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Tanada v. Tuvera
Facts: In procuring the enforcement of public
duty, a petition was sought by
Tañada,Sarmiento, and Movement of Attorneys
for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism,
Inc(MABINI) seeking a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to
publish,and or cause the publication in the
Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees,letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter
of implementation and administrative orders.
There is a need for Publication of Laws to
strengthen its binding force and effect: giving
access to legislative records, giving awareness
to the public of the law promulgated. The
Official Gazette, however, does notcontain
publications of administrative and executive
orders that affect only a particular class of
persons. The Official Gazette, as mandated by
law, presents all presidential issuances “of a
public nature” or “of general applicability.”
Also, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly
recognized that the rule as to laws takes effect
after 15 days unless it isotherwise (for some do
specify the date of effectivity) following the
completion of the publication in the Official
Gazette. However, the decree has been misread
by many; for ithas no juridical force, but a mere
legislative enactment of RA 386.
Issue: WON to provide publications of the law
elsewhere, aside from the Official Gazette, as
itwould be essential to the effectivity of the said
legislative or executive act that regulatesthe
acts and conduct of people as citizens.
Held: Respondents were granted petition
to publish all unpublished issuances in the
OfficialGazette, serving as a response to the
maxim “ignorance as an excuse for non
compliance.” The effectivity of laws shall follow
the notice to parties concerned, for such is a
public right. There will be no retroactive effect
for laws with dates which applied the 15-day
rule of publication in the Official Gazette.
Republic v. Pilipinas Shell
FACTS: On Dec 4, 1991, the Office of the
Energy Affairs, now the DOE,
informed the respondent that its contributions
to the OPSF for foreign exchange risk charge
for the period Dec 1989 to March 1991 were
insufficient. OEA Audit Task Force noted a total
underpayment of P14,414,860.75 by
respondent to the OPSF. As a consequence
of the underpayment, a surcharge of
P11,654,782.31 was imposed upon
respondent. The said surcharge was imposed
pursuant to MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended
by Department of Finance Circular No. 2-94.
Another underpayment in the amount of
P10,139,526.56 for the period Apr1991 to
Oct1991 was noted with additional
surcharges for P2,806,656.65. Therespondent
paid the OEA in full the principal
amount of its underpayment, totaling
P24,554,387.31, but not the surcharges. The
OEA notified the respondent that the latter is
required to pay the surcharges on the late
payment. Respondent then filed a Notice of
Appeal before the OP which affirmed the
conclusion of the DOE. The CA on appeal
reversed the Decision of the CA. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: W/N MOF Circular 1-85, as amended,
was ineffective for failure to
comply with the requirement to file with ONAR.
HELD: As early as 1986, this Court, in
Tañada vs. Tuvera, enunciated that the
publication is indispensable in order that all
statutes, including administrative rules that are
intended to enforce or implement existing laws,
attain binding force and effect. Under the
doctrine of Tañada vs. Tuvera, the MOF Circular
No. 1-85, as amended, is one of those
issuances which should be published
before it becomes effective since it is
intended to enforce PD No. 1956. The said
circular should also comply with the
requirement stated under Sec. 3 of Chapter 2,
Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987
filing with the ONAR in theUniversity of the
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Phils. Law Center for rules that are already in
force at the time the Admin Code of 1987
became effective. These requirements of
publication and filing were put in
place as safeguards against abuses on the part
of lawmakers and as guarantees to the
constitutional right to due process and to
information on matters of public concern
and, therefore, require strict compliance. In
National Association of Electricity
Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory
Board, this Court emphasized that both the
requirements of publication and filing of
administrative issuances intended to
enforce existing laws are mandatory for the
effectivity of said issuances. While MOF Circular
No. 1-85, as amended, may be unimpeachable
in substance, the due process requirements of
publication and filing cannot be disregarded.
Moreover, none of the provisions of EO
No. 137 exempts MOF Circular No. 1-85, as
amended from the aforementioned
requirements.
Cojuangco v. Republic
FACTS: In 1971, RA No. 6260 was enacted
creating the Coconut Investment
Company (CIC) to administer the Coconut
Investment Fund (CIF). The declaration of
martial law saw the issuance of several
presidential decrees, which included PD No. 755
providing for the implementation of the
Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial
Bank for the benefit of Coconut Farmers,
purportedly designed to improve the coconut
industry through the collection and use of the
coconut levy fund. Relevant to the petition is
the acquisition of the First United Bank,
which was renamed as United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB). Concerning the
intended acquisition, FUB was the bank of
choice which Pedro Cojuangco’s group had
control of. The plan, then, was for PCA to buy all
of Cojuangco’s shares in FUBwhich did not
ensue since Cojuangco had the exclusive option
to acquire the former’s FUB controlling
interests. Two deeds emerged from the
agreement: one between Pedro
Cojuangco group and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.
and the other between PCA and Eduardo
Conjuangco, Jr. The PC-ECJ (1st contract)
agreement allegedly contains, inter alia,
Cojuangco’s personal and exclusive option to
acquire the FUB (UCPB) shares from Pedro
and his group. The PCA –Cojuangco agreement
(2nd contract) shows PCA’s acquisition of the
said option from Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.
