RHODA

LABSTAN

Caro vs Rilloraza
102 Phil 61, G.R. No. L-9569 September 30, 1957
RAMON CARO, petitioner, vs. LUCAS RILLORAZA and WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION,
respondents.

FACTS:
* Carmen Prieto de Caro owns a building located in Manila. This building is intended or used for rental
(business) purposes, managed by her husband Ramon Caro.
* Ramon hired the services of Daniel dela Cruz (a job contractor) to repair other parts of the building. Dela
Cruz, in turn, engaged the services of Lucas Rilloraza, a carpenter to work on the job.
* While working on the window railing of the building, the wooden platform on which Rilloraza and another
carpenter were working collapsed and Rilloraza fell to the ground and broke his leg. This injury resulted in his
temporary total disability for 6 months and permanent partial disability of 5% of the broken leg.
* Rilloraza is asking for compensation from the petitioner for the injuries suffered.
* Petitioner contends that Rilloraza is not his employee, on the ground that Rilloraza was hired by Daniel dela
Cruz, who, allegedly, is an independent contractor.
* Workmen’s Compensation Commission ruled in favor of Rilloraza, stating that dela Cruz was, at least,
“merely an intermediary” and that petitioner is the “real employer” of Rilloraza.

ISSUE: Is Rilloraza the petitioner’s employee (within the purview of the Workmen’s Compensation Act)? YES

HELD:
The Court did not uphold petitioner’s contention that Daniel dela Cruz was an independent
contractor, within the purview of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Petitioner did not prove that dela Cruz
had agreed to do a piece of work “according to his own methods, without being subject to the control of his
employer.”

Pursuant to Workmen’s Compensation Act: When an employee suffers personal injury from any
accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, or contracts tuberculosis or other illness directly
caused by such employment, or either aggravated by or the result of the nature of such employment, his
employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the person hereinafter specified. . . (Section 2.)

Further, the Court stated that dela Cruz does not appear to have any office establishment, or even a
license to engage in business. Neither did he file a bond to answer either for the fulfillment of his contract with
petitioner, or for satisfaction of such as may arise by reason of injury in the course of employment. We fail to
see how dela Cruz could possibly be regarded as an “independent contractor”.

In the present case, the building in which Rilloraza worked was found to be "intended or used for
rental (business) purposes." Petitioner, in turn had control of such building, as manager. Obviously, the repair
of said building is part of the usual business of the administration of the aforesaid properties, so that the
same may be suitable for the gainful purpose above referred to.

Consequently, even if Rilloraza, who did the repair work thereof, were a casual laborer, engaged
directly by De la Cruz, acting as an independent contractor, which he is not, the former would still be an
employee of petitioner herein, within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and, hence, would
be entitled to demand compensation from him.