ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Brian Vogt is a Senior Democracy and Governance Advisor for the Office of Afghanistan and
Pakistan Affairs at USAID. He is also a Truman Project Fellow and the Co-Leader of Truman’s
Asia Expert Group. He has more than thirteen years of experience in international development
and political advocacy.

Most recently he served as a Program Manager for Asia at the National Democratic Institute
where he managed the organization's programs in Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Burma,
Thailand, and the Philippines. He also served as a Senior Advisor to the Partnership for a Secure
America, an organization that promotes bipartisanship in U.S. foreign policy, and has written
regularly on foreign policy issues on the blog Across the Aisle. He previously served as an
international election observer in the DRC, Ethiopia, and Indonesia, worked for the
microfinance organization, Sanghamithra, based in Bangalore, India, and worked as an
Associate Director for the international NGO, Ashoka: Innovators for the Public. During the
2004 presidential campaign, he co-founded a political advocacy organization, Win Back
Respect, which developed television advertisements focused on U.S. foreign policy.

A native of Covington, Kentucky, he has a MPA in Public and International Affairs from
Princeton University and a BA in Political Science from Yale University.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Burma has taken important steps towards a more democratic future. Aung San Suu Kyi has
been released and won a seat in parliament in the 2012 by-elections. Most other political
prisoners have also been released and censorship of the media has been abolished. The U.S. and
other western countries are in the process of lifting sanctions that for years have kept Burma
isolated from the international community. However, Burma is only at the very early stages of a
democratic transition and many of the dramatic changes that have occurred are fragile.
Constitutionally, the military, the Tatmadaw, continues to have the predominant role in
decision making and also consumes the largest share of government spending, 20.8 percent1.
The President, former general Thein Sein, and the Speaker of the Lower house, former general
Shwe Mann, have chosen to allow democratic institutions to develop. The democratic gains
made to date could stagnate if the current leadership decides to slow the pace of reform or if less
reform-minded leaders come to power.

It is time to start exploring ways to strengthen the underlying structure so that it can withstand
changes in leadership and allow for sustainable democratic progress in Burma. This ultimately
means constitutional reform. Without the acquiescence of the military, however, constitutional
reform that reduces the military’s role in the government is practically impossible in the short
run. Therefore, it is appropriate to see if there are models that present a pathway for Burma’s
military to voluntarily, on a gradual basis, cede authority to the civilian government. Indonesia
presents a compelling example of how such a transition can take place in a way that maintains
the structural integrity of the country and the stature of the military. The goal for Burma should
be a “pacted transition” in which the key players, the military establishment and the opposition,
both come to agreement on a way forward and have a stake in a gradual establishment of civilian
rule.

This paper will demonstrate the close parallels between the current Burmese government and
the Indonesian New Order government and describe how this trilateral partnership led by the
United States could lay the foundation for the reform of civilian-military relations. To take
advantage of these similarities, the United States should:

 engage in a trilateral partnership with Indonesia and Burma;

 facilitate exchanges between Burmese military, political, and civil society leaders and
their Indonesian counterparts;
 provide an opportunity to share lessons learned from the Indonesia transition.

1
THE BURMESE SYSTEM
Burma has been ruled by the military for nearly fifty years. Even with the dramatic reforms that
have been recently been implemented, the underlying political structure in Burma set forth in
the 2008 constitution remains inherently undemocratic. There is still no civilian control of the
military. Through a variety of methods, the constitution ensures that the military remains the
dominant voice in Burma’s governance.

The 2008 Constitution says that a core objective of the Union is “enabling the Defence Services
to be able to participate in the National political leadership role of the State.” 2 According to the
constitution, 25 percent of seats in the Lower House and Upper Houses and one third of all seats
in State and Regional legislatures are reserved for the military. The Upper and Lower Houses
of Parliament act as an electoral college to elect the President. With 25 percent of seats in this
electoral college, the military already has a clear advantage in ensuring that its candidate wins.

