GROSS DEUTSCHLAND PANZER DIVISION | To Sink a Warship | I Rember: Anzio | Battle of Shanghai, 1932

The Strategy & Tactics of World War II #20 OCT–NOV 2011

GROSSDEUTSCHLAND
PANZER DIVISION

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WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011 3
 The Strategy & Tactics
of World War II
#
20 | OCT–NOV 2011

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Analysis: To Sink a Warship
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Gross Deutschland Panzer:
An Analysis of Hitler’s Elite
By Roger Mason

6 WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011

Origins & Combat History
I
n general, in the early and mid-
1930s the German military was
divided into two groups. The first
was a false front of units that repre-
sented the forces allowed post World
War I treaties. The second group was
made up of the ever more powerful and
numerous sea, air and ground forces
being developed behind the scenes.
More particularly, Berlin was a center
of international attention as Hitler
gained and consolidated power, and
the face of the German Army there was
the Wachtruppe Berlin (Berlin Guard
Troop). Drawn from regiments across
the country on a rotating basis, that
unit provided ceremonial and military
security in the capital city. Starting
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
with the arrival of Hitler, the unit was
continually expanded throughout the
rest of the decade. By January 1939 it
was renamed Infantry Regiment Gross
Deutschland (Greater Germany). It
was by then a stand-alone regiment
with a full complement of support and
administrative units. The soldiers of the
regiment were allowed to wear green
and silver cuff and shoulder tabs bearing
their unit’s name and initials as evidence
of their elite status. The unit was also
unique in that, even as it expanded,
it was allowed to continue to draw
from the pick of recruits from all over
Germany, while the other formations in
the army were territorially recruited.
7

An officer of the II Panzer Regiment
“Grossdeutschland” sporting the
Grossdeutschland cuff title.
France & the Balkans
Though the regiment didn’t take part
in the 1939 Polish campaign, by the next
year the high command determined it
was ready for more than ceremonial and
security duties. Hitler was also interested
in seeing his favorite units received a
mixture of combat and parade ground
experience. The regiment was therefore
attached to Panzer Group Kleist.
That larger formation spearheaded
the invasion of the West and crossed
the Meuse River to participate in the
decisive flanking maneuver beyond
the north end of the Maginot Line.
Men of the panzer regiment check their equipment.
8 WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
After the surrender of France the
regiment prepared to take part in the
invasion of England. When that opera-
tion was cancelled, it was transferred
to a camp at Le Valdahon on the Swiss
border. There the mission was to train
for Operation Felix, a projected attack
on Gibraltar. That was cancelled when
Hitler decided to invade the Balkans.
In early April 1941 the regiment
was moved by rail first to Vienna, then
to Budapest, and then to Szegedin in
Romania. On 11 April it participated in
the invasion of Yugoslavia. Resistance
was light and Gross Deutschland moved
quickly, seizing the town of Pancevo
on the Danube. Its battalions were
detailed to provide security during
the initial occupation of Belgrade.
On 15 June the regiment was moved
to Warsaw. There it was assigned to
the reserve of 2nd Panzer Army.
Barbarossa
On 27 June 1941 the regiment
crossed into Russia as part of Army
Group Center. After heavy fighting
around Minsk the unit crossed the
upper Dnepr River, advancing as far
as the town of Yelnya, where a large-
scale Soviet counterattack stymied
further German movement east toward
Moscow. Fighting continued through the
summer, including a deflection to the
south to take part in the Kiev encircle-
ment. The regiment was then ordered
back north to take part in the renewed
drive on Moscow. By mid-October it
had reached the city of Tula, south of
Moscow. Tula was an important rail and
road junction, and its capture was criti-
cal to the final assault on Moscow. The
regiment took part in repeated attempts
to capture the city, but the overall
offensive ground to a halt with the onset
of winter weather and Tula remained
in Soviet hands. That period was
significant because it marked the first
time a major portion of the unit had to
be replaced due to deaths and injuries.
1942
Fighting continued with the regiment
on the defensive, which further reduced
its strength until, by the end of February,
it was spent. The 2nd Battalion was
disbanded and the two remaining bat-
talions were reformed into a single unit.
By the end of that month the last assault
gun in the regiment had been destroyed.
The regiment was then pulled
out of the line and reorganized, and
a decision was made to upgrade it to
divisional strength. Tanks, artillery,
flak, engineers and support staff were
added. It was redesignated Motorized
Infantry Division Gross Deutschland.
The various new components were
brought together, and in the first week
of June the division joined XXIV Panzer
Corps as part of Army Group South.
 By the end of June the division was
in pursuit of the Soviet units retreating
into Voronezh, while much of the rest
of Army Group South moved across the
Donets River and then toward Stalingrad
and the Caucasus. During August the
division was withdrawn and sent north
to Rzhev to reinforce Army Group Center.
The Soviets began putting pressure
on Rzhev to prevent the establishment
of a German base for a new assault
on Moscow. In that sector the division
became part of XXVII Army (Infantry)
Corps. After a month of inconclusive
fighting, the division was again pulled
back to rest and refit. Parts of it were sent
to reinforce several infantry divisions
that had been mauled in the fighting.
In November the Soviets launched
a major offensive in which the 86th
Infantry Division was crushed. The
only unit close enough to intervene
was 2nd Battalion of the Grenadier
Regiment of Gross Deutschland. Bitter
fighting occurred in the Lutchessa
River valley, lasting nearly a month,
with the panzer grenadiers suffering
serious losses. The division was
withdrawn once again to rest and refit.

1943
The division moved to Smolensk and
then railed to Volchansk, near Belgorod.
By February the Gross Deutschland was
back on the attack between Belgorod
and Kharkov. At that time the division
received its first Tiger tanks and an
additional artillery battalion, just in time
for the new German offensive to retake
Belgorod and Kharkov. The Germans
recaptured those places, thereby achiev-
ing their last major victory in Russia.
From mid-March to the end of June
the division was refitted and reinforced,
with the infantry given greater numbers
of halftracks to improve cross-country
mobility. The Gross Deutschland was
also redesignated Panzer Grenadier
Division Gross Deutschland, and
it was moved to positions north
of Tomarovka in preparation for
Operation Citadel. The panzer regiment
received new Mark V Panther tanks.
Operation Citadel was intended
to reduce the Kursk salient, which
posed a threat along the boundary
line between Army Groups Center
and South. The plan for the offensive
was to pinch off the salient from the
north and south, thereby destroying
the forces the Soviets would need
for their next winter offensive.
The Gross Deutschland was
selected as the spearhead of the
southern attack. The division moved GD grenadiers moving cross-country on foot.

WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011 9

 Organization & Equipment
of the Panzer Grenadiers
The purpose of the panzer grenadier divi-
sions was to provide a mobile combined-arms
force that could fight in concert with armored
divisions as well as on their own. Army plan-
ners originally intended those divisions would
be fully equipped with mechanized infantry
transport as well as tanks; however, in 1939 the
mechanization process remained far from com-
plete. The Polish campaign included everything
from fully mechanized divisions to others exclu-
sively using horses pulling wagons for their
transport. For average units that kind of mix
didn’t change throughout the course of the war.
Panzer grenadier divisions were intended
to provide a force that could operate at the
same speed as tanks; so elite divisions such
as Gross Deutschland were well equipped
with the vehicles needed to make possible
that type of rapid movement. In 1943 the
division was composed of four regiments: the
panzer regiment, the grenadier regiment, the
fusilier regiment and the artillery regiment.
The panzer regiment was equipped
with Mark IV, V and VI tanks. The Mark
IVs were armed with excellent long-barrel
75mm cannon. The Mark V was known as
the “Panther,” weighed 44 tons and had
better sloped armor than its predecessors.
In May 1943 the first Tigers were delivered
to the Gross Deutschland Division.
The famous Hanomag transport.
10
The Mark VI Tiger was a heavy tank
weighing 62 tons and armed with an 88mm
cannon. The division’s panzer regiment had
four companies of Mark IVs and Vs and two
companies of Mark VIs. Tigers assigned
directly to a division were rare, because most
of them were deployed in separate battalions
that were kept under direct control of army or
army group commanders (for commitment at
decisive times and places within larger battles).
The grenadier regiment had its troops
mounted in SdKfz. 251 Hanomag halftracks.
Those vehicles were lightly armored and could
carry 12 infantrymen. The grenadier units were
also supplied with trucks and other prime
movers. The prime mover was the SdKfz. 9
Famo heavy halftrack. They could pull artillery,
supply wagons or even tow disabled tanks.
Unlike the Hanomag, it had no side armor and
was equipped with three open bench seats for
its crew. Flatbed Famo could mount a light flak
gun, a crane for vehicle repair and engineering
tasks, or serve as a tank recovery vehicle.
The fusilier regiment had more troops
in Hanomags, a full flak section and an
anti-tank battalion. They also had a variety
of trucks, both German and captured enemy
models. The flak section had more Famo
with towed 88mm multi-purpose (anti-
armor/anti-aircraft) guns along with smaller
caliber rapid-fire weapons on flatbeds.
The anti-tank battalion was equipped
with towed anti-tank guns and the
Jagdpanzer SdKfz.139 Hetzer. The Hetzer
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
was a small tank destroyer, based on
captured Czech chasses, which was also used
successfully as an infantry-support assault
gun. The Hetzer carried a 76mm gun.
The artillery regiment was equipped with
both towed and self-propelled artillery (SPA).
The regiment had two batteries of SdKfz
124 Wespes and one battery of SdKfz 165
Hummels. The Wespe was based on a Mark II
Panzer chassis and armed with a 105mm how-
itzer. The Hummel was based on both Mark III
and IV chassis and carried a 150mm howitzer.
The Hummels were often accompanied by
Munitionstrager, which were gunless models
used to carry extra ammunition. Those ammuni-
tion carriers could be converted by giving
them guns retrieved from disabled Hummels.
The division was further strengthened
by an assault gun brigade comprised of three
batteries of Sturmgeschutz IIIs. They were
based on the Panzer Mark III chassis, with first
a short-barrel and then a long-barrel 75mm gun.
The low silhouette made it difficult to target
and an effective tank killer. For Kursk the regi-
ment had 35 of those guns with long-barrel 75s.
The table of organization was rounded
out by an engineer battalion that had one
Hanomag-mounted and three truck-mounted
companies. The rest of the division was com-
prised of miscellaneous support troops. Some
of the most important were the vehicle recovery
crews with mobile workshops that returned
damaged tanks and vehicles to the fight. ★
Hummel Wespe

WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011 11

 » continued from page 9
off on the morning of 4 July, but the
effort literally bogged down when
the new Panthers became trapped
by muddy conditions and previously
undetected minefields. In eight days
of fierce fighting the division suffered
heavy casualties and was pulled back.
After a short rest the division was
sent north to Karachev to stabilize
the front in that area. From there the
division fought a continuous rearguard
action back to the Dnepr River. That
included heavy fighting during August
at Akhtyka. The division covered
the withdrawal to the Kremenchug
bridgehead, then south through
continuous fighting to Mischurin Rog.
The year ended with German retreats
along the entire front, during which the
division gained the nickname the “Fire
Brigade” for its repeated deployment
to the points of greatest threat.

1944
In January the division moved
south toward the Crimea to slow the
advance there of 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian
Fronts. The division was relieved and
sent to Hungary in March. Next they
participated in heavy defensive fighting
in the Carpathian Mountains at Targul
Frumos, where some of its formations
were entirely wiped out. The remnants
of the division were pulled back for
refitting and regrouping. By summer the
Gross Deutschland had moved back to
the front and took part in the defense
of East Prussia. In October the division
fought in the Memel bridgehead. In
November the unit was redesignated
a panzer corps, combining the Gross
Deutschland and Brandenburg Divisions.

The stalled advance toward Kursk.

12 WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011


1945
By March the division was down to
4,500 men and a handful of vehicles,
with most finally surrendering to the
Soviets at Pillau; however, approximately
800 escaped west and surrendered to
the British. Those who surrendered to
the Soviets remained in various gulags
until the mid-1950s. Only a handful of
survivors returned to Germany. ✪
SELECTED SOURCES
Erickson, J. (1983). The Road to Berlin. London, UK: Cassell
Books.
Hastings, M. (2005). Armageddon: The Battle for Germany,
1944-45. New York, NY: Random House.
Hoffmann, P. (2000). Hitler’s Personal Security. New York,
NY: De Capo Press.
Lucas, J. (1982). War on the Eastern Front: 1941-1945, The
German Soldier in Russia. New York, NY: Bonanza
Books.
Sajer, G. (2000). The Forgotten Soldier. Dulles, VA: Potomac
Books.
Scheibert, H. (1987). Panzer Grenadier Division Gross
Deutschland. Carrollton, Tx: Squadron Publications
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
Inc.
Schneider, W. (2005). Panzer Tactics: German Small Unit
Armor Tactics in World War Two. Mechanicsburg, PA:
Stackpole Books.
US War Department (1990). Handbook on German Military
Forces. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State Univ. Press.
Williamson, G. (2002). German Army Elite Units, 1939-45.
Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing.
Bull, S. (2005). World War Two Infantry Tactics: Company
and Battalion. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing.
Glantz, D. & House, J. (1999). The Battle of Kursk. Lawrence,
KA: Univ. of Kansas Press.
13
Hitler’s Other Favorites
Gross Deutschland was one of a group
of German Army and Air Force units that
came to be considered elite by Hitler and the
high command. They were often connected
directly to Hitler in some way, and their (often
officially declared) elite status indicated an
elevated sense of personal loyalty to him.
Hitler’s favorites were thus bestowed with
unique uniform items that helped distinguish
them from the soldiers of other units. They
also received a steady stream of the best
equipment available. At the same time, though,
they were committed to relentless combat
that often decimated their ranks. In cycles of
near-destruction and regrouping that ran to
the end of the war, Hitler always found the
resources and personnel to rebuild them.
As regular units shrank from combat losses,
the elites grew in relative combat power and
battlefield significance. While a regular army
panzer division might be reduced to two-dozen
tanks and assault guns, an elite unit would
be kept much nearer to full strength. Because
of Hitler’s confidence in their abilities, they
were routinely sent to emergencies that
developed on every front. That practice in
turn often resulted in heavy losses to the
units, which would then restart the cycle of
rebuilding and emergency recommitment.
Feldherrnhalle Division
The Feldherrnhalle (Commanders’ Hall) was
originally a ceremonial pavilion on the main
plaza in Munich, Bavaria. The location became
the flashpoint of a bloody confrontation during
the failed 1923 Munich “Beer Hall” Putsch.
Later, Hitler made it into a Nazi shrine commem-
orating the storm troopers killed in the incident.
Hitler had earlier planted the seed of
this division when he established a special
Sturm Abteilung (SA or Assault Detachment)
guard unit to protect the offices of the Nazi
Party. They were soon unofficially called
the “Brownshirts,” due to their distinctive
uniforms. With the start of the war the SA
was folded into the regular German Army.
Many of the members of the original guard
unit were then formed into the 271st Infantry
Regiment, which was in turn attached to the 60th
Infantry Division. That regiment was given the
honorary title of the Feldherrnhalle Regiment.
After the 1940 fighting in France, the regi-
ment was bounced from division to division and
served on the Russian front. In 1943 it returned
to the 60th Division, which was then being
reorganized as a panzer grenadier unit. That
entire reorganized formation received the title
Feldherrnhalle, along with a unique brown cuff
band with the name inscribed in silver thread.
In 1944 the division was absorbed into
the 13th Panzer Division, which then took on
the honorific title. Additional panzer units
were added, and the division was broken
14
into two new panzer divisions and upgraded
again to a panzer corps. In May 1945 the
corps surrendered in Czechoslovakia.
Hoch und Deutschmeister
Division
The Hoch and Deutschmeister (Infantry)
Division traced its roots to elite units of the
Austrian Army formed in the 18th century to com-
bat the Turks, and which were fully incorporated
into the German Army at the time of the 1938
Anschluss. (The name is probably best translated
as the “Supreme and German Master Infantry
Division.”) The division participated in the inva-
sion of Poland and France, and was eventually
transferred to the eastern front where it was
assigned to 6th Army for the drive on Stalingrad.
There it was cited for bravery while attempting
to prevent the encirclement of 6th Army. That
sacrifice was favorably noted by Hitler.
The division was therefore reconstituted
after Stalingrad and reorganized under the
title Reich Grenadier Division Hoch and
Deutschmeister, and was awarded a black cuff
band bearing that name. A blue Maltese cross
Men of Infantry Regiment List.
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
with the word “Stalingrad” on it was worn
on the soldiers’ shoulder straps and garrison
caps. The division spent much of 1943 and
1944 fighting in Italy before being transferred
to Hungary, where it remained until retreating
west and surrendering to the US Army in 1945.
Infantry Regiment “List”
Hitler wanted to commemorate his World
War I unit, the 16th Bavarian Reserve Regiment
“List” (named for its founding colonel). Though
disbanded in 1919, by 1939 the unit had been
reactivated and incorporated into the 57th
Infantry Division, and it fought in the invasion
of France. It participated in the invasion
of Russia and fought at Kursk in 1943. The
entire division was awarded a dark green cuff
band with its name in silver embroidery.
In February 1944 the division was trapped
in the Cherkassy Pocket and only escaped after
suffering heavy casualties. It was trapped again
at Minsk with nearly a total loss of personnel.
It was reconstituted and sent back to Russia,
where it barely escaped destruction during
the follow-on Soviet offensive. The remnants
of the division continued fighting until 8 May
1945, when they surrendered to the Soviets.
Hermann Goering Parachute
Panzer Division
In 1933 Hermann Goering became the head
of all police in Prussia, which included Berlin.
He raised a battalion for special assignments
and to serve as his personal guard unit. In 1934
that unit was enlarged and given full military
training. It was then called Landespolizeigruppe
General Goering (National Police Group
General Goering). When Goring took over the
Luftwaffe, the unit went with him. It became
a full regiment that included paratroops and

