Case 1
Moreover they did invoke
G.R. No. L-30026 January 30, 1971
MARIO GUMABON, BLAS
BAGOLBAGOL, GAUDENCIO
AGAPITO, EPIFANIO PADUA and
PATERNO PALMARES, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU
OF PRISONS, respondent.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V.
Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General
Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor
Eduardo C. Abaya for respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
Habeas corpus, the great writ of
liberty, is relied upon by petitioners,
five in number, for their release from
imprisonment. Meted out life terms for
the complex crime of rebellion with
murder and other crimes, they would
invoke the People v.
Hernandez1 doctrine, negating the
existence of such an offense, a ruling
that unfortunately for them was not
handed down until after their
convictions had become final. Nor is
this the first instance, a proceeding of
this character was instituted, as
in Pomeroy v. Director of
Prisons,2 likewise a petition for habeas
corpus, a similar question was
presented. The answer given was in
the negative. Petitioners plead for a
new look on the matter. They would
premise their stand on the denial of
equal protection if their plea would not
be granted.
the codal provision that judicial
decisions shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines,3 necessarily
resulting in the conclusion that the
Hernandez decision once promulgated
calls for a retroactive effect under the
explicit mandate of the Revised Penal
Code as to penal laws having such
character even if at the time of their
application a final sentence has been
rendered "and the convict is serving
the same."4 These arguments carry
considerable persuasion. Accordingly
we find for petitioners, without going
so far as to overrule Pomeroy.
Petitioner Mario Gumabon, after
pleading guilty, was sentenced on May
5, 1953 to suffer reclusion perpetua for
the complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, robbery, arson and
kidnapping. Petitioners Gaudencio
Agapito, Paterno Palmares and
Epifanio Padua, likewise pleaded
guilty to the complex crime of rebellion
with multiple murder and other
offenses, and were similarly made to
suffer the same penalty in decisions
rendered, as to the first two, on March
8, 1954 and, as to the third, on
December 15, 1955. The last
petitioner, Blas Bagolbagol, stood trial
also for the complex crime of rebellion
with multiple murder and other
offenses and on January 12, 1954
penalized with reclusion perpetua.
Each of the petitioners has been since
then imprisoned by virtue of the above
convictions. Each of them has served
more than 13 years.5
Subsequently, in People v.
Hernandez,6 as above noted, this
Court ruled that the information
Page 1 of 100
against the accused in that case for
rebellion complexed with murder,
arson and robbery was not warranted
under Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code, there being no such complex
offense.7 In the recently-decided case
of People vs. Lava,8 we expressly
reaffirmed the ruling in the Hernandez
case rejecting the plea of the Solicitor
General for the abandonment of such
doctrine. It is the contention of each of
the petitioners that he has served, in
the light of the above, more than the
maximum penalty that could have
been imposed upon him. He is thus
entitled to freedom, his continued
detention being illegal.9
The fear that the Pomeroy ruling
stands as an obstacle to their release
on a habeas corpus proceeding
prompted petitioners, as had been
mentioned, to ask that it be appraised
anew and, if necessary, discarded. We
can resolve the present petition
without doing so. The plea there made
was unconvincing, there being a
failure to invoke the contentions now
pressed vigorously by their counsel,
Attorney Jose W. Diokno, as to the
existence of a denial of a constitutional
right that would suffice to raise a
serious jurisdictional question and the
retroactive effect to be given a judicial
decision favorable to one already
sentenced to a final judgment under
Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code. To
repeat, these two grounds carry
weight. We have to grant this petition.
1. The fundamental issue, to repeat, is
the availability of the writ of habeas
corpus under the circumstances
disclosed. Its latitudinarian scope to
assure that illegality of restraint and
detention be avoided is one of the
truisms of the law. It is not known as
the writ of liberty for nothing. The writ
imposes on judges the grave
responsibility of ascertaining whether
there is any legal justification for a
deprivation of physical freedom.
Unless there be such a showing, the
confinement must thereby cease. If
there be a valid sentence it cannot,
even for a moment, be extended
beyond the period provided for by law.
Any deviation from the legal norms call
for the termination of the
imprisonment.
Rightly then could Chafee refer to the
writ as "the most important human
rights provision" in the fundamental
law. 10Nor is such praise unique.
Cooley spoke of it as "one of the
principal safeguards to personal
liberty." 11 For Willoughby, it is "the
greatest of the safeguards erected by
the civil law against arbitrary and
illegal imprisonment by whomsoever
detention may be exercised or
ordered." 12 Burdick echoed a similar
sentiment, referring to it as "one of the
most important bulwarks of
liberty." 13 Fraenkel made it
unanimous, for to him, "without it much
else would be of no avail." 14 Thereby
the rule of law is assured.
A full awareness of the potentialities of
the writ of habeas corpus in the
defense of liberty coupled with its
limitations may be detected in the
opinions of former Chief Justices
Arellano, 15 Avanceña, 16 Abad
Santos, 17 Paras, 18Bengzon, 19 and the
present Chief Justice. 20 It fell to
Justice Malcolm's lot, however to
emphasize quite a few times the
breadth of its amplitude and of its
reach. In Villavicencio v. Lukban, 21 the
Page 2 of 100
remedy came in handy to challenge
the validity of the order of the then
respondent Mayor of Manila who, for
the best of reasons but without legal
justification, ordered the transportation
of more than 150 inmates of houses of
ill-repute to Davao. After referring to
the writ of habeas corpus as having
been devised and existing "as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint" the
opinion of Justice Malcolm continued:
"The essential object and purpose of
the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint
as distinguished from voluntary, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which
will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient." 22
The liberality with which the judiciary is
to construe habeas corpus petitions
even if presented in pleadings on their
face devoid of merit was demonstrated
in Ganaway v. Quilen, 23 where this
Court, again through Justice Malcolm,
stated: "As standing alone the petition
for habeas corpus was fatally defective
in its allegations, this court, on its
motion, ordered before it the record of
the lower court in the case
entitled Thomas Casey, et al. v.
George Ganaway." 24 It is to Justice
Malcolm likewise in Conde v.
Rivera, 25 to whom is traceable the
doctrine, one that broadens the field of
the operation of the writ, that a
disregard of the constitutional right to
speedy trial ousts the court of
jurisdiction and entitles the accused if
"restrained of his liberty, by habeas
corpus to obtain his
freedom." 26
So it is in the United States. An 1830
decision 27 of Chief Justice Marshall
put the matter thus: "The writ of
habeas corpus is a high prerogative
writ, known to the common law, the
great object of which is the liberation
of those who may be imprisoned
without sufficient cause." Then there is
this affirmation from an 1869
decision 28 of the then Chief Justice
Chase: "The great writ of habeas
corpus has been for centuries
esteemed the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom." The
passing of the years has only served
to confirm its primacy as a weapon on
in the cause of liberty. Only the other
year, Justice Fortas spoke for the
United States Supreme Court thus:
"The writ of habeas corpus is the
fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom
against arbitrary and lawless state
action. ... The scope and flexibility of
the writ — its capacity to reach all
manner of illegal detention — its ability
to cut through barriers of form and
procedural mazes — have always
been emphasized and jealously
guarded by courts and lawmakers.
The very nature of the writ demands
that it be administered with the
initiative and flexibility essential to
insure that miscarriages of justice
within its reach are surfaced and
corrected." 29 Justice Fortas explicitly
made reference to Blackstone, who
spoke of it as "the great and
efficacious writ, in all manner of illegal
confinement." Implicit in his just
estimate of its pre-eminent role is his
adoption of Holmes' famous dissent in
Frank v. Mangum: 30 "But habeas
corpus cuts through all forms and goes
to the very tissue of the structure."
Page 3 of 100
2. Where, however, the detention
complained of finds its origin in what
has been judicially ordained, the range
of inquiry in a habeas corpus
proceeding is considerably narrowed.
