CALICDAN

v. CENDAÑA of the deceased spouse. Consequently, respondent, who derived his

G.R. No. 155080 rights from Fermina, only acquired the right of usufruct as it was the
February 5, 2004 only right which the latter could convey. After a review of the
evidence on record, we find that the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the
FACTS: donation was valid was not supported by convincing proof.
On August 25, 1947, Fermina Calicdan executed a deed of Respondent admitted during the cross examination that he had no
donation whereby she conveyed a parcel of land to respondent personal knowledge of whether Sixto Calicdan in fact purchased the
Silverio Cendaña, who immediately entered into possession of the subject land from Felomino Bautista
land, built a fence around the land and constructed a two-storey [G.R. No. 146823. August 9, 2005]
residential house thereon. He occupied the land from 1949 until his SPOUSES RAMON and ESTRELLA RAGUDO, petitioners, vs. FABELLA
death in 1998. On June 1992, petitioner, through her legal guardian, ESTATE TENANTS ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.
filed a complaint for "Recovery of Ownership, Possession and GARCIA, J.:
Damages" against the respondent, alleging that the donation was
void; that respondent took advantage of her incompetence in Under consideration is this petition for review on certiorari under
acquiring the land; and that she merely tolerated respondent’s Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the following
possession of the land as well as the construction of his house issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51230, to wit:
thereon. In his Answer, respondent alleged that the land was 1. Decision dated 19 July 2000,[1] affirming with modification
donated to him by Fermina in 1947; and that he had been publicly, an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court at Pasig City,
peacefully, continuously, and adversely in possession of the land for Branch 155, in an action for recovery of possession thereat
a period of 45 years. Moreover, he argued that the complaint was commenced by the herein respondent against the
barred by prior judgment in the special proceedings for the petitioners; and
"Inventory of Properties of Incompetent Soledad Calicdan", where 2. Resolution dated 29 January 2001,[2] denying petitioners
the court decreed the exclusion of the land from the inventory of motion for reconsideration.
properties of the petitioner. The trial court ruled in favor of the The facts may be briefly stated, as follows:
petitioner, while the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's Earlier, the tenants of a parcel of land at Mandaluyong City with
decision. an area of 6,825 square meters (hereinafter referred to as the Fabella
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation is valid. Estate), which formed part of the estate of the late Don Dionisio M.
HELD: Fabella, organized themselves and formed the Fabella Estate Tenants
The trial court found the donation of the land void because Association, Inc. (FETA), for the purpose of acquiring said property
Fermina was not the owner thereof, considering that it was inherited and distributing it to its members.
by Sixto Calicdan from his parents. Thus, the land was not part of the Unable to raise the amount sufficient to buy the property from
conjugal property of the spouses Sixto and Fermina Calicdan, because the heirs of Don Dionisio M. Fabella, FETA applied for a loan from the
under the Spanish Civil Code, the law applicable when Sixto died in National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) under the
1941, the surviving spouse had a right of usufruct only over the estate latters Community Mortgage Program.
 However, as a pre-condition for the loan, and in order that 13, a title which has been previously adjudged null and void by RTC-
specific portions of the property could be allotted to each tenant who Pasig in a much earlier case involving different parties. Finally, they
will have to pay the corresponding price therefor, NHMFC required insist that FETAs right to recover has been barred by laches in view of
all tenants to become members of FETA. their more than 40-year occupancy of the portion in question.
Accordingly, all the tenants occupying portions of the Fabella Eventually, in a decision dated 29 July 1994,[3] the trial court
Estate were asked to join FETA. While the rest did, the spouses rendered judgment in FETAs favor, thus:
Ramon Ragudo and Estrella Ragudo who were occupying the lot WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
subject matter of this controversy, consisting of about 105 square 1) ordering [spouses Ragudo] to vacate the premises in question
meters of the Fabella Estate, refused to join the Association. and to turn over possession thereof to [FETA];
Consequently, the portion occupied by them was awarded to Mrs. 2) to pay [FETA] rent in the amount of P500.00 for the month of
Miriam De Guzman, a qualified FETA member. November 1981 and every month thereafter until they vacate the
Later, and with the help of the city government of Mandaluyong, premises;
FETA became the registered owner of the entire Fabella Estate, as 3) to pay [FETA] attorneys fees in the amount of P20,000.00;
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2902 issued in its name 4) to pay [FETA] the amount of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
by the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong in 1989. and
To effect the ejectment of the spouses Ragudo from the portion 5) to pay the costs of suit.
in question which they continued to occupy despite the earlier award SO ORDERED.
thereof to Mrs. Miriam de Guzman, FETA filed against them a Therefrom, the spouses Ragudo went on appeal to the Court of
complaint for unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court Appeals, whereat their appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R.
(MeTC) of Mandaluyong City. CV No. 51230.
In a decision dated 6 August 1990, the MeTC dismissed the Meanwhile, pending resolution by the appellate court of the
unlawful detainer case on the ground that it was an improper remedy Ragudos appeal, FETA filed with the trial court a motion for the
because the Ragudos had been occupying the subject portion for issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, to which the Ragudos
more than one (1) year prior to the filing of the complaint, hence the interposed an Opposition, followed by FETAs Reply to Opposition.
proper action should have been one for recovery of possession Then, on 11 October 1994, the Ragudos filed with the trial court
before the proper regional trial court. FETA appealed the dismissal to a Rejoinder to Reply With Counter-Motion to Admit Attached
the Regional Trial Court at Pasig City, which affirmed the same. Documentary Evidence Relevant to the Pending Incident.[4] Attached
FETA then filed with the RTC-Pasig a complaint for recovery of thereto and sought to be admitted therein were the following
possession against the Ragudos. In their Answer, the spouses documents and photographs, to wit:
interposed the defense that they have already acquired ownership of 1. Letter dated 21 November 1989[5] of the spouses Ragudos
the disputed portion since they have been in occupation thereof in son, Engr. Aurelio Ragudo, addressed to FETA, stating
the concept of an owner for more than forty (40) years. They further therein that the Ragudos were willing to become FETA
argued that FETAs title over the entire Fabella Estate is fake because members;
as appearing on TCT No. 2902, it was originally registered as OCT No.
 2. Joint Affidavit, dated 07 October 1994, of three (3) residents Atty. Cesar G. Untalan dated November 21, 1989 are ordered
of the Fabella Estate;[6] EXPUNGED from the records of this case.
3. Photos of three (3) alleged houses of Miriam de Guzman SO ORDERED.
located at the Fabella Estate;[7] The Ragudos moved for a reconsideration, invoking liberality in
4. Photos of two (2) alleged houses of the sons of Miriam de the exercise of judicial discretion and the interest of equity and
Guzman located at the Fabella Estate;[8] substantial justice. Unmoved, the appellate court denied their
5. Photo of a lot allegedly awarded by FETA to its president, motion in its subsequent Resolution of 24 September 1997.[13]
Amparo Nobleza, located at the Fabella Estate;[9] and Eventually, in the herein assailed decision dated 19 July 2000,
6. Photo of a three (3)-storey house of Noblezas relative the Court of Appeals dismissed the Ragudos appeal in CA-G.R. CV No.
named Architect Fernandez located at the Fabella 51230 and affirmed with modification the RTC decision in the main
Estate.[10] case, thus:
In an order dated 25 November 1994, the trial court admitted in WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is
evidence the attachments to the Ragudos' aforementioned Rejoinder hereby AFFIRMED, except for the second clause of the dispositive
With Counter-Motion, etc., and ultimately denied FETAs motion for portion which should be MODIFIED, as follows:
execution pending appeal. 2) to pay [FETA] rent in the amount of P500.00 for the month of
Later, in CA-G.R. CV No. 51230, the Ragudos filed with the November, 1989 and every month thereafter until they vacate the
appellate court a Motion To Admit Certain Documentary Evidence by premises.
Way of Partial New Trial, In the Interest of Justice,[11] thereunder SO ORDERED.
seeking the admission in evidence of the very documents earlier With their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
admitted by the trial court in connection with the then pending appellate court in its equally challenged Resolution of 29 January
incident of execution pending appeal, and praying that said 2001, the Ragudos are now with us via the instant recourse,
documents be made part of the records and considered in the commending for our resolution the following issues:
resolution of their appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 51230. 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
This time, however, the Ragudos were not as lucky. For, in a ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE DOCUMENTS SOUGHT TO BE
Resolution dated 19 May 1997,[12] the appellate court denied their INTRODUCED BY RAGUDO AT THE APPELLATE LEVEL ON