The 25 percent set aside is also significant because it provides the military with an automatic
veto over any constitutional amendments. All amendments must gain more than 75 percent of
votes in parliament. Even if opposition groups were able to gain support from every elected
member in parliament - a nearly impossible feat in itself - it would be unable to amend the
constitution without the agreement of the military.

The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) also perpetuates military
dominance in politics. The USDP is a political party that emerged from the USDA, a social
welfare organization that essentially did the bidding of the military regime. It was led by
military leaders, including General Than Shwe. It had military officers in leadership roles at all
levels down to the villages. The USDA claimed a membership of approximately 24 million,
about half the population of Burma. From 2008 until 2010, the USDA sought to reposition itself
as a political party. However, after the USDP registered as a formal political party in April 2010,
it continued to practice intimidation and bribery to recruit members. Therefore, it is not
surprising that in the November 2010 elections the USDP won over 55 percent of seats in both
houses of parliament. Those seats, along with the military’s guaranteed 25 percent allotment in
both houses, provides the military and its allies with a dominant majority in both houses if
USDP members vote in line with the military.

The military continues to play a key role in the economic affairs of the country, though this is
changing. After independence, Burmese military units throughout the country were required to
raise a significant amount of their own revenue in order to pay salaries and equip themselves.
Today, two military run conglomerates continue to dominate much of Burma’s economy . The
Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (UMEHL) and the Myanmar Economic
Corporation (MEC) make their profits through special privileges granted to them. The MEC was
established to promote the establishment of heavy industries that would generate profit but also
be useful for military procurements.3 However, it has expanded into areas such as banking,
trading companies, agricultural produce, hotel and tourism enterprises, gem and mineral
extraction, telecommunications, and transport services. 4 The UMEHL is involved in light
industry and trading in commercial goods. The UMEHL dominates the rice trade, cigarettes,
and alcohol and aims to provide for the welfare of serving and retired military personnel and

2
their families. However, as Burma’s economy is opening, military companies must increasingly
compete with outside investment and no longer have guaranteed monopolies.

The Myanmar Police Force (MPF) falls under the authority of the Tatmadaw. Therefore, the
MPF have, in addition to their more traditional responsibilities for crime prevention and
detection and civil order, also exercised important paramilitary functions and operated closely
with the armed forces. As long as the MPF is under the authority of the Tatmadaw, they are
likely to continue to have overlapping roles.

PARALLELS TO INDONESIA
Burma’s current government closely parallels Indonesia’s New Order regime in which the
military dominated government and business. The New Order regime, headed for 32 years by
former General Suharto, was governed by the dwifungsi (dual function) doctrine which, similar
to Burma, held that the Indonesian military had two intertwined functions. It was responsible
for state security and also for overall governance of the country. This doctrine was enshrined in
a constitutional provision that set aside 100 of the 500 seats (20 percent) in the Indonesian
House of Representatives (DPR) for the military. In 1997, these reserved seats were reduced to
75 (15 percent).

During Suharto’s authoritarian rule, Indonesians went through the motions of democracy with
very little expectation of true democratic governance. Elections were held every five years.
More than 85 percent of eligible voters participated in those elections. Three parties were
allowed to participate: Golkar, the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), and the United
Development Party (PPP). The system was set up to give the illusion of choice, but all
Indonesians knew that the result was pre-ordained. The ruling party, Golkar, always won.

Golkar, a party that actually served as a model for the development of Burma’s USDA5 was
comprised of all state employees and individuals associated with state-related enterprises and
associations. Although the military was not the only power base in Golkar, it played a significant
role. Members of the military could not vote but their family members were required to be
active Golkar members. The chairman of Golkar was always from the military. Members of the
military and civil servants were required to actively campaign for Golkar candidates who were
often retired military personnel.6 Considering the huge state apparatus engaged to elect Golkar
candidates, it is no surprise that the other two parties provided little competition. Throughout
the New Order period, Golkar always won more than 60 percent of the votes. These majorities
in combination with the reserved seats allocated to the military, resulted in regular
reappointment of the indirectly elected President Suharto. It also meant that the legislature was
essentially a rubber stamp on policies originating in the executive branch.

The military had representation throughout government. It was estimated that in 1999, there
were approximately 4,000 active duty and military officers and as many as 8,000 retired officers
who held positions throughout the bureaucracy. The military command structure mirrored the
civilian administration throughout the country. At every level - provincial, district, sub-district,
and village - there was a military representative who worked closely with the civilian

3
administration, particularly on activities such as intelligence and surveillance of any elements
that it considered threatening.7

In addition to the tremendous political power held by the military, it also was deeply engaged in
the economic affairs of the country. During the New Order regime, Indonesia’s state-led
capitalist economic structure provided many opportunities for military leaders to place
themselves in leadership positions in key industries throughout the country. For most of that
time, the military’s involvement in business went well beyond the initial intention to supplement
meager state resources devoted to the military.8 It is estimated that throughout the New Order
regime that as much as two thirds of all military expenditures were covered by these “off-
budget” businesses. 9

THE INDONESIAN REFORM ERA

During the New Order
After the fall of Suharto in 1998, a gradual process
regime, Indonesia’s state-
began that reduced the military’s role in governance,
led capitalist economic
and which could present a roadmap for Burma. In
structure provided many
November 1998, a new policy was implemented that
opportunities for military
no longer allowed active officers to hold civilian
leaders to place
positions in the bureaucracy. In addition, the armed
themselves in leadership
forces agreed to reduce their legislative
positions in key industries
representation to 38 delegates in the national
throughout the country.
parliament (down from 75) and 10 percent of the
For most of that time, the
seats in local legislatures. In 2000 parliament
military’s involvement in
passed a decree that required the complete
business went well
elimination of military reserved seats by 2009, at the
beyond the initial
latest.10 In 2000 another important reform was
intention to supplement
passed by parliament in the form of a decree that
meager state resources
formally separated the military from the police.
devoted to the military.
Since 1998, there have also been efforts to decrease
the role of the Indonesian military in business. In
2004, parliament passed a law that required that all military interests in private businesses be
divested within five years. By 2006, it was estimated that net income from military businesses
that was available “for operational purposes” was only about 1.5 to 3 percent of the government’s
defense budget. However, an ambiguous 2009 presidential decree has been interpreted to allow
the transfer of military owned businesses to military foundations or cooperatives, providing a
loophole that allows some military-run businesses to continue.11 Though important steps have
been taken to reduce the role of the military in the economy, there remains work to be done.

There are a number of factors that contributed to the progress that Indonesia has made in
increasing civilian oversight of the military. First, because Suharto voluntarily ceded power to
his Vice-President, the military was able to maintain much of its authority even after the
downfall of its longtime leader.12 The dramatic transition of power did not result in a dissolution
of the military power structure. At the same time, recognition had been growing within the
Indonesian military that reform was necessary. The Habibie government insisted that reform

4
happen but allowed that reform process to be led by the military. Secondly, during Suharto’s
rule, civil society organizations (CSOs) were quietly working under the radar, largely on
development projects. In the 1990s, however, a number of advocacy organizations emerged
dealing with issues such as democracy and human rights.13 After Suharto’s downfall, CSOs were
able to expand and rapidly deploy advocacy efforts to support the reform effort. Independent
groups such as ProPatria, a security sector reform think tank and PACIVIS, a research center at
the University of Indonesia, worked with military officers on developing reforms that would
later be implemented. Third, after the fall of the Suharto regime, restrictions on the press were
lifted and stories began to emerge about the military’s past atrocities. This greatly increased
public distrust of the military that previously had significant public support.14