For if "the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge or by virtue
of a judgment or order of a court of
record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process,
render the judgment, or make the
order," the writ does not lie. 31 That
principle dates back to 1902, 32 when
this Court announced that habeas
corpus was unavailing where the
person detained was in the custody of
an officer under process issued by a
court or magistrate. This is
understandable, as during the time the
Philippines was under American rule,
there was necessarily an adherence to
authoritative doctrines of constitutional
law there followed.
One such principle is the requirement
that there be a finding of jurisdictional
defect. As summarized by Justice
Bradley in Ex parte Siebold, an 1880
decision: "The only ground on which
this court, or any court, without some
special statute authorizing it, will give
relief on habeas corpus to a prisoner
under conviction and sentence of
another court is the want of jurisdiction
in such court over the person or the
cause, or some other matter rendering
its proceedings void." 33
There is the fundamental exception
though, that must ever be kept in
mind. Once a deprivation of a
constitutional right is shown to exist,
the court that rendered the judgment is
deemed ousted of jurisdiction and
habeas corpus is the appropriate
remedy to assail the legality of the
detention. 34
3. Petitioners precisely assert a
deprivation of a constitutional right,
namely, the denial of equal protection.
According to their petition: "In the case
at bar, the petitioners were convicted
by Courts of First Instance for the very
same rebellion for which Hernandez,
Geronimo, and others were convicted.
The law under which they were
convicted is the very same law under
which the latter were convicted. It had
not and has not been changed. For the
same crime, committed under the
same law, how can we, in conscience,
allow petitioners to suffer life
imprisonment, while others can suffer
only prision mayor?" 35
They would thus stress that, contrary
to the mandate of equal protection,
people similarly situated were not
similarly dealt with. What is required
under this required constitutional
guarantee is the uniform operation of
legal norms so that all persons under
similar circumstances would be
accorded the same treatment both in
the privileges conferred and the
liabilities imposed. As was noted in a
recent decision: "Favoritism and
undue preference cannot be allowed.
For the principle is that equal
protection and security shall be given
to every person under circumstances,
which if not identical are analogous. If
law be looked upon in terms of burden
or charges, those that fall within a
class should be treated in the same
fashion, whatever restrictions cast on
some in the group equally binding on
the rest." 36
Page 4 of 100
The argument of petitioners thus
possesses a persuasive ring. The
continued incarceration after the
twelve-year period when such is the
maximum length of imprisonment in
accordance with our controlling
doctrine, when others similarly
convicted have been freed, is fraught
with implications at war with equal
protection. That is not to give it life. On
the contrary, it would render it
nugatory. Otherwise, what would
happen is that for an identical offense,
the only distinction lying in the finality
of the conviction of one being before
the Hernandez ruling and the other
after, a person duly sentenced for the
same crime would be made to suffer
different penalties. Moreover, as noted
in the petition before us, after our
ruling in People v. Lava, petitioners
who were mere followers would be
made to languish in jail for perhaps the
rest of their natural lives when the
leaders had been duly considered as
having paid their penalty to society,
and freed. Such a deplorable result is
to be avoided.
4. Petitioners likewise, as was made
mention at the outset, would rely on
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
which requires that penal judgment be
given a retroactive effect. In support of
their contention, petitioners cite U.S. v.
Macasaet, 37 U.S. vs.Parrone, 38 U.S.
v. Almencion, 39 People v.
Moran, 40 and People v. Parel. 41 While
reference in the above provision is
made not to judicial decisions but to
legislative acts, petitioners entertain
the view that it would be merely an
exaltation of the literal to deny its
application to a case like the present.
Such a belief has a firmer foundation.
As was previously noted, the Civil
Code provides that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the
Constitution, as well as legislation,
form part of our legal system.
Petitioners would even find support in
the well-known dictum of Bishop
Hoadley:
"Whoever hath an absolute authority
to interpret any written or spoken laws,
it is he who is truly the law-giver to all
intents and purposes, and not the
person who first thought or spoke
them." It is to be admitted that
constitutional law scholars, notably
Frankfurter, 42 Powell, 43 and
Thayer, 44 in discussing judicial review
as well as the jurist John Chipman
Gray, were much impressed with the
truth and the soundness of the above
observations. We do not have to go
that far though. Enough for present
purposes that both the Civil Code and
the Revised Penal Code allow, if they
do not call for, a retroactive
application.
It being undeniable that if the
Hernandez ruling were to be given a
retroactive effect petitioners had
served the full term for which they
could have been legally committed, is
habeas corpus the appropriate
remedy? The answer cannot be in
doubt. As far back as 1910 the
prevailing doctrine was announced
in Cruz v. Director of Prisons. 45Thus:
"The courts uniformly hold that where
a sentence imposes punishment in
excess of the power of the court to
impose, such sentence is void as to
the excess, and some of the courts
hold that the sentence is void in toto;
but the weight of authority sustains the
proposition that such a sentence is
void only as to the excess imposed in
Page 5 of 100
case the parts are separable, the rule
being that the petitioner is not entitled
to his discharge on a writ of habeas
corpus unless he has served out so
much of the sentence as was
valid." 46 There is a reiteration of such
a principle in Director v. Director of
Prisons 47 where it was explicitly
announced by this Court "that the only
means of giving retroactive effect to a
penal provision favorable to the
accused ... is the writ of habeas
corpus." 48 While the above decision
speaks of a trial judge losing
jurisdiction over the case, insofar as
the remedy of habeas corpus is
concerned, the emphatic affirmation
that it is the only means of benefiting
the accused by the retroactive
character of a favorable decision holds
true. Petitioners clearly have thus
successfully sustained the burden of
justifying their release.
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas
corpus is granted, and it is ordered
that petitioners be forthwith set at
liberty.
Dizon and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the
result.
Castro and Makasiar, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and
dissenting:
The petitioners at bar, three of whom
pleaded guilty1 and two of whom
stood
trial,2 were meted out life terms in
1953, 1954 and 1955 for the so-called
complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder and other crimes, and
have served or are now entering into
their 17th year of imprisonment, save
for petitioner Epifanio Padua who was
sentenced on December 15, 1955 and
is completing his 15th year of
imprisonment, (excluding the periods
they were under pre-conviction
detention). The leaders of the rebellion
who were meted out death and life
sentences for the same charge by the
Court of First Instance of Manila had
their sentences reduced last near to
ten years of prision mayor by the Court
in People v. Lava,3 wherein the Court
expressly re-affirmed the doctrine first
laid down in 1956 in People vs.
Hernandez,4 that the crime of rebellion
cannot be complexed with other
common crimes since such common
crimes "assume the political
complexion of the main crime of which
they are mere ingredients and
consequently cannot be punished
separately from the principal offense,
or complexed with the same, to justify
the imposition of a graver penalty."
The Court rejected therein the State's
plea for the reexamination and setting
aside of such doctrine, declaring that
"(T)his Court has given this plea of the
Solicitor General a very serious
consideration, but after a mature
deliberation the members of this Court
have decided to maintain that ruling in
the Hernandez case and to adhere to
what this Court said in that case." The
Page 6 of 100
said leaders have since been duly
freed as having served out their
penalty, but their followers, herein
petitioners, are still serving their life
sentences.
I concede the validity of the ruling
in Pomeroy vs. Director of
Prisons5 that "(W)ith reference to
persons in custody pursuant to a final
judgment, the rule is that the writ
of habeas corpus can issue only for
want of jurisdiction of the sentencing
court, and cannot function as a writ of
error." "I grant, too, that at the time of
the Pomeroy decision in 1960, as
noted therein, "the existence of the
'complexed' rebellion (was) still upheld
by a sizable number of lawyers,
prosecutors, judges and even justices
of this Court." But with the doctrine
first enunciated in 1956
in Hernandez by a bare six-to-four
majority vote having withstood the test
of time6 and having been just last year
unreservedly reaffirmed without a
single dissent in Lava, it cannot now
be gainsaid that it is now part of our
legal system that the crime of
"complexed" rebellion does not exist in
our Revised Penal Code. No
prosecutor would now file an
information for "complexed" rebellion
but simply for the offense of simple
rebellion as defined in Article 134 of
the Revised Penal Code, and even if
such an information for "complexed"
rebellion to be so filed, the trial courts
would be bound to quash such
information as not charging an offense
on the strength
of Lava and Hernandez.