aforesaid motion and ordered expunged from the records of the THE GROUND OF LIBERALITY OF PROCEDURAL RULES,
appealed case the documents they sought admission of, on the EQUITY AND SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE, THE MISTAKE AND
ground that they could not be considered as newly discovered EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THEIR FORMER
evidence under Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. Dispositively, the COUNSEL, AND THE SOCIAL JUSTICE AND PARENS PATRIAE
Resolution reads: CLAUSE OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion to admit certain documentary 2. WHETHER OR NOT ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION AND
evidence by way of partial new trial is DENIED for lack of merit. EQUITABLE LACHES HAD SET IN TO WARRANT THE
ACCORDINGLY, the Joint Affidavit dated October 7, 1994 of Honesto CONTINUED POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT LOT BY RAGUDO
Garcia III and Miguela L. Balbino and the latter of Aurelio Raguo to AND WHETHER THE SAME PRINCIPLES HAD CREATED A
 VESTED RIGHT IN FAVOR OF RAGUDO TO CONTINUE TO witness, the sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain
POSSESS AND OWN THE SUBJECT LOT.[14] evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of proof, x x x failure to
Informed of Mr. Ramon Ragudos death on 26 March 2001, the introduce certain evidence, to summon witnesses and to argue the
Court, in a resolution dated 14 January 2002,[15] allowed his case are not proper grounds for a new trial, unless the
substitution by his other heirs. incompetency of counsel is so great that his client is prejudiced and
The recourse must fall. prevented from properly presenting his case. (Vol. 2, Moran,
Relative to the first issue, it is petitioners submission that the Comments on the Rules of Court, pp. 218, 219-220, citing Rivero v.
appellate court committed an error when it refused admission as Santos, et al., 98 Phil. 500, 503-504; Isaac v. Mendoza, 89 Phil. 279;
evidence in the main case the documents earlier admitted by the trial Montes v. Court, 48 Phil. 64; People v. Manzanilla, 43 Phil. 167; U.S.
court in connection with FETAs motion for execution pending appeal. v. Umali, 15 Phil. 33; see also People v. Ner, 28 SCRA 1151, 1164). In
Appealing to this Courts sense of judicial discretion in the interest of the 1988 case of Palanca v. American Food, etc. (24 SCRA 819, 828),
equity and substantial justice, petitioners explain that the documents this principle was reiterated. (Tesoro v. Court of Appeals, 54 SCRA
in question were not presented and offered in evidence during the 296, 304). [Citations in the original; Emphasis supplied].
trial of the main case before the RTC due to the honest mistake and This is, as it should be, because a counsel has the implied
excusable negligence of their former counsel, Atty. Celso A. Tabobo, authority to do all acts which are necessary or, at least, incidental to
Jr. the prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his
We are not persuaded. client.[18] And, any act performed by counsel within the scope of his
In this jurisdiction, well-entrenched is the rule that the mistake general and implied authority is, in the eyes of the law, regarded as
and negligence of counsel to introduce, during the trial of a case, the act of the client himself and consequently, the mistake or
certain pieces of evidence bind his client.[16] For sure, in Aguila vs. negligence of the clients counsel may result in the rendition of an
Court of First Instance of Batangas,[17] we even ruled that the omitted unfavorable judgment against him.[19]
evidence by reason of counsels mistake or negligence, cannot be A contrary rule would be inimical to the greater interest of
invoked as a ground for new trial: dispensing justice. For, all that a losing party will do is to invoke the
On the effects of counsels acts upon his client, this Court has mistake or negligence of his counsel as a ground for reversing or
categorically declared: setting aside a judgment adverse to him, thereby putting no end to
It has been repeatedly enunciated that a client is bound by the litigation. Again, to quote from our decision in Aguila:
action of his counsel in the conduct of a case and cannot be heard Now petitioner wants us to nullify all of the antecedent proceedings
to complain that the result might have been different had he and recognize his earlier claims to the disputed property on the
proceeded differently. A client is bound by the mistakes of his justification that his counsel was grossly inept. Such a reason is
lawyer. If such grounds were to be admitted and reasons for hardly plausible as the petitioners new counsel should
reopening cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long as know. Otherwise, all a defeated party would have to do to salvage
new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that his case is claim neglect or mistake on the part of his counsel as a
prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced or ground for reversing the adverse judgment. There would be no
learned. x x x Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a end to litigation if this were allowed as every shortcoming of
counsel could be the subject of challenge by his client through resolution of CA-G.R. CV No. 51230 would certainly collide with
another counsel who, if he is also found wanting, would likewise Section 34, Rule 132, of the Rules of Court, which reads:
be disowned by the same client through another counsel, and so SECTION 34. Offer of Evidence. The court shall consider no evidence
on ad infinitum. This would render court proceedings indefinite, which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the
tentative and subject to reopening at any time by the mere evidence is offered must be specified. (Emphasis supplied).
subterfuge of replacing counsel. (Emphasis supplied). To stress, it was only during the hearing of the motion for
Admittedly, the rule thus stated admits of exceptions. Thus, in execution pending appeal that said documents were presented and
cases where the counsels mistake is so great and serious that the offered in evidence. Sure, the trial court admitted them, but the
client is prejudiced and denied his day in court[20]or when he is guilty admission was only for the purpose for which they were offered, that
of gross negligence resulting in the clients deprivation of his property is, by way of opposition to FETAs motion for execution pending
without due process of law,[21] the client is not bound by his counsels appeal. It is basic in the law of evidence that the court shall consider
mistakes and the case may even be reopened in order to give the evidence solely for the purpose for which it was offered.[23]
client another chance to present his case. While the said documents may have the right to stay in the
Unfortunately, however, petitioners case does not fall under any records of the case for purposes of the incidental issue of execution
of the exceptions but rather squarely within the ambit of the rule. pending appeal, they do not have that same right insofar as far as the
As it is, petitioners were given full opportunity during the trial of main case is concerned, and ought not be considered in the
the main case to adduce any and all relevant evidence to advance resolution thereof.
their cause. In no sense, therefore, may it be argued that they were Petitioners next contend that acquisitive prescription and
denied due process of law. As we said in Antonio vs. Court of equitable laches had set in, thereby vesting them with a right to a
Appeals,[22] a client cannot be said to have been deprived of his day continued possession of the subject lot.
in court and there is no denial of due process as long as he has been The contention holds no water.
given an opportunity to be heard, which, we emphasize, was done in It is not disputed that at the core of this controversy is a parcel
the instant case. of land registered under the Torrens system. In a long line of
Petitioners further argue that the documents which their former cases,[24] we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title
counsel failed to adduce in evidence during trial of the main case cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. So it is that
must be allowed to stay in the records thereof and duly considered in Natalia Realty Corporation vs. Vallez, et al.,[25] we held that a claim
in the resolution of their appeal because they were duly admitted in of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved is a
the trial court during the hearing on the incidental motion for registered land because of Article 1126 of the Civil Code[26] in relation
execution pending appeal. to Act 496 (now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 1529[27]):
Again, we are not persuaded. Appellants claim of acquisitive prescription is likewise
With the reality that those documents were never presented baseless. Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, prescription of
and formally offered during the trial of the main case, their belated ownership of lands registered under the Land Registration Act
admission for purposes of having them duly considered in the shall be governed by special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496
provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of
the registered owner shall be acquired by adverse possession. the court a quo to be inherently weak, and the validly documented
Consequently, proof of possession by the defendants is both claim of ownership of respondents, the latter must naturally
immaterial and inconsequential. (Emphasis supplied). prevail. (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioners would take exception from the above settled rule by WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed
arguing that FETA as well as its predecessor in interest, Don Dionisio decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs
M. Fabella, are guilty of laches and should, therefore, be already against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
precluded from asserting their right as against them, invoking, in this
regard, the rulings of this Court[28] to the effect that while a registered Bautista v. Poblete