INDONESIA AS A MODEL
After Suharto’s downfall,
There are a number of reasons why the Indonesian
civil society organizations
experience is particularly applicable to Burma. First,
were able to expand and
in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto, the military
rapidly deploy advocacy
leadership was still in place and had to slowly accept
efforts to support the
and own the reform process. Similarly, in Burma it
reform effort.
is unlikely that reform will happen without the
agreement of the military. Similar to Indonesia’s
reform era, Burma now has a media free from government censorship, as well as burgeoning
civil society organizations. In addition to the political structures in place, Burma faces many of
the same ethnic tensions that Indonesia faced in the post Suharto era, but on a wider scale. In
both countries the military sees itself as the protector of the nation’s territorial integrity. One of
the critical challenges facing Burma is the status of ethnic minorities, many of whom desire
greater autonomy, and the need for greater protection of fundamental human rights. Indonesia
faced similar problems in places like East Timor and Aceh and still still faces them in West
Papua. Since Indonesian military leaders are still quite respected in Indonesia today, and many
are living quite well, their experience could provide reassurances to Burmese military leaders.
Finally, Indonesia is quite proud of its democratic transition and has demonstrated a willingness
to lead regional democracy strengthening efforts. Chief among them is the Bali Democracy
Forum, an annual intergovernmental meeting launched in 2008 by the Indonesian government.
The Bali Democracy Forum promotes and fosters regional and international cooperation in the
field of peace and democracy through dialogue based on sharing experiences and best
practices.15

This is not to say that Indonesia in the New Order era precisely mirrors the Burmese situation
today. Indonesia’s reforms were jump started by massive protests over economic issues that led
to the resignation of a dictator. Although Burma’s reforms are considered by many to stem in
part from its poor economic condition, there has not been a comparable people’s revolution in
Burma.

There also remain challenges that must be considered. Although Indonesia has made
tremendous progress in initial reform efforts, there is still work to be done. Indonesia’s history
is replete with examples of military abuses that have yet to be addressed. Kopassus, the

5
Indonesian Special Forces, committed massacres against communists in the 1960s as well as
more recent brutalities in East Timor, Aceh, and Papua. Military tribunals to address abuses
leave much to be desired. Secondly, although the military has made steps towards divesting its
assets, some soldiers still supplement their pay through protection and other rackets.16 For these
reasons, it will be important to focus Indonesia’s involvement primarily on identifying lessons
learned from the political transition that took place after the fall of Suharto, rather than present
Indonesia as a goal for human rights concerns.

THE TRILATERAL PARTNERSHIP FOR REFORM

The transition to true civilian rule in Burma should be encouraged through a trilateral
partnership between Burma, Indonesia, and the United States. This partnership would facilitate
exchanges between key sectors of Burmese and Indonesian society that would focus on
identifying lessons learned from the Indonesia transition that could be applied to Burma. These
exchanges should engage military leadership, parliamentarians, and civil society leaders.

Indonesia already has played a role on an ad-hoc basis in encouraging Burma down a path of
political reform. In 2007, after the Burmese military cracked down on anti-government
protests, Indonesian President Yudhoyono sent respected retired general Agus Widjojo to
Burma to consult with General Than Shwe to encourage political reforms. Widjojo is known as a
reformist general who helped push the country’s strongman, General Suharto, to retirement.17
Although these exchanges could theoretically happen bilaterally between Burma and Indonesia,
the U.S. could play a critical role in facilitating and possibly funding some of these programs.
The United States could help transition these interactions from one-off meetings to a program of
sustained effort on the reform of civilian-military relations.

Some have argued for increased military-military relations between the United States and
Burma. For example, the 2013 Asia Society Report, Sustaining Myanmar’s Transition,
recommended that the United States explore opportunities for increased engagement and
training of Burma’s military leaders.18 There have been some small scale exchanges already
between the two militaries. On August 28-29 the U.S. Defense Institute of International Legal
Studies (DIILS) and the Myanmar Armed Forces co-hosted a two-day legal affairs exchange in
Naypyitaw for 20 Myanmar Armed Forces and Ministry of Defense officials.19 Earlier this year
the Burmese military participated as observers in the humanitarian portions of U.S. led military
exercises in Thailand known as Cobra Gold.20 Although these are important steps, the United
States should carefully calibrate its engagement with the Burmese military. American sanctions
still in place sharply curtail direct military-military relations with Burma and limit it mostly to
humanitarian engagement. U.S. engagement with the Burmese military should in the near term
focus on its leadership and prioritize the reform of civilian-military relations. A carefully staged
engagement with the Burmese military could begin with this trilateral initiative in which the
Burmese military is learning from the Indonesians and the United States plays a facilitating role
within the constraints of the current sanctions regime. This way, the United States begins to test
the waters and lay the groundwork for more substantial engagement, but conditioned on
tangible Burmese steps towards reform of civilian-military relations.

6
A carefully orchestrated program funded or facilitated by the United States would bring top level
Burmese military leaders to Indonesia to learn from Indonesian military leaders who have been
involved in the reform of civilian-military relations in Indonesia. This would include Indonesian
leaders such as former General Agus Widjojo, Admiral Agus Suhartono, Major General
Bambang Darmono, and former Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono. Burmese military
leaders at the general officer level would travel to Indonesia to learn about the reform process,
potentially followed by lower level visits by the next generation of Burmese military officers in
the field grade and senior officer levels. Discussions would focus on topics such as the reasons
that the military in Indonesia accepted reforms to civilian-military relations, how the process
was undertaken, what internal and external challenges were faced by the military reformers and
how these were overcome, the procedures and challenges involved in dismantling military
businesses, the benefits of improved civilian oversight and control, and the positive changes in
international military-to-military engagement that resulted from Indonesia’s reforms.

In other military-military fora, Burmese participants have been quite receptive to hearing from
their counterparts from other countries. The similarities between the two countries would also
encourage engagement by the Burmese. Former U.S. military officers could supplement these
meetings by leading discussions on principles of civilian oversight of the military. A possible
venue for these meetings could be the newly established Indonesia Defense University. The U.S.
engagement in this initiative could be led by an institution such as the Asian-Pacific Center for
Security Studies (APSS) that supports the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). APSS builds
capacities and communities of interest by educating, connecting and empowering security
practitioners to advance Asia-Pacific security and is already engaged in security sector reform
workshops and dialogue with Indonesia and other Asian countries. It focuses on executive
education and is frequently involved in regional initiatives. If the topic of civilian control of the
military is perceived by Burmese participants as too threatening, a more varied program could
be designed. Exposure to topics such as humanitarian principles and peacekeeping could
supplement the discussions on civilian-military relations.

In addition to military-to-military exchanges, exchanges between parliamentarians and civil

society groups that focus on civilian-military relations would also be conducted. Already one
initial visit of Burmese parliamentarians to Indonesia has happened. In December 2012, the
Ajar Foundation of Indonesia in cooperation with the Shalom Nyein Foundation of Myanmar
brought 26 members of the Burmese parliament to Indonesia to study lessons learned from the
Indonesian reform process.21 The Burmese participants expressed much interest in how the
Indonesian parliament successfully implemented the reforms that eventually removed the
military from government.

A similar exchange occurred in 2002 between Burmese and Indonesian NGO activists at a
workshop conducted by the Burma Fund, Center for Strategic and International Studies -
Indonesia, and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. This
workshop highlighted the work of the Indonesian think tank, RIDEP, which built civil society
coalitions in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto that cooperated with progressive elements of the
military to promote reform of civilian-military relations.22

7
These previous efforts should be expanded.
Exchanges would focus particularly on how
parliament was able to craft reform legislation and
the role that civil society played in building support Just as important as
for those reforms. Indonesian civil society groups direct exchanges between
that were involved in the post-Suharto civilian- equivalent counterparts
military reform efforts such as ProPatria, PACIVIS, in both countries will be
and RIDEP should be involved. exposure to the other
elements of society. For
A potential partner organization in Indonesia for the example, Burmese
civilian exchanges would be the Institute for Peace military representatives
and Democracy that was established in conjunction should meet with
with the Bali Democracy Forum to share democracy parliamentarians and
strengthening experiences throughout the Asia civil society
region. representatives in
Indonesia to learn about
Just as important as direct exchanges between the reform effort from
equivalent counterparts in both countries will be their point of view.
exposure to the other elements of society. For
example, Burmese military representatives should
meet with parliamentarians and civil society representatives in Indonesia to learn about the
reform effort from their point of view. Equally important, if Burmese parliamentarians aspire to
greater civilian control, they must be exposed to the military. So, they too should learn from
Indonesian military representatives about their reform efforts.

