PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE V.
RAMON JAVELLAN RULING:
G.R. No. 158239 January 25, 2012
Margarita Jose sold to respondent Ramon Javellana by deed of
conditional sale two parcels of land located in Bulacan.
They agreed that Javellana would pay P80,000.00 upon the
execution of the deed and the balance of P80,000.00 upon the
registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens System
After Margarita died, the vendors undertaking fell on the shoulders
of Priscilla, being Margaritas sole surviving heir.
However, Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking to cause the
registration of the properties under the Torrens System, and,
instead, began to improve the properties by dumping filling
materials therein with the intention of converting the parcels of land
into a residential or industrial subdivision
Faced with Priscillas refusal to comply, Javellana commenced an
action for specific performance, injunction, and damages against her
Javellana prayed for the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain Priscilla from dumping filling materials in the
parcels of land; and that Priscilla be ordered to institute registration
proceedings and then to execute a final deed of sale in his favor
Priscilla filed MTD on the grounds of (1) Prescription; and (2) No
cause of action
RTC denied MTD
MR: granted MTD
Opining that Javellana had no cause of action against her due to her
not being bound to comply with the terms of the deed of conditional
sale for not being a party thereto;
Javellana’s MR denied
Javella: notice of appeal (decision of RTC denying MR)-> CA
It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA to assail the June 24, 1999 and June 21, 2000
orders dismissing his complaint
Petition for certiorari: denied by CA
CA (IN NOTICE OF APPEAL) Remanded the records to the RTC for
further proceedings in accordance with law.
Decision of CA: There is a cause of action
As to contention that it was filed out of time:
CA gave due course to the appeal even if filed out of time because
Javellana had no intention to delay the proceedings, as in fact he did
not even seek an extension of time to file his appellants brief; that
current jurisprudence afforded litigants the amplest opportunity to
present their cases free from the constraints of technicalities, such
that even if an appeal was filed out of time, the appellate court was
given the discretion to nonetheless allow the appeal for justifiable
reasons.
ISSUES:
I. WON the RTC order was appealable
II. WON appeal was filed on time
III. WON there is forum shopping
I. YES. Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order of
dismissal was a final order and appealable
Priscilla submits that the order was not the proper subject of an
appeal considering that Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
provides that no appeal may be taken from an order denying a
motion for reconsideration.
Priscillas submission is erroneous and cannot be sustained.
First of all, the denial of Javellanas motion for reconsideration left
nothing more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the
dismissal. It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one. The
Court has distinguished between final and interlocutory orders in
Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is
well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more
to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has
determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case
but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory
order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is
yet to be held and the judgment rendered.
And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines
whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is
appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that appeal may
be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of
the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these
Rules to be appealable; but the remedy from an interlocutory one is
not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal
is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the
interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65
allowed to be resorted to.
Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a
motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment is effectively
an appeal from the final order or judgment itself; and has expressly
clarified that the prohibition against appealing an order denying a
motion for reconsideration referred only to a denial of a motion for
reconsideration of an interlocutory order
II. YES. Appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes v. CA
Priscilla insists that Javellana filed his notice of appeal out of time.
She points out that he received a copy of the June 24, 1999 order on
July 9, 1999, and filed his motion for reconsideration on July 21,
1999 (or after the lapse of 12 days); that the RTC denied his motion
for reconsideration through the order of June 21, 2000, a copy of
which he received on July 13, 2000; that he had only three days from
July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an
appeal; and that having filed his notice of appeal on July 19, 2000,
his appeal should have been dismissed for being tardy by three days
beyond the expiration of the reglementary period.
Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant
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shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30)
days from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new
trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a
motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (n)
Under the rule, Javellana had only the balance of three days from
July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an
appeal due to the timely filing of his motion for reconsideration
interrupting the running of the period of appeal. As such, his filing of
the notice of appeal only on July 19, 2000 did not perfect his appeal
on time, as Priscilla insists.
The seemingly correct insistence of Priscilla cannot be upheld,
however, considering that the Court meanwhile adopted the fresh
period rule in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, by which an aggrieved
party desirous of appealing an adverse judgment or final order is
allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the RTC reckoned from receipt of the order denying a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit:
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It
has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new
rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy
disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the
Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows
extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for
parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days
or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to
afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court
deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to
file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40
governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional
Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from
receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.
The fresh period rule may be applied to this case, for the Court has
already retroactively extended the fresh period rule to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will
not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, inasmuch as there are no vested rights in rules of
procedure. According to De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat:[28]
Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and
forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to administer
justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a
retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation
of statues ― they may be given retroactive effect on actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will
not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of
procedure.
The fresh period rule is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh
period of 15 days within which an appeal may be made in the event
that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court.
Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh
period rule" should be applied to pending actions, such as the
present case.
Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the fresh period rule
will amount to injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject notice of
judgment and final order were issued two years later or in the year
2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and final order in
Neypes which were issued in 1998. It will be incongruous and
illogical that parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders
issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of the fresh period rule
while those later rulings of the lower courts such as in the instant
case, will not.
Consequently, we rule that Javellanas notice of appeal was timely
filed pursuant to the fresh period rule.
III. NO. No forum shopping was committed
Priscilla claims that Javellana engaged in forum shopping by filing a
notice of appeal and a petition for certiorari against the same
orders. As earlier noted, he denies that his doing so violated the
policy against forum shopping.
For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same
transaction, same essential facts and circumstances and must raise
identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does
not exist where different orders were questioned, two distinct
causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were
sought.
Should Javellanas present appeal now be held barred by his filing of
the petition for certiorari in the CA when his appeal in that court was
yet pending?
We are aware that in Young v. Sy, in which the petitioner filed a
notice of appeal to elevate the orders concerning the dismissal of
her case due to non-suit to the CA and a petition for certiorari in the
CA assailing the same orders four months later, the Court ruled that
the successive filings of the notice of appeal and the petition for
certiorari to attain the same objective of nullifying the trial courts
dismissal orders constituted forum shopping that warranted the
dismissal of both cases. The Court said:
Ineluctably, the petitioner, by filing an ordinary appeal and a
petition for certiorari with the CA, engaged in forum shopping.
When the petitioner commenced the appeal, only four months had
elapsed prior to her filing with the CA the Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 and which eventually came up to this Court by way of
the instant Petition (re: Non-Suit). The elements of litis pendentia
are present between the two suits. As the CA, through its Thirteenth
Division, correctly noted, both suits are founded on exactly the same
facts and refer to the same subject matterthe RTC Orders which
dismissed Civil Case No. SP-5703 (2000) for failure to prosecute. In
both cases, the petitioner is seeking the reversal of the RTC orders.
The parties, the rights asserted, the issues professed, and the reliefs
prayed for, are all the same. It is evident that the judgment of one
forum may amount to res judicata in the other.
The remedies of appeal and certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. This is a firm judicial
policy. The petitioner cannot hedge her case by wagering two or
more appeals, and, in the event that the ordinary appeal lags
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significantly behind the others, she cannot post facto validate this
circumstance as a demonstration that the ordinary appeal had not
been speedy or adequate enough, in order to justify the recourse to
Rule 65. This practice, if adopted, would sanction the filing of
multiple suits in multiple fora, where each one, as the petitioner
couches it, becomes a precautionary measure for the rest, thereby
increasing the chances of a favorable decision. This is the very evil
that the proscription on forum shopping seeks to put right. In
Guaranteed Hotels, Inc. v. Baltao, the Court stated that the grave
evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the
rendition by two competent tribunals of two separate and
contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants, taking
advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try
their luck in several different fora until a favorable result is reached.
To avoid the resultant confusion, the Court adheres strictly to the
rules against forum shopping, and any violation of these rules results
in the dismissal of the case.[32]
The same result was reached in Zosa v. Estrella, which likewise
involved the successive filing of a notice of appeal and a petition for
certiorari to challenge the same orders, with the Court upholding
the CAs dismissals of the appeal and the petition for certiorari
through separate decisions.
Yet, the outcome in Young v. Sy and Zosa v. Estrella is unjust here
even if the orders of the RTC being challenged through appeal and
the petition for certiorari were the same. The unjustness exists
because the appeal and the petition for certiorari actually sought
different objectives. In his appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259,
Javellana aimed to undo the RTCs erroneous dismissal of Civil Case
No. 79-M-97 to clear the way for his judicial demand for specific
performance to be tried and determined in due course by the RTC;
but his petition for certiorari had the ostensible objective to prevent
(Priscilla) from developing the subject property and from proceeding
with the ejectment case until his appeal is finally resolved, as the CA
explicitly determined in its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 60455.[34]
Nor were the dangers that the adoption of the judicial policy against
forum shopping designed to prevent or to eliminate attendant. The
first danger, i.e., the multiplicity of suits upon one and the same
cause of action, would not materialize considering that the appeal
was a continuity of Civil Case No. 79-M-97, whereas C.A.-G.R. SP No.
60455 dealt with an independent ground of alleged grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the RTC. The second danger, i.e., the unethical malpractice of
shopping for a friendly court or judge to ensure a favorable ruling or
judgment after not getting it in the appeal, would not arise because
the CA had not yet decided C.A.-G.R. CV No. 68259 as of the filing of
the petition for certiorari.
Instead, we see the situation of resorting to two inconsistent
remedial approaches to be the result of the tactical misjudgment by
Javellanas counsel on the efficacy of the appeal to stave off his
caretakers eviction from the parcels of land and to prevent the
development of them into a residential or commercial subdivision
pending the appeal. In the petition for certiorari, Javellana explicitly
averred that his appeal was inadequate and not speedy to prevent
private respondent Alma Jose and her transferee/assignee xxx from
developing and disposing of the subject property to other parties to
the total deprivation of petitioners rights of possession and
ownership over the subject property, and that the dismissal by the
RTC had emboldened private respondents to fully develop the
property and for respondent Alma Jose to file an ejectment case
against petitioners overseer xxx.[35] Thereby, it became far-fetched
that Javellana brought the petition for certiorari in violation of the
policy against forum shopping.
FREDESVINDO S. ALVERO vs. M.L. DE LA ROSA
G.R. No. L-286 March 29, 1946
Doctrine: WALA PAKE COURT KUNG NAMATAY ASAWA MO,
SUNDIN MO RULES
respondent Jose R. Victoriano had filed a complaint against
petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero and one Margarita Villarica, alleging
two causes of action:
(1) to declare in force the contract of sale between said Victoriano
and Margarita Villarica, which land was subsequently sold by said
Villarica, in favor of petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero, on December
31, 1944, for the sum of P100,000 in Japanese military notes; and
(2) to declare said subsequent sale null and void.
Margarita Villarica filed an answer expressly admitting having sold
said land to Alvero, for P100,000, due to the imperative necessity of
raising funds with which to provide for herself and family, and that
she did not remember the previous sale; at the same time, offering
to repurchase said land from Fredesvindo S. Alvero in the sum of
P5,000, but that the latter refused to accept the offer.
Respondent judge rendered his decision:
considering that Jose R. Victoriano's document was older than that
of Fredesvindo S. Alvero, and that he had taken possession of said
property, since October 1, 1940, the respondent judge rendered his
decision in favor of Jose R. Victoriano, adjudging to him the title
over the property in question, including all the improvements
existing thereon, and dismissed the counterclaim.
Alvero filed a petition for reconsideration and new trial
-was denied and of said order he was notified on January 7, 1946.
January 8, 1946: Alvero filed his notice of appeal and record on
appeal simultaneously in the lower court, without filing the P60-
appeal bond.
Victoriano filed a petition to dismiss the appeal, and at the same
time, asked for the execution of the judgment.
On January 15, 1946, Alvero filed an opposition to said motion to
dismiss, alleging that on the very same day, January 15, 1946, said
appeal bond for P60 had been actually filed, and allege as an excuse,
for not filing the said appeal bond, in due time, the illness of his
lawyer's wife, who died on January 10, 1946, and buried the
following day.
On January 17, 1946, the respondent judge, Hon. Mariano L. de la
Rosa, ordered the dismissal of the appeal, declaring that, although
the notice of appeal and record on appeal had been filed in due
time, the P60-appeal bond was filed too late.
Alvero filed a petition for the reconsideration of the said order dated
January 17, 1946, dismissing his appeal; and said petition for
reconsideration was denied on January 29, 1946. Hence, this
petition for certiorari.
As already stated, the decision rendered by the respondent judge,
Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, was dated November 16, 1945, of which
counsel for Alvero was notified on November 28, 1945; that his
motion for reconsideration and new trial was filed on December 27,
1945, and denied on January 3, 1946, and that said counsel for
Alvero was notified of said order on January 7, 1946; and that he
filed his notice of appeal and record on appeal the following day, to
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wit, January 8, 1946, and that the P60-appeal bond was filed only on
January 15, 1946.
ISSUE: WON the appeal was filed on time
RULING: NO. The appeal was not filed on time
According to the computation erroneously made by the court, the
last day for filing and perfecting the appeal, in this case, was January
8, 1946, or which date, Fredesvindo S. Alvero should have filed his
(1) notice of appeal, (2) record on appeal, and (3) appeal bond. But
the P60-appeal bond was filed only on January 15, 1946.
Failure to perfect the appeal, within the time prescribed by the rules
of court, will cause the judgment to become final, and the
certification of the record on appeal thereafter, cannot restore the
jurisdiction which has been lost.
The period within which the record on appeal and appeal bond
should be perfected and filed may, however, be extended by order
of the court, upon application made, prior to the expiration of the
original period.
Rules of courts, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and
effect of law; and rules of court prescribing the time within which
certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are
considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless
delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.
Strict compliance with the rules of court has been held mandatory
and imperative, so that failure to pay the docket fee in the Supreme
Court, within the period fixed for that purpose, will cause the
dismissal of the appeal. (Salaveria vs. Albindo, 39Phil., 922.) In the
same manner, on failure of the appellant in a civil case to serve his
brief, within the time prescribed by said rules, on motion of the
appellee and notice to the appellant, or on its own motion, the court
may dismiss the appeal. (Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil., 333.)
Counsel for the petitioner Alvero alleges as an excuse, for his failure
to perfect and file his appeal, in due time, the illness of his wife,
which ended in her death on January 10, 1946, and by which he was
greatly affected.
It is not, therefore, difficult to understand the state of mind of the
attorney, and his intense devotion and ardent affection towards his
dying wife.
Unfortunately, counsel for petitioner has created a difficult
situation. In his motion for reconsideration and new trial, dated
December 27, 1945, he did not point out specifically the findings or
conclusions in the judgment, are not supported by the evidence or
which are contrary to law, making express reference to the
pertinent evidence or legal provisions, as expressly required by Rule
37, section 2, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court. Motions of that
kind have been considered as motions pro forma intended merely to
delay the proceeding, and, as such, they cannot and will not
interrupt or suspend the period of time for the perfection of the
appeal. Hence, the period for perfecting herein petitioner's appeal
commenced from November 28, 1945, when he was notified of the
judgment rendered in the case, and expired on December 28, 1945;
and, therefore, his notice of appeal and record on appeal filed on
January 8, 1946, were filed out of time, and much more so his
appeal bond, which was only filed on January 15, 1946.
It is futile to speak of hospitals, doctors and nurses to minister alone
to the needs of the sick and the dying, who are dearest to us, for our
reasoning powers are of little avail when sorrow or despair rages
within.
But human laws are inflexible and no personal consideration should
stand in the way of performing a legal duty.
The attorney for petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero could have asked
for an extension of time, within which to file and perfect his appeal,
in the court below; but he had failed to do so, and he must bear the
consequences of his act. A strict observance of the rules of court,
which have been considered indispensable to the prevention of
needless delays and to the orderly and speedy dispatch of judicial
business, is an imperative necessity.
It may not be amiss to state in this connection that no irreparable
damage has been caused to the petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero, as
Margarita Villarica, the vendor to the two, of the land in question,
has shown readiness to repair the damage done.
No showing having been made that there had been merely
excusable negligece, on the part of the attorney for petitioner
Fredesvindo S. Alvero, and that there had been gave abuse of sound
judicial discretion, on the part of the respondent judge, the petition
for certiorari filed in this case, is, therefore, hereby dismissed,
without costs. So ordered.
DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS vs. ANTONIO G. LUCERO
G.R. No. L-2068 October 20, 1948
>Petitioner Bustos, the accused in a criminal case, assisted by
counsel, appeared at the preliminary investigation.
>In that investigation, his counsel moved that the complainant
present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be
examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by
law.
>The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11
of rule 108.
>Objection was sustained.
>In view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to
renounce his right to present evidence
> justice of the peace forwarded the case to CFI.
>The petitioner filed a motion with the CFI praying that the record of
the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol,
the court of origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine
the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their
testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued for the
arrest of the accused.
>The motion was denied
> It is contended that Section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
infringes Section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution. It is said that
the rule in question deals with substantive matters and impairs
substantive rights
ISSUE: WON Section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court impairs
substantive rights
RULING: NO.
We are of the opinion that Section 11 of Rule 108, like its
predecessors, is an adjective law and not a substantive law or
substantive right. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the
two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous.
Substantive rightsis a term which includes those rights which one
enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal
relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which creates,
defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties
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which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts
are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial
law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains
redress for their invasion.
As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares
what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing
them, as distinguished from the procedural law which provides or
regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be
punished. Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially
remedial; it is the first step taken in a criminal prosecution As a rule
of evidence, Section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Evidence –
which is "the mode and manner of proving the competent facts and
circumstances on which a party relies to establish the fact in dispute
in judicial proceedings" – is identified with and forms part of the
method by which, in private law, rights are enforced and redress
obtained, and, in criminal law, a law transgressor is punished.
Criminal procedure refers to pleading, evidence and practice. The
entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of
Court. We cannot tear down Section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional
grounds without throwing out the whole code of evidence
embodied in these Rules.
In Beazell vs.. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167, 70 L. ed. 216, the United States
Supreme Court said:
"Expressions are to be found in earlier judicial opinions to the effect
that the constitutional limitation may be transgressed by alterations
in the rules of evidence or procedure. And there may be procedural
changes which operate to deny to the accused a defense available
under the laws in force at the time of the commission of his offense,
or which otherwise affect him in such a harsh and arbitrary manner
as to fall within the constitutional prohibition. But it is now well
settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of
evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which
operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his
disadvantage, are not prohibited. A statute which, after indictment,
enlarges the class of persons who may be witnesses at the trial, by
removing the disqualification of persons convicted of felony, is not
an ex post facto law. Nor is a statute which changes the rules of
evidence after the indictment so as to render admissible against the
accused evidence previously held inadmissible or which changes the
place of trial, Gut or which abolishes a court for hearing criminal
appeals, creating a new one in its stead
Tested by this standard, we do not believe that the curtailment of
the right of an accused in a preliminary investigation to cross-
examine the witnesses who had given evidence for his arrest is of
such importance as to offend against the constitutional inhibition. As
we have said in the beginning, preliminary investigation is not an
essential part of due process of law. It may be suppressed entirely,
and if this may be done, mere restriction of the privilege formerly
enjoyed thereunder can not be held to fall within the constitutional
prohibition.