land may not be acquired by prescription, yet, by virtue of the Before us is a petition for review assailing the decision[1] dated
registered owners inaction and neglect, his right to recover the January 7, 1999 of the Court of Appeals:
possession thereof may have been converted into a stale demand. WHEREFORE, the judgment herein appealed from is
While, at a blush, there is apparent merit in petitioners posture, hereby REVERSED, and the lower court is hereby directed to issue a
a closer look at our jurisprudence negates their submission. decree of registration over Lot No. 1243 in favor of the applicants.
To start with, the lower court found that petitioners possession SO ORDERED.[2]
of the subject lot was merely at the tolerance of its former lawful This controversy stems from a petition for the registration, filed
owner. In this connection, Bishop vs. Court of Appeals[29] teaches that by private respondents, of a 6.2556 hectare parcel of land identified
if the claimants possession of the land is merely tolerated by its lawful as Lot 1243.
owner, the latters right to recover possession is never barred by In their application, private respondents, the successors-in-
laches: interest of Socorro Reyes vda. de Poblete (Socorro), claimed that Lot
As registered owners of the lots in question, the private 1243 was donated by Marcelo Reyes Sr. (Marcelo Sr.) to Socorro, his
respondents have a right to eject any person illegally occupying daughter by a second marriage; that the cadastral survey of Lot 1243
their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed had been undertaken primarily for and in the name of Socorro; that
that they were aware of the petitioners occupation of the they purchased the same land from their parents Socorro and Juan
property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the Poblete; and that they and their predecessors in interest have been
lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property in open, continuous, peaceful and notorious possession of the
at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely subject lot in the concept of owner for more than 50 years. Thus, they
tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches. (Emphasis prayed that the land be registered in their names as co-owners.
supplied). Petitioners, Marcelo Sr.s children by his third marriage, opposed
To the same effect is our pronouncement in Urquiaga vs. Court said application alleging that Lot 1243 had been acquired by the
of Appeals,[30] to wit: deceased Marcelo Reyes, Sr. by purchase from a certain Juan Aranda.
We find no reversible error committed by respondent Court of Hence, said lot should be awarded to them as their fathers lawful
Appeals. We sustain private respondents ownership of Lot No. heirs.
6532-B. As between the verbal claim of ownership by petitioners In the course of the proceedings, private respondents presented
through possession for a long period of time, which was found by three witnesses, namely, Socorro Reyes Poblete, Pantaleon Garcia
Ancero and Cecilia Poblete. The material portions of their testimonies (Exh. K). Their mother and they have been in possession of the
were summarized by the appellate court as follows: property for 60 years already.
SOCORRO REYES VDA. DE POBLETE, an octogenarian, testified that The oppositors are half brothers and sisters of her mother, and they
Lot No. 1243 was given to her by her father, Marcelo Reyes, Sr. in had good relations before. The oppositors knew about the exclusive
1932, by way of a deed of donation which was destroyed when her possession of Lot No. 1243 by their mother, because they lived only
house was burned. some 150 meters away and saw their mother harvesting the fruits
Her father was married twice. By his first marriage, he had two of the land. They sometimes even asked her for some of the harvest
daughters, Candida and Carmen. By his second marriage, he also of the land but they never made a claim on it.
had two daughters, Socorro and Henerosa, who is already dead. He The applicants sold the property to Winthrop Corporation for P20
had other children, who are the oppositors in this case. Her father million, of which P3 million has been paid, and the balance to be
had given her sisters Candida and Carmen other parcels of land paid upon registration of the land.[3]
also. The oppositors Sinos (or Seno) were given five carabaos and To buttress their claim over Lot 1243, private respondents
financial support. ventured to prove that it was Marcelo Sr.s practice to give all his
She had Lot No. 1243 planted to sugar cane and palay, and had the children by each of his three wives similar gifts of land; that pursuant
same surveyed by the Bureau of Lands in her name (Exh. F). She also to this practice, Marcelo Sr. gave a six-hectare lot to his daughters by
had it tax declared in her name (Exh. G) and had been paying the the first marriage, Candida and Carmen Reyes; that Lot 1243
taxes thereon until she sold it to her children, the petitioners herein measuring 6.25 hectares was given to his daughter by a second
(Exh. I). She did not have the land registered at once because she marriage, private respondents mother Socorro; that another six-
thought that it first had to be tax declared. hectare lot was given to his children by a third marriage, petitioners
PANTALEON GARCIA ANCERO testified that he was working in Lot Adoracion B. Bautista, Librada R. Ponciano, Estela R. Quiambao and
No. 1243 since 1942 or 1943 first as a tenant of Socorro Reyes and Marcelo Reyes, Jr.; and finally, Marcelo Sr. gave five carabaos and
thereafter of petitioner Celia Poblete. The latter sold the property financial support to his illegitimate children, petitioners Jose, Leonila
two years ago to a Chinaman, and he was paid P700,000.00. and Dominador, all surnamed Sino.
Of the oppositors, he knows only Marcelo Reyes, Jr. who was a Private respondents failed to present the deed of donation by
candidate for councilor and asked his help in the election campaign, which Marcelo Sr. allegedly gave Lot 1243 to Socorro, claiming that
and Dominador Seno who went to the field he was cultivating twice the deed was burned when fire razed their house sometime in 1980.
to get a share of the harvest. Thus, the trial court dismissed the petition for registration.
CELIA POBLETE testified that on August 10, 1983, she and her sisters On appeal, the Court of Appeals considered private respondents
bought Lot No. 1243 for P39,000.00 from her mother, who acquired contention that even if the donation may have been invalid, the same
it more than fifty years before from her father Marcelo Reyes, could still serve as basis for acquisitive prescription. Consequently,
Sr. She brought the deed of sale to the Provincial Capitol and had the appellate court reversed the trial courts decision and ordered the
the tax declaration transferred to her and her and her sisters names issuance of a decree of registration over Lot 1243 in favor of private
(Exh. J), and they have been paying the real estate tax since then respondents. Hence, this petition.
 Perusal of the records reveals that Socorro Reyes was already in Furthermore, petitioner Marcelo Jr. admitted that Lot 1243 was
physical possession of Lot 1243 as early as 1934, even before the the only property left by his father Marcelo Sr. when he died; that
death of Marcelo Sr., and had the land planted to sugarcane and Marcelo Sr. gave a six-hectare lot to his (Marcelo Jr.s) mother which
palay. Socorro filed her application as claimant of Lot 1243 with the they sold in 1951, bolstering private respondents claim that Marcelo
Bureau of Lands way back in 1940 when the latter conducted a Sr. had given land to each of his four families.
cadastral survey. This was evidenced by the Cadastral Cost Register Petitioners were obviously engaged in a fishing expedition when
bearing on record that Socorro paid the amount of P4.24, the owners they opposed private respondents petition for registration of Lot
proportionate cost for the cadastral survey of Lot 1243. 1243. Petitioner Marcelo, Jr. was not even sure if they were co-
Socorros claim in Cad. 285, Carmona Cadastre, Case 2 was owners of the property. This uncertainty explained why none of the
approved on August 5, 1941. The following year, she had the land petitioners was ever in actual possession of the property. He also
tenanted by a certain Pantaleon Ancero. admitted that he did not know if Socorro inherited any property from
In 1948, Socorro registered Lot 1243 in her name under tax their father. They were allegedly surprised when they learned that
declaration no. 1430 and, thereafter, religiously paid the real estate the property was already in Socorros name.
tax on the property. The fact that petitioner Dominador Sino allegedly got a share of
On August 1, 1983, Socorro sold Lot 1243 to her children, the the harvest twice did not disprove at all that the entire harvest
private respondents. belonged to Socorro. At most, these two occasions only proved
On October 27, 1983, private respondents obtained a Socorros generosity to him, considering that he was an illegitimate
Declaration of Real Property in their favor under PD 464 otherwise child and received almost nothing by way of inheritance. Marcelo Sr.,
known as The Real Property Tax Code. died in 1932 under the regime of the old Civil Code which granted no
Finally, on August 28, 1991, private respondents filed a Petition successional rights to illegitimate children. Corollarily, the
for Registration of Title to Lot 1243 before the lower court in order to inheritance rights established by the new Civil Code in favor of
perfect the sale of the lot to Winthrop Realty Corporation illegitimate children could be claimed only by those whose parents
for P20,694,600. died after the effectivity of the law on August 30, 1950.[4] Thus,
Petitioners insist that Socorro expressly and impliedly petitioners Jose, Leonila and Dominador never really had any cause
recognized their rights as her co-heirs when she was entrusted with of action against private respondents.
the management of the land in 1934; that the harvest had always Quite telling too was the admission of Felino Quiambao,
been divided among the heirs, with petitioner Dominador Sino petitioners attorney-in-fact, that neither he nor any of petitioners
representing the others in getting their respective shares; that there (except Jose Sino) had ever been to the disputed land despite the fact
was a demand for partition but it did not push through because the that they lived only 150 meters away from the residence of Socorro
land was tenanted. in Carmona, Cavite; that they never filed any answer or objection to
However, other than the bare allegation of cestui que trust, the claim of Socorro in the cadastral proceedings over Lot 1243.[5]
petitioners failed to present proof of their claim. There was no There is a close parallelism between this case and Pensader v.
evidence showing that Socorro managed Lot 1243 on behalf of Pensader [6] wherein the Court held that:
Marcelo Sr.s heirs, including petitioners.
It was not shown that such possession was in common with the The donation of Lot 1243 to Socorro was made in 1932. She took
plaintiffs. As above stated, the origin of said possession is adverse to possession of the land immediately thereafter. Under the Code of
such community, namely, the donation, which although it is not Civil Procedure which was then in force, ten years of adverse
established by a sufficient documentary evidence, stands in this possession by the person claiming to be the owner, in whatever way
case as a circumstance explaining the exclusive character of the such occupancy may have commenced, shall vest in the actual
possession of Maria Revelar and Alejandra Pensader and that of possessor of the land a full and complete title.[9]
their common successor in interest Silverio P. Revelar. It is a settled rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
The ruling was reiterated in Espique v. Espique[7] where the Court binding upon this Court if borne out by the evidence on record. We
made the following pronouncement: find no reversible error in the appellate courts decision. Thus, we
There is no question that the donation in question is invalid because declare that no co-ownership existed between petitioners and
it involves an immovable property and the donation was not made respondents. Socorro obtained possession of the land even before
in a public document as required by Article 633 of the old Civil Code, Marcelo Sr. died. After his death, Socorro continued to enjoy
in connection with Article 1328 of the same Code (concerning exclusive possession of the land with no objection from petitioners.
gifts propter nuptias), but it does not follow that said donation may The land was cadastrally surveyed and tax-declared in her name,
not serve as basis of acquisitive prescription when on the strength again with no protestation from petitioners. It was only when Lot
thereof the donee has taken possession of the property adversely 1243 was sold for P20.7 million that petitioners suddenly fantasized
and in the concept of owner. about being co-owners thereof and wanted to share in the bonanza.
The appellate court, upon meticulous review of the records, WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
found that private respondents possession of Lot 1243 since 1934 decision AFFIRMED.
was adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and uninterrupted, Costs against petitioners.
and in the concept of an owner. This case was filed only in 1991. All SO ORDERED.
this time, Socorro was exercising acts of dominion over the land such
as enjoying its fruits to the exclusion of all others, having the land RESTAR V. CICHON
cadastrally surveyed in her name and faithfully paying realty taxes on While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does
Lot 1243 in her name. Assuming but not conceding that there existed not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by
an implied trust between the parties, Socorros aforementioned acts prescription where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-
of dominion clearly repudiated such trust. It is the essence of the ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse
statute of limitations that, whether the party had the right to the and exclusive ownership.
possession or not, if he entered under the claim of such right and
remained in possession for the period required for acquisitive FACTS:
prescription, the right of action of a party claiming title is barred by
that adverse possession. The right given by the statute of limitations -In 1935, Emilio Restar died intestate leaving 8 children-compulsory
does not depend on and has no necessary connection to the validity heirs. In 1960, Emilio’s eldest child, Flores caused the cancellation of
of the claim under which the possession is held.[8] a tax declration under Restar’s name covering a lot located at Brgy
Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan and a new tax declaration issued under his
name. Flores died in 1989. The co-heirs of Flores discovered the acts Whether or not the Heirs of Flores acquired the land through adverse
of Flores. possession.
-The heirs of Flores’ sisters together with Flores’ surviving issters filed
a complaint against Flores’ heirs for partition of the said lot and RULING:
declaration of nullity of documents, ownership before the RTC. YES.
-Flores’ brothers Policarpio and Adolfo were impleaded as
defendants but they were unwilling co-plaintiffs. When Restar died in 1935, his eight children became pro indiviso co-
-The respondents alleged that during the lifetime of FLores, they owners of the lot by intestate succession. Respondents never
were given their shares of Palay from the lot eand even after the possessed the lot, however, much less asserted their claim thereto
death of Flores. Flores’ widow Esmenia appealed to them to allow her until January 21, 1999 when they filed the complaint for partition
to hold on to the lot to finance the education of her childreen to subject of the present petition.
which the respondents agreed on the condition that when they finish
their education, the lot would be divided into 8 equal parts. Upon In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot after Restar’s death and
demand for the partition, the Heirs of Flores refused claiming that exercised acts of dominion thereon – tilling and cultivating the land,
they were the lawful owners of the land which they inherited from introducing improvements, and enjoying the produce thereof.
Flores.
-The Heirs of Flores claimed that they had been in possession of the The statutory period of prescription, however, commenced not in
lot in the concept of owner for more than 30 years and been paying 1935 but in 1960 when Flores, who had neither title nor good faith,
the realty taxes ever since. They denied the claims of the secured a tax declaration in his name and may, therefore, be said to
respondents. They further claimed that after WW2, Flores caused the have adversely claimed ownership of the lot. And respondents were
transfer of parcels of ricelands in Aklan to his siblings as their shares also deemed to have been on said date become aware of the adverse
from the estate of their father Emilio and that an extra-judicial claim.
partition took place in 1973 which was notarized by an Atty. Jose
Igtanloc and appointing among themselves 4 parcels of land. Flores’ possession thus ripened into ownership through acquisitive
-Adolfo interposed no objection to the partition of the lot while prescription after the lapse of thirty years in accordance with the
Policarpio acknowledged Flores as the owner of the lot but part of it earlier quoted Article 1137 of the New Civil Code.
was sold to him which he prayed for the exclusion in the partition.
-The RTC of Aklan stated that Flores and his heirs had performed acts The evidence proved that as far back as 1959, Flores Restar
sufficient to constitute repudiation of the co-ownership, and have adjudicated unto himself the whole land in question as his share from
aquired the lot by prescription. The RTC dismissed the complaint. The his father by means of a joint affidavit which he executed with one
CA reversed the decision of the RTC . Helen Restar, and he requested the Provincial Treasurer/Assessor to
have the land declared in his name. It was admitted by the parties
ISSUE: during the pre-trial that this affidavit was the basis of the transfer of
Tax Declaration No. 6686 from Emilio Restar to Flores Restar. So that coupled with actual possession, they constitute evidence of great
from 1960 the land was declared in the name of Flores Restar (Exhibit weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through
10). This was the first concrete act of repudiation made by Flores of prescription.
the co-ownership over the land in question. x x x
HEIRS OF CRISOLOGO VS RAÑON
Plaintiffs did not deny that aside from the verbal partition of one This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of
parcel of land in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan way back in 1945, they also
had an amicable partition of the lands of Emilio Restar in Cerrudo and the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
Palale, Banga Aklan on September 28, 1973 (exhibit "20"). If they No. 72552, dated 10 November 2005 and 12 January 2006,
were able to demand the partition, why then did they not demand respectively, which affirmed in toto the Decision[3] dated 8 August
the inclusion of the land in question in order to settle once and for all
the inheritance from their father Emilio Restar, considering that at 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch
that time all of the brothers and sisters, the eight heirs of Emilio 18, in Civil Case No. 3875-18. The RTC reversed the 11 December
Restar, were still alive and participated in the signing of the extra-
2001 Decision[4] of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Badoc-
judicial partition?
Pinili, Badoc, Ilocos Norte, in Civil Case No. 141-B.
Also it was admitted that Flores died only in 1989. Plaintiffs had all
the chances (sic) to file a case against him from 1960, or a period of
Records show that on 18 October 1995, Agrifina Raon[5] filed
29 years when he was still alive, yet they failed to do so. They filed
the instant case only on January 22, 1999, almost ten (10) years after a Complaint[6] against spouses Conrado and Mila Montemayor
Flores’ death. (spouses Montemayor) with the MCTC of Badoc, Ilocos Norte,

claiming ownership over an unregistered residential lot (subject
From the foregoing evidence, it can be seen that the adverse
possession of Flores started in 1960, the time when the tax property) situated at Brgy. No. 2 Badoc, Ilocos Norte, covered by Tax
declaration was transferred in his name. The period of acquisitive Declaration No. 420809, more particularly described as follows:
prescription started to run from this date. Hence, the adverse

possession of Flores Restar from 1960 vested in him exclusive
RESIDENTIAL with an area of 472 sq. ms.
ownership of the land considering the lapse of more than 38 years.
(sic) Bounded on the North by Ladera St.; on the East
Acquisitive prescription of ownership, laches and prescription of the
by Dionisio Ladera; on the South by Buenaventura
action for partition should be considered in favor of Flores Restar and
Arzadon; and on the West by Rafael Ladera; Assessed
his heirs.
at P1700.00 under Tax Dec. No. 420809.[7]

While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence According to Agrifina Raon, her family had enjoyed continuous,
of ownership and do not prove title to the land, nevertheless, when peaceful and uninterrupted possession and ownership over the
subject property since 1962, and had religiously paid the taxes On 22 July 1996, the Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo,
thereon. They had built a house on the subject property where she (represented by Leticia A. Crisologo del Rosario), Mauricia Arzadon,
and her family had resided. Unfortunately, in 1986, when her family and Bernardo Arzadon (petitioners) filed an Answer in
was already residing in Metro Manila, fire razed and destroyed the Intervention[10] claiming, inter alia, that they are the rightful owners
said house. Nonetheless, they continued to visit the subject property, of the subject property, having acquired the same from their
as well as pay the real estate taxes thereon.However, in August of predecessors-in-interest.They averred that there existed no liens or
1986, her daughter, Zosie Raon, discovered that the subject property encumbrances on the subject property in favor of Agrifina Raon; and
was already in the name of the spouses Montemayor under Tax that no person, other than they and the spouses Montemayor, has
Declaration No. 0010563 which was purportedly issued in their favor an interest in the property as owner or otherwise.
by virtue of an Affidavit of Ownership and Possession which the
spouses Montemayor executed themselves. The Affidavit was Per petitioners allegations, their predecessors-in-interest,
alleged to have created a cloud of doubt over Raons title and spouses Timoteo and Modesta Alcantara (spouses Alcantara) bought
ownership over the subject property. the subject property from its owner, Rafael Ladera, on 2 May
1936. The spouses Alcantara then built a house of strong materials
Hence, Agrifina Raon sought a Writ of Preliminary on the subject property which served as their conjugal
Injunction[8] against the spouses Montemayor commanding them to home. Residing with them was Timoteo Alcantaras sister, Augustina
cease and desist from further exercising any right of ownership or Alcantara-Arzadon. As the spouses Alcantara died without issue, their
possession over the subject property. She further prayed that she be properties were left to Timoteo Alcantaras nearest of kin, Augustina
finally declared the true and lawful owner of the subject property. Alcantara-Arzadon and Tiburcio Alcantara, sister and brother,
respectively, of Timoteo Alcantara. Tiburcio Alcantara also died
The spouses Montemayor, for their part, alleged that they acquired without any known heir; thus, leaving the subject property in
the subject lot by purchase from Leticia del Rosario and Bernardo Augustina Alcantara-Arzadons sole favor. Augustina Alcantara-
Arzadon who are the heirs of its previous owners for a consideration Arzadon is the mother of petitioners Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo
of P100,000.00.[9] (now deceased and whose heirs are represented by Leticia del
Rosario) and Mauricia Arzadon. Bernardo Arzadon is the son of
Mauricia Arzadon.
 mode of succession pursuant to [A]rticle
1001 of the [C]ivil [C]ode of the Philippines;
Petitioners asseverated further that Bernardo Arzadon had
lived in the house constructed on the subject property until 1985 2. Declaring the [petitioners] to have the
when it was gutted by fire. To further support their claims, petitioners better right over the other half of the
undivided whole of the lot-in-suit by mode of
averred that they had religiously paid the real estate taxes on the prescription pursuant to [A]rticle 1137 of the
subject property. Finally, by way of a counterclaim, petitioners Civil Code of the Philippines;
sought compensation for the damages which they allegedly suffered
3. Dismissing the counter-claim of the
by reason of the baseless filing of the instant suit. [petitioners] against the [respondents];

4. Ordering [petitioners] to pay the cost of
On 22 October 1999, the MCTC issued an Order[11] dropping
the suit.[12]
the name of the spouses Montemayor from the caption of the case
on the ground that sometime in 1996, Leticia del Rosario and First, the MCTC ruled that while the adverse claims of Agrifina
Bernardo Arzadon had repurchased the subject property from the Raon on the subject lot against the spouses Alcantara may have
spouses Montemayor for the consideration of P100,000.00. As a started in 1962, this adverse possession was interrupted in the year
result, the spouses Montemayor had no more interest or claim 1977 due to the filing of an adverse claim by petitioner Marcelina
whatsoever on the property in litigation. Arzadon-Crisologo with the Office of the Assessor. In 1977, the tax
declaration in the name of Valentin Raon, Agrifina Raons husband,
On 11 December 2001, the MCTC rendered a Decision in was cancelled and a new tax declaration was issued in Marcelina
favor of the petitioners. The decretal portion thereof reads, thus: Arzadon-Crisologos name. The MCTC said that the period of
possession of the spouses Raon in the concept of an owner from 1962
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment
is hereby rendered: to 1977 did not ripen into ownership because their occupation was
in bad faith. The Civil Code requires, for acquisitive prescription of

1. Declaring the [petitioners] to be the true real property, 30 years of uninterrupted possession if the same is
and lawful owners of one-half (1/2) portion wanting in good faith and without a just title.
of the undivided whole of the lot-in-suit by

Second, the MCTC held that by virtue of succession, petitioners are ownership over the subject property by adverse possession under
entitled to one-half of the subject property. This is because according Article 1137[17] of the Civil Code.
to Article 1001[13] of the Civil Code, should brothers and sisters or On appeal, the RTC reversed and set aside the Decision of the MCTC.
their children survive with the widow or the widower (who are
without issue), the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the The RTC declared that the respondent Raons who are heirs of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other original plaintiff had acquired the subject property by virtue of
half. The spouses Alcantara died without issue. As between Timoteo acquisitive prescription, and therefore adjudged respondents to be
Alcantara and Modesta Alcantara, the former predeceased the the absolute owners thereof; thus, in the 8 August 2002 Decision of
latter. Timoteo Alcantara was survived by (1) his brother Tiburcio the RTC, it held:
Alcantara, who also died without any known heir; and (2) his sister
Augustina Alcantara.Thus, following the death of the spouses WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision
of the trial [c]ourt is hereby REVERSED and SET
Alcantara, only the children of Augustina Alcantara, namely ASIDE, and judgment is hereby rendered:
Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo and Mauricia Arzadon, stand to inherit
Timoteo Alcantaras share in the subject property. 1) Declaring the [respondents] as the absolute
owners of the parcel of land in suit, having
acquired the same through extraordinary
Moreover, the MCTC declared that for the part of Modesta Alcantara, acquisitive prescription.
there was no legal heir who claimed the other half of the property
No costs.[18]
which she[14] inherited from her husband, Timoteo Alcantara who
predeceased her. On this portion, the MCTC held that petitioners
exercised rights of ownership and dominion over the same by In its findings, the RTC declared that a more circumspect scrutiny of
[15]
periodically visiting the lot and cleaning it. It also held that from 31 the evidence showed that for a long time from the death of the
August 1977, when petitioners predecessor-in-interest Marcelina spouses Alcantara, no one adjudicated the subject property unto
Arzadon-Crisologo filed an adverse claim for herself and for her themselves. Although petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest
brothers and sisters which led to the issuance of Tax Declaration No. claimed to have successional rights over the subject property, they
[16]
44120 in her name, to 11 December 2001, there is a total of 33 did not take action to have the same adjudicated to themselves or, at
years, three months and 10 days which is sufficient to claim least, to have the same declared for taxation purposes. The RTC ruled
that petitioners had slept on their rights. On the part of the taken the necessary action in claiming the parcel of
land in suit. It is the vigilant and not the sleepy that
respondent Raons, in 1962, Valentin Raon, respondents father, is being assisted by the laws. (Ledita Burce Jacob v.
declared the subject property in his name for taxation purposes and Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 92159, July 1, 1993).
paid the corresponding taxes thereon. In the years that followed, his
It stands to reason, therefore, to hold that because
wife, Agrifina Raon, declared the same in her name for taxation of the claim of the [respondents] to have acquired
purposes, as well as paid the real estate taxes on the subject the parcel of land in suit by acquisitive prescription,
property.In 1977, the latter even mortgaged the subject property the Intervenors who belatedly claimed to be the legal
and compulsory heirs of the late Timoteo Alcantara,
with the Philippine National Bank. It was only in 1977 when as ruled by the trial court, had regrettably forfeited
petitioners predecessor-in-interest Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo their such (sic) successional rights, simply due to
their inaction for a long period of time. Hence,
executed an Adverse Claim and Notice of Ownership and declared
contrary to the findings of the trial court, the
the subject property in her name and paid its taxes. [petitioners] are not entitled to the one-half (1/2)
portion of the parcel of land in suit.[19]



The RTC elucidated in this wise, to wit:
Likewise, the RTC reasoned that the Notice of Adverse Claim
It bears to note that since the death of Timoteo
Alcantara until the year 1977, [petitioners], as well as executed by petitioners predecessor-in-interest Marcelina Arzadon-
their predecessors-in-interests (sic) had not taken Crisologo against the Raons in 1977 implied that respondents have
any concrete step in exercising their supposed
successional rights over the parcel of land in suit, or been in possession of the subject property. On this matter, the RTC
at least, the Intervenors should have always [stayed] said, viz:
on their guard or especially vigilant against anyone
who would secure a claim to the said parcel of land, Evidently, the trial court considered by implication
more so that Valentin Raon and plaintiff Agrifina that the execution by Marcelina Arzadon Crisologo of
Raon were then living with them. It is very said Adverse Claim and Notice of Ownership in 1977
unfortunate that it was only in 1977 that the to have interrupted the running of the prescriptive
Intervenors made known to others of their supposed period on the possession by the [respondents] of the
successional rights over the parcel of land in parcel of land in suit. It bears to stress on (sic) this
suit. Relief is denied to a claimant whose right has point, that the Adverse Claim and Notice of
become stale for a long time, considering that some Ownership executed by Marcelina Arzadon Crisologo
other persons like [respondents] had wayback (sic) is nothing but a notice of a claim adverse to the
 [respondents]. By its nature, its implication is that
the [respondents] have been in possession of the
parcel of land in suit in some concept. But definitely, On review before the Court of Appeals, the Decision of the RTC was
said Adverse Claim does not, upon its execution, affirmed in toto.
operate to toll or interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period because there is a necessity to
determine the validity of the same. And this could The Court of Appeals held that when Valentin Raon executed the
only be done by the filing of the necessary action in affidavit declaring himself to be the true and lawful owner of the
court such [as] contemplated in the provisions of subject property in 1962, the same was a repudiation of petitioners
Article 1123 of the Civil Code. It is only on (sic) such
instance that the prescriptive period should be legal title over it. The repudiation, coupled with the payment of realty
deemed interrupted. And undisputedly, nothing had taxes, was made with the knowledge of petitioners, who failed to act
been done by the Intervenors after the execution of
against it. Thus, from 1962 up to the filing of the action in 1995,
said Adverse Claim by Marcelina Crisologo, except of
course as they claimed, and as held by the trial court, respondents continued to adversely occupy the property. In the
they started to possess the parcel of land in assailed 10 November 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals, it ruled:
suit. Regretably (sic), however, such possession by

the Intervenors of the parcel of land in suit does not
Moreover, respondents payment of realty
benefit them for purposes of prescription.[20]
taxes made with the knowledge and consent of
petitioners and went unchallenged for a number of
years, indubitably show their positive claim as
The RTC also declared that the Raons have been in possession of the owners of the property. While it is true that by
parcel of land in the concept of an owner since 1962. Even as they themselves tax receipts and declarations of
had gone to live in Manila following the burning of the house on the ownership for taxation purposes are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they
subject property, they continued to exercise acts of dominion over become strong evidence of ownership acquired by
the same by visiting and looking after the property. The RTC also prescription when accompanied by proof of actual
possession of the property. It is only where payment
considered in favor of the respondents, the admission of petitioner
of taxes is accompanied by actual possession of the
Bernardo Arzadon and the petitioners witnesses that Valentin Raon land covered by the tax declaration that such
and Agrifina Raon had been staying in the house on the subject lot circumstance may be material in supporting a claim
of ownership.
since 1947, which shows that they had been in possession of the

subject property for a period of more than 50 years.
 Needless to state, from 1962 onwards, prescription occupation was rooted from the mere tolerance of
begun to run against petitioners and was not in any the Arzadons or from a bona fide sale between
way interrupted from their mere execution of the Agrifina Raon and Rafael Ladera.[22]
Notice of Adverse Claim since the notice of adverse
claim cannot take the place of judicial summons
which produces the civil interruption provided for Hence, the instant Petition.
under the law. And even if We are to eliminate the
question of good faith in determining the
prescriptive period, evidence are (sic) still abundant The primordial issue in the case at bar is whether the Court of Appeals
to substantiate respondents thirty years of erred in declaring that respondents had acquired ownership over the
possession in the concept of owner commencing
from 1962 until 1995 when the complaint below was subject property through uninterrupted and adverse possession
filed.[21] thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good

faith. Petitioners dispute the findings of the Court of Appeals and the

RTC in declaring that acquisitive prescription has set in against them
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon which was
and in favor of the respondents. They claim that the evidence does
denied by the Court of Appeals in the following manner, to wit:
not support respondents contention that they have been in public,

After a careful study of the grounds relied notorious, and uninterrupted possession over the subject property in
upon by petitioners We find no new matters raised the concept of an owner since 1962 as alleged in their
to justify a modification much less, a reversal of the
Complaint. Instead, petitioners rely on the finding of the MCTC that
Decision sought to be reconsidered. To reiterate,
even assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner respondents were not able to prove their adverse claim for an
merely tolerated the Raons (sic) occupancy of the uninterrupted period of thirty years.
subject property, it must be stressed that the

execution in 1962 of Valentin Raons Affidavit, the
corresponding payment of realty taxes and other At this juncture, we take an opportune look at the applicable rules on
acts of dominion which went unchallenged by the the acquisition of ownership through prescription.
petitioners, had effectively severed their alleged

juridical relation. Suffice it to state that these acts,
taken as a whole, vest upon the Raons the right to Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and
claim ownership over the subject property other real rights over immovable property.[23] It is concerned with
irrespective of whether the nature of their
lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law,
namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that acquisitive prescription of
public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse.[24] Possession is open real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.[30] Ordinary acquisitive
when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just
clandestine.[25] It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and title for the time fixed by law; without good faith and just title,
[26]
not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in
possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an character.[31] Regarding real or immovable property, ordinary
appropriation of it to his own use and benefit;[27] and notorious when acquisitive prescription requires a period of possession of ten
it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the years, while extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires an
[28]
public or the people in the neighborhood. The party who asserts uninterrupted adverse possession of thirty years.[32]
ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the Were respondents able to sufficiently satisfy the legal requirements
essential elements of acquisitive prescription. to prove prescription?
Article 1117 of the Civil Code is instructive:
To recapitulate, respondents traced their claim of ownership from
Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and the year 1962 until the filing of their Complaint for Ownership before
other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
the MCTC on 18 October 1995. To support their possession, they rely
on an Affidavit executed on 19 October 1962 by Valentin Raon
Articles 1134 and 1137 of the Civil Code fix the periods of claiming ownership over the subject property by virtue of an alleged
possession,[29] which provide: sale.The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals were unanimous in
declaring that the execution by Valentin Raon of the Affidavit in 1962
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over was an express repudiation of petitioners claim over the property. By
immovable property are acquired by ordinary
prescription through possession of ten years. virtue of such Affidavit, respondents were able to cancel Tax
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over Declaration No. 02853 in the name of petitioners predecessor-in-
immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted interest Timoteo Alcantara who was shown to have paid taxes on the
adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without
need of title or of good faith. subject property in 1950. Hence, in 1962, Tax Declaration No. 033062
was issued in the name of Valentin Raon.The same was subsequently

cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 033106, which was in the name of
his wife, Agrifina Raon. The same was likewise cancelled in 1967 by Both Article 1123 and Article 1124 of the Civil Code
Tax Declaration No. 420809, similarly under the name of Agrifina underscore the judicial character of civil interruption. For civil
Raon. In 1977, however, petitioners predecessor-in-interest interruption to take place, the possessor must have received judicial
Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo filed an Adverse Claim and a Notice of summons. None appears in the case at bar. The Notice of Adverse
Ownership claiming that the subject property which is not yet Claim which was filed by petitioners in 1977 is nothing more than a
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laoag City is notice of claim which did not effectively interrupt respondents
declared under Tax Declaration No. 420809 in the name of Valentin possession. Such a notice could not have produced civil
Raon for taxation purposes only; but that they have been in interruption. We agree in the conclusion of the RTC, which was
possession of the said land publicly, peacefully and continuously affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the execution of the Notice of
without any intervention or interruption for more than 15 years. Adverse Claim in 1977 did not toll or interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period because there remains, as yet, a necessity for a
However, a question must be asked: did the Notice of judicial determination of its judicial validity. What existed was merely
Adverse Claim filed by petitioners constitute an effective interruption a notice. There was no compliance with Article 1123 of the Civil
since 1962 of respondents possession of the subject property? Code. What is striking is that no action was, in fact, filed by petitioners
against respondents. As a consequence, no judicial summons was
The answer is in the negative. received by respondents. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals in its
[33]
Article 1123 of the Civil Code is categorical. Civil interruption is affirmance of the RTCs ruling, the Notice of Adverse Claim cannot
produced by judicial summons to the possessor. Moreover, even with take the place of judicial summons which produces the civil
[34]
the presence of judicial summons, Article 1124 sets limitations as interruption provided for under the law.[35] In the instant case,
to when such summons shall not be deemed to have been issued and petitioners were not able to interrupt respondents adverse
shall not give rise to interruption, to wit: 1) if it should be void for lack possession since 1962. The period of acquisitive prescription from
of legal solemnities; 2) if the plaintiff should desist from the 1962 continued to run in respondents favor despite the Notice of
complaint or should allow the proceedings to lapse; or 3) if the Adverse Claim.
possessor should be absolved from the complaint.
From another angle, we find that, quite clearly, questions of fact
exist before us. There is a question of fact when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the
query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly Thus, by preponderance of evidence, it has
been established preponderantly that the
the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of [respondents] have been in possession of the parcel
specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each of land in suit continuously, peacefully, publicly,
other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.[36] notoriously, uninterrupted and in the concept of an
owner since 1962 to the present. The fact that the
Thus, we find proper the application of the doctrine that [respondents] have gone to live in Manila right after
findings of facts of the Court of Appeals upholding those of the trial the house built in the parcel of land in suit was
court are binding upon this Court.[37]Even though the rule is subject burned in 1988, they, however, then and thereafter
intermittently come to Badoc, Ilocos Norte purposely
to exceptions,[38] we do not find them applicable in the instant case. to look after and to visit the parcel of land in
suit. Actual possession of land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
As found by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
nature as a party would naturally exercise over his
nothing was done by petitioners to claim possession over the subject own property. One needs (sic) not to (sic) stay on
property from the time their predecessors-in-interest had lost it.The acts exercised by the [respondents] over the
parcel of land in suit are consistent with
possession of the property due to their deaths. Plainly, petitioners
ownership. Possession in the eyes of the law does
slept on their rights. Vigilantibus sed non dormientibus jura not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
subveniunt. The law comes to the succor only to aid the vigilant, not square meter of the ground before it can be said that
he is in possession [thereof]. (Ramos v. Director of
those who slumber on their rights. It was only in 1977 when they
Lands, 39 Phil. 175, cited in the case of Somodio v.
attempted to call the attention of respondents, which as earlier Court of Appeals, et al., 235 SCRA 307). It is sufficient
discussed, did not even operate as an interruption on the latters that the [respondents] were able to subject the
parcel of land to the action of their will.
possession. The RTC and the Court of Appeals held that from 1962 to

the time they filed their Complaint before the MCTC and until the Furthermore, the Court finds it (sic)
present time, respondents occupied without interruption the subject significant the testimonies of [petitioner] Bernardo
Arzadon and his witnesses Leonila Arzadon and
property in the concept of an owner, thereby acquiring
Elpidio Evangelista who categorically testified to the
ownership via extraordinary acquisitive prescription. To reiterate, effect that Valentin Raon and [respondent] Agrifina
the RTCs factual findings based on the evidence on record were Raon had been staying in the house standing on the
parcel of land in suit since 1947. Basically, the
manifestly in favor of respondents, to wit:
 defendants are bound by their admissions and also claim of title over the property.[42] As is well known, the payment of
bound by the testimonies of the witnesses they
presented. And going along with their respective taxes coupled with actual possession of the land covered by the tax
testimonies, from 1947 to 1977 or for [a] period of declaration strongly supports a claim of ownership.[43] The Court of
thirty (30) years the [respondents] have been in Appeals did not err in affirming the factual findings of the RTC that
possession of the parcel of land in suit enough to
invoke extraordinary acquisitive prescription, respondents had validly established their claim of ownership over the
pursuant to the provisions of Article 1134[39] (sic) of subject property through acquisitive prescription.
the New (sic) Civil Code. However, as earlier stated,
the [respondents], contrary to the claim of the
[petitioners] and findings of the trial court, have WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
been in possession of the parcel of land in suit Court of Appeals dated 10 November 2005 and the Resolution
continuously and uninterrupted from 1962 to the
dated 12 January 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72552 are AFFIRMED. No
present but because of the admissions of the
[petitioners], the [respondents] have been in costs.
possession of the same from 1947 to the present or
for more than fifty (50) years now.[40] AGUIRRE, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 122249 January 29, 2004

FACTS:
Leocadio Medrano and his first wife Emilia owned a piece of
The open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by land. After the death of Emilia, Leocadio married his second wife
respondents of the subject property for a period of more than 30 Miguela. When Leocadio died, all his heirs agreed that Sixto
years in repudiation of petitioners ownership had been Medrano, a child of the first marriage, should manage and administer
the said property. After Sixto died, his heirs learned that he had
established. During such length of time, respondents had exercised executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property in which he falsely
acts of dominion over the subject property, and paid taxes in their stated that he was the only heir of Leocadio. It turned out that while
name.Jurisprudence is clear that although tax declarations or realty Sixto were still alive, he sold a portion of the subject land tp Tiburcio
Balitaan and another portion to Maria Bacong, Maria Bacong later
tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, sold the said portion to Rosendo Bacong. Petitioners, all heirs of
nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of Leocadio who were affected by the sale demanded reconveyance of
owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a the portions sold by Sixto but the 3 vendees refused. Resultantly,
petitioners filed a suit against them seeking the nullity of the
property that is not in his actual or at least constructive documents and partition thereof. The vendees contended that they
possession.[41] They constitute at least proof that the holder has a acquired the property under the valid deed of sale and petitioners’
cause of action was barred by laches and prescription. Tiburcio also Thus, in order that a co-owner’s possession may be deemed
contended that he is an innocent purchaser for value. adverse to the cestui que trust or the other co-owners, the following
elements must concur:
ISSUE: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation
Whether or not there was a valid sale between Sixto Medrano amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or the other co-
and the three purchases considering the fact that it was made owners;
without the consent of the co-owners. (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been known to
the cestui que trust or the other co-owners; and
(3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.

HELD: Tested against these guidelines, the respondents failed to
Under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, a sale by a co-owner present competent evidence that the acts of Sixto adversely and
of the whole property as his will affect only his own share but not clearly repudiate the existing co-ownership among the heirs of
those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale). The Leocadio Medrano. Respondent’s reliance on the tax declaration in
provision clearly provides that the sale or other disposition affects the name of Sixto Medrano is unworthy of credit since we have held
only the seller’s share, and the transferee gets only what corresponds on several occasions that tax declarations by themselves do not
to his grantor’s share in the partition of the property owned in conclusively prove title to land. Further, respondents failed to show
common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a that the Affidavit executed by Sixto to the effect that he is the sole
sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of owner of the subject property was known or made known to the
the other co-owner is not null and void; only the rights of the co- other co-heirs of Leocadio Medrano.
owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner
of the property. It is clear therefore that the deed of sale executed by
Sixto in favor of Tiburcio Balitaan is a valid conveyance only insofar as
the share of Sixto in the co-ownership is concerned. Acts which may
be considered adverse to strangers may not be considered adverse in
so far as co-owners are concerned. A mere silent possession by a co-
owner, his receipts of rentals, fruits or profits from the property, the
erection of buildings and fences and planting of trees thereon, and
the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive
ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and convincing evidence that
he exercised such acts of possession which unequivocally constituted
an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners.