TORTS CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS (SET 1) Article 2179 on contributory negligence is not an exercise in chronology or physics but w
hat is important is the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and
1. G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL vs
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO
FACTS:
Respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a meeting with his boss where
he had taken a “shot or two” of liquor. While driving down the street, his headlights were
turned off. When he switched on his headlights to “bright”, he suddenly saw dump truck
some 2 ½ meter away from his car prompting him to try to avoid the collission by swerving
to the left, but it was too late. His car smashed into truck causing him physical injuries. The
truck belonged to Phoenix, & was parked thereby by company driver Carbonel. It was
parked askew so it was sticking out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming
traffic. There were no lights nor were there any “early warning” reflector devices set
anywhere near the truck. Phoenix permitted Carbonel to take home the truck, which was
scheduled to be used the next morning. Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the
accident to respondent’s own negligence in driving at a high speed without curfew pass
and headlights, and while intoxicated. It invoked the Last Clear Chance Doctrine: Dionisio
had the Last Clear Chance of avoiding the accident and so Dionisio, having failed to take
the last clear chance, must bear his own injuries alone.
The trial court and the IAC ruled in favor of private respondent.
ISSUE: Whether the collission was brought by respondent’s own negligence
HELD:
No.
Dionisio is guilty of contributory negligence but the legal and proximate cause of the
collision was brought about by the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dumptruck
was parked, in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. The collision of
Dionisio's car with the truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck
driver's negligence. The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk
or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the
plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope of
original risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts have generally agreed
that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's
responsibility. Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk
in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable
when the plaintiff is run down by a car, eventhough the car is negligently driven; and one
who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of
responsibility when another negligently drives into it.
The Last Clear Chance doctrine of the Common Law was imported into our jurisdiction by
Picart vs. Smith but it is still a matter of debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its
way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. The doctrine was applied by Common Law
because they had a rule that contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a
negligent plaintiff. In our jurisdiction, Article 2179 of the Civil Code rejects the Common
Law doctrine of contributory negligence.
gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of thecommunity. To say
that Phoenix should be absolved from liability would come close to wiping out the
fundamental law that a man must respond for the foreseeable consequences of his own
negligent act or omission. Thus, the Last Clear Chance Doctrine was not applied because
the court thinks that it is not applicable in our jurisdiction.
Consequently, Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to
mitigation by the courts.
2. McKee vs. IAC
G.R. No. 68102
Facts:
 A cargo truck driven by Ruben Galang and owned by private respondents Tayag
and Manalo was travelling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando,
Pampanga, bound for Manila. On the other hand, a Ford Escort car driven by Jose
Koh, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando.
 When the northbound car was about 10 meters away from the southern
approach of the bridge, 2 boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road
and into the lane of the car. The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of
whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back.
 Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the
truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and
thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided
with the truck.
 The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on
the said bridge. The said collision resulted to the death of Jose Koh, Kim Koh
McKee, and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee,
Christopher Koh McKee, and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford
Escort.
 In the statement of Ruben Galang to the investigating police officers immediately
after the accident, he admitted that he was travelling at 30 miles per hour (48
kph).
 Two civil cases for damages were filed before the CFI of Pampanga. The first civil
case was for damages for the death of Jose Koh. The second civil case, on the other
hand, was for the damages for the death of one and a half year old Kim Koh McKee
and the physical injuries sustained by George and Araceli.
 About a month later, a charge of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple
homicide, physical injuries and damage to property was filed against Ruben
Galang and was raffled in the same court where the second civil case was
assigned.
 In their Answer with Counterclaim for the first civil case, private respondents
asserted that it was the Ford Escort car which "invaded and bumped the lane of
the truck driven by Ruben Galang and, as counterclaim, prayed for the award of
attorney's fees, actual and liquidated damages, moral damages and business
losses.
  In the second civil case, private respondents first filed a motion to dismiss on
grounds of pendency of another action and failure to implead an indispensable
party, Ruben Galang, the truck driver; they also filed a motion to consolidate the
case with the first civil case pending before Branch III of the same court, which
was opposed by the plaintiffs. Both motions were denied by Judge Capulong.
 In the criminal case, a judgment of conviction was rendered against Ruben
Galang.
 Subsequently, Judge Mario Castañeda, Jr. dismissed the two (2) civil cases and
awarded the private respondents moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorney's fees.
 Ruben Galang appealed the judgment of conviction but it was affirmed.
 Plaintiffs (McKee) on the other hand, appealed the dismissal of the civil cases to
the appellate court.
 The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court.
 The decision is anchored principally on the respondent Court's findings that it
was Ruben Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which caused the
accident.
 The appellate court further said that the law presumes negligence on the part
of the defendants (private respondents), as employers of Galang, in the
selection and supervision of the latter; it was further asserted that these
defendants did not allege in their Answers the defense of having exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising the
said employee.
 Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration alleging improper
appreciation of facts and on the basis of which, respondent court affirmed the
trial court's decision in dismissing the civil cases.
 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this
petition.
Issues: (1) Did Galang’s negligence cause the collision?
(2) Were Tayag and Manalo liable for damages?
Held: Yes. The lower court held that Jose Koh was negligent for improperly invading the
lane of the truck. This is unwarranted because it is manifest that no negligence can be
imputed to Koh. In Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil 809, 813) the Court held that:
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that (reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation?) If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
It is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and
ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving
the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane.
The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck was
running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed
allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour.
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. The truck driver's
negligence was likewise duly established through the testimony of Araceli Koh McKee
which was duly corroborated by the testimony of Eugenio Tanhueco, an impartial
eyewitness to the mishap.
Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver's subsequent negligence in failing to take the
proper measures and degree of care necessary to avoid the collision which was the
proximate cause of the resulting accident.
(2) Yes. It was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the
collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision.
As employers of the truck driver, the private respondents are, under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that
they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. That presumption,
however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
5. G.R. No. 115024 February 7, 1996
MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER
COMMERCIAL, INC.
FACTS:
This is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for serious physical
injuries sustained in a vehicular accident.
At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was
driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No. FFU 542 from her restaurant at Marcos
highway to her home at Palanza Street, Araneta Avenue. She was travelling along Aurora
Blvd. with a companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the direction of Manila. Before
reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a
lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit
help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and
that she cannot reach her home in that car's condition, she parked along the sidewalk,
about 1-1/2 feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the
rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to
the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987
Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant
Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the
windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground.
She was pulled out from under defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the
middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body. She
was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found to have a
"traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee)". She was confined in the
hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The expenses
for the hospital confinement (P120,000.00) and the cost of the artificial leg (P27,000.00)
were paid by defendants from the car insurance.
Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent.
After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiff's submissions and found defendant
Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code. The trial court likewise held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li's
employer, jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180.
As a result of the trial court's decision, defendants filed an Omnibus Motion for New Trial
and for Reconsideration. The trial court denied the motion. Defendants forthwith filed an
appeal with the respondent Court of Appeals.
In agreeing with the trial court that the defendant Li was liable for the injuries sustained
by the plaintiff, the Court of Appeals, in its decision, however, absolved the Li's employer,
Alexander Commercial, Inc. from any liability towards petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela.
Consequently, both parties assail the respondent court's decision by filing two separate
petitions before this Court. Richard Li, in G.R. No. 117944, contends that he should not be
held liable for damages because the proximate cause of the accident was Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela's own negligence. Alternatively, he argues that in the event that this Court finds
him negligent, such negligence ought to be mitigated by the contributory negligence of
Valenzuela.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 115024, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela assails the respondent
court's decision insofar as it absolves Alexander Commercial, Inc. from liability as the
owner of the car driven by Richard Li and insofar as it reduces the amount of the actual
and moral damages awarded by the trial court.
As the issues are intimately related, both petitions are consolidated.
ISSUES:
A. Whether or not Valenzuela is guilty of contributory negligence.
B. Whether or not Alexander Commercial, Inc. Li's employer should also be held
liable.
RULING:
Valenzuela is not guilty of Contributory Negligence
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal
cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required
to conform for his own protection.
Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted
with an emergency is not to be held up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an
individual who is in no such situation. The law takes stock of impulses of humanity when
placed in threatening or dangerous situations and does not require the same standard of
thoughtful and reflective care from persons confronted by unusual and oftentimes
threatening conditions.
Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, an
individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act
without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the
emergency was brought by his own negligence.
While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought, or the
opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent, the conduct which is
required of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the
event which absolutely negates thoroughful care, but by the over-all nature of the
circumstances. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night
will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and
which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard
in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where she would likely find
no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her not to stop and assess the emergency
(simply because the entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking zone) because the
hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists. In the instant
case, Valenzuela, upon reaching that portion of Aurora Boulevard close to A. Lake St.,
noticed that she had a flat tire. To avoid putting herself and other motorists in danger, she
did what was best under the situation.
Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably
dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to have contributed to the
unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one of her
lower extremities. The emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in
Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was evident that she had taken
all reasonable precautions.
Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on
the night of the accident. "Negligence, as it is commonly understood is conduct which
creates an undue risk of harm to others." It is the failure to observe that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury. We stressed, in Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company, that negligence
is the want of care required by the circumstances.
Li's obvious unpreparedness to cope with the situation confronting him on the night of the
accident was clearly of his own making.

Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly and severally liable
SC agrees with the respondent court that the relationship in question is not based on
the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the servant,
but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer,
for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection
and supervision of his employees. Utilizing the bonus pater familias standard
expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, Li's employer, Alexander Commercial,
Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for the damage caused by the accident of June 24,
1990.
The employer's primary liability under the concept of pater familias embodied by
Art 2180 (in relation to Art. 2176) of the Civil Code is quasi-delictual or tortious in
character. His liability is relieved on a showing that he exercised the diligence of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Once
evidence is introduced showing that the employer exercised the required amount
of care in selecting its employees, half of the employer's burden is overcome. The
question of diligent supervision, however, depends on the circumstances of
employment.
Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent supervision
of its employee during the performance of the latter's assigned tasks would be enough to
relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. The employer is not expected to exercise supervision over either the employee's
private activities or during the performance of tasks either unsanctioned by the former or
unrelated to the employee's tasks. The case at bench presents a situation of a different
character, involving a practice utilized by large companies with either their employees of
managerial rank or their representatives.
It is customary for large companies to provide certain classes of their employees with
courtesy vehicles. These company cars are either wholly owned and maintained by the
company itself or are subject to various plans through which employees eventually
acquire their vehicles after a given period of service, or after paying a token amount. Many
companies provide liberal "car plans" to enable their managerial or other employees of
rank to purchase cars, which, given the cost of vehicles these days, they would not
otherwise be able to purchase on their own.
Under the first example, the company actually owns and maintains the car up to the point
of turnover of ownership to the employee; in the second example, the car is really owned
and maintained by the employee himself. In furnishing vehicles to such employees, are
companies totally absolved of responsibility when an accident involving a company-issued
car occurs during private use after normal office hours?
Most pharmaceutical companies, for instance, which provide cars under the first plan,
require rigorous tests of road worthiness from their agents prior to turning over the car
(subject of company maintenance) to their representatives. In other words, like a good
father of a family, they entrust the company vehicle only after they are satisfied that the
employee to whom the car has been given full use of the said company car for company or
private purposes will not be a threat or menace to himself, the company or to others. When
a company gives full use and enjoyment of a company car to its employee, it in effect
guarantees that it is, like every good father, satisfied that its employee will use the
privilege reasonably and responsively.
In the ordinary course of business, not all company employees are given the privilege of
using a company-issued car. For large companies other than those cited in the example of
the preceding paragraph, the privilege serves important business purposes either related
to the image of success an entity intends to present to its clients and to the public in
general, or - for practical and utilitarian reasons - to enable its managerial and other
employees of rank or its sales agents to reach clients conveniently. In most cases,
providing a company car serves both purposes. Since important business transactions and
decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises, the
provision for the unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the business
and goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who
actually uses the car, the managerial employee or company sales agent. As such, in
providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purpose of furthering the
company's image, a company owes a responsibility to the public to see to it that the
managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company
issued car are able to use the company issue capably and responsibly.
In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc. In his
testimony before the trial court, he admitted that his functions as Assistant Manager did
not require him to scrupulously keep normal office hours as he was required quite often
to perform work outside the office, visiting prospective buyers and contacting and meeting
with company clients. These meetings, clearly, were not strictly confined to routine hours
because, as a managerial employee tasked with the job of representing his company with
its clients, meetings with clients were both social as well as work-related functions. The
service car assigned to Li by Alexander Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li - as well
as the corporation - to put up the front of a highly successful entity, increasing the latter's
goodwill before its clientele. It also facilitated meeting between Li and its clients by
providing the former with a convenient mode of travel.
Moreover, Li's claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the accident
because he was coming from a social visit with an officemate in Paranaque was a bare
allegation which was never corroborated in the court below. It was obviously self-serving.
Assuming he really came from his officemate's place, the same could give rise to
speculation that he and his officemate had just been from a work-related function, or they
were together to discuss sales and other work related strategies.
In fine, Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated that it exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No
allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary
to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave
full and unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able to overcome the burden
of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to
Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and
severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela
during the accident.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is modified with the effect of REINSTATING the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court.
6. 6. DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC., vs. C & A Construction
G.R. No. 156034. October 1, 2003
Facts: C&A Construction (C & A for brevity) was engaged by the National Housing
Authority (NHA) to construct a deflector wall at the Vitas Reclamation Area in Vitas, Tondo
Manila.
M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned and operated by petitioner Delsan Transport Lines, Inc.,
(Delsan) anchored at the Navotas Fish Port for the purpose of installing a cargo pump and
clearing the cargo oil tank. At around 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, Captain
Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan Express received a report from his radio head operator
in Japan that a typhoon was going to hit Manila in about eight (8) hours.
At approximately 8:35 in the morning of the next day, Captain Jusep tried to seek shelter
at the North Harbor but could not enter the area because it was already congested. At
10:00 am., Captain Jusep decided to drop anchor at the vicinity of Vitas mouth which is 4
miles away from a Napocor power barge. At that time, the waves were already reaching 8
to 10 feet high. Captain Jusep ordered his crew to go full ahead to counter the wind which
was dragging the ship towards the Napocor power barge.
To avoid collision, Captain Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel. He succeeded in avoiding
the power barge, but when the engine was re-started and the ship was maneuvered full
astern, it hit the deflector wall constructed by (C & A). C&A demanded payment of the
damage from Delsan but the latter refused to pay. Hence, the complaint for damages with
the RTC.
RTC ruled against C&A and in favor of Delsan stating absence of negligence. The CA
reversed. Hence, this petition.
Issues: 1. WON Captain Jusep was negligent.
2. WON Delsan is solidary liable under Article 2180 of the NCC
Ruling:
1. Yes. Captain Jusep was negligent in deciding to transfer the vessel only at 8:35 in the
morning of the next day when as early as 12:00 in the midnight beforehand, he received a
report from his radio head operator in Japan that a typhoon was going to hit Manila after
8 hours. This, notwithstanding, he did nothing, until 8:35 of the next day.
The finding of negligence cannot be rebutted upon proof that the ship could not have
sought refuge at the North Harbor even if the transfer was done earlier. It is not the
speculative success or failure of a decision that determines the existence of negligence in
the present case, but the failure to take immediate and appropriate action under the
circumstances.
When he ignored the weather report notwithstanding reasonable foresight of harm,
Captain Jusep showed an inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary prudent
person would have observed in the same situation.
Furthermore, the “emergency rule” is not applicable in this case because the danger where
Captain Jusep found himself was caused by his own negligence.
2. Yes. Delsan is vicariously liable for the negligent act of Captain Jusep. Under Article 2180,
an employer may be held solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee.
Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly
arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligence in the
selection or supervision of its employees. The proper defense for the employer to raise so
that he may escape liability is to prove that he exercised the diligence of the good father of
the family to prevent damage not only in the selection of his employees but also in
adequately supervising them over their work.
Delsan cannot claim that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees. In this case, Delsan presented no evidence that it formulated rules/guidelines
for the proper performance of functions of its employees and that it strictly implemented
and monitored compliance therewith. Failing to discharge the burden, Delsan should
therefore be held liable for the negligent act of Captain Jusep.
WHEREFORE, petition DENIED.
8. G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918 Amado Picart, plaintiff-appellant vs. Frank Smith
Jr., defendant-appellee
FACTS: Plaintiff Amado Picart appealed because the Court of First Instance absolved
defendant Frank Smith Jr. Picart was riding on his pony on the bridge. The defendant was
riding on his car from the opposite directions when he approached Picart. Smith blew his
horn to give warnings but Picart moved his horse to the right instead of moving to the left
because he thought that he had no sufficient time to move to the right direction. Defendant
continued to move towards the left side but when he got near the plaintiff and the horse,
the animal became frightened that it turned its body across the bridge. The limb of the
horse was broken and it died. The plaintiff was thrown off and suffered injuries. He also
required medical attention for several days. The plaintiff filed an action for damages
against the defendant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner described was
guilty of negligence such as it gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done.
HELD: Yes, the defendant Frank Smith Jr. was guilty of negligence. As Smith started to
across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over
the proper side. But as he approached toward the center of the bridge, he can see to his
eyes that this won’t be done; and he must in a moment have known that it was too late for
the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of things, this
change of situation occurred while it was no longer within the power of the plaintiff to
escape being run don by going to a place of a greater safety. The control of the situation
had then passed to the defendant. The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows. Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would
have foreseen than an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his
foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences. It goes without saying that
Plaintiff was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting
himself in the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was
also negligent; and in such case, the problem is always to discover which agent is
immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two
parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the
negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under the circumstances, the law is
that the person who has the last clear chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do
it is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the
other party. The last clear chance rule of the law of negligence is particularly applied to
automobile accidents. This rule cannot be invoked where the negligence of the plaintiff is
concurrent with that of the defendant.
9. CASE DIGEST BY: JB LORENZO (TORTS)
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., Petitioner, v. MARICAR BASCOS BAESA, thru her
personal guardian FRANCISCA O. BASCOS, FE O. ICO, in her behalf and in behalf of
her minor children, namely ERWIN, OLIVE, EDMUNDO and SHARON ICO, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 79050-51. November 14, 1989
Facts:
On the morning of June 12, 1981, spouses Ceasar and Marilyn and their
children Harold Jim, Marcelo and Maricar Baesa, together with spuses Ico and their
son Erwin and seen other persons were aboard a passenger jeepney on the way to
Malalam River for a picnic.
Upon reaching the highway the jeepney, driven by David Ico, turned right
towards Malalam River at a speed of 20kph. While proceeding to their destination,
a speeding Pantranco bus from Aparri encroached on the jeepney’s lane while
negotiating a curve and collided with it.
As a result of the accident, spouses Baesa their 2 sons and David Ico died
and the rest of the passengers suffered injuries. All the victims, except for the
private respondents settled the case amicably under the “No Liability” insurance of
Pantranco.
Separate cases were filed by the private respondents for damages arising
from quasi-delict against Pantranco, with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
In its answer, Pantranco raised two defenses. One, the alleged negligence of David
Ico as the proximate cause of the accidend, and two, that it exercised due diligence
in the selection of its employees. The Court of First Instance of Pangasinan ruled in
favor of the private respondents. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals denied the
petition for lack of merit, thus the instant petition.
Issues:
1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not applying the doctrine
of “last clear chance” against the jeepney driver, David Ico.
2) Whether or not Pantranco North Express Inc. is liable for the negligence
of its employee.
Ruling:
Issue #1
According to the Supreme Court, the doctrine of last clear chance simply,
means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the
negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable
care and prudence might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant not
withstanding his negligence.
For this doctrine to be applicable the Supreme Court said that it is
necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert
the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due
care, have been aware of it. And upon examination of the courts of the different
circumstances in the case such doctrine cannot be applied, the court even
emphasized that such doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required
to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all
means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered. Therefore, the
Court of Appeals did not err in the non-application of the doctrine in the instant case.
Issue #2
The Supreme Court held that, where an injury is caused by the negligence
of an employee there instantly arises a presumption that the employer has been
negligent either in the selection of his employees or in the supervision over their
acts. Although this presumption is only a disputable presumption which could
overcome by proof of diligence of a good father of a family. In the instant case the
court believed that the evidence submitted by the defendant to show that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the case of Ramirez, as a
company driver is far from sufficient. Therefore, Pantranco North Express Inc. is
liable, as employer, for the damage caused by the negligence of Ramirez.
10.10 VICENTE VERGARA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and AMADEO
AZARCON, G.R. No. 77679 September 30, 1987
On 5 August 1979 in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Martin Belmonte, driver of Vergara, while driving
a cargo truck belonging to petitioner, rammed "head-on" the store-residence of the private
respondent, causing damages thereto.
The petitioner alleged his driver Martin Belmonte operated said cargo truck in a very
diligent but as a result blown-out tire and despite application of his brakes, the said cargo
truck hit the store-residence of plaintiff and that the said accident was an act of God for
which he cannot be held liable.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent. Upon appeal to the Court
of Appeals, the latter court affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the respondent is guilty of fault or negligence
2. Whether or not the employer was guilty of the acts of its driver
Ruling:
1. Yes It was established by competent evidence that the requisites of a quasi-delict
are present in the case at bar. These requisites are: (1) damages to the plaintiff;
(2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose
acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect
between such negligence and the damages.
It is undisputed that private respondent suffered damages as a result of an act or
omission of petitioner. The issue of whether or not this act or omission can be
considered as a "negligent" act or omission was passed upon by the trial court.
The findings of said court, affirmed by the respondent court, which we are not
prepared to now disturb, show that the fact of occurrence of the "vehicular
accident" was sufficiently established by the policy report and the testimony of
Patrolman Masiclat. And the fact of negligence may be deduced from the
surrounding circumstances thereof.
2. The petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to overcome the disputable
presumption of negligence on his part in the selection and supervision of his
driver.
11. 11. TEODORO UMALI vs. Hon. ANGEL BACANI of the CFI and FIDEL SAYNES
G.R. No. L-40570. January 30, 1976
Facts: A storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala, Pangasinan. During the
storm, the banana plants standing on an elevated ground along the barrio road in San
Pedro III of said municipality and near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric plant
(Alcala) were blown down and fell on the electric wire. As a result, the live electric wire
was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post and the other fell to the
ground under the fallen banana plants.
On the following morning, the barrio captain who was passing by saw the broken electric
wire and so he warned the people in the place not to go near the wire for they might get
hurt. He also saw Cipriano Baldomero, a laborer of Alcala, near the place and notified right
there of the broken line and asked him to fix it, but the latter told the captain that he could
not do it.
Sometime after the barrio captain and Baldomero left the area, a small boy of 3 years and
8 months old whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went to the place where
the broken line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he
subsequently died. It was only after the electrocution that the broken wire was fixed on
the same morning.
Teodoro Umali, who was the owner and manager of Alcala claims that he could not be
liable under the concept of quasi-delict because the proximate cause of the boy’s death by
electrocution could not be due to any negligence on his part, but rather to a fortuitous
event. Furthermore, he argued that the boy’s death could be attributed to the parent’s
negligence in allowing a child of tender age to go out of the house alone.
Issue: WON Teodoro Umali liable under quasi-delict as the owner and manager of the
Alcala electric plant?
Ruling: Yes. A series of negligence on the part of the Umali’s employees resulted in the
death of the victim. First, by the very evidence that there were big and tall banana plants
at the place of the incident standing on an elevated ground and which were higher than
the electric post supporting the electric line. The employees of Alcala who, with ordinary
foresight, could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the electric line
would be endangered, but did not even take the necessary precaution to eliminate the
source of danger to the electric line.
Second, even after the employees of Alcala were made aware of the possible damage, thus
becoming a possible threat to life and property, they did not cut off from the plant the flow
of electricity along the lines, an act they could have easily done.
Third, Baldomero was negligent because even if he was already made aware of the live cut
wire, he did not have the foresight to realize that the same posed a danger to life and
property, and that he should have taken the necessary precaution to prevent anybody
from approaching the live wire; instead he left the premises.
Because of the aforementioned series of negligence on the part of the employees, anybody,
even a responsible grown up or not, could have met the same fate that befell the victim.
The contributory negligence of the victim’s parents which enabled him to leave the house
alone might mitigate Umali’s liability. However, Umali’s argument that such was the
proximate cause of the death cannot be sustained because the real proximate cause was
the fallen live wire which posed a threat to life and property on that morning. Stated
otherwise, even if the child was allowed to leave the house unattended due to the parent’s
negligence, he would not have died that morning where it not for the cut live wire he
accidentally touched.
Article 2179 of the NCC provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants’ lack
of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages
to be awarded.
Furthermore, Umali’s liability for injury caused by his employees’ negligence is well
defined in paragraph 4 of Article 2180 of the NCC. The negligence of the employee is
presumed to be the negligence of the employer because the employer is supposed to
exercise supervision over the work of the employees. This liability is primary and direct.in
fact the proper defense for the employer to raise so that he may escape liability is to prove
that he exercised the diligence of the good father of the family to prevent damage not only
in the selection of his employees but also in adequately supervising them over their work.
This defense was not adequately proven.
WHEREFORE, decision AFFIRMED.
12. Bustamante V. CA G.R. No. 89880
FACTS:
On April 20, 1983, 6:30 am, a collision occurred between a 1947 model gravel
and sand truck driven by Montesiano and owned by Del Pilar and a Mazda passenger
bus driven Susulin along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite. Front left side
portion of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger bus,
ripping off the wall from the driver's seat to the last rear seat. Several passengers of
the bus were thrown out and died as a result of the injuries they sustained:
1. Rogelio Bustamante, 40, husband of Emma Adriano Bustamante and father of
Rossel, Gloria, Yolanda, Ericson, and Ederic, all surnamed Bustamante;
2. Maria Corazon Jocson, 16, daughter of spouses Salvador and Patria Jocson;
3. Jolet C. Ramos, 16, daughter of spouses Jose and Enriqueta Ramos;
4. Enrico Himaya, 18, son of spouses Narciso and Adoracion Himaya; and
5. Noel Bersamina, 17, son of spouses Jose and Ma. Commemoracion Bersamina
The bus was registered in the name of Novelo but was owned and/or operated
as a passenger bus jointly by Magtibay and Serrado. Before the collision, the cargo
truck and the passenger bus were approaching each other, coming from the opposite
directions of the highway. While the truck was still about 30 meters away, Susulin,
the bus driver, saw the front wheels of the vehicle wiggling. He also observed that the
truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding this circumstance due to his belief
that the driver of the truck was merely joking, Susulin shifted from fourth to third
gear in order to give more power and speed to the bus, which was ascending the
inclined part of the road, in order to overtake or pass a Kubota hand tractor being
pushed by a person along the shoulder of the highway.
Ruling of the RTC: liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary.
Ruling of CA: owner and driver of the sand and gravel truck appealed was granted.
ISSUE:
WON the last clear chance can apply making the bus negligent in failing to avoid
the collision and his act in proceeding to overtake the hand tractor was the proximate
cause of the collision making him solely liable.
HELD:
No. The doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts
may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is
entitled to recovery. A person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an
accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person
imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of
the accident. Since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the
colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both
owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles the court erred in absolving the owner and
driver of the cargo truck from liability
13. 13. MEDARDO AG. CADIENTE vs BITHUEL MACAS,
G.R. No. 161946, November 14, 2008
Facts: At the intersection of Buhangin and San Vicente Streets in Davao City, 15-year old
high school student Bithuel Macas, herein respondent, was standing on the shoulder of the
road. He was bumped and run over by a Ford Fiera, driven by Chona C. Cimafranca.
Cimafranca rushed the respondent to the Davao Medical Center.
Dr. Hilario Diaz, the orthopedic surgeon who attended to the respondent, testified that the
respondent suffered severe muscular and major vessel injuries, as well as open bone
fractures in both thighs and other parts of his legs. In order to save his life, the surgeon
had to amputate both legs up to the groins.
Cimafranca had since absconded and disappeared. Records showed that the Ford
Fiera was registered in the name of herein petitioner, Atty. Medardo Ag. Cadiente.
However, Cadiente claimed that when the accident happened, he was no longer the owner
of the Ford Fiera, that he sold the vehicle to Engr. Rogelio Jalipa, and turned over the
Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt to Jalipa, with the understanding that the
latter would be the one to cause the transfer of the registration.
A complaint for torts and damages against Cimafranca and Cadiente was filed by
the father of the victim. Cadiente later filed a third-party complaint against Jalipa.
In answer, Jalipa claimed that he was no longer the owner of the Ford Fiera at the time of
the accident because he sold the vehicle to Abraham Abubakar. He thus filed a fourth-party
complaint against Abubakar.
The trial court rendered judgement in favor of the plaintiff declaring Atty.
Medardo Ag. Cadiente and Engr. Rogelio Jalipa jointly and severally liable for damages to
the plaintiff for their own negligence.
The same was affirmed by the appellate court, hence this appeal.
Issues:
1. Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the victim;
2. Whether the petitioner and third-party defendant Jalipa are jointly and severally
liable to the victim.
Held:
1. No contributory negligence on the part of the accused.
Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides:
When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of
his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded
Records show that when the accident happened, the victim was standing on the
shoulder, which was the uncemented portion of the highway. As noted by the trial court,
the shoulder was intended for pedestrian use alone. Only stationary vehicles, such as those
loading or unloading passengers may use the shoulder. Running vehicles are not supposed
to pass through the said uncemented portion of the highway. However, the Ford Fiera in
this case, without so much as slowing down, took off from the cemented part of the
highway, inexplicably swerved to the shoulder, and recklessly bumped and ran over an
innocent victim. The victim was just where he should be when the unfortunate event
transpired. Thus, we are unable to accept the petitioner's contention that the respondent
was negligent.
2. Yes.The registered owner of any vehicle, even if he had already sold it to someone
else, is primarily responsible to the public for whatever damage or injury the
vehicle may cause.
The policy behind vehicle registration is the easy identification of the owner who can
be held responsible in case of accident, damage or injury caused by the vehicle. This is so
as not to inconvenience or prejudice a third party injured by one whose identity cannot be
secured
Ruling: No, Respondent COL Realty cannot recover for damages against Petitioner
Ramos.
The Supreme Court cited Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts to apply
in this case.
Article 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall
mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation.

14. LAMBERT S. RAMOS vs C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring
G.R. No. 184905 August 28, 2009 contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the latter’s negligence is imputed to
his superior and will defeat the superior’s action against the third person, assuming of
Facts: course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which
 In March 2004, along Katipunan Ave., corner Rajah Matanda St., Quezon City, a complaint is made.
vehicular accident took place between a Toyota Altis Sedan, owned by petitioner
C.O.L. Realty Corporation and driven by Aquilino Larin , and a Ford Expedition, Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilinos act of crossing
owned by Lambert Ramos (Ramos) and driven by Rodel Ilustrisimo. A passenger Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it was prohibited by
of the sedan, one Estela Maliwat sustained injuries and was immediately rushed law. Moreover, it was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery
for any damages suffered by respondent from the accident.
to the hospital for treatment.
 Upon investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found It is unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodel’s contributory negligence, since it cannot
probable cause to indict Rodel, the driver of the Ford Expedition, for Reckless
overcome or defeat Aquilino’s recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.
of the accident. Rodel’s contributory negligence has relevance only in the event that Ramos
 C.O.L. Realty filed a Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict against Ramos seeks to recover from respondent whatever damages or injuries he may have suffered as
before the MeTC, averring that its driver, Aquilino, was slowly driving the Toyota a result; it will have the effect of mitigating the award of damages in his favor. In other
Altis car at a speed of 5-10kph and has just crossed Katipunan Ave. when the words, an assertion of contributory negligence in this case would benefit only the
Ford Expedition violently rammed against the car’s right rear door and fender. petitioner; it could not eliminate respondent’s liability for Aquilino’s negligence which is
And Ramos being the employer of Rodel, he is then held solidarily liable for the proximate result of the accident.
damages.
 Ramos however denied liability, insisting that it was the negligence of Aquilino
which was the proximate cause of the accident and maintained that the Toyota
Altis crossed Katipunan Ave. despite the concrete barriers placed thereon
prohibiting vehicles to pass through the intersection.
 MeTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. C.O.L Realty filed an appeal
before RTC which then affirmed the MeTC decision.
 C.O.L. Realty appealed to the CA which affirmed the view that Aquilino was
negligent in crossing Katipunan Ave. from Rajah Matanda St. since, as per
Certification of the MMDA, such act is specifically prohibited. However, the CA
likewise found the driver Rodel guilty of contributory negligence for driving the
Ford Expedition at high speed along a busy intersection that was then the subject
of an ongoing construction.

Issue: WON Respondent COL Realty can recover for damages against Petitioner Ramos.