Petitioners have therefore properly
invoked in their favor the provisions of
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
that:
ART. 22. Retroactive
effect of penal laws.—
Penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar
as they favor the person
guilty of a felony, who is
not a habitual criminal,
as this term is defined in
rule 5 of article 62 of this
Code, although at the
time of the publication of
such laws a final
sentence has been
pronounced and the
convict is serving the
same.
in relation to the provisions of Article 8
of the Civil Code that "(J)udicial
decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the
Philippines."
The situation of petitioners is no
different than it would be if, say, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua were
imposed by statute for the crime of
simple rebellion at the time of their
conviction and they were accordingly
sentenced, and the statutory penalty
were now reduced to prision mayor or
12 years imprisonment; having served
out the maximum penalty of 12 years
now imposed by the amended statute,
they would be entitled to invoke the
retroactive effect of the statute
favoring them.lâwphî1.ñèt The only
difference between the situation given
and the present case is that here it is
this Supreme Court, interpreting the
Page 7 of 100
laws in discharge of its constitutional
prerogative, that has laid down the
doctrine since Hernandez in 1956 that
no offense of "complexed" rebellion
exists and petitioners should therefore
be now equally entitled to the
retroactive favorable effect of such
doctrine.
The actual case of petitioners is that at
the time of their conviction, it was
believed — erroneously — that the
crime committed by them was
punishable by life imprisonment, but
the Court has subsequently judicially
determined it not be so and that the
maximum imposable penalty is prision
mayor or 12 years. Petitioners-
convicts are entitled to the benefit of
this later judicial declaration, just as if
a statutory amendment had been
enacted—not because the sentencing
court had no jurisdiction or is now
ousted of jurisdiction. The writ prayed
for should issue, since as held
in Directo vs. Director of Prisons,7 "the
only means of giving retroactive effect
to a penal provision favorable to the
accused where the trial judge has lost
jurisdiction over the case, is the writ of
habeas corpus."
The question of jurisdiction of the
sentencing court therefore is moot, for
it is universally recognized that relief
by habeas corpus may be properly
sought in cases of imposition of
excessive penalty, such that the part of
the sentence beyond or in excess of
the power of the court to impose is
held void, the applicant having already
served out the entire part of the
sentence within the court's power. 8 As
pointed out by the Court in Rodriguez
vs. Director of Prisons,9 furthermore,
"Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code ... extends its benefits even to
convicts serving sentence, and the
only legal remedy open to them to
make use of such benefits is the writ of
habeas corpus inasmuch as, if the
penalty imposed upon them under the
former penal law was decreased by
the revised code, the excess has
become illegal."
Regardless, therefore, of whether the
trial courts that sentenced petitioners
to life sentences had jurisdiction or not
to impose such penalty, or were right
or wrong in imposing such penalty, the
only relevant question now is whether
petitioners have served the maximum
— and lesser — sentence of prision
mayor that this Court has by firm
judicial doctrine since 1956
determined to be the penalty that the
Revised Penal Code fixes for the
crime of rebellion. Since they have
actually served much more than the
maximum imposable penalty, the
excess of the sentence imposed upon
them over the imposable maximum of
twelve years of prision mayor cannot
but be declared illegal and they should
now be set free.
In People vs. Parel, 10 the Court held
that the provisions of a new law (Act
3030) for the prescription of certain
election offenses (fixing the same at
one year after commission) were more
favorable to the accused than those of
the pre-existing law and were
therefore retroactive as to the same
offenses committed before the
enactment of the new law. In meeting
the objection that the reduced
prescription period was by its terms
applicable only to offenses resulting
from the new law (which amended the
pre-existing Election Law) and could
Page 8 of 100
not be given retroactive effect, the
Court found "that practically all of the
offenses defined in the former law are
also defined in the same language in
Act 3030 (the new law), the only
difference being that the penalties
have been increased." Holding that the
retroactivity clause of Article 22 of the
Penal Code must apply in all in which
the new law is more favorable to the
accused, in the absence of any
express statutory exception, the Court
drew this analogy: "Let us suppose
that a statute is enacted defining the
crime of murder in the same language
in which it is defined in the Penal
Code, but providing that the maximum
penalty for the crime defined in the
new statute shall be life imprisonment,
the statute containing no provision that
it shall not be retroactive in its effect.
Would anyone then maintain that the
death penalty might still be imposed
for murder committed before the new
statute was enacted?"
The case at bar for petitioners is much
stronger. Here, there is no question
even as to the enactment of a law
statute describing the crime in the
same language and imposing a lesser
penalty, but the settled doctrine of this
Court that there does not exist in our
legal system the complex crime of
rebellion of which the petitioners stand
convicted, "since rebellion cannot form
a complex with common crimes,
because the latter are either absorbed
by the rebellion itself or are punishable
as independent
offenses." 11 Petitioners here have
been convicted for the very same
rebellion and under the very same
law for which their leaders, Jose Lava
et al., have been convicted. Yet, while
their leaders have since been freed
after serving their sentences of ten
years of prision mayor, petitioners as
mere followers are serving out the life
sentences imposed on them,
notwithstanding their already having
served out much more than the
maximum penalty of twelve years
of prision mayor imposable upon them.
The fact that the legal doubts about
the non-existence of the crime of
"complexed" rebellion were cleared up
only in 1956 after they had already
been convicted and were serving their
sentences does not make the excess
in the penalty imposed upon them
beyond the maximum of twelve years
any less illegal.
The rule of prospective and non-
retroactive operation of judicial
doctrines, and its corollary rule of the
law of the case, have no application
here. These salutary rules decree that
rights of parties having been decisively
settled and determined by final
judgment of the court of competent
jurisdiction with the party adversely
affected having had the opportunity to
raise in the case all relevant questions,
the decision becomes the law of the
case, and vested rights would be
impaired, judicial chaos and disorder
ensue and litigation would be never-
ending and would become more
intolerable than the wrongs it is
intended to redress, should an
adjudicated case be reopened simply
because in another and subsequent
case, this Court adopted a new or
different construction of the law under
which a different result of the
adjudicated case might have been
obtained. Here, the whole question
turns — simply — on the nature of the
crime of rebellion as defined in section
134 of the Revised Penal Code and
Page 9 of 100
the maximum penalty imposable
therefor under section 135 of the same
Code. As this Court had ruled since
1956--which is now settled doctrine—
that only the crime of simple rebellion
exists in our legal system for which the
maximum penalty of prision
mayor may be imposed, the excess of
the life sentences imposed upon
petitioners over the imposable
maximum of prision mayor cannot
stand and must necessarily be
declared void.
Prescinding then from the question of
jurisdiction of the sentencing courts,
the case at bar presents a clear case
of an excess in penalty imposed
beyond twelve years of prision
mayor which has become illegal by
virtue of this Court's settled doctrine
that the crime of rebellion cannot be
complexed with other common crimes.
On this ground, as well as on the
further and more fundamental ground
that to hold them liable to continue
serving life sentences for a crime that
the law—at the time of their conviction
as well as now—punishes only
with prision mayor which they have
more than fully served, would be to
deny them their constitutional rights of
due process and equal protection of
the law.
Any further detention of petitioners, in
my view as above discussed, is illegal
and unconstitutional and the petition
for habeas corpus should be granted
and petitioners forthwith set at liberty.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal and Villamor,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and
dissenting:
The petitioners at bar, three of whom
pleaded guilty1 and two of whom
stood
trial,2 were meted out life terms in
1953, 1954 and 1955 for the so-called
complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder and other crimes, and
have served or are now entering into
their 17th year of imprisonment, save
for petitioner Epifanio Padua who was
sentenced on December 15, 1955 and
is completing his 15th year of
imprisonment, (excluding the periods
they were under pre-conviction
detention). The leaders of the rebellion
who were meted out death and life
sentences for the same charge by the
Court of First Instance of Manila had
their sentences reduced last near to
ten years of prision mayor by the Court
in People v. Lava,3 wherein the Court
expressly re-affirmed the doctrine first
laid down in 1956 in People vs.
Hernandez,4 that the crime of rebellion
cannot be complexed with other
common crimes since such common
crimes "assume the political
complexion of the main crime of which
they are mere ingredients and
consequently cannot be punished
separately from the principal offense,
or complexed with the same, to justify
the imposition of a graver penalty."
The Court rejected therein the State's
plea for the reexamination and setting
aside of such doctrine, declaring that
"(T)his Court has given this plea of the
Solicitor General a very serious
consideration, but after a mature
deliberation the members of this Court
have decided to maintain that ruling in
Page 10 of 100
the Hernandez case and to adhere to
what this Court said in that case." The
said leaders have since been duly
freed as having served out their
penalty, but their followers, herein
petitioners, are still serving their life
sentences.
I concede the validity of the ruling
in Pomeroy vs. Director of
Prisons5 that "(W)ith reference to
persons in custody pursuant to a final
judgment, the rule is that the writ
of habeas corpus can issue only for
want of jurisdiction of the sentencing
court, and cannot function as a writ of
error." "I grant, too, that at the time of
the Pomeroy decision in 1960, as
noted therein, "the existence of the
'complexed' rebellion (was) still upheld
by a sizable number of lawyers,
prosecutors, judges and even justices
of this Court." But with the doctrine
first enunciated in 1956
in Hernandez by a bare six-to-four
majority vote having withstood the test
of time6 and having been just last year
unreservedly reaffirmed without a
single dissent in Lava, it cannot now
be gainsaid that it is now part of our
legal system that the crime of
"complexed" rebellion does not exist in
our Revised Penal Code. No
prosecutor would now file an
information for "complexed" rebellion
but simply for the offense of simple
rebellion as defined in Article 134 of
the Revised Penal Code, and even if
such an information for "complexed"
rebellion to be so filed, the trial courts
would be bound to quash such
information as not charging an offense
on the strength
of Lava and Hernandez.
Petitioners have therefore properly
invoked in their favor the provisions of
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
that:
ART. 22. Retroactive
effect of penal laws.—
Penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar
as they favor the person
guilty of a felony, who is
not a habitual criminal,
as this term is defined in
rule 5 of article 62 of this
Code, although at the
time of the publication of
such laws a final
sentence has been
pronounced and the
convict is serving the
same.
in relation to the provisions of Article 8
of the Civil Code that "(J)udicial
decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the
Philippines."
The situation of petitioners is no
different than it would be if, say, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua were
imposed by statute for the crime of
simple rebellion at the time of their
conviction and they were accordingly
sentenced, and the statutory penalty
were now reduced to prision mayor or
12 years imprisonment; having served
out the maximum penalty of 12 years
now imposed by the amended statute,
they would be entitled to invoke the
retroactive effect of the statute
favoring them. The only difference
between the situation given and the
present case is that here it is this
Supreme Court, interpreting the laws
Page 11 of 100
in discharge of its constitutional
prerogative, that has laid down the
doctrine since Hernandez in 1956 that
no offense of "complexed" rebellion
exists and petitioners should therefore
be now equally entitled to the
retroactive favorable effect of such
doctrine.
The actual case of petitioners is that at
the time of their conviction, it was
believed — erroneously — that the
crime committed by them was
punishable by life imprisonment, but
the Court has subsequently judicially
determined it not be so and that the
maximum imposable penalty is prision
mayor or 12 years. Petitioners-
convicts are entitled to the benefit of
this later judicial declaration, just as if
a statutory amendment had been
enacted—not because the sentencing
court had no jurisdiction or is now
ousted of jurisdiction. The writ prayed
for should issue, since as held
in Directo vs. Director of Prisons,7 "the
only means of giving retroactive effect
to a penal provision favorable to the
accused where the trial judge has lost
jurisdiction over the case, is the writ of
habeas corpus."
The question of jurisdiction of the
sentencing court therefore is moot, for
it is universally recognized that relief
by habeas corpus may be properly
sought in cases of imposition of
excessive penalty, such that the part of
the sentence beyond or in excess of
the power of the court to impose is
held void, the applicant having already
served out the entire part of the
sentence within the court's power. 8 As
pointed out by the Court in Rodriguez
vs. Director of Prisons,9 furthermore,
"Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code ... extends its benefits even to
convicts serving sentence, and the
only legal remedy open to them to
make use of such benefits is the writ of
habeas corpus inasmuch as, if the
penalty imposed upon them under the
former penal law was decreased by
the revised code, the excess has
become illegal."
Regardless, therefore, of whether the
trial courts that sentenced petitioners
to life sentences had jurisdiction or not
to impose such penalty, or were right
or wrong in imposing such penalty, the
only relevant question now is whether
petitioners have served the maximum
— and lesser — sentence of prision
mayor that this Court has by firm
judicial doctrine since 1956
determined to be the penalty that the
Revised Penal Code fixes for the
crime of rebellion. Since they have
actually served much more than the
maximum imposable penalty, the
excess of the sentence imposed upon
them over the imposable maximum of
twelve years of prision mayor cannot
but be declared illegal and they should
now be set free.
In People vs. Parel, 10 the Court held
that the provisions of a new law (Act
3030) for the prescription of certain
election offenses (fixing the same at
one year after commission) were more
favorable to the accused than those of
the pre-existing law and were
therefore retroactive as to the same
offenses committed before the
enactment of the new law. In meeting
the objection that the reduced
prescription period was by its terms
applicable only to offenses resulting
from the new law (which amended the
pre-existing Election Law) and could
Page 12 of 100
not be given retroactive effect, the
Court found "that practically all of the
offenses defined in the former law are
also defined in the same language in
Act 3030 (the new law), the only
difference being that the penalties
have been increased." Holding that the
retroactivity clause of Article 22 of the
Penal Code must apply in all in which
the new law is more favorable to the
accused, in the absence of any
express statutory exception, the Court
drew this analogy: "Let us suppose
that a statute is enacted defining the
crime of murder in the same language
in which it is defined in the Penal
Code, but providing that the maximum
penalty for the crime defined in the
new statute shall be life imprisonment,
the statute containing no provision that
it shall not be retroactive in its effect.
Would anyone then maintain that the
death penalty might still be imposed
for murder committed before the new
statute was enacted?"
The case at bar for petitioners is much
stronger. Here, there is no question
even as to the enactment of a law
statute describing the crime in the
same language and imposing a lesser
penalty, but the settled doctrine of this
Court that there does not exist in our
legal system the complex crime of
rebellion of which the petitioners stand
convicted, "since rebellion cannot form
a complex with common crimes,
because the latter are either absorbed
by the rebellion itself or are punishable
as independent
offenses." 11 Petitioners here have
been convicted for the very same
rebellion and under the very same
law for which their leaders, Jose Lava
et al., have been convicted. Yet, while
their leaders have since been freed
after serving their sentences of ten
years of prision mayor, petitioners as
mere followers are serving out the life
sentences imposed on them,
notwithstanding their already having
served out much more than the
maximum penalty of twelve years
of prision mayor imposable upon them.
The fact that the legal doubts about
the non-existence of the crime of
"complexed" rebellion were cleared up
only in 1956 after they had already
been convicted and were serving their
sentences does not make the excess
in the penalty imposed upon them
beyond the maximum of twelve years
any less illegal.
The rule of prospective and non-
retroactive operation of judicial
doctrines, and its corollary rule of the
law of the case, have no application
here. These salutary rules decree that
rights of parties having been decisively
settled and determined by final
judgment of the court of competent
jurisdiction with the party adversely
affected having had the opportunity to
raise in the case all relevant questions,
the decision becomes the law of the
case, and vested rights would be
impaired, judicial chaos and disorder
ensue and litigation would be never-
ending and would become more
intolerable than the wrongs it is
intended to redress, should an
adjudicated case be reopened simply
because in another and subsequent
case, this Court adopted a new or
different construction of the law under
which a different result of the
adjudicated case might have been
obtained. Here, the whole question
turns — simply — on the nature of the
crime of rebellion as defined in section
134 of the Revised Penal Code and
Page 13 of 100
the maximum penalty imposable
therefor under section 135 of the same
Code. As this Court had ruled since
1956--which is now settled doctrine—
that only the crime of simple rebellion
exists in our legal system for which the
maximum penalty of prision
mayor may be imposed, the excess of
the life sentences imposed upon
petitioners over the imposable
maximum of prision mayor cannot
stand and must necessarily be
declared void.
Prescinding then from the question of
jurisdiction of the sentencing courts,
the case at bar presents a clear case
of an excess in penalty imposed
beyond twelve years of prision
mayor which has become illegal by
virtue of this Court's settled doctrine
that the crime of rebellion cannot be
complexed with other common crimes.
Case 2
G.R. No. L-63345 January 30, 1986
EFREN C. MONCUPA, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, FABIAN C.
VER, GALILEO KINTANAR,
FERNANDO GOROSPE, AND JOSE
CASTRO, respondents.
Lorenzo M. Tanada, Jose W. Diokno
and Joker Arroyo for petitioner,
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
On this ground, as well as on the
further and more fundamental ground
that to hold them liable to continue
serving life sentences for a crime that
the law—at the time of their conviction
as well as now—punishes only
with prision mayor which they have
more than fully served, would be to
deny them their constitutional rights of
due process and equal protection of
the law.
Any further detention of petitioners, in
my view as above discussed, is illegal
and unconstitutional and the petition
for habeas corpus should be granted
and petitioners forthwith set at liberty.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal and Villamor,
JJ., concur.
Footnotes
As early as 1919, in the leading case
of Villavicencio v. Lukban (39 Phil. 778,
790), this Court ruled:
A prime specification of al
application for a writ of
habeas corpus is restraint
of liberty. The essential
object and purpose of the
writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as
distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any
restraint which will
preclude freedom of action
is sufficient. ...
This latitudinarian scope of the writ of
habeas-corpus has, in law, remained
Page 14 of 100
undiminished up to the present. The
respondents' contention that the petition
has become moot and academic must
necessarily be denied. Efren C.
Moncupa may have been released from
his detention cell. The restraints
attached to his temporary release,
however, preclude freedom of action
and under the Villavicencio v.
Lukban rule warrant this Court's inquiry
into the nature of his involuntary
restraint and our relieving him of such
restraints as may be illegal.
Petitioner Efren C. Moncupa, together
with others, was arrested on April 22,
1982 at about 10:50 P.M., at the corner
of D. Street and Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City. Moncupa D. Tuazon was
brought to MIG-15 Camp Bago Bantay,
Quezon City where he was detained. On
April 23, 1982, on the allegation that he
was a National Democratic Front (NDF)
staff member, a Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO) was issued
against him and eight (8) other persons.
After two separate investigations,
conducted first, by Lieutenant Colonel
Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Chief of Task
Force Makabansa Investigation Group
and second, by Investigating Fiscal
Amado Costales of Quezon City, it was
ascertained that the petitioner was not a
member of any subversive organization.
Both investigators recommended the
prosecution of the petitioner only for
illegal possession of firearms and illegal
possession of subversive documents
under Presidential Decree No. 33.
Consequently, two separate
informations were filed against the
petitioner, one, for illegal possession of
firearms before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal and the other for
violation of P.D. 33 before the City Court
of Quezon City. Against the other
accused, however, the cases filed were
for violation of P.D. 885 as amended.
Significantly, the petitioner was excluded
from the charge under the Revised Anti-
Subversion Law. During the pendency of
this petition, it is significant that his
arraignment and further proceedings
have not been pursued. And yet, the
petitioner's motions for bail were denied
by the lower court.
Hence, the petitioner filed the instant
petition.
The respondents, in their return of the
writ justified the validity of petitioner's
detention on the ground that the
privilege of the writ had been suspended
as to the petitioner. However, on August
30, 1983, the respondents filed a motion
to dismiss stating that on May 11, 1983,
the petitioner was temporarily released
from detention on orders of the Minister
temporary of National Defense with the
approval of the President. The
respondents stated. "Since the petitioner
is free and no longer under the custody
of the respondents, the present petition
for habeas corpus may be deemed moot
and academic as in similar cases.
The issue to be resolved is whether or
not the instant petition has become
moot and academic in view of the
petitioner's temporary release.
It is to be noted that attached to the
petitioner's temporary release are
restrictions imposed on him. These are:
1) His freedom of movement is curtailed
by the condition that petitioner gets the
approval of respondents for any travel
outside Metro Manila.
Page 15 of 100
2) His liberty of abode is restricted
because prior approval of respondents
is also required in case petitioner wants
to change his place of residence.
3) His freedom of speech is muffled by
the prohibition that he should not
"participate in any interview conducted
by any local or foreign mass media
representatives nor give any press
release or information that is inimical to
the interest of national security."
4) He is required to report regularly to
respondents or their representatives.
The petitioner argues that although
admittedly his temporary release is an
improvement upon his actual detention,
the restrictions imposed by the
respondents constitute an involuntary
and illegal restraint on his freedom.
The petitioner stresses that his
temporary release did not render the
instant petitioner moot and academic
but that "it merely shifted the inquiry
from the legality of his actual detention
to the legality of the conditions imposed
by the respondents."
We agree with the petitioner.
The reservation of the military in the
form of restrictions attached to the
temporary release of the petitioner
constitute restraints on the liberty of Mr.
Moncupa. Such restrictions limit the
freedom of movement of the petitioner. It
is not physical restraint alone which is
inquired into by the writ of habeas
corpus.
In Villavicencio v. Lukban, the women
who had been illegally seized and
transported against their will to Davao
were no longer under any official
restraint. Unlike petitioner Moncupa,
they were free to change their domicile
without asking for official permission.
Indeed, some of them managed to
return to Manila. Yet, the Court
condemned the involuntary restraints
caused by the official action, fined the
Mayor of Manila and expressed the
hope that its "decision may serve to
bulwark the fortifications of an orderly
government of laws and to protect
individual liberty from Megal
encroachment."
In the light of the above ruling, the
present petition for habeas corpus has
not become moot and academic. Other
precedents for such a conclusion are
not wanting.
The decision in Caunca v. Salazar (82
Phil. 851) states:
An employment agency,
regardless of the amount it
may advance to a
prospective employee or
maid, has absolutely no
power to curtail her
freedom of movement. The
fact that no physical force
has been exerted to keep
her in the house of the
respondent does not make
less real the deprivation of
her personal freedom of
movement, freedom to
transfer from one place to
another, from to choose
one's residence. Freedom
may be lost due to
external moral compulsion,
to founded or groundless
fear, to erroneous belief in
the existence of the will. If
Page 16 of 100
 the actual effect of such
psychological spell is to
place a person at the
mercy of another, the
victim is entitled to the
protection of courts of
justice as much as the
individual who is illigally
deprived of liberty by
deprived or physical
coercion.
