MALAGA vs PENACHOS

FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its (PBAC) caused the publication of an Invitation to
Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. It announced that the last day for the submission
of pre-qualification requirements was on December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on
December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.
Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction and Best Built Construction,
respectively, submitted their pre-qualification documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988.
Petitioner Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to
participate in the bidding as their documents were considered late.
Hence, the petitioners filed a complaint with the RTC against the officers of PBAC for their refusal without just
cause to accept them resulting to their non-inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the
resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their documents. They also asked that if the
bidding had already been conducted, the defendants be directed not to award the project pending resolution of
their complaint.
Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and award the project.
The defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the court is prohibited from issuing
such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in government infrastructure project under
Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818.
ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions of PD 1818?
RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled corporations.
The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:
Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with
functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and
colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).
It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818.
There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it was created in
pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority program of the government to
effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines shall also be
the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on
Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are
authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state college, such apparatus, equipment,
or supplies and even the services of such employees as can be spared without serious detriment to public service.
Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was
also decreed in its charter that the funds and maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in
the General Appropriations Law.

Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree as there
are irregularities present surrounding the transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to the bidding
and the award of the project. P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed
by administrative agencies such as the anomalies above described. Hence, the challenged restraining order was
not improperly issued by the respondent judge and the writ of preliminary injunction should not have been denied

There are at least two irregularities committed by PBAC that justified injunction of the bidding and the award of
the project. First, PBAC set deadlines for the filing of the PRE-C1 and the opening of bids and then changed these
deadlines without prior notice to prospective participants. Second, PBAC was required to issue to pre-qualified
applicants the plans, specifications and proposal book forms for the project to be bid thirty days before the date
of bidding if the estimate project cost was between P1M and P5M. PBAC has not denied that these forms were
issued only on December 2, 1988, or only ten days before the bidding scheduled for December 12, 1988. At the
very latest, PBAC should have issued them on November 12, 1988, or 30 days before the scheduled bidding.

Restraining order Upheld.

GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR.,
FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E.
ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON AGUILA, petitioners, vs.MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO T

In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and
for Other Purposes”, was passed. BP 129 mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of
Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals,
unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered separated from the judiciary.
It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being alleged that
thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded, Gualberto De la
Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would
be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional
provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court
can remove judges NOT the Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP
129).
HELD: What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and justices from their services.
What is important is the validity of the abolition of their offices. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office
that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order
to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith. the question of any impairment of security of tenure does
not arise.
In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of
constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted
and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to
accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is
involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of
the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put
in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the
reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure
therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal
interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of
reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored
or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily
discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in
accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another
which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.”
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown, this petition is
dismissed. No costs.

VALENTIN TIO doing business under the name and style of OMI ENTERPRISES, petitioner, vs.VIDEOGRAM
REGULATORY BOARD, MINISTER OF FINANCE, METRO MANILA COMMISSION, CITY MAYOR and CITY TREASURER
OF MANILA, respondents.
In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” was enacted
which gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The said law sought to
minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse
effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being
acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10
of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs.
In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, is a rider and is not germane to the subject
matter of the law.
2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an administrative body, because the law allowed
the VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other government agencies to assist the VRB in enforcing the said PD.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tio’s arguments are correct. Is the law unconstitutional?
HELD: No.
1. The Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof” is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose
which a statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video
industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that
general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms
scattered throughout the PD.
Reading section 10 of P.D. No. 1987 closely, one can see that the foregoing provision is allied and germane to,
and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the law, which is the regulation of
the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not
inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the
regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the decree.
Aside from revenue collection, tax laws may also be enacted for the purpose of regulating an activity. At the same
time, the videogram industry is also an untapped source of revenue which the government may validly tax. All of
this is evident from preambulatory clauses nos. 2, 5, 6 and 8, quoted in partabove.
The levy of the 30% tax is also for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating
the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property
rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the law to protect
the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is not being tasked to legislate. What was
conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to seek assistance in the execution, enforcement, and
implementation of the law. Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such
assistance is for a “fixed and limited period” with the deputized agencies concerned being “subject to the direction
and control of the [VRB].”
This is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its
execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make
the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to
its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid
objection can be made." Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the Board to solicit such
assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction
and control of the Board."
3. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree No.
1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie
industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair
competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by
the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally
violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention
the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit
and municipal license fees are required to engage in business.
2. No. There was no undue delegation of law making authority.
Petitioner was concerned that Section 11 of P.D. No. 1987 stating that the videogram board (Board) has authority
to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited
period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is an
undue delegation of legislative power.
This is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its
execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make
the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to
its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid
objection can be made." Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the Board to solicit such
assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction
and control of the Board."
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ANG TANG HO, defendant-appellant.
During a special session, the Philippine Legislature passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing
the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes
the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products.
Pursuant to this Act, the Governor General issued Executive Order 53 fixing the price at which rice should be sold.
The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and different prices in other and
different provinces in the Philippine Islands, and delegates the power to determine the other and different prices
to provincial treasurers and their deputies. Here, then, you would have a delegation of legislative power to the
Governor-General, and a delegation by him of that power to provincial treasurers and their deputies, who "are
hereby directed to communicate with, and execute all instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce
and Industry, for the most effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their respective
localities." The issuance of the proclamation by the Governor-General was the exercise of the delegation of a
delegated power, and was even a sub delegation of that power.
Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of
eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the Executive Order. He was charged
in violation of the said Executive Order and was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months
imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there was an undue delegation of
power to the Governor General.
Issues:Whether or not there was an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
Discussions: By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and
enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine
Islands. As to the question here involved, the authority of the Governor-General to fix the maximum price at which
palay, rice and corn may be sold in the manner power in violation of the organic law.
Act No. 2868, as analysed by the Court, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy
should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without
the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative
discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must
be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing
must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and
substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon
the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
Rulings: Yes. When Act No. 2868 was analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General
which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words,
the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not “any cause”
for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not “an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,”
and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or
quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be
enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify
or define what was “any cause,” or what was “an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn,” Neither did
it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the
proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General
issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of
rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale “of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which
is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53.”
By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and enact laws
is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands. As
to the question here involved, the authority of the Governor-General to fix the maximum price at which palay,
rice and corn may be sold in the manner power in violation of the organic law. DEFENDANT discharged

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED
NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY,
REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law,
Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the
movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was
then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be
heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos
even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid
exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of
carabaos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A created a presumption
based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean
a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the
carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an
invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner
of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.
There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic
rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court said that The
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned
measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos
can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in
one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter
there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there

The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the
petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly
observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were
returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be
heard, thus denying due process.

The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of Police power because the method employed to conserve the
carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. To justify the
State in the imposition of its authority in behalf of the public, it must be:
1) The interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference;
2) that the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS. JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE M.
MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO,
FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary
of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people power”
revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to
die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when
the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and
move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.

Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:

failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders

channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer. This is to prove
that they can stir trouble from afar
Honasan’s failed coup
Communist insurgency movements
secessionist movements in Mindanao
devastated economy because of
accumulated foreign debt
plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel
documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in the
Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim of
the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner
also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.

According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due process and
equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to Section
6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.

Issue:

Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.
Decision:

No to both issues. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:

Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.”
However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the same article it touches on
exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus
and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons…
(art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive.
She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the
general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national
interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the
President can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest
discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to maintain peace
during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.

The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the circumstances. The request
of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the
constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of
case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated
as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit
in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President
to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for the
President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is
proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened before her decision
are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country & protection
of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.

Fernan, Concurring
The president’s power is not fixed. Limits would depend on the imperatives of events and not on abstract theories
of law. We are undergoing a critical time and the current problem can only be answerable by the President.
Threat is real. Return of the Marcoses would pose a clear & present danger. Thus, it’s the executive’s responsibility
& obligation to prevent a grave & serious threat to its safety from arising.
We can’t sacrifice public peace, order, safety & our political & economic gains to give in to Marcos’ wish to die in
the country. Compassion must give way to the other state interests.
Cruz, Dissenting
As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos’ right to return, live & die in his own country. It is a right guaranteed by
the Consti to all individuals, whether patriot, homesick, prodigal, tyrant, etc.
Military representatives failed to show that Marcos’ return would pose a threat to national security. Fears were
mere conjectures.
Residual powers – but the executive’s powers were outlined to limit her powers & not expand.
Paras, Dissenting
AFP has failed to prove danger which would allow State to impair Marcos’ right to return to the Philippines. .
Family can be put under house arrest & in the event that one dies, he/she should be buried w/in 10 days.
Untenable that without a legislation, right to travel is absolute & state is powerless to restrict it. It’s w/in police
power of the state to restrict this right if national security, public safety/health demands that such be restricted.
It can’t be absolute & unlimited all the time. It can’t be arbitrary & irrational.
No proof that Marcos’ return would endanger national security or public safety. Fears are speculative & military
admits that it’s under control. Filipinos would know how to handle Marcos’ return.
Padilla, Dissenting
Sarmiento, Dissenting

President’s determination that Marcos’ return would threaten national security should be agreed upon by the
court. Such threat must be clear & present.
G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989

Marcos, petitioner

VS.

Manglapus, respondent (Part 2)

Facts:

In its decision dated September 15, 1989, the Court by a vote of eight to seven, dismissed the petition, after
finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return
of former President Marcos and his family pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their
return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii.

President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that in the interest of the safety of those who will take the
death of Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility and order of the state and
society, she did not allow the remains of Marcos to be brought back in the Philippines.

A motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners raising the following arguments:

Barring their return would deny them their inherent right as citizens to return to their country of birth and all
other rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all Filipinos.
The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had exercised it arbitrarily.
There is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos.
Issue:

Whether or not the motion for reconsideration that the Marcoses be allowed to return in the Philippines be
granted.

Decision:

No. The Marcoses were not allowed to return. Motion for Reconsideration denied because of lack of merit.
Ratio:

Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant reconsideration.

Factual scenario during the time Court rendered its decision has not changed. The threats to the government, to
which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have
ceased. Imelda Marcos also called President Aquino “illegal” claiming that it is Ferdinand Marcos who is the legal
president.
President has unstated residual powers implied from grant of executive power. Enumerations are merely for
specifying principal articles implied in the definition; leaving the rest to flow from general grant that power,
interpreted in conformity with other parts of the Constitution (Hamilton). Executive unlike Congress can exercise
power from sources not enumerates so long as not forbidden by constitutional text (Myers vs. US). This does not
amount to dictatorship. Amendment No. 6 expressly granted Marcos power of legislation whereas 1987
Constitution granted Aquino with implied powers.
It is within Aquino’s power to protect & promote interest & welfare of the people. She bound to comply w/ that
duty and there is no proof that she acted arbitrarily
HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA
LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City Schools of Manila, petitioners, vs.THE COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ
DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.
PRINCIPLES: (1) The grant of investigatory power does not imply the grant of judicial or quasi-judicial
power.
(2) Matters relating to discipline of teachers are under the original Jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Education, and may be appealed to the Civil Service Commission, and lastly to the Supreme Court
(Note: Under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, appeals from the Civil Service Commission must first go
through the Court of Appeals).

FACTS: On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila
Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they
described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure
of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention.
The teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education (Hon.
Isidro Cariño) to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials
concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements.
Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the
days that followed.

For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively
charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also
preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" (the Civil Service Decree) and
temporarily replaced.

The MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner Secretary
Cariño, which was dismissed. Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify
said dismissal, grounded on the alleged violation of the striking teachers’ right to due process and peaceable
assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. After their petitions were denied, respondent teachers thereafter
submitted sworn statements dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that
while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers,
allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. The Commission scheduled
a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cariño requiring his attendance therein.
Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence.

The Commission on Human Rights had earlier made clear its position that it does not feel bound by the Supreme
Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, making plain its intention to hear and resolve the case on
the merits. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE: Where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other
government agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudication, may the Commission on Human Rights take
cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and adjudication?

RULING: No. The CHR has no such power. It was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-
judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The CHR may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence
and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered
such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided
by law. This function the Commission does not have.

It cannot try and decide cases as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to
adjudicate or adjudge.
"Investigate," means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The purpose of
investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is
the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the
law to the facts established by the inquiry.

"Adjudicate," means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle, to settle finally (the
rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle
judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-
judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ."

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should
not "try and resolve on the merits" the matters involved. These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the
original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him
under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. Indeed, the
Secretary of Education had already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them, and it appears that appeals
have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself
has had occasion to pass upon said issues. The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme
of things. It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil Service
Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on
the questions involved.

Reversal can only be done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by the Supreme Court. The only thing the
Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cariño was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate
Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service Commission. It cannot arrogate
unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

Petition GRANTED; CHR Order ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent CHR and the Chairman and Members
thereof PROHIBITED from hearing and resolving the case (Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC, Branch 127, Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO
A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN, respondents.
AGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs COURT OF APPEALS (Romero[1], 1994)
FACTS
· The residents of Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City raised a complaint with the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA), seeking to stop the operation of the City Government of Caloocan of an 8.6
hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the
pollution of the surrounding water.
· LLDA discovered that the City Government of Caloocan has been maintaining the open dumpsite at the
Camarin Area without a requisite Environmental Compliance Certificate from the Environmental Management
Bureau of the DENR. They also found the water to have been directly contaminated by the operation of the
dumpsite.
· LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order against the City Government and other entities to completely halt,
stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter on the Camarin dumpsite.
· The City Government went to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City to file an action for the declaration
of nullity of the cease and desist order and sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote
the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its
territorial jurisdiction.
· LLDA sought to dismiss the complaint, invoking the Pollution Control Law that the review of cease and desist
orders of that nature falls under the Court of Appeals and not the RTC.
· RTC denied LLDA’s motion to dismiss, and issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining LLDA from
enforcing the cease and desist order during the pendency of the case.
· The Court of Appeals promulgated a decision that ruled that the LLDA has no power and authority to issue
a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage.
· The residents seek a review of the decision.
ISSUE
WoN the LLDA has authority and power to issue an order which, in its nature and effect was injunctive.
THEORY OF THE PARTIES
City Government of Caloocan: As a local government unit, pursuant to the general welfare provision of the Local
Government Code, they have the mandate to operate a dumpsite and determine the effects to the ecological
balance over its territorial jurisdiction.
LLDA: As an administrative agency which was granted regulatory and adjudicatory powers and functions by RA
No. 4850, it is invested with the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order pursuant to various
provisions in EO No. 927.
RULING
YES.
1. LLDA is mandated by law to manage the environment, preserve the quality of human life and ecological
systems and prevent undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution in the Laguna Lake area and
surrounding provinces and cities, including Caloocan.
· While pollution cases are generally under the Pollution Adjudication Board under the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, it does not preclude mandate from special laws that provide another forum.
· In this case, RA No. 4850 provides that mandate to the LLDA. It is mandated to pass upon or approve or
disapprove plans and programs of local government offices and agencies within the region and their underlying
environmental/ecological repercussions.
· The DENR even recognized the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over the case when the DENR acted as
intermediary at a meeting among the representatives of the city government, LLDA and the residents.

2. LLDA has the authority to issue the cease and desist order.
a. Explicit in the law.
· §4, par. (3) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its
jurisdiction.
· While LLDA was not expressly conferred the power “to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order” in that
language, the provision granting authority to “make (…) orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution”, has the
same effect.

b. Necessarily implied powers.

· Assuming arguendo that the cease and desist order” was not expressly conferred by law, there is
jurisprudence enough to the effect.
· While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such power as expressly granted to it
by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied
in the exercise of its express powers. Otherwise, it will be reduced to a “toothless” paper agency.
· In Pollution Adjudication Board vs Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the PAB has the power to issue an
ex-parte cease and desist order on prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the allowable standards
set by the anti-pollution laws of the country.
· LLDA has been vested with sufficiently broad powers in the regulation of the projects within the Laguna Lake
region, and this includes the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the area.--------------------
RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP AND/OR SERGIO CORPUS, petitioners,
vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, TEODORICO L. RUIZ, as Labor Arbiter and ROGELIO R.
CORIA, respondents.

FACTS:
In August 1977, herein respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by herein petitioner Rizal Empire Insurance Group
as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. On January 1, 1978, he was made a regular employee, having
been appointed as clerk-typist, with a monthly salary of P300.00. Being a permanent employee, he was furnished
a copy of petitioner Company’s “General Information, Office Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations”. In the
same year, without change in his position-designation he was transferred to the Claims Department and his salary
was increased to P450.00 a month. In 1980, he was transferred to the Underwriting Department and his salary
was increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of living allowance, until he was transferred to the Fire Department
as filing clerk. In July 1983, he was made an inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly salary of P685.00 plus
allowances and other benefits.

On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work, allegedly, on the grounds of
tardiness and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment
(MOLE), and in a Decision dated March 14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated
him to his position with back wages. Petitioner filed an appeal with the NLRC but, in a Resolution dated November
15, 1985, the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had been filed out of time. Hence, the instant
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing
petitioner’s appeal on a technicality.

HELD:
Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on appeal, provides:

SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. – Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless appealed to the
Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of notice thereof.

SECTION 6. No extension of period. – No motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect an
appeal shall be entertained.

The record shows that the employer (petitioner herein) received a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter on
April 1, 1985. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on April 11, 1985 and filed
the Memorandum of Appeal on April 22, 1985. Pursuant to the “no extension policy” of the NLRC, aforesaid
motion for extension of time was denied in its resolution dated November 15, 1985 and the appeal was dismissed
for having been filed out of time.

The Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit and leave no room for
interpretation. Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administration law that administrative regulations and policies
enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law,
and are entitled to great respect (Espanol vs Phil. Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314 [1985]).

Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in this case has
become final and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal.

Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter appears to be correct; the consistent promotions in rank and
salary of the private respondent indicate he must have been a highly efficient worker, who should be retained
despite occasional lapses in punctuality and attendance. Perfection cannot after all be demanded.

Wherefore, this petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.