7.) G.R. No.

76193 November 9, 1989

UNITED FEATURE SYNDICATE, INC., petitioner,

vs.
MUNSINGWEAR CREATION MANUFACTURING COMPANY, respondent.

Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Pena and Nolasco for petitioner.

Jaime G. Manzano for private respondent.

NOP: This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by United Feature Syndicate Inc., seeking to set aside
the Resolution of the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals * dated September 16, 1986 dismissing the
appeal of petitioner-appellant for having been filed out of time and denying its Motion for Reconsideration
for lack of merit in its Resolution dated October 14, 1986.

DOCTRINE: Pertinently, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 49, otherwise known as the "Decree on
Intellectual Property", provides:

Section 2. The rights granted by this Decree shall, from the moment of creation, subsist with respect to any
of the following classes of works:

xxx xxx xxx

(O) Prints, pictorial illustrations, advertising copies, labels, tags and box wraps. ...

Therefore, since the name "CHARLIE BROWN" and its pictorial representation were covered by a copyright
registration way back in 1950 the same are entitled to protection under PD No. 49.

HELD: Petition granted. An examination of the records show that the only appreciable defense of
respondent-registrant is embodied in its answer, which reads:

It uses, the trademark "CHARLIE BROWN" & "DEVICE" on children's wear such as T-shirts, undershirts,
sweaters, brief and sandos, in class 25; whereas "CHARLIE BROWN" is used only by petitioner as
character, in a pictorial illustration used in a comic strip appearing in newspapers and magazines. It has no
trademark significance and therefore respondent-registrant's use of "CHARLIE BROWN" & "DEVICE" is
not in conflict with the petitioner's use of "CHARLIE BROWN" (Rollo, p. 97 [21]).

It is undeniable from the records that petitioner is the actual owner of said trademark due to its prior
registration with the Patent's Office. Finally, in La Chemise Lacoste S.A. v. Hon. Oscar Fernandez &
Gobindram Hemandas Sujanani v. Hon. Roberto V. Ongpin, et al. 129 SCRA 373 [1984]), the Court
declared. In upholding the right of the petitioner to maintain the present suit before our courts for unfair
competition or infringement of trademarks of a foreign corporation, we are moreover recognizing our duties
and the rights of foregoing states under the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property to
which the Philippines and (France) U.S. are parties. We are simply interpreting a solemn international
commitment of the Philippines embodied in a multilateral treaty to which we are a party and which we
entered into because it is in our national interest to do so.
8.) U.S. Supreme Court Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Svc. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)

Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc. No. 89-1909

Argued Jan. 9, 1991

Decided March 27, 1991

499 U.S. 340

NOP:

DOCTRINE: To establish copyright infringement, two elements must be proven: ownership of a valid
copyright and copying of constituent elements of the work that are original. The first element is met in this
case because the directory contains some forward text. As to the second element, the information contains
facts, which cannot be copyrighted. They existed before being reported and would have continued to exist
if a telephone directory had never been published. There is no originality in the formatting, so there is no
copyrightable expression. Thus, there is no copyright infringement.

HELD: Facts cannot be subject to copyright laws; otherwise there would be no spreading of information or
learning. Subjecting facts to copyright laws would mean that any time a person used a fact found in a book,
be it in a school paper, newspaper, or another book, that person would be guilty of piracy.

9.) G.R. No. 165306 September 20, 2005

MANLY SPORTWEAR MANUFACTURING, INC., Petitioners, vs. DADODETTE ENTERPRISES

AND/OR HERMES SPORTS CENTER, Respondent.

NOP: This petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assails
the July 13, 2004 decision2 of the Court of Appeals3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 79887 and its September 15, 2004
resolution4 denying reconsideration thereof.

DOCTRINE: Sec. 2 Effects of Registration and Deposit of Work. The registration and deposit of the work
is purely for recording the date of registration and deposit of the work and shall not be conclusive as to
copyright ownership or the term of the copyrights or the rights of the copyright owner, including neighboring
rights.

At most, the certificates of registration and deposit issued by the National Library and the Supreme Court
Library serve merely as a notice of recording and registration of the work but do not confer any right or title
upon the registered copyright owner or automatically put his work under the protective mantle of the
copyright law. It is not a conclusive proof of copyright ownership. As it is, non-registration and deposit of
the work within the prescribed period only makes the copyright owner liable to pay a fine.
10.) G.R. No. 130360 August 15, 2001

WILSON ONG CHING KlAN CHUAN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LORENZO TAN, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

NOP: This petition for review1 seeks to annul the decision2 dated August 27, 1997 of the Court of Appeals
which set aside the resolutions3 dated October 13 and December 15, 1993 as well as the order dated March
1, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94.4

DOCTRINE: To resolve this controversy, we have to return to basics. A person to be entitled to a copyright
must be the original creator of the work. He must have created it by his own skill, labor and judgment without
directly copying or evasively imitating the work of another.14 The grant of preliminary injunction in a case
rests on the sound discretion of the court with the caveat that it should be made with extreme caution.15
Its grant depends chiefly on the extent of doubt on the validity of the copyright, existence of infringement,
and the damages sustained by such infringement.16In our view, the copies of the certificates of copyright
registered in the name of Ceroilfood Shandong sufficiently raise reasonable doubt. With such a doubt
preliminary injunction is unavailing.17 In Medina vs. City Sheriff, Manila, 276 SCRA 133, 139 (1997), where
the complainant's title was disputed, we held that injunction was not proper.

HELD: Finally, we note that the complaint initially filed with the RTC was for infringement of copyright. The
trial court's resolution subject of Tan's petition under Rule 65 before the CA concerns the correctness of
the grant of the writ of preliminary injunction. The only issue brought before the CA involved the grave
abuse of discretion allegedly committed by the trial court in granting the writ of preliminary injunction. The
Court of Appeals in declaring that the wrapper of petitioner is a copy of Ceroilfood Shandong's wrapper
went beyond that issue touched on the merits of the infringement case, which remains to be decided by the
trial court.19 In our view, it was premature for the Court of Appeals to declare that the design of petitioner's
wrapper is a copy of the wrapper allegedly registered by Ceroilfood Shandong. That matter remains for
decision after appropriate proceedings at the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
to prohibit Tan from using the cellophane wrapper with two-dragon device is denied, but the finding of the
respondent appellate court that Ong's copyrighted wrapper is a copy of that of Ceroilfood Shandong is SET
ASIDE for being premature. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, is directed to proceed
with the trial to determine the merits of Civil Case No. 33779 expeditiously. Let the records of this case be
REMANDED to said trial court promptly.