In Tibo v. The Provincial
Commander (85 SCRA 564), this Court
ruled:
Although the release in the
custody of the Deputy
Minister did not signify that
petitioners could once
again enjoy their full
freedom, the application
could have been
dismissed, as it could be
withdrawn by the parties
themselves. That is a
purely voluntary act. When
the hearing was held on
September 7, 1978, it
turned out that counsel for
petitioner Bonifacio V.
Tupaz could have
academic in a hasty
manner when he set forth
the above allegations in
his manifestation of August
30, 1978, for Attorney Jose
C. Espinas, who appeared
for petitioners, while
conceding that there was
such a release from
confinement, also alleged
that it was conditioned on
their restricting their
activities as labor union
leaders to the premises of
the Trade Unions of the
Philippines and
ABSOLUTE Services,
presumably in Macaraig as
well as the Ministry of
labor. As the voting was to
take place in the business
firm in Bataan, the acts set
would nullify whatever
efforts they could have
exerted. To that extent,
and with the prohibition
against their going to
Bataan, the restraint on
liberty was undeniable. If
so, the moot and
academic character of the
petition was far from clear.
More recently, we had occasion to rule
squarely on whether or not a temporary
release from detention renders the
petition for writ of habeas corpus moot
and academic. As in this case of
Moncupa, the petitioners in Toyoto, et al
v. Hon. Fidel Ramos, et al, G.R. No.
69270, October 15, 1985, were
temporarily released from detention. The
respondents filed a motion to dismiss
the petition for habeas corpus on the
ground that the petitioners had been
temporarily released and their case had,
therefore, become moot and academic.
The petitioners insisted, however, that
their case may be considered moot and
academic only "if their release would be
permanent." In ruling for the petitioners,
we said:
Ordinarily, a petition for
habeas corpus becomes
moot and academic when
the restraint on the liberty
of the petitioners is lifted
either temporarily or
permanently. We have so
Page 17 of 100
 held in a number of cases.
But the instant case
presents a different
situation. The question to
be resolved is whether the
State can reserve the
power to re-arrest a
person for an offense after
a court of competent
jurisdiction has absolved
him of the offense. An
affirmative answer is the
one suggested by the
respondents because the
release of the petitioners
being merely 'temporary' it
follows that they can be re-
arrested at anytime
despite their acquittal by a
court of competent
jurisdiction. We hold that
such a reservation is
repugnant to the
government of laws and
not of men principle.
Under this principle the
moment a person is
acquitted on a criminal
charge he can no longer
be detained or re-arrested
for the same offense. This
concept is so basic and
Case 3
G.R. No. 79173 December 1, 1987
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION
FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
ROLANDO N. ABADILLA, SUSAN S.
ABADILLA, in her own behalf and in
behalf of the minors JUNE
elementary that it needs
no elaboration.
In effect the principle is clear. A release
that renders a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus moot and academic
must be one which is free from
involuntary restraints. Where a person
continues to be unlawfully denied one or
more of his constitutional freedoms,
where there is present a denial of due
process, where the restraints are not
merely involuntary but appear to be
unnecessary, and where a deprivation of
freedom originally valid has, in the light
of subsequent developments, become
arbitrary, the person concerned or those
applying in his behalf may still avail
themselves of the privilege of the writ.
The respondents have failed to show
why the writ may not issue and why the
restraints on the petitioner's freedom of
movement should not be lifted.
WHEREFORE, the PETITION is
GRANTED. The conditions attached to
the temporary release of the petitioner
are declared null and void. The
temporary release of the petitioner is
declared ABSOLUTE. No costs,
SO ORDERED.
ELIZABETH, ROLANDO, JR.,
DAPHINE JENNIFER, MA. THERESA,
ANNA ROSANNA, VINCENT MARCUS
and BART JOSEPH, all surnamed
ABADILLA, petitioners,
vs.
General FIDEL V. RAMOS, Chief of
Staff, AFP; Major General RENATO
DE VILLA, Commanding General,
Philippine Constabulary & Vice-Chief
of Staff, AFP; and Brigadier General
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE,
Page 18 of 100
Commanding General, CAPCOM,
PC, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The validity of the detention of an
individual is challenged in this Petition
for habeas corpus. The petitioners are
the spouse and minor children of the
detainee while the respondents are
ranking officers of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP).
The record of the case discloses that on
January 27, 1987, a group of officers
and enlisted men of the AFP seized
control of the radio-television
broadcasting facilities of the Republic
Broadcasting System (GMA-Channel 7)
located in Quezon City ostensibly for the
purpose of toppling the existing
constitutional government. While the
takeover might have been a prelude to
similar operations throughout the
national capital, it did not succeed. On
January 29, 1987, the mutineers
surrendered to the military authorities
and the possession of the facility was
restored to the owners and managers
thereof. Soon thereafter, the military
authorities conducted an investigation of
the matter.
On April 18, 1987, a group of enlisted
men staged a mutiny inside the Fort
Bonifacio military facility in Makati,
Metropolitan Manila. The mutiny,
dubbed as "The Black Saturday
Revolt," 1 did not succeed either. After
the incident, the military authorities also
conducted an investigation.
The first investigation was concluded on
March 12, 1987. The investigation
disclosed that Colonel Rolando N.
Abadilla of the Philippine Constabulary
(PC) of the AFP was one of the leaders
of the unsuccessful takeover of the GMA
radio-television facilities. 2 The Board of
Officers investigating the matter
recommended that the case of Colonel
Abadilla be endorsed for pre-trial
investigation and that the appropriate
charges be filed against him for violation
of Article of War 67 (Mutiny or Sedition).
Article of War 94 (Various Crimes) in
relation to Article 139 of the Revised
Penal Code and Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, and such
other offenses that may be warranted by
the evidence. Accordingly, a charge
sheet was prepared against the Colonel.
The investigation conducted on "The
Black Saturday Revolt" ended on May
27, 1987. It was found at said
investigation that Colonel Abadilla was
also involved in the mutiny. The Board of
Officers conducting the investigation and
recommended that the case be
endorsed for pre-trial investigation and
that the appropriate charges be filed
against the Colonel. 3 The Colonel was
likewise charged, accordingly.
Colonel Abadilla was at large when both
investigations were conducted.
On May 4, 1987 or some two weeks
before the second investigation was
concluded, herein respondent Major
General Renato De Villa, Commanding
General of the PC and Vice-Chief of
Staff of the AFP issued an Order for the
arrest and confinement of Colonel
Abadilla. 4
On May 21, 1987, respondent AFP Chief
of Staff General Fidel V. Ramos issued
General Orders No. 342 dropping
Page 19 of 100
Colonel Abadilla from the rolls of regular
officers of the AFP. 5 The pertinent
portions of the said General Orders are
as follows-
DROPPING FROM THE
ROLLS OF REGULAR
OFFICERS
The names of the following
officers are dropped from
the rolls of Regular
Officers, Armed Forces of
the Philippines for cause
effective as of 9 May 1987
pursuant to Article of War
117. (Authority: Letter from
the President, dated 9 May
1987).
BRIGADIER GENERAL
JOSE MARIA CARLOS
ZUMEL ...
COLONEL ROLANDO N
ABADILLA 0-4937
PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY
(GENERAL STAFF
CORPS)
MAJOR REYNALDO C
CABAUATAN ...
BY ORDER OF THE
SECRETARY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE:
xxx xxx xxx
On July 7, 1987, the Assistant City
Fiscal of Quezon City filed an
Information for Slight Physical Injuries
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Metropolitan Manila in Quezon City
against Colonel Abadilla. 6 The case
was docketed as Criminal Case No.
0237558.
On July 27, 1987, a combined element
of the Philippine Army and Philippine
Constabulary arrested Colonel
Abadilla. 7 He was detained first in
Camp Crame in Quezon City and later,
up to the present, in Fort Bonifacio in
Makati.
On July 30, 1987, another Information,
this time for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition) was filed by
the Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City
against Colonel Abadilla. 8 The case
was assigned to Branch 104 of the
Regional Trial Court in Quezon City and
was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-
53382.
On the same date, July 30, 1987, Mrs.
Susan S. Abadilla the spouse of Colonel
Abadilla together with their minor
children June Elizabeth, Rolando, Jr.
Daphine Jennifer, Ma. Theresa, Anna
Rosanna, Vincent Marcus and Bart
Joseph, went to this Court and filed the
instant Petition for habeas corpus,
challenging the validity of the detention
of Colonel Abadilla. 9
The main arguments in the Petition are
as follows —
(1) When Colonel Abadilla
was dropped from the rolls
of officers effective May 9,
1987, he became a civilian
and as such, the order for
his arrest and confinement
is null and void because
he was no longer subject
to military law;
Page 20 of 100
 (2) His detention is illegal
because he is not charged
with any criminal offense,
either before a civil court
or a court-martial;
(3) Even assuming that the
order for the arrest and
confine- ment of Colonel
Abadilla was valid at the
initial stage, the said order
became functus
officio and/or moot and
academic when the
Colonel was dropped from
the rolls of officers;
(4) Even assuming that
Colonel Abadilla is subject
to military law, his
detention remains illegal
because under Article of
War 70, a person subject
to military law can be
detained only if he is
charged with a crime or a
serious offense under the
Articles of War.
In the meantime, the Regional Trial
Court, with Judge Maximiano O.
Asuncion presiding therein, granted the
Motion to Quash and the Supplement
thereto filed by the counsel of Colonel
Abadilla. Accordingly, the Information in
Criminal Case No. Q-53382 was
dismissed by the trial court. 10
In a resolution dated August 4, 1987,
this Court resolved to issue the writ
of habeas corpus. The respondents
were required to make a return of the
writ on August 10, 1987. 11
On August 10, 1987, the respondents,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), submitted the Return of
the writ. 12 The main arguments in the
Return are as follows —
(1) In the event that
proceedings with a view to
military trial are
commenced against a
Person subject to military
law before the termination
of military service, military
jurisdiction will fully attach
on the said person.;
(2) The confinement of
Colonel Abadilla as a
person subject to military
jurisdiction is authorized
by Article of War 70; and
(3) The continued
confinement of Colonel
Abadilla in Fort Bonifacio
is imperative and justified
on account of the criminal
case/s filed against him by
both the military and civil
authorities.
As instructed by this Court, the
petitioners submitted their Reply to the
Return of the writ on September 7,
1987. 13The main arguments in the
Reply are as follows —
(1) The pendency of a
case in the civil courts has
no relevance to the issue
of military jurisdiction over
Colonel Abadilla. This view
notwithstanding, Criminal
Case No. Q-53382 filed
against Colonel Abadilla
has been dismissed by the
trial court. The pendency
of Criminal Case No.
Page 21 of 100
0237558 filed against the
Colonel does not warrant
his continued confinement
inasmuch as the Colonel
has posted bail for his
provisional liberty;
(2) Colonel Abadilla is not
in the active service of the
AFP nor is he a person
under sentence adjudged
by courts-martial. As such,
he does not fall under the
category of a person
subject to military law as
defined by Article of War 2;
(3) An officer dropped from
the rolls by order of the
President is fully
separated from the service
and is no longer subject to
military law (Citing Gloria,
Philippine Military Law
Annotated).;
(4) Under Section 10 of
the Manual for Courts-
Martial, Philippine Army,
court-martial jurisdiction
over officers in the military
service of the Philippines
ceases on discharge or
separation from the
service. The case of
Colonel Abadilla does not
fall under any of the
exceptions to this rule.
This observation has been
upheld in Martin v. Ver,
123 SCRA 745 (1983);
(5) The pronouncement of
the United States
Supreme Court in Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11
(1955), cited in Olaguer v.
Military Commission No.
34, G.R. Nos. 54558 and
69882, May 22, 1987,
supports the stand taken
by the herein petitioners
and
(6) Under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No.
1850, as amended by
Presidential Decree No.
1952, court-martial
jurisdiction over the person
of accused military
personnel Cannot be
exercised if they are
already separated from the
active service, provided
that jurisdiction has not
attached beforehand
unless otherwise provided
by law.
On September 9, 1987, the petitioners
submitted their Traverse to the Return of
the writ. 14 It is contended therein that,
contrary to the view of the Solicitor
General, jurisdiction over a person is
acquired not by the mere filing of a
charge or information, or by the
commencement of an investigation, but
by the arrest of the defendant. The
petitioners stress that inasmuch as
Colonel Abadilla was arrested after he
had become a civilian, the charge
sheets prepared against him by the
military authorities are nun and void for
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
Colonel.
On September 24, 1987, the petitioners
submitted their Additional Traverse
together with a Motion to Decide the
Petition. 15 On the issue of military
jurisdiction, and in support of their
Page 22 of 100
contentions, they cite the treatise of
Colonel William Winthrop
entitled Military Law and Precedents. 16
Inasmuch as the parties herein had
already presented their respective
arguments, the case was, therefore,
deemed submitted for deliberation.
The sole issue in habeas
corpus proceedings is the legality of the
detention. 17 Therefore, the issue that
must be resolved by this Court is this: Is
the detention of Colonel Abadilla illegal?
The resolution of this issue will, of
course, relate to the jurisdiction of the
military authorities over the person of
Colonel Abadilla.
I.
We shall first resolve the problem of
jurisdiction.
In Olaguer v. Military Commission No.
34, 18 this Court held that a military
commission or tribunal cannot try and
exercise jurisdiction over civilians for
offenses allegedly committed by them
as long as the civil courts are open and
functioning, and that any judgment
rendered by such body relating to a
civilian is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the military
tribunal concerned. For the same
reasons, the doctrine announced
in Aquino, Jr. v. Military Commission No.
2 19 and all decided cases affirming the
same, in so far as they are inconsistent
with the Olaguer pronouncement, were
deemed abandoned. There is no doubt,
therefore, that military authorities cannot
try civilians.
The petitioners contend that
the Olaguer doctrine applies to Colonel
Abadilla on the ground that he had
become a civilian since May 9, 1987
when he was dropped from the rolls of
officers of the AFP. They argue that on
account of his civilian status, Colonel
Abadilla is no longer subject to military
law. In support of their arguments, the
petitioners cite the Articles of War, 20 the
Manual for Courts-Martial of the
AFP, 21 Presidential Decree No. 1850, as
amended, as well as the dissertations
on military law of Colonel William
Winthrop 22 and Colonel Claro
Gloria. 23 They likewise invoke the
pronouncement of this Court in Martin v.
Ver 24 and that of the Supreme Court of
the United States in Toth v. Quarles. 25
On the other hand, the Solicitor General
contends that military jurisdiction had
fully attached on Colonel Abadilla
inasmuch as proceedings were initiated
against him before the termination of his
service in the military.
We agree.
As early as March, 1987, months before
Colonel Abadilla was dropped from the
rolls of officers, the military authorities
began the institution of proceedings
against him. As of that time, he was
certainly subject to military law. He was
under investigation for his alleged
participation in the unsuccessful
mutinies when he was an officer of the
AFP. As a military officer, it was
incumbent upon him to appear before
his superior officers conducting the
investigation even for the purpose of
clearing his name. He did not do so. His
superiors could not confine him during
the period of investigation because as
stated earlier, he was at large. This
disregard for military duty and
responsibility may have prompted his
Page 23 of 100
superiors to cause him to be dropped
from the rolls of officers.
It is clear that from the very start of this
controversy, the military authorities
intended to try Colonel Abadilla as a
person subject to military law. This can
be gleaned from the charge sheets
prepared against him.
