enemy might
unleash against them. The Japanese
took full advantage of that vulnerability.
The source myth is that the Fixed
Defences included two huge 18-inch
guns once mounted on the Royal Navy
battlecruiser HMS Furious. Rumors to
that effect first appeared in the mid-
1930s when work on the naval base
was almost complete. It was fostered
by the British to further cement the
image of Singapore’s invincibility.
The Furious had been laid down
in 1915 as a “big gun cruiser” armed
with two 18-inch rifles. Two years
later one of those guns was removed
to make room for the instillation of a
forward flight deck, transforming the
warship into a hybrid battlecruiser-
carrier. After seeing brief action in
World War I, Furious underwent a
second reconstruction. The remaining
18-inch gun was then removed and
the ship was recommissioned as a full
flush-deck carrier. The two guns were
used for tests and experimentation
and then eventually turned into
scrap. They were never considered for
inclusion in Singapore’s defenses.
The heavily publicized big guns
actually emplaced at Singapore, while
impressive, were in fact less powerful
than those of the Furious. In addition to
six 9.2-inch guns, eighteen 6-inch guns,
and an assortment of lighter weapons,
Singapore boasted five 15-inch naval
rifles similar to those then being
mounted on British battleships. They
were originally built as spare tubes for
vessels of the Queen Elizabeth-class.
The final Singapore myth has to do
with the disposition of the guns after
the British capitulation. Some sources
state the Japanese transferred the cap- into service for the German Navy
tured pieces to Tarawa, in the Gilbert (Kriegsmarine) at the start of the war.
Islands, where they are then alleged to This evacuation, dubbed “Operation
have become an important part of the Hannibal,” lasted 15 weeks, from 21
Japanese defense there. In that scenario January to 8 May 1945. It was the largest
they were supposedly responsible for evacuation by sea in modern times,
the heavy casualties inflicted on the far surpassing the British effort at
US Marines when they invaded there Dunkirk in 1940 (see the next article).
in late 1943. That story first surfaced On 30 January, Capt. Friedrich
shortly after the island was taken. Peterson, skipper of the Gustloff,
The fallacy there is that the largest received orders to sail. At around
Japanese guns on Tarawa were 8-inch 12:30 p.m. the Gustloff left port.
naval rifles, which they had actually She was carrying 173 female naval
bought from the British before the war, auxiliaries, along with 918 officers
and there were never any weapons of and men of the 2nd U-Boat Training
that size at Singapore. Nor were the real Division (2 Unterseeboot Lehr Division),
Singapore guns moved anywhere else 373 Women’s Naval Auxiliaries, 162
in the Pacific. Of the 29 large pieces wounded soldiers and 8,956 civilians
on the island at the start of the war, (including 4,000 children), for a total
only a single 15-inch gun and two of of 10,582 passengers and crew. She
the 6-inchers survived the 1942 battle was dangerously overcrowded for a
in repairable condition. Those the vessel that had only been designed to
Japanese retained at Singapore for hold a maximum of 1,800 persons.
its defense under their possession. The Wilhelm Gustloff had as its
destination Kiel, at the base of the
— Stanley L. Falk Danish peninsula. She was accompa-
nied only by the Hansa (also filled with
On the Seas thousands headed west), the whaling
boat Walter Rau and two torpedo boats.
Hitler’s Titanic : Icebreakers worked to carve a path
The Wilhelm Gustloff through the Bay of Danzig in order to
create a passage into the Baltic Sea.
By the winter of 1945 the war on Shortly into the voyage the Hansa
Germany’s eastern front was going from developed mechanical problems and
bad to worse for that nation. Refugees returned to port along with one of the
were fleeing west, away from the city torpedo boats. The Gustloff, Walter Rau
of Koenigsberg in East Prussia, to avoid and torpedo boat Lowe continued.
the Soviet onslaught. They fled to the Soon after 6:00 p.m. the captain of
Baltic seaports at Pillau (now Baltiysk, the Gustloff received word a convoy of
Russia) and Gotenhafen (formerly the German minesweepers was approach-
Polish port of Gdynia), hoping to board ing from the west. He then made the