The timing and modalities associated with the enactment of this partnership require sensitivity
and forethought. This arrangement will only work if the Burmese and the Indonesians fully buy
into the partnership and all parties have ownership. The Indonesians will likely be most
receptive to engagement on the sensitive issue of civilian-military relations in Burma if such a
request comes directly from the Burmese. The Burmese may be more willing to make such a
request if it comes after sustained engagement with Indonesia on other less threatening aspects
of governance reform. It is also important that the activities be framed in the context of
Indonesia sharing its experiences with civilian-military reform rather than either Indonesia or
the United States proscribing a specific path forward for Burma. Depending on the willingness
of all parties to engage on this sensitive topic, it is possible that this trilateral partnership may
not be realized until several years in the future. However, it is important to begin the
discussions and lay the groundwork now.

There are challenges to direct military-to-military engagement with Burma. From 1980-1988,
167 Burmese military officers had been trained by the U.S. military under IMET (International
Military Education and Training). However, all contact with the Burmese military was cut off in
1988 after the Burmese military cracked down violently on mass protests throughout the
country. Today there is increased discussion about reengaging the Burmese military. There is
debate in Congress about the pace at which the United States should provide training
opportunities to the Burmese military. Senator Mitch McConnell has declared his support for a
modest military-to-military relationship. On the other hand, Representative Steve Chabot

8
argued, “it is far too soon to initiate military engagement between the U.S. and Burma.” A draft
House defense authorization bill requires that the Myanmar military's efforts "to end impunity
for human rights abuses" should be assessed before going beyond initial dialogue and
engagements.23 Working through Indonesia would allow military engagement to go forward
without contravening existing sanctions.

The trilateral partnership presents an alternative

that has a number of benefits. Direct U.S. assistance
to the Burmese military is likely to remain Indonesia has already
controversial due to its human rights record and engaged Burma on the
continued involvement in governance. However, conflict in Rakhine state
involvement of the United States in this proposed and has sought to position
trilateral partnership initiative is a sensible step in itself as a supporter of
reengagement and could be more effective than democracy in the Asia
direct U.S. - Burmese military engagement in region. A more
reaching an outcome of greater civilian control of the structured engagement
armed forces. It also leverages Indonesia’s desire to with Burma could further
be seen as a regional power and a leader. Indonesia bolster Indonesia’s
has already engaged Burma on the conflict in reputation.
Rakhine state and has sought to position itself as a
supporter of democracy in the Asia region. A more
structured engagement with Burma could further bolster Indonesia’s reputation. At the same
time, it also strengthens the U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership which was launched in
2009 to strengthen bilateral between the world’s second and third largest democracies. This
initiative could be a key element in that partnership, in which both countries work closely
together to address this challenge in a third country. It also sends a subtle signal to China that
the Burmese democratic transition is a concern not just of the West, but also of others in the
region.

With the dramatic reforms that have already taken place in Burma, the time is right to begin
exploring ways to promote structural reforms that could set the country on a path to democracy.
Fortunately, Indonesia has already blazed a trail that demonstrates that the military can cede
power to a civilian government without the country disintegrating and with the military
maintaining its stature and legitimate security role in society. What is needed now is leadership
to facilitate this experience sharing. The United States, as a key power in region that has
committed to reorienting its attention Asia, can play a critical role in bringing these two
countries together in a manner that has long term benefits for the region as a whole.

9
ENDNOTES
1
"Burma Military to Receive 20.8% of Budget," The Irawaddy, February 20, 2013, accessed January 23,
2014, http://www.irrawaddy.org/latest-news/burma-military-to-receive-20-8-of-budget.html
2
Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008),
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs09/Myanmar_Constitution-2008(en&bu)-red.pdf, Chapter 1.
3
Crisis Group, “Myanmar: The Politics of Economic Reform”, July 27, 2012,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/burma-myanmar/231-myanmar-the-politics-
of-economic-reform.pdf, 11
4
Gaens, Bart, "Political Change in Myanmar", Finnish Institute of International Affairs, February 2013,
http://www.fiia.fi/assets/publications/wp78.pdf, 11
5
Jones, Lee, “The Political Economic of Myanmar’s Transition”,
https://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/jspui/bitstream/123456789/3740/9/JONESThePoliticalEconomy2013PREPT.pdf,
7.
6
Anwar, Dewi Fortuna, “Negotiating and Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control of the Indonesian
Military”, February 2001, http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/PSop004.pdf, 14.
7
Sebastian, Leonard C. and Iisgindarsah, “Assessing 12-year Military Reform in Indonesia: Major
Strategic Gaps for the Next Stage of Reform”, April 6, 2011,
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP227.pdf, 3-4.
8
Anwar, 18.
9
Rabasa, Angel and Haseman, John, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and
Power (Rand Corporation, 2002), 70.
10
The National Democratic Institute, “Indonesia’s Road to Constitutional Reform: The 2000 MPR Annual
Session,” October 2000, http://www.ndi.org/files/1077_id_constireform.pdf, 50.
11
Michaels, Samantha and Haryanto, Ulma, "What's the Indonesian Military's Business," The Jakarta
Globe, May 11, 2012, accessed January 23, 2014, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/whats-the-
indonesian-militarys-business/
12
Meitzner, Marcus, “The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict,
Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance”, 2006,
http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/10125/3497/ps023.pdf?sequence=1, 5.
13
CIVICUS, “Indonesian Civil Society 2006”, 2006,
http://www.civicus.org/new/media/CSI_Indonesia_Country_Report.pdf, 19.
14
Sebastian, Leonard C. and Iisgindarsah, 5.
15
Institute for Peace and Democracy, "What is the Bali Democracy Forum", Accessed on January 23,
2014, http://bdf.kemlu.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=445&Itemid=106&lang=en
16
"The Army in Indonesia, A Special Force", The Economist, Sept 14, 2013,
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21586302-military-trial-underscores-how-much-further-army-needs-
change-special-force .
17
Macaan-Makaar, Marwan, "Indonesia's Special Relationship with Burma Faces Testing Times," The
Irawaddy, April 9, 2013, http://www.irrawaddy.org/indonesia/indonesias-special-relationship-with-burma-
faces-testing-times.html
18
Clapp, Priscilla and DiMaggio, Suzanne, “Sustaining Myanmar’s Transition: Ten Critical Challenges”,
Asia Society, June 24, 2013, http://asiasociety.org/files/pdf/Sustaining_Myanmars_Transition.pdf, 15.
19
U.S. Embassy, Rangoon, "U.S. Defense Institute of International Legal Studies and Myanmar
Armed Forces Host Military Legal Affairs Exchange in Naypyitaw," August 29, 2013,
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/burma/895/pdf/08292013DIILSworkshopinNaypitaw.pdf
20
Schearf, Daniel, "Burma Observers Participate in US-Led Military Exercises in Thailand," Voice of
America, February 11, 2013, http://www.voanews.com/content/burma-observers-participate-in-us-led-
military-exercies-in-thailand/1601193.html
21
"Ajar Foundation, About Us", Accessed on November 15, 2013, http://asia-ajar.org/about-us/

10
22
The Burma Fund, “Shaping Civil-Military Relations in Burma: Learning Lessons from ASEAN”, 2002,
http://www.idea.int/asia_pacific/burma/upload/summary_report.pdf, 13.
23
Pennington, Matthew, "Lawmakers Uneasy over US-Myanmar Military Ties" The Associated Press,
September 5, 2013, http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2013/Sep/05/lawmakers-uneasy-over-us-myanmar-
military-ties/2/?#article-copy

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