HG Division in Italy.
heavy flak units. Those flak formations were
detailed to provide anti-aircraft protection for
Hitler when he was in Berlin, on his train, or
at his mountaintop retreat at Obersalzburg.
The regiment fought in France and the early
stages of the Russian campaign. They wore a
standard German army uniform with Luftwaffe
wings on the breast and a blue cuff band with
“Hermann Goering” sewn on it. The heavy flak
units were attached to panzer units in Army
Group South during 1941, until they were
withdrawn to transition into a brigade. Goering
then decided he rated an entire division named
after him. So various miscellaneous units were
collected and supplemented by experienced
armored crew from the army. Thus the Hermann
Goering Parachute Panzer Division was born.
In early 1943 components of the division
were sent to North Africa, where they were
captured when Axis forces surrendered in
Tunisia. The division was then sent with new
Tiger I tanks to Sicily, where it fought stubbornly
against the Allied invasion. The division suc-
cessfully retreated to mainland Italy, where it
fought at Salerno and Anzio. It was withdrawn
from Italy and rebuilt in time to defend
Warsaw against the Soviet offensive there.
In late 1944 the division was divided
into separate panzer and panzer grenadier
divisions and was redesignated Panzerkorps
Hermann Goering. During the final weeks of
the war it fought a delaying action back to
Dresden, where it was finally surrounded by
the Soviets. The survivors were shipped to
Siberia, where most perished in the gulags. ★
Offensive Operations
The Germans gave great thought to the development of their offensive doctrine
during the prewar years. The foundation of it was Auftragstaktik (mission-oriented
tactics), a system originally devised by the Prussian Army in the mid-19th century. That
meant orders to small units provided the overall objective and the intention of the
higher-level commander, but the small-unit commanders were in turn left free to develop
a solution based on the situation as they saw it evolving during combat.
Because Gross Deutschland was a panzer grenadier (mechanized
infantry) unit, its particular offensive doctrine became a mixture of armor and
infantry solutions. The mid-war addition of armored transport vehicles for
the infantry allowed them to cooperate more closely with the tanks.
All offensive planning began with the identification of a Schwerpunkt (main point of
concentration). Within and near that Schwerpunkt, units were assigned specific avenues
of advance to decrease confusion and the possibility of friendly fire situations.
Armored offensive tactics were in turn based on the idea of continual move-
ment. Three specific forms of attack were: meeting engagement, hasty attack
and deliberate attack. The meeting engagement was intended to allow lead
units to quickly transition, upon first contact with a moving enemy, to offensive
operations before the surprised enemy could organize his response.
The doctrine further dictated that, in fluid tactical environments, battalion
commanders must be prepared to attack even when their units weren’t at optimal
strength or properly concentrated. German armor units therefore conducted
extensive training in transition from march columns to hasty attack formations.
Deliberate attack was used when facing an enemy in a prepared defense. Different
parts of the overall attacking formation would then be assigned individual Schwerpunkt,
based on the exact type of defensive position each one would be facing.
That general approach in turn led to the development of the Kampfgruppe (KG or battle-
group) concept. In theory it involved carefully selecting units, equipment and personnel from
as wide an overall spectrum as possible in order to optimally customize a force for the mission
at hand. By 1944, however, KG had generally deteriorated in practice into hastily collecting
any survivors and vehicles and throwing them back into battle as ad hoc reinforcements. ★
Final preparations for an attack.
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011 15
Defensive Operations
While Hitler had envisioned staying on
the strategic offensive until final victory, by
the winter of 1941-42 the issue of large-scale
defensive operations was current and
contentious. Hitler generally insisted ground
once taken must be held at all costs. His com-
manders preferred the ebb and flow of elastic
defense, which offered greater opportunities
for preserving personnel and equipment while
generating chances for eventual counterattack.
For the Gross Deutschland Division, defensive
tactics became the key to survival.
From the German doctrinal perspective the
ultimate goal of defensive operations was the
deployment of available forces in such a way
as to create the opportunity to counterattack.
Defenders were to fight from blocking positions
with the coordination of personnel, equipment
and resources coming from “coordination points”
(Anschlusspunkt). Those coordination points
were the flipside of the offensive Schwerpunkt.
The primary mission of the coordination
point was to maintain the cohesion of the
overall defense. It maintained contact with
neighboring units and shared local intelligence.
That was especially important in regard to
observed changes that might impact neighboring
units, such as enemy forces redeploying.
Whenever possible, that reporting was
facilitated by hardwire communication lines.
16
Forward blocking positions were hardened
sites sometimes supported by tanks. “Hardened”
on the eastern front, however, was a far cry from
Atlantic Wall type fortifications. They were usu-
ally just dug in positions that made use of local
terrain advantages. The mission of the blocking
positions was to break up the overall momentum
of the enemy attack and channel it into smaller
areas that counterattacks could then destroy
piecemeal. Blocking positions might use tanks,
assault guns or towed guns for support.
Once the enemy got past the forward
blocking positions, they hit the main defensive
area. That was ideally to be set up as a defense
in depth with three lines: the forward security
position, the main battle line and the rear area.
The forward security area was usually
only lightly held. The German goal within that
area was to further harass the enemy
forces that had already been broken up and
channelized by the blocking positions.
The overall depth of a properly constructed
German defensive position meant attackers
were never to be sure when they would hit
the main battle line. That initial contact was
intended to be a severe shock to them.
The rear areas were organized to
resupply the forward defense positions and
provide staging areas for further counterat-
tacks. The access routes were chosen to
provide the greatest protection for troops
and equipment moving between them.
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
In the main defensive line, tanks were used
in three types of positions: open, hull down and
concealed. Open was never the best option
because of the obvious threat to survivability.
Hull down offered the best protection for tanks
and assault guns, because full concealment
(which restricted mobility) was only good
until the shooting started. Tanks hull down
on the edge of towns or in tree lines were
sometimes able to get off the first shot during
enemy attacks and then get away before heavy
return fire could be brought against them.
Counterattacks came in two forms: planned
and hasty. Planned counterattacks often
coincided with favorable terrain features that
allowed the defenders opportunities to try
to stop their retreat and retake the initiative.
Decisions were made ahead of time establishing
what the limits of such counterattacks would be.
Hasty counterattacks were based on local condi-
tions and opportunistic timing. Commanders
were expected to seize unanticipated opportuni-
ties to attack and thereby regain the initiative.
As the war progressed the issue of fighting
from encirclements also grew in importance.
When encircled the first step was the preserva-
tion of morale and the prevention of “encircle-
ment fever” (Kesselfieber). It was found that the
knowledge among the soldiers their unit was
cut off could easily result in panic that greatly
diminished their survival potential. The key was
providing as much information as possible to
the soldiers. The better they understood the
situation, the more they were likely to hang on.
If the encircled force was relying on
outside forces for their rescue, an airfield
generally had to be maintained. Resupply
was prioritized as ammunition then food. Any
planes that landed always left with whatever
wounded could be carried. Aerial resupply
proved successful in smaller pockets, but was
unsuccessful for large pockets like Stalingrad.
The Germans developed three defensive
strategies for breaking encirclements. The
first was a hedgehog defense, where troops
dug in to await relief from outside forces That
was used when holding a position deemed
critical or when trapped units were too
weak to conduct their own breakout.
If the position was critical, the problem
became determining when the defenders
had become too weak to assist in, or conduct
on their own, a break out. Indecision
in that regard ultimately determined
the fate of 6th Army at Stalingrad.
Oberst Karl Lorenz, commander of the Grossdeutschland Panzer Regiment, meeting with the crew of a Panther in south Russia.
The second type of encirclement defense
involved conducting active operations to
break the enemy line and thus regain freedom
of movement. Initially all disabled vehicles
were cannibalized to provide maximum fuel
and spare parts for the others. The point
of greatest weakness in the enemy line
was determined, and the breakout was
coordinated with the nearest friendly force.
The third strategy was the mobile pocket.
That approach was selected when the nearest
friendly forces weren’t strong enough to attack
toward the pocket, or if the distance that had
to be covered in order to escape was too great
for a single thrust from inside the pocket. As
the pocket moved, battlegroups were sent out
to shield it from the direct impact of an attack
and conceal the intent of the movement.
As the war progressed, training and
equipment were developed to deal with
the realities of defensive operations. Gross
Deutschland recruit training included extensive
practice in preparing hasty defensive positions
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
and the use of the panzerfaust man-carried
anti-tank weapon. The panzerfaust was a 13
lb. disposable steel tube with an explosive
shaped-charge on its end. When fired, a rocket
charge propelled the explosive head up to 200
feet and, when well handled, it was capable
of defeating any tank armor of the day.
The problem with German defensive
techniques was they required time to effectively
prepare. As the pace of Soviet offensives accel-
erated in late 1943, there was less and less time
to do that. In practice, then, when attacked, the
strongest surviving units were hastily collected
in groups and rushed to locations where break-
throughs were occurring. That usually meant a
handful of tanks or assault guns were rapidly
shifted from crisis to crisis as the defenders
tried to slow the enemy offensive. Defensive
operations based on strategy and training
were thus replaced by hasty improvisation. The
strength of the Soviet offensives, combined
with the diminishing resources of the defenders,
resulted in the defeat of the German Army. ★
17
Command & Control
Elite units like the Gross Deutschland
were prized by the high command for their
ability to move rapidly while engaging in a
variety of operational and tactical situations.
Efficient command and control was critical
to those high-tempo operations. When the
Germans used mission-oriented tactics,
battalion commanders had great latitude in
how their operations were conducted. To
accomplish that, a standard headquarters
organization for the battalion was developed.
Each battalion had its headquarters
company. The headquarters company had four
platoons: signals, armored reconnaissance,
engineer, and air defense. Later in the war
the signals platoon was sometimes placed
directly within the command group.
In an armored unit the battalion commander
had three tanks: the command tank in which he
rode, the secondary tank with the battalion adju-
tant, and a third reserve tank commanded by a
senior non-commissioned officer. While leading
the battalion from a tank seemed initially attrac-
tive, many commanders came to find halftracks
allowed them more space and the ability to
better access radios and maps during a battle.
When a command post was established,
the senior officer of the headquarters company
was in charge there and reported directly to the
battalion commander. Radio communication was
maintained in the command tank or halftrack
with the aid of a radio truck. There were two fre-
quencies: the battalion frequency allowed com-
pany commanders to communicate with battal-
ion headquarters; the other frequency connected
the battalion commander to higher authority.
The range of German battlefield wireless
communications varied with conditions. If a unit
was unable to maintain radio communications, a
18
secondary unit was placed midway to relay mes-
sages. That became more and more important
on the eastern front, where subordinate units
were often spread over large frontages.
One problem with the battalion
radio net came from the fact over
a dozen sub-units and their personnel had
access to it. That included everyone from
company commanders to forward air controllers.
Combat situations demanded strict radio
discipline, and radio silence while on the
move often also needed to be maintained.
Units might be ordered to set their sets only
to receive; however, that stricture could
be broken if a unit discovered the enemy
was moving forward to make contact.
Besides radios, command and control was
also conducted using hand signals, flags and
lights. Hand signals were common among
smaller units. Flag signaling was eventually
discarded due to the difficulty of manipulating
them while vehicles were moving and during
combat. Lights (red, green and white) were
most often used at night. Individual units often
developed their own light shields from discarded
cans and boxes to try to ensure their signals
wouldn’t be easily spotted by the enemy.
When a battalion from the Gross
Deutschland was on the move, the platoon
or company commanders had the authority
to open fire and attack. They were expected
to immediately report the following by radio:
enemy strength and location, the current posi-
tion and course of action of their own units, and
any recommendations of the reporting officer.
At battalion headquarters a signals
officer would filter the incoming data to
provide the commander a summary of
vital information. That prevented the com-
mander from becoming overwhelmed with
confusing and overlapping reports.
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
When advancing, the company com-
manders would lead in their vehicles. If
reconnaissance platoons located the enemy,
the company command vehicles would move
to the location providing the greatest visual
access. The rest of the company would move
forward and past them to the attack.
Good reconnaissance was an important
part of command and control. Armor and
panzer grenadier units conducted two types of
reconnaissance. Combat reconnaissance was
always focused on providing the commander
knowledge of the whereabouts and strength
of the enemy. Terrain reconnaissance
identified the roads and paths the follow-on
units should take. That included the location
of river fords, the quality of the roads, and
terrain suitable for blocking positions if the
advance turned into a defensive operation.
When transitioning to hasty attack, the bat-
talion commander had to rely on the platoon and
company commanders who were closest to the
action. A main objective was quickly identified,
and follow-on units were given instructions
on their line of approach to it. A decision was
necessary whether to eliminate or bypass
any enemy position that was encountered.
If bypassed, the battalion commander had
to identify it as an enemy strongpoint and
select the follow on force to destroy it.
In the end the German troops on the
eastern front were defeated by a less
sophisticated enemy. The Soviets who faced
the Gross Deutschland Division had few of the
advantages of flexible command and control
supported by modern communication technology.
Their overwhelming numbers, constant resupply
from an ever-larger Soviet and Allied economic
base, and their willingness to accept frightful
levels of casualties proved decisive. ★
GROSS DEUTSCHLAND PANZER
The Famous Divisions Series, featuring Gross Deutschland
Panzer (FDGDP) in its first installment, is a new evolution in design
that brings tactics to operational simulations. Recreating four
battles from the eastern front in 1943-44, it includes: Lutchessa
Valley, Kursk, Akhtyrka and Mischurin Rog. Each is played on its
own detailed and historically accurate map. It was designed by John
Schettler and has been developed by Eric Harvey and Ty Bomba.
Combat is governed by 140 Event Chits. They introduce the
element of chaos. Certain chits may be nullified by the play other
chits; so you never know how an attack will be resolved based on
odds and terrain. The number of chits a given side may hold and
draw also serves as a measure of its elite or non-elite status.
Each hex represents 550 yards from side to opposite side. Each
turn represents six hours, but they’re not divided into friendly and
enemy player turns. Rather, each is made up of numerous head-
quarters activations. All HQ activation chits are placed in a cup, and
they’re drawn one at a time to activate (movement and combat) a
particular headquarters and its associated units. When that activation
is finished, a new HQ is drawn and its activation takes place.
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
FDGDP is a “special edition” game that includes two counter-sheets
(560 counters) and four maps (on two 34x22” sheets) of the various
battlefields where the highlighted battles were fought. Combat units
(iconic) are individual companies featuring distinct vehicles and weapons.
Play is tactical: units have individual ranges, different movement
capabilities depending on type (wheeled, tracked or leg), and rules
cover such things as demolishing bridges, pontoon bridges, weather,
overrun, supply, infantry riding tanks, direct and ranged fire, artillery
barrage, opportunity fire, night, bunkers, trenches, mines, dragons teeth,
engineers, armor recovery vehicles, airpower and anti-aircraft artillery.
$50 US Customers
$56 Canadian Customers
$58 Overseas Customers
All prices include postage for first class or airmail shipping.
CA residents add $3.19 sales tax.
Send to: Decision Games
ATTN: WaW Game Offer
PO Box 21598
Bakersfield, CA 93390
19
Design Corner
Joseph Miranda
GROSS DEUTSCHLAND PANZER
G
ross Deutschland Panzer demon-
strates once again the principle
of synergy in wargame design.
The original concept, first articulated
in a proposal almost two decades
ago, was for a tactical game following
the progress of famous World War II
divisions, with scenarios representing
their major actions. While the original
design provided insight into the nature
of tactical combat in that era, its pro-
cedurally dense system aged poorly.
Developer Eric Harvey streamlined
it to make it more accessible. Still,
what was needed was something that
would model the human dimension in
warfare. Thus, Ty Bomba came up with
the sub-system of players randomly
drawing Event Chits that enhance, or
detract from, their intended actions.
While random events have been
widely used in operational and
strategic games, they’re usually seen as
something above the scale of individual
battles or as things that occur only infre-
quently. Here their near-constant
management in play becomes the key
test of player success. Their appearance
in this game is therefore innovative.
Actually, chaos factors—that’s what
random events in wargaming essentially
model—are just as prevalent on the
tactical battlefield as they are in the
bigger strategic picture, if not more so.
Given that any kind of firefight is going
20
to be far less a controlled event, as com-
pared to general staffs moving markers
representing divisions or corps across
maps of theaters of operation, some
accounting for chaos needs to included
if a tactical game is to be considered
truly “accurate” at the deepest level.
On the mechanical level, the chits
are simply modifiers to various game
functions. On another level, however,
they provide the central narrative.
The totality of the chits that come out
during each play of the game tell a story,
adding a new perceptual dimension
to it. That ensures each time you play
the “story” will be different, even if the
outcome is the same. The battle isn’t
simply one of adding up combat factors
and rolling a die. It’s also a matter of
managing the human dimension,
which in turn provides the opportunity
to exploit unanticipated situations.
As on real battlefields, in the
game there’s no “sure thing” and
the best plan often doesn’t survive
first contact with the enemy (or an
unfortunate chit pull). The chits are
also an easy way to integrate a lot of
other factors into play without having
to write special rules. Rather, the chits
generate unique situations under the
umbrella of one general rules set.
Aside from the events, the system
also accounts for other important fac-
tors operating on the tactical battlefield,
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
such as command activations. Units
can attack only if they’re within a
certain radius of an active headquarters.
The players therefore can’t assume
omniscient viewpoints, moving forces
without handling issues of command
and control. Instead, you have to
plan on getting your headquarters to
the right places so they can activate
their formations at the right times.
The rule is simple but effective.
Headquarters are also useful
for providing supply, another often
neglected factor in tactical games.
Ammunition, fuel and medical
support are just as much a part of
battle as are fire and movement.
Gross Deutschland was one of
Germany’s premier units. Usually
the low-numbered divisions of the
Waffen SS, or sometimes the Luftwaffe
paratroops, get that status, but this
division (later a corps) accomplished
incredible feats on the eastern front. In
the game there are four scenarios, each
distilled from major clashes in which
the division fought: Kursk, Akhtyrka,
Mischurin Rog and Lutchessa Valley.
We’re presently preparing the
next game in the series, Guards
Armour, covering the famous British
division that fought its way across
northwest Europe in 1944. ✪

Battle for Stalingrad
In the autumn of 1942, 14 German divisions
of the Sixth Army and Fourth Panzer
Army were poised to attack the vital city
of Stalingrad. Facing the German forces
were dozens of divisions and brigades of
the Soviet 62nd army. For seven weeks the
Germans would hammer at the city in a
seesaw conflict for control of the Volga River.
Battle for Stalingrad simulates the
campaign that would halt the German
drive to the east in the Soviet Union.
The playing map represents the terrain
in and around Stalingrad, and the colorful
cardboard playing pieces reflect the sizes and
strengths of the opposing military units.
Battle for Stalingrad is a classic game
design by noted game designer John Hill.
Game components include:
Two rule booklets (standard and optional),
600 die cut cardboard playing pieces, one
22 x 34 inch map and various player aids.
Classic
History
Classic
Games
Ancient Conquest
Ancient Conquest is a classic and highly
rated multiplayer game covering at a grand
strategic level the rise and fall of empires
and peoples in the ancient near east. Ancient
Assyria, Egypt, Babylon and the Hittites are all
included, as well as numerous other powers.
Historically, a highly accurate game, while
yet designed with elegantly simple game
mechanics; Ancient Conquest is sure to be
a favorite. A must for any game enthusiast.
Game components include:
Full color rule booklet, one map and 200
die cut counters and numerous charts.
Available Now
Battle for Stalingrad: $54.95
Ancient Concquest: $44.95
Shipping Additional
available from:
Decision Games
(661) 587-9633 | (661) 587-5031 fax
P.O. Box 21598 | Bakersfield CA 93390
decisiongames.com
S&T 270 | SEP–OCT 2011 1
I Remember:
Sgt. John Shirley & the Anzio Battle Sleds
As Told to J.E. & H.W. Kaufmann

Sherman tanks ofloading at Anzio.

22 WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011

Background
S
ince the Salerno landing in
September 1943, the Allies
had only slowly worked their
way up the Italian “boot” until the
weather, terrain and staunch German
resistance brought them to a halt in
December. Operation Shingle, the Allied
amphibious assault at Anzio, took place
on 22 January 1944. Gen. Mark Clark,
commanding US Fifth Army, hoped
to land Gen. John P. Lucas’s VI Corps
behind the German Winter Line, have
that force break out toward Rome, and
thereby collapse the enemy main front.
In conjunction with the Anzio
landing, the 34th and 36th “Texas” Infantry
Divisions had launched an assault on
the main front in January. The 36th suf-
fered a major reverse trying to cross the
Rapido River, while the 34th only reached
the lower slopes of Monte Cassino
by 24 January. Meanwhile, the Allied
forces that had landed at Anzio had
barely managed to advance 10 miles. At
Cassino 4th Indian and 2nd New Zealand
Divisions relieved US II Corps in mid-
February, setting up British Eighth Army
to initiate a renewed battle for that area.
That British first effort failed; so
its New Zealand Corps made a third
attempt to take Monte Cassino in
mid-March, but again failed. That
position, including the infamously
bombed out ruins of its Benedictine
Abby, wouldn’t fall until a fourth battle
was fought for it in mid-May, when II
Polish Corps took over the effort. Had
Anzio been a success, those horrific
battles wouldn’t have been needed.
The initial landing at Anzio had
taken German Field Marshal Albert
Kesselring, commanding the Italian
theater, by surprise. Allied forces landed
opposed by only a few artillery pieces
and two companies of grenadiers that
were easily overcome. The landing
force began an easy advance inland,
but then stopped. Lucas had received
fewer divisions than originally promised
for the operation, and he feared his
force of only three infantry divisions
and a combat command from 1st
Armored Division would be cut off if
he tried to make a deep penetration.
While Lucas consolidated, Kesselring
rushed to the area the few units he
had available, while other divisions
from outside Italy were moved in.
Thus the surprise attack that was
meant to collapse the overall German
position in central Italy turned into
a quagmire that tied down an Allied
corps in a small beachhead.
Enter John Shirley
In January 1944, at the time of the
initial Anzio landing, John Shirley was
at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He followed the
news from the various war fronts, but
he had no inkling he would soon find
himself in the Anzio beachhead when he
received orders to go overseas. He’d cele-
brated his 18th birthday a little more than
a year earlier on 8 December 1942. A few
months later he’d been drafted while still
attending California State Polytechnic
University at San Luis Obispo.
He was glad when his letter
of “Greetings” from the Federal
government was delivered in March
1943. He packed his belongings and
boarded a Greyhound bus bound for
his home at Costa Mesa, south of Los
Angles, on a beautiful spring day.
A soldier from the 35th Infantry
Division, stationed at Camp San Luis
Obispo near his former college campus,
boarded the bus with him. On their jour-
ney south, as they passed Camp Cooke,
they saw a gate in front of a field of
sagebrush and sand and in the distance
behind it some new crude tarpaper and
wood barracks. The camp, isolated from
population centers, sprawled on a pla-
teau surrounded by hills. Construction
of a permanent camp on the site had
begun in September 1941, and the
post had been activated a month later.
Previously it had merely been an open
training area. Though construction on
the site continued well into 1942, the 5th
Armored Division began to train there in
the spring. It was soon joined by other
divisions. Shirley’s traveling companion
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
assured him, as they peered through
the bus window, he was looking at the
“worst army post in the country.”
After a few weeks at home, Shirley
reported to the induction center in
Riverside. A week later, with a sense
of elation, he boarded another bus
with other inductees. He felt that
a great adventure awaited him:
We were winding our way north
through Los Angeles as it grew dark.
The bus stopped about 10:00 that
evening. We stepped out and looked
around in the dim light of a yellow
bulb on a telephone pole. We could
see a paved street, some garbage
cans, some wooden barracks, and
that was about all. We were in the
middle of Camp Cooke! I was about
200 miles from home and about 65
miles from where I had been going to
college. So much for seeing the world!
Basic training lasted four months.
Instead of undergoing standard infantry
training, Shirley and his companions
prepared to serve in armored infantry
units, receiving instruction and practice
on driving jeeps, trucks and halftracks.
During tactical problems while riding
in halftracks, “the tracks churned up
clouds of dust, so we wore goggles and a
mask over our eyes, mouths and noses.”
The training included learning
the manual of arms and close
order drill, with lots of practice and
many inspections: “We learned the
nomenclature of the M-1 Garand rifle,
and could field-strip it blindfolded.”
23

Weapons training also included field-
stripping and firing the .45 caliber pistol,
the M-1 carbine and the Browning
Automatic Rifle (BAR). Each man took
his turn firing 60mm mortars and the 30
caliber air-cooled light machineguns.
For close combat training they practiced
‘fighting’ burlap dummies as well as
each other. Time was allotted to practice
with hand grenades, along with a visit
to the “gas chamber” to learn the proper
use of gas masks. The trainees were
also introduced to TNT, landmines and
barbed wire. Field training included how
to advance against an enemy position:
While some of the squad would
fire toward the enemy, other men
would get up, run a short distance,
hit the dirt, roll, and start firing
while the rest of the squad moved
up. There was a set of hand signals
used by the squad leader to direct
us. We learned to move along the
ground in an “infantry crawl.”
Poison oak was a big problem, and
some men ended up in the hospital
from exposure to it. Rattlesnakes
were another threat, and large snakes
would be killed from time to time. I
don’t remember anyone being bitten,
but they were frequently on our mind.
The exercises were usually done
without live fire, but as training
progressed we would use live
ammunition. One of the last exercises
24
was to advance through an obstacle
course with live machinegun bullets
firing overhead. Small explosives
were placed in the ground along
our route to simulate the explo-
sions of mortars or artillery fire.
Training films added another dimen-
sion, along with an opportunity to catch
40 winks for those who could get away
with it. Memorable lectures on venereal
diseases were also part of the course, as
was daily “P.T.” (physical training, a.k.a.
calisthenics), the running of obstacle
courses, inspections, guard and mess
duty, and memorizing and reciting the
army’s General Orders. He found the last
day of training a unique experience:
We marched out on the drill field by
platoons. The company commander
then formed the platoons four
abreast, forming a large square
instead of a column of platoons. He
drilled the large massed formation for
a short time; the large mass of men
did their best to keep their ranks even
to the right, left and straight-ahead
as we moved as a company. After
about a half-hour, I was called out
in front of the company and was
asked to drill the company. I was the
only recruit asked to do that, and
was amazed and honored by the
opportunity. The training company
officers were on the lookout for future
leaders. Four of us in the 200-man
training company were promoted to
corporals at the end of basic training.
Once they completed training, all the
recruits, except the four new corporals,
one of whom was Shirley, got two weeks
leave before moving on to their next
duty station. That summer Cpl. Shirley
left for Fort Sill, Oklahoma, about 1,600
miles from his home. That post had
many beautiful brick buildings, trees
and grass parade fields: “I found it a
pleasant contrast from my first post,
but our company was still in tar paper
barracks in a new part of the post.”
Two weeks later he received two
weeks leave, but he had to pay his
own way back to California, and the
rail journey took six days round trip
in old passenger cars with nowhere
to sleep except in the hard seats.
Back at Fort Sill, Shirley was
assigned to the 3rd Battalion/166th
Infantry, an Ohio National Guard
regiment that had been separated from
its parent 37th Division when that unit
was reorganized. The regiment was
assigned to the fort’s Replacement &
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
School Command. Shirley’s battalion
within it was assigned to the Artillery
School and to training OCS (Officer
Candidate School) artillery students:
We furnished an “aggressor force” to
maneuver against the candidates in
their wargames. We would be placed
out on ranges where live artillery
fire would fly overhead. I guess they
wanted the candidates to feel a
sense of responsibility firing over
infantry as they would in combat.
The routine was breakfast, then
marching to the training area with
the regimental band in the lead for
P.T. and close order drill. En route to
that area he had his first encounter
with the enemy: German POWs
who worked in the warehouses.
By late fall Shirley had earned
his third stripe, making him a “buck
sergeant.” He received new orders
in February 1944: he was being sent
overseas as an infantry replacement.
In February he headed to Fort Meade,
Maryland. After two weeks there the
group to which he’d been assigned
received three-day passes. He wavered
between spending his time sightseeing
in the nation’s capital or going to
Baltimore and its notorious red light
district. His new friends convinced him
to accompany them to Baltimore. On
their return they were trucked to Camp
Patrick Henry at Newport News, Virginia.
We were there only a few days when
we were marched down to a long
wharf. Along side was a Liberty
Ship. We climbed up the gangplank,
headed for one of the cargo holds
in the ship, and picked out bunks
that were stacked five high. I don’t
know how they got to the top bunk,
but mine was fairly low. We went
back on deck and were standing at
the railing when we saw a troop of
125 men being marched down the
wharf toward our ship. They were
dressed as infantry replacements
with helmet, duffel bag, etc., but what
was unusual was they were being
escorted by armed MPs. They were
being paroled out of stockades all
over the eastern United States. Most
were from the back streets of New
York, Boston and Philadelphia.
Those former prisoners came
aboard as additional infantry
replacements. When they reached
Italy, several of them who spoke
Italian deserted, melting away into
the local population after arriving.
I had never been on the ocean more
than 30 or 40 minutes without
getting seasick, and I was soon at the
rail vomiting and feeling terrible.
My seasickness lasted seven days.
Our Liberty Ship was designed
for cargo, but they did convert
enough space in one cargo hold to
accommodate 500 replacements.
We had only cold seawater for show-
ers. For our meals we stood at tables
that came up to our waist. Most of
the food was boiled: powdered eggs
and oatmeal mush for breakfast,
boiled potatoes and vegetables,
boiled stews. It was monotonous,
but since I didn’t eat for seven days
it made little difference at first.
The men who came to us from
stockades were much wiser in the
ways of the world. A few would bribe
or pay the civilian crews or their
guard—25 sailors who manned the
anti-aircraft guns as well as a 5-inch
anti-submarine gun—to get them
food out of the ship’s civilian mess.
to our tents and warned it would
be very hard on us to be caught in
Palermo again without a pass. I
remember being denied admittance
to the USO, but little else before
being herded back to the enclosure.
In a few days we were loaded on
trucks and headed east along the
north coast road to Messina. It was
on that road I saw for the first time
a person killed. A soldier flicked his
cigarette butt out the back of our
truck. A small boy about 10-years-old
dashed out into the road to pick it
up, and the next truck ran over him.
That sight has always remained
with me. The Sicilian people were
poor and hungry, and the tobacco
from cigarette butts was valuable.
Shirley (standing right-rear) on leave in Naples.
In Messina we were fed at an army
mess, and I remember, as we left the At Messina, Shirley and his
mess hall to clean our mess kits at comrades boarded ferries to the
garbage cans, long lines of women mainland where electric trains waited
and children were there begging for to take them to the front. During the
the remains from our mess kits and innumerable whistle stops on the
scrounging through the garbage cans. journey, the stations were swarmed
by locals who waved basketfuls of
produce to sell to the passengers.

Poker and craps were the main

entertainment aboard ship. John
noticed the former prisoners usually
won. They spent 21 days at sea before
they berthed at Casablanca, but no
soldiers were allowed off the ship.
They weighed anchor again the next
morning and steamed alone toward
Sicily. After reaching Palermo the
replacements were marched down the
gangplank to a field on the edge of the
city enclosed by a fence. The ship then
began unloading its cargo of wheat.

Soon several trucks arrived with a

supply of large tents, and they were
assembled with our help. We were
given blankets, and K-rations to
eat. We were to sleep on the ground
with no cot or sleeping mat. I’m
not sure where we got water to
drink or wash up with. We hadn’t
had a decent shower in 22 days.
Most of the men from the stockade
left our improvised encampment
and headed for Palermo.

In town there were restaurants, a USO

club, women and MPs. Some of us
thought if the men from the stockades
could go AWOL we could too; so it
was over the fence and into the big
city. A lot of us were soon taken into
custody by the MPs, brought back

WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011 25


At almost every stop, one or two
of the Italian-speaking replacements
mingled with the crowd and went
AWOL. The officers in charge were
unable to control the situation.
By the time the train pulled into
Caserta, just beyond Naples, 13 of
the former prisoners had deserted.
The troops were loaded onto trucks
and taken to a replacement depot locat-
ed on a farm about 20 miles behind the
front. The billets consisted of tents that
held eight men along with a stove for
heat. Since a lone Luftwaffe raider, “Bed
Check Charlie,” flew over every night,
protective slit trenches had been dug
nearby, but they’d turned into muddy
holes in the early spring downpours.
With little else to do, many of the
men became caught up in gambling.
Shirley wasn’t unhappy to leave a week
later with a group of replacements.
They were trucked to the small port
of Pozzuoli, near Naples, where they
boarded an LST for the trip up the coast
to Anzio. At the time he knew little about
the situation along the main front or
26
within the beachhead. After they disem-
barked, he and others were sent to join
the 15th Infantry Regiment of 3rd Division.
He was assigned to Company I as an
assistant squad leader in mid-April 1944.
Gen. John “Iron Mike” O’Daniel
had replaced Lucian Truscott as
commander of 3rd Division when
the latter took over for Lucas at VI
Corps in February. Lucas was held
responsible for the overall stalemate.
In May, O’Daniel devised the
idea of “battle sleds” to spearhead
the breakout of his new command.
Though some post-war sources insist
the sleds consisted of converted
torpedo half-shells, they were actually
purpose-designed and prefabricated
open steel tubes, each wide and long
enough to hold an infantryman and
mounted on flat runners for stability.
Fifth Army mechanics produced 360 of
the sleds between 29 April and 14 May
near Capua (north of Naples). The sleds
were to be pulled by tanks, and were
intended to protect the troops from
small arms and anti-personnel mines.
Sled teams were formed and began
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
training in early May in anticipation of
a new offensive. Each regiment contrib-
uted 60 men who formed Regimental
Battle Sled Teams, each of five squads
commanded by a first lieutenant. Since
there turned out to be few volunteers
for the assignment in 15th Infantry, each
company commander was ordered
to select one NCO and several men.
The Company I commander selected
Shirley, along with another sergeant
and four privates, all of whom had
little or no combat experience.
The men ate and lived with their
company, and every morning for
about three weeks marched off to a
special training area. Everyone on the
beachhead lived in dugouts because
German artillery could cover the
entire area. Our sled team could train
with relative safety in the rear area
because giant smoke generators laid
down huge smoke screens along the
front to obscure the vision of enemy
artillery observers. Occasionally
shells interrupted the training, and
once a man was nearly hit by a
 small shell fragment. Anticipated
objectives were laid out with white
tape, and we rehearsed attack after
attack. We charged those imaginary
targets with enough enthusiasm and
accuracy to satisfy our commander.
Gen. Mark Clark paid us a visit one
day to see the battle sleds operate.

Each of the sled teams included five

Sherman tanks, each of which towed
a 12-man squad in two rows of sleds.
To keep the six sleds on each towline
from colliding, a bar was attached to
each pair allowing each line to slide
along a path left by their tow-tank’s
tracks. The teams also included men
who carried flamethrowers, Bangalore
torpedoes and satchel charges. Most
of them also traded their M-1 rifles
for Thompson submachine guns.
The 15th Infantry was to attack on the
division’s right to outflank the German
strongpoint in Cisterna. The 30th Infantry
was to do the same on the left, and it
was expected there would be minefields,
wire and bunkers in its path. The 7th
Infantry was to tie down the Germans Infantry coming ashore.
defending the rubble of Cisterna.
Despite an effort to maintain
security, the secret leaked out. One
day those with radios heard “Axis
Sally” warn them between her
broadcasts of popular music that the
sled teams would be “annihilated.”
“Her warning added little to
the anxiety we already felt,” Shirley
remembered. When the day for the
breakout dawned, the sled team
men were ready to do their part.
At 5:45 a.m. on 23 May a 45-minute
artillery barrage along the front heralded
the beginning of the attack. Tactical
combat support aircraft followed shortly
afterward. When the assault began,
the sky was overcast and smoke and
fog limited visibility. The 2nd Battalion
of 15th Infantry attacked to the right of
3rd Battalion and initially made good
progress. Company L, 3rd Battalion, led
the assault but began taking heavy casu-
alties. Early in the afternoon the sled
teams of 15th Infantry renewed the attack
and led the way with Companies I and K.

The sky was choked with smoke,

dust and the odor of cordite from
thousands of artillery and bomb
explosions. Our battle sled teams
assembled in a house near the
front. The men waited inside,
and the tanks and sleds were
camouflaged in the nearby yard. I
heard the ungodly sounds of battle
growing in intensity, and we were

WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011 27

 all thankful we were being spared,
even if only for a few hours. If the
assault companies were successful,
perhaps we wouldn’t be called.
About 9:00 a.m. a radio message
called us to battle. The squad leaders
met over a map with the lieutenant.
After a minute or two we were waved
toward our sleds without a word
about our objective. There was a great
urgency to get moving. I, an assistant
squad leader, didn’t have the slightest
idea what we were expected to attack.
We lay on our stomachs, head down,
in our sleds and moved onto the road
and toward the front. We couldn’t see
28
a thing with our heads down, and
with German artillery shells landing
nearby there wasn’t much inclination
to look over the edge of the sleds.
After a short distance on the road
the tanks made a left turn into an
open field. In what only seemed like
a minute or two, the tanks turned
right and stopped. The squad leader
yelled to get out and move forward.
A drainage ditch had proved too
difficult to surmount; so McDaniel’s
invention failed its first and only test
in combat. Shirley’s sled team was
in a wheat field covered by German
machineguns firing just above the men’s
heads. To make things worse, Shirley
spotted several anti-personnel mines
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
that had been exposed by the rains
and realized they were in a minefield.
Incoming artillery rounds gave him
little time to crawl between the mines.
It took him 10 minutes to crawl
about 60 feet to reach the barrier
ditch, which was about nine feet deep,
almost 20 feet wide across its top and
about six feet wide at the bottom.
There he discovered many survivors
from his battalion, which had taken
heavy casualties. He also came face to
face with the first battle death of his
military career: his platoon sergeant, a
veteran of all the division’s campaigns,
who’d accidentally set off a booby trap.
The lieutenant commanding his sled
team assembled five other men of
Shirley’s squad to continue the mission
on foot, and sent him to observe the
enemy positions through a section
of the ditch destroyed by shellfire:
It was difficult and frightening to lift
my head up to look over the edge [of
the ditch]. As I looked, a huge puff of
black smoke and fire exploded a short
way in front of my face. The flame of a
German flamethrower stopped about
25 feet short of me. I only felt the heat.
I quickly returned to the lieutenant.
Shirley described to the lieutenant
what he’d been able to see of the enemy
position in front of them. One squad
member, nicknamed “Flash” because
of his always slicked-down black hair,
crawled out of the ditch toward the
enemy. Another man followed him;
then Shirley and the squad member
with the BAR also moved out—all
without direct orders to do so.
We’d crawled only a few feet when
a bullet struck the man in front
of me. I rolled him over and saw
his eyes were rolled up and set.
He was dead. I crawled a few feet
more and took cover behind a low
pile of brick and rubble. The BAR
man moved up alongside me.
In front of them was a zigzag trench
with a dead German soldier lying just on
the other side of it. The ruins of a house
were about 25 feet to the right. “Flash”
had disappeared. John ordered the BAR
man to fire over the trench as he threw a
grenade into the doorway of the house.
After the explosion he made a dash
inside and then, with the BAR man still
covering him, he jumped back into the
trench and followed it until he turned a
corner and spotted an enemy rifleman.
With a short burst from his sub-
machinegun he killed his first enemy.
Farther on he came across a German
machinegunner. Again he fired a few
rounds. His magazine empty, he rushed
forward and hit the man with the butt
of his weapon on the helmet. The stock
of his gun broke off but, his adrenaline
pumping, he knocked off the German’s
helmet and hit the man several times
until he realized he must’ve killed him
with his last round. Then he peeked
over the trench and saw his battalion
advancing toward him from the ditch.
During that respite Shirley went
on a souvenir hunt. One of the dead
Germans had a pistol in a holster, but
the whole situation was too bloody a
mess for him to want to try to extract it.
Next he peeped out from the edge
of the trench and saw another German
trench about 50 feet away. He then also
spotted “Flash” running toward it, just
as the Germans within it threw several
grenades at that point man. Seconds
later those same Germans waved a white
cloth, and 30 of them stood up with their
hands in the air. They were generally in
bad shape and used blankets to carry
out their wounded. John took them
prisoner and herded them back to the
big ditch, where he came across his
astonished company commander.
As they moved into the ditch, several
enemy mortar rounds rained down
on them and wounded one of the new
prisoners. The sled team lieutenant,
who was killed about 20 minutes later,
Sleds: Because of
the need to have
infantry with the
advancing tanks
these metal sleds
were made with
hopes of solving
that problem and
giving soldiers a
greater degree of
protection. They
were made at Anzio
and extensively
tested but they were
found not to work.
The photo shows
them abandoned
after the breakout.
ordered Shirley to take the prisoners for valor, and a Purple Heart. ✪
to a collection point. Remembering
the mine that had earlier killed the
platoon sergeant, he ordered a German
to lead the way along the bottom of
the ditch and back to the road. They
moved on that way until he found MPs
who took charge of the prisoners
“Flash” had been picked by the
captain because he was a goof-off, but
Shirley came to think of him as a hero
that day. Shirley never saw him again
and had to assume the multiple German
grenades had simply obliterated him.
He also never again saw the BAR man.
His first battle had lasted only two
hours. Two days later Cisterna was
finally taken, enabling the breakout.
The day after that two Free French
officers drove up in a jeep and shook
his hand. He didn’t realize they were
from the force advancing from the main
battlefront to link up with the Anzio
breakout. Several days after that, Shirley
found he was the only sergeant left in
3rd Platoon. There was also only one
corporal left standing. Shirley was put in
command of the remains of the joined
remnants of 2nd and 3rd Platoons, which
altogether had been reduced to only 24
men out of an original 80. After 12 days
of combat his unit marched into Rome.
The war was actually just beginning
for John Shirley. He remained with 3rd
Division and later received a battlefield
commission. He received the Silver
Star, two Bronze Stars with V-device
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011 29
Analysis:
The 1932 Shanghai Incident
By Terence Co
Ed’s Note: Chinese units are in
italics; Japanese units are in plaintext.
City of Sin
I
n 1932 Shanghai was a thriving
world-class commercial center,
the economic heart of China
and its window on the world. With a
population of 3 million, it was ranked
30
as the world’s fifth most populous
city. In its Chinese areas the people
lived in squalor and worked under
near slave labor conditions. That was
exacerbated by the corruption of the
government and police. Many (mostly
Chinese) died of hunger or violence.
Shanghai was therefore also
known as one of the most dangerous
and crime-ridden cities in the world,
with brutal local and foreign gangs
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
in control of the rackets. Chicago’s
legendary gangland violence of that
same era paled in comparison to the
savage brutality typical of the Shanghai
streets. In contrast, Shanghai’s rich area,
known as the International Settlement,
was the heart of the city’s economy,
where modern art deco buildings and
skyscrapers lit up the night as Western-
style nightclubs, theaters and businesses
were frequented by foreigners and rich
Chinese. The Japanese population in
Shanghai comprised their single largest
overseas community, with around
30,000 inhabitants in the Hengkou
District of the International Settlement.
It was peppered with Japanese-owned
shops, factories and banks. It was
a common saying of the day that
“Shanghai was built on 48-storey
skyscrapers and 28 layers of hell.”
With the Chinese Nationalist Party’s
(Kuomintang or KMT) victory in 1928
and the resultant unification of China
under its rule (more or less), its leader
Chiang Kai-shek sought to cement his
power by ending the unequal economic
treaties with the West. Centrally targeted
by that nationalist sentiment were
the Japanese who, of all the foreign
powers, had the most economic
and political interests in China.
The Japanese had meddled
in Chinese politics during the
Reunification War of 1916-1928, and
they were still using military and
economic bribes to pit one warlord
against another in order to keep China
disunited and in chaos. The Japanese
had also financed the building of a
large number of factories in China, and
China was its largest export market.
The Chinese also had a grudge against
the Japanese stemming from their
defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War
(1894-95), which had brought on the
start of the collapse of imperial China
and a long and bloody civil war.
Shanghai was also a major center
of competition between Japanese and
Chinese business interests. Industrialists
from both countries had sited many
factories in the city. Taking advantage
of the lax local laws and cheap labor,
both groups intensely competed
for local and foreign markets.
With all that as backdrop, after 1928
the KMT government instituted a series
of boycotts against the Japanese that
culminated in the “Great Anti-Japanese
Boycott” of 1931. Massacres of Chinese
civilians in Japanese-occupied Korea in
that year provided the rationale for the
KMT to institute a nationwide boycott
of Japanese products and businesses.
Chinese businesses selling Japanese
goods were picketed; Japanese goods
were seized and destroyed; merchants
were intimidated by KMT “enforcers,”
and numerous incidents of sabotage
took place in Japanese-owned factories
and warehouses in China. That was
answered by defiance on the part of the
Japanese, as they saw it as the start of a
threat to their overall superiority in the
region. Further, the Great Depression
had already put the Japanese economy
into a tailspin; so they felt increasingly
justified in taking military action.
From 19 to 25 September 1931,
in violation of orders from Tokyo, the
Japanese 2nd Infantry Division took
control of every city along the 693-mile
length of the Southern Manchuria
Railway, culminating with the capture of
Liaoning. Other Japanese units poured
into Manchuria, and in a swift campaign
they overran that province by February
1932. While KMT forces in Manchuria
(around 200,000 men) greatly outnum-
bered those of the Japanese (50,000), the
latter had excellent intelligence, coordi-
nation, mobility, firepower and support.
The KMT armies were mostly composed
of uncoordinated, badly trained, poorly
motivated and lightly armed warlord
troops who either broke and ran or
simply defected to the Japanese.
The episode came to be known as the
“Mukden Incident,” and it further exac-
erbated the general and growing hostil-
ity between the Chinese and Japanese
governments. Shanghai soon became
the scene of growing clashes between
Chinese protesters and Japanese troops.
Numerous anti-Japanese organizations
sprang up that then organized further
attacks on Japanese businesses and
civilians in Shanghai. That in turn
prompted the Japanese to increase
their military presence in the city.
KMT Turmoil
In order to defeat the “Northern
Warlords” during the climactic fighting
of 1926-28, the KMT had enlisted the
aid of the “Southern Warlords.” In
the wake of the KMT victory in 1928,
those Southern Warlords were given a
KMT 5th Army troops.
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
place in the central party leadership
and had begun jockeying for control
of the overall organization. That
culminated in the Central Plains War
of May to November 1930, which had
seen a massive clash between Chiang
Kai-shek’s faction and an alliance of
opposing factions (mainly Southern)
for final control of the party. A total
of some 2 million men had fought a
bloody war (total losses around 300,000
for each side) across a campaign
area the size of Western Europe.
Though Chiang Kai-shek had
emerged as victor, his triumph was
imperfect: overall Chinese military
strength had been severely weakened,
and he was forced to compromise with
his enemies to obtain a settlement.
Those enemies were officially retained
within the KMT leadership, with their
armies weakened but still under their
control. That settlement had the dual
detrimental effects of: 1) enticing the
Japanese to overrun Manchuria, as
they realized the KMT had become
too weak to send forces there: and 2)
creating opportunities for the rise of
further factionalism within the KMT.
The Guangdong (Cantonese) faction
31
 within the KMT soon used Chiang’s
inaction in Manchuria to rationalize
making a new move against his Nanjing
faction. The Guangdong faction
remained at the forefront of political
opposition to Chiang within the KMT,
just as it had been part of the rebelling
KMT factions during the Central Plains
War. In the Mukden Incident they saw
a new opening to depose Chiang while
riding the growing wave of Chinese
nationalism to supreme power. The
Guangdong faction therefore encour-
aged anti-Japanese rioters to burn
down Nanjing government buildings
and beat KMT government ministers.
Within the KMT they managed to force
Chiang out of the party leadership on
15 December 1931. They then also
moved one of their best armies, the
19th Route, to Shanghai in order to
circumvent control of that important
city by Nanjing faction Central Army
units. (The Nanjing faction remained
under Chiang’s control. “Route” was an
honorific allowed an army rated as being
efficiently mobile over long distances.)
By January 1932 Shanghai was
thus becoming a new stronghold of
the Guangdong faction. That faction’s
leaders – ironically then including
Wang Jing Wei, future leader of a
pro-Japanese Chinese collaborationist
government – had thereby also become
anti-Japanese war-hawks and were
pushing for a general war against them.

Tinderbox

The actions of Maj. Ryukichi Tanaka

then further inflamed the situation.
He was a Japanese intelligence officer
within the clique responsible for the
Mukden Incident. Even before the
invasion of Manchuria, he and his group
had decided the following phase of
operations in China was to take place
in Shanghai. To provide an excuse to
intervene in the city, Tanaka supervised
various clandestine attacks on factories
and warehouses there. His actions
climaxed in an 18 January 1932 attack
on five Japanese monks who were
beaten by Chinese paid by Tanaka.
Chiang Kai-shek had meanwhile
negotiated his way back into the
national leadership of the KMT. In
mid-January he mended fences with
the Guangdong faction, engineering a
new “united front” against the Japanese.
Even so, knowing KMT military forces
were still too weak to fight the Japanese,
he also moved to deescalate the
situation in Shanghai by ordering 19th
Route Army moved out of the city to

32 WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011

be replaced by a civilian police force.
By late January the situation
in Shanghai was spiraling out of
control, however, as Chinese mobs
spontaneously clashed with Japanese
troops and civilian vigilantes. Chinese
attacks on Japanese businesses were
being met with Japanese burnings of
Chinese factories and warehouses.
Chinese and Japanese troops trading
fire became commonplace events. In
that light, the Great Powers (the US,
Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan)
increased the number of warships and
marines in the city to protect their
areas. By late January there were 32
warships of various sizes from different
nations anchored at Shanghai.
On the afternoon of 28 January 1932
a few hundred Japanese naval infantry
in trucks, supported by five tanks and 30
motorcycles, rumbled into their coun-
try’s settlement in the Chapei District.
Their mission was to carry out the
evacuation of Japanese civilians there.
As the last of those people were evacu-
ated at 4:00 p.m., the Japanese troops,
instead of withdrawing with them, forti-
fied Chapei and were soon reinforced
to a total strength of 1,000 men.
The rationale of Rear Adm. Koichi
Shiozawa – commander of the Japanese
Navy’s Yangtze Patrol, with authority to
protect Japanese nationals in central
China – was that only military force
could keep control of the deteriorating
situation across the city. At 11:00 p.m.
he issued a demand for Chinese forces
to withdraw from around Chapei.
At 11:00 p.m. Japanese and Chinese
troops began exchanging fire. The
Japanese later accused the Chinese
of starting the fight by sniping at
Japanese troops. Chinese and Western
eyewitnesses claimed to have seen
Japanese civilian auxiliaries firing first
on Chinese troops who then responded.
Shortly thereafter the KMT 6th
Regiment/156th Brigade/78th Division/19th
Route Army fully deployed so as to
use its familiarity with the dense
urban terrain to begin an increas-
ingly effective enfilade against the
Japanese, firing down from rooftops
and windows on their positions.
29 January
At 2:00 a.m. Japanese armored cars
and motorcycles drove from the west
into Chapei, racing to reinforce the
troops already in place there. That was
the signal for those troops to counterat-
tack the Chinese. Overconfident because
they were trained in night combat and
were generally derisive of Chinese
martial ability, the attack fell into a trap
sprung by the Chinese troops of 6th
Regiment. Those soldiers were veterans
of fighting communist guerrillas and
were expert in partisan warfare. They
used those skills to outmaneuver the
Japanese and keep them beneath a
storm of machinegun fire and grenades
that rained down on them from the
rooftops. The attacking Japanese soon
became trapped in the city streets
and alleyways, while the Chinese
commanded the situation from the
buildings and rooftops around them.
At 6:00 a.m., as their casualties con-
tinued to mount, the Japanese began to
hit Chapei with naval gunfire and bombs
from aircraft flying from offshore carri-
ers. While the massive show of firepower
surprised the Chinese, it only produced
more rubble for the defenders to dig into
and strengthen their positions. At the
same time, though, it also allowed the
Japanese to overwhelm several Chinese
positions. By the afternoon, eastern
Chapei and the North Train Station
was in their hands. At around the same
time a Japanese cruiser and a dozen
destroyers began steaming up and
down the Huangpu River, raining shells
on the remaining Chinese positions in
Chapei and the Fort of Woosung from
what amounted to pointblank range.
At 5:00 p.m. the Chinese counterat-
tacked, backed up by an armored
train, hundreds of local criminal gang
members and thousands of fresh troops
from 19th Route Army. That Chinese
effort succeeded in overrunning the
Japanese in North Station. By 7:00
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
p.m. the Chinese had pushed the
Japanese completely out of Chapei.
That victory prompted Gen. Tsai
Ting Kai, commander of 19th Route
Army, to further reinforce Shanghai. The
Japanese denied they’d lost control of
the situation and began landing more
men. By the end of the day, Western
observers placed Japanese dead at
100 with the Chinese losing 300. An
estimated 1,000 Chinese civilians had
also been killed in the crossfire.
Ceasefire
Both sides agreed to a ceasefire on
30 January. The Chinese used the lull
to move their 5th Army from Nanjing to
Shanghai. Having learned the political
cost of inaction in Manchuria, Chiang
had thereby committed one of his best
formations to bolster 19th Route Army.
The Japanese also used the ceasefire to
strengthen their forces in Shanghai, with
a total of 4,000 naval infantry and civil-
ian auxiliaries manning their positions.
Both sides went on the
diplomatic offensive, putting their
causes to the League of Nations.
An Anglo-American diplomatic
counteroffensive started putting pres-
sure on the Japanese to withdraw.
The Japanese Navy high command
33
 at first denied it was losing control
in Shanghai. They couldn’t bear to
directly ask the army for assistance;
so they had the Japanese Foreign
Ministry make the request. By 2
February, then, the Imperial Japanese
Army’s 9th Infantry Division was
mobilized for transport to Shanghai.
The ceasefire was fragile from
the start; punctuated by numer-
ous violations by both sides, it
fully collapsed on 2 February.

2-13 February

On 2 February the Japanese resumed

their offensive in Chapei, but the
Chinese held their positions. By the
next day the Chinese had fully repulsed
the new Japanese effort. Increasingly
desperate to salvage the deteriorating
situation, the IJN dispatched its 3rd
Fleet, under command of Vice Adm.
Nomura Kichisaburo, to take charge
around Shanghai. In order to “save
face,” Shiozawa immediately ordered
more attacks on Chapei. He felt sure
Japanese firepower superiority would
soon break the Chinese defense.
As it turned out, though, the heavy
fire simply created more rubble for the
Japanese Army infantry move into Shanghai.

34 WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011

Chinese to dig into, after which they
emerged to repulse each successive
Japanese ground advance. On 13
February the Japanese remained
stalled after having lost around 1,000
more killed. At the same time the
Chinese were estimated to have lost
some 3,000 more soldiers along with
several thousand more civilians.
Chiang Kai-shek, while apprehensive
of having to fight a broader war with
Japan, was also elated by the reac-
tion of the British and Americans to
the fighting. He hoped, if full-scale
war did erupt, those nations would
intervene against Japan. More US and
British warships and troops began
moving in to provide better security
to the International Settlement.

Enter the Japanese Army

On the evening of 13 February the

IJA 9th Infantry Division, commanded
by Lt. Gen. Kenkichi Ueda, arrived in
Shanghai along with the 24th Mixed
Brigade. Those troops joined the tired
and worn out Japanese naval infantry
on the front line, bringing with them
more artillery and a company of tanks.
The Chinese had meanwhile also
continued extensively fortifying and
reinforcing their positions. Using
entrenching techniques taught them by
German advisors, they created defensive
moats: two-yard-deep trenches
reinforced by iron sheets, bricks, barbed
wire and numerous machinegun nests.
At the same time, though, the
Chinese were having increasing
difficulty because their supplies were
running low. The KMT government was
bankrupt; so the Chinese forces in the
city increasingly relied on donations
by the locals. They also took to using
captured weapons and supplies.
Getting reinforcements was also
problematic, as numerous Japanese air
attacks caused delays and casualties.
Similarly, constant fire from Japanese
ships offshore caused steadily climbing
losses and inhibited movement.
On 20 February, Lt. Gen. Ueda,
newly appointed overall ground force
commander in Shanghai, threw the
9th Division, the 24th Mixed Brigade, as
well as the remnants of the IJN naval
infantry and local auxiliaries, at the
five divisions of the 19th Route Army
and the newly arrived 5th Army. At 8:00
a.m. the attack started with a naval, air
and artillery bombardment of Chinese
positions all along the front lasting for
30 minutes. The Japanese then shifted
their fire to concentrate on bombard-

WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011 35

 ing the Chinese central position in
the walled village of Chiangwan.
At 9:00 a.m., shielded by a smoke-
screen and led by a company of tanks,
13,000 Japanese troops rushed into the
Chinese positions. Their plan was to
have the bulk of 9th Infantry Division hit
Chiangwan while the 24th Mixed Brigade
moved on its right into the village of
Miaohang. Chiangwan was defended
by the KMT 61st and 78th Infantry
Divisions of 19th Route Army, while
Miaohang was defended by the KMT
88th Infantry Division of 5th Army. The
Japanese plan was to smash through the
Chinese front in order to rapidly enter
their rear area and cut supply. It was
hoped that would in turn bring on the
collapse the overall Chinese defense.

Battle of Chiangwan

The Chinese managed to throw

back the first three Japanese charges
into Chiangwan. The Japanese tanks
at first managed to penetrate the outer
defenses, but then bogged down in the
Chinese trenches. (Throughout the rest
of the campaign they were used mainly
to tow artillery pieces.) The Japanese
attacks were again defeated because
the Chinese continued to hit them
with fire from rooftops and windows.
The Japanese also had to contend
with ever-greater numbers of snipers
in their rear area. Chinese troops
would often take off their uniforms
when the Japanese advanced into
their areas and pose as civilians;
then they would put them back on
again after the Japanese passed by.
Japanese artillery was also less
effective, as the mud that increasingly
ringed the Chinese trenches absorbed
most of the force of their shells.
Japanese aerial bombardment was also
ineffective, as most of it missed due to
bombers attacking from high altitude.
The lone Chinese artillery support, a
railroad gun soon nicknamed “Slippery
Mary” firing from the area of North
Station, counter-bombarded Japanese
positions. It was more an irritation
than a danger to the Japanese, as most
of its poorly aimed shells missed their
targets. At the same time, though,
the Japanese proved unable to find
its exact position and destroy it.
By the end of the day on the 20th,
while the Japanese had captured a few
points inside Chiangwan, they were
effectively stalled. The next day the
Chinese counterattacked, and by 22
February they’d forced the Japanese
to retreat entirely out of the village.

36 WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011

The Japanese 9th Infantry Division
then moved to reinforce the 24th Mixed
Brigade fighting at Miaohang.

Battle of Miaohang

The situation at Miaohang was

also dire for the Japanese: the Chinese
stopped their initial attack with
heavy casualties. The green but well-
trained and well-armed 88th Infantry
Division stopped the Japanese using a
combination of four-yard-wide barbed
wire entanglements, trenches and
machinegun fire. On 22 February a new
Japanese offensive, reinforced by arriv-
ing units of 9th Infantry Division along
with heavy naval gunfire and artillery
support, threatened to push the 88th out
of its positions. The 88th’s commander
threw in the last of his reserves and,
in hand-to-hand fighting, managed
to again throw back the Japanese.
With the Japanese bogged down on
all fronts, Lt. Gen. Ueda ordered his forc-
es to rest and regroup while he laid on
a new around-the-clock naval, artillery
and aerial bombardment. Seeing things
differently, Vice Adm. Nomura transmit-
ted a report to Tokyo detailing the army’s
failure to defeat the Chinese and calling
for yet more reinforcement. Accordingly,
on 24 February the 11th and 14th Infantry
Divisions were dispatched to Shanghai
along with a new IJA commander, Gen. Japanese Naval infantry in defensive laager.
Shirakawa Yoshinori, to replace Ueda.
a final “big push” would put their structural fires to block any Japanese
Second Lull country in a favorable position for advance. By 2 March the Chinese were
any ensuing peace agreement. out of Chapei. At the same time, though,
The Japanese used the resultant the Japanese declined to pursue, as Gen.
five-day ground lull to rest and refit their The Big Push Shirakawa didn’t want to risk having to
troops in the front lines and to await the face an all-out Chinese last stand. He
arrival of the two new divisions. They At dawn on 1 March a general announced that all Japanese objectives
also constantly bombarded the Chinese Japanese offensive resumed all along had been reached. There were numer-
positions, causing heavy casualties, the front. Their 9th Infantry Division and ous skirmishes along the new front
collapsing trenches, limiting mobility 24th Mixed Brigade again attacked the line, but on 3 March a new ceasefire
and interdicting supply. Even so, the Chinese center at Chiangwan, and again was declared that ended the battle.
Chinese also managed to reinforce stalled inside the Chinese trench system.
Shanghai, bringing in more supplies Japanese naval infantry landed in Conclusions
and men under cover of darkness. By eastern Chapei and near North Station
27 February the entirety of 19th Route were pinned down at the water’s edge. The Shanghai Incident of 1932 was
and 5th Armies were in the front lines. Gen. Shirakawa, though, had new costly for both sides. The Chinese had
In the meantime international politi- cards up his sleeve: he used the 11th suffered around 12,000 casualties, some
cal pressure was being brought to bear and 14th Infantry divisions to amphibi- 4,000 of them killed in action and a high
on Japan to withdraw from Shanghai. ously outflank the Chinese positions proportion of that number being junior
Even more crucial was the threat of at Woosung and Changhuapin. While officers. Japanese casualty figures have
the $1 billion naval appropriations bill Chiang Kai-shek had foreseen the always been murky, since their records
pending in the US Congress that, Tokyo Japanese might attempt such a move, of the battle were burned in 1945; how-
was told by its embassy in Washington, Gen. Kai had ignored his warning. ever, best estimates are that some 10,000
would surely pass if the crisis in Suddenly in danger of being entirely of their troops were made casualties,
Shanghai dragged on much longer. outflanked, the Chinese were forced to with about 1,000 KIA. Thus Japanese
While the diplomats and officials withdraw at night to new positions at losses in Shanghai in 1932 were far high-
carried on behind-the-scenes Changshu, Kunshan and Sungchiang. er than what they suffered while secur-
talks, the Japanese commanders While withdrawing, the Chinese ing all of Manchuria the year before.
in Shanghai convinced themselves destroyed their trenches and set large The local Shanghai Chinese suffered

WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011 37

 some 26,000 casualties (6,000 dead).
The Chinese performed unexpected-
ly well. Their troops used the urban ter-
rain to advantage in resisting Japanese
attacks. Coordination was also excellent,
even though both their involved armies
were from different KMT factions.
Though they would’ve been as likely to
fight each other as to cooperate before
the battle, the 19th Route and the 5th
Armies come together in Shanghai under
the banner of Chinese nationalism.
As a result their soldiers’ morale was
high, and that helped them weather the
constant bombardment and repeated
Japanese attacks. At the same time,
though, the Chinese defense suffered
from a lack of aerial, naval and artillery
support. That enabled the Japanese to
inflict increasingly heavy casualties on
the Chinese while also interdicting their
operational and strategic mobility.
The Japanese demonstrated good
inter-service coordination despite the
traditional rivalry between their Army
and Navy high commands. Their artillery
and naval gunfire control was generally
excellent, but never enough infantry-
artillery coordination was achieved so
as to prevent the Chinese from using the
resultant rubble to further fortify their
defense. The performance of Japanese
aircraft was abysmal, despite the fact
they had air supremacy. Their bombs
were almost always dropped from too
high an altitude to achieve accuracy,
mostly missing their targets and instead
only causing civilian casualties.
Japanese tactics were poor. Lt. Gen
Ueda opted for Allied-style World War I
frontal assaults on the German-inspired
Chinese trench system, relying on
heavy firepower and samurai zeal to
win the day. Unfortunately for him, that
approach failed against the resolute
defense. Only the use of imaginative
amphibious flanking moves by Gen.
Shirakawa finally won the day for the
Japanese at the operational level.
While the Shanghai Peace Agreement
was signed on 5 May 1932, it did nothing
to abate the hostility between China
and Japan. In fact, during the years 1933
through 1936, the boycotts of Japanese
products continued and political ten-
sions increased, along with numerous
clashes between the two nations’ troops
in northern China and Shanghai. ✪

SOURCES
Jordan, Donald A. China’s Trial By Fire the Shanghai War of
1932. Univ. of Michigan Press, 2001.
Cooke, Maj. E.D. “Japanese Attacks at Shanghai and the
Defense by the Chinese, 1931-1932.” Military Review,
December 1937.
Dreyer, Edward L. China at War 1901-1949. Longman
Group, 1995.
Rottman, Gordon L & Akira Takizawa. World War II Japanese
Tank Tactics. Osprey Publishing, 2008.

38 WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011

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Analysis: To Sink a Warship
By Joseph Miranda
Legend vs. Fact
I
n World War II’s Pacific Theater of
Operations (PTO), the aircraft car-
rier legendarily reigned supreme
as the ultimate naval weapon. The
Imperial Japanese Navy’s (IJN) air raid
on Pearl Harbor, the Battles of Coral
Sea and Midway, and the general domi-
nance of airpower during the island
campaigns are symbols of the seeming
obsolescence of surface warships.
Yet the record of naval battles in the
PTO indicates a different reality. Most
surface warships, aside from carriers
themselves, were actually sunk by
naval gunfire or submarine-launched
torpedoes. The US did lose eight
battleships to Japanese carrier attack
at Pearl Harbor, but they were caught
by surprise in what was supposed
to have been a secure naval base.
Pearl Harbor didn’t actually
herald the end of surface naval warfare.
Indeed, there were numerous surface
actions in which no carriers were
involved, including, among others,
the Java Sea and Sunda Strait fights
(27-29 February 1942), Savo Island (9
August 1942), and the Naval Battles of
Guadalcanal (12-15 August 1942).
To fight and win an ocean going
war a navy still needed surface
ships. The question, then, remains:
what was really the best way to
sink warships in World War II?
40
Rise of the Battleship
The traditional method to win a
naval action was for battle fleets to
engage each other via gunfire and
torpedoes. The Russo-Japanese War
(1904-05) opened with the latter’s
surprise attack on the former’s fleet
anchored at Port Arthur in Manchuria.
There the Japanese disabled a couple
Russian battleships with torpedoes,
followed by their battle line indecisively
bombarding the port. At Tsushima (27
May 1905), the Japanese Combined
Fleet destroyed the Russian Baltic Fleet.
Tsushima saw Japanese battleships
win via superior maneuver and gunfire
supported by effective torpedo tactics.
The lesson wasn’t lost on naval
staffs around the world, and one
response was the building of numerous
“dreadnought” battleships, designated
after the Royal Navy’s class-initiating
ship of that name. Those ships were
designed as big gun platforms that could
engage enemy ships at long range. The
idea was whoever delivered the most
firepower at the earliest opportunity
would gain the victory. Torpedoes were
also part of the equation, to be launched
by smaller ships such as destroyers.
Interestingly, destroyers were
originally called “torpedo-boat destroy-
ers” because their primary mission was
to stop enemy torpedo boats before
they could close and launch torpedoes
against the main battle line. As the 20th
century progressed, destroyers became
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
general-purpose, suitable for convoy
escort and anti-submarine warfare as
well as launching their own torpedo
attacks. In between the destroyers and
battleships were cruisers, capable of
independent operations as long as they
didn’t run into enemy battleships.
One type of ship that caught the
public imagination was the battlec-
ruiser. They were built to carry the
heavy guns of a battleship but to also
have the speed of a cruiser (hence
the name). To accomplish that, naval
designers had to make trade-offs that
meant reducing armor protection. As
a result, battlecruisers tended to be
effective only as long as they didn’t have
to face serious enemy opposition.
At the Battle of the Falklands (8
December 1914), two Royal Navy bat-
tlecruisers destroyed a German cruiser
squadron that up until then had success
raiding Allied merchant shipping in
transoceanic waters. As that engagement
demonstrated, battlecruisers could
catch enemy cruisers and deliver long-
range firepower to blow them to pieces.
The Battle of Jutland (31 May-1
June 1916) demonstrated battlecruisers
couldn’t slug it out with battleships.
The Royal Navy lost three battlecruisers
in that action to German gunfire. The
German battlecruisers fared relatively
better, but that was because they were
sufficiently armored to survive for a
while in a fight against dreadnoughts.
Later in the 20th century, improvements
in naval propulsion systems would
make it possible for battleships to HMS Tiger
cruise at speeds sufficient to make
battlecruisers redundant.
Jutland was the only general action
between enemy fleets in the 20th
century in which both sides had large
numbers of capital ships. Tactically,
Jutland was indecisive: the British lost
three battlecruisers, three cruisers and
eight destroyers; the Germans lost one
pre-dreadnought battleship, one bat-
tlecruiser, four cruisers and five destroy-
ers. In terms of tonnage, the British
had more of their naval strength sunk
than did the Germans. Strategically,
Jutland kept the German fleet in port
for the rest of the war, as their high (USN) a force of cruisers and destroy- due to a combination of US cruiser fire
command realized they lacked the ers. In the second, the USN had two and land-based aerial attack. The other
strength to defeat the Royal Navy. battleships and the IJN one. Altogether, was sunk by fire from the battleship USS
the IJN lost two battleships while the Washington. Both sides also lost cruisers
Battleship vs. Battleship USN had one battleship damaged. and destroyers, but the battle was a clear
Interestingly, one IJN battleship was lost American victory insofar as it ended
In World War II, battleship versus
battleship actions involved only one,
two or three capital ships on each
side (with the exception of Surigao
Strait, as will be discussed below).
On 24 May 1941 the German battle-
ship Bismarck, escorted by the cruiser
Prinz Eugen, engaged a Royal Navy
squadron, destroying the British battlec-
ruiser Hood and damaging the battleship
Prince of Wales. Three days later a plane
from the carrier Ark Royal put a torpedo
into the Bismarck’s rudder, ending her
maneuverability. Surface British units,
including two battleships, pursued and
sank the Bismarck with an assist from
torpedo-firing cruisers and destroyers.
At Cape Mattapan (28 March 1941)
the RN trounced the Italian Regia
Marina (RM) near Crete. The RN had
three battleships present, the RM one,
plus cruisers and destroyers on both
sides. Significantly, the British had
the edge in terms of carrier airpower;
yet they failed to sink any ships with
airplanes in that fight. What made the
difference was superior RN leadership
and training, which gave them the edge
in the resultant gun duels. Mattapan
was more significant than the Bismarck
action, since the Axis were trying to gain
control of the Eastern Mediterranean.
The Italian defeat there, on top of
their loss of three battleships to British
carrier aircraft at Taranto (November
1940), effectively finished the offensive
projection of Italian naval power.
The PTO saw a battleship versus
battleship action in the Naval Battles
of Guadalcanal, a series of fights from
12 through 15 November 1942. In the
initial action the Imperial Japanese Navy
(IJN) had two battleships, the US Navy

WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011 41

the IJN challenge in the Solomon Sea.
Surigao Strait (24-25 October 1944)
also had the elements of a general bat-
tleship action; however, the US force was
composed largely of older battleships
being used to support the amphibious
landings at Leyte Gulf, while the IJN
could only get three battlewagons into
action. Given the numbers, Surigao
Strait was a foreordained US victory.
Still, after Jutland, it was the largest
capital ship battle of the World Wars.
In all those actions naval aviation,
either land- or carrier-based, was a
factor for the winning side. British
carrier aircraft found and crippled the
Bismarck, allowing the battleships to
trap it and finish it off. At Mattapan,
British carrier aircraft were again
effective at crippling Italian ships.
In the Guadalcanal campaign, US
aviation restricted Japanese surface
naval operations during daytime and
provided the coup de grace to the
battleship Hiei. Even so, carrier aviation
in those actions didn’t sink battleships
in isolation. Rather, it served to provide
other functions, especially reconnais-
sance and interdiction, which gave the
side with local air superiority an edge
in setting up decisive surface fights.
On the Battle Line
Given they could fight and fight
well, then, the question arises why
Royal Navy aircraft carriers.
42
battleships weren’t used more often
in surface actions during World War
II. Part of the reason was doctrine: the
concept of the “fleet in being.” The
idea was capital ships needed to be
conserved to fight the expected decisive
battle. Battleships were therefore only
sparingly committed. Added to that
was the expense and time involved
in building battleships, meaning
they couldn’t be easily replaced. The
Germans, Italians and Japanese were
also faced with fuel shortages that
restricted their big ships’ operations.
Another factor was the big ships
themselves were often simply not
there. The US lost eight of its battle-
ships at Pearl Harbor, destroyed or
damaged sufficiently to take them out
of the war for over a year. Similarly, the
British carrier raid on Taranto heavily
damaged three Italian battleships and
two cruisers. Many of the surface
actions of World War II, especially
in the Pacific, found only cruisers in
the main battle line as a result.
The USN was more willing to take
risks with its battleships, even during the
early part of the war when the IJN still
held the edge. The Solomons campaign,
which began in August 1942 with the
US invasion of Guadalcanal, saw several
surface actions fought at night. One rea-
son they were fought in the dark was the
US, through its possession of Henderson
Field, could threaten the IJN during
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
the day with air attack. The Japanese
were also more willing to fight at night
because they’d trained extensively for
that during peacetime. The result was
actions such as Savo Island, one of the
worst defeats for the USN in its history.
Airpower changed the naval equa-
tion, but not so much because airplanes
by themselves actually sank many capi-
tal ships. Rather, airpower threatened
to sink them. Air attack added another
risk for already risk-adverse naval high
commands, thereby deterring the
commitment of capital ships except in
circumstances of local air superiority.
That was one way in which aircraft
carriers truly came into their own: they
could provide defensive air cover for
a fleet, allowing warships to operate
in the face of enemy aviation. Of
course, that meant having the carriers
present, and that was only safely
doable if enemy carriers had first been
removed from the area of operations.
Rise of the Carriers
There were five carrier versus
carrier battles during World War II,
all in the Pacific: Coral Sea (4-8 May
1942), Midway (4-6 June 1942), Eastern
Solomons (24-25 August 1942), Santa
Cruz (26-27 October 1942), and the
Philippine Sea (19-21 June 1944). In
all those battles, naval commanders
made enemy carriers the primary
targets of their aerial attacks.
In theory, by sinking enemy carriers
one would obtain local air superior-
ity, thereby allowing further air attack
on enemy surface units; however,
carrier battles also often resulted in
the depletion of the air groups of the
victorious fleet as aircraft were shot
down. The carriers themselves also
often suffered damage and had to be
withdrawn to distant bases for repair.
That usually meant there could be no
immediate follow-up to a carrier victory.
In the longer run, whichever side
had land-based airpower within range
held the ultimate advantage. Of those
five carrier battles, only two proved to
be both tactically and strategic decisive
in that one side lost a larger tonnage of
ships and was also deterred from fulfill-
ing its strategic objectives: Midway and
the Philippine Sea, both US victories.
Four of the five carrier battles
took place within the first year of the
opening of the Pacific War. With the
Japanese high command ordering
Guadalcanal abandoned in February
1943, and the Allies advancing up the
Solomon Islands, the IJN pulled back
its carriers to refit and create new air
groups. The carrier air groups were
transferred to land bases in an attempt
to regain air superiority over the
northern Solomons and New Guinea.
That decision made some sense in
that, since the Japanese had gone over
to the strategic defensive, the carriers
weren’t needed. By withdrawing them
from the risks of combat, the carriers
could be preserved for the anticipated
deceive battle. The IJN would attempt
to fight that battle in June 1944 at the
Philippine Sea. By that time in the
war, however, they simply lacked the
overall numbers needed to challenge
the USN. More critically, IJN pilot
training had declined precipitously.
Their new and inexperienced aircrew
were incapable of duplicating the
victories of the first year of the war.
There was still more to the decline
of the IJN than the loss of ships and the
drop-off in aircrew quality: their naval
doctrine was fundamentally flawed.
Their obsession with the concept of
decisive battle led them to try to win
at the Philippine Sea with carrier and
land-based aviation. Airpower by itself,
however, couldn’t sink sufficient enemy
ships to decide the course of the war in a
single action. Airpower was, effectively,
an attritional factor in the destruction of
enemy sea power. Airplanes could, over
the course of a campaign, damage or
destroy sufficient enemy ships such that
a fleet could lose effectiveness. It also
facilitated the operations of surface units
via interdiction and reconnaissance,
but airpower couldn’t win by itself.
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
The dilemma for the Japanese was
they were seeking to fight the decisive
battle, but that simply couldn’t be
achieved by the aviation technologies
of the time. The early Japanese victories
at Pearl Harbor and in the Indian
Ocean raid were against foes caught by
surprise or that were reeling from earlier
defeats. In turn, those victories created
an exaggerated picture of what could
be accomplished by airpower. It wasn’t
that Pearl Harbor, the Indian Ocean
raid, or even Taranto, weren’t critical
tactical victories for carriers – they
were – but they couldn’t be replicated
under common wartime conditions.
The “battleship admirals” were
therefore justified in asserting surface
warships were still a critical instrument
continued on page 48 »
43
Naval Actions 1941−42 *

South China Sea

CV CVL/CVE BB CA/CL DD Naval Aircraft Other
10 December 1941
88
Japanese present
(land based)
Japanese lost 5
Allied present 2 4
Allied lost 2

Java Sea – Sunda Strait

CV CVL/CVE BB CA/CL DD Naval Aircraft Other
27 February – 1 March 1942
Japanese present 1 5 14 c. 40 1 YP
Japanese lost 1d 1d
Allied present 5 10
Allied lost 5 6

Indian Ocean Raid

CV CVL/CVE BB CA/CL DD Naval Aircraft Other
31 March – 10 April 1942
Japanese present 5 1 4 7 19 350
Japanese lost 20
Allied present 3 5 7 15 100
Allied lost 1 2 2 40 3 smaller craft

Coral Sea
CV CVL/CVE BB CA/CL DD Naval Aircraft Other
4 – 8 May 1942 (CC)
Japanese present 2 1 9 15 127 1 YP
Japanese lost 1d 1 1 + 1d 92
Large numbers of
Allied present 2 9 13 128 LBAC but ineffective

Allied lost 1 1 69 1 oiler

Midway
CV CVL/CVE BB CA/CL DD Naval Aircraft Other
4 – 6 June 1942 (CC)
Japanese present (CSF) 4 2 3 12 248
70
Japanese lost 4 1 248
LBAC being transported
233 127
Allied present 3 8 15 land based aircraft
180
Allied lost 1 1 (naval + LBAC)

44 WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011

(CSF): Carrier Striking Force only *

Savo Island
CV CVL/CVE BB CA/CL DD Naval Aircraft Other
8 – 9 August 1942
Japanese present 7 1
Japanese lost 3d
Allied present 8 15
Allied lost 4 + 1d 2d

Eastern Solomons
CV CVL/CVE BB CA/CL DD Naval Aircraft Other
24 – 25 August 1942 (CC)
Japanese present 2 1 2 16 25 175 1 YP
Japanese lost 1 1d 1 75 1d YP

Allied present 2 1 4 11
176
Allied lost 1d 25

Santa Cruz
CV CVL/CVE BB CA/CL DD Naval Aircraft Other
26 – 27 October 1942 (CC)
Japanese present 2 2 4 10 22 199
Japanese lost 1d 1d 1d 99

Allied present 2 1 6 14
136
Allied lost 1 + 1d 1 + 2d 81

Naval Battles of
Guadalcanal CV CVL/CVE BB CA/CL DD Naval Aircraft Other
12 – 15 November 1942
Japanese present 1 (a) 2 8 16 ?
Japanese lost 2 1 3 41
Henderson
Allied present 1 (a) 2 5 12
? Field LBAC
26
Allied lost 1d 2 7 (naval + LBAC)

*
NOTES

In some cases, the number of ships varies depending on their presence at individual actions within a battle.
Damaged ships are indicated by “+ d”; in several of the battles, damaged ships aren’t listed.
(a): carriers provided air cover from a distance. but didn’t engage each other.
(CC): carrier vs. carrier battle. Other battles are surface versus surface or combined air-surface.

Abbreviations
BB: Battleships and battlecruisers
CA/CL: heavy and lighter cruisers
CV/CVL/CVE: fleet aircraft carriers/ light carriers/escort carriers
DD: destroyers (sometimes includes lighter ships)
LBAC: Land based aircraft
SS: Submarines
YP: Seaplane Tender

WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011 45

The Picket Line
The Battle of the Philippine Sea (19-21
June 1944) came to be called the “Great
Marianas Turkey Shoot” by US sailors. That
was because of the large number of Japanese
aircraft shot down by anti-aircraft fire.
Throughout 1942-44 the USN vastly increased
the anti-aircraft armament of its warships,
making it expensive for an air strike to penetrate
the wall of flak. US crews were also adept at
damage control, thereby salvaging warships
that might’ve been written off in other navies.
46
Added to that was the increasingly superior
US utilization of new technologies such as radar.
It had been available in one form or another since
the start of the war, but it took a couple years to
figure out how to use it efficiently. By mid-war the
USN began to set up screens of radar-equipped
“picket” destroyers outside the main body of the
fleet to detect incoming enemy aircraft, giving the
carriers time to scramble fighters for interception.
As a result, the Japanese attacked at the
Philippine Sea using tactics that might’ve worked
in 1941-42 but stood little chance in 1944. ★
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
Underseas

Japanese doctrine called for submarines to US Warship Losses by Type

be used to seek out and destroy major enemy Includes all theaters of operation
warships, especially carriers and battleships. CV/CVL/CVE BB/BC CA/CL DD SS
The idea was, by sinking capital ships the
Japanese would gain a favorable correlation Air delivered Bomb 2 1 - 11 131
of force in the follow-on surface naval battles. Air torpedo 2 1 1 3 -
That was in contrast to American and European
doctrine in which submarines were primarily Kamikaze 3 - - 11 -
to be used to sink enemy cargo shipping. Total loss by air attacks 7 3
2 1 25 13
As the chart of warship losses shows, the
Japanese may have been on to something.
Surface gunfire 1 - 5 13 162
Submarines were responsible for sinking a Surface torpedo - - 2 8 -
significant number of enemy carriers and not
Submarine torpedo 3 - 2 15 1
inconsiderable numbers of other warships. On
top of those outright losses there were large Mine - - - 6 7
numbers of ships damaged by submarines, such Other - - - 13 16
as the battleship North Carolina (15 September
1942). In the short run—as in the time needed Total loss by surface/
to fight and win a single battle—a damaged submarine attacks 4 - 9 57 40
warship was just as much out of action as one Total losses 11 2 10 82 53
that was sunk. Interestingly, USN submarines
also proved effective in attacking IJN warships
despite the official commerce-raiding doctrine.
Submarines had the advantage of Japanese Warship Losses by Type
being cheaper than capital ships, as well CV/CVL/CVE BB/BC CA/CL DD SS
as minimizing chances for detection when
running submerged. They were also usually Air delivered Bomb 9 2 15 44 22
longer-ranged when operating off batteries. Air torpedo 2 1 1 3 (4)
The downside was they were slow and couldn’t
provide gunfire support to land forces. ★ Total loss by air attacks 11 3 16 47 22
Surface gunfire - 1 3 15 702
Surface torpedo - 2 2 13 -
Battleships vs. Carriers
Submarine torpedo 8 1 16 42 25
The Battle of Samar (25 October 1944), Mine - - - 7 4
fought while Surigao Strait was raging
nearby, was a true curiosity. There an Other - 1 - 10 9
IJN surface group—four battleships, six Total loss by surface/
cruisers and 10 destroyers—pursued submarine attacks 8 5 21 87 108
a USN task force of six escort carriers
Total 19 8 37 134 130
and seven destroyers. Those escort
carriers were relatively small ships,
designed mainly to ferry airplanes
and conduct limited operations such Ship Types Notes
as anti-submarine warfare or ground
1
support. They were also slow, and CV: Aircraft Carriers Includes combined air and surface attacks.
2
were supposedly entirely vulnerable if CVL: Light Carriers Includes depth charges.
3
caught by enemy warships. That said, CVE: Escort Carriers At Pearl Harbor six more US battle-
the escort carriers defended themselves BB/BC: Battleships & Battlecruisers; ships were damaged but eventually
aggressively, launching air attacks the latter are sometimes abbreviated CC repaired and returned to action.
4
that confounded the Japanese even CA/CL: Heavy & Light Cruisers Combined aerially delivered
as the carriers maneuvered to escape. DD: Destroyers & Escorts bombs and torpedoes.
Japanese gunnery, meanwhile, showed LBAC: Land-Based Aircraft
a marked fall off as they sank only one PT: Patrol Torpedo Boats
carrier and three destroyers, despite SS: Submarines
being in range for most of the fight. YP: Seaplane Carrier/Tender
The action came to an end when
other US carrier aircraft joined in, caus-
ing the Japanese to break off. Samar
showed it was aggressive leadership, as
much as anything else, that ultimately
won the day in sea battles. ★

WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011 47

» continued from page 43
of war. Carriers couldn’t by themselves
win the decisive battle because their air
groups lacked the strength to engage
and sink large numbers of enemy
ships, especially when the enemy had
his own carriers to provide air cover
and launch counterstrikes. Carriers
could mainly sink other carriers
– the primary outcome of the four
carrier versus carrier battles of 1942
– but not the rest of a battle fleet.
That would change in 1944-45,
when the USN could concentrate
overwhelming numbers of carriers
and aircraft. Again, though, by that
time the overall balance of forces
had turned decisively in favor of the
United States in all categories.
Decision Through Sea Power
An important fact to consider is that,
for practical purposes, the Japanese got
their hoped for decisive battle in 1942.
At the Battles of the Java Sea and Savo
Island, the Allies lost large numbers of
cruisers at a time when such sinkings
couldn’t be afforded and when there
were few battleships available to back
them up. Meanwhile the IJN still had
its battleship fleet intact. Yet the Allies
continued to fight the war in the Pacific.
Even with the losses at Savo Island, the
US didn’t call off its Solomons campaign.
It was a matter of trial and error and
on-the-job-training, but within three
months the USN turned the tide during
the Naval Battles of Guadalcanal.
The IJN had destroyed and damaged
sufficient US carriers throughout 1942
such that in October of that year the
US had only one operational carrier in
the Pacific. The IJN, despite its losses at
Midway, could still deploy several car-
riers at that time. Unfortunately for the
Japanese, efficiently sinking enemy ships
wasn’t enough to win the war for them
in the face of unrealistic strategic goals.
The Japanese couldn’t follow up by con-
solidating what their navy had won. ✪
SOURCES
Dear, I.C.B. & M.R.D. Foot, eds. The Oxford Companion to
World War II. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Ellis, John. World War II: A Statistical Study. NY: Facts on
File, 1993.
Morison, Samuel Eliot. History of United States Naval
Operations in World War II. Boston: Little Brown, 1951.
Dunnigan, James & Albert Nofi. The Pacific War
Encyclopedia. NY: Checkmark,1998.
Parshall, Jonathan & Anthony Tully. Shattered Sword. Dulles:
Potomac, 2005.
Prados, John. Combined Fleet Decoded. NY: Random House,
1995.

Airpower in the Mediterranean

The Axis had considerable air strength in the Mediterranean
at the time of Mattapan, but lack of aero-naval coordination
kept those planes from supporting their surface ships. There
had been a similar shortfall in the Bismarck operation when
long-range Luftwaffe airpower, based in France, was supposed to
provide cover for the battleship. Lacking coordinative structures
between the two services, the Luftwaffe bombers showed
up only after the Bismarck had been sunk on 27 May.
The Luftwaffe would later turn around that situation in
the Mediterranean. During the German airborne invasion of
Crete (May 1941), their aircraft sank three RN cruisers and six
destroyers, and made it too dangerous for the British to continue
to operate their battleships, two of which were damaged.
Crete demonstrated land-based airpower was an effective
instrument against ships. The Germans initially committed
Fliegerkorps X (Air Corps 10) to the Mediterranean, where it was
later reinforcement by Luftflotte (Air Fleet) Two. Fliegerkorps X was
specially trained in anti-shipping operations and, along with Italian
aviation, sank large numbers of Allied combat and cargo ships.
During the 1943 Dodecanese campaign, the Luftwaffe temporarily
gained superiority in the skies over the Aegean, thereby making
possible one of the last German operational victories in the war.
With the Italians having effectively withdrawn their battleships
owing to Taranto and Mattapan, however, consolidating control
of the sea lanes from the air alone wasn’t feasible. Had the Axis
been able to come up with a better-coordinated aero-naval strategy
from the start, they might’ve gained control of the convoy routes
to North Africa. That would’ve had huge implications for Rommel’s
first offensive in Libya, which was in progress at that time. ★

48 WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011


Decisive Doctrine,
Indecisive Navy
Japanese naval doctrine called for
fighting the decisive battle, to be executed
by massed battleships and carriers. Despite
that doctrine the IJN often fought indecisively.
Midway is a striking example. There, Adm.
Yamamoto utilized most of the carriers and
battleships of the Combined Fleet for his
operation. Had he concentrated all those ships
into one force, it’s doubtful the USN could’ve
brought to bear the strength to challenge him
in an all-out fight for the island, regardless
of the availability of ULTRA intelligence.
Instead of taking advantage of his superior
strength, though, Yamamoto divided his fleet
into several independent task groups and
sent them off on various missions across the
Central and North Pacific. That allowed the
USN to gain local superiority in the waters
Deck hands work on the Vittoria Veneto.
off Midway. Yamamoto wasn’t aware of US
strength, owing to Allied deception measures
and to poor Japanese naval intelligence about
the situation. Regardless, his operational
plan called for an unnecessary dispersion of
IJN strength just at the time it was sup-
posed to be fighting its decisive action.
Midway brings up another oddity of IJN
doctrine: Japanese commanders tended to
overestimate the importance of spirit and
determination to carry through to victory. Those
factors were supposed to overcome Allied
materiel superiority. Even so, for all their talk
about “samurai spirit,” IJN operations often
came off as overly cautious. For example, after
the air clashes at Midway the IJN still had
overwhelming superiority in surface warships
plus three light carriers. Yet Yamamoto
failed to muster the determination to order
the completion of that critical operation.
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
On the other side the USN carrier groups
were in poor shape, having lost most of their
planes while sinking four Japanese carriers on
4 June. While Yamamoto wouldn’t have been
able to launch any further big carrier strikes, he
would’ve had the air cover necessary to protect
his fleet from what was left of American air-
power at Midway, and his superiority in surface
ships could’ve allowed them to fight their way
to the island to support the amphibious landing.
In the end, though, Yamamoto lost his samurai
spirit, took the path of caution and broke off.
In retrospect, it’s always easy to speculate
on alternative decisions, especially when
we have a more complete picture than did
the original combatants. Still, the distance
between IJN doctrine and practice cost them
the opportunity to win their sought after
decisive battle in more than one instance. ★
49
Mega Feedback
(Answer form available at the
end of this survey for mail
in or use our on-line form at
strategyandtacticspress.com)
1. Do you generally buy or
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or just the magazine?
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3. If buying the game edition,
how many of the issues in the
last 12 months did you buy?
a. 4-6 issues.
b. 1-3 issues.
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4. If subscribing or buying the
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level of approval for the use of
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to 0 (hate it; want it to stop).
5. If subscribing to the just the
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6. If buying just the magazine,
how many of the issues in the
last 12 months did you buy?
a. 4-6 issues.
b. 1-3 issues.
c. None, I just found this
survey on you web site and
decided to complete it.
BOOKS 14. What categories or specific
companies would you like to see
7. How many books (paper or in ads in future issues?
e-books) have you purchased
in the past 12 months? 15. Anything else you’d like to tell
a. 0. us about the ads in our magazines?
b. 1-5.
c. 6-10.
d. 11-20. OVERALL
e. 21 or more.
16. What rating would you give
8. How many military history S&T magazine overall in the past
books (paper or e-books) have you year (10=excellent, 0=horrible)?
purchased in the past 12 months?
a. 0. 17. What do we need to do
b. 1-5. to rate a 10 in the future?
c. 6-10.
d. 11-20. 18. What rating would you give
e. 21 or more. S&T games overall in the past
year (10=excellent, 0=horrible)?
9. Of the military history books,
how many were from Osprey? 19. What do we need to do
a. 0. to rate a 10 in the future?
b. 1-5.
c. 6-10. 20. What rating would you give
d. 11-20. Decision Games releases overall in
e. 21 or more. the past year (i.e. the folio games
and Totaler Krieg and Dai Senso)
10. Of the military history books, (10=excellent, 0=horrible)?
how many were from Casemate?
a. 0. 21. What do we need to do
b. 1-5. to rate a 10 in the future?
c. 6-10.
d. 11-20.
e. 21 or more. GAME PROPOSAL SECTION
11. Of the military history books, Please take a few minutes to
how many were from ________ review the game proposals and
(please fill in the name of you buy select the ones you would like to
see us publish in future issues. This
feedback is the most important
b. 1-5. source for determining what
c. 6-10. games we will be working on for
d. 11-20. future issues of World at War.
e. 21 or more. We’re also seeking your input on
additional ideas we’re considering.
We also have a feature on our
ADS other web site <decisiongames.
com> where you can pledge your
12. What ads have you responded support for future boxed games,
to in the past 12 months in S&T S&T Special Editions, books, and
and/or World at War magazines? computer games. As those projects
move up the rankings, they move
13. What ads have you forward into design, development,
responded to in the past 12 artwork, printing and release. You
months in other magazines? can also see the latest listing in the
next Dispatch. The World at War
game line-up current looks like this:
21 Rhineland
22 Minsk: East Front Battles #3
23 Guadalcanal: Pacific Battles #1
24 Sedan
25 Keren
26 Race to the Reichstag
27 Special Edition:
Olympic & Coronet
28 Green Hell: Operation
Thursday and The Admin Box
29 Norway 1940
30 Hinge of Fate: 1939
31 Dubno: East Front Battles #3
32 Nomahan: Pacific Battles #2
33 Accolade Solitaire
34 Special Edition: Guards Armour
35 Strike North
36 Stalingrad Cauldron
37 Bloody Ridge
The games in issues 21 through
24 are printed and awaiting their
magazines, #25-29 are printing, and
#30 through 37 are in various stages
of development and artwork—there
may be some changes to the
schedule, but those games are
expected to appear. This survey
will determine what games will be
going into issues 38 through 48.
Christopher “Doc” Cummins
Publisher
In sections A through E, you will
find six proposals per category.
Please rank the proposals in
each category as first (1), sec-
ond (2), third (3), fourth (4), fifth
(5), and sixth (6) choice. Do not
use ratings scales. Please use
each ranking once and and only
once (e.g. do not rank one pro-
posal as “1” and all others “6”).
West/Mediterranean Theater
(mark 1 to 6)
A1. Third Army. This will put the
US player in command of Third
Army during Patton’s 1944 drive
across France. The German player
will command various formations
which Third Army encountered. The
American objective is to reach the
Rhine before the German Ardennes

50 WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011


counteroffensive is launched in
December 1944. Emphasis in the
game will be on logistics—supply
can be allocated to different game
functions, and the American player
can devote operations to rounding
up supply by unorthodox means. The
German player, meanwhile, is trying
to delay the Americans through
rearguard actions and desperate
counterattacks. Depending
on how well the Germans are
doing, the Ardennes counterof-
fensive may be launched sooner
or later according to a random
events table. Joseph Miranda.
A2. Ghost Division. This will put
the German player in the boots
of Rommel as commander of the
7th Panzer Division during the
campaign in France 1940—and of
his Allied counterparts. Units will
be tactical level, companies and
platoons. The game will include
several scenarios drawn from
this campaign, and the map will
be 200 meters per hex. Emphasis
will be on command control and
combined arms tactics. Commander
units will be able to influence the
movement of forces, and provide
fire modifiers. The idea is to show
how the German panzer divisions,
even though having tanks which
were often inferior to their Allied
counterparts, were able to gain
tactical victories. The game will also
have a campaign version in which
what happens in one scenario will
influence the next. Joseph Miranda.
A3. Bastogne! This will cover the
fighting for the strategic crossroads
town of Bastogne during the Battle
of the Bulge. The Germans are trying
to take the town against determined
American resistance. American
forces are desperately holding on,
while Patton drives to the rescue.
The game system will be based on
Manila ’45 and Leningrad ’41. Units
will be battalions and companies,
and combat results will be modified
by the morale of defending units.
Morale is critical to both sides: the
Germans can make calls for sur-
render while the American can make
defiant rebuffs. Joseph Miranda.
A4. Anzio: The Bloodiest
Beachhead. The design deals
with the Anzio landings in January
1944 and the subsequent six
weeks of intense fighting, as the
Allies attempted to expand the
beachhead, while the Germans
worked to eliminate it. This was the
most interesting and mobile part of
the campaign. By the first week in
March, both sides had fought each
other to a standstill, taking huge
casualties and having little to show
for it. Both players have the capacity
and opportunity to attack. Seeking
these opportunities, preventing the
enemy from doing the same, and
managing depleted units creates
moments of crisis throughout the
game. Units are generally at the
brigade / regimental / battalion
level and hit markers are used to
reflect the attritional nature of
the battle. Units attack / defend
as single stacks, using combat
differentials to inflict retreats and
hits. The sequence of play is classic
Supply, Reinforcement, movement
followed by combat. Norman Smith.
A5. Tunis 1943. A solitaire
game simulating the final Allied
drive on Tunis. The game uses a
similar system to the designer’s
Israeli Independence, using chits as
to track army movement and random
events. The player is placed in
the unusual position of controlling
German forces, attempting a
holding action with remnants of
the famed Afrika Korps and relief
troops under the command of
General von Arnim. As Free French,
British, and American forces close
in on the Eastern Dorsal, the player
must hold back Allied advances
long enough to secure permission
to evacuate North Africa, while
withstanding a deterioration of sup-
plies and air power. Darin Leviloff.
A6. Crusade: WWII in Northwest
Europe, 1944-45. This corps-level
game with monthly game turns
smulates this theater from D-Day to
V-E Day. A historic campaign game
would be included, a free-choice
landing-site scenario, as well as
1942, 1943 and 1944 what-ifs. The
system would be a derivation of
the one from Drive on Stalingrad,
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
Mega Feedback
but adapted to this more strategic “what ifs” that surround the bitter
scale. The “Patton Factor” would fighting for the Korsun Pocket. The
also be emphasized. Ty Bomba. game uses the same rules system
as Guards Tank. Paul Youde.
Eastern Theater (mark 1 to 6) B4. Jackboots on the Caucasus:
Summer 1942, the Germans
B1. Vistula-Oder-Berlin will launched their great Eastern
be a corps-army (for the Soviets) offensive to seize the Soviet
and divisional (for the Germans) Caucasus oilfields. The campaign
simulation of the last five months came crashing to a disastrous
of the war in the East in Poland, finale at Stalingrad later that
Czechoslovakia and Eastern year. Caucasus will use the
Germany. Nine turns, from January They Died with Their Jackboots
to May 1945. The map covers from system to simulate this mighty
Memel to the Dukla pass and from campaign. It uses a command chit
Lublin in S. Poland to Leipzig and system which randomly selects
Rostock in Germany (20 km to the sub-commands for operational
hex). There will be a campaign game impulses. Certain command chits
plus several scenarios: Red Storm will give players extra, one time,
on the Reich (the January offensive), bonuses such as the Soviet
fight for the flanks (clearing Operation Uranus. Joseph Miranda.
operations at Prussia, Silesia and B5. Panzers East: Army Group
Pomerania, February-March ‘45) the Center, June-August 1941. Like
last battle (the final offensive on to PGG, but for the wargamers of
Berlin, April ‘45) and race to Prague today. Turns equal one week. Units
(May ‘45). Javier Romero. are primarily divisions for both
B2. Operation Uranus: Race sides, with some separate brigades,
for Stalingrad. This would cover regiments and battalions. Germans
the Soviet double envelopment of would be multi-step; Soviets
Stalingrad in the winter of 1942-43, would be one-step with unknown
using a modified form of the classic strengths. The map covers from the
SPI Battle for Germany system. Each border to Moscow at 16 miles per
of the two players would command hex. Special rules for: Guderian,
one wing of the Soviet forces Rollbahns, Hitler’s interference,
racing to envelop the Sixth Army. variable phase sequences, supply
As well as the Axis forces facing attenuation, airpower, the Stalin
the other Soviet player. The game Line. Can you take Moscow before
would be based on new information Hitler turns AGC south? Ty Bomba.
about the Red Army in World War B6. Duel in the North simulates
II, including the use of deception the sweeping advances of the
operations and resurgent mobile German forces across the Baltic
doctrine. Each player must race to States and into Russia in the
be the first to reach its operational summer of 1941. The game includes
objectives on its side of the map, rules for special weather, air power
thereby gaining recognition from and armored combat. The counters
the Kremlin as well as pos- represent German Divisions and
sible additional reinforcements all Kampfgruppe sized formations
generated by a random events table. and Soviet Brigades or Divisions
Units will be divisions and corps sized formations. Paul Youde.
with airpower. Joseph Miranda.
B3. Escaping through Hell’s Pacific Theater (mark 1 to 6)
Gate simulates the German 3rd
Panzer Corps attempted relief of C1. Midway Solitaire. This will
the Korsun Pocket in February 1944. use the Coral Sea Solitaire system
The game allows players to recreate to model the great aircraft carrier
the historical situation in the first battle of June 1942. The player
scenario; whilst the alternative sce- would control American forces,
nario lets them explore some of the while the game system would
51
Mega Feedback
run the Japanese. The Japanese
have superior numbers of carriers
and capital ships but they are
moving in several different task
forces. The American player would
have the advantage of superior
intelligence from ULTRA which
he can use to defeat the foe
in detail. Joseph Miranda.
C2. Samurai & Warlords:
China 1937-1941. The Japanese
and Chinese Nationalist players
attempt to by reinforcing their own
armies and by mobilizing the forces
of Chinese warlords in shifting
coalitions. Airpower conducts
tactical support and terror raids.
The Chinese Nationalists can
also gain the support of Western
powers and the USSR bringing
in volunteer air units and more
supplies. The objective is to gain
control of China before the Pacific
war begins. Joseph Miranda.
C3. Seventh Fleet v. Kurita (25
Oct 1944) examines whether the
US Seventh Fleet of old battleships
could have defeated the Japanese
Central Force of surface ships
during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. The
game would cover both a meeting
engagement outside Leyte Gulf and
the Seventh Fleet forming a battle
line near the entrance of Leyte
Gulf. Rules would include air strikes,
limited ammunition for US ships, US
radar advantages, leadership effects
such as Admiral Ugaki replacing
Kurita, ability of US ships to fire on
the Japanese from within Leyte Gulf
and an attempt by the Japanese to
force their way into the Gulf. Ships
would be double-long counters
with single counters for leadership
and air strikes. Otto Reichardt.
C4. Central Pacific Campaign.
This would use the Red Dragon
Rising-South Seas Campaign
system for the Allied offensive in
the Central Pacific, 1943-44. The
campaign begins with the Allied
counteroffensive at Tarawa and
continues through to the seizure of
central Pacific islands to be used
as staging areas for the invasion
of the Philippines and as B-29
bases for the strategic assault
52
on the Japanese home islands.
The Japanese player will have to
carefully husband his forces for
potentially decisive counterat-
tacks. Naval units will represent
individual carriers, 2-4 battleships,
and squadrons for everything else.
Air units will be at wing level,
and ground units as divisions and
brigades. Joseph Miranda.
C5. CBI Air War. This would
simulate the air war over the
China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater of
Operations, 1941-44. Players would
allocate air units to various missions
and targets which would then
be executed via a semi-abstract
system. Depending on how well
these operations are executed, the
front line for the ground war will be
affected, thereby giving or taking
away various airbases. Air units
will represent groups, depicting
different types of aircraft with their
own capabilities. Joseph Miranda.
C6. Midway Campaign. This will
use simulate Yamamoto’s entire
campaign in the eastern Pacific dur-
ing the summer of 1942. The game
will stretch from Japanese bases in
the central Pacific to Hawaii and the
Aleutians. The design will be based
on Red Dragon Rising-South Seas
Campaign, emphasizing combined
operations and continuous actions
to generate operations. One
additional element will be limited
intelligence. Units will be deployed
as part of task forces and the Allies
will have the advantages of their
ULTRA intelligence. Game units
will represent individual aircraft
carriers, groups of two battleships,
and squadrons for everything
else. Air units will be at the group
level, and ground formations as
regiments. Joseph Miranda.
Other Proposals (mark 1 to 6)
D1. Plan Gertrud 1942. The
German invasion of Turkey during
1942 was originally conceived due
to concern Turkey might join the
Allies. This presumes the Germans
preemptly attack Turkey in order to
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
threaten Syria and Iraq in support
of Axis forces in North Africa as
well as supporting the Stalingrad/
Caucasus campaign. The scale will
be division level. David March
D2. Ghost Column is a tactical
level game with a twist. The title
comes from a night attack the
Germans made at Rezhavets during
the battle of Kursk. The game is
solitaire, with the player in control
of an armored column attempting to
penetrate Soviet lines. The Soviets
are played using a simple agent
based system designed to react to
the presence of enemy forces. The
active player will have to make deci-
sions about what types of equip-
ment and personnel to assign to
his force, and then once the action
begins, about movement paths and
when to engage in combat. Units
are platoon and company level.
Stealth and command decisions are
emphasized, but when the shooting
starts you will have a wide array
of weapons to utilize. Complexity
is low to moderate. Roger Mason.
D3. France Fights On. This
alternative history game examines
the strategic and operational pos-
sibilities inherent in the campaign
that would’ve occurred in France in
June 1940 if the French government
had resolved to fight on. The French
choose to evacuate as much of their
army as possible to Algeria. The
resultant campaign, then, is one of
strategic retreat and pursuit. The
German player must try to destroy
as much of the French force as
possible, while keeping his own
losses to a minimum in doing so.
Both sides’ orders of battle are
entirely historical. Ty Bomba.
D4. La Resistance! simulates the
cat and mouse game between the
German Counterintelligence and the
Allied-supported resistance. Using
mechanics of the old SPI Spies!
game, this game is set during the
period of 1941-1944. Players will
have to guard their resources, avoid
being detected by security troops,
and infiltrate units into occupied
France/Belgium/Netherlands.
Successfully completing
operations provides more chits
and actions. David March.
D5. Crisis Manchuria. This
game will use the same system
as Rhineland Crisis 1936-1937.
Historically the KMT did not
intervene in Manchuria since it
was militarily weak having lost
hundreds of thousands of men
and was economically bankrupt in
the aftermath of the 1930 Central
Plains War. Crisis Manchuria
posits Chang Kai Shek’s KMT and
allied Chinese warlords managed
to come together and vigorously
confronted the Japanese invasion
of Manchuria in 1931. Brian Train.
D6. Operation-A: Japan Invades
Australia. What if Japan had
won the Battle of the Coral Sea,
conquered New Guinea, and then
launched an invasion of Australia?
Operation-A explores this pos-
sibility. The game map will cover
northern Australia, the southern
Dutch East Indies, and New Guinea
(the latter being Japanese bases).
The Japanese player will have
a limited number of divisions to
conduct his invasion, and will have
to choose from several different
landing areas. Units will be divi-
sions with brigade and regimental
breakdowns, plus airpower and
fleets. Joseph Miranda.
Special Editions (mark 1 to 6)
Special Editions have two map
sheets, two counter sheets,
and up to 32 pages for rules.
E1. Medwar Campaign. The entire
campaign in the Mediterranean
theater of operations, 1940-43,
using the Red Dragon Rising-South
Seas Campaign system. The game
map would stretch from Algeria to
Iraq, and include strategic islands
such as Malta and Crete. Ground
units would be divisions, air units
groups, and naval units at the
squadron level. German divisions
can break down into kampfgruppen.
Armored units can employ special
post combat movement rules,
depending on their level of mobility.

Special operations units will include
the Long Range Desert Group, the
Brandenburgers, and Italian naval
commandos. Players can consult
an Appeal to the High Command
Table which may bring in additional
reinforcements, or trigger loyalty
changes in Vichy forces, or trigger
the Iraqi coup. There will also be
variable scenarios depending on the
level of force commitment by both
sides. Special rules will let the Axis
build their Operation Herkules force
to invade Malta, while the British
can reorganize their forces for more
efficient operations. Event chits
will include the impact of ULTRA,
American intervention (everything
from carriers in the Med to
Operation Torch), and leaders such
as Rommel, O’Conner, Montgomery
and Patton. Joseph Miranda.
E2. O’Connor’s War. A what if
game dealing with the ultimate
question of the Med Campaign.
Churchill decides to capitalize on
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the gains of Operation Compass,
and does not divert forces to
Greece or Ethiopia. The game
starts with Benghazi on its east
edge and Tunisia and Sicily on
the West Edge. The game starts
with Beda Fomm and goes to
the end of May 1941. The game
focuses on not just territory but
national morale. The German
player must concentrate on keeping
a faltering Italy from creating a
separate peace with Britain, after
an invasion of Sicily. David March.
E3. ETO: 1943. This is a hypotheti-
cal game based on World War II
in Europe breaking out in 1942
rather than in 1939. Historically, the
German and Italian war economies
would have been prepared for
full-scale war in 1943. Both the
Axis and Allied forces have more
time to prepare, but the historic
lessons of 1939-41 would not have
been learned. Therefore, the
powers would start the war with
A1 B1
A2 B2
A3 B3
A4 B4
A5 B5
B6
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
Mega Feedback
forces determined via a random
table. Units will be army level
with some corps breakdowns. A
pre-game events system will
establish the alliances on each side,
as well as giving special victory
conditions. Joseph Miranda.
E4. ABDACOM/Red Sun Rising.
Using modified Red Dragon Rising
rules, ABDACOM covers the open-
ing moves of the Japanese entry
into WWII. Not just a complete
walkover as many have thought,
the opening battles were heavily
contested by the allies concentra-
tion of forces at appropriate places
to interfere with the invasions.
Both the Allied and Japanese
players must carefully husband
their resources while ensuring
that all objectives are met. The
map covers Malaysia, Indonesia,
and the Philippines. Units are at
the squadron level for airplanes
and small naval ships, individual
ships for capitol ships, regiments
C1 D1
C2 D2
C3 D3
C4 D4
C5 D5
C6 D6
for ground troops. David March.
E5. Battle for Germany. An update
and expansion of the classic S&T
game. It would cover the last year
of WWII in Europe at the army
and corps level. Of course, the
ground-breaking ‘split-command’
system would be maintained, along
with better developed OBs and
rules. A short scenario covering
the six months (as in the original)
will be included. Ty Bomba.
E6. Zhukov’s War: Russia, 1942-
43. This design would simulate
the crucial middle-phase of the
eastern front from 19 Nov 1942
through the liberation of Kiev late
in 1943. Units would be corps for
the Germans and armies for the
Soviets. A short scenario, beginning
with Operational Citadel, would
be included, as well as a what-if
“Manstein’s Gambit” scenario.
Ty “Proud Monster” Bomba.
E1
E2
E3
E4
E5
E6
53
Game Preview
MINSK’44
Minsk covers the crucial exploitation
phase of the great Soviet summer
offensive against the Germans’ Army
Group Center in June of 1944. The game
utilizes the classic quad series rules’
mechanics and a retreat-emphasizing
differential combat system to encourage
encirclement tactics, so typical of Soviet
armor strategy during World War II.
Minsk is a two-player (Soviet versus
German) operational-level game. The
game includes 228 medium-sized
die-cut counters, with the division as
the primary maneuver unit, and also
includes air units, untried units, blown
bridge markers, and headquarters
units. The colorful map features the
area of the Third Belorussian Front
during Operation Bagration, with
54
each hex representing approximately
two miles across, and includes such WaW UPCOMING
prominent locations as Berezina and FEATURES
the transportation center of Minsk.
#
21: Rhineland ‘36
The rules entail a variety of #
22: Minsk 1944
standard and unique rules, such #
23: Pacific Battles: Guadalcanal
as Railroad Movement, “What if” #
24: Sedan: France, May 1940
Optional Reinforcements, Blowing #
25: Keren, East Africa
Bridges, Untried Units, and the full #
26: Race to the Reichstag
range of historical unit formations, Visit STRATEGYandTACTICSpress.com
such as 5th Guards Tank Army, and the for previews of these issues.
505th Heavy Armor Battalion, etc.
Victory in the game is determined
by the accumulation of VP for
control of important hexes, as well
as evacuating friendly units. ✪
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011

STRATEGIC
BACKWATERS
Djibouti: Running the
Allied Food Blockade
The port and territory of Djibouti
held, in June 1940, somewhere around
40,000 souls. Of that number 8,300
were French soldiers, with another 20
or so sailors, the rest being European
and native residents and workers as
well as approximately 1,000 refugees
(mostly women and children). The latter
had been evacuated from Indochina
and the Levant in order to get them
out of those potential combat zones.
All of them had at least one thing
in common: they needed to eat.
When France signed its armistice
with Germany in June 1940, Djibouti
became a potential threat to the British.
On the one hand, they had no real need
for another harbor in that part of the
world, as Mombassa to the south, Aden
to the east, and all the facilities around
Suez to the north were more than ample
to meet regional Royal Navy needs.
The potential for basing Vichy naval
raiders out of Djibouti was slight, as all
French ships had been dispatched to the
Mediterranean in September 1939 when
the British agreed to ensure the protec-
tion of all convoys in the area as well as
guaranteeing Djibouti’s food supply.
It was that last point the British
planned to exploit: the inhabitants of
Djibouti, both European and native,
depended on the importation of food
in order to survive, as almost nothing
edible was produced in Djibouti. All
that food had come by sea, normally
either from France itself or its colonies.
On 19 July 1940 the British consul
in Djibouti formally warned the Vichy
governor the food supply was to
be cut-off by the imposition of a
blockade. On 2 August that blockade
went into full affect, enforced by
British warships based out of Aden,
by Yemen- and British Somaliland-
based aircraft, and by troops along
the Djibouti/Somaliland frontier. At
Observation Post
that time Djibouti had food stocks
on hand adequate for two months.
With little choice, the French in
Djibouti turned to the Italians, who had
conquered neighboring Ethiopia several
years earlier, and who also occupied
Eritrea to the north. Despite the hostility
that had existed between them and the
French for the previous several years,
the Italians agreed to provide 800 tons of
food per month, stocks mostly confiscat-
ed from Ethiopians. With strict rationing,
that meant everyone in Djibouti
would receive a barely minimal diet.
In that situation the pro-Vichy
governor confronted three choices:
surrender and join the Free French,
attempt to arrange a new provision-
ing agreement with the British, or
simply hold on, hoping smuggling
and blockade runners would augment
the Italian supply arrangement.
Contact was therefore initiated with
British authorities in Aden via the US
Consulate, asking to ease the blockade
and allow humanitarian resupply. That
initial effort failed, but both sides knew
communications would continue.
With the blockade in effect, two other
factors emerged bearing on it. First,
in 1940 Winston Churchill promised
Mussolini that, if Italy entered the war
on the side of the Axis, Britain would
“tear Italy’s empire to shreds.” In fulfill-
ment of that pledge, in January 1941
British forces began moving against the
Italians in East Africa and the Horn. The
second factor was Charles De Gaulle and
his “Free France” movement. He wanted
the soldiers in Djibouti as well as the ter-
ritory itself, which would constitute not
only one more piece of “France” freed,
but another justification as to why he, in
particular, should represent Free France
to both the British and the people of
occupied France. For De Gaulle, his
being aided in the recovery of Djibouti
was a critical test of British goodwill.
In December 1940 several Free
French infantry battalions had been
ordered by De Gaulle to invade Djibouti,
first mustering in Port Sudan for what
he codenamed “Operation Marie.”
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
They were soon commandeered by the
British, however, reorganized into the
Brigade of the Orient, and sent against
the Italians in Eritrea. Further, British
forces soon retook British Somaliland
and then broke all contact between
Italian forces and Djibouti, cutting the
railway and ending that food conduit. By
April 1941, then, Djibouti was complete-
ly invested and no food was going in. By
June, Djibouti was starting to starve.
In February 1941 Vichy France and
the US had signed, and the British
reluctantly agreed to, the Murphy-
Weygand Accord for North Africa,
which allowed food and humanitarian
supplies to be moved between France
and North Africa. The accord provided
for using French funds otherwise frozen
in the US to buy stocks of food, fuel and
other non-strategic goods necessary
to keep afloat the economy of French
North Africa. It specifically allowed
France to ship such goods through
the British naval blockade under
“navicerts” issued in London. The
British weren’t willing to stretch the
accord to cover Djibouti, however, as it
had become their policy to more fully
support De Gaulle and his Free French
movement. At the same time, however,
the reality on the ground also led to
bitter dispute between the British and
those same Free French over Djibouti.
Once Italian forces in the region
were being defeated or driven into
remote areas, the British became more
interested in arranging an accord with
Vichy to allow their use of the port
and railroad facilities of Djibouti. Such
an accord would make easier their
occupation of the overall region. In
exchange, British blockading forces
would turn a blind eye toward food and
humanitarian shipments for Djibouti.
De Gaulle, though, would accept no
such compromise. He demanded the
rigorous implementation of the block-
ade, reasoning the faster the people
and troops in Djibouti starved, the
sooner they would be willing to join Free
France. Toward that end he transferred
to Aden two of the limited number of
55
Observation Post
Free French naval vessels then avail-
able—the sloop Savorgnan de Brazza
and the minesweeper Commandant
Duboc—to help enforce the blockade.
They frequently patrolled well into the
Gulf of Tadjoura to intercept even coast-
al traffic. Free French intelligence agents
also began actively working among
the Yemeni Arabs, offering bribes to
divert even small boat traffic away from
Djibouti, as well as preemptively buying
cargoes to keep them from going there.
The Vichy-controlled French Navy,
traditionally responsible for Djibouti,
refused to accept the evolving situation.
The French Naval-Officer-In-Command
(NOIC) in Madagascar, a Capt. Maerten,
was therefore directed to effect the
relief of Djibouti by all possible means.
(Madagascar, roughly 2,000 miles from
Djibouti, was more than self-sufficient
in food.) Because naval assets and
merchant shipping were limited,
Maerten commandeered local sailing
vessels, mostly dhows, but also a few
schooners (some motorized), and
called for volunteers to man them.
The first vessel, a 120-ton schooner
named the Hind, was loaded with
70 tons of food and sent off on 7 July
1941. Resembling nothing so much as
a regional pirate vessel, with a mixed
crew of Malgaches and Comoran
fishermen captained by Ens. Cazalis
de Fonduce, the ship made its way
north. Frequently becalmed en route,
she delivered her cargo on 1 August.
A second vessel, the submarine Le
Vengeur, departed Diego Suarez two
days after the Hind, but arrived before
the slow schooner. She delivered only
10 tons of food, as volume and weight
are severely restricted in submarines,
but her ballast tanks had been filled
with red wine. On her return to
Deigo Suarez, the Le Vengeur fired a
torpedo at the Savorgnan de Brazza
as it was stopping a dhow engaged in
smuggling food to Djibouti. The shot
missed, but the Savorgnan de Brazza
fled the scene after releasing the
dhow, allowing it to reach Djibouti.
Other vessels followed. The Naram
56
Passa, a sailing vessel, was requisitioned
in the Comoro Islands, refurbished
and dispatched with 60 tons of food
in early September. Meeting only
a few merchant ships and being
ignored by two troopships escorted
by a British heavy cruiser, she arrived
without difficulty on 17 September.
Next, the Amir, a confiscated gold
smuggler, was dispatched in late
September, but she was captured by the
Royal Indian Navy patrol boat Ratjaniri
on 5 October, 80 miles short of Djibouti.
The dhow Aeroplane had to turn
back after springing a leak; the dhow
Marianne lost most of her cargo in heavy
seas, and another two decrepit dhows
had to turn back to Madagascar on the
verge of sinking. Finally an old coaster,
the Sur Couf, was captured by the British
in November and taken to Aden.
Vichy naval vessels were forced
to try to take up the slack. The
submarine Monge delivered 10 tons
in late October, followed by the Le
Heros in late November. The gunboat
D’Iberville, in company with the
submarine Le Glorieux, managed
to run the blockade, delivering 300
tons of food on Christmas Eve 1941.
Even so, starvation was approaching
and the submarine resupply effort
was only delaying the inevitable.
The Japanese victories at Pearl
Harbor and, more importantly for
Djibouti, at Singapore, prompted the
British to relax their blockade, as the
vessels being used there were sud-
denly needed for more important tasks.
Yemeni dhow smuggling increased and,
on 20 February 1942, the Vichy “auxiliary
cruiser” Bougainville (formerly the
banana boat Victor Schoelcher)
arrived with 1,100 tons of food as
well as some live cattle. She made
the run again in March and on-hand
food stocks were then deemed large
enough that starvation was no longer
an immediate threat. Then, on 5 May
1942, the British seized Diego Suarez
on Madagascar, meaning Djibouti lost
all but the Yemeni smuggling option.
The situation was again desperate.
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
To continue the Yemeni smuggling
traffic, Djiboutian authorities needed
hard cash, as the Arabs would only
take bullion, not paper money or
credit. Only gold francs or silver thaler
(old Austro-Hungarian Maria Theresa
coins, locally called “fat ladies”) were
acceptable and, while the dhow traffic
was fast, their loads were small and
many trips were required. Thus lots
of money was needed, and for that
the Vichy French relied on airlift.
Djibouti had managed to maintain
an aerial line of communication with
metropolitan France, using seaplanes
flying via Beirut until June 1941 and by
bombers flying via Italian-held territory
until late that year. After that only a few
long-range aircraft flew directly from
North Africa to Djibouti, those being
either Amiot or Glenn Martin bombers.
Along with mail and passengers, boxes
of silver thaler were also delivered to
ensure Djibouti had enough money to
pay the smugglers who delivered food.
Even so, Djibouti was steadily slipping
closer to starvation, even though several
hundred women and children were
evacuated to Madagascar early in 1942.
It all came to an end in December,
after the Allied landing in North Africa
and the widespread collapse of Vichy
control in its colonies across the
continent. Military discipline in Djibouti
simply gave way; troops deserted en
masse to British territory and, on 28
December 1942, Free French troops
arrived along with an Allied naval
task force the next day (the British
cruiser Ceres, the destroyer Hero, two
minesweepers and three Free Greek
torpedo boats). During the long siege
the population of Djibouti had shrunk
by 15,000, almost all of them natives
who chose to simply move away from
an increasingly dangerous situation.
— Vernie Liebl
WEAPONS & TACTICS
Tank & Anti-Tank Tactics in Burma
The Japanese deployed little armor
to Burma during the war. The tables
of organization and equipment for
their infantry divisions called for a
company of six “tankettes,” which had
two-man crews and a 37mm cannon.
Also available in limited numbers
was a medium tank with a crew of
four and armed with a 57mm cannon
along with two 7.7mm machineguns.
What the Japanese did have in
significant numbers were two types
of anti-tank guns. There was a high
velocity 47mm gun and a light-weight
37 mm gun. Of the two, the Americans
considered the 47mm the least effective
because of the characteristics of its
ammunition. The 47mm armor-
piercing shell had a large amount
of explosive, but the projectile burst
before it penetrated its target. In one
engagement some 14 hits were made
on an M3A3 light tank by a 47mm
anti-tank weapon at a range of 100 feet,
all without penetration because of the
projectiles’ premature explosions.
The Japanese anti-tank guns were
the core of their anti-tank defense. The
system they devised demonstrated
careful coordination between anti-tank
guns, machineguns and magnetic
mine-thrower teams. Other elements
consisted of the skillful use of terrain,
land mines and field artillery support.
Complicating the effective employ-
ment of tanks by the Chinese and
Americans in that theater of operations
was the limitation placed on vehicles
by the vegetation. High elephant
grass, also called coogan or kunai
grass, sometimes grew to a height of
18 feet and, along with heavy vines
entwined among the numerous trees,
it generally limited armored vehicles to
roads and paths. It was often difficult
for vehicles to maneuver off-road at all
when the enemy was encountered.
Japanese anti-tank guns were gener-
ally employed in pairs from covered
emplacements at distances from 30
to 100 feet from a road. Machinegun
nests, located so as to prevent infantry
from attacking the anti-tank guns,
were used as protection. Wherever
possible the Japanese located up to four
weapons on the far banks of streams
and rivers covering a road bridge,
which gave them a good chance of
getting a hit when a tank attempted
to cross the waterway. The guns were
sited with narrow fire lanes, which
enhanced their ability to avoid early
discovery by advancing enemy troops.
The Japanese proved adept at placing
and concealing their anti-tank guns. To
prevent a position from being overrun
by tanks, especially the M4 medium
tanks of the Americans, emplacements
were located next to large trees that
couldn’t be knocked down. Where trees
were cut down to create obstacles,
their stumps were left high enough to
block a tank trying to cross over them.
Discovering such positions proved
difficult. Tank crew seldom saw an
emplacement until its anti-tank gun
or machinegun opened fire. Even then
it was hard to determine from exactly
where the fire was coming. In one
instance a tank was hit four times by
an anti-tank gun located 30 feet off the
road. It took 15 minutes for the tank
crew to find and destroy that position.
Anti-tank gun emplacements,
along with most defensive positions
constructed by the Japanese, weren’t
slipshod efforts. The thickness of the
walls and the cover on top could vary
from two to six feet, depending on how
much time the crew had to prepare
the position. The gun port was usually
kept narrow, normally not more than
eight inches high and 24 inches wide.
Deep and narrow trenches for stor-
ing ammunition and concealing extra
crew were constructed to the rear. The
depth of those trenches made it hard to
get hits on their contents. The trenches
were concealed as well, giving little hint
as to the size of the overall position.
When taking Allied tanks under fire
the Japanese had varied success with
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
their anti-tank weapons. Their 37mm
gun fired an AP-HE (armor piercing
high explosive) round. Against the front
glacis of the M3A3 that projectile was
impotent, but it was effective against
the sides of those tanks, especially
when they hit the gas tanks.
Against the American M4 medium
tank, neither the 37mm nor the 47mm
was effective. Even when the running
gear was hit, the damage wasn’t
significant enough to disable the
tank. The Japanese soon learned
they couldn’t defeat the American
medium tank, and as a result they
rarely tried to engage it, deciding not
to give away their concealed positions
and risk subsequent destruction.
At the same time, the tanks of the
1st Provisional Chinese-American Tank
Group in northern Burma achieved only
varied success in dealing with Japanese
anti-tank emplacements. The 37mm
guns mounted on their M3A3 light
tanks fired a canister round, but the
typical anti-tank gun position’s narrow
firing aperture made it difficult to
neutralize them unless a round achieved
a direct hit within that opening.
The M4 tanks could use their 75mm
cannon to better effect, depending on
the type of ammunition employed.
Even so, unless a direct hit on an
anti-tank gun’s firing aperture was
achieved, high explosive rounds were
seldom effective. When a high explosive
round did find its target, the results
were excellent, with great damage
done to the Japanese gun and crew.
Better results were achieved with
armor piercing high explosive rounds.
The 75mm round’s penetrating ability
was powerful. It could go through up
to six feet of soil and logs and then
explode within the emplacement.
One of the major dangers Allied
tank crews encountered in engaging
an enemy intent on knocking out
their vehicles came from magnetic
mine-throwers. The Japanese made
wide use of teams of soldiers armed
with magnetic mines who sprang from
concealed roadside holes to place those
57
Observation Post
charges directly on top of passing tanks.
Those magnetic mines were
designed to be attached to the most
vulnerable parts of a vehicle. If placed
on a tank’s running gear, such as a track
sprocket, an exploding mine would
often simply be thrown off, doing no
damage. If placed on the rear deck over
the gas tank of an armored vehicle, how-
ever, when the mine exploded it would
often cause the entire tank to burn.
To combat the Japanese use of mag-
netic mines required careful over-watch
of the lead tanks by accompanying vehi-
cles. When M4 medium and M3A3 light
tanks worked in coordination, the light
tanks would cover the medium tanks
with their machineguns and 37mm can-
non. That kept Japanese infantry from
leaping on the medium tanks’ rear decks
and attaching the mines over the engine
compartment and gas tanks. Using those
defensive tactics, Chinese and American
crewmen found the Japanese soon
became reluctant to face the spray effect
of the aforementioned canister rounds
fired by the light tanks’ 37mm guns.
A more passive defense measure
involved the placing of wire netting
over front slope hatches and rear
engine decking of the light tanks.
Experimentation with previously burned
out tanks revealed that a four-inch
gap between such netting and the
tank body resulted in a mine blowing
up and doing no damage. To keep the
netting in place, mechanics welded
rods to the armor that supported the
wire, and bamboo and logs were used
58
to fill the gap between the mesh and
armor. Though that worked for the light
tanks, it proved difficult to apply to
the medium tanks; so, as a substitute,
sandbags were employed there. To
defeat Japanese who tried to climb on
the M4s and remove the sandbags,
they were wired securely in place.
The mine-throwers who attempted
to penetrate those defense measures
were especially dedicated men who
worked in pairs. Four to five pairs
composed a squad and were com-
manded by an officer who was charged
with carrying and distributing the mine
fuses. Each pair of men was issued
at least two magnetic mines, though
as many as eight were found in holes
from which the soldiers jumped.
The tactics employed by the mine
throwers were closely coordinated
with the employment of the anti-tank
guns and supporting machineguns.
The positions from which the soldiers
made their attacks were always in close
proximity to the guns and were covered
by them. The positions were small
holes dug close enough to the road that
the mines could be simply thrown on
passing tanks. If a thrown mine landed
on the rear deck of a light tank it caused
the complete destruction of that vehicle.
The passive deployment of mines
on roads and trails also met with
some success. The terrain in which
the Chinese and Americans operated
so channeled the maneuver room of
their tanks that the Japanese use of
mines and obstacles often slowed down
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
operations to the point of defeating
missions. Ultimately, though, mines
embedded in thoroughfares proved
more of a nuisance than a debilitating
threat. Except in two engagements,
there was little effort to plant true
minefields or make use of such mines in
coordination with anti-tank defenses.
The first encounter of the Chinese
and American tankers with standard
Japanese landmines actually involved
an attempt to place mines lashed to
poles under the treads of passing tanks.
Concealed by high elephant grass, which
grew close by the side of a trail down
which the tanks were driving, Japanese
soldiers attempted to disable several
light tanks in that way. The attempt
was thwarted by firing 37mm canister
rounds that dispersed the attackers and
discouraged further use of the tactic.
Landmines proved most effective
against logistical vehicles. A single mine
was able to blow off the front wheel of a
truck, but such vehicles weren’t difficult
to repair. A double-stacked landmine,
however, could be destructive enough
to damage the wheel assembly of a
two and a half ton truck so badly it was
impossible to repair in the field. At the
same time, double-stacked mines once
badly shattered the tracks of several
light tanks. In another instance a single
mine broke the track of an M3A3 light
tank, but did no more than destroy
one track block. As for M4 medium
tanks, the landmines proved ineffec-
tive in even breaking their tracks.
Another important element of
Japanese anti-tank tactics involved the
use of artillery in support of their defen-
sive operations. The Japanese often
had sufficient artillery in the Chinese-
American combat area in Burma to
have a significant impact on operations.
Whenever tanks appeared the Japanese
responded with the full strength of their
available guns. That proved hard on the
accompanying Chinese infantry, who
took heavy losses when they operated
too closely with the armor. On the other
hand, when the artillery succeeded in
separating the tanks from the infantry,
Japanese defenders would in turn
infiltrate back into the resulting gap and
reestablish their fighting positions. The
result was often the re-emplacement
of Japanese automatic weapons that
would then take a further heavy toll
on the separated Chinese infantry.
The tactical combination of anti-tank
guns, automatic weapons, landmines,
mine-throwers and artillery often proved
itself defending against the Chinese-
American armor threat represented by
the 1st Provisional Chinese-American
Tank Group in Burma in 1944 and 1945.
In sum, however, though having the
advantage of excellent defensive terrain,
the Japanese still only managed to slow,
not stop, the advance of that Allied
armor formation. As skillfully executed
as their anti-tank tactics were, they were
ultimately insufficient to avoid the final
defeat of Japanese forces in Burma.
— Raymond E. Bell, Jr.
TECHNOLOGY
BACKDATE
Trains Over Beaches
World War II saw many American
technological innovations that created
surprise on the battlefield and helped
lead to ultimate Allied victory: the atom-
ic bomb, the proximity fuse, radar and
sonar advances, the Norden bombsight,
and amphibious tanks are a few of the
better known examples. This, however,
is the story of a little known yet amazing
American technological achievement
that overcame seemingly impossible
hurdles to create a tremendous strategic
asset that significantly contributed
to victory in northwest Europe.
Early in 1944 Hitler surveyed
his Atlantic Wall, and he felt secure
the Allies couldn’t effectively crack
it. His number one reason for that
self-assurance: though there are 1,500
locomotives and 20,000 freight cars
waiting in England to be brought to
the continent, he believed the Allies
would need a fully operating port to
accomplish that logistically vital feat.
He therefore ordered every French
port heavily fortified and garrisoned,
and ordered those defenders to fight
to the death. If a port was about to
be captured, its docks were to be
blown up prior to that. No port facility
was to be allowed to fall intact into
Allied hands. As long as that was
accomplished, he believed the Allies
could never rehabilitate the French
rail system in time to wage a mobile
war across France that same year.
In believing that, Hitler made a
fatal miscalculation. For even though
intact ports were denied to the invading
Allied armies, they nonetheless rapidly
brought the necessary rolling stock and
locomotives into play using an unfore-
seen and seemingly impossible method.
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
Prior to D-Day, Allied airpower had
been used to cut off Normandy from
the larger French rail-net, in the hope of
thereby denying easy or swift German
reinforcement during the campaign.
French locomotives and rail cars were
high priority targets, and large numbers
of them were destroyed. Of course,
once Allied armies were well ashore in
France, that same rail network would
be vital to the strategic mobility of that
huge force. It therefore had to be rapidly
put back into service. The replacement
locomotives, cars and other materials
were accordingly stockpiled in England.
The Americans also had a plan, and
the technology, to quickly transport the
replacement railroad stock onto the
French rail net. It involved an innova-
tive technique to move train cars and
locomotives over open sand beaches.
Col. Sidney H. Bingham had run the
New York City subway system before
the war. In the army he was called on
to develop a plan to ship trains across
the Channel and unload them over the
open, sloping Normandy beaches and
right onto the French rail network.
When he first proposed the idea at
an inter-Allied conference in England
in July 1942 he was scoffed at. The tide
on the Normandy beaches runs to 24
feet, and would therefore allow only 90
minutes of unloading time for such huge
pieces of cargo every 24 hours. It was
estimated the British ships that had been
used to shuttle trains across the Channel
before the war would take 3.5 years
to move the necessary replacement
locomotives and rolling stock to France,
and that was only if dock facilities were
available. The proposed American
59
Observation Post

Performance of Allied Railways,

Northern France, Summer 1944

Month > July August September

Average Tons 1,520 3,410 11,834
Hauled Per Day
Average Number of 15.5 25.5 32.8
Trains Per Day
Average Number 22 26.2 267
of Miles Freight
Was Hauled
Average Tons of 138 133 351
Freight Per Train
Miles of Track in Use 60 Figure Not Available 4,788

scheme therefore seemed hare-brained.
The situation was so potentially des-
perate, the go ahead was given for rails
to be experimentally laid inside Landing
Ship Tanks (LST), in line with Bingham’s
thinking. Rolling stock was loaded
aboard those ships and the combination
tested for seaworthiness. To create the
required stability, the locomotives were
actually welded to the rails on which
they sat inside the hulls of the LST.
For unloading without docks, tracks
were laid from the nearest inland rail
line to the beach, and expandable
“breathing” bridges were emplaced
on shore, using quick-drying concrete
poured at low tide for their foundations.
A flexibly expansive system connecting
the rails aboard the ships to the rails
onshore was devised, and the unwelded
trains were then simply unloaded over
the open beach by driving them off the
ships and onto the rail line ashore. It was
found that 22 rail cars could be unload-
ed in 21 minutes using that method
There was only one more obstacle
to be overcome. The Allied senior
ground commander ashore, British Field
Marshal Bernard Montgomery, was
generally opposed to the whole scheme.
In particular, he declared he would allow
no steam locomotives in the British area
of operations within the beachhead
during the first weeks after the invasion.
That was because, in his view, trains
inescapably created steam and smoke
that drew heavy enemy artillery fire.
Bingham therefore exclusively deployed
diesel locomotives in the British area.
Starting on 14 July (38 days after
the initial landing), LST run up on
the Normandy beaches disgorged
entire freight trains directly onto the
French rail net. That technological
achievement provided the strategic
logistical backbone that enabled a rapid
advance across France to the German
border. In the 90 days following that
date the US Army Transportation Corps
Military Railway Service delivered
1,500 locomotives and 20,000 railcars
to France using LST. It was one of the
war’s greatest engineering feats.
— Mark Day

60 WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011

WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011 61
Media Reviews
Kohima 1944: The Battle that
Saved India, by Robert Lyman
(Osprey Publishing, 2010).
Reviewed by Andrew Hind.
Robert Lyman, a prolific writer on
World War II , does a remarkable job
of describing the little-remembered
Battle of Kohima and why it was so
important to the course of events
in the Indo-China Theater and to
the Allied victory over Japan.
In February 1944 the Japanese
launched Operation Ha-Go into Assam
Province in British India, designed
as a feint to lure British forces away
from the planned main event a month
later: Operation U-Go. Launched in
March, U-Go was an ambitious attack
intended to inspire a rising by the
Indian populace against British rule.
The Japanese plan relied on mobility,
infiltration and captured supplies to
maintain the momentum of the attack.
That scheme was unhinged by the
dogged British defense of Kohima, the
key point in the entire Imphal region.
62
The Battle of Kohima took place After 229 releases, Osprey has all but
in two stages. From 3 to 16 April the perfected this series. The one quibble I
Japanese attempted to capture Kohima had was the lack of theater map illustrat-
Ridge, which dominated the roads over ing the struggle from the strategic point
which the British and Indian troops of view. It would’ve been better if the
on the Imphal plain were supplied. A book’s designers hadn’t taken for granted
small British garrison, outnumbered that readers would already know the
more than 10:1, held out against fierce location of Kohima within the theater,
and repeatedly desperate attacks to especially in light of the obscurity of the
retain control of the vital ridge. campaign in US military historiography.
The second phase, which lasted from Kohima has been called the
mid-April through June, saw British “Stalingrad of the east.” This book illus-
and Indian troops counterattacking in trates why that’s an apt comparison. The
an effort to drive the Japanese from the ferocious fighting, the immense strategic
area. The fighting during that phase, implications of the battle, and the vivid
against an increasingly desperate presentation make it a must-read.
enemy, was among the most brutal
experienced anywhere in World War II.
When it was over and the British had
prevailed, a turning point in the war
had been reached. From that time on
the Japanese in Indo-China were on the
retreat, with the British systematically
driving them from their conquests.
Lyman was an inspired choice
to write this book in Osprey’s series.
Not only is he a skilled writer and
historian, but as Chairman of the
Kohima Educational Trust and a Trustee
of the Burma Campaign Memorial
Library, he is one of the greatest
scholars on the subject. His knowledge
shines through in a text that captures
all the horror and heroism that came
to mark the Battle of Kohima. At the
same time, he manages to paint an
evocative picture of the difficulties
inherent in fighting in a jungle. Rarely
has a battle come alive more vividly.
The text is supported by a Struggle for the Middle Sea: The Great
number of detailed illustrations by Navies at War in the Mediterranean
Peter Dennis, as well as by dozens of Theater, 1940-1945, by Vincent P.
period photographs. Maps, including O’Hara (Naval Institute Press, 2009).
a number of three-dimensional Reviewed by Ken MacFarlane
topographic representations, make it
easy to follow the chain of events.
WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011
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More major sea battles were fought
in the Mediterranean during World
War II than any other body of water.
This work offers a fresh examination of
the struggle to control the Middle Sea
by five of the chief naval combatants
of the war: Britain, France Germany,
Italy and the United States.
The entry of Italy into the conflict
in June 1940 triggered a seemingly
endless series of engagements with the
goal of exerting control over this major
supply route between three continents.
European colonies were also at stake,
open to the naval victor for the taking.
Though Mussolini declared war
before his navy was fully prepared, he
felt that service was strong enough to
challenge the British Royal Navy given
that the French had been immobilized
by their surrender to Germany. The
Italians, though, were matched against
an opponent who was confident, brave
and well trained. Despite facing such an
intimidating foe, along with shortages
of fuel and inferior repair facilities, the
Italians won many battles and were
mostly successful in convoying forces to
Africa. Yet fear and mediocre leadership
at the highest levels kept them from
winning. Poor performance in night
engagements, coupled with inferior
torpedo tactics and aircraft coordina-
tion, ultimately doomed their efforts.
While the Luftwaffe offered the grav-
est threat to the Allies, the American
and Free French Navies tipped the
balance in the Mediterranean, allowing
multiple landings that forced Italy
from the war. Following the Italian
armistice in 1943, Germany quickly
seized minor Italian units to continue
the naval campaign until May 1945.
This book is rich in detail, providing
in-depth examinations of all of the
surface battles between the major
combatants complete with maps and
tables. Each table shows the weather
conditions and a list of the Allied and
Axis ships, all annotated with leader,
nationality, type and damage received.
Other charts show the overall delivery
of material or comparative losses.
A number of less well known
aspects of the campaign are brought
to light, such as the distribution of
mine fields, engagements in the
Aegean, torpedo boat actions, and
the employment of German S-boat
flotillas. It also highlights submarine
actions by both sides, which were at
first expected to change the course
of the overall conflict but then disap-
pointed the planners on both sides.
There are a few detractions. The
book is choppy; I found it easier to read
in small chunks like a magazine. While
a terrific reference, it loses the big-
picture focus toward the end, perhaps
because the battles became smaller
with no strategic impact. The impact
of airpower also seemed minimized.
This is a good work with a
fresh perspective and lacking
any nationalistic bias. It will be
especially valuable to readers desir-
ing rich detail of the campaign.

WORLD at WAR 20 | OCT–NOV 2011 63

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