C800 Commonwealth of the Philippines v.

Baldello, GR L-45375, 12 April 1939, En

Banc, Moran [J] (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1939/apr1939/gr_l-45375_1939.html)

Carlos A. Sobral for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.

MORAN, J.:

Gloria Baldello, a Filipino citizen, married a stateless person in the contemplation of the Law of
the Nations, on November 12, 1921, one Gabino Ordorica, a native of Mexico, then serving in the
United States Army in the Philippines.

We believe, and so hold, that there being no new citizenship imposed upon her by marriage,
nothing could have divested her of her original citizenship, and, therefore, her Philippine
citizenship remained unchanged. The general rule that a married woman follows the nationality of
her husband presupposes a nationality in the husband. Where no such nationality exists, the rule
does not apply.

Our opinion finds corroboration in the rule indicated in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil., 315,
324, 325), which is now a legal provision embodied in paragraph 7, article 1, of Commonwealth Act
No. 63, to the effect that a Filipino woman does not lose her citizenship by marrying a foreigner
belonging to a nation the laws of which do not allow her to acquire the husband's nationality. Were it
not for this rule, if a Filipino woman loses her nationality simply by marrying a foreigner, even without
acquiring the foreigner's citizenship, then she would become destitute of nationality. And evidently
the purpose of the said rule is to prevent such condition of statelessness in a Filipino woman married
to an alien, a policy that is perfectly applicable in the present case.

We hold, therefore, that appellant Gloria Baldello , is a Filipino citizen, and accordingly her petition
for Philippine citizenship is unnecessary.

Judgment is affirmed, without costs.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
C801 In RE Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, GR L-83882, 24 January 1989, En Banc, Padilla
[J] (http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/jan1989/gr_l83882_1989.html) <

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-83882 January 24, 1989

IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE YU, petitioner,

vs.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P. ALANO, JR., MAJOR PABALAN, DELEO
HERNANDEZ, BLODDY HERNANDEZ, BENNY REYES and JUN ESPIRITU SANTO, respondent.

Pelaez, Adriano and Gregorio and Bonifacio A. Alentajan for petitioner.

Chavez, Hechanova & Lim Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioner.

Augusto Jose y. Arreza for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

FACTS:

1971 Petitioner was issued a Portuguese passport valid for five (5) years and renewed for the same
period upon presentment before the proper Portuguese consular officer.

10 Feb 1978 Petitioner was naturalized as a Philippine citizen

21 July 1981, petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport by the Consular Section of the
Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo.

April 1980 Petitioner declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents.

ISSUE:

Whether the acts of applying for a foreign passport and declaration of foreign nationality in
commercial documents, constitute an express renunciation of one’s Philippine citizenship acquired
through naturalization.

RULING:

YES. To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express
renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In a related
jurisprudence, express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly
and explicitly and not left to inference or implication.

Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon
naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen,
applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in official documents
even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of
Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.

(2) Reacquisition
C802 Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, GR 87193, 23 June 1989, En Banc,
Cruz [J]
(http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/jun1989/gr_87193_1989.html) <
Frivaldo case 1

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989

JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON
CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE
ESTUYE, respondents.

J.L. Misa & Associates for petitioner.

Lladoc, Huab & Associates for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS

November 19, 1987 Petitioner Filed CoC.

Jan 18, 1988 Local Elections

Jan. 22, 1988 Petitioner Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of Sorsogon.

October 27, 1988 the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League), represented
by its President, Salvador Estuye, file a petition for annulment with the Commission on Elections of
Frivaldo’s election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been
naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983.

May 22, 1988, (affirmative defense) Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States
as alleged but pleaded that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against
President Marcos. In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his
naturalization as an American citizen was not "impressed with voluntariness."

His oath in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of
repatriation.

Additionally, his active participation in the 1987 congressional elections had divested him of
American citizenship under the laws of the United States, thus restoring his Philippine citizenship.

Jan 20, 1988 COMELEC decided to set the case for hearing on the merits even though Frivaldo
moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses.

Feb 21, 1988 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by COMELEC.

Petitioner filed in this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask that the said orders be set
aside on the ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:

Whether Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18,
1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.

RULING
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all
public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the
specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local
elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency
where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter
must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable
requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a
"natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The
evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the
following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly
authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A.

This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he expressly admitted it in his answer.
Nevertheless, as earlier noted, he claims it was "forced" on him as a measure of protection from the
persecution of the Marcos government through his agents in the United States.

The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos
dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into
embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of
his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright. The
martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of those Filipinos in exile who, unlike the petitioner,
held fast to their Philippine citizenship despite the perils of their resistance to the Marcos regime.

The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of effective
nationality which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar.

It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his naturalization in Liechtenstein whereas in the
present case Frivaldo is rejecting his naturalization in the United States.

If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the
petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as
amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

Frivaldo claims he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims
that by actively participating in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American
citizenship under the laws of the United States.

Frivaldo did not formally reject his adopted state and reaffirm his allegiance to the Philippines. He
contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had already effectively recovered
Philippine citizenship.

But that is hardly the formal declaration. Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not
that cheaply recovered. Once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be
lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous
and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its
prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and
unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.