CARANDANG vs.

DESIERTO
G.R. No. 148076; January 12, 2011

Facts: RPN-9 is a private corporation duly registered with the SEC.

Benedicto, a stockholder thereof, entered into a compromise agreement with
the Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG) whereby he ceded
to the government his shares of stock in RPN with an outstanding capital of
72.4%, which was later discovered to be only 32.4%

Meanwhile, President Estrada appointed Carandang as general

manager and chief operating officer of RPN. He was charged with grave
misconduct before the Ombudsman on the ground of conflict of interest as he
entered into a contract with AF Broadcasting, Inc, despite his being an
incorporator, director and stockholder of the said corporation.

Carandang sought the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed

against him on the ground that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over him
because RPN was not a government-owned or –controlled corporation.
Consequently he insists that he is not a public official hence he is not subject
to the administrative authority of the Ombudsman and the criminal
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Issue: Whether or not RPN is a GOCC, which in turn renders Carandang

subject to
the administrative authority of the Ombudsman and the criminal jurisdiction
of the
Sandiganbayan.

Ruling: No, RPN is not a GOCC.

Section 2 of PD 2029 states that a GOCC is a stock or a non-stock

corporation, whether performing governmental or proprietary functions,
which is directly chartered by a special law, or if organized under the general
corporation law is owned or controlled by the government directly or
indirectly through a parent coerporation or subsidiary corporation, to the
extent of at least a majority of its outstanding capital stock or of its
outstanding voting capital stock.

Due to the inability to resolve the issue regarding the actual shares
owned by the PCGG, the conclusion that the government held majority shares
finds no factual basis.

Thus Carandang is not subject to the administrative authority of the

Ombudsman and the criminal jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
 CAPALLA vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 201112; June 13, 2012

Facts: On July 10, 2009, the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM entered into a
Contract for the Provision of an Automated Election System for the May 10,
2010 Synchronized National and Local Elections,(AES Contract). The contract
between the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM was one of “lease of the AES with
option to purchase (OTP) the goods listed in the contract.” In said contract,
the Comelec was given until December 31, 2010 within which to exercise the
option. In September 2010, the Comelec partially exercised its OTP 920 units
of PCOS machines with corresponding canvassing/consolidation system
(CCS) for the special elections in certain areas in the provinces of Basilan,
Lanao del Sur and Bulacan. In a letter dated December 18, 2010, Smartmatic-
TIM, through its Chairman Flores, proposed a temporary extension of the
option period on the remaining PCOS machines until March 31, 2011,
waiving the storage costs and covering the maintenance costs. The Comelec
did not exercise the option within the extended period. Several extensions
were given for the Comelec to exercise the OTP until its final extension on
March 31, 2012.

On March 29, 2012, the Comelec issued a Resolution resolving to

accept Smartmatic-TIM’s offer to extend the period to exercise the OTP until
March 31, 2012 and to authorize Chairman Brillantes to sign for and on
behalf of the Comelec the Agreement on the Extension of the OTP Under the
AES Contract (Extension Agreement). Comelec again issued a Resolution
resolving to approve the Deed of Sale between the Comelec and Smartmatic-
TIM to purchase the latter’s PCOS machines to be used in the upcoming May
2013 elections and to authorize Chairman Brillantes to sign the Deed of Sale
for and on behalf of the Comelec. The Deed of Sale was forthwith executed.

Issue: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Comelec in issuing the assailed
Resolutions and in executing the assailed Extension Agreement and Deed.

Ruling: No, Comelec did not abuse its discretion when it issued the
resolutions and excecuted the Extension Agreement and Deed

A reading of the other provisions of the AES contract would show that
the parties are given the right to amend the contract which may include the
period within which to exercise the option. There is, likewise, no prohibition
on the extension of the period, provided that the contract is still effective.
The Comelec still retains P50M of the amount due Smartmatic-TIM as
performance security, which indicates that the AES contract is still effective
and not yet terminated.

Consequently, pursuant to Article 19 of the contract, the provisions

thereof may still be amended by mutual agreement of the parties provided
said amendment is in writing and signed by the parties. Considering,
however, that the AES contract is not an ordinary contract as it involves
procurement by a government agency, the rights and obligations of the
parties are governed not only by the Civil Code but also by RA 9184.

Smartmatic-TIM was not granted additional right that was not

previously available to the other bidders. The bidders were apprised that
aside from the lease of goods and purchase of services, their proposals
should include an OTP the subject goods. The amendment of the AES contract
is not substantial. The approved budget for the contract was
P11,223,618,400.00 charged against the supplemental appropriations for
election modernization. Bids were, therefore, accepted provided that they
did not exceed said amount. The competitive public bidding conducted for
the AES contract was sufficient. A new public bidding would be a superfluity.
The amendment of the AES contract is more advantageous to the Comelec
and the public because the P7,191,484,739.48 rentals paid for the lease of
goods and purchase of services under the AES contract was considered part
of the purchase price. For the Comelec to own the subject goods, it was
required to pay only P2,130,635,048.15. If the Comelec did not exercise the
option, the rentals already paid would just be one of the government
expenses for the past election and would be of no use to future elections.

CALLO-CLARIDAD vs. ESTEBAN

G.R. No. 191567; March 20, 2013
Facts: Petitioner is the mother of Cheasare Armani “Chase” Callo Claridad,
whose lifeless and bloodied body was discovered in the evening of February
27, 2007 between vehicles parked at the carport of a residential house
located inside Ferndale Homes, Quezon City. It was alleged that Chase
had been last seen alive with respondent Philip Ronald P. Esteban less than
an hour before the discovery of his lifeless body

Petitioner filed a criminal complaint for murder against respondents

Philip and Teodora on the strength of the several pieces of circumstantial
evidence.

The Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint based on

the observation that there was lack of evidence, motive and circumstantial
evidence sufficient to charge respondent with homicide, much less murder.
On petition for review, the Secretary of Justice affirmed the dismissal
of the complaint stating that the confluence of lack of an eyewitness, lack of
motive, insufficient circumstantial evidence, and the doubt as to the proper
identification of Philip by the witness resulted in the lack of probable cause
to charge Philip and Teodora with the crime alleged. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for review and the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner resorted to the correct remedy when she
filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals to review the
Secretary of Justice’s resolution on the determination of probable cause.

Ruling: No, the petitioner did not resort to the correct remedy.

A petition for review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be taken

only to review the decisions, resolutions or awards by the quasi-judicia;l
officers, agencies or bodies, particularly those specified in Section 1 of Rule
43.

Here, the Secretary of Justice was not an officer performing a quasi-

judicial function. In reviewing the findings of the OCP of Quezon City on the
matter of probable cause, the Secretary of Justice performed an essentially
Executive function to determine whether the crime alleged against the
respondents was committed and whether there was probable cause to
believe that the respondents were guilty thereof. The courts could intervene
in the Secretary of Justice’s determination of probable cause only through a
special civil action for certiorari. That happens when the Secretary of Justice
acts in a limited sense like a quasi-judicial officer of the Executive
department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law. But the
requirement for such intervention was still for the petitioner to demonstrate
clearly that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction unless such a clear demonstration
is made, the intervention is disallowed in deference to the doctrine of
separation of powers.

AIR ADS vs. TADECO

 G.R. No. 160736; March 23, 2011

Facts: A civil case for damages entitled Elva O. Pamento vs. Tagum
Agricultual Development Corporation (TADECO) and Edwin Yap was filed in
RTC Davao City Branch 15. Respondent, through counsel ACCRA Law Office,
filed an answer with compulsory counterclaims and motion for leave to file
third party complaint, impleading petitioner Air Ads, Inc and Pioneer
Insurance Surety Corporation as third-party defendants. The same was
admitted however upon realizing that Pioneer was a client of its Makati
Office, ACCRA Law filed a notice of dismissal without prejudice to third party
complaint only against Pioneer. Consequently, TADECO filed through another
counsel Dominguez Law Office, a motion to withdraw notice of dismissal
without prejudice of third party complaint only against Pioneer or motion for
reconsideration, alleging that the notice of dismissal filed by ACCRA had been
made without its consent.

The RTC granted the notice of dismissal filed by ACCRA. A month

later, RTC also granted the motion to withdraw notice of dismissal filed by
TADECO through its new counsel and set aside the dismissal of the third
party complaint against Pioneer. Tadeco, through Dominguez Law Office,
filed a motion to admit third party complaint in substitution of the third
party complaint filed by the third party plaintiff’s former counsel. The third
party complaint, however, contained allegations pertaining only to Pioneer
as third party defendant. Notwithstanding this, the RTC granted said motion.

Air Ads filed a motion to dismiss against the third party complaint
averring that it had been dropped as third party defendant under TADECO’s
substitute third party complaint. TADECO, now represented by ACCEA,
countered that it had never been the intention of Dominguez Law to file a
new third party complaint against Air Ads because the latter represented
TADECO only in regards to the third party complaint against Pioneer. The
RTC denied Air Ads motion to dismiss holding tthat the notice of dismissal
filed by ACCRA did not have the effect of dropping Air Ads as a third party
defendant due to the notice being expressly restrictive.

Air Ads filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
RTC. A subsequent petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Air Ads
before the Court of Appeals was also denied for failure to attach the board
resolution designating the petitioner’s duly authorized representative to sign
the verification and certification against forum shopping. Instead of filing a
motion for reconsideration, Air Ads filed a new petition for certiorari and
prohibition already including the proper board certificate.

Issue: Whether or not the filing of an identical petition following the

dismissal of the first petition on the ground of defective and insufficient
verification and certification constitute forum shopping.

Ruling: No, the filing of an identical petition following the dismissal of the first
petition on the ground of defective and insufficient verification and
certification does not constitute forum shopping.

Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines the

effect of the failure to comply with the requirements for the certification
against forum shopping. Said section expressly provides that the dismissal of
a petition due to failure to comply with the requirements therein is withpout
prejudice unless otherwise provided by the court. Accordingly, the plaintiff
or petitioner is not precluded from filing a similar action in order to rectify
the defect in the certification where the court states in its order that the
action is dismissed due to such defect, unless the court directs that the
dismissal is with prejudice, in which case the plaintiff is barred from filing a
similar action by res judicata.

In the context of the aforementioned rule, the dismissal, being without

any qualification, was a dismissal without prejudice, plainly indicating that
Air Ads could not be barred from filing the second petition.

ALONSO vs. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB

G.R. No. 188471; April 20, 2010
Facts: Sometime in 1992, petitioner discovered documents showing that his
father acquired Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate from the
Government of the Philippine Islands in or about the year 1911 in
accordance with the Friar Lands Act. Upon investigation of the status of the
land, petitioner found out from the office of the Registrar of Deeds of Cebu
City that title to Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate had been
"administratively reconstituted from the owner’s duplicate" in the name of
United Service Country Club, Inc., predecessor of Cebu Country Club, Inc.
After Cebu Country Club refused to heed to the demand of the petitioner to to
restore to him the ownership and possession of said lot within fifteen (15)
days from receipt thereof, he filed with the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City.
RTC decided in favor of Cebu Country Club. Both parties appealed to the CA
which affirmed the RTC. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied. Such denial prompted petitioner to appeal to the Supreme
Court. On January 31, 2002, the Supreme Court denied the petition for review
and ruled that the disputed lot belonged to the Government of the
Philippines. Petitioners sought a reconsideration which was denied, thus
making the decision final and executory.

In 2004, the Government, filed in the RTC a motion for the issuance of
a writ of execution which was opposed by Cebu Country Club. The RTC
denied the OSG’s motion. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
questioning the denial of the OSG’s motion. The RTC denied the petitioners’
motion for reconsideration citing that the party who had a direct interest in
the execution of the decision and the reconsideration of the denial of the
motion for execution was the Government represented only by the OSG;
hence the petitioners had no legal standing to file the motion for
reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners were the real parties-in-interest to

question the denial by the RTC of the OSG’s motion for the issuance of a writ
of execution.

Ruling: No, petitioners are not the real parties-in-interest to question

the denial by the RTC of the OSC’s motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution.

In an earlier case, the Supreme Court found that petitioners did not
validly acquire ownership of Lot No 727-D-2 and that the same belonged to
the Government. This pronouncement renders beyond dispute that the non-
execution of the judgment would not adversely affect the petitioners, who
now hold no right whatsoever in said lot. Otherwise put, they are not the
proper parties to assail the questioned orders of the RTC because they stand
to derive nothing from the execution of the judgment against Cebu Country
Club, Inc.

A real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by

the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Interest
within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue
and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental interest. One having no right or
interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-
plaintiff in an action.
 AMPATUAN vs DE LIMA
G.R. No. 197291; April 3, 2013

Facts: Fifty seven innocent civilians were massacred in Sitio Masalay,

Municipality of Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province. Among the principal
suspects was petitioner, then the Mayor of the Municipality of Datu Unsay,
Maguindanao Province. Inquest proceedings were conducted against
petitioner at the General Santos (Tambler) Airport Lounge, before he was
flown to Manila and detained at the main office of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).
The NBI and the Philippine National Police (PNP) charged other
suspects, for what became aptly known as the Maguindanao massacre.
Secretary of Justice Agnes Devanadera constituted a Special Panel of
Prosecutors to conduct the preliminary investigation. DOJ resolved to file the
corresponding informations for murder against petitioner, and to issue
subpoenas to several persons. Twenty-five informations for murder were
also filed against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial Region,
in Cotabato City.
A panel of Prosecutors charged one hundred ninety six individuals
with multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre. It appears
that in issuing the joint resolution the Panel of Prosecutors partly relied on
the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag.
Petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice
Leila De Lima and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to
request the inclusion of Dalandag in the informations for murder considering
that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the massacre
through his two sworn declarations. Petitioner reiterated the request twice.
Secretary De Lima denied petitioner’s request. Petitioner brought a petition
for mandamus in the RTC in Manila, seeking to compel respondents to charge
Dalandag as another accused in the various murder cases undergoing trial in
the QC RTC. Respondents questioned the propriety of the conduct of a trial in
a proceeding for mandamus. Petitioner opposed. RTC of Manila issued the
assailed order dismissing the petition for mandamus.

Issue: Whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to

charge Dalandag, as an accused for multiple murder despite his admission to
the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ.

Ruling: No, respondents may not be compelled by writ of mandamus to

charge Dalandag as an accused for multiple murder despite his admission to
the WPP.

The public prosecutors are solely responsible for the determination of

the amount of evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to justify the
filing of appropriate criminal charges against a respondent. Theirs is also the
quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not criminal cases should
be filed in court.

Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the

Constitution, the Court deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the
conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow the Executive
Department, through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine
what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the
prosecution of supposed offenders.

Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer

or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is
proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the
discretion of the tribunal or officer. In matters involving the exercise of
judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in order to
compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take
action, but it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way
discretion is to be exercised, or to compel the retraction or reversal of an
action already taken in the exercise of judgment or discretion.

As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on

the letter-request of petitioner, but may not be compelled to act in a certain
way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request.
 CHU vs. SPOUSES CUNANAN
G.R. No. 156185; September 12, 2011

Facts: Spouses Chu executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage involving
their five parcels of land, in favour of Trinidad N. Cunanan. The parties
stipulated that the ownership of lots would remain with the spouses as the
vendors and would be transferred to Cunanan only upon complete payment
of the total consideration and compliance with the terms of the deed of sale
with assumption of mortgage. Thereafter, the Chus executed an SPA
authorizing Cunanan to borrow the amount of consideration from any
banking institution and to mortgage the lots as security, and then to deliver
the proceeds to the Chus. Cunanan was able to transfer the title of the lots to
her name without the knowledge of the Chus, and was able to borrow money
with the lots as security without paying the balance and the purchase price to
the Chus. She later transferred two of the lots to Spouses Garcia. As a result,
the Chus caused the annotation of an unpaid vendor’s lien on three of the
lots. Nonteheless, Cunanan still assigned the remaining lots to Cool Town
Realty.

The Chus commenced Civil Case No. G-1936 in the RTC to recover the
unpaid balance from Spouses Fernando and Trinidad Cunanan (Cunanans),
which complaint was later on amended to seek the annulment of the deed of
sale with assumption of mortgage and of the TCTs issued pursuant to the
deed, and to recover damages. They impleaded Cool Town Realty and the
Office of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga as defendants. By virtue of the
sale by the spouses Carlos of the two lots to Benelda Estate, the Chus further
amended the complaint to Benelda Estate as additional defendant.

Benelda Estate filed its answer with a motion to dismiss, claiming,

among others, that the amended complaint stated no cause of action. The
same was denied by the RTC which prompted the former to assail the denial
on certiorari in the CA. The CA annulled RTC’s denial and dismissed the civil
case as against Benelda Estate. Said dismissal of the case was later on upheld
by the Supreme Court in a subsequent case involving the same parties.
Subsequently, the Chus, Cunanans and Cool Town Realty entered into a
compromise agreement whereby the Cunanans transferred to the Chus their
50% share in all the parcels of land registered in the name of Cool Town
Realty for an in consideration of the full settlement of the case, which the
RTC approved.

Thereafter, the Chus brought another suit against the Carloses and
Benelda Estate seeking the cancellation of the titles in Benelda Estate’s
names. The petitioners then amended their complaint to implead the
Cunanans as additional defendants. The Cunanans and the Carloses moved
for the dismissal of the case on several grounds including res judicata. The
RTC denied both motions holding that the action was not barred by res
judicata because there was no identity of parties and subject matter between
the present case and the first case. Reconsideration was sought by the
Cunanans but the same was denied, prompting them to file a petition for
certiorari in the CA which was granted.

Issue: Whether or not Civil Case No. 12251 is barred by res judicata although
the compromise agreement did not expressly include Benelda Estate as a
party and although the compromise agreement made no reference to the lots
registered in the name of Benelda Estates.

Ruling: Yes, Civil Case No. 12251 is barred by res judicata although the
compromise agreement did not expressly include Benelda Estate as a party
and although the compromise agreement made no reference to the lots
registered in the name of Benelda Estates.

A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by

making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
commenced. It encompasses the objects specifically stated therein, although
it may include other objects by necessary implication, and is binding on the
contracting parties, being expressly acknowledged as a juridical agreement
between them. It has the effect and authority of res judicata upon the parties.
The intent of the parties to settle all their claims against each other is
expressed in the phrase “any and all their respective claims against each
other as alleged in the pleading they respectively filed in connection with this
case, which was broad enough to cover whatever claims the petitioners
might asset based on the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage covered
all the five lots.

Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the

merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the
rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points and
matters determined in the previous suit.

The first requisite of res judicata – that the former judgment must be
final –is attendant in the case. Civil Case No. 6-1936 was already terminated
under the compromise agreement, for the judgment, being upon a
compromise, was immediately final and unappealable. As to the second
requisite, the RTC had jurisdiction over the cause of action in the first case,
the action being incapable of pecuniary estimation. Lastly, that the
compromise agreement explicitly settled the entirety of the first case by
resolving all claims of the parties against each other, indicated that the third
requisite was also satisfied. Hence all three requisites concur. Thus Civil Case
No. 12251 is barred by res judicata

CITYTRUST BANKING CORPORATION vs. CRUZ

 G.R. No. 157049; August 11, 2010

Facts: Respondent Carlo Romulo Cruz maintained a savings and checking

account at petitioner’s Loyola Heights Branch. The account was closed due to
the negligence of one of the latter’s tellers. Due to the closure, the respondent
sustained extreme embarrassment for the checks he issued would not be
honoured although his savings account was sufficiently funded and the
accounts were maintained under the petitioner’s check-o-matic. The
respondent sued in the RTC to claim for damages from the petitioner. After
the trial, the RTC ruled in favour of the respondent, and ordered the
petitioner to pay him P 100,000.00 as moral damages, P 20,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P 20,000.00 as attorney’s fees. The RTC found that
the petitioner failed to properly supervise its teller in which the respondent
sustained embarrassment and humiliation, entitling him to damages. The
petitioner appealed to the CA, arguing that the RTC erred in ordering it to pay
moral and exemplary damages. The CA affirmed the RTC. The petitioner
sought for reconsideration but CA denied it for lack of merit.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable to respondent for moral and
exemplary damages.

Ruling: Yes, the petitioner is liable to respondent for moral and exemplary
damages.

In several decisions of the Court, the banks, defendants therein, were

made liable for negligence, even without sufficient proof of malice or bad
faith on their part, and the Court awarded moral damages of P 100,000.00
each time to the suing depositors in proper consideration of their reputation
and their social standing. The respondent should be similarly awarded for
the damage to his reputation as an architect and businessman.

It is never overemphasized that the public always relies on a bank’s

profession of diligence and meticulousness in rendering irreproachable
service. Its failure to exercise diligence and meticulousness warranted its
liability for exemplary damages and for reasonable attorney’s fees.

CONSING vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 161075; July 15, 2013
Facts: Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia,
various loans totalling 18 Million pesos from Unicapital, secured by real
estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of land registered under the name of
Cecilia. In accordance with its option to purchase the mortgaged property,
Unicapital agreed to purchase one-half of the property for a total
consideration of P 21, 221,500.00. Payment was effected by off-setting the
amounts due to Unicapital under the promissory notes ofe Cecilia and
petitioner in the amount of 18 million pesos and paying an additional amount
of P3,145,946.50. The other half of the property was purchased by Plus
Builders, Inc. (Plus Builders), a joint venture partner of Unicapital. Before
Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned that
the title to the property was really TCT No. 114708 in the names of Po Willie
Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the parties from whom the property had been
allegedly acquired by Cecilia. TCT No. 687599 held by Cecilia appeared to be
spurious. On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount of
P41,377,851.48 that had been paid to and received by Cecilia and Petitioner,
but the latter ignored the demands.

Petitioner filed Civil Case No. 1759 in the Pasig City RTC for injunctive
relief, thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital from proceeding against him for
the collection of the P41,377,851.48 on the ground that he had acted as a
mere agent of his mother. On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal
complaint for estafa through falsification of public document against
petitioner and Cecilia in the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office. Unicapital sued
petitioner in the RTC in Makati City (Civil Case No. 99-1418) for the recovery
of a sum of money and damages, with an application for a writ of preliminary
attachment.

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed against Petitioner
and Cecilia an information for estafa through falsification of public document
in the RTC in Makati City. Petitioner moved to defer his arraignment in the
Makati criminal case on the ground of existence of a prejudicial question due
to the pendency of the Pasig and Makati civil cases. On September 25, 2001,
petitioner reiterated his motion for deferment of his arraignment, citing the
additional ground of pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 in the CA. On
November 19, 2001, the Prosecution opposed the motion. A week later, the
RTC issued an order suspending the proceedings in the Makati criminal case
on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question and subsequently
denied the Prosecution’s motion for reconsideration.

The State thus assailed in the CA the last two orders of the RTC in the
Makati criminal case via petition for certiorari. The CA promulgated its
decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252, dismissing the petition for certiorari and
upholding the RTC’s questioned orders. Subsequently, the CA amended its
decision, reversing itself. Petitoner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the
CA denied the motion through the second assailed resolution.
Issue: Whether or not an independent civil action based on fraud initiated by
the defrauded party raises a prejudicial question.

Ruling: No, an independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the

defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial question.

Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, it is well-settled that a civil

action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be
independently instituted and does not operate as a prejudicial question that
will justify the suspension of a criminal case.
 Here, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on
account of the alleged fraud committed by Consing and Cecilia in selling the
disputed lot to Plus Builders is an independent civil action under Article 33 of
the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question. The
issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is
whether or not Consing merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la
Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages
and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother are
liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase
of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his
mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot
be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held
liable for conspiring to falsify public documents.

The determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for
Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in
the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document.

DISINI vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 169823-24; September 11, 2013
Facts: The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated June
30,2004 charging Disini in the Sandiganbayan with corruption of public
officials, penalized under Article 212 in relation to Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code (Criminal Case No. 28001), and with a violation of Section 4(a) of
Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (Criminal Case No. 28002). In this two actions it alleged his
confederations with the late President Marcos and His family.

Disini challenges the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the

offenses charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.He
contends that: (1) the informations did not allege that the charges were being
filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order (E.O.) Nos.1, 2, 14
and 14-A; (2) the offenses charged were not of the nature contemplated by
E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A because the allegations in the informations neither
pertained to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, nor involved sequestration
cases; (3) the cases were filed by the Office of the Ombudsman instead of by
the PCGG; and (4) being a private individual not charged as a co-principal,
accomplice or accessory of a public officer, he should be prosecuted in the
regular courts instead of in the Sandiganbayan.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offenses charged because Criminal
Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 were filed within the purview
of Section 4 (c) of R.A. No. 8249; and that both cases stemmed from the
criminal complaints initially filed by the PCGG pursuant to its mandate under
E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A to investigate and file the appropriate civil or
criminal cases to recover ill-gotten wealth not only of the Marcoses and their
immediately family but also of their relatives, subordinates and close
associates.

Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction over the offenses
charged

Ruling: Yes, Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
offenses charged.

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 was the law that established the
Sandiganbayan and defined its jurisdiction. The law was amended by R.A. No.
7975 and R.A. No. 8249. Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan
was vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving:
(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense; (b) Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office; and (c) Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection
with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

That Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses
charged from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No.1,
which tasked the PCGG with assisting the President in "the recovery of all ill-
gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether
located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration
of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during
his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage
of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship," expressly granted the authority of the PCGG to
recover ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos’ immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates, without distinction as to their
private or public status.

Contrary to Disini’s argument, too, the qualifying clause found in

Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 applied only to the cases listed in Subsection 4a
and Subsection 4b of R.A. No. 8249. Unquestionably, public officials
occupying positions classified as Grade 27 or higher are mentioned only in
Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b,signifying the plain legislative intent of
limiting the qualifying clause to such public officials. To include within the
ambit of the qualifying clause the persons covered by Subsection 4c would
contravene the exclusive mandate of the PCGG to bring the civil and criminal
cases pursuant to and in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

In view of this, the Sandiganbayan properly took cognizance of

Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 despite Disini’s being
a private individual, and despite the lack of any allegation of his being the co-
principal, accomplice or accessory of a public official in the commission of the
offenses charged.

FDC vs. AGCAOILI

G.R. No. 165025; August 31, 2011
Facts: Interchem Laboratories Incorporated (Interchem) purchased Fedman
Suites Buildings Unit 411 under a contract to sell. FDC executed a Master
Deed with Declaration of Restrictions, and formed the Fedman Suite
Condominium Corporation (FSCC) to manage FSB and hold title over its
common areas. Interchem, with FDCs consent, transferred all its rights in
Unit 411 to respondent Federico Agcaoili. The centralized air-conditioning
unit of FSBs fourth floor broke down. Being thereby adversely affected,
Agcaoili wrote to Eduardo X. Genato (Genato, demanding the repair of the
air-conditioning unit. Not getting any immediate response, Agcaoili sent
follow-up letters to FSCC reiterating the demand, but the letters went
unheeded. He then informed FDC and FSCC that he was suspending the
payment of his condominium dues and monthly amortizations. FDC cancelled
the contract to sell involving Unit 411 and cut off the electric supply to the
unit. Agcaoili was thus prompted to sue FDC and FSCC in the RTC, Makati
City, Branch 144 for injunction and damages. The parties later executed a
compromise agreement that the RTC approved. Immediately thereafter, FDC
again disconnected the electric supply of Unit 411. Agcaoili thus moved for
the execution of the RTC decision dated August 26, 1985. On July 17, 1986,
the RTC issued an order temporarily allowing Agcaoili to obtain his electric
supply from the other units in the fourth floor of FSB until the main meter
was restored.

Agcaoili lodged a complaint for damages against FDC and FSCC in the
RTC, which was raffled to Branch 150 in Makati City. FDC claims that there
was a failure to pay the correct amount of docket fee herein because the
complaint did not specify the amounts of moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorney’s fees; that the payment of the prescribed docket fee
by Agcaoili was necessary for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the case.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case despite
failure by Agcaoili to pay the correct amount of docket fee.

Ruling: Yes, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case despite failure by
Agcaoili to pay the correct amount of docket fee.

The prevailing rule is that if the correct amount of docket fees are not
paid at the time of filing, the trial court still acquires jurisdiction upon full
payment of the fees within a reasonable time as the court may grant, barring
prescription. The prescriptive period that bars the payment of the docket fees
refers to the period in which a specific action must be filed, so that in every
case the docket fees must be paid before the lapse of the prescriptive period,
as provided in the applicable laws, particularly Chapter 3, Title V, Book III, of
the Civil Code, the principal law on prescription of actions. Even where the
clerk of court fails to make a deficiency assessment, and the deficiency is not
paid as a result, the trial court nonetheless continues to have jurisdiction over
the complaint, unless the party liable is guilty of a fraud in that regard,
considering that the deficiency will be collected as a fee in lien within the
contemplation of Section 2, Rule 141 (as revised by A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC. The
reason is that to penalize the party for the omission of the clerk of court is
not fair if the party has acted in good faith.

Here, the docket fees paid by Agcaoili were insufficient considering

that the complaint did not specify the amounts of moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorneys fees. Nonetheless, it is not disputed that Agcaoili paid
the assessed docket fees. Such payment negated bad faith or intent to defraud
the Government. Nonetheless, Agcaoili must remit any docket fee deficiency
to the RTCs clerk of court.
 GALVEZ vs CA
G.R. No. 157445; April 3, 2013

Facts: Spouses Eustacio and Segundina used to own a property located in

Barangay District II, Babatngon, Leyte. After their marital relationship turned
sour, Eustacio and Segundina separated and cohabited with other
partners. Eustacio sold the property to their daughter Jovita without the
 knowledge or consent of Segundina. After the sale, Jovita constituted a
mortgage on the property on March 9, 1981 to secure her loan from the
Philippine National Bank (PNB). Jovita failed to pay her obligation. Hence,
PNB had the property extrajudicially foreclosed. In the ensuing foreclosure
sale, PNB was the highest bidder. There being no redemption, the property
became PNB’s acquired asset. Respondents Spouses Honorio and Susana
Montaño purchased the property from PNB. Thereafter, the Montaños tried
to get the actual possession of the property, but Segundina refused to vacate.
Accordingly, the Montaños sued Segundina for recovery of ownership and
possession, and damages in the Municipal Trial Court of Babatngon, Leyte
(MTC). Segundina countered that the sale of the property by Eustacio to
Jovita was null and void for having been done without her knowledge and
consent; that the sale to PNB as well as to the Montaños were consequently
void; and that the Montaños were also buyers in bad faith.

The MTC ruled in favor of the Montaños. Segundina appealed to the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tacloban City. The RTC affirmed the MTC’s
decision. Segundina filed a motion for reconsideration against the RTC’s
decision but the RTC denied the same. Thereafter, Segundina appealed to the
CA by petition for review. The CA promulgated its first assailed resolution
dismissing outright the petition, stating thus: “A cursory perusal of the
instant petition for review shows that no copies of pleadings and other
material portions of the record as would support the allegations thereof were
attached as annexes in violation of Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure”. Segundina moved for the reconsideration of the resolution,
arguing that it was within her judgment as petitioner to decide what
documents, pleadings or portions of the records would support her petition;
that her exercise of judgment was not a technical error that warranted the
outright dismissal of her petition; that the rule requiring all pleadings and
material portions of the records to be attached to the petition was an “absurd
requirement”; and that attaching the pleadings and other portions of the
record was not an indispensable requirement the non-compliance with
which would cause the denial of the petition. CA denied Segundina’s motion
for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not the mere failure to attach copies of pleadins and other
material portions of the recored as would support the allegations causes the
outright dismissal of a petition for review.

Ruling: No, the mere failure to attach copies of pleadings and other material
portions of the record as would support the allegations should not cause the
outright dismissal of a petition for review.

The Court has laid down three guideposts in determining the

necessity of attaching the pleadings and portions of the records to the
petition. First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be
attached to the petition. Only those which are relevant and pertinent must
accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the document in question will
support the material allegations in the petition, whether said document will
make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince the
court to give due course to the petition. Second, even if a document is
relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if it is shown
that the contents thereof can also found in another document already
attached to the petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper
are summarized in a questioned judgment, it will suffice that only a certified
true copy of the judgment is attached. Third, a petition lacking an essential
pleading or part of the case record may still be given due course or
reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted
 the documents required, or that it will serve the higher interest of justice that
the case be decided on the merits.

The Court considers the attachments of Segundina’s petition for

review (i.e., the certified true copies of the MTC decision dated February 4,
2000, the RTC decision dated November 29, 2000, and the RTC order dated
April 22, 2002) already sufficient to enable the CA to pass upon her assigned
errors and to resolve her appeal even without the pleadings and other
portions of the records. To still deny due course to her petition for not
attaching the complaint and the answer despite the MTC decision having
substantially summarized their contents was to ignore the spirit and purpose
of the requirement to give sufficient information to the CA.

GOLANGCO vs. FUNG

G.R. No. 157952; September 8, 2009

Facts: In 1995, petitioner Golangco, as complainant, initiated a prosecution

for libel against the respondent Fung in the Regional Trial Court. Allegedly,
the respondent had issued an office memorandum maliciously imputing
against the petitioner the commission of bribery and had sent copies of the
 mrmorandum to the petitioner’s superiors in the POEA and to other public
officers and personalities not connecter with the POEA, causing damage and
prejudice to the petitioner. On hearing day, the prosecution still failed to
present its witness because no subpoena had been issued to and served on
him for the purpose. The RTC judge issued an order terminating the
prosecution’s presentation of evidence.

Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari to assail the

order and claimed that the RTC judge committed grave buse of discretion for
not issuing the subpoena to require the witness to appear and testify in the
hearing. He contended that his prior request for the subpoena for an earlier
hearing date should have been treated as a continuing request for the
subpoena considering that the Rules of Court did not require a party to apply
for a subpoena again should it not be served in the first time. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the petition for
certiorari of the petitioner.

Ruling: Yes, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled when it dismissed the
petition for certiorari

The petitioner did not join the People of the Philippines as a party in
his action for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. He thereby ignored that the
People of the Philippines were indispensable parties due to his objective
being to set aside the trial court’s order. The omission was fatal and already
enough cause for the summary rejection of his petition for certiorari. The
petitioner did not also obtain the consent of the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) to his petition for certiorari. At the very least, he should ave furnished
a copy of the petition for certiorari to the OSG prior to the filing thereof, but
even that he did not do.

The petitioner now needs to be reminded that certiorari is an

extraordinary remedy to correct a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when an appeal, or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is not available. In this regard,
grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction whenever the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice
or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation
of law.

HEIRS OF SIMON vs CHAN

G.R. No. 157547; February 23, 2011

Facts: On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the
MeTC of Manila an information charging the late Eduardo Simon with a
 violation of BP 22, docketed as Criminal Case No. 275381 entitled People v.
Eduardo Simon.
More than three years later, respondent Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC
in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the principal amount of
P336,000.00, coupled with an application for a writ of preliminary
attachment (docketed as Civil Case No. 915-00).

On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of

preliminary attachment, which was implemented on August 17, 2000
through the sheriff attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon. Eight days thereafter,
Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs
attachment bond for damages. Chan opposed Simons urgent motion to
dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment bond for damages.

On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simon the
urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiffs attachment
bond for damages. The MTC cites the grounds of litis pendentia and that the
case for sum of money is one based on fraud and hence falling under Article
33 of the Civil Code, still prior reservation is required. Chans motion for
reconsideration was denied as well as his appeal with the RTC. On the CA,
Chan's appeal was granted.

Issue: Whether or not Chan’s civil action (Civil Case No. 915-00) was an
independent civil action.

Ruling: No, Chan’s civil action was not an independent civil action.

There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability

arising from the issuance of an unfunded check prohibited and punished
under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22). This is clear from Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court which relevantly provides: "The criminal action for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil
action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed."

Supreme Court Circular 57-97 also provides that: "1. The criminal
action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily
include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil
action separately shall be allowed or recognized."

HEIRS OF GARCIA vs. MUNICIPALITY OF IBA, ZAMBALES

G.R. No. 162217; July 22, 2015

Facts: Melecio R. Bueno brought an ejectment suit in the MTC of Iba against
the Municipality of Iba, Zambales claiming that the municipality constructed
the public market on his lands without his consent. After due proceedings,
the MTC ruled in favor of Bueno. Then the municipality of Iba filed its notice
 of appeal, but the MTC denied due course to the notice of appeal. The
Municipality of Iba filed its petition for certiorari in the RTC assailing MTC’s
denial. The petition for certiorari was granted.

Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to the CA by petition for review

under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The CA dismissed the petition for review
for not being the proper mode of appeal observing that the assailed orders
had been issued by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.
Although admitting that their petition for review under Rule 42 was
inappropriate, the petitioners pray that the Court exercise its equity
jurisdiction because a stringent application of the Rules of Court would not
serve the demands of substantial justice.

Issue: Whether or not the Court should exercise its equity jurisdiction and
give due course to the petition.

Ruling: No. The distinctions between the various modes of appeal cannot be
taken for granted, or easily dismissed, or lightly treated. The appeal by notice
of appeal under Rule 41 is a matter or right, but the appeal by petition for
review under Rule 42 is a matter of discretion. An appeal as a matter of right,
which refers to the right to seek the review by a superior court of the
judgment rendered by the trial court, exists after the trial in the first
instance. In contrast, the discretionary appeal, which is taken from the
decision or final order rendered by a court in the exercise of its primary
appellate jurisdiction, may be disallowed by the superior court in its
discretion. Verily, the CA has the discretion whether to due course to the
petition for review or not.

The plea for liberality is unworthy of any sympathy from the Court.
Appeal is not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege. As the parties
invoking the privilege, the petitioners should have faithfully complied with
the requirements of the Rules of Court. Their failure to do so forfeited their
privilege to appeal. Indeed, any liberality in the application of the rules of
procedure may be properly invoked only in cases of some excusable formal
deficiency or error in a pleading, but definitely not in cases like now where a
liberal application would directly subvert the essence of the proceedings or
results in the utter disregard of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the petitioners did not give any good reason or cause that could
warrant the relaxation of the rules in their favor. Their bare plea for
substantial justice was not enough ground to suspend the rules. Acceding to
their plea would conceal their shortcomings in procedure, and thereby
belittle the lofty objectives of instituting rules of procedure.

HEIRS OF SOTTO vs PALICTE

G.R. No. 159691; January 13, 2013

Facts: In June 1967, Pilar Teves (Pilar) and other heirs of Carmen Rallos
(Carmen), the deceased wife of Filemon, filed in the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Cebu City a complaint against the Estate of Sotto ( Civil Case No. R-
10027 ) seeking to recover certain properties that Filemon had inherited
 from Carmen, and damages. The CFI rendered judgment awarding to Pilar
and other heirs of Carmen damages of P 233,963.65, among other reliefs . On
July 24, 1980, Matilde filed in Civil Case No. R-10027, a motion to transfer to
her name the title to the four properties. However, the CFI denied her
motion, and instead declared the deed of redemption issued in her favor null
and void, holding that Matilde, although declared in Special Proceedings No.
2706-R as one of the heirs of Filemon, did not qualify as a successor-in-
interest with the right to redeem the four properties. The other heirs of
Filemon failed to exercise their option granted in the decision of September
21, 1987 to join Matilde as co-redemptioners within the six-month period.
Accordingly, on October 5, 1989, the trial court issued an order in Civil Case
No. R-10027 approving Matilde’s motion to transfer the title of the four lots
to her name, and directing the Register of Deeds of Cebu to register the deed
of redemption and issue new certificates of title covering the four properties
in Matilde’s name.

Pascuala who earlier executed a document expressly waiving her

rights to the properties changed her mind and decided to file on September
23, 1996 in the RTC in Cebu City a complaint to seek the nullification of her
waiver of rights, and to have herself be declared as a co-redemptioner of the
four properties (Civil Case No. CEB-19338). However, the RTC dismissed
Civil Case No. CEB-19338 on the ground of its being barred by laches.

In November 1998, the heirs of Miguel filed a motion for

reconsideration in Civil Case No. R-10027 of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 16,
praying that the order issued on October 5, 1989 be set aside, and that they
be included as Matilde’s co-redemptioners. After the RTC denied the motion
for reconsideration for its lack of merit on April 25, 2000, they assailed the
denial by petition for certiorari and prohibition. On September 10, 1999, the
heirs of Marcelo and the heirs of Miguel instituted the present action for
partition against Matilde in the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 20 (Civil Case No.
CEB-24293), alleging in their complaint that despite the redemption of the
four properties having been made in the sole name of Matilde, the four
properties still rightfully belonged to the Estate of Sotto for having furnished
the funds used to redeem the properties, they prayed that the RTC declare
the four properties as the assets of the Estate of Sotto, and that the RTC direct
their partition among the heirs of Filemon. The heirs of Pascuala did not join
the action for partition whether as plaintiffs or defendants. Instead of filing
her answer, Matilde moved to dismiss the complaint, stating, among others,
that a similar case entitled Pahang v. Palicte (Civil Case No. 19338) had been
dismissed with finality by Branch 8 of the RTC in Cebu City. The RTC granted
Matilde’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint. Following the
denial by the RTC of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners appealed
the dismissal of Civil Case No. CEB-24293 to the CA, which affirmed the
dismissal. After the CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, they
brought this present appeal to the Court.

Issue: Whether or not the action for partition was already barred by prior
judgment.

Ruling: Yes, the action for partition was already barred by prior judgment

Res judicata exists when as between the action sought to be dismissed

and the other action these elements are present, namely: (1) the former
judgment must be final; (2) the former judgment must have been rendered
by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) the
former judgment must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be
between the first and subsequenst actions (i) identity of parties or at least
such as representing the same interest in both actions, (ii) identity of subject
 matter or of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and (iii) identity of caused of action in both actions such
that any judgment that may be rendered in the other action will regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.

The first three elements are present. What remains to be determined

is whether civil case no. CEB -24293 and the previous cases involved the
same parties, the same subject matter, the same causes of action an the same
factual and legal issues. Indeed, civil case no. CEB-24293 was no different
from the previous cases. In other words, it is an undisguised relitigation of
the same settled matter concerning Matilde’s ownership of the four
properties.

In all the five cases, an identity of parties existed because the parties
were the same or there was privity among them or some of the parties were
successors in interest litigating for the same thing and under the same title
and in the same capacity. An absolute identity of the parties was not
necessary because a shared identity of interest sufficed for res judicata to
apply. Moreover, mere substantial identity of parties, oven community of
interests between parties in the prior and subsequent cases, even if the latter
were not impleaded in the first case could be sufficient. Secondly, the subject
matter of all the actions was the same, that is, Matilde’s right to the four
properties. On the one hand, Matilde insisted that she had the exclusive right
to them while, on the other hand, the other declared heirs of Filemon, like
petitioners’ predecessors in interest maintained that the properties belonged
to the estate of Sotto. And, lastly, a judgment rendered in the other cases,
regardless of which part was successful could amount to res judicata in
relation to civil case no. CEB-24293.

Hi, in the same case forum shopping was discussed. Thus, please be guided by
this SC pronouncement on forum shopping:

Forum shopping can be committed in three ways:

1. Filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same
prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (LITIS PENDENTIA)
2. Filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer,
the previous case having been finally resolved (RES JUDICATA)
3. Filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different
prayers (SPLITTING OF CAUSES OF ACTION WHERE THE GROUND FOR
DISMISSAL IS ALSO EITHER LITIS PENDENTIA OR RES JUDICATA)

If the forum shopping is not considered wilful and deliberate, the subsequent cases
shall be dismissed without prejudice on one of the two grounds mentioned above.
However, if the forum shopping is wilful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are
more than two) actions shall be dismissed with prejudice.

HEIRS OF PRODON vs HEIRS OF ALVAREZ

G.R. No. 170604; September 2, 2013

Facts: The heirs of Spouses Maximo S. Alvarez Sr. and Vzalentina have
claimed that they could not locate the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No.
84797 pertaining to the land they inherited from their parents, that the entry
of the Deed of sale with Right to Repurchase on the original TCT did not exist
 and that the entry had been maliciously done by Prodon. Prodon claimed that
the late Maximo Sr had executed the deed of sale with right to repurchase on
September 9, 1975 and this had been registered with the Register of Deeds
and duly annotated on the title. She had then become the absolute owner of
the property due to its non-repurchase within the given 6-month period.
The custodian of the recored of the property attested that the copy of
the deed of sale with right to repurchase could not be found in the files of the
Register of Deeds of Manila.

RTC rendered judgment in favour of Prodon. It opined that the

contents of the Deed of Sale could be proven by secondary evidence in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, upon proof of its
execution or existence and of the cause of its unavailability being without bad
faith when defendant Prodon swore that she purchased the land and her
testimony has been confirmed by the Notarial Register of Notary Public
Eliseo Razon and by the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds of
Manila. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling, saying that: “A party
must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence
before he can resort to secondary evidence. The correct order of proof is as
follows: existence, execution, loss, contents, although the court in its
discretion may change this order if necessary. The CA also found
circumstances that put doubt on the existence of the alleged deed of sale as
evidence on record showed that Maximo Sr. was hospitalized between
August 23 to September 3, 1975 and suffered from palaysis on half of his
body and blindness due to cataract., and then was again later hospitalized
and subsequently died on October of 1975 without having left the hospital

Issue: Whether or not the Best Evidence Rule applies in an action for
quieting of title based on the inexistence of a deed of sale with right to
repurchase.

Ruling: No, the Best Evidence Rule does not apply in an action for quieting of
title based on the inexistence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase.

This action does not involve the terms or contents of the deed of sale
with right to repurchase. The principal issue was whether or not the deed of
sale with right to repurchase, duly executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr.,
had really existed. The Best Evidence Rule was not applicable because the
terms of the deed of sale with right to repurchase were not the issue . The
lower court should have simply addressed and determined whether or not
the "existence" and "execution" of the deed as the facts in issue had been
proved by preponderance of evidence.
The presentation of evidence other than the original document, like
the testimonies of Prodon and Jose Camilon, the Notarial Register of Notary
Eliseo Razon, and the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds, would
have sufficed even without first proving the loss or unavailability of the
original of the deed. The foregoing notwithstanding, good trial tactics still
required Prodon to establish and
explain the loss of the original of the deed of sale with right to repurchase to
establish the genuineness and due execution of the deed. This was because
the deed, although a collateral document, was the foundation of her defense
in this action for quieting of title.

The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a

written document, the original of the document must be reproduced in court.
The rule excludes an evidence other than the original writing to prove the
contents thereof, unled the offeror proves: (a) the existence or due execution
of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for
its non-production in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the
 offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The
primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that the exact
contents of a writing are brought before court.

HEIRS OF SPOUSES RETERTA vs. SPOUSES LOPEZ

G.R. No. 159941; August 17, 2011

Facts: The Petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and

reconveyance in the RTC in Trece Martires City averring that they were the
true and real owners of the parcel of land (the land) situated in Trez Cruzes,
Tanza, Cavite, having inherited the same from their father who had died on
July 11, 1983; that their late father had been the grantee of the land by virtue
of his occupation and cultivation; that their late father and his predecessors
 in interest had been in open, exclusive, notorious, and continuous possession
of the land for more than 30 years; that they had discovered in 1999 an
affidavit dated March 1, 1966 that their father had purportedly executed
whereby he had waived his rights, interests, and participation in the land;
that by virtue of the affidavit, Sales Certificate No. V-769 had been issued in
favor of respondent Lorenzo Mores by the then Department of Agriculture
and Natural Resources; and that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-64071 had
later issued to the respondents. Respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to
dismiss, insisting that the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
case due to the land being friar land, and that the petitioners had no legal
personality to commence the same.

The RTC granted the motion to dismiss, holding that considering that the
land is a friar land and not land of the public domain, consequently Act No.
1120 is the law prevailing on the matter which gives to the Director of Lands
the exclusive administration and disposition of Friar Lands, and that the
determination whether or not fraud had been committed in the procurement
of the sales certificate rests to the exclusive power of the Director of Lands.
Hence this Court is of the opinion that it has no jurisdiction over the nature of
this action. On the second ground relied upon by the defendants in their
Motion To Dismiss, suffice it to state that the Court deemed not to discuss the
same.

The petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC
denied the same. Petitioners assailed the dismissal via petition for certiorari,
but the CA dismissed the petition. Petitioners filed a motion for but the same
was denied by the CA. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court. However the same was dismissed as it cannot be used as a
substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. Finally, the CA denied the petitioners
motion for reconsideration

Issue: Whether or not it is the Director of Lands who has jurisdiction over
the action for quieting of title.

Ruling: No, the Director of Lands has no jurisdiction over the action for
quieting of title.

The law governing jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of Batas Pa,bansa Plg.

129, as amended by Republic Act No, 7691, which provides: Section 19.
Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction: (2)In all civil actions which involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed
value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)
or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful
detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts;

Conformably with the provision, because an action for reconveyance

or to remove a cloud on one’s title involves the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, exclusive original jurisdiction over such
action pertained to the RTC, unless the assessed value of the property did not
exceed P20,000.00 (in which instance the MTC having territorial jurisdiction
would have exclusive original jurisdiction). Determinative of which regular
court had jurisdiction would be the allegations of the complaint (on the
assessed value of the property) and the principal relief thereby sought.
 The respondents reliance on Section 12 and Section 18 of Act No.
1120 to sustain their position that the Bureau of Public Lands (now LMB)
instead had exclusive jurisdiction was without basis. the authority of LMB
under Act No. 1120, being limited to the administration and disposition of
friar lands, did not include the petitioners action for reconveyance. LMB
ceases to have jurisdiction once the friar land is disposed of in favor of a
private person and title duly issues in the latter’s name. By ignoring the
petitioners showing of its plain error in dismissing Civil Case No. TM-983 and
by disregarding the allegations of the complaint, the RTC acted whimsically
and capriciously.

JOSE vs JAVELLANA
G.R. No. 158239; January 25, 2012

Facts: Margarita sold for a consideration of P160,000.00 to Ramon Javellana

by deed of conditional sale, two parcels of land in Guiguinto, Bulacan. They
agreed that Javellana would pay P 80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed
and the balance of
P 80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens
System,
 and that should Margarita become incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-
fact, Juvenal, and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would
receive the payment of the balance and proceed with the application for
registration. After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased
Margarita, Priscilla did not comply with the undertaking to cause the
registration of the properties under the Torrens System, and, instead, began
to improve the properties by dumping filling materials therein with the
intention of converting the parcels of land into a residential or industrial
subdivision.

Javellana commenced an action for specific performance, injunction,

and damages against her in the RTC in Malolos, Bulacan, averring that he had
paid the full consideration and that in 1996, Priscilla had called to inquire
about the mortgage constituted on the parcels of land and that he had told
her then that the parcels of land had not been mortgaged but had been sold
to him. He prayed for the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction
to restrain Priscilla from dumping filling materials and that Priscilla be
ordered to institute registration proceedings and then to execute a final deed
of sale in his favor. Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the
complaint was already barred by prescription and that the complaint did not
state a cause of action

The RTC initially denied Priscilla’s motion. However upon her motion
for reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself and granted the same. Javellana
moved for reconsideration, contending that the presentation of evidence of
full payment was not necessary at that stage of the proceedings and that in
resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action, the facts alleged in the complaint were hypothetically admitted and
only the allegation in the complaint should be considered. RTC denied the
motion for reconsideration for lack of any reason to disturb the order.
Javellana filed a notice of appeal which the RTC gave due course to, and the
records were elevated to the Court of Appeals.

Priscilla countered that the order was not appealable, that the appeal
was not perfected on time and that Javellana was guilty of forum shopping as
it appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition for certiorari
in the CA to assail orders dimissing his complaint. The dismissed the petition
for certiorari. CA reversed and set aside the dismissal of the civil case and
remanded the records to the RTC for further proceedings in accordance with
law. CA denied the motion for reconsideration

Issue: Whether or not the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an

order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss was an interlocutory order.

Ruling: No, the denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the
defendant’s motion to dismiss is not an interlocutory order but a final order
which puts an end to the particular matter involved.

First of all, the denial of Javellana’s motion for reconsideration left

nothing more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one.

The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is

well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be
done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the
latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be
decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the
trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment
 rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is
interlocutory of final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be
done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does the
order or judgment leaves something to be done in the trial court with respect
to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory;
otherwise, it is final.

And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines

whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to
accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court to the effect that “appeal may be taken from a judgment or
final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter
therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable;” but the remedy from
an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the
interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. Then it is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be
resorted to.

LORENO SHIPPING vs. DMAP

G.R. No. 155849; August 11, 2011

Facts: MARINA issued MC 153 pursuant to Executive Order No. 213 (EO
213) entitled Deregulating Domestic Shipping Rates promulgated by
President Fidel V. Ramos on November 24, 1994. Seven years later, the
Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued a Letter-Resolution advising
respondent Distribution Management Association of the Philippines (DMAP)
 that a computation of the required freight rate adjustment by MARINA was
no longer required for freight rates officially considered or declared
deregulated in accordance with MARINA Memorandum Circular No. 153 (MC
153).

In order to challenge the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and the

Letter-Resolution, DMAP commenced in the Court of Appeals a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction or temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. SP No. 65463). The CA
dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition and upheld the
constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and the Letter-Resolution. Later, the CA
denied DMAPs motion for reconsideration.
DMAP appealed to the Supreme Court but the Court denied DMAPs petition
for review on certiorari. The Supreme Court also denied with finality DMAPs
motion for reconsideration.

DMAP held a general membership meeting (GMM) on the occasion of

which DMAP, acting through its co-respondents Lorenzo Cinco, its President,
and Cora Curay, a consultant/adviser to Cinco, publicly circulated the Sea
Transport Update.
Thereupon, the petitioners brought this special civil action for contempt
against the respondents, insisting that the publication of the Sea Transport
Update constituted indirect contempt of court for patently, unjustly and
baselessly insinuating that the petitioners were privy to some illegal act, and,
worse, that the publication unfairly debased the Supreme Court by making
scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo to the effect that the
Supreme Court had allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not the statements contained in the Sea Transport Update
constituted or amounted to indirect contempt of court.

Ruling: No, the statements contained in the Sea Transport Update did not
constitute or amount to indirect contempt of court.

Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or

disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard
of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or
an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent
language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to
impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense,
contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a
court. The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing within its legal
signification a variety of different acts.

Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is

committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the
administration of justice; and constructive or indirect contempt, which
consists of willful disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court.
The punishment for the first is generally summary and immediate, and no
process or evidence is necessary because the act is committed in facie curiae.
In contrast, the second usually requires proceedings less summary than the
first. The proceedings for the punishment of the contumacious act committed
outside the personal knowledge of the judge generally need the observance
of all the elements of due process of law, that is, notice, written charges, and
an opportunity to deny and to defend such charges before guilt is adjudged
and sentence imposed.

Proceedings for contempt are sui generis, in nature criminal, but may
be resorted to in civil as well as criminal actions, and independently of any
 action. They are of two classes, the criminal or punitive, and the civil or
remedial. A criminal contempt consists in conduct that is directed against the
authority and dignity of a court or of a judge acting judicially, as in unlawfully
assailing or discrediting the authority and dignity of the court or judge, or in
doing a duly forbidden act. A civil contempt consists in the failure to do
something ordered to be done by a court or judge in a civil case for the
benefit of the opposing party therein. It is at times difficult to determine
whether the proceedings are civil or criminal. In general, the character of the
contempt of whether it is criminal or civil is determined by the nature of the
contempt involved, regardless of the cause in which the contempt arose, and
by the relief sought or dominant purpose. The proceedings are to be
regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil
when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial.

The test for criticizing a judge’s decision is, therefore, whether or not
the criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. Viewed through the prism of the test, the Sea
Transport Update was not disrespectful, abusive, or slanderous, and did not
spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Thereby, the respondents were
not guilty of indirect contempt of court.

MANALANG vs BACANI
G.R. No. 156995; January 12, 2015

Facts: Petitioners were co-owners for lot in question and caused a relocation
and verification survey which showed that respondents had encroached on a
portion of said lot. When the respondents refused to vacate the encroached
 portion and to surrender peaceful possession thereof despite demands, the
petitioners commenced this action for unlawful detainer.

MTC dismissed the action on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. RTC

reversed the decision of the MTC and remanded case on appeal. MTC
ultimately dismissed case. Another appeal to RTC was made. RTC ordered
the petitioners to conduct a relocation survey to determine their allegation of
encroachment, and also heard the testimony of the surveyor. The RTC then
reversed the MTC’s decision.

Issue Whether or not RTC shall conduct a rehearing or trial de novo.

Ruling: No, the The RTC shall not conduct a rehearing or trial de novo.

Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Courtclearly provides: Sec. 18.

Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving
title or ownership. The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the
appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of
the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such
memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by
the Regional Trial Court.

The RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of the
relocation and verification survey “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction” and by
hearing the testimony of the surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount to its
holding of a trial de novo. The violation was accented by the fact that the RTC
ultimately decided the appeal based on the survey and the surveyor’s
testimony instead of the record of the proceedings had in the court of origin.

MACASLANG vs. ZAMORA

G.R. No. 156375; May 30, 2011

Facts: Respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in the MTCC,

alleging that the petitioner sold to them a residential land located in Sabang,
Danao City and that the former requested to be allowed to live in the house
with a promise to vacate as soon as she would be able to find a new
residence. They further alleged that despite their demand after a year, the
petitioner failed or refused to vacate the premises. Despite the due service of
 the summons and copy of the complaint, the petitioner did not file her
answer. The MTCC declared her in default upon the respondents’ motion to
declare her in default, and proceeded to receive the respondents’ oral
testimony and documentary evidence.

The MTCC rendered judgment against petitioner ordering her to vacate

the properties in question, to pay to respondents Attorneys Fees in the sum
of P10,000.00 and monthly rental of P5,000.00 starting December, 1997 until
the time the defendant shall have vacated the properties in question.
Petitioner appealed to the RTC, averring that extrinsic fraud was practiced
upon her which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by
reason of which she has been impaired of her rights; and that she has a
meritorious defense in that there was no actual sale considering that the
absolute deed of sale relied upon by respondents is a patent-nullity as her
signature therein was procured through fraud and trickery.

The RTC rendered judgment in favour of petitioner and dismissed the

complaint filed by respondents, for failure to state cause of action without
prejudice to the refilling of the same. The respondents appealed to the CA,
assailing the RTCs decision for disregarding the allegations in the complaint
in determining the existence or non-existence of a cause of action. The CA
reversed and set aside the RTCs decision and reinstated the MTCCs decision
in favor of the respondents. The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied.

Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its Appellate
Jurisdiction is limited to the assigned errors in the Memorandum or brief
filed before it

Ruling: No, the Regional Trial Court is not limited in its review of the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court to the issues assigned by the appellant,
but can decide on the basis of the entire records of the proceedings of the
trial court and such memoranda or briefs as may be submitted by the parties
or required by the RTC.

The petitioner’s appeal being taken from the decision of the MTCC to
the RTC, was governed by a different rule, specifically Section 18 of Rule 70
of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 18. xxx

xxx
The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate
Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire
record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda
and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the
Regional Trial Court. (7a)

As such,the RTC, in exercising appellate jurisdiction, was not limited

to the errors assigned in the petitioners appeal memorandum, but could
decide on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the trial
court and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties
or required by the RTC.

The difference between the procedures for deciding on review is

traceable to Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. As its compliance with
the requirement of Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 to adopt special
rules or procedures applicable to such cases in order to achieve an
expeditious and inexpensive determination thereof without regard to
technical rules, the Court promulgated the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, whereby it institutionalized the summary procedure for all the
 first level courts. Later on, the Court promulgated the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, effective on July 1, 1997, and incorporated in Section 7 of Rule 40
thereof the directive to the RTC to decide appealed cases on the basis of the
entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such
memoranda as are filed. As a result, the RTC presently decides all appeals
from the MTC based on the entire record of the proceedings had in the court
of origin and such memoranda or briefs as are filed in the RTC.

Yet, even without the differentiation in the procedures of deciding

appeals, the limitation of the review to only the errors assigned and properly
argued in the appeal brief or memorandum and the errors necessarily
related to such assigned error sought not to have obstructed the CA from
resolving the unassigned issues by virtue of their coming under one or
several of the following recognized exceptions to the limitation, namely: (a)
When the question affects jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) Matters
that are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c)
Matters whose consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision and
complete resolution of the case or in serving the interests of justice or
avoiding dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) Matters raised in the trial court
and are of record having some bearing on the issue submitted that the
parties failed to raise or that the lower court ignored; (e) Matters closely
related to an error assigned; and (f) Matters upon which the determination of
a question properly assigned is dependent.

Consequently, the CA improperly disallowed the consideration and

resolution of the two errors despite their being: (a)necessary in arriving at a
just decision and acomplete resolution of the case; and (b) matters of record
having some bearing on the issues submitted that the lower court ignored.

MAHOGANY GROVE HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION vs. SPOUSES TORNO

G.R. No. 206243; December 10, 2014

SC Pronouncement on Motion to Dismiss based on Lack of Jurisdiction

It is well-settled that in a motion to dismiss based on lack of

jurisdiction, the movant hypothetically admits the veracity of the allegations
in the complaint and accordingly, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or
theories set forth in an answer or a motion to dismiss; otherwise, it would
 become almost entirely dependent upon the whims and caprices of the
defendant or movant. Verily, the allegations in the complaint and the reliefs
prayed for determine the nature of the action and of which court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Note: Full text of the case is not available. The only available reference was
the notice signed by AJ Bersamin relative to the case.

MANGILA vs. PANGILINAN

G.R. No. 160739; July 17, 2013

Facts: Seven criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita Mangila and four
others with syndicated estafa and illegal recruitment were filed in the MTCC
of Puerto Princesa City. A preliminary investigation was conducted by Judge
Heriberto Pangilinan (respondent), presiding judge of the MTCC. Thereafter a
warrant for the arrest of petitioner was issued. Mangila was then arrested
and detained at the NBI headquarters in Taft Avenue, Manila.

Claiming that respondent judge did not have the authority to conduct
the preliminary investigation; that the preliminary investigation he
conducted was not yet completed when he issued the warrant of arrest; and
 that the issuance of the warrant of arrest was without sufficient justification
or without a prior finding of probable cause, Mangila filed in the Court of
Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to obtain her release from detention,
averring that the remedy of habeas corpus was available to her because she
could no longer file a motion to quash or a motion to recall the warrant of
arrest considering that respondent judge had already forwarded the entire
records of the case to the City Prosecutor who had no authority to lift or
recall the warrant.

Tha CA denied the petition for habeas corpus for its lack of merit,
explainaing that as a general rule, a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted
where relief may be had or could have been procured by resort to another
general remedy. Mangila moved for the reconsideration of the denial of her
petition for habeas corpus, but the CA denied the same.

Issue: Whether or not habeas corpus was the proper remedy to obtain the
release of Mangila from detention.

Ruling: No, habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to obtain the release of
Mangila from detention

Habeas corpus is that of a civil proceeding in character. It seeks the

enforcement of civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the
criminal act of which the complaint is made, but into the right of liberty,
notwithstanding the act and the immediate purpose to be served is relief
from illegal restraint. The rule applies even when instituted to arrest a
criminal prosecution and secure freedom. When a prisoner petitions for a
writ of habeas corpus, he thereby commences a suit and prosecutes a case in
that court.

Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as

substitute for the trial court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal,
certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to investigate and
consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on
the merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the
question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any
reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law
provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of
exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted
in advance of trial.

The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of
the detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the
release of the detainee. Equally well-settled however, is that the writ will not
issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is
in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge with
jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record. With
Mangila’s arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the order lawfully
issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not an appropriate
remedy to relieve her from the restraint on her liberty. This is because the
restraint, being lawful and pursuant to a court process, could not be inquired
into through habeas corpus.
 SPOUSES MENDIOLA vs CA
G.R. No. 159746; July 18, 2012

Facts: Shell entered into an agreement for the distribution of Shell

petroleum products by a single proprietorship belonging to petitioner
Ramon G. Mendiola. To secure Pacific’s performance of its obligations under
the agreement, petitioners executed a real estate mortgage in favor of Shell
covering their real estate and its improvements, located in the then
Municipality of Paraanaque, Rizal. Pacific ultimately defaulted on its
obligations, impelling Shell to commence extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings.. Having received a notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure
scheduled to be held at the main entrance of the Paranaque Municipal Hall,
petitioners proceeded to the announced venue on the scheduled date and
time but did not witness any auction being conducted and did not meet the
sheriff supposed to conduct the auction despite their being at the lobby. They
 later learned that the auction had been held as scheduled by Deputy Sheriff
Bernardo San Juan of the Regional Trial Court in Makati, and that their
mortgaged realty had been sold to Tabangao Realty, Inc. (Tabangao), as the
corresponding certificate of sale bears out. They further learned that
Tabangao s winning bidder bid of P670,000.00 had topped Shell s bid of
P660,000.00.

After application of the proceeds of the sale to the obligation of Pacific,

a deficiency remained. The deficiency was not paid by Ramon. Thus, Shell
sued in the RTC in Manila to recover the deficiency. In his answer with
counterclaim Ramon asserted that the extra-judicial foreclosure of the
mortgage had been devoid of basis in fact and in law; and that the foreclosure
and the filing of the action were made in bad faith, with malice, fraudulently
and in gross and wanton violation of his rights.

Pending the Manila case, petitioners commenced in the RTC in Makati

an action to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure which was assigned to Branch
134 (Makati case). As defendants in the Makati case, Shell and Tabangao
separately moved for dismissal, stating similar grounds, namely: (a) that the
Makati RTC had no jurisdiction due to the pendency of the Manila case; (b)
that the complaint stated no cause of action, the Makati case having been
filed more than a year after the registration of the certificate of sale; (c) that
another action (Manila case) involving the same subject matter was pending;
(d) that the venue was improperly laid; and (e) that the Makati case was
already barred by petitioners failure to raise its cause of action as a
compulsory counterclaim in the Manila case. After the Makati RTC denied
both motions Shell filed its answer ad cautelam, whereby it denied
petitioners allegation that no auction had been held; insisted that there had
been proper accounting of the deliveries made to Pacific and its clients; and
averred that petitioners failure to file their compulsory counterclaim in the
Manila case already barred the action.

Pending the trial of the Makati case, the Manila RTC rendered its
judgment in favor of Shell. As sole defendant in the Manila case, Ramon
appealed, but his appeal was decided adversely to him, with the CA affirming
the Manila RTC s decision and finding that he was guilty of forum shopping
for instituting the Makati case. Undaunted, he next appealed to the Supreme
Court, which denied his Petition for Review and upheld the foreclosure of the
mortgage. The decision of the Court became final and executor.

Nonetheless, the Makati RTC resolved the Makati case, finding that
there had been no auction actually conducted on the scheduled date; that had
such auction taken place, petitioners could have actively participated and
enabled to raise their objections against the amount of their supposed
obligation; and that they had been consequently deprived of notice and
hearing as to their liability. Shell sought the reconsideration of the decision
while Tabango adopted Shell’s motion for reconsideration. The Makati RTC
denied Shell s motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved by the decision of the
Makati RTC, Shell and Tabangao filed a joint notice of appeal. Instead of filing
their appellees brief, petitioners submitted a motion to dismiss appeal,
mainly positing that Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court prohibited an
appeal of the order denying a motion for reconsideration. The CA denied
petitioners motion to dismiss appeal through the first assailed resolution.
The CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration through the second
assailed resolution.½ll

Issue: Whether or not the Makati case was barred in view of litis pendentia
or res judicata.
Ruling: Yes, the Makati case was barred in view of res judicata.

Bar by res judicata avails if the following elements are present, to wit:
(a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order
must be on the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (d) there must be,
between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter
and cause of action.

The Manila RTC had jurisdiction to hear and decide on the merits
Shell s complaint to recover the deficiency, and its decision rendered on May
31, 1990 on the merits already became final and executory. Hence, the first,
second and third elements were present. Anent the fourth element, the
Makati RTC concluded that the Manila case and the Makati case had no
identity as to their causes of action. The foregoing conclusion of the Makati
RTC on lack of identity between the causes of action was patently unsound.

The identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity;

otherwise, a party may easily escape the operation of res judicata by
changing the form of the action or the relief sought. The test to determine
whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same
evidence will sustain the actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts
essential to the maintenance of the actions. If the same facts or evidence will
sustain the actions, then they are considered identical, and a judgment in the
first case is a bar to the subsequent action.42 Petitioners Makati case and
Shell s Manila case undeniably required the production of the same evidence.
In fact, Shell s counsel faced a dilemma upon being required by the Makati
RTC to present the original copies of certain documents because the
documents had been made part of the records of the Manila case elevated to
the CA in connection with the appeal of the Manila RTC s judgment. 43 Also,
both cases arose from the same transaction (i.e., the foreclosure of the
mortgage), such that the success of Ramon in invalidating the extrajudicial
foreclosure would have necessarily negated Shell s right to recover the
deficiency.

Hi, in relation to res judicata and because the facts mentioned something
about the petitioner filing an Answer with compulsory counterclaim being
filed, please refer to the SC pronouncement on compulsory counterclaim:

Rule 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines a compulsory counterclaim as

one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is
connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the
opposing party s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of
third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.

The four tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not are the
following, to wit: (a) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the
counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendant s claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially
the same evidence support or refute plaintiff s claim as well as the defendant s
counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the
parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and
the court? Of the four, the one compelling test of compulsoriness is the logical
relation between the claim alleged in the complaint and that in the counterclaim.
Such relationship exists when conducting separate trials of the respective claims of
the parties would entail substantial duplication of time and effort by the parties and
the court; when the multiple claims involve the same factual and legal issues; or
when the claims are offshoots of the same basic controversy between the parties. If
these tests result in affirmative answers, the counterclaim is compulsory.

METROBANK vs. TOBIAS

G.R. No. 177780; January 25, 2012

Facts: The Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon charged Tobias with
estafa through falsification of public documents in relation to his loan with
petitioner. He filed a motion for re-investigation but the City Prosecutor of
Malabon still found probable cause against him and recommended that he be
charged. Tobias appealed to the Department of Justice which issued a
resolution directing the withdrawal of the information filed against Tobias.

Metrobank moved to reconsider but the same was denied. Metrobank

challenged the adverse resolutions through certiorari with the Court of
Appeals which denied the same. It stressed that the determination of
probable cause was an executive function within the discretion of the public
 prosecutor and, ultimately, of the Secretary of Justice, and the courts of law
could not interfere with such determination; that the private complainant in
a criminal action was only concerned with its civil aspect; that should the
State choose not to file the criminal action, the private complainant might
initiate a civil action based on Article 35 of the Civil Code. Metrobank sought
reconsideration, but the CA denied its motion for that purpose, emphasizing
that the presumption that metrobank firmly relied upon was overcome by
Tobias sufficiently establishing his good faith and lack of criminal intent

Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Justice has the prerogative to review
the resolutions of the public prosecutor in terms of determining the existence
of probable cause.

Ruling: Yes, the Secretary of Justice has the prerogative to review the
resolutions of the public prosecutor in terms of determining the existence of
probable cause.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right

to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government, or to substitute their
own judgments for that of the Executive Branch, represented in this case by
the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will not
interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the purpose
of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. That
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act
at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.

METROBANK vs. JUDGE SANDOVAL

G.R. No. 169677; February 18,2013

Facts: In 1987, the Republic brought a complaint for reversion,

reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages in the Sandiganbayan
against Andres V. Genito, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos and
other defendants. Fourteen years later or in 2001, the Republic moved for
the amendment of the complaint in order to implead Asian Bank as an
additional defendant. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion. When the
Republic was about to terminate its presentation of evidence against the
original defendants in Civil Case No. 0004, it moved to hold a separate trial
against Asian Bank.

Commenting on the motion, Asian Bank sought the deferment of any

action on the motion until it was first given the opportunity to test and assail
the testimonial and documentary evidence the Republic had already
 presented against the original defendants, and contended that it would be
deprived of its day in court if a separate trial were to be held against it
without having been sufficiently apprised about the evidence the Republic
had adduced before it was brought in as an additional defendant. The
Republic maintained that a separate trial for Asian Bank was proper because
its cause of action against Asian Bank was entirely distinct and independent
from its cause of action against the original defendants

The Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution granting the

Republic’s motion for separate trial. Asian Bank moved for the
reconsideration of the resolution, but the Sandiganbayan denied its motion
through its second assailed resolution.

Issue: Whether or not the Republic was entitled to a separate trial against
Asian Bank ( or its successor-in-interest, Metrobank)

Ruling: No, the Republic was not entitled to a separate trial against Asian
Bank.

The rule on separate trials in civil actions is found in Section 2, Rule

31 of the Rules of Court, which reads: Section 2. Separate trials. – The court, in
furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial
of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any
separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-
party complaints or issues.

The text of the rule grants to the trial court the discretion to
determine if a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-
party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-
claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues should be held,
provided that the exercise of such discretion is in furtherance of convenience
or to avoid prejudice to any party.

In actions at law, the general practice is to try all the issues in a case at
one time; and it is only in exceptional instances where there are special and
persuasive reasons for departing from this practice that distinct causes of
action asserted in the same case may be made the subjects of separate trials.
Whether this reasonably may be done in any particular instance rests largely
in the court’s discretion.

The Sandiganbayan veered away from the general rule of having all
the issues in every case tried at one time, unreasonably shunting aside the
dictum that a "single trial will generally lessen the delay, expense, and
inconvenience to the parties and the courts." Exceptions to the general rule
are permitted only when there are extraordinary grounds for conducting
separate trials on different issues raised in the same case, or when separate
trials of the issues will avoid prejudice, or when separate trials of the issues
will further convenience, or when separate trials of the issues will promote
justice, or when separate trials of the issues will give a fair trial to all parties.
Otherwise, the general rule must apply.

The justification of the Sandiganbayan for allowing the separate trial

did not constitute a special or compelling reason like any of the exceptions.
To begin with, the issue relevant to Asian Bank was not complicated. In that
context, the separate trial would not be in furtherance of convenience. And,
secondly, the cause of action against Asian Bank was necessarily connected
with the cause of action against the original defendants.
 NERWIN INDUSTRIES vs. PNOC-EDC
G.R. No. 167057; April 11, 2012

Facts: In 1999, the National Electrification Administration (NEA) published

an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for a contract, otherwise known as IPB
No. 80, for the supply and delivery of about sixty thousand (60,000) pieces of
woodpoles and twenty thousand (20,000) pieces of cross-arms needed in the
country’s Rural Electrification Project. The qualified bidder submitted their
financial bids where Nerwin emerged as the lowest bidder for all
schedules/components of the contract. NEA then conducted a pre-award
inspection of Nerwin’s manufacturing plants and facilities, including its
identified supplier in Malaysia, to determine its capability to supply and
deliver NEA’s requirements.

Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 for the
O-ILAW Project, Nerwin filed a civil action in the RTC in Manila, alleging that
Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 was an attempt to subject a portion of the items
 covered by IPB No. 80 to another bidding; and praying that a TRO issue to
enjoin respondents’ proposed bidding for the wooden poles. Respondents
sought the dismissal of the case, stating that the complaint averred no cause
of action, violated the rule that government infrastructure projects were not
to be subjected to TROs, contravened the mandatory prohibition against non-
forum shopping, and the corporate president had no authority to sign and file
the complaint. The RTC granted the TRO.
Respondents moved for the reconsideration of the order and also to set aside
the order of default and to admit their answer to the complaint. The RTC de
nied respondents motions for reconsideration, to set aside
order of default, and to admit answer

Respondents commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil

action for certiorari, alleging that the RTC had committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that Nerwin
had been entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction despite
the express prohibition from the law and from the Supreme Court; in issuing
the TRO in blatant violation of the Rules of Court and established
jurisprudence; in declaring respondents in default; and in disqualifying
respondents’ counsel from representing them. The CA granted the petition.
Nerwin moved for reconsideration but the same was denied.

Issue: Whether or not it was proper for the RTC to grant the TRO despite the
express prohibition in RA 8975 on the issuance of the same and preliminary
injunctions, on government project.

Ruling : No, it was not proper for the RTC to grant the TRO despite the express
prohibition in RA 8975 on the issuance of the same, and preliminary
injunctions, on government project.

Ruling: Sections 3 and 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 expressly prohibits any
court, except the Supreme Court, from issuing any TRO, preliminary
injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain, prohibit or
compel the Government, or any of its subdivisions or officials, or any person
or entity, whether public or private, acting under the Government’s direction
from (a) acquiring, clearing and developing the right-of-way, site or location
of any National Government project; (b) bidding or awarding of a contract or
project of the National Government; (c) commencing, prosecuting, executing,
implementing, or operating any such contract or project; (d) terminating or
rescinding any such contract or project; and (e) undertaking or authorizing
any other lawful activity necessary for such contract or project.

The text and tenor of the provisions being clear and unambiguous,
nothing was left to the RTC to do except to enforce them and to exact upon
nerwin obedience to them.

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action

or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a
court, agency or person, to refrain from a particular act/s. It is an ancillary or
preventive remedy resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights
or interests during the pendency of the case. As such, it is issued only when it
is established that: (a) The applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and
the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance or non-performance of the at or acts complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or (c) A party,
court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act/s probably in violation of the
 rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and
tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

It is never the function of a TRO or preliminary injunction to

determine the merits of a case, or to decide controverted facts. It is but a
preventive remedy whose only mission is to prevent threatened wrong,
further injury, and irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties
can be settled. A Regional Trial Court that ignores the statutory prohibition
and issues a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory
injunction against a government contract or project acts contrary to law.

NHA vs. JUDGE ROXAS

G.R. No. 161204; April 6, 2011

Facts: PHHC (NHA’s predecessor) was the registered owner of two large
parcels of land which was later subdivided into 17,387 lots, more or less,
under several survey plans. The subdivided lots were sold and disposed off
to NHAs beneficiaries/lot buyers. NHA delivered its owner’s copy of TCT No.
1356 to the QCRD to facilitate the numerous partial cancellations of TCT No.
1356 on account of the deeds of sale executed by NHA in favor of the
beneficiaries. However, fire razed the entire premises of QCRD and destroyed
the original and the owners duplicate copies of TCT No. 1356, along with
many other records and documents then in the possession and custody of
QCRD.

NHA filed a petition for the reconstitution of TCT No. 1356 in the
Regional Trial Court in Quezon City (RTC). Its petition was raffled to Branch
227 of the RTC, presided by respondent Judge Vicente Q. Roxas. NHA
 attached to its petition documents to prove its ownership and the identity of
the lands involved. The RTC set the petition for initial hearing and directed
NHA to submit twelve copies of the petition, certified true copies or originals
of the annexes, certified true copies of tax declarations and tax receipts, and
other jurisdictional requirements as provided by law. NHA failed to comply
with the directive and to appear at the initial hearing. Thus, the RTC issued
an order archiving said case until compliance by NHA with the jurisdictional
requirements. Subsequently, RTC issued a resolution denying the NHAs
petition for reconstitution for lack of merit.

NHA sought reconsideration. The RTC set NHAs motion for

reconsideration for hearing and directed NHA to comply with the legal
requirements in order to show its good faith. However, despite compliance
on the part of NHA, the RTC issued two orders denying NHAs motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.

NHA filed a notice of appeal seeking to elevate the dismissal for

review by the CA. However, the RTC dismissed the appeal, pointing out that
NHA had only a day left within which to file its notice of appeal due to NHAs
having filed its motion for reconsideration that interrupted the running of
the period for appeal on the fourteenth day; and that the filing of the notice of
appeal and the payment of the appellate court docket fees were made way
past the deadline to perfect its appeal. Aggrieved, NHA filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA. The CA summarily dismissed the petition for certiorari
because of the failure of NHA to attach to the petition the certified true copies
of all the relevant pleadings and documents. After NHAs motion for
reconsideration was denied upon the additional ground that NHAs notice of
appeal had been filed out of time in the RTC, NHA now appeals.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed NHA’s

petition for certiorari.

Ruling: Yes, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed NHA’s petition for
certiorari.
NHA, as the petitioner, had the obligation to comply with the basic
requirements for the filing of a petition for certiorari prescribed in Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, specifically to accompany the petition with a certified true
copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of
section 3, Rule 46.

At the time the RTC issued its resolution denying due course to NHAs
notice of appeal, the applicable rule was Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court, which stated that the period for taking an ordinary appeal is within 15
days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. The filing of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration interrupted the running of the period
of appeal, which began to run again from the movants receipt of notice of the
order denying the motion. Thus, NHA had only the balance of the period
within which to perfect an appeal, the balance being the number of days
remaining in its reglementary period after deducting the time during which
the motion was pending, that is, from the date it filed the motion for
reconsideration to the date it received the notice of denial of its motion for
reconsideration. Considering that NHA filed its motion for reconsideration on
the last day of the reglementary period, its appeal must be brought within the
day following the service to it of the order denying its motion for
reconsideration. Under the circumstances, NHAs notice of appeal was
undeniably filed out of time. NHAs stance might be correct under the Neypes
 Rule where the Court has allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which an
aggrieved party may file the notice of appeal in the RTC, reckoned from the
receipt of the order denying said partys motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Although Neypes has been intended to standardize the
appeal periods under the Rules of Court, and has been applied retroactively in
some cases due to its being a dictum on remedial law, the pronouncement
could not now benefit NHA considering that the issue of whether or not the
RTC had been guilty of grave abuse of discretion the precise subject matter of
its petition for certiorari should be determined on the basis of the rules and
jurisprudence then prevailing.

PAHILA-GARRIDO vs. TORTOGO

G.R. No. 156358; August 17, 2011

Facts: Domingo Pahila commenced in the MTCC in Bacolod City an action for
ejectment with prayer for preliminary and restraining order to evict several
defendants, including the respondents herein, from his properties. He
amended the complaint to implead the spouses of some of the defendants.
However, he died during the pendency of the action, and his surviving
spouse, herein petitioner Angelina Pahila-Garrido, was substituted for him.

The defendants in Civil Case No. 23671 were divided into two groups.
The MTCC rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff. All the defendants
appealed. The RTC in Bacolod City affirmed the decision of the MTCC. Only
the second group, which includes respondents herein, appealed the RTCs
decision to the Court of Appeals, insisting that the land was foreshore land
and that the petitioner’s title was not valid. Considering that the first group
did not appeal, the RTCs decision became final and executory as to them. The
CA dismissed the second groups appeal, and later denied their motion for
 reconsideration. The respondents appealed the dismissal to the Supreme
Court via a petition for certiorari , but the Court rejected their recourse and
issued an entry of judgment. In the meantime, the MTCC amended its
decision to correct typographical errors in the description of the properties
involved. None of the parties objected to or challenged the corrections.

The MTCC issued the writ of execution upon the petitioners motion,
which writ was duly served upon all the defendants. The respondents filed a
motion to quash against the writ of execution and its aliases, and a motion to
stay the execution of both the first and the amended decision, anchoring their
motions on the supposedly supervening finding that the lot covered by the
writ of execution was foreshore land belonging to the State. The MTCC
denied the respondents motion to quash, observing that the cancellation of
the petitioners TCT No. T-55630 was an event that might or might not
happen, and was not the supervening event that could stay the execution.
The MTCC also denied their motion for reconsideration.

More than a year after the writ of execution was served upon the
defendants, the respondents, led by respondent Elisa M. Tortogo filed a
petition for certiorari with a prayer that a TRO and a writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction be issued. The RTC granted the respondents prayer
for a TRO. The petitioner sought a clarificatory order, moving that the TRO
be vacated due to its being effective for only twenty days and because such
effectivity could neither be extended nor be made indefinite. The RTC issued
the assailed writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction

Issue: Whether or not the RTC lawfully issued the TRO and the writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction despite the already final and executor
nature of the decision of the MTCC.

Ruling: No, the RTC did not lawfully issue the TRO and the writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction

The respondents elevated to the Supreme Court the CA decision dated

December 6, 1999 and resolution dated April 17, 2000 via a petition for
certiorari. The Court dismissed the petition on July 19, 2000, and the
dismissal became final and executory because the respondents did not timely
file a motion for reconsideration. Consequently, the MTCC rightly issued the
writ of execution on April 5, 2000. Based on the sheriffs return of service, the
writ of execution was duly served upon all the defendants.

Under the circumstances, the principle of immutability of a

final judgment must now be absolutely and unconditionally applied against
the respondents. Even as their right to initiate an action in court ought to be
fully respected, their commencing SCA Case No. 01-11522 in the hope of
securing a favorable ruling despite their case having been already fully and
finally adjudicated should not be tolerated. Their move should not frustrate
the enforcement of the judgment, the fruit and the end of the suit itself. Their
right as the losing parties to appeal within the prescribed period could not
defeat the correlative right of the winning party to enjoy at last the finality of
the resolution of her case through execution and satisfaction of the judgment,
which would be the life of the law. To frustrate the winning party’s right
through dilatory schemes is to frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure
of the courts, which thereby increases the costs of litigation.

It is true that nnotwithstanding the principle of immutability of final

judgments, equity still accords some recourse to a party adversely affected
by a final and executory judgment, specifically, the remedy of a petition to
annul the judgment based on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of
 jurisdiction, or the remedy of a petition for relief from a final order or
judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. He may also have a competent
court stay the execution or prevent the enforcement of a final judgment when
facts and circumstances that render execution inequitable or unjust
meanwhile transpire; or when a change in the situation of the parties can
warrant an injunctive relief. Neither of such remaining equitable remedies is
available anymore to the respondents, however, for the time for such
remedies is now past. Indeed, it is now high time for the respondents to bow
to the judgment, and to accept their fate under it.

PATULA vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 164457; April 11, 2012

Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa under an information filed in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Dumaguete City. Petitioner pled not guilty to
the offense charged in the information. At pre-trial, no stipulation of facts
was had, and petitioner did not avail herself of plea bargaining. Thereafter,
trial on the merits ensued.

During its presentation of evidence, the prosecution called to the

witness stand, Karen Guivencan, whom Footluckers employed as its store
auditor. She submitted to Go a written report denominated as List of
Customers Covered by Saleswoman Lerima Patula w/ Differences in Records
as per Audit Duly Verified March 16-20, 1997. The Prosecution marked the
ledgers of petitioners various customers allegedly with discrepancies as
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive.

Petitioner’s counsel interposed a continuing objection on the ground

that the figures entered in Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive,
were hearsay because the persons who had made the entries were not
themselves presented in court. With that, petitioners counsel did not
anymore cross-examine Guivencan, apparently regarding her testimony to be
irrelevant because she thereby tended to prove falsification, an offense not
 alleged in the information. Petitioner also contends that the RTC grossly
erred in admitting as evidence Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive, despite their being private documents that were not duly
authenticated as required by Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether or not the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive) were admissible as evidence of petitioner’s guilt for
estafa as charged despite their not being duly authenticated.

Ruling: No, the ledgers and receipts were not admissible as evidence of
petitioner’s guilt for estafa.

Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court distinguishes between a

public document and a private document for the purpose of their
presentation in evidence.
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the
documents may be presented as evidence in court.

A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or

because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial
will) or a competent public official with the formalities required by law, or
because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-
authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be
presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any other
writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the
intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some
disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or
sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by
law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed by
law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court. The
requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four
instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the
context of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b) when the
genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have not been
specifically denied under oath by the adverse party; c) when the genuineness
and authenticity of the document
have been admitted; or (d) when the document is not being offered as
genuine.

There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were

private documents because private individuals executed or generated them
for private or business purposes or uses. Considering that none of the
exhibits came under any of the four exceptions, they could not be presented
and admitted as evidence against petitioner without the Prosecution
dutifully seeing to their authentication in the manner provided in Section20
of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
 PEOPLE vs. CRISTOBAL
G.R. No. 159450; March 30, 2011

Facts: Accused was charged of the offense qualified theft. After the accused
pleaded not guilty at arraignment, the Stated presented its witnesses. When
the State rested its case against the accused, her counsel filed a Demurrer to
Evidence and Motion to Defer Defense Evidence, praying for the dismissal of
the charge on the ground that the evidence of the State did not suffice to
establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The RTC denied the Demurrer to
Evidence and Motion to Defer Defense Evidence and deemed the case
submitted for decision on the basis that her filing her demurrer to evidence
without express leave of court as required by Section 15, Rule 119, of the
Rules of Court had waived her right to present evidence.

The RTC rendered its decision finding and pronouncing the accused
guilty of qualified. The accused appealed, but the CA affirmed her conviction,
albeit modifying the penalty.

Issue: Whether or not Cristobal waived the presentation of her evidence

when she filed her "Demurrer To Evidence and Motion to Defer Evidence"
without prior leave of court.
Ruling: Yes, Cristobal waived the presentation of her evidence when she filed
her “Demurrer to Evidence and Motion to Defer Evidence”, without prior
leave of court.

Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court provides: xxx If the court
denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his
defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express
leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the
case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.

Under the rule, the RTC properly declared the accused to have waived
her right to present evidence because she did not obtain the express leave of
court for her demurrer to evidence, thereby reflecting her voluntary and
knowing waiver of her right to present evidence. The RTC did not need to
inquire into the voluntariness and intelligence of the waiver, for her opting to
file her demurrer to evidence without first obtaining express leave of court
effectively waived her right to present her evidence.

The accused and her counsel should not have ignored the potentially
prejudicial consequence of the filing of a demurrer to evidence without the
leave of court required in Section 15, Rule 119, of the Revised Rules of Court.
They were well aware of the risk of a denial of the demurrer being high, for
by demurring the accused impliedly admitted the facts adduced by the State
and the proper inferences therefrom.

PEOPLE vs. GONZALES

G.R. No. 182417; April 3, 2013

Facts: Gonzales was formally charged in the RTC with a violation of Section
5, Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165. At arraignment, Gonzales entered a
plea of not guilty. During trial, the prosecution presented PO1 Dimla as sole
witness. PO1 Dimla testified that before he acted as poseur buyer in the
afternoon of June 13, 2013, he marked with his own initials "ED" each of the
two P100.00 bills to be used as the buy-bust money, and then recorded the
marked bills in the police blotter. He also testified that Gonzales handed to
him a plastic sachet containing white substances, and in turn he handed the
two marked P100.00 bills to Gonzales. Further, Dimla testified that after
arresting Gonzales, he immediately marked the plastic sachet with his initials
"ED." The Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory Office certified that the
contents the plastic sachet were 0.194 gram of shabu.

For the part of the defense, Gonzales denied the accusation and
attested that he was only resting in front of his house when five armed men
approached and forced him inside his house and that after searching his
house, they brought him to Camp General Alejo Santos. This testimony was
corroborated to by her sister.
 The RTC convicted Gonzales of the crime charged. Gonzales appealed,
to the Court of Appeals, insisting that the RTC erred in finding him guilty as
charged despite the Prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Finding no error on the part of the RTC, however, the CA
affirmed the conviction of Gonzales.

Issue: Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove Gonzales’ guilt for
violation of Section 5, Artile II of RA 9165, beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling: No, the prosecution was not able to prove Gonzales’ guilt for violation
of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, beyond reasonable doubt.

To secure a conviction of the accused charged with the illegal sale of

dangerous drugs as defined and punished by Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165, the State must establish the concurrence of the following
elements, namely: (a) that the transaction or sale took place between the
accused and the poseur buyer; and (b) that the dangerous drugs subject of
the transaction or sale is presented in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.

Anent the second element, it is indispensable for the State to establish

that the dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale and subsequently
examined in the laboratory are the same dangerous drugs presented in court
as evidence. The identity of the dangerous drugs is essential to proving the
corpus delicti. To achieve that end, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 and
Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.
9165 (IRR) define the procedures to be followed by the apprehending
officers in the seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs.

These provisions obviously demand strict compliance, for only by

such strict compliance may be eliminated the grave mischiefs of planting or
substitution of evidence and the unlawful and malicious prosecution of the
weak and unwary that they are intended to prevent. Such strict compliance is
also consistent with the doctrine that penal laws shall be construed strictly
against the Government and liberally in favor of the accused.13

"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements

and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of
dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody
of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held
temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer
of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as
evidence, and the final disposition;

Given the high concern for the due recording of the authorized
movements and custody of the seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant
sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment, the presentation as
evidence in court of the dangerous drugs subject of and recovered during the
illegal sale is material in every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs.17 Without such dangerous drugs being presented as evidence, the
State does not establish the corpus delicti, which, literally translated from
Latin, refers to the body of the crime, or the actual commission by someone
of the particular offense charged

Further review of the records underscores that poseur-buyer

PO1Dimla nowhere recalled in court that he and PO2 Chua had conducted the
physical inventory and photographing of the shabu subject of the sale by
Gonzales. In fact, in their joint affidavit of arrest,24 PO1 Dimla and PO2 Chua
 did not mention any inventory and photographing. The omission can only
mean that no such inventory and photographing were done by them. The
omission of the inventory and photographing exposed another weakness of
the evidence of guilt, considering that the inventory and photographing to be
made in the presence of the accused or his representative, or within the
presence of any representative from the media, Department of Justice or any
elected official, who must sign the inventory, or be given a copy of the
inventory, were really significant stages of the procedures outlined by the
law and its IRR.

MALLARI vs. GSIS

G.R. No. 157659; January 25, 2010

Facts: In 1968, the petitioner obtained two loans totaling P34,000.00 from
respondent GSIS. To secure the performance, he mortgaged two parcels of
land registered under his and his wife Marcelina Mallari’s names. However,
he paid GSIS about ten years after contracting the obligations
only P10,000.00 and P20,000.00

Nearly three years later (1984), GSIS applied for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage by reason of his failure to settle his account. He
requested an updated computation of his outstanding account. He persuaded
the sheriff to hold the publication of the foreclosure to await action on his
pending request for final accounting (that is, taking his payments
of P30,000.00 made in 1978 into account). GSIS responded to his request. It
finally commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against him because
he had meanwhile made no further payments.

The petitioner sued GSIS for preliminary injunction. The RTC decided
in his favor, nullifying the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale. GSIS
appealed to the CA, which reversed the RTC. Petitioner elevated the CA
decision to this Court via petition for review on certiorari. The Supreme
 Court denied his petition for review and motion for reconsideration. As a
result, the CA decision became final and executory, rendering unassailable
both the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale. GSIS acceded to
petitioner’s request for an extension of time to vacate the properties, yet, the
petitioner did not voluntarily vacate the properties, but instead filed a
Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Quash the Writ of Execution and
Motion to Hold GSIS in Contempt of Court for painting the fence of the
properties during the pendency of his said motion.

To prevent the Presiding Judge of Branch 44 of the RTC from resolving

the pending incidents, GSIS moved to inhibit him for alleged partiality. The
case was then re-raffled to Brancg 48, whose presiding judge, on February
11, 2002, denied his motion for reconsideration. By petition for certiorari
dated March 15, 2002 filed in the CA, the petitioner assailed the orders of
February 11, 2002, July 30, 2001 (denying Motion to Hold in Contempt),
October 21, 1999 (Grainting the Writ of execution cum writ of possession),
and October 8, 1999. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of
merit.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for certiorari before the CA was filed out
of time.

Ruling: Yes, the petition for certiorari was filed out of time.

Considering that the motion for reconsideration dated August 17, 2001
denied by the order dated February 11, 2002 was in reality and effect
a prohibited second motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the orders
dated October 21, 1999 and October 8, 1999, the assailed orders dated July
30, 2001, October 21, 1999, and October 8, 1999 could no longer be subject
to attack by certiorari. Thus, the petition for certiorari filed only in March
2002 was already improper and tardy for being made beyond the 60-day
limitation defined in Section 4, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, which requires a petition for certiorari to be filed “not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution,” or, in case a
motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion
is required or not, “the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of
the denial of the said motion.” It is worth emphasizing that the 60-day
limitation is considered inextendible, because the limitation has been
prescribed to avoid any unreasonable delay that violates the constitutional
rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their cases.
PEOPLE vs. VILLAFLORES
G.R. No. 184926; April 11, 2012

Facts: Marita, a four years and eight month-old child was notice by her
mother to be missing on July 2, 1999. In her desperation to find her child who
remained missing the next day, Julia sought out a clairvoyant who hinted that
Marita might be found only five houses away from their own. Following the
clairvoyants direction, they found Maritas lifeless body covered with a blue
and yellow sack inside the comfort room of an abandoned house about five
structures away from their own house.

The ensuing police investigation led to two witnesses, Aldrin Bautista

and Jovy Solidum. Both witnesses narrated that they saw Villaflores leading
Maria by the hand. At noon, the three used shabu for a while, but the
witnesses did not see Marita in the vicinity of Villaflores’ house. It
was only on 3:00PM that they heard cries of a child. At about 7:00PM
both witnesses saw Villaflores carrying a yellow sack which appears heavy,
the same sack that they saw when they were still inside Villaflores’ house.
The wife of the accused also gave a supporting testimony that on the night of
 July 2, 1999 she saw his husband place some sack sunder their house and
then went closer and saw a protruding elbow inside the sack, when
she c o n f r o n t e d h i s h u s b a n d w h o w a s o n d r u g s , V i l l a f l o r e s
said it was nothing.

The City Prosecutor of Caloocan City filed in the RTC the information
charging Villaflores with rape with homicide. The RTC convicted Villaflores,
holding that the circumstantial evidence led to no other conclusion but that
his guilt was shown beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the conviction.

Issue: Whether or not the guilt of Villaflores for rape with homicide was
established beyond reasonable doubt through circumstantial evidence.

Ruling: Yes, the guilt of Villaflores for rape with hokmicide was established
beyond reasonable doubt through circumstantial evidence.

Direct evidence proves a fact in issue directly without any reasoning

or inferences being drawn on the part of the factfinder; in contrast,
circumstantial evidence indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that the
factfinder must draw an inference or reason from circumstantial evidence.
To be clear, then, circumstantial evidence may be resorted to when to insist
on direct testimony would ultimately lead to setting a felon free

Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court specifies when circumstantial

evidence is sufficient for conviction, viz: (a) There is more than one
circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (5)

In resolving to convict Villaflores, several circumstances, which when

appreciated together and not piece by piece, were seen as strands which
create a pattern when interwoven, and formed an unbroken chain that led to
the reasonable conclusion that Villaflores, to the exclusion of all others, was
guilty of rape with homicide.

Firstly, the witnesses saw Villaflores holding Marita by the hand

leading the child through the alley going towards the direction of his house
econdly, Marita went missing after that and remained missing until the
discovery of her lifeless body on the following day. Thirdly, Solidum passed
by Villaflores house and heard the crying and moaning of a child coming from
inside. Fourthly, Solidum saw Villaflores coming from his house carrying a
yellow sack that appeared to be heavy and going towards the abandoned
house where the childs lifeless body was later found. Fifthly, the father of
Marita, identified the yellow sack as the same yellow sack that covered the
head of his daughter at the time he discovered her body. Manito also
mentioned that a blue sack covered her body. Sixthly, a hidden pathway
existed between the abandoned house where Marita’s body was found and
Villaflores house, because his house had a rear exit that enabled access to the
abandoned house without having to pass any other houses. Seventhly,
several pieces of evidence recovered from the abandoned house, like the
white rope around the victims neck and the yellow sack, were traced to
Villaflores. Eighthly, the medico-legal findings showed that Marita had died
from asphyxiation by strangulation, which cause of death was consistent
with the ligature marks on her neck and the multiple injuries including
abrasions, hematomas, contusions and punctured wounds. Ninthly, Marita
sustained multiple deep fresh hymenal lacerations, and had fresh blood from
her genitalia. The vaginal and periurethral smears taken from her body
tested positive for spermatozoa. And, tenthly, the body of Marita was already
 in the second stage of flaccidity at the time of the autopsy of her cadaver,
indicating that such stage of flaccidity confirmed that she had been dead for
more than 24 hours.

These circumstances were links in an unbroken chain whose totality

has brought a moral certainty of the guilt of Villaflores for rape with homicide.

PEOPLE vs. PO2 VALDEZ

G.R. No. 175602; January 18, 2012

Facts: The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charged the two
accused in the RTC with three counts of murder for the killing of Ferdinand
Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson.

On March 1, 2000, at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, Estrella

Sayson, (Estrella) was at the canteen, preparing for the celebration of the
birthday of her second husband, Wilfredo Lladones, which was held later in
the evening. Estrella’s son, the deceased Moises Sayson, a former policeman,
and his wife, Susan Sayson (Susan) owned the said canteen and managed the
betting station. At about 9:00 o’clock in the evening, Estrella’s other sons
Joselito Sayson (Joselito) and Ferdinand Sayson (Ferdinand) arrived at the
canteen to greet their stepfather. Estrella’s family and other visitors ate and
enjoyed themselves at the party. At about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, the
celebration was interrupted with the arrival of Eduardo and Edwin, who
alighted from a motorcycle in front of the jai alai fronton. Eduardo and Edwin
asked the jai alai teller, Jonathan Rubio (Jonathan), to come out. Jonathan
was then attending to customers who were buying jai alai tickets. Moises
approached Eduardo and Edwin and tried to reason with them. Estrella saw
 Eduardo and Edwin armed with guns. She tried to prevent Moises from going
near Edwin and Eduardo. Moises did not heed his mother’s warning. He went
out and advised Eduardo and Edwin not to force Jonathan to go out of the
fronton. Estrella then heard one of the accused-appellants threaten Moises
with the words “Gusto mo unahin na kita?” Moises replied “huwag.”
Successive shots were thereafter heard. Moises fell and was continuously
fired upon even after he was sprawled on the ground. Ferdinand immediately
approached the scene to help his brother Moises. Ferdinand, however was
shot on the left temporal portion of his head and fell. Somebody told Joselito
to run away, but he was hit at the back while running. Joselito fell on a burger
machine. After shooting the Sayson brothers, Eduardo and Edwin escaped
from the scene of the crime.

The RTC convicted the two accused of three counts of murder and
sentenced them to suffer reclusion perpetua for each count of murder. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the convictions. Accused, assails, in the appeal they
filed before the Supreme Court, the credibility of the State’s witnesses by
pointing to inconsistencies and weaknesses in their testimonies; challenges
the finding of conspiracy between the accused; and contends that the State
did not establish the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

Issue: Whether or not the prosecution sufficiently established the qualifying

circumstance of treachery.

Ruling: No, the prosecution did not sufficiently establish the qualifying
circumstances of treachery.

Treachery is the employment of means, methods, or forms in the

execution of any of the crimes against persons which tend to directly and
specially insure its execution, without risk to the offending party arising from
the defense which the offended party might make. It encompasses a wide
variety of actions and attendant circumstances, the appreciation of which is
particular to a crime committed. Corollarily, the defense against the
appreciation of a circumstance as aggravating or qualifying is also varied and
dependent on each particular instance. Such variety generates the actual
need for the State to specifically aver the factual circumstances or particular
acts that constitute the criminal conduct or that qualify or aggravate the
liability for the crime in the interest of affording the accused sufficient notice
to defend himself.

For a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name

of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and
the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the
title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the
particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime
charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions
complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person
of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged,
and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a
crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the
elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in
the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included
therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of
the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in
the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation
against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The
 presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts
that constitute the offense.

The averments of the information to the effect that the two accused
“with intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse
of superior strength did xxx “assault, attack and employ personal violence
upon” the victims by then and there shooting them with a gun, hitting them
on various parts of their bodies which were the direct and immediate cause
of their deaths” did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances
describing how treachery attended each of the killings. It should not be
difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by shooting him
with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the crime was
directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense
that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to kill
was not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve the
same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a
sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a
conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and
circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in
murder were missing from the information.

PEOPLE vs. TAPERE

G.R. No. 178065; February 20, 2013

Facts: At around 7:30 p.m. on September 2, 2002, elements of the Philippine

Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) arrested Tapere for selling shabu to a
poseur buyer during a buy-bust operation conducted against him in Purok
San Antonio, Iligan City. Prior to the buy-bust operation, Tapere was already
included in the PDEA’s drug watch list as a drug pusher based on the
frequent complaints made against him by residents of Purok San Antonio,
Iligan City. It appears that SPO2 Diosdado Cabahug of the PDEA, a neighbor,
had warned Tapere to stop his illegal activities, but he apparently ignored the
warning and continued to sell shabu in that locality. Such continuing activity
on the part of Tapere was the subject of the report of PDEA informant Gabriel
Salgado. An entrapment was executed in order to arrest Tapere in the act of
selling shabu while vending lanzones along side Tipanoy. Accused alleged
that he was just asked by Salgado to buy the shabu where disobeying him is
not an option for him. He further alleged that the way he was arrested was by
instigation which is absolutory in nature entitling him to acquittal.

Issue: Whether or not Tapere’s arrest resulted from a legitimate

entrapment.
Ruling: Yes, Tapere’s arrest resulted from a legitimate entrapment.

Instigation takes place when a peace officer induces a person to

commit a crime. Without the inducement, the crime would not be committed.
Hence, it is exempting by reason of public policy; otherwise, the peace officer
would be a co-principal. It follows that the person instigating must not be a
private person, because he will be liable as a principal by inducement. On the
other hand, entrapment signifies the ways and means devised by a peace
officer to entrap or apprehend a person who has committed a crime. With or
without the entrapment, the crime has been committed already. Hence,
entrapment is not mitigating. Although entrapment is sanctioned by law,
instigation is not. The difference between the two lies in the origin of the
criminal intent – in entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the
criminal, but in instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the
crime and suggests it to the accused, who adopts the idea and carries it into
execution.

Tapere was caught in flagrante delicto committing the illegal sale of

shabu during the buy-bust operation. In that operation, Salgado offered to
buy from him a definite quantity of shabu for P100.00. Even if, as he claims,
he was unaware that Salgado was then working as an undercover agent for
the PDEA, he had no justification for accepting the offer of Salgado to buy the
shabu. His explanation that he could not have refused Salgado's offer to buy
for fear of displeasing the latter was implausible. He did not show how
Salgado could have influenced him at all into doing something so blatantly
illegal. What is clear to us, therefore, is that the decision to peddle the shabu
emanated from his own mind, such that he did not need much prodding from
Salgado or anyone else to engage in the sale of the shabu; hence, he was not
incited, induced, instigated or lured into committing an offense that he did
not have the intention of committing.

PEOPLE vs. SALAFRANCA

G.R. No. 173476; February 22, 2012

Facts: Johnny Bolanon (Bolanon) was stabbed by Rodrigo Salafranca

(Salafranca) on the night of July 31, 1993, after the said incident, the assailant
ran away. Bolanon still being able to walk, went to his uncle, Rodolfo B.
Estaño to seek help. After having known of the incident, Estaño then brought
Bolanon to PGH. On their way to the hospital on board a taxi, Bolanon
confided to Estaño about the incident and told him that it was Salafranca who
stabbed him and a certain Augusto Mendoza witnessed the said incident. At
around 2:30am, despite receiving medical attention, Bolanon succumbed to
death.

Issue: Whether or not the utterance made by Balanon can be considered a

dying declaration.

Ruling: Yes, the utterance made by Balanon is not only considered as a dying
declaration but also as part of the res gestae.

The statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after
the hacking incident borel all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or
part of the res gestae, either of which was an exception to the hearsay rule.
 A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due
to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following
requisites concur: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the
declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending
death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the
declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide, in
which the declarant is a victim. All the requisites were met.

Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement to Estao,

identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At the time of his
statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending death, having sustained a
stab wound in the chest and, according to Estao, was then experiencing great
difficulty in breathin. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital emergency room a
few minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours after the
stabbing. There is ample authority for the view that the declarant’s belief in
the imminence of his death can be shown by the declarant’s own statements
or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of his wounds,
statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of his physician. Bolanon
would have been competent to testify on the subject of the declaration had
he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal
prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim.

A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and

thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the
following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a
startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statgements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.

Here, the requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res

gestae concur. Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estao,
Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, i.e. his stabbing by
Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the taxicab that would bring him to
the hospital; and thus had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca
as the assailant. His utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was
made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. The
statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the perpetrator.

The term res gestae has been defined as those circumstances which
are the undersigned’s incidents of a particular litigated act and which are
admissible when illustrative of such act. In a general way, res gestae refers to
the circumstances, facts and declarations that grow out of the main fact and
serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and
contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation
and fabrication.

The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements

made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during or immediately after the commission of the crime
when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion
and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate
a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res
gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so
intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also
 whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.

PEOPLE vs. TAGUIBUYA

G.R. No. 180497; October 5, 2011

Facts: The accused was charged with two counts of rape and a violation of
Republic Act No. 7610, committed against his own minor daughter. The RTC
accorded credence to the testimony of the minor victim and found the
accused guilty of two counts of qualified rape due to the minority of the
victim at the time of the commission of the rapes and because he had
admitted being her father. The RTC acquitted him of the violation of Republic
Act No. 7610 on the ground that the information did not allege that the victim
had been been a child below eighteen years of age but over twelve years.
Consequently the accused was ordered to pay seventy five thousand and fifty
thousand pesos in each case as civil indemnity and by way of moral damages,
respectively. The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the RTC but it
however reduced the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with no
possibility of parole for each of the two (2) counts of consummated rape and
ordered the accused to indemnify the victim for each of the two counts of
consummated rape the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00
as moral damages.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals ordered the correct civil indemnities
for the two counts of rape.
Ruling: No, the Court of Appeald did not order the correct civil indemnities for the
two counts of rape.

Civil indemnity is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape; it is

distinct from and should not be denominated as moral damages, which are
based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise
of its discretion. In contrast, moral damages are granted to the victim in rape
in such amount as the court shall deem just and reasonable without the
necessity of pleading or proof. Indeed, the fact that the victim suffered the
trauma of mental, physical and psychological sufferings that constituted the
bases for moral damages is too obvious to still require the recital of such
sufferings by the victim at the trial; the trial court itself assumes and
acknowledges her agony as a gauge of her credibility. To expect and to
require her to still provide the proof of her pains and sufferings is to demand
that she render a very superfluous testimonial charade.

Exemplary damages, which are intended to serve as deterrents to

serious wrongdoings and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton
invasion of the rights of an injured, or as a punishment for those guilty of
outrageous conduct, are awarded under Article 2230 of the Civil Code when
the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. The
term aggravating circumstances as used by the Civil Code should be
understood in its broad or generic sense, not in the sense of prescribing a
heavier punishment on the offender; hence, the ordinary or qualifying nature
of an aggravating circumstance should be a distinction that was of
consequence only to the criminal, as contrasted from the civil, liability,
thereby entitling the offended party or victim to an award of exemplary
damages regardless of whether the aggravating circumstance was ordinary
or qualifying.

Being the victim of two counts of qualified rape, the minor daughter,
was entitled to recover for each count of rape the amounts of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

PEOPLE vs. TEODORO

G.R. No. 175876; February 20, 2013

Facts: Two informations, both dated March 25, 1998, charged Teodoro with
statutory rape for allegedly having carnal knowledge over his eight-year-old
step-daughter, AAA, on December 18, 1997 and February 8, 1998. At his
arraignment, Teodoro pleaded not guilty. Although he subsequently
manifested a willingness to change the pleas to guilty, he balked when he was
re-arraigned by qualifying that he had only "fingered" AAA. Accordingly, the
RTC reinstated his pleas of not guilty.

During the trial, AAA and her mother, BBB, testified for the
Prosecution, but two years later recanted and turned hostile towards the
Prosecution, now telling the RTC that Teodoro had only touched AAA’s
vagina on the nights of the alleged rape.

The RTC rendered its judgment convicting Teodoro on both counts of

statutory rape notwithstanding the recantations by AAA and BBB. The RTC
rejected AAA’s recantation of her accusation for being inconsistent with the
testimony of Dr. Abrenillo showing that the redness on the edges of the
protective structure of her vaginal opening had been caused by friction from
the forceful introduction of an erect penis; and that such forceful
 introduction of an erect penis had led to the gaping of the labia minora and
labia majora of AAA. On appeal, the CA sustained the RTC, and ignored AAA’s
recantation for being dictated by her family’s financial difficulties. It agreed
with the observation of the Office of the Solicitor General to the effect that
AAA’s recantation should not be considered because it came about after she
had returned home from the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.

Issue: Whether or not the recantation made by AAA should be accepted by the
court.

Ruling: No, the recantation made by AAA should not be accepted by the court.

As a rule, recantation is viewed with disfavor firstly because the

recantation of her testimony by a vital witness of the State like AAA is
exceedingly unreliable, and secondly because there is always the possibility
that such recantation may later be repudiated. Indeed, to disregard
testimony solemnly given in court simply because the witness recants it
ignores the possibility that intimidation or monetary considerations may
have caused the recantation.

Court proceedings, in which testimony upon oath or affirmation is

required to be truthful under all circumstances, are trivialized by the
recantation. The trial in which the recanted testimony was given is made a
mockery, and the investigation is placed at the mercy of an unscrupulous
witness. Before allowing the recantation, therefore, the court must not be too
willing to accept it, but must test its value in a public trial with sufficient
opportunity given to the party adversely affected to cross-examine the
recanting witness both upon the substance of the recantation and the
motivations for it.

The recantation, like any other testimony, is subject to the test of

credibility based on the relevant circumstances, including the demeanor of
the recanting witness on the stand. In that respect, the finding of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight on appeal
unless cogent reasons necessitate its re-examination, the reason being that
the trial court is in a better position to hear first-hand and observe the
deportment, conduct and attitude of the witnesses.

PEOPLE vs. ZAKARIA

G.R. No. 181042; November 26, 2012

Facts: A confidential informant went to the CALABARZON Regional Office

of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) in Camp Vicente Lim in
Calamba, Laguna and informed Chief Supt. Abe Lemos that he had entered
into a drug deal with alias Danny and alias Joana to take place at 287 Tamayo
Compound on Caliraya Drive, in Taguig City. Thereafter, Chief Supt. Lemos
tasked Insp. Julius Ceasar Ablang to form a team for a buy-bust operation,
made up of PO2 Aninias as poseur-buyer, and SPO2 Gerry Abalos, SPO1
Miguel Lapitan, SPO1 Norman Jesus Platon, PO3 Ronald Valdez, PO3 Sherwin
Bulan, and PO3 Danilo Leona as the other team members. Insp. Ablang gave a
P500.00 bill to PO2 Aninias to serve as the buy-bust money. PO2 Aninias
wrote his initials “LLA” on the P500.00 bill, and then placed the marked bill
on the bundle of boodle money that seemingly amounted to P98,000.00. He
put the boodle money in a white window envelope.
 PO2 Aninias, PO3 Valdez and the confidential informant surveyed the
target area in order to confirm if drug activities were taking place there. PO2
Aninias observed there about ten persons going in and out of the target area.
About 30 minutes later, PO2 Aninias and his companions left the target area
and returned to the Regional Office to report their observations. The next
day, the confidential informant contacted Danny to tell him that he had a
buyer. They agreed to have the deal at the target area. Insp. Ablang prepared
a pre-operation report, and coordinated with the PDEA National Office.

Using a Toyota Revo and a Mitsubishi Adventure, the buy-bust team

arrived at the target area. PO2 Aninias parked the Revo some 10 meters
away from the target area, while the other driver parked the Adventure
about 50 meters from the Revo. The confidential informant then called
Danny and told him that he and the buyer were already in the vicinity, but
Danny advised them to wait for the shabu to be prepared. PO2 Aninias moved
the Revo closer to the target area. Not long after, Danny arrived. The
confidential informant, whom Danny personally knew, motioned to Danny to
get on board the Revo. Once Danny got in the Revo, the confidential
informant introduced PO2 Aninias to Danny as the buyer of shabu.

Danny asked PO2 Aninias about the money. PO2 Aninias showed to
Danny the white window envelope containing the P500.00 bill and boodle
money. Saying that the shabu was with his wife, Danny then got out of the
Revo to fetch her. After nearly 15 minutes, Danny returned with a woman.
The confidential informant requested the two to board the Revo. Danny
introduced the woman to PO2 Aninias as his wife Joana. Danny again asked
for the money. PO2 Aninias once more flashed the white window envelope to
Danny and asked to see the shabu. Danny pulled three sachets containing
white crystalline substance from his pocket and handed the sachets to PO2
Aninias, who turned over the white window envelope to Joana and forthwith
made a missed call to PO3 Valdez.

The missed call was the pre-arranged signal indicating that the
transaction was consummated. As Danny was about to count the money in
the envelope, PO2 Aninias drew and pointed his gun at Danny and Joana. The
rest of the team, who had meanwhile rushed towards the Revo as soon as
PO3 Valdez received PO2 Aninias’ missed call, quickly arrested the two
suspects.
 2017 Bar Examinations – Remedial Law Cases

PO2 Aninias immediately placed his initials on the three sachets received
from Danny, while PO3 Valdez recovered the boodle money from Joana. The
team then brought Danny and Joana to Camp Vicente Lim for investigation.
Danny was identified as Samin Zakaria y Makasulay and Joana as Joana Zakaria y
Silungan.

Bearing the Request for a Laboratory Examination prepared by Chief Supt.

Lemos, PO2 Aninias turned over the seized sachets and their contents to the PNP
Regional Crime Laboratory, where Forensic Chemist Sr. Insp. Donna Villa
Huelgas conducted qualitative and quantitative examinations on the contents. The
examinations yielded positive results for the presence of methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

A certificate of inventory22 was issued by the PDEA Regional Office and

was signed by Insp. Ablang, Bell Desolo of Abante-Tonite, and Victor Penid, an
official of Barangay Mapayapa.

PO3 Valdez corroborated PO2 Aninias’ account of the conduct of the

surveillance and buy-bust operation. PO3 Valdez said that during the operation he
received the missed call from PO2 Aninias and immediately rushed towards the
Revo to assist in the arrest of the two suspects.23 He attested that he recovered the
marked money from Joana.24

68 Good luck, GOD BLESS and may the odds be ever in your favor!  - GMDC06062017