While Section 11 of Rule 108 denies to the defendant the right to
cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation, his right to
present his witnesses remains unaffected, and his constitutional
right to be informed of the charges against him both at such
investigation and at the trial is unchanged. In the latter stage of the
proceedings, the only stage where the guaranty of due process
comes into play, he still enjoys to the full extent the right to be
confronted by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. The
degree of importance of a preliminary investigation to an accused
may be gauged by the fact that this formality is frequently waived.
The distinction between "remedy" and "substantive right" is
incapable of exact definition. The difference is somewhat a question
of degree. It is difficult to draw a line in any particular case beyond
which legislative power over remedy and procedure can pass
without touching upon the substantive rights of parties affected, as
it is impossible to fix that boundary by general condition.
This being so, it is inevitable that the Supreme Court in making rules
should step on substantive rights, and the Constitution must be
presumed to tolerate if not to expect such incursion as does not
affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of
a defense, but operates only in a limited and unsubstantial manner
to his disadvantage. For the Court's power is not merely to compile,
revise or codify the rules of procedure existing at the time of the
Constitution's approval. This power is "to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts," which is
a power to adopt a general, complete and comprehensive system of
procedure, adding new and different rules without regard to their
source and discarding old ones.
PANAY RAILWAYS INC. vs. HEVA MANAGEMENT
G. R. No. 154061 January 25, 2012
>petitioner Panay Railways Inc., executed a Real Estate Mortgage
Contract covering several parcels of lands in favor of Traders Royal
Bank (TRB)
>Petitioner excluded certain portions of Lot
>Petitioner failed to pay its obligations to TRB, prompting the bank
to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgaged properties
>It was only in 1994 that petitioner realized that the extrajudicial
foreclosure included some excluded properties in the mortgage
contract.
>filed a Complaint for Partial Annulment of Contract to Sell and
Deed of Absolute Sale with Addendum; Cancellation of Title No. T-
89624; and Declaration of Ownership of Real Property with
Reconveyance plus Damages
>respondents filed their respective Motions to Dismiss –> GRANTED
>petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal without paying the necessary
docket fees.
>respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground of
nonpayment of docket fees.
>In its Opposition, petitioner alleged that its counsel was not yet
familiar with the revisions of the Rules of Court that became
effective only on 1 July 1997. Its representative was likewise not
informed by the court personnel that docket fees needed to be paid
upon the filing of the Notice of Appeal. Furthermore, it contended
that the requirement for the payment of docket fees was not
mandatory. It therefore asked the RTC for a liberal interpretation of
the procedural rules on appeals.
>the RTC issued an Order dismissing the appeal citing Sec. 4 of Rule
419 of the Revised Rules of Court.
>Petitioner: MR -> DENIED
>petitioner filed with CA a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
under Rule 65 alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction to dismiss the
Notice of Appeal, and that the trial court had acted with grave abuse
of discretion when it strictly applied procedural rules.
>CA’s ruling: RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the appeal and set aside the latter’s assailed Order
>It held that while the failure of petitioner to pay the docket and
other lawful fees within the reglementary period was a ground for
the dismissal of the appeal pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 50 of the
Page 5 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER
Revised Rules of Court, the jurisdiction to do so belonged to the CA
and not the trial court.
>respondents filed MR: granted
>CA’s ruling:
It appears that prior to the promulgation of the CA’s Decision, this
Court issued Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 00-2-10-SC which
took effect on 1 May 2000, amending Rule 4, Sec. 7 and Sec. 13 of
Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. The circular expressly
provided that trial courts may, motu proprio or upon motion,
dismiss an appeal for being filed out of time or for nonpayment of
docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.
Subsequently, Circular No. 48-200013 was issued on 29 August 2000
and was addressed to all lower courts.
>By virtue of the amendment to Sec. 41, the CA upheld the
questioned Orders of the trial court by issuing the assailed
Amended Decision in the present Petition granting respondents’
Motion for Reconsideration.
>Contention of petitioner:
The CA’s action prompted petitioner to file a Motion for
Reconsideration alleging that SC Circular No. 48-2000 should not be
given retroactive effect. It also alleged that the CA should consider
the case as exceptionally meritorious. Petitioner’s counsel, Atty.
Rexes V. Alejano, explained that he was yet to familiarize himself
with the Revised Rules of Court, which became effective a little over
a month before he filed the Notice of Appeal. He was thus not aware
that the nonpayment of docket fees might lead to the dismissal of
the case.
ISSUE: WON SC Circular No. 48-2000 should be given a retroactive
effect
RULING: YES.
Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered
applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws and rules are retroactive in that sense and
to that extent. The effect of procedural statutes and rules on the
rights of a litigant may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. This retroactive application does not violate any
right of a person adversely affected. Neither is it constitutionally
objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no vested right
may attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules. It has been
held that "a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and
a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case,
whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of
procedure."16 More so when, as in this case, petitioner admits that
it was not able to pay the docket fees on time. Clearly, there were
no substantive rights to speak of when the RTC dismissed the Notice
of Appeal.
The argument that the CA had the exclusive jurisdiction to dismiss
the appeal has no merit
When this Court accordingly amended Sec. 13 of Rule 41 through
A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, the RTC’s dismissal of the action may be
considered to have had the imprimatur of the Court. Thus, the CA
committed no reversible error when it sustained the dismissal of the
appeal, taking note of its directive on the matter prior to the
promulgation of its Decision.
As early as 1932, in Lazaro v. Endencia, we have held that the
payment of the full amount of the docket fees is an indispensable
step for the perfection of an appeal. The Court acquires jurisdiction
over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees.
Moreover, the right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of
due process. It is merely a statutory privilege, which may be
exercised only in accordance with the law.
We have repeatedly stated that the term "substantial justice" is not
a magic wand that would automatically compel this Court to
suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or
dismissed simply because their non-observance may result in
prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all other rules, they are
required to be followed, except only for the most persuasive of
reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve litigants of an injustice
not commensurate with the degree of their thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed.
We cannot consider counsel’s failure to familiarize himself with the
Revised Rules of Court as a persuasive reason to relax the
application of the Rules. It is well-settled that the negligence of
counsel binds the client. This principle is based on the rule that any
act performed by lawyers within the scope of their general or
implied authority is regarded as an act of the client. Consequently,
the mistake or negligence of the counsel of petitioner may result in
the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against it.
FELIX MARTOS vs. NEW SAN JOSE BUILDERS, INC
G.R. No. 192650 October 24, 2012
>New San Jose Builders, Inc. (NSJB) hired Martos et al. for the the
San Jose Plains Project (hereafter SJPP). SJPP, which is also known as
the "Erap City" calls for the construction of low cost housing, which
are being turned over to the National Housing Authority to be
awarded to deserving poor families.
>NSJB was constrained to slow down and suspend most of the works
on the SJPP project due to lack of funds of the National Housing
Authority. Thus, the workers were informed that many of them
[would] be laid off and the rest would be reassigned to other
projects.
>Juan Villaber, Terso Garay, Rowell Batta, Pastor Pantig, Rafael Villa,
and Melvin Garay were laid off.
>While on the other hand, Felix Martos, Ariel Dominguez, Greg
Bisonia, Allan Caballera, Orlando Limos, Mandy Mamalateo, Eric
Castrence, Anthony Molina, and Roy Silva were among those who
were retained and were issued new appointment papers to their
respective assignments, indicating therein that they are project
employees.
>However, they refused to sign the appointment papers as project
employees and subsequently refused to continue to work.
>Complaints for Illegal Dismissal and for money claims were filed
before the NLRC
>LA: Martos was illegally dismissed
- as to the claim of others: DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE (ratio:
not verified)
>NLRC: ordered to reinstate all the complainants to their former
positions, without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages,
counted from the time their compensation was withheld from them
until actual reinstatement.
>CA’s ruling: CA ruled that NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in reviving the complaints of petitioners despite their
failure to verify the same
ISSUE: WON the CA was correct in dismissing the complaints filed
by those petitioners who failed to verify their position papers
RULING: YES. CA is correct
Page 6 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provide:
SEC. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically required by
law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or
accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the
pleadings and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his
personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification
based on "information and belief" or upon "knowledge, information
and belief" or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading.
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or
principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any
claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending
action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof;
and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action
or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within
five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint
or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be
curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after
hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance
with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his
counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the
same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative
sanctions. x x x. [Emphases supplied]
The verification requirement is significant, as it is intended to secure
an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and
correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. Verification
is deemed substantially complied with when, as in this case, one
who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in
the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct.
The absence of a proper verification is cause to treat the pleading as
unsigned and dismissible.
The lone signature of Martos would have been sufficient if he was
authorized by his co-petitioners to sign for them. Unfortunately,
petitioners failed to adduce proof that he was so authorized. The
complaints of the other parties in the case of Nellie Vda. De Formoso
v. v. PNB13 suffered a similar fate. Thus:
Admittedly, among the seven (7) petitioners mentioned, only
Malcaba signed the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping in the subject petition. There was no proof that Malcaba
was authorized by his co-petitioners to sign for them. There was no
special power of attorney shown by the Formosos authorizing
Malcaba as their attorney-in-fact in filing a petition for review on
certiorari. Neither could the petitioners give at least a reasonable
explanation as to why only he signed the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping.
The liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations
where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a
pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of
the proceeding and it at least connotes a reasonable attempt at
compliance with the rules. Besides, fundamental is the precept that
rules of procedure are meant not to thwart but to facilitate the
attainment of justice; hence, their rigid application may, for
deserving reasons, be subordinated by the need for an apt
dispensation of substantial justice in the normal course. They ought
to be relaxed when there is subsequent or even substantial
compliance, consistent with the policy of liberality espoused by Rule
1, Section 6.14 Not being inflexible, the rule on verification allows
for such liberality.15
Considering that the dismissal of the other complaints by the LA was
without prejudice, the other complainants should have taken the
necessary steps to rectify their procedural mistake after the decision
of the LA was rendered. They should have corrected this procedural
flaw by immediately filing another complaint with the correct
verification this time. Surprisingly, they did not even attempt to
correct this technical blunder. Worse, they committed the same
procedural error when they filed their appeal16 with the NLRC.
Under the circumstances, the Court agrees with the CA that the
dismissal of the other complaints were brought about by the own
negligence and passive attitude of the complainants themselves. In
Formoso, the Court further wrote:
The petitioners were given a chance by the CA to comply with the
Rules when they filed their motion for reconsideration, but they
refused to do so. Despite the opportunity given to them to make all
of them sign the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping, they still failed to comply. Thus, the CA was constrained to
deny their motion and affirm the earlier resolution.
The Court can only do so much for them.
Most probably, as the list submitted is not complete with the
information as to when each started and when each was dismissed
there must be some truth in the claim of respondent that those
complainants who failed to affix their signatures in the verification
were either not employees of respondent at all or they simply
refused to prosecute their complaints. In its position paper,18
respondent alleged that, aside from the four (4) complainants who
withdrew their complaints, only 17 out of the more or less 104
complainants appeared on its records as its former project
employees or at least known by it to have worked in one of its
construction projects. From the sworn statements executed by Felix
Yortas, Marvin Batta,
Lito Bantillo, Gavino Felix Nicolas, and Romeo Pangacian Martos,
they already withdrew their complaints against respondent. Their
status and cause of action not being clear and proven, it is just not
right that these complaints be considered as similarly situated as
Martos and entitled to the same benefits.
Page 7 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER
MARIA CONSOLACION RIVERA-PASCUAL vs. SPS MARILYN LIM
G.R. No. 191837 September 19, 2012
>Maria Consolacion Rivera-Pascual (Consolacion) filed for a petition
to be recognized as a tenant of a property against Danilo Deato
(Deato). The property covered is by TCT under Deato’s name.
>During the pendency of the petition, Deato sold the property to
Spouses Lim. The sale was registered leading to the issuance of TCT
in favor of Spouses Lim.
>The petition to be recognized as tenant was granted
> Consolacion filed a petition against Spouses Lim praying for the
issuance of an order directing Spouses Lim to accept the amount of
₱ 10,000,000.00 which she undertook to tender during the initial
hearing, declaring the property redeemed
>Regional Adjudicator’s ruling: it was lawfully redeemed
>DARAB reversed: not lawfully redeemed
>MR denied for being filed out of time
> petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the CA
> CA resolved to require Consolacion’s counsel to submit within five
(5) days from notice his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) Certificate of Compliance or Exemption and an amended
Verification and Certification Against Non-Forum-Shopping.
Apparently, Consolacion’s counsel failed to indicate in the petition
his MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Exemption Number as
required under Bar Matter No. 1922. Also, the jurat of Consolacion’s
verification and certification against non-forum-shopping failed to
indicate any competent evidence of Consolacion’s identity apart
from her community tax certificate.
> Considering the failure of Consolacion and her counsel to comply,
the CA dismissed the petition
Contention of Consolacion:
CA’s summary dismissal of her petition on technical grounds is
unwarranted. Consolacion invoked substantial justice against the
CA’s strict application of the rule requiring her counsel to note his
MCLE Compliance or Exemption Certificate Number and the rule
rendering the jurat of her verification and certification on non-
forum-shopping defective in the absence of the details of any one of
her current identification document issued by an official agency
bearing her photograph and signature.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal was proper
RULING: YES
The Court sees no reversible error committed by the CA in
dismissing Consolacion’s petition before it on the ground of
petitioner’s unexplained failure to comply with basic procedural
requirements attendant to the filing of a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Notably, Consolacion and her counsel
remained obstinate despite the opportunity afforded to them by the
CA to rectify their lapses. While there was compliance, this took
place, however, after the CA had ordered the dismissal of
Consolacion’s petition and without reasonable cause proffered to
justify its belatedness. Consolacion and her counsel claimed
inadvertence and negligence but they did not explain the
circumstances thereof. Absent valid and compelling reasons, the
requested leniency and liberality in the observance of procedural
rules appears to be an afterthought, hence, cannot be granted. The
CA saw no compelling need meriting the relaxation of the rules.
Neither does this Court see any.
The Court is aware of the exceptional cases where technicalities
were liberally construed. However, in these cases, outright dismissal
is rendered unjust by the presence of a satisfactory and persuasive
explanation. The parties therein who prayed for liberal
interpretation were able to hurdle that heavy burden of proving that
they deserve an exceptional treatment. It was never the Court’s
intent "to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with
impunity."
This Court will not condone a cavalier attitude towards procedural
rules. It is the duty of every member of the bar to comply with these
rules. They are not at liberty to seek exceptions should they fail to
observe these rules and rationalize their omission by harking on
liberal construction.
While it IS the negligence of Consolacion's counsel that led to this
unfortunate result, she is bound by such. (sorry u tanga counsel mo)
ESTIPONA v. HON. LOBRIGO
GR NO. 226679 AUGUST 15 2017
>Petitioner Estipona is accused for violation of Section 11, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165
> Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea
Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and,
instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus
and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of
rehabilitation
>He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 which states that
“Any person charged under any provision of this Act regardless of
the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision
on plea-bargaining” violates the rule-making authority of the
Supreme Court and
ISSUE: WON Sec 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached
upon the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of
procedure.
RULING: YES. It is unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-
making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
is now SC’s exclusive domain and no longer shared with the
Executive and Legislative departments.
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for
the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court
was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importontly, the Constitution took away the power of Congress to
repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with
Congress, more so with the Executive.
this Court asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish
new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and
executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court's
authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure
is exclusive and one of the safeguards of our institutional
independence
Page 8 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure
The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal
procedural rules is limited to the preservation of substantive rights,
i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the latter.
Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether
a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for
the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges,
or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of
them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the
rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as
a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing
an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.
it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure
for the speedy disposition of cases in all courts that the rules on plea
bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing criminal charges by
agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an
"important," "essential," "highly desirable," and "legitimate"
component of the administration of justice.
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process
whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval." There
is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The
essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the
defense make concessions to avoid potential losses.
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on
plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right.
Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by
regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy
and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic
rights are infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of
guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
AMPARO IN FAVOR OF LILIBETH O. LADAGA
G.R. Nos. 189689, 189690 and 189691 November 13 2012
Petitioners share the common circumstance of having their names
included in what is alleged to be a JCICC "AGILA" 3rd Quarter 2007
Order of Battle Validation Result of the Philippine Army's 1Oth
Infantry Division:(10th ID), which is a list containing the names of
organizations and personalities in Southern Mindanao, particularly
Davao City, supposedly connected to the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) and its military arm, the New People's Army (NPA).
They perceive that by the inclusion of their names in the said Order
of Battle (OB List), they become easy targets of unexplained
disappearances or extralegal killings – a real threat to their
life, liberty and security.
In fine, petitioners were one in asserting that the OB List is really a
military hit-list as allegedly shown by the fact that there have
already been three victims of extrajudicial killing whose violent
deaths can be linked directly to the OB List
petitioners separately filed before the RTC a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Application for a Production
Order
in their Returns, Respondents denied authorship of the document
being adverted to and distributed by Representative Ocampo to the
media.
>They claimed that petitioners miserably failed to show, by
substantial evidence, that they were responsible for the alleged
threats perceived by petitioners. Instead, they asserted that
petitioners' allegations are based solely on hearsay, speculation,
beliefs, impression and feelings, which are insufficient to warrant
the issuance of the writ and, ultimately, the grant of the privilege of
the writ of amparo.
After submission of the parties' respective Position Papers, RTC
denied the petitions for writ of amparo
RULING: SC AFFIRMED RTC. PETITION DENIED
The writ of amparo was promulgated by the Court pursuant to its
rulemaking powers in response to the alarming rise in the number of
cases of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. It plays
the preventive role of breaking the expectation of impunity in the
commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, as
well as the curative role of facilitating the subsequent punishment of
the perpetrators.
In Tapuz v. Del Rosario, the Court has previously held that the writ of
amparo is an extraordinary remedy intended to address violations
of, or threats to, the rights to life, liberty or security and that, being
a remedy of extraordinary character, it is not one to issue on
amorphous or uncertain grounds but only upon reasonable
certainty. Hence, every petition for the issuance of the writ is
required to be supported by justifying allegations of fact on the
following matters:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent
responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is
unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an
assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission
of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed
with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names,
personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority
or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the
investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine
the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of
the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for. The petition may include a general prayer
for other just and equitable reliefs.
The sole and common issue presented in these petitions is whether
the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required under
the Amparo Rule. Sections 17 and 18 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo provide as
follows:
SEC. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. – The
parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.
xxxx
SEC. 18. Judgment. – The court shall render judgment within ten (10)
days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the
allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the
Page 9 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER
court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be
proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.
Thus, in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, the Court laid down a new standard of
relaxed admissibility of evidence to enable amparo petitioners to
meet the required amount of proof showing the State's direct or
indirect involvement in the purported violations and found it a fair
and proper rule in amparo cases “to consider all the pieces of
evidence adduced in their totality” and “to consider any evidence
otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is
consistent with the admissible evidence adduced.”
Put simply, evidence is not to be rejected outright because it is
inadmissible under the rules for as long as it satisfies “the most basic
test of reason – i.e., relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand
and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence.”
This measure of flexibility in the admissibility of evidence, however,
does not do away with the requirement of substantial evidence in
showing the State's involvement in the enforced disappearance,
extrajudicial killing or threats thereof. It merely permits, in the
absence of hard-to-produce direct evidence, a closer look at the
relevance and significance of every available evidence, including
those that are, strictly speaking, hearsay where the circumstances of
the case so require, and allows the consideration of the evidence
adduced in terms of their consistency with the totality of the
evidence.
The statement of Representative Ocampo that the respondents are
the real source of the OB List is unquestionably hearsay evidence
because, except for the fact that he himself received the OB List
from an unnamed source merely described as “a conscientious
soldier,” he had no persona knowledge concerning its preparation.
But even if the Court were to apply the appropriate measure of
flexibility in the instant cases by admitting the hearsay testimony of
Representative Ocampo, a consideration of this piece of evidence to
the totality of those adduced, namely, the Press Releases issued by
the 10th ID admitting the existence of a military-prepared Order of
Battle, the affidavits of petitioners attesting to the threatening visits
and tailing of their vehicles by menacing strangers, as well as the
violent deaths of alleged militant personalities, leads to the
conclusion that the threat to petitioners' security has not be
adequately proven.
In the case of Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,48 the Court
ruled that a person's right to security is, in one sense, “freedom
from fear” and that any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security
is an actionable wrong. The term “any threat,” however, cannot be
taken to mean every conceivable threat in the mind that may cause
one to fear for his life, liberty or security. The Court explicated
therein that “[f]ear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus,
a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from
being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The
degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the
variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character
or past experience with the stimulus.” Certainly, given the
uniqueness of individual psychological mindsets, perceptions of
what is fearful will necessarily vary from one person to another.
The alleged threat to herein petitioners' rights to life, liberty and
security must be actual, and not merely one of supposition or with
the likelihood of happening. And, when the evidence adduced
establishes the threat to be existent, as opposed to a potential one,
then, it goes without saying that the threshold requirement of
substantial evidence in amparo proceedings has also been met.
Thus, in the words of Justice Brion, in the context of the Amparo
rule, only actual threats, as may be established from all the facts and
circumstances of the case, can qualify as a violation that may be
addressed under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
No substantial evidence of an actual threat to petitioners' life,
liberty and security has been shown to exist in this case. For, even if
the existence of the OB List or, indeed, the inclusion of petitioners'
names therein, can be properly inferred from the totality of the
evidence presented, still, no link has been sufficiently established to
relate the subject OB List either to the threatening visits received by
petitioners from unknown men or to the violent deaths of the three
(3) mentioned personalities and other known activists, which could
strongly suggest that, by some identifiable pattern of military
involvement, the inclusion of one's name in an Order of Battle would
eventually result to enforced disappearance and murder of those
persons tagged therein as militants.
UNITED CLAIMANTS ASSOCIATION OF NEA (UNICAN) vs NATIONAL
ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION (NEA)
G.R. No. 187107 January 31, 2012
>IRR to implement RA 9136 were issued on February 27, 2002.
Under Sec. 3(b)(ii), Rule 33 of the Rules and Regulations, all the NEA
employees and officers are considered terminated otherwise known
as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA Law)
> Petitioners are former employees of NEA who were terminated
from their employment with the implementation of the assailed
resolutions.
>Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. The NEA Board has no power to terminate all the NEA employees;
2. Executive Order No. 119 did not grant the NEA Board the power
to terminate all NEA employees; and
3. Resolution Nos. 46 and 59 were carried out in bad faith.
>On the other hand, respondents argue in their Comment that:
1. The Court has no jurisdiction over the petition
Respondents essentially argue that petitioners violated the principle
of hierarchy of courts, pursuant to which the instant petition should
have been filed with the Regional Trial Court first rather than with
this Court directly.
2 Injunction is improper in this case given that the assailed
resolutions of the NEA Board have long been implemented; and
3. The assailed NEA Board resolutions were issued in good faith
Issues:
I. WON the Court has jurisdiction over the petition
II. WON injunction is proper
RULING:
i. YES. THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION
We explained the principle of hierarchy of courts in Mendoza v.
Villas, stating:
In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, a petition for certiorari filed under
Rule 65 was dismissed for having been filed directly with the Court,
violating the principle of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. In Heirs of Bertuldo
Hinog v. Melicor, citing People v. Cuaresma, this Court made the
following pronouncements:
Page 10 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER
This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not
exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and
with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs
an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of
courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and
also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the
latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed
only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly
and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy.
It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the
Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-
crowding of the Court’s docket. (Emphasis supplied.)
Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed with the RTC.
However, as an exception to this general rule, the principle of
hierarchy of courts may be set aside for special and important
reasons. Such reason exists in the instant case involving as it does
the employment of the entire plantilla of NEA, more than 700
employees all told, who were effectively dismissed from
employment in one swift stroke. This to the mind of the Court
entails its attention.
Moreover, the Court has made a similar ruling in National Power
Corporation Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC-DAMA) v.
National Power Corporation (NPC).2 In that case, the NPC-DAMA
also filed a petition for injunction directly with this Court assailing
NPC Board Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125, both dated
November 18, 2002, directing the termination of all employees of
the NPC on January 31, 2003. Despite such apparent disregard of the
principle of hierarchy of courts, the petition was given due course.
We perceive no compelling reason to treat the instant case
differently.
II. YES. The Remedy of Injunction Is still Available
(TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE TOPIC)
Respondents allege that the remedy of injunction is no longer
available to petitioners inasmuch as the assailed NEA Board
resolutions have long been implemented.
Taking respondents’ above posture as an argument on the
untenability of the petition on the ground of mootness, petitioners
contend that the principle of mootness is subject to exceptions, such
as when the case is of transcendental importance.
In Funa v. Executive Secretary,3 the Court passed upon the seeming
moot issue of the appointment of Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista)
as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Maritime Industry Authority
(MARINA) while concurrently serving as Undersecretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications. There, even
though Bautista later on was appointed as Administrator of
MARINA, the Court ruled that the case was an exception to the
principle of mootness and that the remedy of injunction was still
available, explaining thus:
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts
decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of
mootness. However, as we held in Public Interest Center, Inc. v.
Elma, supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot
prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave
violation of the Constitution. Even in cases where supervening
events had made the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to
resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and public.
As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already
done. However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will
decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet
evading review. (Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, in the instant case, while the assailed resolutions of the
NEA Board may have long been implemented, such acts of the NEA
Board may well be repeated by other government agencies in the
reorganization of their offices. Petitioners have not lost their remedy
of injunction.
EMMANUEL A. DE CASTRO vs. EMERSON S. CARLOS
G.R. No. 194994 April 16, 2013
>Before us is a Petition for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto
under Rule 66 filed by Emmanuel A. de Castro (petitioner) seeking to
oust respondent Emerson S. Carlos (respondent) from the position
of assistant general manager for operations (AGMO) of the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA).
> Filed directly with SC:
> Contention of petitioner (why he filed it directly):
petitioner submits that a direct recourse to this Court is warranted
by the urgent demands of public interest, particularly the veritable
need for stability in the civil service and the protection of the rights
of civil servants. Moreover, considering that no other than the
President of the Philippines is the appointing authority, petitioner
doubts if a trial court judge or an appellate court justice, with a
prospect of promotion in the judiciary would be willing to go against
a presidential appointment.
ISSUE: WON doctrine of hierarchy of courts is violated
RULING: YES.
Although Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus, the jurisdiction of this Court is not exclusive but
is concurrent with that of the Court of Appeals and regional trial
court and does not give petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of
court forum.16 The hierarchy of courts must be strictly observed.
Settled is the rule that "the Supreme Court is a court of last resort
and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions
assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial
tradition." A disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
warrants, as a rule, the outright dismissal of a petition.
A direct invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when
there are special and important reasons that are clearly and
specifically set forth in a petition. The rationale behind this policy
arises from the necessity of preventing (1) inordinate demands upon
the time and attention of the Court, which is better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) further
overcrowding of the Court’s docket.
In this case, petitioner justified his act of directly filing with this
Court only when he filed his Reply and after respondent had already
Page 11 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER
raised the procedural infirmity that may cause the outright dismissal
of the present Petition. Petitioner likewise cites stability in the civil
service and protection of the rights of civil servants as rationale for
disregarding the hierarchy of courts.
Petitioner’s excuses are not special and important circumstances
that would allow a direct recourse to this Court. More so, mere
speculation and doubt to the exercise of judicial discretion of the
lower courts are not and cannot be valid justifications to hurdle the
hierarchy of courts. Thus, the Petition must be dismissed
PHILIPPINE SINTER CORPORATION and PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL
AUTHORITY vs. CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER and LIGHT CO., INC.
G.R. No. 127371 April 25, 2002
>Pursuant to such Cabinet Memorandum by Corazon Aquino,
respondent Cagayan Electric Power and Light, Co. (CEPALCO),
grantee of a legislative franchise to distribute electric power to the
municipalities of Villanueva, Jasaan and Tagoloan, and the city of
Cagayan de Oro, all of the province of Misamis Oriental, filed with
the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) a petition entitled "In Re: Petition
for Implementation of Cabinet Policy Reforms in the Power Sector,"
docketed as ERB Case No. 89-430. The petition sought the
"discontinuation of all existing direct supply of power by the
National Power Corporation (NPC, now NAPOCOR) within CEPALCO's
franchise area.
> ERB granted the petition
> To implement the decision in ERB, CEPALCO wrote Philippine
Sinter Corporation (PSC), petitioner, and advised the latter of its
desire "to have the power supply of PSC, directly taken from NPC
(NAPOCOR), disconnected, cut and transferred" to CEPALCO
> To restrain the execution of the ERB Decision, PSC and PIA filed a
complaint for injunction against CEPALCO with the RTC
> RTC granted the petition for injunction
Issue: WON injunction lies against the final and executory
judgment of the ERB.
Ruling: NO.
In Bachrach Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, this Court, through Mr.
Justice Jose C. Vitug, pertinently held:
"The rule indeed is, and has almost invariably been, that after a
judgment has gained finality, it becomes the ministerial duty of the
court to order its execution. No court, perforce, should interfere by
injunction or otherwise to restrain such execution. The rule,
however, concededly admits of exceptions; hence, when facts and
circumstances later transpire that would render execution
inequitable or unjust, the interested party may ask a competent
court to stay its execution or prevent its enforcement. So, also, a
change in the situation of the parties can warrant an injunctive
relief."
Clearly, an injunction to stay a final and executory decision is
unavailing except only after a showing that facts and circumstances
exist which would render execution unjust or inequitable, or that a
change in the situation of the parties occurred. Here, no such
exception exists as shown by the facts earlier narrated. To disturb
the final and executory decision of the ERB in an injunction suit is to
brazenly disregard the rule on finality of judgments. In Camarines
Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Torres, we underscored the
importance of this principle, thus:
"We have stated before, and reiterate it now, that administrative
decisions must end sometime, as fully as public policy demands that
finality be written on judicial controversies. Public interest requires
that proceedings already terminated should not be altered at every
step, for the rule of non quieta movere prescribes that what had
already been terminated should not be disturbed. A disregard of this
principle does not commend itself to sound public policy."
Corollarily, Section 10 of Executive Order No. 172 (the law creating
the ERB) provides that a review of its decisions or orders is lodged in
the Supreme Court. Settled is the rule that where the law provides
for an appeal from the decisions of administrative bodies to the
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies
are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts in terms of rank and
stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.
Hence, the trial court, being co-equal with the ERB, cannot interfere
with the decision of the latter. It bears stressing that this doctrine of
non-interference of trial courts with co-equal administrative
bodies is intended to ensure judicial stability in the administration
of justice whereby the judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court
of concurrent jurisdiction.
Granting that the ERB decision has not attained finality, or that the
ERB is not co-equal with the RTC, still injunction will not lie. As a
rule, to justify the injunctive relief prayed for, the movant must
show: (1) the existence of a right in esse or the existence of a right to
be protected; and (2) the act against which injunction is to be
directed is a violation of such right. In the case at bar, petitioners
failed to show any clear legal right which would be violated if the
power supply of PSC from the NAPOCOR is disconnected and
transferred to CEPALCO.
VINCENT E. OMICTIN vs. CA
G.R. No.148004 January 22, 2007
>Petitioner Vincent E. Omictin, Operations Manager Ad Interim of
Saag Phils., Inc., filed a complaint for two counts of estafa against
private respondent George I. Lagos.
>He alleged that private respondent, despite repeated demands,
refused to return the two company vehicles entrusted to him when
he was still the president of Saag Phils., Inc.
> charged with the crime of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of RPC
before RTC
> private respondent filed a motion to suspend proceedings on the
basis of a prejudicial question because of a pending petition with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) involving the same
parties:
>It appears that private respondent filed with SEC for the
declaration of nullity of the respective appointments of Alex Y. Tan
and petitioner as President Ad Interim and Operations Manager Ad
Interim of Saag Phils., Inc.
> RTC denied motion to suspend
> CA reversed: there is a prejudicial question
Issue: WON there is a prejudicial question
RULING: YES
>the resolution of the issues raised in the intra-corporate dispute
will determine the guilt or innocence of private respondent in the
crime of estafa filed against him by petitioner.
>4TH ELEMENT OF ESTAFA: That there is a demand made by the
offended party to the offender
> Logically, under the circumstances, since the alleged offended
party is Saag Phils., Inc., the validity of the demand for the delivery
of the subject vehicles rests upon the authority of the person
making such a demand on the company’s behalf. Private
respondent is challenging petitioner’s authority to act for Saag Phils.,
Inc. in the corporate case pending before the RTC of Mandaluyong,
Branch 214. Taken in this light, if the supposed authority of
Page 12 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER
petitioner is found to be defective, it is as if no demand was ever
made, hence, the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper.
Doctrine of primary jurisdiction
Likewise, by analogy, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction may be
applied in this case. The issues raised by petitioner particularly the
status of Saag Phils., Inc. vis-à-vis Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., as well as the
question regarding the supposed authority of the latter to make a
demand on behalf of the company, are proper subjects for the
determination of the tribunal hearing the intra-corporate case which
in this case is the RTC of Mandaluyong, Branch 214. These issues
would have been referred to the expertise of the SEC in accordance
with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction had the case not been
transferred to the RTC of Mandaluyong.
Strictly speaking, the objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from
exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has
determined some question or some aspect of some question arising
in the proceeding before the court. The court cannot or will not
determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to resolving the
same, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience
and services in determining technical and intricate matters of fact.
While the above doctrine refers specifically to an administrative
tribunal, the Court believes that the circumstances in the instant
case do not proscribe the application of the doctrine, as the role of
an administrative tribunal such as the SEC in determining technical
and intricate matters of special competence has been taken on by
specially designated RTCs by virtue of Republic Act No. 8799. Hence,
the RTC of Mandaluyong where the intra-corporate case is pending
has the primary jurisdiction to determine the issues under
contention relating to the status of the domestic corporation, Saag
Phils., Inc., vis-à-vis Saag Pte. Ltd.; and the authority of petitioner to
act on behalf of the domestic corporation, the determination of
which will have a direct bearing on the criminal case. The law
recognizes that, in place of the SEC, the regular courts now have the
legal competence to decide intra-corporate disputes
REPUBLIC V CARLITO LACAP
G.R. No. 158253 March 2, 2007
>The District Engineer of Pampanga issued and duly published an
"Invitation To Bid".
>Respondent, doing business under the name and style Carwin
Construction and Construction Supply (Carwin Construction),
submitted the lowest bid
> he was awarded the contract for the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay
Pare.
>respondent undertook the works, made advances for the purchase
of the materials and payment for labor costs
> Thereafter, respondent sought to collect payment for the
completed project
> DPWH withheld payment from respondent after the District
Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved the final
release of funds on the ground that the contractor’s license of
respondent had expired at the time of the execution of the contract.
> In a First Indorsement, Cesar D. Mejia, Director III of the Legal
Department, recommended that payment should be made to
Carwin Construction, reiterating his earlier legal opinion. Despite
such recommendation for payment, no payment was made to
respondent.
>respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and
Damages against petitioner before the RTC.
> petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds
that the complaint states no cause of action and that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the nature of the action since respondent did not
appeal to the COA the decision of the District Auditor to disapprove
the claim
ISSUE: WON doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
should be applied
RULING: NO
The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of
the court, he should first avail of all the means afforded him by
administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies
are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them
and submitted to a court without first giving such administrative
agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due
deliberation.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will
not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of
that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.31
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
and the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based
on sound public policy and practical considerations, are not
inflexible rules. There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a)
where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the
doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently
illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably
prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is
relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately
have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial
intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and
irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due
process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is
involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings.34 Exceptions (c) and
(e) are applicable to the present case.
Notwithstanding the legal opinions of the DPWH Legal Department
rendered in 1993 and 1994 that payment to a contractor with an
expired contractor’s license is proper, respondent remained unpaid
for the completed work despite repeated demands. Clearly, there
was unreasonable delay and official inaction to the great prejudice
of respondent.
Furthermore, whether a contractor with an expired license at the
time of the execution of its contract is entitled to be paid for
completed projects, clearly is a pure question of law. It does not
involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties. There is a question of law when the doubt
or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
and not as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. Said
question at best could be resolved only tentatively by the
administrative authorities. The final decision on the matter rests not
Page 13 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER
with them but with the courts of justice. Exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply, because nothing of an
administrative nature is to be or can be done. The issue does not
require technical knowledge and experience but one that would
involve the interpretation and application of law.
Thus, while it is undisputed that the District Auditor of the COA
disapproved respondent’s claim against the Government, and, under
Section 4837 of P.D. No. 1445, the administrative remedy available
to respondent is an appeal of the denial of his claim by the District
Auditor to the COA itself, the Court holds that, in view of exceptions
(c) and (e) narrated above, the complaint for specific performance
and damages was not prematurely filed and within the jurisdiction
of the RTC to resolve, despite the failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. As the Court aptly stated in Rocamora v. RTC-Cebu
(Branch VIII):
The plaintiffs were not supposed to hold their breath and wait until
the Commission on Audit and the Ministry of Public Highways had
acted on the claims for compensation for the lands appropriated by
the government. The road had been completed; the Pope had come
and gone; but the plaintiffs had yet to be paid for the properties
taken from them. Given this official indifference, which apparently
would continue indefinitely, the private respondents had to act to
assert and protect their interests
GABRIEL ABAD ET AL. V. RTC
G.R. No. L-65505 October 12, 1987
> petitioners filed against respondent Philippine American General
Insurance Company, Inc. (PHILAMGEN, for brevity) for the
enforcement of contract and recovery of loss of money basically
praying for, among other things, payment of the money value of the
respective accumulated sick leave with pay of the separated
employees of respondent company either thru retirement,
retrenchment or resignation
> On January, 1983, judicial reorganization took place by the passage
of Executive Order No. 864 and the case at bar was re-raffled to
respondent RTC of Manila
> Respondent court motu proprio, dismissed the complaint declaring
that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject made being money claims
arising from employer-employee relations.
Issue: WON dismissal was proper
RULING: YES
The rule of adherence of jurisdiction until a cause is finally resolved
or adjudicated does not apply when the change in jurisdiction is
curative in character. Thus in the instant case, there is nothing
wrong in holding that Courts of First Instance /Regional Trial Courts
no longer have jurisdiction over aforesaid monetary claims of labor.
One of the important features in the Judiciary Reorganization
effected through B.P. 129 is the addition of paragraph (6),
(P155,828.60). Sec. 19, in defining the jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Courts (which took the place of the abolished Courts of First
Instance), which reading as follows:
In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. (emphasis supplied).
A provision not found in Sec. 44 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. It was
the intention of the legislative body to uncluttered the courts of
cases which may be adjudicated, in the first instance, by officials or
bodies exercising quasi-judicial adjudicatory powers like the Labor
Arbiters or the National Labor Relations Commission a specialized
body or bodies on labor related provisions and are not restricted by
the technical rules of pleading and evidence.
The Regional Trial Courts of today are actually the same courts that
functioned as Courts of First Instance before the Judiciary
Reorganization Act (Batas Pambansa Bilang 129). There might have
been a change in the name and in some incidental features but
essentially, they are the same.
However, whereas before jurisdiction over money claims of laborers
and employees appertained to Courts of First Instance, the same are
now to be taken cognizance of by proper entities in the
Department of Labor and Employment.
OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION V. HERTZ PHIL. EXCLUSIVE CARS,
G.R. No. 183035 January 9, 2013
>Optima entered into a Contract of Lease with respondent over an
office unit and a parking slot in the Optima Building for a period of
three years
> Optima, through counsel, wrote Hertz a letter requiring the latter
to surrender and vacate the leased premises in view of the
expiration of the Contract of Lease. It likewise demanded payment
of rental arrearages, unpaid utility bills and other charges. Hertz,
however, refused to vacate the leased premises.
>As a result, Optima was constrained to file before the MeTC a
Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages with Prayer for the
Issuance of a TRO and/or Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
(Unlawful Detainer Complaint) against Hertz.
>Summons for the Unlawful Detainer Complaint was served on
Henry Bobiles, quality control supervisor of Hertz, who complied
with the telephone instruction of manager Rudy Tirador to receive
the Summons.
>14 days after service of the Summons, Hertz filed a Motion for
Leave of Court to file Answer with Counterclaim and to Admit
Answer with Counterclaim (Motion for Leave to File Answer). In that
Motion, Hertz stated that, "in spite of the defective service of
summons, it opted to file the instant Answer with Counterclaim with
Leave of Court."23 In the same Motion, it likewise prayed that, in
the interest of substantial justice, the Answer with Counterclaim
attached to the Motion for Leave to File Answer should be admitted
regardless of its belated filing, since the service of summons was
defective
ISSUE: WON MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the person of
respondent Hertz
RULING: YES. The MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of
respondent Hertz.
In civil cases, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be
acquired either by service of summons or by the defendant’s
voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority.35
In this case, the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of
respondent Hertz by reason of the latter’s voluntary appearance in
court.
In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy, we had
occasion to state:
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is
acquired either by the coercive power of legal processes exerted
over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general
Page 14 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER
proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule
that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to
admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration
of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for
reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court's
jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of
conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special
appearance to challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over
his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule
on voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an
unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or
motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court
for resolution. (Emphases supplied)
In this case, the records show that the following statement
appeared in respondent’s Motion for Leave to File Answer:
In spite of the defective service of summons, the defendant opted
to file the instant Answer with Counterclaim with Leave of Court,
upon inquiring from the office of the clerk of court of this Honorable
Court and due to its notice of hearing on March 29, 2005 application
for TRO/Preliminary Mandatory Injunction was received on March
26, 2006.
Furthermore, the Answer with Counterclaim filed by Hertz never
raised the defense of improper service of summons. The defenses
that it pleaded were limited to litis pendentia, pari delicto,
performance of its obligations and lack of cause of action. Finally, it
even asserted its own counterclaim against Optima.
Measured against the standards in Philippine Commercial
International Bank, these actions lead to no other conclusion than
that Hertz voluntarily appeared before the court a quo. We
therefore rule that, by virtue of the voluntary appearance of
respondent Hertz before the MeTC, the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over respondent’s.
ABUBAKAR A. AFDAL and FATIMA A. AFDAL v. ROMEO CARLOS
G.R. No. 173379 December 1, 2010
> Romeo Carlos (respondent) filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
and damages against petitioners before MTC
> According to the records, there were three attempts to serve the
summons and complaint on petitioners.
> However, petitioners failed to file an answer.
> respondent filed an ex-parte motion and compliance with position
paper submitting the case for decision based on the pleadings on
record. (Judgment by default)
> MTC ruled in favor of respondent.
>petitioners filed the petition for relief before the RTC. Petitioners
pointed out that they never received respondent’s demand letter
nor were they informed of, much less participated in, the
proceedings before the Lupon. Moreover, petitioners said they were
not served a copy of the summons and the complaint.
ISSUE: WON jurisdiction over the petitioners were acquired
RULING: NO
Clearly, a petition for relief from judgment in forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases, as in the present case, is a prohibited
pleading.
The remedy of petitioners in such a situation is to file a petition for
certiorari with the RTC under Rule 6518 of the Rules of Court on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the MTC over the person of
petitioners in view of the absence of summons to petitioners. Here,
we shall treat petitioners’ petition for relief from judgment as a
petition for certiorari before the RTC.
An action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real action and
in personam because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal
obligation on the defendant for the latter to vacate the property
subject of the action, restore physical possession thereof to the
plaintiff, and pay actual damages by way of reasonable
compensation for his use or occupation of the property. In an action
in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case.
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid
service of summons or the defendant’s voluntary appearance in
court. If the defendant does not voluntarily appear in court,
jurisdiction can be acquired by personal or substituted service of
summons as laid out under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court
Any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is null and void.
The 23 August 2004 Decision of the MTC states:
Record shows that there were three attempts to serve the summons
to the defendants. The first was on January 14, 2004 where the
same was unserved. The second was on February 3, 2004 where the
same was served to one Gary Akob and the last was on February 18,
2004 where the return was duly served but refused to sign.
A closer look at the records of the case also reveals that the first
indorsement carried the annotation that it was "unsatisfied/given
address cannot be located." The second indorsement stated that the
summons was "duly served as evidenced by his signature of one
Gary Acob25 (relative)." While the last indorsement carried the
annotation that it was "duly served but refused to sign" without
specifying to whom it was served.
Service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service
first and only when the defendant cannot be promptly served in
person will substituted service be availed of. In Samartino v. Raon,
we said:
We have long held that the impossibility of personal service
justifying availment of substituted service should be explained in the
proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service failed.
The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of
summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return;
otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld.
In this case, the indorsements failed to state that prompt and
personal service on petitioners was rendered impossible. It failed
to show the reason why personal service could not be made. It was
also not shown that efforts were made to find petitioners personally
and that said efforts failed. These requirements are indispensable
Page 15 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER
because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of
service. It is an extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the
defendant to the consequences of a suit even though notice of such
action is served not upon him but upon another whom the law could
only presume would notify him of the pending proceedings. Failure
to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the statutory
requirements of substituted service renders such service ineffective.
Likewise, nowhere in the return of summons or in the records of the
case was it shown that Gary Acob, the person on whom substituted
service of summons was effected, was a person of suitable age and
discretion residing in petitioners’ residence. In Manotoc v. Court of
Appeals, we said:
If the substituted service will be effected at defendant’s house or
residence, it should be left with a person of "suitable age and
discretion then residing therein." A person of suitable age and
discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18
years old) and is considered to have enough discernment to
understand the importance of a summons. "Discretion" is defined as
"the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice
and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may
be presupposed." Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person
must know how to read and understand English to comprehend the
import of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the
summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible
time for the person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person
must have the "relation of confidence" to the defendant, ensuring
that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of
the summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if the person
found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal
age, what the recipient’s relationship with the defendant is, and
whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of
the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the
defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of
summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically described
in the Return of Summons.
In this case, the process server failed to specify Gary Acob’s age, his
relationship to petitioners and to ascertain whether he
comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his
duty to deliver it to petitioners or at least notify them of said receipt
of summons.
In sum, petitioners were not validly served with summons and the
complaint by substituted service. Hence, the MTC failed to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners and, thus, the MTC’s
23 August 2004 Decision is void.34 Since the MTC’s 23 August 2004
Decision is void, it also never became final.
We REMAND the case to the MTC, for consolidation with the
unlawful detainer case in Civil Case No. 3719 and for the MTC to
continue proceedings thereon by affording petitioners Abubakar A.
Afdal and Fatima A. Afdal a chance to file their answer and present
evidence in their defense, and thereafter to hear and decide the
case.
FE V. RAPSING et al V. HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO R. ABLES
G.R. No. 171855 October 15, 2012
>Respondents alleged that they received information about the
presence of armed elements reputed to be New People’s Army
(NPA) partisans in Sitio Gaway-gaway, Barangay Lagta, Baleno,
Masbate.
> Acting on the information, they coordinated with the Philippine
National Police and proceeded to the place. Thereat, they
encountered armed elements which resulted in an intense firefight.
> When the battle ceased, seven (7) persons were found sprawled
on the ground lifeless. The post-incident report of the Philippine
Army states that a legitimate military operation was conducted and
in the course of which, the victims, armed with high-powered
firearms, engaged in a shoot-out with the military.
>Petitioners, on the other hand, are the widows of those who were
allegedly killed in cold blood by the respondents.
>petitioners complained that there was no encounter that ensued
and that the victims were summarily executed in cold blood by
respondents. Hence, they requested NBI to investigate the case.
After investigation, the NBI recommended that a preliminary
investigation be conducted against respondents for the crime of
multiple murder.
>respondents were charged with multiple murder
>Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) filed an Omnibus Motion with the trial court
seeking the cases against respondents be transferred to the
jurisdiction of the military tribunal
>Trial court granted the Omnibus Motion and the entire records of
the case were turned over to the Commanding General of the 9th
Infantry Division, Philippine Army, for appropriate action.
Petitioners alleged that the trial court gravely abused its discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction when it transferred the criminal
case filed against the respondents to the jurisdiction of the military
tribunal, as jurisdiction over the same is conferred upon the civil
courts by Republic Act No. 7055 (RA 7055).
Respondents, however, contend that the military tribunal has
jurisdiction over the case at bar because the crime charged was a
service-connected offense allegedly committed by members of the
AFP.
Issue: WON RTC has jurisdiction over the case
RULING: YES. The trial court gravely abused its discretion in not
taking cognizance of the case, which actually falls within its
jurisdiction.
It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case is conferred by law and is determined by
the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff
is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein. As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court
cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer
or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of
jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What
determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action
pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The
averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought
are the matters to be consulted.
In the case at bar, the information states that respondents,
"conspiring together and mutually helping with one another, taking
advantage of their superior strength, as elements of the Philippine
Army, armed with their government-issued firearms with intent to
kill, by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
the [victims], hitting them on different parts of their bodies, thereby
Page 16 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER
inflicting upon them multiple gunshot wounds which caused their
deaths." Murder is a crime punishable under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, and is within the jurisdiction
of the RTC. Hence, irrespective of whether the killing was actually
justified or not, jurisdiction to try the crime charged against the
respondents has been vested upon the RTC by law.
In view of the provisions of R.A. 7055, the military tribunals cannot
exercise jurisdiction over respondents' case since the offense for
which they were charged is not included in the enumeration of
"service-connected offenses or crimes" as provided for under
Section 1 thereof. The said law is very clear that the jurisdiction to
try members of the AFP who commit crimes or offenses covered by
the RPC, and which are not service-connected, lies with the civil
courts. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to
mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to
it that its mandate is obeyed. There is no room for interpretation,
but only application. Hence, the RTC cannot divest itself of its
jurisdiction over the alleged crime of multiple murder.
JOSE MENDOZA V. ARCISO GERMINO and BENIGNO GERMINO
G.R. No. 165676 November 22, 2010
The plaintiffs claimed that they were the registered owners of a
parcel of land. Sometime in 1988, respondent Narciso unlawfully
entered the subject property by means of strategy and stealth, and
without their knowledge or consent. Despite the plaintiffs’ repeated
demands, respondent Narciso refused to vacate the subject
property
plaintiffs filed a complaint with MTC for forcible entry
Respondent Narciso filed his answer, claiming, among others, that
his brother, respondent Benigno Germino, was the plaintiffs’
agricultural lessee and he merely helped the latter in the cultivation
as a member of the immediate farm household
the plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case to the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), in view of the
tenancy issue raised by respondent Narciso.
>Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), impleading respondent Benigno as
additional defendant.
>plaintiffs alleged that Efren Bernardo was the agricultural lessee of
the subject property. Respondent Benigno unlawfully entered the
subject property through strategy and stealth, and without their
knowledge or consent.
PARAD: ordered the respondents to vacate the subject property,
and pay the plaintiffs 500 cavans of palay as actual damages.
>Respondents filed a notice of appeal with the DARAB, arguing that
the case should have been dismissed because the MTC’s referral to
the DARAB was void
DARAB It held that it acquired jurisdiction because of the amended
complaint that sufficiently alleged an agrarian dispute, not the
MTC’s referral of the case
CA found that the MTC erred in transferring the case to the DARAB
since the material allegations of the complaint and the relief sought
show a case for forcible entry, not an agrarian dispute.
Issue: whether the MTC or the DARAB has jurisdiction over the
case.
RULING: MTC has jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint
It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations in the complaint. It is determined
exclusively by the Constitution and the law. It cannot be conferred
by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties, or acquired
through or waived, enlarged or diminished by their act or omission,
nor conferred by the acquiescence of the court. Well to emphasize,
it is neither for the court nor the parties to violate or disregard the
rule, this matter being legislative in character.23
Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,24 as amended by R.A. No. 7691,25
the MTC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The RRSP26 governs the
remedial aspects of these suits.27
Under Section 5028 of R.A. No. 6657, as well as Section 3429 of
Executive Order No. 129-A,30 the DARAB has primary and exclusive
jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and
adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and other agrarian laws
and their implementing rules and regulations.
An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to, among
others, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture.31 For a case to
involve an agrarian dispute, the following essential requisites of an
agricultural tenancy relationship must be present: (1) the parties are
the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3)
there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there
is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvest or payment
of rental.
Based on these allegations and reliefs prayed, it is clear that the
action in the MTC was for forcible entry.
Allegation of tenancy does not divest the MTC of jurisdiction
Although respondent Narciso averred tenancy as an affirmative
and/or special defense in his answer, this did not automatically
divest the MTC of jurisdiction over the complaint. It continued to
have the authority to hear the case precisely to determine whether
it had jurisdiction to dispose of the ejectment suit on its merits.34
After all, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set
up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise,
jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the
whims of the defendant.35
Under the RRSP, the MTC is duty-bound to conduct a preliminary
conference and, if necessary, to receive evidence to determine if
such tenancy relationship had, in fact, been shown to be the real
issue. The MTC may even opt to conduct a hearing on the special
and affirmative defense of the defendant, although under the RRSP,
such a hearing is not a matter of right. If it is shown during the
hearing or conference that, indeed, tenancy is the issue, the MTC
should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
In the present case, instead of conducting a preliminary conference,
the MTC immediately referred the case to the DARAB. This was
contrary to the rules. Besides, Section 240 of P.D. No. 316, which
required the referral of a land dispute case to the Department of
Agrarian Reform for the preliminary determination of the existence
of an agricultural tenancy relationship, has indeed been repealed by
Section 7641 of R.A. No. 6657 in 1988.
Amended complaint did confer jurisdiction on the DARAB
Page 17 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER
Neither did the amendment of the complaint confer jurisdiction on
the DARAB. The plaintiffs alleged in the amended complaint that the
subject property was previously tilled by Efren Bernardo, and the
respondents took possession by strategy and stealth, without their
knowledge and consent. In the absence of any allegation of a
tenancy relationship between the parties, the action was for
recovery of possession of real property that was within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts.
The CA, therefore, committed no reversible error in setting aside the
DARAB decision. While we lament the lapse of time this forcible
entry case has been pending resolution, we are not in a position to
resolve the dispute between the parties since the evidence required
in courts is different from that of administrative agencies.
REMEDIOS ANTONINO v. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
G.R. No. 185663 June 20, 2012
>petitioner Remedios Antonino had been leasing a residential
property at MAKATI owned by private respondent Tan Tian Su (Su).
Under the governing lease contract, Antonino was accorded with the
right of first refusal in the event Su would decide to sell the subject
property
>the parties executed a document denominated as Undertaking
Agreement where Su agreed to sell to Antonino the subject
property. However, in view of a disagreement as to who between
them would shoulder the payment of the capital gains tax, the sale
did not proceed
>Antonino filed a complaint against Su with RTC of MAKATI for the
reimbursement of the cost of repairs on the subject property and
payment of damages.
>amended complaint to enforce the Undertaking Agreement and
compel Su to sell to her the subject property
>RTC dismissed Antonino’s complaint on the grounds of improper
venue and non-payment of the appropriate docket fees. According
to the RTC, Antonino’s complaint is one for specific performance,
damages and sum of money, which are personal actions that should
have been filed in the court of the place where any of the parties
resides. Antonino and Su reside in Muntinlupa and Manila,
respectively, thus Makati City is not the proper venue.
>Antonino filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment.
Antonino prayed for the nullification of the RTC’s Order dated
December 8, 2004 dismissing her complaint, Order dated January 6,
2005 denying her motion for reconsideration and Joint Resolution
dated February 24, 2005 denying her motion for reconsideration of
the January 6, 2005 Order. According to Antonino, the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it ruled that her action for the enforcement of the
Undertaking Agreement is personal and when it deprived her of an
opportunity to pay the correct amount of docket fees. The RTC’s
grave abuse of discretion, Antonino posited, was likewise exhibited
by its strict application of the rules on motions and summary denial
of her motion for reconsideration.
Issue: WON Antonino’s use of the remedy of a petition for
annulment of judgment as against the final and executory orders
of the RTC was proper
RULING: NO.
In Ramos v. Judge Combong, Jr., this Court expounded that the
remedy of annulment of judgment is only available under certain
exceptional circumstances as this is adverse to the concept of
immutability of final judgments:
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed
only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other
adequate remedy. Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, governs actions for annulment of judgments or final
orders and resolutions, and Section 2 thereof explicitly provides only
two grounds for annulment of judgment, i.e., extrinsic fraud and lack
of jurisdiction. The underlying reason is traceable to the notion that
annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of
judgment. Litigation must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of
justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause
involved therein should be laid to rest. The basic rule of finality of
judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy
and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgment
of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final
at some definite date fixed by law.
In Barco v. Court of Appeals, this Court emphasized that only void
judgments, by reason of "extrinsic fraud" or the court’s lack of
jurisdiction, are susceptible to being annulled.
The law sanctions the annulment of certain judgments which,
though final, are ultimately void. Annulment of judgment is an
equitable principle not because it allows a party-litigant another
opportunity to reopen a judgment that has long lapsed into finality
but because it enables him to be discharged from the burden of
being bound to a judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with.
Apart from the requirement that the existence of "extrinsic fraud" or
"lack of jurisdiction" should be amply demonstrated, one who
desires to avail this remedy must convince that the ordinary and
other appropriate remedies, such as an appeal, are no longer
available for causes not attributable to him. This is clearly provided
under Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
Antonino’s recourse to annulment of judgment is seriously flawed
and the reasons are patent. There is therefore no reason to disturb
the questioned issuances of the RTC that are already final and
executory.
A petition for annulment of judgment cannot serve as a substitute
for the lost remedy of an appeal.
First, Antonino cannot pursue the annulment of the various
issuances of the RTC, primary of which is the Order dated December
8, 2004, in order to avoid the adverse consequences of their
becoming final and executory because of her neglect in utilizing the
ordinary remedies available. Antonino did not proffer any
explanation for her failure to appeal the RTC’s Order dated
December 8, 2004 and, thereafter, the Order dated January 6, 2005,
denying her Motion for Reconsideration dated January 3, 2005.
Knowledge of rudimentary remedial rules immediately indicates that
an appeal was already available from the Order dated December 8,
2004, as this is a final order as contemplated under Sections 2, 3 and
5 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, and there was no legal
compulsion for Antonino to move for reconsideration. Nonetheless,
since there is no bar for her to file a motion for reconsideration so as
to give the RTC opportunity to reverse itself before elevating the
matter for the appellate courts’ review, appeal is the prescribed
remedy from the denial of such motion and not another motion for
reconsideration. While Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
includes "an order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration" in the enumeration of unappealable matters, this
Court clarified in Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc. that such refers to
a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order and the
Page 18 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER
denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal is a
final order, therefore, appealable. Moreover, a second motion for
reconsideration from a final judgment or order is prohibited, hence,
can never interrupt the period to perfect an appeal.
The RTC may have been overly strict in the observance of the three-
day notice rule under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court
contrary to liberal stance taken by this Court in cases when the
purpose of such rule can be achieved by giving the opposing party
sufficient time to study and controvert the motion.27 Justice and
equity would thus suggest that the fifteen-day period within which
Antonino can appeal should be counted from her receipt on January
7, 200528 of the Order dated January 6, 2005 denying her Motion
for Reconsideration dated January 3, 2005. Unfortunately, even
liberality proved to be inadequate to neutralize the adverse
consequences of Antonino’s negligence as she allowed such period
to lapse without filing an appeal, erroneously believing that a second
motion for reconsideration is the proper remedy. While a second
motion for reconsideration is not prohibited insofar as interlocutory
orders are concerned, the Orders dated December 8, 2004 and
January 6, 2005 are final orders.
In fact, even if the period to appeal would be counted from
Antonino’s receipt of the Order dated February 24, 2005 denying her
second motion for reconsideration, she interposed no appeal and
filed a petition for annulment of judgment on April 1, 2005 instead.
This, for sure, constitutes a categorical admission that the assailed
issuances of the RTC had already become final and executory in view
of her omission to perfect an appeal within the mandated period. By
no means can her petition for annulment of judgment prosper as
that would, in effect, sanction her blatant negligence or sheer
obliviousness to proper procedure.
Let it be stressed at the outset that before a party can avail of the
reliefs provided for by Rule 47, i.e., annulment of judgments, final
orders, and resolutions, it is a condition sine qua non that one must
have failed to move for new trial in, or appeal from, or file a petition
for relief against said issuances or take other appropriate remedies
thereon, through no fault attributable to him. If he failed to avail of
those cited remedies without sufficient justification, he cannot
resort to the action for annulment provided in Rule 47, for otherwise
he would benefit from his own inaction or negligence.
"Grave abuse of discretion" is not a ground to annul a final and
executory judgment.
Second, a petition for annulment of judgment can only be based on
"extrinsic fraud" and "lack of jurisdiction" and cannot prosper on the
basis of "grave abuse of discretion". By anchoring her petition on the
alleged grave abuse of discretion that attended the dismissal of her
complaint and the denial of her two (2) motions for reconsideration,
Antonino, is, in effect, enlarging the concept of "lack of jurisdiction".
As this Court previously clarified in Republic of the Philippines v. "G"
Holdings, Inc., "lack of jurisdiction" as a ground for the annulment of
judgments pertains to lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defending party or over the subject matter of the claim. It does not
contemplate "grave abuse of discretion" considering that
"jurisdiction" is different from the exercise thereof. As ruled in
Tolentino v. Judge Leviste:
Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As
distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the
authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein.
Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter,
the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an
exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may
commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment
which are the proper subject of an appeal.33
In fact, the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion or err in
dismissing Antonino’s complaint. The RTC was correct in classifying
Antonino’s cause of action as personal and in holding that it was
instituted in the wrong venue. Personal action is one that is founded
on privity of contracts between the parties; and in which the plaintiff
usually seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of
a contract, or recovery of damages. Real action, on the other hand,
is one anchored on the privity of real estate, where the plaintiff
seeks the recovery of ownership or possession of real property or
interest in it. Antonino’s following allegations in her amended
complaint show that one of her causes of action is one for the
enforcement or consummation of a contract, hence, a personal
action
Antonino’s cause of action is premised on her claim that there has
already been a perfected contract of sale by virtue of their execution
of the Undertaking Agreement and Su had refused to comply with
his obligations as seller. However, by claiming the existence of a
perfected contract of sale, it does not mean that Antonino acquired
title to the subject property. She does not allege otherwise and
tacitly acknowledges Su’s title to the subject property by asking for
the consummation of the sale.
That there is a private document supposedly evidencing the alleged
sale does not confer to Antonino title to the subject property.
Ownership is transferred when there is actual or constructive
delivery and the thing is considered delivered when it is placed in
the control or possession of the buyer or when the sale is made
through a public instrument and the contrary does not appear or
cannot be clearly inferred.36 In other words, Antonino’s complaint is
not in the nature of a real action as ownership of the subject
property is not at issue.
Moreover, that the object of the alleged sale is a real property does
not make Antonino’s complaint real in nature in the absence of a
contrary claim of title. After a contract of sale is perfected, the right
of the parties to reciprocally demand performance, thus
consummation, arises – the vendee may require the vendor to
compel the transfer the title to the object of the sale and the vendor
may require the payment of the purchase price. The action to cause
the consummation of a sale does not involve an adverse claim of
ownership as the vendor’s title is recognized and the vendor is
simply being asked to perform an act, specifically, the transfer of
such title by any of the recognized modes of delivery.
Considering that the filing of the complaint in a wrong venue
sufficed for the dismissal thereof, it would be superfluous to discuss
if Antonino’s non-payment of the correct docket fees likewise
warranted it.
At any rate, even if the RTC erred in ordering the dismissal of her
complaint, such had already become final and executory and will not
be disturbed as it had jurisdiction and it was not alleged, much less,
proved that there was extrinsic fraud. Moreover, annulment of the
assailed orders of the RTC will not issue if ordinary remedies, such as
an appeal, were lost and were not availed of because of Antonino’s
fault. Litigation should end and terminate sometime and
somewhere. It is essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final,
the winning party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict
Page 19 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER
DELFIN LAMSIS v. MARGARITA SEMON DONG-E
G.R. No. 173021 October 20, 2010
>This case involves a conflict of ownership and possession over an
untitled parcel of land. s. While petitioners are the actual occupants
of Lot No. 1, respondent is claiming ownership thereof and is
seeking to recover its possession from petitioners.
> The land subject of the instant application is the ancestral land of
the herein applicants.
It has been sufficiently substantiated by the applicants that prior to
and at the time of the pendency of the land registration case and
henceforth up to and including the present, the herein applicants by
themselves and through their predecessor-in-interest have been in
exclusive, continuous, and material possession and occupation of
the said parcel of land mentioned above under claim of ownership,
devoting the same for residential and agricultural purposes.
> On the matter of the applicant[s’] indiguinity [sic] and
qualifications, there is no doubt that they are members of the
National Cultural Communities, particularly the Ibaloi tribe. They are
the legitimate grandchildren of Ap-Ap (one name) who lived along
the Asin Road area
For the first time in the entire proceedings of this case, petitioners
raise the trial court’s alleged lack of jurisdiction over the subject-
matter in light of the effectivity of the IPRA at the time that the
complaint was filed. They maintain that, under the IPRA, it is the
NCIP which has jurisdiction over land disputes involving indigenous
cultural communities and indigenous peoples.
Issue: WON Trial court has jurisdiction to decide the case in light of
the effectivity of RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of
1997 at the time that the complaint was instituted
RULING: YES. They are already barred by prescription
As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be
raised at any time of the proceedings. This is because jurisdiction
cannot be waived by the parties or vested by the agreement of the
parties. Jurisdiction is vested by law, which prevails at the time of
the filing of the complaint.
An exception to this rule has been carved by jurisprudence. In the
seminal case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, the Court ruled that the
existence of laches will prevent a party from raising the court’s lack
of jurisdiction. Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned or declined to assert it."80 Wisely, some cases81
have cautioned against applying Tijam, except for the most
exceptional cases where the factual milieu is similar to Tijam.
In Tijam, the surety could have raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction
in the trial court but failed to do so. Instead, the surety participated
in the proceedings and filed pleadings, other than a motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. When the case reached the appellate
court, the surety again participated in the case and filed their
pleadings therein. It was only after receiving the appellate court’s
adverse decision that the surety awoke from its slumber and filed a
motion to dismiss, in lieu of a motion for reconsideration. The CA
certified the matter to this Court, which then ruled that the surety
was already barred by laches from raising the jurisdiction issue.
In case at bar, the application of the Tijam doctrine is called for
because the presence of laches cannot be ignored. If the surety in
Tijam was barred by laches for raising the issue of jurisdiction for the
first time in the CA, what more for petitioners in the instant case
who raised the issue for the first time in their petition before this
Court.
At the time that the complaint was first filed in 1998, the IPRA was
already in effect but the petitioners never raised the same as a
ground for dismissal; instead they filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the value of the property did not meet the jurisdictional
value for the RTC. They obviously neglected to take the IPRA into
consideration.
When the amended complaint was filed in 1998, the petitioners no
longer raised the issue of the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction.
Instead, they proceeded to trial, all the time aware of the existence
of the IPRA as evidenced by the cross-examination conducted by
petitioners’ lawyer on the CSTFAL Chairman Guillermo Fianza. In the
cross-examination, it was revealed that the petitioners were aware
that the DENR, through the CSTFAL, had lost its jurisdiction over
ancestral land claims by virtue of the enactment of the IPRA. They
assailed the validity of the CSTFAL resolution favoring respondent on
the ground that the CSTFAL had been rendered functus officio under
the IPRA. Inexplicably, petitioners still did not question the trial
court’s jurisdiction
When petitioners recoursed to the appellate court, they only raised
as errors the trial court’s appreciation of the evidence and the
conclusions that it derived therefrom. In their brief, they once again
assailed the CSTFAL’s resolution as having been rendered functus
officio by the enactment of IPRA. But nowhere did petitioners assail
the trial court’s ruling for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
It is only before this Court, eight years after the filing of the
complaint, after the trial court had already conducted a full-blown
trial and rendered a decision on the merits, after the appellate court
had made a thorough review of the records, and after petitioners
have twice encountered adverse decisions from the trial and the
appellate courts — that petitioners now want to expunge all the
efforts that have gone into the litigation and resolution of their case
and start all over again. This practice cannot be allowed.
Thus, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ theory about the
effect of IPRA is correct (a matter which need not be decided here),
they are already barred by laches from raising their jurisdictional
objection under the circumstances.
There is laches when a party is aware, even in the early stages of the
proceedings, of a possible jurisdictional objection, and has every
opportunity to raise said objection, but fails to do so, even on
appeal.
CORAZON JALBUENA DE LEON v. CA
G.R. No. 96107 June 19, 1995
>Jalbuena, the owner of the land, entered into a verbal lease
contract with Uldarico Inayan, for one year renewable for the same
period.
>Inayan, private respondent herein, bound himself to deliver cavans
of palay each year as rental to be paid during the first ten days of
January.
> Although private respondent cultivated the subject property
through hired men, the cavans of palay were paid annually until
1983 when Inayan ceased paying the agreed rental and instead,
asserted dominion over the land.
>When asked by the petitioner to vacate the land, he refused to do
so, prompting the latter to bring an action in court
Page 20 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER
> herein petitioner filed a complaint against private respondent
before RTC for "Termination of Civil Law Lease; Recovery of
Possession, Recovery of Unpaid Rentals and Damages."
> RTC in favor of petitioner
> On appeal to the Court of Appeals, private respondent raised the
sole issue of jurisdiction and alleged that the lower court, acting as
Court of Agrarian Relations, had no jurisdiction over the action.
> CA held that jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law, private
respondent's attack on the jurisdiction of the lower court must fail
for he is guilty of estoppel.
ISSUE: WON he is guilty of estoppel
RULING: YES
Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is conferred only by
the Constitution or by law. It is determinable on the basis of
allegations in the complaint. 12
An error in jurisdiction can be raised at any time and even for the
first time on appeal. Barring highly meritorious and exceptional
circumstances, neither estoppel nor waiver may be raised as
defenses to such an error.
In order to determine whether the court below had jurisdiction, it is
necessary to first ascertain the nature of the complaint filed before
it.
A study of the complaint instituted by petitioner in the lower court
reveals that the case is, contrary to the findings of the respondent
appellate court, not one of unlawful detainer.
Where the issues of the case extend beyond those commonly
involved in unlawful detainer suits, such as for instance, the
respective rights of parties under various contractual arrangements
and the validity thereof, the case is converted from a mere detainer
suit to one "incapable of pecuniary estimation," thereby placing it
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the regional trial courts
(formerly the courts of first instance). 26
PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL
Still on the question of jurisdiction, private respondent Inayan, as
appellant before the respondent court, claimed that the trial court,
acting as a court of agrarian relations, did not have jurisdiction over
the complaint filed by petitioner because the latter did not concern
itself with tenancy or agrarian matters. The Court of Appeals, in its
original decision, ruled that private respondent was guilty of
estoppel. Accordingly, he can not successfully raise the issue.
In the past, the principle of estoppel has been used by the courts to
avoid a clear case of injustice. Its use as a defense to a jurisdictional
error is more of an exception rather than the rule. The
circumstances outlining estoppel must be unequivocal and
intentional, for it is an exception to standard legal norms and is
generally applied only in highly exceptional and justifiable cases.
We find that the situation in the case at bench falls within the ambit
of justifiable cases where estoppel may be applied. The trial court's
recourse to agrarian procedure was undoubtedly provoked by
private respondent Inayan's insistence on the existence of a tenancy
relationship with petitioner. Private respondent cannot now use
these same misrepresentations to assert the court's lack of
jurisdiction. He cannot invoke the court's jurisdiction to secure
affirmative relief against petitioner and, after failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
Participation in judicial proceedings where the court was devoid of
jurisdiction is not normally considered as estoppel because the
jurisdiction of a court is mandated by law. Estoppel is likewise not
appreciated where a mistaken belief in the court's jurisdiction is
maintained.
But private respondent's case is different for it does not involve an
honest mistake. He is directly responsible for the trial court's use of
the special rules of agrarian procedure. His insistence brought
about the want of jurisdiction he conveniently asserted before the
appellate court, and only after an adverse decision was leveled
against him. Private respondent cannot be allowed to seek refuge
under the protective mantle of the law after he has abused and
made a mockery of it. He is, therefore, considered estopped from
asserting the court's want of jurisdiction to try the case.
Moreover, the case was ostensibly one that involved agrarian
matters, as alleged by private respondent. Hence the trial court
cannot be faulted for its use of agrarian procedure.
In sum, we have concluded that the case filed by petitioner below,
not being one of unlawful detainer, the regional trial court had
jurisdiction to hear and try the case.
Moreover, as shown in the foregoing paragraphs, private
respondent is estopped from asserting the lower court's lack of
jurisdiction.
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL v. MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY
G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968
> On July 19, 1948 – barely one month after the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 296 known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 — the
spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil Case in
CFI against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to
recover from them the sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest thereon
from the date of the filing of the complaint until the whole
obligation is paid, plus costs.
> a writ of attachment was issued by the court against defendants'
properties, but the same was soon dissolved upon the filing of a
counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co.,
Inc. hereinafter referred to as the Surety, on the 31st of the same
month
> Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
> after the same had become final and executory, the Court issued a
writ of execution against the defendants
> Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground
that the same was issued without the required summary hearing
provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court.
> Surety appealed to the CA. Not one of the assignment of errors
raises the question of lack of jurisdiction, neither directly nor
indirectly.
> Although the appellees failed to file their brief, CA affirmed the
orders appealed from.
> On January 8, 1963 — five days after the Surety received notice of
the decision, it filed a motion asking for extension of time within
which to file a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals
granted the motion.
> Two days later the Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO
DISMISS, alleging substantially that appellees action was filed in CFI
of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00
only; that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296, otherwise
known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become effective,
Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction
of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-
matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00,
Page 21 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER
exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of First Instance
therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case.
Issue: WON CFI has jurisdiction
RULING: YES. GUILTY OF ESTOPPEL
It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in
the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the Sibonghanoy spouses
was for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only — an amount
within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in
accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which
had taken effect about a month prior to the date when the action
was commenced. True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and
as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances
of the present case — which shall forthwith be set forth — We are
of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking
this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annuling everything
done heretofore in the case with its active participation.
As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen years
before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963
raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.
It must be remembered that although the action, originally, was
exclusively against the Sibonghanoy spouses the Surety became a
quasi-party therein since July 31, 1948 when it filed a counter-bond
for the dissolution of the writ of attachment issued by the court of
origin (Record on Appeal, pp. 15-19). Since then, it acquired certain
rights and assumed specific obligations in connection with the
pending case, in accordance with sections 12 and 17, Rule 57, Rules
of Court (Bautista vs. Joaquin, 46 Phil. 885; Kimpang & Co. vs. Javier,
65 Phil. 170).
Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the counter-
bond the Surety not only filed a written opposition thereto praying
for its denial but also asked for an additional affirmative relief —
that it be relieved of its liability under the counter-bond upon the
grounds relied upon in support of its opposition — lack of
jurisdiction of the court a quo not being one of them.
Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution against the
counter-bond, the Surety appeared, through counsel, to ask for time
within which to file an answer or opposition thereto. This motion
was granted, but instead of such answer or opposition, the Surety
filed the motion to dismiss mentioned heretofore.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in
different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel
in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds
of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the
discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations,
is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the
inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced
or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the
case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that
the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the
subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in
such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not
because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as
an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be
tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a
cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too
late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court
(Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct.
283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in
Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right
for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court
in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards
deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases
mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963
(supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable
practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then
accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et
al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs.
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor
Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307,
Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a
quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the
lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take
cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money
involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so.
Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as
well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said
courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final
adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was
rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the
question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its
part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings
had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948
and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once
more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but
revolting.
ATTY. RESTITUTO G. CUDIAMAT v. BATANGAS SAVINGS AND LOAN
BANK, INC
G.R. No. 182403 March 9, 2010
>Petitioner Atty. Restituto Cudiamat and his brother Perfecto were
the registered co-owners of a parcel of land.
> entrusted the custody of the title to who was residing in Balayan
> Perfecto, without the knowledge and consent of Restituto,
obtained a loan from respondent Batangas Savings and Loan Bank,
Inc. (the bank). To secure the payment of the loan, Perfecto
mortgaged the property for the purpose of which he presented a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by Restituto,
Page 22 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER
with the marital consent of his wife-herein co-petitioner Erlinda
Cudiamat.
> property was foreclosed
> Restituto informed the bank that he had no participation in the
execution of the mortgage and that he never authorized Perfecto for
the purpose.
> Perfecto died in 1990. as Perfecto’s widow petitioner Corazon was
being evicted from the property, she and her co-petitioner-spouses
Restituto and Erlinda filed RTC of Balayan a complaint "for quieting
of title with damages" against the bank and the Register of Deeds
assailing the mortgage as being null and void as they did not
authorize the encumbrance of the property.
> In its Answer to the complaint, the bank, maintaining the validity
of the mortgage, alleged that it had in fact secured a title in its
name, after Perfecto failed to redeem the mortgage; that the
Balayan RTC had no jurisdiction over the case as the bank had been
placed under receivership and under liquidation by the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC); that PDIC filed before the RTC
of Nasugbu a petition for assistance in the liquidation of the bank
which was docketed as SP No. 576; and that jurisdiction to
adjudicate disputed claims against it is lodged with the liquidation
court-RTC Nasugbu.
> Balayan RTC rendered judgment, in the complaint for quieting of
title, in favor of the plaintiffs-herein petitioners.
> The bank appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending, inter alia,
that the Balayan RTC had no jurisdiction over petitioners’ complaint
for quieting of title.
ISSUE: WON RTC has jurisdiction
RULING: YES.
Estoppel bars the bank from raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction of
the Balayan RTC.
In Lozon v. NLRC, the Court came up with a clear rule on when
jurisdiction by estoppel applies and when it does not:
The operation of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly
depends on whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not.
If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the
theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal,
from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter
of law, and may not be conferred by the consent of the parties or by
estoppel." However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case
was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as
that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt
such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an
inconsistent position – that the lower court had jurisdiction
The ruling was echoed in Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin.
In the present case, the Balayan RTC, sitting as a court of general
jurisdiction, had jurisdiction over the complaint for quieting of title
filed by petitioners. The Nasugbu RTC, as a liquidation court,
assumed jurisdiction over the claims against the bank only on May
25, 2000, when PDIC’s petition for assistance in the liquidation was
raffled thereat and given due course.
While it is well-settled that lack of jurisdiction on the subject matter
can be raised at any time and is not lost by estoppel by laches, the
present case is an exception. To compel petitioners to re-file and
relitigate their claims before the Nasugbu RTC when the parties had
already been given the opportunity to present their respective
evidence in a full-blown trial before the Balayan RTC which had, in
fact, decided petitioners’ complaint (about two years before the
appellate court rendered the assailed decision) would be an exercise
in futility and would unjustly burden petitioners.
The Court, in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, held that as a general
rule, if there is a judicial liquidation of an insolvent bank, all claims
against the bank should be filed in the liquidation proceeding. The
Court in Valenzuela, however, after considering the circumstances
attendant to the case, held that the general rule should not be
applied if to order the aggrieved party to refile or relitigate its case
before the litigation court would be "an exercise in futility."
In the present case, the Court finds that analogous considerations
exist to warrant the application of Valenzuela. Petitioner Restituto
was 78 years old at the time the petition was filed in this Court, and
his co-petitioner-wife Erlinda died during the pendency of the case.
And, except for co-petitioner Corazon, Restituto is a resident of
Ozamis City. To compel him to appear and relitigate the case in the
liquidation court-Nasugbu RTC when the issues to be raised before it
are the same as those already exhaustively passed upon and decided
by the Balayan RTC would be superfluous.
FIRST CORPORATION v. FORMER SIXTH DIVISION OF CA
G.R. No. 171989 July 4, 2007
> Respondent Eduardo M. Sacris (Sacris) is the alleged creditor of
the petitioner corporation, while private respondent Cesar A. Abillar
(Abillar) had served as the President and Chairman of the Board of
the petitioner corporation
> private respondent Sacris filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with
Damages before the RTC of Quezon City against the petitioner
corporation, docketed as Civil Case No. Q01-44599, to recover his
alleged collectible amount of P1.8 million due from the petitioner
corporation. Petitioner corporation filed its Answer denying the
material allegations stated in the Complaint. Petitioner corporation
denied having liability to private respondent Sacris, as it had no
knowledge of or consent to the purported transactions or dealings
that private respondent Sacris may have had with private
respondent Abillar. Subsequently, petitioner corporation filed a
Third-Party Complaint against private respondent Abillar alleging
that the investment/loan transactions of private respondent Sacris,
the basis of his cause of action against the petitioner corporation,
were all entered into by private respondent Abillar without the
knowledge, consent, authority and/or approval of the petitioner
corporation or of the latter’s Board of Directors. The aforesaid
transactions were not even ratified by the petitioner corporation or
by its Board of Directors. Private respondent Abillar filed his Answer
to the said Third-Party Complaint raising therein the same
allegations found in the Complaint filed by private respondent
Sacris.
> RTC of Quezon City ruled in favor of the private respondents
> CA affirmed
> In the Memorandum filed by the petitioner corporation, it avers
that the RTC of Quezon City and the appellate court erred in holding
that private respondents’ claim of the existence of the purported
loans was supported by a preponderance of evidence, despite the
fact that the pieces of documentary evidence presented by the
private respondents were tainted with irregularities. Thus, the RTC
and the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of their jurisdiction in giving credence to these
pieces of documentary evidence presented by the private
respondents.
> Petitioner corporation further argues that the conclusion made by
the RTC of Quezon City and the appellate court that it benefited
Page 23 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER
from the loans obtained from private respondent Sacris had no basis
in fact and in law. Also, petitioner corporation alleges that it was
grave abuse of discretion for the RTC and the appellate court to hold
that private respondent Abillar was authorized by the petitioner
corporation to borrow money from private respondent Sacris,
deliberately ignoring the provisions of the by-laws of petitioner
>Lastly, petitioner corporation contends that the RTC and the Court
of Appeals likewise acted with grave abuse of discretion in not
awarding damages in its favor and in dismissing its Third-Party
Complaint against private respondent Abillar
>filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
RULING:
Petitioner corporation evidently availed itself of the wrong mode
of appeal. Although petitioner corporation ascribes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
both the RTC of Quezon City and the appellate court in rendering
their respective Decisions, a closer look on the grounds relied upon
by the petitioner corporation in its present Petition for Certiorari will
clearly reveal that the petitioner corporation seeks a review of the
factual findings and evidence of the instant case.
It is a well-entrenched rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. This
Court will not pass upon the findings of fact of the trial court,
especially if they have been affirmed on appeal by the appellate
court.13 Unless the case falls under the recognized exceptions, the
rule should not be disturbed.
In the case at bar, the findings of the RTC of Quezon City as well as
the appellate court are properly supported by evidence on record.
Both courts found that the alleged loans extended to the petitioner
corporation by private respondent Sacris were reflected in the
petitioner corporation’s financial statements, particularly in the
years 1992-1993, were contrary to the claim of petitioner
corporation. The said financial statements of the petitioner
corporation were not the sole bases used by the RTC of Quezon City
and by the appellate court in its findings of liability against the
petitioner corporation. The RTC of Quezon City also took into
consideration the pieces of documentary evidence15 which likewise
became the grounds for its findings that indeed, private respondent
Sacris had extended a loan to petitioner corporation, and that the
same was given to private respondent Abillar, and received by the
petitioner corporation. Those pieces of documentary evidence very
well supported the claim of private respondent Sacris that the
petitioner corporation received money from him through its former
President, private respondent Abillar. Thus, petitioner corporation
cannot claim that it never consented to the act of private
respondent Abillar of entering into a loan/investment transaction
with private respondent Sacris, for there are documents that would
prove that the money was received by the petitioner corporation,
and the latter acknowledged receipt of said money. The same pieces
of evidence likewise confirm the findings of the RTC of Quezon City
that the petitioner corporation benefited from the said transaction;
therefore, it should be held liable for the same amount of its unpaid
obligation to private respondent Sacris. As the findings of the RTC of
Quezon City and the appellate court are supported by evidence, this
Court finds no reason to deviate from the heretofore cited rule.
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and
evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari, which is extra ordinem - beyond the ambit of appeal. In
certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to
examine and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the
probative value thereof. It does not include an inquiry as to the
correctness of the evaluation of evidence. Any error committed in
the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that
cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one
which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An
error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued
by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary
writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors of the
trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, or its
conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law.
It is not for this Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-
evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or substitute the findings of
fact of the court a quo.
Since the issues raised by the petitioner corporation in its Petition
for Certiorari are mainly factual, as it would necessitate an
examination and re-evaluation of the evidence on which the RTC of
Quezon City and the appellate court based their Decisions, the
Petition should not be given due course.
Settled is the rule that the proper remedy from an adverse decision
of the Court of Appeals is an appeal under Rule 45 and not a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. It should be emphasized that
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari will not lie when there are
other remedies available to the petitioner. Therefore, in availing
itself of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the petitioner
corporation resorted to a wrong mode of appeal.
While it is true that this Court, in accordance with the liberal spirit
which pervades the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, may
treat a Petition for Certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45,
more so if the same was filed within the reglementary period for
filing a Petition for Review, however, in the present case, this Court
finds no compelling reason to justify a liberal application of the
rules, as this Court did in the case of Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals. In the said case, this Court treated the Petition for
Certiorari filed by the petitioner therein as having been filed under
Rule 45, because said Petition was filed within the 15-day
reglementary period for filing a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Petitioner’s counsel therein received the Court of Appeals
Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration on 26 October
1993 and filed the Petition for Certiorari on 8 November 1993, which
was within the 15-day reglementary period for filing a Petition for
Review on Certiorari. It cannot therefore be claimed that the
Petition was used as a substitute for appeal after that remedy had
been lost through the fault of the petitioner. Conversely, such was
not the situation in the present case.
In the instant case, petitioner corporation received on 23 February
2006 the Resolution of the appellate court dated 14 February 2006
denying its Motion for Reconsideration. Upon receipt of the said
Resolution, the petitioner corporation had 15-days or until 10 March
2006 within which to file an appeal by way of Petition for Review
under Rule 45. Instead of doing so, they inexplicably allowed the
15-day period to lapse, and then on 6 April 2006 or on the 42nd day
from receipt of the Resolution denying their Motion for
Reconsideration, they filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of both the RTC of
Quezon City and the appellate court. Hence, this case cannot be
treated as an appeal under Rule 45, primarily because it was filed
way beyond the 15-day reglementary period within which to file the
Petition for Review. Petitioner corporation will not be allowed to use
the remedy of certiorari as a substitute for the lapsed or lost remedy
of appeal.26
Page 24 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER

Finally, even if this case will be treated as having been filed under
Rule 45, still it will be dismissed for utter lack of merit because this
case does not fall under the recognized exceptions wherein this
Court is authorized to resolve factual issues.
CHESTER DE JOYA v. JUDGE PLACIDO C. MARQUEZ
G.R. No. 162416 January 31, 2006
The report shows that Hao induced Dy to invest more than a
hundred million pesos in State Resources Development
Management Corporation, but when the latter’s investments fell
due, the checks issued by Hao in favor of Dy as payment for his
investments were dishonored for being drawn against insufficient
funds or that the account was closed
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the Court
to nullify and set aside the warrant of arrest issued by respondent
judge against petitioner in for violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of
the RPC in relation to P.D. No. 1689 (Syndicated estafa) Petitioner
asserts that respondent judge erred in finding the existence of
probable cause that justifies the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against him and his co-accused.
RULING:
petitioner is not entitled to seek relief from this Court nor from the
trial court as he continuously refuses to surrender and submit to
the court’s jurisdiction. Justice Florenz D. Regalado explains the
requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires
such jurisdiction, thus:
x x x Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court
acquires such jurisdiction:
a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is acquired by the
filing of the complaint, petition or initiatory pleading before the
court by the plaintiff or petitioner.
b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired by
the voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant or
respondent to the court or by coercive process issued by the court
to him, generally by the service of summons.
c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is conferred by law and,
unlike jurisdiction over the parties, cannot be conferred on the court
by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties.
d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is determined and
conferred by the pleadings filed in the case by the parties, or by
their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation, or, at times by
their implied consent as by the failure of a party to object to
evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings, as provided in
Sec. 5, Rule 10.
e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the
subject of the litigation). This is acquired by the actual or
constructive seizure by the court of the thing in question, thus
placing it in custodia legis, as in attachment or garnishment; or by
provision of law which recognizes in the court the power to deal
with the property or subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction,
as in land registration proceedings or suits involving civil status or
real property in the Philippines of a non-resident defendant.
Justice Regalado continues to explain:
In two cases, the court acquires jurisdiction to try the case, even if it
has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident
defendant, as long as it has jurisdiction over the res, as when the
action involves the personal status of the plaintiff or property in the
Philippines in which the defendant claims an interest. In such cases,
the service of summons by publication and notice to the defendant
is merely to comply with due process requirements. Under Sec. 133
of the Corporation Code, while a foreign corporation doing business
in the Philippines without a license cannot sue or intervene in any
action here, it may be sued or proceeded against before our courts
or administrative tribunals.
Again, there is no exceptional reason in this case to allow petitioner
to obtain relief from the courts without submitting to its jurisdiction.
On the contrary, his continued refusal to submit to the court’s
jurisdiction should give this Court more reason to uphold the action
of the respondent judge. The purpose of a warrant of arrest is to
place the accused under the custody of the law to hold him for trial
of the charges against him. His evasive stance shows an intent to
circumvent and frustrate the object of this legal process. It should be
remembered that he who invokes the court’s jurisdiction must first
submit to its jurisdiction.
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 189505 March 12, 2014
Court rendered a Decision affirming the 2 April 2009 Decision of the
Sandiganbayan and declaring all the assets of Arelma, S.A., an entity
created by the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, forfeited in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines. The anti-graft court found that the
totality of assets and properties acquired by the Marcos spouses
was manifestly and grossly disproportionate to their aggregate
salaries as public officials, and that petitioners were unable to
overturn the prima facie presumption of ill-gotten wealth, pursuant
to Section 2 of Republic Act No. (RA) 1379.
Contention of petitioner:
> Petitioner Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. acknowledges that "the subject
matter of the case (i.e. the power/authority to determine whether
an asset may be forfeited under R.A. 1379) is within the
(Sandiganbayan’s) jurisdiction." However, he objects to the graft
court’s purported lack of territorial jurisdiction on the theory that
forfeiture is an action in rem. He argues that the Sandiganbayan
must first acquire territorial jurisdiction over the Arelma proceeds
before the judgment may be enforced.
> That the Sandiganbayan does not possess territorial jurisdiction
over the res or the Arelma proceeds, which are held by Merrill Lynch
in the United States.
ISSUE: WON SB acquired jurisdiction over the res
RULING: YES
In any case, we find that the Sandiganbayan did not err in granting
the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, despite the fact that the
Arelma account and proceeds are held abroad. To rule otherwise
contravenes the intent of the forfeiture law, and indirectly privileges
violators who are able to hide public assets abroad: beyond the
reach of the courts and their recovery by the State. Forfeiture
proceedings, as we have already discussed exhaustively in our
Decision, are actions considered to be in the nature of proceedings
in rem or quasi in rem, such that:
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual
custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal
proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and
Page 25 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER
made effective. In the latter condition, the property, though at all
times within the potential power of the court, may not be in the
actual custody of said court.
The concept of potential jurisdiction over the res, advanced by
respondent, is not at all new. As early as Perkins v. Dizon, deciding a
suit against a non-resident, the Court held: "In order that the court
may exercise power over the res, it is not necessary that the court
should take actual custody of the property, potential custody
thereof being sufficient. There is potential custody when, from the
nature of the action brought, the power of the court over the
property is impliedly recognized by law."
ESPERANZA SUPAPO v. SPOUSES ROBERTO AND SUSAN DE JESUS
G.R. No. 198356, April 20, 2015
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint for accion publiciana against
Roberto and Susan de Jesus (Spouses de Jesus), Macario Bernardo
(Macario), and persons claiming rights under them (the
respondents), with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan
City.
Respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana was
filed in the wrong court
Issue: WON MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction;
RULING: YES. MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction
Accion Publiciana and the Jurisdiction of the MeTC
Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the
better right of possession of realty independent of title. It refers to
an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the
accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of
possession of the realty.
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo filed an action for the
recovery of possession of the subject lot but they based their better
right of possession on a claim of ownership.
This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion
publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. However,
where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass
upon the issue to determine who between the parties has the right
to possess the property.
This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of
ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the
issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership,
being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties
involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not
conclusive on the issue of ownership.36
Thus, while we will dissect the Spouses Supapo's claim of ownership
over the subject property, we will only do so to determine if they or
the respondents should have the right of possession.
Having thus determined that the dispute involves possession over a
real property, we now resolve which court has the jurisdiction to
hear the case.
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,37 the jurisdiction of the RTC over
actions involving title to or possession of real property is plenary.
RA No. 7691,39 however, divested the RTC of a portion of its
jurisdiction and granted the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts the exclusive and
original jurisdiction to hear actions where the assessed value of the
property does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), or
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), if the property is located in
Metro Manila.
Section 1 of RA No. 7691 states:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known
as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," is hereby amended to
read as follows:
Section. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or,
for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 3 of the same law provides:
Section. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Section. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. -
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title
to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs x x x. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In view of these amendments, jurisdiction over actions involving
title to or possession of real property is now determined by its
assessed value. The assessed value of real property is its fair
market value multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous
to taxable value.
In Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals we explained:
Does the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of
possession regardless of the value of the property involved?
The answer is no. The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial
of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, as affirmed by the CA — that all
cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the
regional trial courts regardless of the value of the property — no
longer holds true. As tilings now stand, a distinction must be made
between those properties the assessed value of which is below
P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within.
In this regard, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the
real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to
determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. This is
required because the nature of the action and the court with original
and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the
material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by
the plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action is filed,
irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of
the claims asserted therein.
Page 26 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER

In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed
value of the subject lot, located in Metro Manila, is P39,980.00.
This is proven by the tax declaration issued by the Office of the City
Assessor of Caloocan. The respondents do not deny the genuineness
and authenticity of this tax declaration.
Given that the Spouses Supapo duly complied with the jurisdictional
requirements, we hold that the MeTC of Caloocan properly acquired
jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana.
A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC v. EMMA MONDEJAR
G.R. No. 200804 January 22, 2014
>petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money under the Rule of
Procedure for Small Claims Cases before the MTCC, seeking to
collect from respondent the amount of ₱23,111.71 which
represented her unpaid water bills
> MTCC: ruled in favor of respondent
>petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court before the RTC
> RTC dismissed the petition finding that the said petition was only
filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of small claims cases
as provided under Section 2322 of the Rule of Procedure on Small
Claims Cases
Issue: WON RTC erred in dismissing petitioner’s recourse under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the propriety of the MTCC
Decision in the subject small claims case.
RULING: YES. RTC erred in dismissing the said petition on the
ground that it was an improper remedy
Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states
that:
SEC. 23. Decision. — After the hearing, the court shall render its
decision on the same day, based on the facts established by the
evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision shall immediately be entered
by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy
thereof forthwith served on the parties.
The decision shall be final and unappealable.
Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under
the above-stated rule, the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the
prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its execution.25
Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims cases,
similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an available
remedy,26 does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This
general rule has been enunciated in the case of Okada v. Security
Pacific Assurance Corporation,27 wherein it was held that:
In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that "the
extraordinary writ of certiorari is always available where there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law." In Jaca v. Davao Lumber Co., the Court
ruled:
x x x Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that
the special civil action of certiorari may only be invoked when "there
is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
course of law," this rule is not without exception. The availability of
the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground
to prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari where appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally
beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy – not the mere
absence – of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of
justice without the writ that usually determines the propriety of
certiorari.
This ruling was reiterated in Conti v. Court of Appeals:
Truly, an essential requisite for the availability of the extraordinary
remedies under the Rules is an absence of an appeal nor any "plain,
speedy and adequate remedy" in the ordinary course of law, one
which has been so defined as a "remedy which (would) equally (be)
beneficial, speedy and sufficient not merely a remedy which at some
time in the future will bring about a revival of the judgment x x x
complained of in the certiorari proceeding, but a remedy which will
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that
judgment and the acts of the inferior court or tribunal" concerned. x
x x (Emphasis supplied)
In this relation, it may not be amiss to placate the RTC’s
apprehension that respondent’s recourse before it (was only filed to
circumvent the non-appealable nature of [small claims cases],
because it asks [the court] to supplant the decision of the lower
[c]ourt with another decision directing the private respondent to
pay the petitioner a bigger sum than what has been awarded."28
Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original
action29 designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of
judgment. Owing to its nature, it is therefore incumbent upon
petitioner to establish that jurisdictional errors tainted the MTCC
Decision. The RTC, in turn, could either grant or dismiss the petition
based on an evaluation of whether or not the MTCC gravely abused
its discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding
evidence that is material to the controversy.30
In view of the foregoing, the Court thus finds that petitioner
correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari to assail the propriety of
the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case, contrary to the
RTC’s ruling.
Likewise, the Court finds that petitioner filed the said petition before
the proper forum (i.e., the RTC).1âwphi1 To be sure, the Court, the
Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari.31 Such concurrence of
jurisdiction, however, does not give a party unbridled freedom to
choose the venue of his action lest he ran afoul of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Instead, a becoming regard for judicial hierarchy
dictates that petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari against
first level courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals, before resort
may be had before the Court.32 This procedure is also in
consonance with Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.33
Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,34
certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed before
their corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied
with when it instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC
which, as previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same.
FIORELLO R. JOSE V. ROBERTO ALFUERTO ET AL
G.R. No. 169380 November 26, 2012
In his amended complaint, the petitioner presents the following
allegations in support of his unlawful detainer complaint:
Page 27 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER
3. plaintiff leased from lessor, Mr. Rudy Chuasing, that parcel of lot
owned and registered in the lessor’s name, covering the area
occupied by the defendants.
6. Plaintiff’s lessor had acquired the subject property
7. Defendants, having been fully aware of their unlawful occupancy
of the subject lot, have defiantly erected their houses thereat
without benefit of any contract or law whatsoever, much less any
building permit as sanctioned by law, but by mere tolerance of its
true, lawful and registered owner, plaintiff’s lessor.
8. By reason of defendants’ continued unlawful occupancy of the
subject premises, plaintiff referred the matter to his lawyer who
immediately sent a formal demand upon each of the defendants to
vacate the premises.
9. Despite notice, however, defendants failed and refused and
continues to fail and refuse to vacate the premises without valid or
legal justification.
> MeTC held that the respondents had no right to possess the land
and that their occupation was merely by the owner’s tolerance
> RTC affirmed
> CA reversed the RTC and MeTC decisions. It ruled that the
respondents’ possession of the land was not by the petitioner or his
lessor’s tolerance. It emphasized that ejectment cases are summary
proceedings where the only issue to be resolved is who has a
better right to the physical possession of a property. The
petitioner’s claim, on the other hand, is based on an accion
publiciana: he asserts his right as a possessor by virtue of a contract
of lease he contracted after the respondents had occupied the land
Issue: WON an action for unlawful detainer is the proper remedy.
RULING: NO. Unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy for the
present case
The allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the
action and the jurisdiction of the court. The complaint must
specifically allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer. In the
absence of these allegations of facts, an action for unlawful detainer
is not the proper remedy and the municipal trial court or the MeTC
does not have jurisdiction over the case.26
The petitioner’s allegations in the amended complaint (SEE FACTS
FOR ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT) run counter to the
requirements for unlawful detainer. In an unlawful detainer action,
the possession of the defendant was originally legal and his
possession was permitted by the owner through an express or
implied contract.
In this case, paragraph makes it clear that the respondents’
occupancy was unlawful from the start and was bereft of contractual
or legal basis. In an unlawful detainer case, the defendant’s
possession becomes illegal only upon the plaintiff’s demand for the
defendant to vacate the property and the defendant’s subsequent
refusal. In the present case, paragraph 8 characterizes the
defendant’s occupancy as unlawful even before the formal demand
letters were written by the petitioner’s counsel. Under these
allegations, the unlawful withholding of possession should not be
based on the date the demand letters were sent, as the alleged
unlawful act had taken place at an earlier unspecified date.
The petitioner nevertheless insists that he properly alleged that the
respondents occupied the premises by mere tolerance of the owner.
No allegation in the complaint nor any supporting evidence on
record, however, shows when the respondents entered the property
or who had granted them permission to enter. Without these
allegations and evidence, the bare claim regarding "tolerance"
cannot be upheld.
In Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al., the Court cited Prof. Arturo M.
Tolentino’s definition and characterizes "tolerance" in the following
manner:
Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely tolerated are
"those which by reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of
property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the
property; they are generally those particular services or benefits
which one’s property can give to another without material injury or
prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or
courtesy." He adds that: "they are acts of little disturbances which a
person, in the interest of neighborliness or friendly relations,
permits others to do on his property, such as passing over the land,
tying a horse therein, or getting some water from a well." And,
Tolentino continues, even though "this is continued for a long time,
no right will be acquired by prescription." Further expounding on the
concept, Tolentino writes: "There is tacit consent of the possessor to
the acts which are merely tolerated. Thus, not every case of
knowledge and silence on the part of the possessor can be
considered mere tolerance. By virtue of tolerance that is considered
as an authorization, permission or license, acts of possession are
realized or performed. The question reduces itself to the existence
or non-existence of the permission. [citations omitted; italics
supplied]
The Court has consistently adopted this position: tolerance or
permission must have been present at the beginning of possession;
if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful
detainer would not be the proper remedy and should be dismissed.
It is not the first time that this Court adjudged contradictory
statements in a complaint for unlawful detainer as a basis for
dismissal. In Unida v. Heirs of Urban, the claim that the defendant’s
possession was merely tolerated was contradicted by the
complainant’s allegation that the entry to the subject property was
unlawful from the very beginning. The Court then ruled that the
unlawful detainer action should fail.
The contradictory statements in the complaint are further deemed
suspicious when a complaint is silent regarding the factual
circumstances surrounding the alleged tolerance. In Ten Forty Realty
Corporation v. Cruz,31 the complaint simply stated that: "(1)
defendant immediately occupied the subject property after its sale
to her, an action merely tolerated by the plaintiff; and (2) the
respondent’s allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by
mere tolerance." The Court expressed its qualms over these
averments of fact as they did not contain anything substantiating
the claim that the plaintiff tolerated or permitted the occupation of
the property by the defendant:
These allegations contradict, rather than support, plaintiff’s theory
that its cause of action is for unlawful detainer. First, these
arguments advance the view that defendant’s occupation of the
property was unlawful at its inception. Second, they counter the
essential requirement in unlawful detainer cases that plaintiff’s
supposed act of sufferance or tolerance must be present right from
the start of a possession that is later sought to be recovered.
Page 28 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER
As the bare allegation of plaintiff’s tolerance of defendant’s
occupation of the premises has not been proven, the possession
should be deemed illegal from the beginning. Thus, the CA correctly
ruled that the ejectment case should have been for forcible entry —
an action that had already prescribed, however, when the Complaint
was filed on May 12, 1999. The prescriptive period of one year for
forcible entry cases is reckoned from the date of defendant’s actual
entry into the land, which in this case was on April 24, 1998.32
Similarly, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, the Court considered the
owner’s lack of knowledge of the defendant’s entry of the land to be
inconsistent with the allegation that there had been tolerance.
In Padre v. Malabanan,34 the Court not only required allegations
regarding the grant of permission, but proof as well. It noted that
the plaintiffs alleged the existence of tolerance, but ordered the
dismissal of the unlawful detainer case because the evidence was
"totally wanting as to when and under what circumstances xxx the
alleged tolerance came about." It stated that:
Judging from the respondent’s Answer, the petitioners were never
at all in physical possession of the premises from the time he started
occupying it and continuously up to the present. For sure, the
petitioners merely derived their alleged prior physical possession
only on the basis of their Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), arguing
that the issuance of said title presupposes their having been in
possession of the property at one time or another.35
Thus, the complainants in unlawful detainer cases cannot simply
anchor their claims on the validity of the owner’s title. Possession de
facto must also be proved.
As early as the 1960s, in Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al.,36 we already
ruled that a complaint which fails to positively aver any overt act on
the plaintiff’s part indicative of permission to occupy the land, or any
showing of such fact during the trial is fatal for a case for unlawful
detainer. As the Court then explained, a case for unlawful detainer
alleging tolerance must definitely establish its existence from the
start of possession; otherwise, a case for forcible entry can mask
itself as an action for unlawful detainer and permit it to be filed
beyond the required one-year prescription period from the time of
forcible entry:
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word
"tolerance" confirms our view heretofore expressed that such
tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought
to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful
detainer — not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would
espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible
entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor.
Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress — in the
inferior court — provided for in the rules. If one year from the
forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy
ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived
his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second. If a forcible entry
action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of
years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry
can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in
physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit
in the inferior court — upon plea of tolerance to prevent
prescription to set in — and summarily throw him out of the land.
Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the
postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer
are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to the suit is
but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action.37 (italics
supplied)
Given these rulings, it would be equally dangerous for us to deprive
the respondents of possession over a property that they have held
for at least eight years before the case was filed in 1999, by means
of a summary proceeding, simply because the petitioner used the
word "tolerance" without sufficient allegations or evidence to
support it
The Court cannot treat an ejectment case as an accion publiciana
or accion reivindicatoria.
The petitioner argues that assuming this case should have been filed
as an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, this Court should
still resolve the case, as requiring him to properly refile the case
serves no other ends than to comply with technicalities.45
The Court cannot simply take the evidence presented before the
MeTC in an ejectment case and decide it as an accion publiciana or
accion reivindicatoria. These cases are not interchangeable and their
differences constitute far more than mere technicalities.
In Regis, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,46 we ruled that an action for
forcible entry cannot be treated as an accion publiciana and
summarized the reasons therefor. We find these same reasons also
applicable to an unlawful detainer case which bears the same
relevant characteristics:
On the issue of whether or not an action for forcible entry can be
treated as accion publiciana, we rule in the negative. Forcible entry
is distinct from accion publiciana. First, forcible entry should be filed
within one year from the unlawful dispossession of the real
property, while accion publiciana is filed a year after the unlawful
dispossession of the real property. Second, forcible entry is
concerned with the issue of the right to the physical possession of
the real property; in accion publiciana, what is subject of litigation is
the better right to possession over the real property. Third, an action
for forcible entry is filed in the municipal trial court and is a
summary action, while accion publiciana is a plenary action in the
RTC.
The cause of action in ejectment is different from that in an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. An ejectment suit is brought
before the proper inferior court to recover physical possession only
or possession de facto, not possession de jure. Unlawful detainer
and forcible entry cases are not processes to determine actual title
to property. Any ruling by the MeTC on the issue of ownership is
made only to resolve the issue of possession, and is therefore
inconclusive.47 Because they only resolve issues of possession de
facto, ejectment actions are summary in nature, while accion
publiciana (for the recovery of possession) and accion reivindicatoria
(for the recovery of ownership) are plenary actions.48 The purpose
of allowing actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer to be
decided in summary proceedings is to provide for a peaceful, speedy
and expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of
property from unjustly taking and continuing his possession during
the long period it would take to properly resolve the issue of
possession de jure or ownership, thereby ensuring the maintenance
of peace and order in the community; otherwise, the party illegally
deprived of possession might take the law in his hands and seize the
property by force and violence.49 An ejectment case cannot be a
substitute for a full-blown trial for the purpose of determining rights
of possession or ownership. Citing Mediran v. Villanueva, the Court
Page 29 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER
in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals51 describes in detail how these two
remedies should be used:
In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer the
purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual
possession; and in case of controverted right, it requires the parties
to preserve the status quo until one or the other of them sees fit to
invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the
question of ownership. It is obviously just that the person who has
first acquired possession should remain in possession pending the
decision; and the parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage
in a petty warfare over the possession of the property which is the
subject of dispute. To permit this would be highly dangerous to
individual security and disturbing to social order.1âwphi1 Therefore,
where a person supposes himself to be the owner of a piece of
property and desires to vindicate his ownership against the party
actually in possession, it is incumbent upon him to institute an
action to this end in a court of competent jurisdiction; and he cannot
be permitted, by invading the property and excluding the actual
possessor, to place upon the latter the burden of instituting an
action to try the property right. [italics supplied]
Thus, if we allow parties to file ejectment cases and later consider
them as an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, we would
encourage parties to simply file ejectment cases instead of plenary
actions. Courts would then decide in summary proceedings cases
which the rules intend to be resolved through full-blown trials.
Because these "summary" proceedings will have to tackle
complicated issues requiring extensive proof, they would no longer
be expeditious and would no longer serve the purpose for which
they were created. Indeed, we cannot see how the resulting
congestion of cases, the hastily and incorrectly decided cases, and
the utter lack of system would assist the courts in protecting and
preserving property rights.
NAPOLEON GEGARE v. CA AND ARMIE ELMA
G.R. No. 83907. September 13, 1989
> Both petitioner and private respondent filed an application for this
lot in the Board of Liquidators (Board)
>A Resolution was passed by the Board disposing of the lot in favor
of petitioner.
>Private respondent protested against the application of petitioner.
>After hearings, Mr. Garlit submitted a report to the Manila office
recommending division of the lot to the parties.
> Board passed Resolution approving said recommendation by
dividing the lot equally between the parties
>petitioner filed an action for "Annulment and Cancellation of
Partition of Lot 5989, Ts-217, situated at Dadiangas, General Santos
City and Annulment of Resolutions No. 272 and 185 and/or to
Declare them Null and Void" against private respondent and the
Board.
>CA dismissed the case for failure of the plaintiff to comply with the
provisions of P.D. no. 1508 before filing his complaint in court
Contention of petitioner:
petitioner argues that it was erroneous for the appellate court to
hold that the case should be dismissed by the lower court for failure
to comply with a provision of Presidential Decree No. 1508 before
filing the complaint. He alleges that this rule is not applicable in said
case for one of the parties therein is the government or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof which is excepted from this
requirement under Section 2 of said law.
Issue: WON PD 1508 should be applied
RULING: YES.
True it is that the Board is a government instrumentality but the
petitioner and private respondent who are also contending parties
in the case are residents of the same barangay so Section 6 of
Presidential Decree No. 1508 should apply to them as it provides---
Section 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. No
complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter
within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof
shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office
for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties
before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or
the Pangkat Secretary attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman,
or unless the settlement has been repudiated.
The purpose of this confrontation is to enable the parties to settle
their differences amicably. If the other only contending party is the
government or its instrumentality or subdivision the case falls within
the exception but when it is only one of the contending parties, a
confrontation should still be undertaken among the other parties.
CLAUDIA RIVERA SANCHEZ v. HONORABLE MARIANO C. TUPAS
G.R. No. 76690 February 29, 1988
Herein petitioner and private respondent are both occupants of a
public agricultural land.
Petitioner claims that the area of 450 square meters, more or less,
has been in her possession since 1947, long before private
respondent came in and occupied another portion of the lot.
On the other hand, private respondent claims that the area being
claimed by petitioner is a part of his ¾ of a hectare parcel, the right
to which he acquired from its former possessor and owner of the
improvements thereon. Sometime in 1966, out of charity and upon
their agreement that petitioner will vacate the premises upon
demand, he granted petitioner's request to build her house inside
the land occupied by him.
>private respondent filed an ejectment case against petitioner.
>the City Court of Davao rendered a "Judgment by Compromise."
>petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Davao a petition to
annul the aforesaid judgment of the City Court of Davao
>respondent Judge sustained private respondent's Motion to
Dismiss by dismissing the case for lack of cause of action or
prematurity for not having passed the Barangay Court
ISSUE: WON respondent Judge erred in dismissing petitioner's
action for annulment of judgment simply because said action did
not pass the Barangay Court.
RULING: YES. The respondent judge erred.
Presidential Decree No. 1508 requires that the parties who actually
reside in the same city or municipality should bring their controversy
first to the Barangay Court for possible amicable settlement before
filing a complaint in court. This requirement is compulsory (as ruled
in the cited case of Morato vs. Go, 125 SCRA 444), [1983] and non-
compliance of the same could affect the sufficiency of the cause of
action and make the complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the
ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity. It must be borne in
mind that the purpose of the conciliation process at the barangay
level is to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in court in order
to decongest the clogged dockets and in the process enhance the
quality of justice dispensed by courts (Morato, vs. Go, supra).
Page 30 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER

In the instant case, it will be noted that the ejectment case in the
City Court of Davao, Civil Case No. 17-10-D, was filed on September
18, 1980, when Presidential Decree No. 1508 was already enforced.
However, the records do not show that there was an opposition to
the filing of the said ejectment case on the ground that the dispute
had not been submitted to the Barangay Court for possible amicable
settlement under P.D. 1508. The only logical conclusion therefore is
that either such requirement had already been complied with or had
been waived. Under either circumstance, there appears to be no
reason, much less a requirement that this case be subjected to the
provisions of P.D. 1508. In fact, the present controversy is an action
for annulment of a compromise judgment which as a general rule is
immediately executor
PETRA VDA. DE BORROMEO v. POGOY
G.R. No. L-63277. November 29, 1983
>The intestate estate of the late Vito Borromeo is the owner of a
building bearing the deceased’s name. Said building has been leased
and occupied by petitioner Petra Vda. de Borromeo.
> Atty. Ricardo Reyes, administrator of the estate and a resident of
Cebu City, served upon petitioner a letter demanding that she pay
the overdue rentals, and thereafter to vacate the premises.
>As petitioner failed to do so, Atty. Reyes instituted an ejectment
case against the former
>petitioner moved to dismiss the case, advancing, among others, the
want of jurisdiction of the trial court. Pointing out that the parties
are residents of the same city, as alleged in the complaint, petitioner
contended that the court could not exercise jurisdiction over the
case for failure of respondent Atty. Reyes to refer the dispute to the
Barangay Court, as required by PD No. 1508, otherwise known as
Katarungang Pambarangay Law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss.
"The Clerk of Court when this case was filed accepted for filing same.
That from the acceptance from (sic) filing, with the plaintiff having
paid the docket fee to show that the case was docketed in the civil
division of this court could be considered as meeting the
requirement or precondition for were it not so, the Clerk of Court
would not have accepted the filing of the case especially that there
is a standing circular from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
without even mentioning the Letter of Instruction of the President
of the Philippines that civil cases and criminal cases with certain
exceptions must not be filed without passing the barangay court."
In both his comment and memorandum, private respondent
admitted not having availed himself of the barangay conciliation
process, but justified such omission by citing paragraph 4, section 6
of PD 1508 which allows the direct filing of an action in court where
the same may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations, as
applying to the case at bar.
Issue: WON case should be dismissed for not complying with PD
1508
RULING: NO
The excuse advanced by private respondent is unsatisfactory. Under
Article 1147 of the Civil Code, the period for filing actions for forcible
entry and detainer is one year, 1 and this period is counted from
demand to vacate the premises. 2
In the case at bar, the letter-demand was dated August 28, 1982,
while the complaint for ejectment was filed in court on September
16, 1982. Between these two dates, less than a month had elapsed,
thereby leaving at least eleven (11) full months of the prescriptive
period provided for in Article 1147 of the Civil Code. Under the
procedure outlined in Section 4 of PD 1508, 3 the time needed for
the conciliation proceeding before the Barangay Chairman and the
Pangkat should take no more than 60 days. Giving private
respondent nine (9) months — ample time indeed — within which
to bring his case before the proper court should conciliation efforts
fail. Thus, it cannot be truthfully asserted, as private respondent
would want Us to believe, that his case would be barred by the
Statute of Limitations if he had to course his action to the Barangay
Lupon.
With certain exceptions, PD 1508 makes the conciliation process at
the Barangay level a condition precedent for filing of actions in those
instances where said law applies. For this reason, Circular No. 22
addressed to "ALL JUDGES OF THE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE,
CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURTS, JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS
COURT, COURTS OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, CITY COURTS,
MUNICIPAL COURTS AND THEIR CLERKS OF COURT" was issued by
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando on November 9, 1979. Said
Circular reads:
"Effective upon your receipt of the certification by the Minister of
Local Government and Community Development that all the
barangays within your respective jurisdictions have organized their
Lupons provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise
known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in implementation of
the barangay system of settlement of disputes, you are hereby
directed to desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions or
proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said
Lupons."cralaw virtua1aw library
While respondent acknowledged said Circular in his order of
December 14, 1982, he nevertheless chose to overlook the failure of
the complaint in Civil Case No. R-23915 to allege compliance with
the requirement of PD 1508. Neither did he cite any circumstance as
would place the suit outside the operation of said law. Instead, he
insisted on relying upon the pro tanto presumption of regularity in
the performance by the clerk of court of his official duty, which to
Our mind has been sufficiently overcome by the disclosure by the
Clerk of Court that there was no certification to file action from the
Lupon or Pangkat secretary attached to the complaint.
Be that as it may, the instant petition should be dismissed. Under
Section 4(a) of PD No. 1508, referral of a dispute to the Barangay
Lupon is required only where the parties thereto are "individuals."
An "individual" means "a single human being as contrasted with a
social group or institution." Obviously, the law applies only to cases
involving natural persons, and not where any of the parties is a
juridical person such as a corporation, partnership, corporation sole,
testate or intestate, estate, etc.
In Civil Case No. R-23915, plaintiff Ricardo Reyes is a mere nominal
party who is suing in behalf of the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo.
While it is true that Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the
administrator of an estate to sue or be sued without joining the
party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended, it is
indisputable that the real party in interest in Civil Case No. R-23915
is the intestate estate under administration. Since the said estate is
a juridical person 6 plaintiff administrator may file the complaint
directly in court, without the same being coursed to the Barangay
Lupon for arbitration.
Page 31 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER

ELMER PEREGRINA V. HON. DOMINGO D. PANIS
G.R. No. L-56011 October 31, 1984
The Complaint filed by the SPOUSES Procopio and Carmelita Sanchez
against PETITIONERS Elmer, Adelaida and Cecilia, all surnamed
Peregrina, is a civil action for damages for alleged disrespect for the
dignity, privacy and peace of mind of the SPOUSES under Article 26
of the Civil Code, and for alleged defamation under Article 33 of the
same Code.
Admittedly, the parties are actual residents of the same barangay in
Olongapo City. In fact, they are neighbors.
>No conciliation proceedings were filed before the Lupon.
PETITIONERS, as defendants, moved for the dismissal of the
Complaint. Before firing an Opposition, the SPOUSES applied for a
Writ of Preliminary Attachment. Thereafter, the SPOUSES presented
their Opposition claiming that, under Section 6(3) of P.D. No. 1508,
the parties may go directly to the Courts if the action is coupled with
a provisional remedy such as preliminary attachment.
ISSUE: WON case should be dimissed for not complying with PD
1508
RULING: YES
Section 3 of P.D. No. 1508 specifically provides:
Disputes between or among persons actually respectively in the
same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the
Lupon of said barangay. ...
It is also mandated by Section 6 of the same law:
SECTION 6. Conciliation, pre-condition to filing of complaint. — No
complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter
within the authority of the Lupon as provided. in Section 2 hereof
shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office
for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties
before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or
the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman,
or unless the settlement has been repudiated. ...
Thus, Morata vs. Go, 125 SCRA 444 (1,,983), and Vda. de Borromeo
vs. Pogoy, 126 SCRA 217 (1983) have held that P.D. No. 1508 makes
the conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition precedent
for the filing of a complaint in Court. Non-compliance with that
condition precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's
cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on
the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity. The condition
is analogous to exhaustion of administrative remedies, or the lack of
earnest efforts to compromise suits between family members,
lacking which the case can be dismissed.
The parties herein fall squarely within the ambit of P.D. No. 1508.
They are actual residents in the same barangay and their dispute
does not fall under any of the excepted cases.
It will have to be held, therefore, that respondent Judge erred in
reconsidering his previous Order of dismissal on the ground that the
provisional remedy of attachment was seasonably filed. Not only
was the application for that remedy merely an afterthought to
circumvent the law, but also, fundamentally, a Writ of Attachment is
not available in a suit for damages where the amount, including
moral damages, is contingent or unliquidated. Prior referral to the
Lupon for conciliation proceedings, therefore, was indubitably called
for.
LIBRADA M. AQUINO V. ERNEST S. AURE
G.R. No. 153567 February 18, 2008
>Aure and E. Aure Lending filed a Complaint for ejectment against
Aquino before the MeTC.
>In their Complaint, Aure and Aure Lending alleged that they
acquired the subject property from Aquino and her husband Manuel
(spouses Aquino) by virtue of a Deed of Sale
>Aure claimed that after the spouses Aquino received substantial
consideration for the sale of the subject property, they refused to
vacate the same
MeTC: in favor of Aquino and dismissed the Complaint for non-
compliance with the barangay conciliation process, among other
grounds. The MeTC observed that Aure and Aquino are residents of
the same barangay but there is no showing that any attempt has
been made to settle the case amicably at the barangay level.
Issue: WON non-compliance with the barangay conciliation
proceedings is a jurisdictional defect that warrants the dismissal of
the complaint.
RULING: NO.
It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply with
the requirement of Section 412 of the Local Government Code on
barangay conciliation (previously contained in Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 1508) is much the same effect produced by
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies -- the complaint
becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; and the controversy
there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The complaint
becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, the
conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, so that non-
compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court
has otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the person
of the defendant.23
As enunciated in the landmark case of Royales v. Intermediate
Appellate Court:
Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed
by P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of
action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of
lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the same would not
prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power
of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants, as in
this case, failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their
answer and even during the entire proceedings a quo.
While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from
exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking exception
thereto, they instead invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an
answer and seeking affirmative relief from it. What is more, they
participated in the trial of the case by cross-examining respondent
Planas. Upon this premise, petitioners cannot now be allowed
belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the
jurisdiction of the court to which they had submitted themselves
voluntarily. x x x
In the case at bar, we similarly find that Aquino cannot be allowed to
attack the jurisdiction of the MeTC over Civil Case No. 17450 after
having submitted herself voluntarily thereto. We have scrupulously
examined Aquino’s Answer before the MeTC in Civil Case No. 17450
Page 32 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER
and there is utter lack of any objection on her part to any deficiency
in the complaint which could oust the MeTC of its jurisdcition.
CRISANTA ALCARAZ MIGUEL v. JERRY D. MONTANEZ
G.R. No. 191336 January 25, 2012
respondent Montanez secured a loan payable in 1 yearfrom the
petitioner. The respondent gave as collateral therefor his house
Due to the respondent’s failure to pay the loan, the petitioner filed a
complaint against the respondent before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa. The parties entered into a Kasunduang Pag-aayos
wherein the respondent agreed to pay his loan in installments in the
amount ₱2,000.00 per month, and in the event the house and lot
given as collateral is sold, the respondent would settle the balance
of the loan in full. However, the respondent still failed to pay, the
Lupong Tagapamayapa issued a certification to file action in court in
favor of the petitioner.
the petitioner filed before MeTC of Makati City for Collection of Sum
of Money
>MeTC: in favor of plaintiff
>RTC affirmed
>CA: since the parties entered into a Kasunduang Pag-aayos before
the Lupon ng Barangay, such settlement has the force and effect of a
court judgment, which may be enforced by execution within six (6)
months from the date of settlement by the Lupon ng Barangay, or
by court action after the lapse of such time. Considering that more
than six (6) months had elapsed from the date of settlement, the CA
ruled that the remedy of the petitioner was to file an action for the
execution of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos in court and not for
collection of sum of money.
The petitioner contends that the CA erred in ruling that she should
have followed the procedure for enforcement of the amicable
settlement as provided in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay
Law, instead of filing a collection case. The petitioner points out that
the cause of action did not arise from the Kasunduang Pag-aayos but
on the respondent’s breach of the original loan agreement
ISSUE: WON CA should have decided the case on the merits rather
than remand the case for the enforcement of the Kasunduang Pag-
aayos
RULING: YES
This Court agrees with the petitioner.
It is true that an amicable settlement reached at the barangay
conciliation proceedings, like the Kasunduang Pag-aayos in this case,
is binding between the contracting parties and, upon its perfection,
is immediately executory insofar as it is not contrary to law, good
morals, good customs, public order and public policy.16 This is in
accord with the broad precept of Article 2037 of the Civil Code, viz:
A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res
judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a
judicial compromise.
Being a by-product of mutual concessions and good faith of the
parties, an amicable settlement has the force and effect of res
judicata even if not judicially approved.17 It transcends being a mere
contract binding only upon the parties thereto, and is akin to a
judgment that is subject to execution in accordance with the
Rules.18 Thus, under Section 417 of the Local Government Code,19
such amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by
execution by the Barangay Lupon within six (6) months from the
date of settlement, or by filing an action to enforce such settlement
in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond the six-month
period.
Under the first remedy, the proceedings are covered by the Local
Government Code and the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing
Rules and Regulations. The Punong Barangay is called upon during
the hearing to determine solely the fact of non-compliance of the
terms of the settlement and to give the defaulting party another
chance at voluntarily complying with his obligation under the
settlement. Under the second remedy, the proceedings are
governed by the Rules of Court, as amended. The cause of action is
the amicable settlement itself, which, by operation of law, has the
force and effect of a final judgment.20
It must be emphasized, however, that enforcement by execution of
the amicable settlement, either under the first or the second
remedy, is only applicable if the contracting parties have not
repudiated such settlement within ten (10) days from the date
thereof in accordance with Section 416 of the Local Government
Code. If the amicable settlement is repudiated by one party, either
expressly or impliedly, the other party has two options, namely, to
enforce the compromise in accordance with the Local Government
Code or Rules of Court as the case may be, or to consider it
rescinded and insist upon his original demand. This is in accord with
Article 2041 of the Civil Code, which qualifies the broad application
of Article 2037, viz:
If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the
other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as
rescinded and insist upon his original demand.
In the case of Leonor v. Sycip,21 the Supreme Court (SC) had the
occasion to explain this provision of law. It ruled that Article 2041
does not require an action for rescission, and the aggrieved party, by
the breach of compromise agreement, may just consider it already
rescinded, to wit:
It is worthy of notice, in this connection, that, unlike Article 2039 of
the same Code, which speaks of "a cause of annulment or rescission
of the compromise" and provides that "the compromise may be
annulled or rescinded" for the cause therein specified, thus
suggesting an action for annulment or rescission, said Article 2041
confers upon the party concerned, not a "cause" for rescission, or
the right to "demand" the rescission of a compromise, but the
authority, not only to "regard it as rescinded", but, also, to "insist
upon his original demand". The language of this Article 2041,
particularly when contrasted with that of Article 2039, denotes that
no action for rescission is required in said Article 2041, and that the
party aggrieved by the breach of a compromise agreement may, if
he chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original
demand, as if there had never been any compromise agreement,
without bringing an action for rescission thereof. He need not seek a
judicial declaration of rescission, for he may "regard" the
compromise agreement already "rescinded".22 (emphasis supplied)
As so well stated in the case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals,23 a
party's non-compliance with the amicable settlement paved the way
for the application of Article 2041 under which the other party may
either enforce the compromise, following the procedure laid out in
the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or consider it as
rescinded and insist upon his original demand. To quote:
Page 33 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER
In the case at bar, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law The CA took off on the wrong premise that enforcement of the
provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement of an amicable Kasunduang Pag-aayos is the proper remedy, and therefore erred in
settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by the Punong Barangay which is its conclusion that the case should be remanded to the trial court.
quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere motion of the party The fact that the petitioner opted to rescind the Kasunduang Pag-
entitled thereto; and (b) an action in regular form, which remedy is aayos means that she is insisting upon the undertaking of the
judicial. However, the mode of enforcement does not rule out the respondent under the original loan contract. Thus, the CA should
right of rescission under Art. 2041 of the Civil Code. The availability have decided the case on the merits, as an appeal before it, and not
of the right of rescission is apparent from the wording of Sec. 417 prolong the determination of the issues by remanding it to the trial
itself which provides that the amicable settlement "may" be court. Pertinently, evidence abounds that the respondent has failed
enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from its to comply with his loan obligation. In fact, the Kasunduang Pag-
date or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if aayos is the well nigh incontrovertible proof of the respondent’s
beyond that period. The use of the word "may" clearly makes the indebtedness with the petitioner as it was executed precisely to give
procedure provided in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law the respondent a second chance to make good on his undertaking.
directory or merely optional in nature. And since the respondent still reneged in paying his indebtedness,
justice demands that he must be held answerable therefor.
Thus, although the "Kasunduan" executed by petitioner and
respondent before the Office of the Barangay Captain had the force
and effect of a final judgment of a court, petitioner's non-
compliance paved the way for the application of Art. 2041 under
which respondent may either enforce the compromise, following
the procedure laid out in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay
Law, or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.
Respondent chose the latter option when he instituted Civil Case No.
5139-V-97 for recovery of unrealized profits and reimbursement of
advance rentals, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
Respondent was not limited to claiming ₱150,000.00 because
although he agreed to the amount in the "Kasunduan," it is
axiomatic that a compromise settlement is not an admission of
liability but merely a recognition that there is a dispute and an
impending litigation which the parties hope to prevent by making
reciprocal concessions, adjusting their respective positions in the
hope of gaining balanced by the danger of losing. Under the
"Kasunduan," respondent was only required to execute a waiver of
all possible claims arising from the lease contract if petitioner fully
complies with his obligations thereunder. It is undisputed that
herein petitioner did not.24 (emphasis supplied and citations
omitted)

In the instant case, the respondent did not comply with the terms
and conditions of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos. Such non-compliance
may be construed as repudiation because it denotes that the
respondent did not intend to be bound by the terms thereof,
thereby negating the very purpose for which it was executed.
Perforce, the petitioner has the option either to enforce the
Kasunduang Pag-aayos, or to regard it as rescinded and insist upon
his original demand, in accordance with the provision of Article 2041
of the Civil Code. Having instituted an action for collection of sum of
money, the petitioner obviously chose to rescind the Kasunduang
Pag-aayos. As such, it is error on the part of the CA to rule that
enforcement by execution of said agreement is the appropriate
remedy under the circumstances.

Considering that the Kasunduang Pag-aayos is deemed rescinded by

the non-compliance of the respondent of the terms thereof,
remanding the case to the trial court for the enforcement of said
agreement is clearly unwarranted.

The petitioner avers that the CA erred in remanding the case to the
trial court for the enforcement of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos as it
prolonged the process, "thereby putting off the case in an indefinite
pendency."25 Thus, the petitioner insists that she should be allowed
to ventilate her rights before this Court and not to repeat the same
proceedings just to comply with the enforcement of the Kasunduang
Pag-aayos, in order to finally enforce her right to payment.26

Page 34 of 34 | Luke 1:37 | ER