ISSUE: W/N the PCA –Cojuangco agreement
cannot be accorded the status of a law
for the lack of the requisite publication?
HELD: Section 1 of PD No. 755 incorporated, by
reference, the “Agreement for the
Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the
Benefit of the Coconut Farmers” executed by
the PCA. It bears to stress that the PCA –
Cojuangco Agreement referred to in Section 1
of PD 755 was not reproduced or attached as an
annex to the same law. And it is well-settled
that laws must be published to be valid. In fact,
publication is an indispensable condition for the
effectivity of a law. The publication, as further
held in Tañada, must be of the full text of the
law since the purpose of publication is to inform
the public of the contents of the law. Mere
referencing the number of the presidential
decree, its title or whereabouts and its
supposed date of effectivity would not
satisfy the publication requirement. In this
case, while it incorporated the PCA-
Cojuangco Agreement by reference, Section 1
of PD 755 did not in any way reproduce the
exact terms of the contract in the decree.
Neither was a copy thereof attached to the
decree when published. We cannot, therefore,
extend to the said Agreement the status of a
law. Consequently, we join the Sandiganbayan
in its holding that the PCA –Cojuangco
Agreement shall be treated as an ordinary
transaction between agreeing minds to be
governed by contract law under the Civil Code.
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Villanueva v. JBC
Facts: After about a year from being appointed
as a MCTC judge, Judge Villanueva applied for
the vacant position of presiding judge in some
RTC branches. The JBC however informed him
that he was not included in the list of
candidates for such position because the JBC’s
long-standing policy requires 5 years of service
as judge of first-level courts before one can
apply as judge for second-level courts. Before
the SC, he assailed via Rule 65 and Rule 63 with
prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction the
policy of JBC on the ground that it is
unconstitutional and was issued with grave
abuse of discretion. Allegedly, the policy also
violates procedural due process for lack of
publication and non-submission to the UP Law
Center Office of the National Administrative
Register (ONAR), adding that the policy should
have been published because it will affect all
applying judges. On the other hand, one of the
JBC’s arguments was that the writ of certiorari
and prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC
from performing its principal function under the
Constitution to recommend appointees to the
Judiciary because the JBC is not a tribunal
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function.
Issue : W/N the policy of JBC should have been
published
Held: Yes. As a general rule, publication is
indispensable in order that all statutes,
including administrative rules that are intended
to enforce or implement existing laws, attain
binding force and effect. Exempted from
requirement of publication are interpretative
regulations and those merely internal in nature,
which regulate only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, and
the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates
in the performance of their duties.
Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within
the administrative rules and regulations
exempted from the publication requirement. It
involves a qualification standard by which the
JBC shall determine proven competence of an
applicant. It is not an internal regulation,
because if it were, it would regulate and affect
only the members of the JBC and their
staff. Notably, the selection process involves a
call to lawyers who meet the qualifications in
the Constitution and are willing to serve in the
Judiciary to apply to these vacant positions.
Thus, naturally it follows that potential
applicants be informed of the requirements to
the judicial positions, so that they would be
able to prepare for and comply with them.
Jurisprudence has held that rules implementing
a statute should be published. Thus, by analogy,
publication is also required for the five-year
requirement because it seeks to implement a
constitutional provision requiring proven
competence from members of the judiciary.
ASTEC v. ERC
FACTS:
Petitioners Batangas I Electric Cooperative, Inc.
(BATELEC I), Quezon I Electric Cooperative, Inc.
(QUEZELCO I), Quezon II Electric Cooperative,
Inc. (QUEZELCO II) and Pampanga Rural Electric
Service Cooperative, Inc. (PRESCO) are rural
electric cooperatives established under P.D. No.
269. BATELEC I, QUEZELCO I and QUEZELCO II
are members of the Association of Southern
Tagalog Electric Cooperatives, Inc. (ASTEC).
PRESCO is a member of the Central Luzon
Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (CLECA).
BATELEC I, et al. are engaged in the distribution
of electricity.
On 8 December 1994, R.A. No. 7832 or the Anti-
Electricity and Electric Transmission
Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994 was
enacted. The law imposed a cap on the
recoverable rate of system loss that may be
charged by rural electric cooperatives to their
consumers. The IRR of R.A. No. 7832 required
every rural electric cooperative to file with the
Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), on or before 30
September 1995, an application for approval of
an amended Power Purchase Agreement (PPA)
Clause incorporating the cap on the recoverable
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rate of system loss to be included in its schedule
of rates.
On 8 June 2001, R.A. No. 9136 or the Electric
Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) was
also enacted. Section 38 of the EPIRA abolished
the ERB, and created the Energy Regulatory
Commission (ERC). The ERC issued an Order
which provides that rural electric cooperatives
should only recover from their members and
patrons the actual cost of power purchased
from power suppliers. The ERC also ordered
BATELEC, et al. to refund their respective over-
recoveries to end-users. In addition, the ERC
also adopted the new "grossed-up factor
mechanism" in the computation of the over-
recoveries of the electric cooperatives to be
remitted to their consumers.
Thus, BATELEC I, et al. moved to reconsider the
said orders but the ERC denied the same. On
appeal, the CA upheld the validity of the ERC
Orders.
Hence, this petition. BATELEC I, et al. aver that
these ERC Orders are invalid for lack of
publication, non-submission to the U.P. Law
Center, and for their retroactive application.
ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed orders are
invalid for non-publication, non-submission to
the U.P. Law Center and for their retroactivity?
HELD: The petition is partly meritorious.
CIVIL LAW: publication of laws
Procedural due process demands that
administrative rules and regulations be
published in order to be effective. In Tada v.
Tuvera, this Court articulated the fundamental
requirement of publication, thus: "We hold
therefore that all statutes, including those of
local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature. Administrative rules and regulations
must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant also
to a valid delegation."
There are, however, several exceptions to the
requirement of publication. First, an
interpretative regulation does not require
publication in order to be effective. The
applicability of an interpretative regulation
"needs nothing further than its bare issuance
for it gives no real consequence more than
what the law itself has already prescribed." It
"adds nothing to the law" and "does not affect
the substantial rights of any person." Second, a
regulation that is merely internal in nature does
not require publication for its effectivity. It
seeks to regulate only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the general
public. Third, a letter of instruction issued by an
administrative agency concerning rules or
guidelines to be followed by subordinates in the
performance of their duties does not require
publication in order to be effective.
The policy guidelines of the ERC on the
treatment of discounts extended by power
suppliers are interpretative regulations.
Publication is not necessary for the effectivity of
the policy guidelines. As interpretative
regulations, the policy guidelines of the ERC on
the treatment of discounts extended by power
suppliers are also not required to be filed with
the U.P. Law Center in order to be effective.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, this Court
recognized the basic rule "that no statute,
decree, ordinance, rule or regulation (or even
policy) shall be given retrospective effect unless
explicitly stated so." A law is retrospective if it
"takes away or impairs vested rights acquired
under existing laws, or creates a new obligation
and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new
disability, in respect of transactions or
consideration already past." The policy
guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of
discounts extended by power suppliers are not
retrospective. The policy guidelines did not take
away or impair any vested rights of the rural
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electric cooperatives. Furthermore, the policy
guidelines of the ERC did not create a new
obligation and impose a new duty, nor did it
attach a new disability.
However, the grossed-up factor mechanism
amends the IRR of R.A. No. 7832 as it serves as
an additional numerical standard that must be
observed and applied by rural electric
cooperatives in the implementation of the PPA.
In light of these, the grossed-up factor
mechanism does not merely interpret R.A. No.
7832 or its IRR.It is also not merely internal in
nature. The grossed-up factor mechanism
amends the IRR by providing an additional
numerical standard that must be observed and
applied in the implementation of the PPA. The
grossed-up factor mechanism is therefore an
administrative rule that should be published
and submitted to the U.P. Law Center in order
to be effective.
As previously stated, it does not appear from
the records that the grossed-up factor
mechanism was published and submitted to the
U.P. Law Center. Thus, it is ineffective and may
not serve as a basis for the computation of
over-recoveries. The portions of the over-
recoveries arising from the application of the
mechanism are therefore invalid. Furthermore,
the application of the grossed-up factor
mechanism to periods of PPA implementation
prior to its publication and disclosure renders
the said mechanism invalid for having been
applied retroactively.PARTLY GRANTED
Garcillano v. House of Representatives
Committee on Public Information, Public Order
Safety, National defense and security
information and communications technology
and suffrage and electoral reforms
FACTS:Petitioners in G.R. No. 179275 seek to
disallow the Senate to continue with the
conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry on
the issue of “Hello Garci” tapes containing the
wiretapped communication of then President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, without duly
published rules of procedure, in clear
derogation of the constitutional requirement.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in
their pleadings and even on oral argument that
the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been
published in newspapers of general circulation
only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the
present Senate of the 14th Congress, however,
of which the term of half of its members
commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was
undertaken for the publication of these rules
when they first opened their session.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the
constitutionally mandated publication by
arguing that the rules have never been
amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are
published in booklet form available to anyone
for free, and accessible to the public at the
Senates internet web page, invoking R.A. No.
8792.
ISSUE: Whether or not the invocation by the
respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,
otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce
Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid
publication through the internet is a substantial
compliance of the constitutional requirement of
publication.
RULING:NO. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides that [t]he
Senate or the House of Representatives, or any
of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure. The
requisite of publication of the rules is intended
to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data
message or an electronic document as the
functional equivalent of a written document
only for evidentiary purposes. In other words,
the law merely recognizes the admissibility in
evidence (for their being the original) of
electronic data messages and/or electronic
documents. It does not make the internet a
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medium for publishing laws, rules and

regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate

Committees, therefore, could not, in violation
of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in
the legislative inquiry subject of these
consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in
aid of legislation by the Senate has to be
deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so
only in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure.