Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Anupam Sarkar1
Jechonia Islary1
Abstract
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (2005) is regarded
as largest public employment programme in the world. As per the official
parlance MGNREGA belongs to the core of core programmes of Government
of India. Majority of participants of MGNREGA are poor and vulnerable sections
of the society. `480 billion has been allocated for the programme in Central
government budget in 2017–18. However, in recent years there are criticisms
on the government to weaken and dilute the key features of the programme to
the detriment of the interest of poor labourers. On the other hand many see the
programme as unnecessary drag on public money. In this context this article aims
to study recent trend and patterns of participation, employment and income
generation from MGNREGA among casual labourers in Jharkhand which happens
to be one of poor and tribal dominated states of India.
Keywords
Manual work, public works programmes, rural labour market, labour force
participation, unemployment, daily wages and earnings, MGNREGA
Introduction
In India, there have been emphases on creation of employment and earning oppor-
tunities for the poor after independence. Several programmes were launched
throughout the course of independent India with the target of poverty alleviation
and generation of employment. First such programme at the state level-Employment
Guarantee Scheme (EGS) of Maharashtra was launched in 1972–73. At the
1
Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai, Maharashtra, India.
Corresponding author:
Anupam Sarkar, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai, Maharashtra, India.
E-mails: anupamonnet@gmail.com; anupam.sarkar@tiss.edu
Sarkar and Islary 21
Literature Review
in the programme. Reddy, Reddy and Bantilan (2014) argued that participation
of women in MGNREGA works is higher because MGNREGA is perceived as
working for government rather than private proprietors, parity between male and
female wages and on-site facilities such as child care, first aid and dignified work
environment.
[T]he ideal that NREGS should serve the deprived and the poor through the self-selection
mechanism was based on the belief that the programme wages will provide adequate
motivation to people who intend to work but do not have access to work in the local
economy. Besides, the amount of the daily wage should be just about the level of the
reservation wages of deprived households … NREGA wages should not be too high or
too low, but such that the poor, when they intend, can seek employment that is available
on demand.
Jha, Gaiha and Pandey (2011) in their study covering 1,500 MGNREGA labour
households spread over three states—Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Andhra
Pradesh—have found that net increase in household income from MGNREGA
amounts to 7 per cent in Maharashtra, 10 per cent in Rajasthan and 17 per cent in
Andhra Pradesh. In a study covering 1,064 households in Medak district of Andhra
Pradesh, Ravi and Engler (2013) have found that 12 per cent of respondents reported
increase in household income due to employment opportunities in MGNREGA.
Banerjee and Saha (2010) in their study in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Odisha
reported that most of the household purchasing power to have enough food grains
would have curtailed had MGNREGA not been implemented in the study region.
According to Chand and Srivastava (2014), MGNREGA has been effective in setting
a higher benchmark for wage rate, changing work environment and work culture in
rural labour market. Several other studies like Morgan (2012) and Berg et al. (2012)
have shown faster rise in unskilled rural wage in post MGNREGA period.
Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (2011) argue that MGNREGA has caused wages
to rise, open unemployment to come down and gender gap in wages to decrease.
Jose (2013), however, cautions against drawing any ‘rosy picture’ of effect of the
scheme. He cites the study by Kannan and Raveendran (2011, 2012) who argue
that MGNREGA seems to have made only a marginal impact on living standards
of rural poor and the question of creating gainful employment for rural women
labour force remains as pertinent as ever (Jose 2013).
disclosure of data. In addition to this, placing muster rolls for public scrutiny
and direct transfer of payments to bank accounts have further reduced the scope
for corruption (Dreze 2014b). The most common form of embezzlement of
funds in public works programmes adopted by middlemen is inflating the muster
rolls by showing higher number of workdays and pocketing the difference.
However, the Public Evaluation of Entitlement Programmes Survey (PEEP;
Dreze and Khera 2013) found that for the sample of 2,000 households spread
over 10 states, there is very little difference in average number of days worked
in 2012–13 in MGNREGA schemes as self-reported by sample households
(21–22 days) and the official records (23 days). Another aspect of corruption is
construction of poor quality of assets with public money. However, a study by
Narayanan et al. (2014) on assessment of assets created under MGNREGA in
Maharashtra found that 86.6 per cent of total assets exist and are functional, 51
per cent and 40 per cent of the households reported that the assets created are
useful and somewhat useful, respectively.
The scheme has come under criticisms from social activists, practitioners and
academicians alike for rising delays in wage payment. According to official data,
delayed payments constitute 70 per cent of all wage payments (Dreze 2016).
Some recent amendments in the scheme’s guidelines can also potentially erode
workers welfare and give rise to corruption. Government has allowed machine
use in activities such as road connectivity, building construction, production of
building material, and dug wells for improving land productivity. Consequently,
the permissible ratio of labour and material has been reduced to 51:49 from earlier
60:40. Saha and Verick (2016) are of the opinion that these changes will increase
the influence of job contractors in MGNREGA. Moreover, material-intensive
works are more vulnerable to corruption (Dreze 2014b). A second area of concern
is the compensation for delayed wage payments which has been reduced to 0.05
per cent of daily wage (ibid.).
Aggarwal (2016), in the context of Jharkhand, has opined that lack of
accountability on the part of functionaries, shortage of trained staff and weak
grievance redressal system are some of the problem plaguing implementation
of the Act in the state. Apart from the procedural bottlenecks, success of the
programme crucially depends on awareness among masses and their partici-
pation at all levels. Studies have found that there exists very low awareness
among people regarding unemployment allowance, work on demand and griev-
ance redressal mechanism. Despite substantial role of gram sabhas prescribed
in the Act in identification and prioritization of the work to be undertaken by
the scheme, in actual implementation, gram sabhas are held infrequently, very
few attend gram sabhas and oftentimes projects sanctioned are not in accord-
ance with priorities or demand of gram sabhas. A study by NSSO in Andhra
Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan reveal that for the financial year
2008–09, only 12.5 per cent, 27.2 per cent and 21.5 per cent of the households
in these three states, respectively, had attended gram sabha. A whopping 82.7
per cent in Andhra Pradesh, 75.6 per cent in Madhya Pradesh and 83.7 per cent
in Rajasthan are not aware of provision of any compensation in case of work
sought but not provided.
Sarkar and Islary 25
Nearly 59 per cent of the total workforce is engaged in agriculture. There has
been a decline of share of cultivators in total workers and a corresponding rise in
the share of agricultural labourers. This, on the one hand, indicates increased dis-
tress and inequality, and on the other, poses a major challenge for gainful employ-
ment of labourers.
Data from quinquennial employment and unemployment surveys of NSSO
shows decline in labour force participation rate (LFPR) in Jharkhand between
2004–05 and 2011–12.2 However, there are some positive developments as sea-
sonal unemployment or underemployment, as captured by current weekly sta-
tus and daily status, has come down since 2004–05 (Table 3). This period also
roughly overlaps with the implementation period of MGNREGA.
NSS data also throws light on the increasing casualization of workforce in
Jharkhand. There has been an expansion of share of casual labourers from 22.2
per cent in 2004–05 to 30.7 per cent in 2011–12. During the same period, share
Sarkar and Islary 27
of self-employed has declined and share of regular wage salaried has remained
unchanged (Table 4). However, this is not an isolated phenomenon for Jharkhand,
rather part of an overall trend of sustained decline of self-employment and rise
in casual wage employment that is observed across sectors and regions: a trend
that began in the 1990s and has only gained momentum in the first decade of the
2000s. According to Chadha and Sahu (2002), rising incidence of proportion of
agricultural labourers in rural workforce is a worrisome tendency as this may
indicate that many of the previously self-employed cultivators or landholders are
leaving self-cultivation to join the rank of landless labourers.
28 International Journal of Rural Management 13(1)
Nominal daily wage rate in works other than public works has increased from
`52.5 per day to `132 per day in Jharkhand between 2004–05 and 2011–12.
This has followed roughly the same course as the all-India level. However, in
Jharkhand, this growth rate in casual wage is much slower than wage from regular
salaried employment which has multiplied by more than three times during the
same period (Table 5).
In sum, rural labour market in Jharkhand is characterized by high incidence of
poverty, increasing casualization, stagnation in regular salaried employment oppor-
tunities and slower growth in wages from causal employment. Worsening labour
market conditions call for employment security programmes for rural labourers
to supplement their livelihood and income opportunities. As Ghosh (2004) has
pointed out—‘government sponsored special employment programmes, designed
to directly generate wage employment for the working poor, must remain an essen-
tial component of [public] policy.’ He further adds, ‘special employment schemes
can and should be viewed as instruments for simultaneously reducing underem-
ployment and increasing the real wage for casual labour in agriculture’ (ibid.).
50
40
30
20
10
0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Fiscal year
Jharkhand India
Bokaro
Chatra
Deogarh
Dhanbad
Dumka
East Singbhum
Garhwa
Giridih
Godda
Gumla
Hazaribag
Jamtara
Jharkhand
Khunti
Koderma
Latehar
Lohardaga
Pakur
Palamu
Ramgarh
Ranchi
Sahenganj
Saraikela Kharsawan
Simdega
West Singbhum
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2014–15 2015–16
90
80
70
Percentage of households
60
50
40
30
20
10
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Fiscal year
Jharkhand India
Literacy Rate
Data shows a moderately negative association between average days of employ-
ment per household and literacy rate. Correlation coefficient between these two
variables is –0.41. This shows that demand for work is low in districts with higher
level of literacy. The self-targeting mechanism of MGNREGA led greater rate of
self-selection into the programme by illiterate workers. Several other studies have
found that MGNREGA is more likely to attract workers with lower education
level. This is primarily because illiterate workers are at a disadvantageous posi-
tion in job markets elsewhere. Joshi, Desai and Tiwari (2015) found that among
the households in which no adult member is literate, about 30 per cent of them
participate in MGNREGA compared to 13 per cent among other households.
A study by the Institute of Applied Manpower Research (IAMR 2007) covering
6,000 workers in 20 districts across the country found that more than half (53.2
per cent) of the MGNREGA workers who ‘could not put their signature on record
and recorded their signature by thumb impression’. This proportion is highest in
the western region (81.42 per cent).
Income Poverty
There exists a strong positive association between share of households with family
income less than `5,000 per month and average days of employment generated
per household under MGNREGA. Correlation coefficient between these two vari-
ables is 0.65. This implies that there exists a higher demand for MGNREGA in
poorer districts. Several other papers—Dutta et al. (2014), and Saha and Verick
(2016)—found higher demand for MGNREGA works among poorer households.
Dutta et al. (2014) analysed the questions of demand for and participation in
MGNREGA works across states using NSS 64th round data. Their study found
that the association between share of households demanding work and head count
ratio of poverty at state level was 0.59.
While a separate study is needed for full assessment of the reasons behind
this improved performance in terms of generation of employment, preliminary
analysis points to the recent initiatives taken in Jharkhand to increase involve-
ment of different stakeholders—rural masses, officials, panchayati raj institu-
tions and civil society—at various levels of planning and implementation of
the scheme, focusing on capacity building of grass-roots level functionaries and
efforts towards bringing accountability and transparency in the process. Few
such initiatives are Kaam Maango Abhiyaan, Cluster Facilitation Team (CFT)
projects and Yojana Banao Abhiyaan. Operational guidelines of Ministry of Rural
Development (2013) provide for creation of CFTs for helping gram panchay-
ats, inhabited mostly by socio-economically backward households, in capacity
building, community mobilization, facilitate planning, designing and smooth
implementation of the works, maintaining accounts and MIS. Initially, 250 blocks
across the country were selected for CFT implementation including 76 blocks
70 70
60 60
50 50
40 40
40 45 50 55 60 50 60 70 80 90
Literacy rate Share households with monthly income <`5000
Average days per household Fitted values Average days per household Fitted values
Figure 5. Association between Number of Days of Employment per Households and Literacy Rate, Share of Households with Monthly Income Less
than `5,000 per month
Sources: MIS of MGNREGA, Census (2011) and Ministry of Rural Development (2011).
Sarkar and Islary 33
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 2014–15 2015–16
Fiscal year
Jharkhand India
90
Share of Scheduled Castes
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 2014–15 2015–16
Fiscal year
Jharkhand India
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 2014–15 2015–16
Fiscal year
Jharkhand India
asks for each household member of age 18 years or more whether the person is reg-
istered in MGNREGA job card, whether he/she has sought work under MGNREGA
during the last 365 days and whether the jobseeker has actually worked in MGNREGA
schemes at least one day during this period. Rationing in the allotment of job in
public works programmes happens when more people demand employment under
the scheme than the maximum number of people whom could be provided employ-
ment. Dutta et al. (2014), Narayan and Das (2014) defined ‘rationing rate’ as the
proportion of job seekers who were not allotted work. Official data from MGNREGA
MIS permits calculation of rationing rate only at the household level and this show
a very small albeit increasing proportion of rural households face rationing. For
example, as per MIS, while in 2012–13 only 0.33 per cent of households who
demanded work could not be provided employment, this number has risen to 3.1 per
cent in 2015–16. Thus, it is important to look at individual level data and the ration-
ing faced by different socio-economic class of individual workers. This pattern of
rationing can be studied with unit level data of NSS 68th round.
Table 6 shows that in 2011–12, only 19 per cent of the individuals in rural
Jharkhand were registered under MGNREGA job cards. 15 per cent had sought
work during that year, 11 per cent actually worked and 30 per cent of rural work-
ers who sought employment under MGNREGA did not get work. Demand for
work and participation rate is higher among marginalized groups such as SC and
STs than others. Similarly, workers from BPL families have higher demand and
participation rate than APL families. There is also evidence from NSS data that
workers from socio-economically vulnerable groups such as workers educated
up to primary, SC and ST workers and workers from BPL families face relatively
higher rationing than their better off counterparts.
Year
Apr '06–Mar '07
for field labourers in agriculture (`104 per day for male and `99 per day for
female workers). There exists no difference in male and female daily wage under
MGNREGA, although even in other public works programmes daily wage rate
for male workers is higher than female labourers by `20.
MGNREGA wages are not related to state minimum wages. As shown in
Table 8, minimum wages in MGNREGA fixed by MoRD has remained below the
statutory minimum wage for agricultural labourers in Jharkhand since 2011–12.
Here it would be pertinent to say that although statutory minimum wages in the
Table 8. Agriculture and MGNREGA Minimum Wage and Average Daily Earnings from
MGNREGA (` per day at Current Prices)
Minimum Agricultural Wage Average
First half Second half Minimum Wage for Daily Wages
(1 April–30 (1 October–31 MGNREGA as Paid in
Year September) March) Notified by Centre MGNREGA
2011–12 133.81 138.39 120 120
2012–13 145.54 150.38 122 122
2013–14 160.03 167.17 138 138
2014–15 177.07 178.67 158 158
2015–16 187.43 212.47 162 162
Source: Department of Labour, Employment and Training, Government of Jharkhand and MoRD,
GoI.
Note: * Including variable dearness allowances (V.D.A).
Sarkar and Islary 39
state are revised twice in a year and has risen faster, in most of the places, the
norms are not followed by private employers and actual wage paid is much less.
Nevertheless, meagre increase in MGNREGA wages has been a source of major
discontent among workers (The Wire 2016a).
55
55
50
50
45
45
40
40
35
35
30
30
25
25
20
20
15
15
10
10
40 45 50 55 60 65 70 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Average days of employment per household Share of Job cardholders demanded employment during the year
Fitted values Share of delayed wage payments in total Fitted values Share of delayed wage payments in total
Figure 10. Association between Delay in Wage Payments with Average Days of Employment and Share of Job Cardholders Demanded Work for
2015–16
Source: MIS of MGNREGA.
Sarkar and Islary 41
have either demanded or worked under MGNREGA during the last three years.
Members of nearly 62,000 registered households have worked in MGNREGA
in 2015–16 which amounts to 57.7 per cent of active job cardholders or 34.3
per cent of total job cardholders. In 2013–14, we did few case studies on some
procedural aspects in implementation of MGNREGA, which have direct bear-
ing on the welfare and benefits received by poor participants of the scheme in
the district. For the purpose of confidentiality, the names of the respondents are
changed in this article.
that has not happened till now. The Act also entitles the workers with compen-
sation for the number of days delayed. But this particular provision has never
been operationalized before. Villagers of Van Bishnupur consider MGNREGA
as programme of good times because they work under it when they have enough
food at home and can wait for their wage payment for months. Thus, it defeats
the purpose of mitigating the hardships that rural labour households face due to
seasonal variation in work and employment as originally envisaged.
Further discussion with the junior engineers and assistant engineers reveal
that the saving from digging extra 27 cft is used to bear various expenses they
incur upon—treating the visiting officials with meals and snacks, other official
errands such as field mobility, printout of papers and stationary requirements.
According to them, siphoning off labour cost for construction of additional 27
cft from every worker’s account help in covering the extra costs that have no
provisions in the rulebook.
But here is a well where there is water of about 7 ft at the 18 ft dug well. However,
the owner beneficiary wanted to drain out the water in order to dig further down
the well up to 35 ft. It was brought to our understanding that as per the rule of
MGNREGA works, the amount that will be reimbursed for digging of 18 ft dug
well will not be enough to cover the actual costs.
As is evident from Table 10, the amount sanctioned for well-digging under
MGNREGA increases progressively with depth of the well and it sees a steep
increase from 25 ft. As per the guidelines, while digging between 25 ft and 35 ft,
there is provision for a total of 682 person-days, the cost of digging first 10 ft is
just wage of 50.8 person-days. Therefore, the owners find it easier to cover all the
costs by digging deeper.
All the payments under MGNREGA are made against the measurement books
after being measured and recorded by junior engineers and countersigned by
Sarkar and Islary 47
assistant engineers. If the beneficiary would have stopped digging out his well
at 18 ft, he would be able to make claims against measurement booked by junior
engineer and would have hardly got about `20,000 for that depth. However, if he
digs up to 35 ft, he can get substantial cost advantage. So, it is sensible on benefi-
ciary’s part to insist on digging up to 35 ft.
Concluding Remarks
MGNREGA was introduced to rejuvenate the rural economy and effectively
address problems of poverty, unemployment and distress migration. However,
in recent years, there have been allegations of diluting provisions of the Act and
shrinkage of its coverage. In this context, this article studies recent trend in
employments generation under this Act and its role in supplementing income
and employment of labourer households in Jharkhand, one of the poorest states
in India.
Our analysis shows that there has been an increase in number of days of
employment per household under MGNREGA in Jharkhand in 2015–16. All dis-
tricts of Jharkhand have seen higher employment during the year. Rise in employ-
ment is comparatively higher in the districts of Dhanbad, Dumka, Garhwah,
Giridih, Gumla, Latehar, Pakur, Sahebganj and Simdega. Days of employment
generated per household have positive association with relative poverty and
negative association with literacy rates in the districts. Corresponding to higher
level of person-days generated, there is more proportion of labourer households
that completed 100 days of employment during the year. However, although
labour force participation among female in Jharkhand is higher than all-India
figures, the share of female labourers in total days of employment generated
under MGNREGA is less than even the statutory minimum of 33 per cent. The
share of SC and ST workers in total person-days has remained more or less
constant at around 12 per cent and 40 per cent, respectively.
NSS 68th round data on employment and unemployment makes it possible
to analyse on demand and rationing for work among different socio-economic
categories of individual workers. On the whole, it has been found that in the
survey year, that is, 2011–12, nearly 30 per cent of rural workers who sought
employment were unable to work under MGNREGA. There is also evidence of
bias against poorer or marginalized section in the state in forms of rationing.
Our analysis of daily wage/earnings from MGNREGA works based on employ-
ment and unemployment survey data of NSSO (68th round) shows that a labourer
household who worked for average person-days in MGNREGA in 2011–12 can
earn an estimated `3,960 on average in Jharkhand. This is enough to cover only
7 per cent annual consumption expenditure of a household of average size in
rural Jharkhand. The share of estimated earnings as figured out in our analysis in
total household expenditure increases as we move from higher to lower classes
of MPCE. For example, earnings from MGNREGA constitute around 11 and 15
per cent of average annual consumption expenditure of households belonging to
10–20 percentile and 0–10 percentile, respectively.
48 International Journal of Rural Management 13(1)
Lastly, observations from worksites of one of the backward and populous dis-
tricts of Jharkhand, Giridih shows that delay in wage payments casts a dampening
effect on enthusiasm of workers to demand employment in MGNREGA works.
Although as per MGNREGA guidelines, wages are to be paid on piece-rate basis,
it is the most common practice to pay the wages on daily basis. Lack of awareness
among workers regarding norms of measurement of the work done encourages
the functionaries who indulge in corruption and flout the norms frequently.
This is more common in case of digging pits where the workers are paid wage of
73 cft for digging up to 100 cft and pocket the difference through entry of fake
names in the muster roll. Also, the budget sanctioned for projects on individual
land, particularly digging wells of shallow depth is inadequate and the average
cost comes down drastically for digging deeper due to disproportionately higher
provisioning labour days for deeper wells as per cost manual for MGNREGA
works in the State. This often compels the beneficiaries to dig in excess of what
is required to recover cost. Initiatives such as Kaam Maango Abhiyaan are suc-
cessful in generating enthusiasm and demand for work among workers but timely
allocation of work to them still remains a problem. Banking institutions tasked
with the seeding of Aadhaar number to workers passbooks are often short staffed
and not capable of finishing the work in a timely manner.
In recent years, there has been some noteworthy initiatives taken by the state
government in association with civil society groups to improve the working of the
scheme, for example, awareness generation campaign (Kaam Maango Abhiyaan)
among workers to create more demand for job cards and work under the scheme,
completion of social audit of expenditures made and assets created in a number
of gram panchayats, special drive for participatory planning of work to be under-
taken throughout the year in every gram panchayat involving community (yojana
banao abhiyaan) and convergence of MGNREGA with other welfare programmes,
particularly National Rural Livelihood Mission (NRLM). This has resulted in
higher awareness and employment generation. However, there is much room left
for improved performance in terms of timely disbursal of wages and completion
of projects. Both the Central and State governments have to work in tandem to
meet these twin challenges which is vital for the MGNREGA programme to live
up to its mandate to become a lifeline for rural poor amid slump in economy and
consequent distress in rural India.
Appendix
Table A1. Year-wise funds allotted, expenditure and employment generated under MGNREGA for Jharkhand State (at current prices)
Expenditure made by the Total number
Plan outlay in Funds Total funds State (` Cr.)$ Expenditure of households Households
Central Actual funds released to available for as percentage got got full
Budget for all released all the State the State of funds employment employment
Year India (` Cr.) India (` Cr.) (` Cr.) (` Cr.)# Labour Material Total available (in lakhs) (in lakhs)
2006–07* 11300 8694 550 982 451 252 712 73 13.4 0.51
2007–08** 12000 12661 738 1254 647 393 1063 85 17 0.5
2008–09 30000 30000 1806 2363 707 602 1342 57 15 0.95
2009–10 39100 33539 812 1924 823 512 1380 72 17 1.33
2010–11 40100 35842 962 1693 858 367 1284 76 20 1.31
2011–12 40000 29215 1237 1759 734 375 1171 67 16 0.57
2012–13 33000 30274 809 1481 687 402 1152 78 14 0.86
2013–14 33000 32993 621 987 580 276 913 93 11.4 0.69
2014–15 @ 34000 32977 724 892 483 164 1029 115 11 0.82
2015–16^ 34699 34675 970 1035 883 389 1331 129 11.3 1.7
Sources: 1) Outcome Budget of Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India.
2) Annual Reports of Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India.
3) MGNREGA Annual Reports, Annual Reports of Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India.
4) MGNREGA MIS, Annual Reports of Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India.
Notes: *Restricted to 200 districts at all India level, ** restricted to 330 districts at all India level.
# includes funds released from current budget+ funds released last year but received during the current year+ opening balance+ State’s contribution+ miscellaneous
receipts.
$ Difference between total expenditure and labour plus material cost is administrative expenditure.
@ Expenditure on unskilled labour only. Due payments in 2014–15 in the State was 15 Crores and net balance of `–152 Crores.
^ Includes figures of funds released and available and expenditure till January14, 2016. Expenditure on labour includes unskilled labour only. As on January 14, 2016 due
payments was `29 Crore and net balance of `–325 Crore.
50 International Journal of Rural Management 13(1)
Notes
1. WPR is defined as percentage of workers to total population.
2. NSSO uses three different methods of determining the activity status (employed/unem-
ployed/within or outside labour force) of persons: usual principal activity status (ps),
current weekly status (cws) and current daily status (cds).
For detailed discussion on the definitions, see Ghosh (2004).
3. For more information on CFT, see Ministry of Rural Development (2013).
4. See Report of Comptroller and Auditor General of India on Mahatma Gandhi National
Rural Employment Guarantee Act, Government of Jharkhand (2013c).
5. Ministry of Rural Development (2013) states the need for organizing Rojgar Diwas or
Employment Guarantee Day at every gram panchayat at least once in a month to proac-
tively seek application for work from prospective workers.
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