ships that would carry them to the controversial decision to turn on his
relative safety of western Germany. ship’s red and green navigational lights
In early January, Grand Adm. Karl in order to avoid the possibility of a
Doenitz wanted to bring away his collision. Unknown to him the Soviet
submariners, who were being trained submarine S-13, commanded by Capt.
and housed aboard ships lying in some Alexander Marinesko, was nearby.
of those ports. The majority of them Just before 8:00 p.m. the first
were based at Gotenhafen aboard the officer of the S-13 spotted lights in
vessels Deutschland, Hamburg, Hansa the distance. Marinesko quickly made
and the Wilhelm Gustloff. All but the his way to the conning tower. When
first of those vessels had once been he peered through the periscope
passenger liners that were drafted he saw what he described as “the
World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011 51
Observation Post
silhouette of an enormous ocean
liner with its lights showing.”
The S-13 shadowed that vessel
for nearly an hour until it reached
the Stolpe Bank off the Pomeranian
coast. At around 9:00 p.m. Marinesko
gave the command to fire all four
forward torpedoes. One failed to
launch; however, the other three sliced
smoothly through the water toward
the target. Those onboard the Gustloff,
Rau and Lowe remained unaware of the
danger rushing toward them, since the
submarine detection equipment on the
Lowe had become frozen and useless.
At 9:16 p.m. the first torpedo
struck the port bow of the Gustloff.
The resultant explosion opened a
gaping hole. Soon after, the second
torpedo hit amidships where the ship’s
swimming pool was located. Finally,
the third torpedo scored a hit on the
engine room directly below the funnel.
Upon getting the first reports
of damage, Peterson ordered the
Wilhelm Gustloff
as a hospital ship.
Danzig,
23 September 1939
52 World at War 18
watertight doors shut in order to seal
off the forward part of the ship. That
area contained the crew quarters.
That resulted in many of the off-duty
crew being sealed in a watery tomb.
Where the second torpedo
impacted, the swimming pool, there
was a scene of devastation. That was
due to the fact the drained pool and
cabins in its vicinity were being used to
house the Women’s Naval Auxiliaries.
Only a handful managed to escape.
It was the third torpedo, however,
that decided the fate of the Wilhelm
Gustloff. Its direct hit on the engine
room knocked out power on the
ship: all the lights went out and the
communication system went dead.
Survivors later reported all they could
hear in the pitch dark was screaming,
shouting and rushing water. The ship
quickly began to list to the port side.
Radioman Rudi Lange was able
to use an emergency transmitter to
send an SOS. It was only then the
| JUN–JUL 2011
Lowe became aware of the attack.
She turned toward the damaged
ship and managed to pluck some
472 survivors from the icy water.
Forty-five minutes after the
first torpedo struck the 25,484-ton
Wilhelm Gustloff slipped beneath
the surface. She plunged into the
depths taking thousands with her.
Another torpedo boat, the T-36,
arrived just in time to see the liner go
under. She was from another convoy
and had been escorting the heavy
cruiser Admiral Hipper. As the T-36
rescued other survivors, the S-13 fired
a torpedo at her. The torpedo boat
managed to dodge that attack, despite
being overloaded with survivors. Her
skipper made the decision not to go
after the sub with depth charges, since
that would’ve caused harm to other
survivors still in the water. Thus the
S-13 was able to make a clean escape.
Three other minesweepers arrived,
saving a total of 179 more among
them. The steamer Gottigen was able and East Prussia. In that timeframe the stand-fast order proved calamitous,
to rescue 28, the TF-19 seven, the Kriegsmarine also delivered 400,000 leaving hundreds of thousands of
freighter Gotland two; and patrol tons of supplies to the troops still troops trapped against the coast.
boat V-1703 saved one baby from a fighting along the Baltic coast. It was a Finland signed an armistice with
lifeboat who was found surrounded by remarkable accomplishment, carried the Soviet Union on 4 September and
frozen corpses. That baby was the last out under conditions of fuel shortages agreed to drive all German forces off
survivor from the Wilhelm Gustloff. and enemy aero-naval superiority. its territory, forcing Engelhardt to ship
It’s estimated some 9,343 men, Planning began in the summer of over 40,000 troops out of that country.
women and children died aboard 1944 when Allied offensives in both German naval chief Grand Adm.
the Wilhelm Gustloff, making it the the east and west finally awakened Karl Doenitz feared the Soviet conquest
largest loss of life occurring during a Nazi officials to the need for central- of the Baltic coast would free its navy
single ship sinking in history. In 2002 ized direction of naval transport to prey on Germany’s vital ore shipping
the German magazine Der Spiegel operations. Since the party officials out of Sweden and threaten his U-
summarized in a retrospective on the initially placed in charge proved inept, boats’ training area. Finland left the war
disaster: “The Titanic was a testament the Kriegsmarine high command the day after Tallin fell, ensuring Soviet
to the hubris of a civilization that designated Adm. Konrad Engelhardt, submarines and fast attack craft could
worshipped technology and thought Seetraeger Offizier (Sea Transport go around the German minefields
it could conquer nature. The Gustloff, Officer, or Seetra). He was well qualified otherwise blocking the Gulf of Finland.
on the other hand, was the symbol for the task, having served as Seetra The latter, however, were short-ranged
of German hubris, the dream of a in the Mediterranean in 1942 – 43. and would need bases close to
greater German Empire that ended in a Using his authority as both the Sweden (on the Baltic coast) to be
nightmare. It was Adolf Hitler’s Titanic.” navy’s and army’s sea transport officer, effective. Doenitz didn’t believe Soviet
he requisitioned and directed shipping submarines were a serious threat, but
— Edmond N. Gaudelli, Jr. as required to meet all Germany’s Soviet aircraft and light attack craft
needs in that regard. His first major were a different story. He therefore
Broader operation was the evacuation of the convinced Hitler the Courland area
Perspective Aegean Island garrisons in August (the Latvian Coast south of the Islands
1944. That was followed almost dominating the Gulf of Danzig) had
Germany’s Evacuation immediately by the riparian withdrawal to be held. The resulting decision to
of the Baltic of forces and supplies up the Danube do that led to the Germans retaining a
River to avoid their being rolled 27-division garrison in what became
On 8 May 1945 a total of 138 up by the Red Army’s late-summer known as the “Courland pocket.”
Kriegsmarine small craft departed the drive into southeastern Europe. Engelhardt pulled German forces
Latvian ports of Liepaja and Ventspils, The Soviet summer offensive out of Tallin, Estonia, on 22 September,
carrying 25,700 troops and refugees against Army Groups North and just hours ahead of the Soviet Army’s
away from advancing Soviet armies. Center (Operation Bagration) was also entry there. He initiated planning
They ran a gauntlet of air strikes and disastrous for the Germans. Soviet to do the same for Army Group
naval patrols to disembark all but armored thrusts split Army Group North North’s troops in Latvia, but was then
300 of their charges at Copenhagen, from Army Group Center and pushed it ordered by Hitler to focus instead
Denmark, the next day. That delivery against the Baltic coast. Hitler’s initial on providing logistical support for
ended Germany’s maritime evacuation
of its eastern territories. Though the Evacuation Statistics Month Ships Sunk Lives Lost
Royal Navy’s Operation Dynamo, the
transport of over 350,000 Anglo-French January — May 1945 January  Wilhelm Gustloff 9,343
troops out of Dunkirk in 1940, was Liepaja: 100,000 troops February General von Steuben 3,200
World War II’s most famous seaborne Ventspils: 30,000 troops Eifel 680
evacuation, it pales in comparison
March Andross 550
to its German counterpart. East Prussian Ports
Between 25 January and 8 May 1945, • 1,498,000 civilian refugees April Neuwerk 800
Germany’s 13th Naval Transport Flotilla • 441,000 troops Moltkefels 1,000
carried 1.4 million civilian refugees and Pomeranian Ports Karlsruhe 800
550,000 military personnel and govern- • 70,000 civilian refugees Goya 6,000
ment officials out of the Baltic republics • 7,500 troops Emily Sauber 50

World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011 53

Observation Post
their continued resistance there.
Engelhardt managed to
withdraw eight divisions before
that halt order was given.
Army Group North was re-des-
ignated Army Group Kurland on 15
January 1945, and Germany’s Baltic
Fleet was ordered to supply its nearly
600,000 troops while also evacuating
civilians, wounded and unnecessary
military personnel. Command of that
operation was given to Adm. Oscar
Kummetz, Marineoberkommando Ost
(Naval High Command East). He in
turn placed the 13th Naval Transport
Flotilla in charge and gave its com-
mander authority over all transports
in the Baltic. Even warships were to
serve as transports when returning
from gunfire support missions.
Despite that massive resource allo-
cation, the operation faced challenges.
First, British aerial mining rendered
areas of the Baltic unsafe for navigation.
Britain and the Soviets were also bomb-
ing the destination and departure ports,
respectively. The Soviets were bombing
Liepaja and most East Prussian
ports almost daily, while the British
were doing the same to Flensburg,
Kiel, Stettin and Swinemuende.
The first 7,000 civilian refugees
departed Pillau on 25 January, and
another 55,000 followed over the next
three days. The Soviet Navy wasn’t idle,
launching aggressive aerial patrols
and deploying submarines off those
ports. Over 9,000 died in the Baltic’s
freezing waters (see previous article).
By late February the transport
convoys themselves were facing nearly
constant Soviet air attack, forcing them
to steam only at night. The pace then
unavoidably picked up as the Courland
pocket shrank and Soviet armies
penetrated into East Prussia. April saw
over 157,270 wounded evacuated along
with 264,887 refugees carried out of
East Prussia. Another 100,000 wounded
were taken out of the Courland pocket,
which the Soviets were desperately try-
ing to destroy. Despite the Army High
Command urging Hitler to abandon
54 World at War 18
Courland and use its transferred Hitler and Hermann Goering, head
garrison to defend Germany, that of the German Air Force and heir appar-
withdrawal order wasn’t given until late ent to the Fuehrer, both had extensive
April. By then Liepaja and Ventspils personal art collections. Their insatiable
had been severely damaged and all desire for obtaining ever more items of
the East Prussian ports were lost. Fuel value in the countries under German
shortages and mounting ship losses occupation fueled massive looting.
also cut transport capacity. Over 60,000 Other senior German officers also
troops were abandoned on the coat of sought to benefit from the treasures
East Prussia, and some 200,000 were being stolen and stockpiled in Germany.
left to their fate in the Courland pocket. The German Reichskulturkammer
The precise number Germany (Empire Chamber of Culture)
evacuated across the Baltic during the regulated everything related to the arts.
war’s final six months will never be Membership was required of all who
known, but it involved the transport of worked in any field of art. Jews, commu-
at least 2.1 million people under com- nists, and those whose works didn’t con-
bat conditions. Losses were heavy. Six form to Nazi philosophy were excluded.
large passenger liners were sunk with Much artwork by Jewish artists was
a loss of over 19,000 lives, and another deemed “undesirable” and destroyed.
104,000 tons of shipping were sunk dur- The Germans established the
ing the effort, as were four destroyers Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg
and over a dozen minesweepers, the (Special Staff of Empire Leader
primary escort ships used. Nonetheless, Rosenberg, or ERR) in Paris in July
it was a remarkable operation. Dunkirk, 1940. The initial mission of that task
and even America’s 1975 evacuation of force was to acquire — by forced
over 100,000 refugees from Vietnam, purchase, official confiscation or simply
don’t come close in terms of size looting — Jewish art collections recently
or duration, though the British can rendered “ownerless.” That mission later
claim they faced an equally serious expanded to acquire masterpieces from
military threat in 1940. Germany’s all sources in all the occupied nations.
evacuation of the east remains the Nominally the ERR was under
largest maritime evacuation of all the control of the Reichsleiter Alfred
time, and marks a feat not likely to be Rosenberg. His title was a misnomer,
matched in the foreseeable future. however, in that Goering was actually
the master thief who controlled his
— Carl Otis Schuster organization. The latter’s art collec-
tion, which had been stolen from
Historical museums across Europe, was found
Perspective in a building near Berchtesgaden,
Germany, soon after the war.
Nazi Art Theft in World War II The first major Nazi acquisition
of art masterpieces had occurred
Art became a high priority in the when German troops crossed the
Third Reich after Adolf Hitler became Austrian border in March 1938.
Chancellor of Germany in January The German secret state police,
1933. He dreamed of building an art the Geheimstaatpolizei or Gestapo,
museum — the Fuehrer Museum — in quickly acquired the art collections of
his hometown of Linz, Austria. That Vienna’s prominent non-Nazi families.
world-class institution would contain American journalist William Shirer,
all the masterpieces from the Nazi- then a reporter for CBS, lived near the
occupied countries of Europe. His focus palace of Louis de Rothschild. Shirer
on art and cultural pillage continued reported seeing troops hauling away his
until his suicide in April 1945. continued on page 56 »
| JUN–JUL 2011
 In one search of a
repository used by
the Uffizi Gallery, the
officers discovered that
retreating German troops
had found and stolen
many of the hidden
paintings. Two priceless
paintings, Botticelli’s
Birth of Venus (below)
and Leonardo da Vinci’s
Adoration of the Magi
(right), lay undamaged
amid the rubble on the
floor. Apparently the
Germans unwittingly
left those masterworks
in their hasty retreat.

World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011 55

Observation Post
» continued from page 54
collection. The Germans subsequently
arrested Rothschild and commandeered
his home as a headquarters.
Later, Jews were allowed to leave
Austria by first surrendering their
possessions, especially valuable art,
to the Office of Jewish Emigration.
Failure to abide by that order resulted
in imprisonment and, ultimately,
transport to a concentration camp.
56 World at War 18
The Schutztaffel (SS), a Nazi Party
political and military organization,
confiscated all the valuables of others
who fled Austria. The valuables of those
who remained in Austria had to be
registered with the Gestapo, and could
be seized whenever desired by Hitler.
When Hitler visited Rome in 1938
he was dazzled by the artistic splendor
of the Eternal City. During his tour
of the Uffizi Gallery in Florence, he
| JUN–JUL 2011
realized Germany’s existing artwork
wouldn’t be adequate for his museum
in Linz. After his return to Germany,
therefore, the ongoing acquisitions
became more organized and systematic.
The art collections of Jews were the
first target for theft. Kristallnacht
occurred on 9 November 1938, when
the Nazis orchestrated a night of
widespread violence against them.
From then on, all their possessions,
especially their art collections, were
legally available for the taking.
In 1939, Hitler appointed art histo-
rian Hans Posse to handle the growing
collection destined for the museum
in Linz. As the war raged across more
and more of Europe, museum directors
thus not only had to deal with the
possible loss of irreplaceable artwork
from bombing raids and combat; they
also had to face confiscation by Posse
after those dangers had passed.
As the plundering expanded,
curators began to hide their treasures
in villas, chateaus, castles and even
under viaducts; however, those precau-
tions didn’t deter Hitler’s troops from
arriving at homes and museums with
shopping lists of artwork the Fuehrer
wanted. Hitler’s art advisers prepared
detailed dossiers of desired works. For
example, in November 2001 the US
National Archives announced discovery
of two leather bound photograph
albums created by the ERR. Those
albums documented art that had
been looted, and they had served as
a catalogues from which Hitler could
choose particular pieces for the Linz
museum. It’s known the ERR created
nearly 100 such albums during the war.
Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower,
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe,
gave a high priority to preserving
and recovering cultural treasures.
A multinational group known as
the Allied Monuments Fine Arts &
Archives (MFAA) unit was established
in 1943. About 400 MFAA members
thereafter worked to preserve
Europe’s cultural heritage, and to
locate and return stolen treasures
afterward. The unit’s personnel I Remember cable anchoring it came slashing down
became known as “Monuments on the boat. Boy, that was scary!
Officers” and “Monuments Men.” Charlie Bell’s War But that wasn’t my most frightening
After the war those officers traveled experience. That moment came shortly
the continent to find the repositories I was born in Toronto in 1924. My after landing at Naples. We’d just gotten
of missing pieces, determine their father had a modest job in a dairy; off the ship and were camped alongside
provenance, and return them to their so the depression was tough for us. a railroad when the Luftwaffe arrived
rightful owners. They returned around When war broke out in Europe in and bombed a Red Cross train sitting
5 million items between 1945 and 1951. 1939 my three older brothers quickly nearby. The air raid was terrifying,
Even so, hundreds of thousands of otherenlisted, two in the army and one in and several of our fellows were
items have never been recovered. In onethe navy. I tried to join the navy as a wounded. The explosions were close.
search of a repository used by the Uffizi
17-year-old, but they wouldn’t have That was a real introduction to war.
Gallery, the officers discovered that me. In 1942, when I was 18, I joined While in Italy I was transferred to the
retreating German troops had found the army. To be honest I didn’t enlist Army Service Corps, which was respon-
and stolen many of the hidden paint- out of a sense of patriotism. Since my sible for supplying the gas, water, food,
ings. Two priceless paintings, Botticelli’s
brothers had already joined up I was ammunition and other vital equipment
Birth of Venus and Leonardo da Vinci’s almost home alone, and I didn’t think to the combat regiments fighting
Adoration of the Magi, lay undamaged much of that. I suppose I was lonely. their way up the Italian peninsula.
amid the rubble on the floor. Apparently
That’s why I joined up. And like many Our offensive stalled at the Gustav
the Germans unwittingly left those young guys at the time, I thought Line, which ran across Italy south of
masterworks in their hasty retreat. serving would be an experience. Rome and blocked further advance.
In 2001, American museums After basic training I was assigned Attempts to penetrate that line resulted
announced a plan to identify art to the artillery and went to Cape Breton in some of the bloodiest battles in
that may have been stolen by the where I helped set up an anti-aircraft the war, including the famous Battle
Nazis. The search for those lost battery to defend Sydney, Nova Scotia. of Monte Cassino. The Germans had
treasures, tracing their provenance, At the time Sydney was a major port the high ground there, and they could
and returning the stolen art to its for convoys forming up; so defending it see everything that was going on. We
rightful owners may never be over. The was a priority. Of course, the Germans had to take that position if we were
effort continues today. World War II didn’t have any bombers with a range to get through the Gustav Line. We
survivors, art historians and govern- that could reach Canada; so I’m not in the Army Service Corps hauled
ments continue to work to recover the sure the battery was necessary. ammunition to the artillery there
incredible cultural loss. The Central In 1943 I went to England where I for days upon days leading up to the
Registry on Looted Cultural Property was posted with 5th Armored Division. attack, building huge stockpiles for the
1933 to 1945 <www.lootedart.com> The first campaign for the Canadian barrage that would begin our offensive.
provides two searchable databases: an Army in Europe came when the Allies On the day of the attack, hundreds
information database and an object invaded Italy that year. After taking part and hundreds of guns opened fire for
database. The provenance section in the assault on Sicily in July, the Allies hours on end. The sight and sound
allows a search of ownership history. made an assault landing across the was unlike anything you can imagine.
The Israel Museum exhibited more Strait of Messina onto mainland Italy The thunder of it was deafening,
than 50 paintings and drawings in on September 3rd. That force was soon and the fire lit up the night sky.
December 2007. It was the museum’s reinforced by other Canadian units, Eventually the Gustav Line was
hope the exhibition would unite the including the 5th Division and myself. cracked and the advance resumed. In
paintings with rightful owners in France. Passing the Rock of Gibraltar and every village and town we liberated we
Some 60,000 stolen French paintings entering the Mediterranean was an were treated warmly by the Italian pop-
that had been taken to Germany during experience. It was a real sight, but I ulace. The Italians were our enemy ear-
the war have since been repatriated. soon understood I was entering a war lier in the war, but as soon as Mussolini
It’s since been observed, though, that zone. Every ship in the convoy had a was out and the Italian government
some lost works have been harder to barrage balloon above it, which was had surrendered, the people welcomed
trace than would otherwise be the case intended to keep enemy airplanes us and we became good friends.
because some museums’ archives and too high to accurately bomb us. After One of my brothers was at
buying practices lack transparency. passing Gibraltar we were attacked by Ortona. That was one of the worst
the Luftwaffe and the balloon above battles Canada has ever fought.
— Annie Laura Smith my ship was shot down. The steel The Germans wanted to prevent

World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011 57

Observation Post

our tanks from breaking through;

so they reduced the town to rubble
and blocked every road. Fighting
through that town was a real slog.
I spent a year in Italy, but that
changed in January 1945 when I went
by naval transport from Livorno to
the French port of Marseilles, then
up north to join the Canadian army
fighting its way along the English
Channel into Belgium and Holland. We
served as part of First Canadian Army
in the final offensive across the Rhine.
Germany surrendered in May
1945. While most Canadian soldiers
were looking forward to returning
home and demobilization, I had
different plans. I volunteered to go
fight Japan, and was sent to Georgia
for training as an airborne soldier in
preparation for the invasion of the
home islands. The war ended before
we had to invade, though; so I was
mustered out of service later that year.
I’m proud of my service during the
war. My time in uniform made me a
man. I’d do it over again; that’s for sure.
For me it was a great experience, but of
course many guys didn’t make it, and
for them the war was a real tragedy.

— Charlie Bell,
as told to Andrew Hind

58 World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011

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World at War 18 | JUN–JUL 2011 59

Media Reviews
America at War Trading Cards,
WWII Series 1: D-Day (iCardz/Graphic
Communications Group, 2009).
Reviewed by Chris Perello.
These cards come as a boxed set
with 24 packs of eight trading cards
— bubblegum not included. Each
card covers one detail of a much
larger story — in this case the Allied
invasion of Normandy in 1944 — with
a picture of a person or event on one
side and a short description on the
other. Some boxes include special
cards, including some autographed
60 World at War 18
by the actual veterans of the “Easy
Company” depicted in Band of Brothers.
The cards are full-color on high-
quality coated cardstock. They’re well
researched and concise, and in the right
combination can tell the complete story
of part of the action or the whole battle.
The downside is each card necessarily is
limited in scope, and each pack or even a
whole box will have gaps in the narrative.
The end result isn’t a detailed and com-
plete account, but could be a way to per-
sonalize one thread of the whole cloth, a
conversation starter, or a good introduc-
tion to the subject for a novice.  ★
| JUN–JUL 2011
With
Custer
at the
Death
by Robert F. Burke
The fascination with Custer’s Last
Stand hasn’t diminished in the decades
since 1876. He led his regiment well
ahead of the main body, only to run
into an unprecedented gathering
of Indians. The first accounts were
pieced together by other soldiers
arriving on the scene in the battle’s
aftermath, and by archaeologists in the
generations since. To that information
was added the reminiscences of
the Indians who fought there.
Interleaving and cross-referencing all
those accounts provides a minute-
by-minute story of the fighting, as
Custer desperately and expertly
maneuvered his outnumbered troops
to face repeated and well-coordinated
assaults by bands of Indian warriors.
The resultant narrative is supported
by dozens of detailed maps and
orders of battle for both sides.
Available now from
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(661) 587-9633
strategyandtacticspress.com
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Turning the
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1982 FALKLAnDS WAr | taiping rebellion | Hattin | Llamas & Lilies

#269 JUL–AUG 2011

FAlklAndS
WAR 1982 Going beyond the usual
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“Blackman Street, London, 1885” by John Atkinson Grimshaw (1836-93). Image from Wikimedia Commons.
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