The fact that Colonel Abadilla was
dropped from the rolls of officers cannot
and should not lead to the conclusion
that he is now beyond the jurisdiction of
the military authorities. If such a
conclusion were to prevail, his very own
refusal to clear his name and protect his
honor before his superior officers in the
manner prescribed for and expected
from a ranking military officer would be
his shield against prosecution in the first
place. His refusal to report for duty or to
surrender when ordered arrested, which
led to his name being dropped from the
roll of regular officers of the military,
cannot thereby render him beyond the
jurisdiction of the military courts for
offenses he committed while still in the
military service. This Court cannot
countenance such an absurd situation.
Established principles in remedial law
call for application.
The military authorities had jurisdiction
over the person of Colonel Abadilla at
the time of the alleged offenses. This
jurisdiction having been vested in the
military authorities, it is retained up to
the end of the proceedings against
Colonel Abadilla. Well-settled is the rule
that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost
upon the instance of the parties but
continues until the case is terminated. 26
The petitioners stress that jurisdiction
over a person is acquired not by the
mere filing of a charge or an information,
or by the commencement of an
investigation, but by the arrest of the
defendant. They maintain that the
Colonel was arrested when he was
already a civilian.
The argument is untenable.
The rule that jurisdiction over a person
is acquired by his arrest applies only to
criminal proceedings instituted before
the regular courts. It does not apply to
proceedings under military law. At the
time the military investigations were
commenced, Colonel Abadilla was an
officer of the AFP subject to military law.
As such, the military authorities had
jurisdiction over his person pursuant to
Article of War 2 and Section 8 of the
Manual for Courts-Martial, AFP, which
provide as follows-
Art. 2. Persons Subject to
Military Law. — The
following persons are
subject to these articles
and shall be understood
as included in the term
'any person subject to
military law or persons
subject to military law
whenever used in these
articles:
(a) All officers and soldiers
in the active service of the
Armed Forces of the
Philippines or of the
Philippine Constabulary; ...
; and
8. COURTS-MARTIAL —
Jurisdiction in general —
Persons. — The following
Page 24 of 100
 persons are subject to
military law:
(a) All officers and soldiers
in the active service of the
Armed Forces of the
Philippine Constabulary; ...
xxx xxx xxx
As mentioned earlier, his earlier arrest
could not be effected because he was at
large. The initial stages of the
investigations had against him before
his arrest were, therefore, not improper.
As a whole, the authorities cited and
relied upon by the petitioners do not
satisfactorily support their contentions.
Article of War 2 enumerates who are
subject to military law. In March, 1987,
Colonel Abadilla was a military officer.
Under this Article, he was subject to
military law.
Section 10 of the Manual for Courts-
Martial, AFP, which discusses court-
martial jurisdiction in general, states the
general rule to be:
The general rule is that
court-martial jurisdiction
over officers, cadets,
soldiers, and others in the
military service of the
Philippines ceases on
discharge or other
separation from such
service, and that
jurisdiction as to an
offense committed during
a period of service thus
terminated is not revived
by a re-entry into the
military service.
Attention is called to the exception
mentioned in the last sentence of the
Section, to wit —
So also, where a
dishonorably discharged
general prisoner is tried for
an offense committed
while a soldier and prior to
his dishonorable
discharge, such discharge
does not terminate his
amenability to trial for the
offense.
This exception applies to the case of
Colonel Abadilla inasmuch as he is at
present confined in Fort Bonifacio upon
the orders of his superior officers, and
his having been dropped from the rolls
of officers amounts to a dishonorable
discharge.
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
1850, as amended, even acknowledges
instances where military jurisdiction fully
attaches on an individual even after he
shall have been separated from active
service, to wit —
SECTION 1. Court martial
jurisdiction over Integrated
National Police and
Members of the Amed
Forces ...
(b) all persons subject to
military law under Article 2
of the aforecited Articles of
War who commit any
crime or offense shall be
exclusively tried by courts-
martial or their case
disposed of under the said
Articles of War; Provided,
that in either of the
Page 25 of 100
 aforementioned situations,
the case shall be disposed
of or tried by the proper
civil or judicial authorities
when court- martial
jurisdiction over the
offense has prescribed
under Article 38 of
Commonwealth Act No.
408, as amended, or
court-martial jurisdiction
over the person of the
accused military or
Integrated National Police
can no longer be
exercised by virtue of their
separation from the active
service without jurisdiction
having duly attached
beforehandunless
otherwise provided by law;
... (Emphasis supplied.)
The dissertations of Colonels Winthrop
and Gloria are, at most, persuasive
authorities. Indeed, this Court has cited
the treatise of Colonel Winthrop in at
least three cases 27 on account of the
scholarly discussions contained therein.
Works of this nature provide insight and
information which have been of
tremendous help to this Court in many
judicial controversies. Regardless of
their great value, they cannot prevail
over opposing but nonetheless settled
doctrines in Philippine jurisprudence.
These observations notwithstanding, We
have gone through the treatise of
Colonel Winthrop and We find the
following passage which goes against
the contention of the petitioners, viz —
3. Offenders in general —
Attaching of jurisdiction. It
has further been held, and
is now settled law, in
regard to military offenders
in general, that if the
military jurisdiction has
once duly attached to
them previous to the date
of the termination of their
legal period of service,
they may be brought to
trial by court-martial after
that date, their discharge
being meanwhile withheld.
This principle has mostly
been applied to cases
where the offense was
committed just prior to the
end of the term. In such
cases the interests of
discipline clearly forbid
that the offender should go
unpunished. It is held
therefore that if before the
day on which his service
legally terminates and his
right to a discharge is
complete, proceedings
with a view to trial are
commenced against him
— as by arrest or the
service of charges, — the
military jurisdiction will fully
attach, and once attached
may be continued by a
trial by court-martial
ordered and held after the
end of the term of the
enlistment of the
accused ... 28
The case of Martin v. Ver 29 cited by the
petitioners is not in point. In Martin this
Court took the opportunity to discuss the
general rule that "court-martial
jurisdiction over persons in the military
service of the Philippines ceases upon
discharge or separation from such
Page 26 of 100
service" and an exception to the general
rule recited in Article of War 95
regarding frauds against the
Government.
The case of Toth v. Quarles 30 decided
by the Supreme Court of the United
States is also inapplicable.
Toth involves a former serviceman
named Audrey M. Toth who, five months
after his honorable discharge from the
U.S. Air Force, was arrested by military
authorities on a charge of murder
allegedly committed in Korea when he
was still an airman. A divided Supreme
Court 31 held that Congress has no
power to subject a discharged
serviceman to trial by court-martial for
offenses committed by him while in the
military service and so to deprive him of
the constitutional safeguards protecting
persons accused of crime in a federal
court.
The Toth ruling is inapplicable to the
instant case for two reasons.
First — Toth was honorably discharged
from the military service. The
arrangement was voluntary on the part
of the serviceman. There was an
ostensible intention on his part to live
the life of a civilian again. Colonel
Abadilla was not honorably discharged.
On the contrary, he was dropped from
the rolls of regular officers of the AFP.
This arrangement did not have his
express consent. In fact, he was at large
at that time.
Second — The proceedings
against Toth began after his honorable
discharge from the service. The
proceedings against Colonel Abadilla
were commenced when he was still a
regular officer of the AFP.
Moreover, the doctrine in Toth is not a
unanimous pronouncement as there
were some persuasive dissenting views.
Although Toth was cited in Olaguer v.
Military Commission No. 34, 32 the
citation should not be construed as a
sweeping endorsement of the entire
doctrine therein. Toth was cited in
Olaguer only for the purpose of
emphasizing that military commissions
or tribunals cannot try civilians. In
Olaguer, this Court relied on the doctrine
announced in Ex-parte Milligan, 33 and
not the one in Toth, in arriving at the
Decision of the Court.
Another point should be mentioned
regarding the matter of jurisdiction. We
agree with the respondents in their
assertion that the pendency of a case in
the civil courts has no relevance to the
problem of military jurisdiction over
Colonel Abadilla. The argument is well-
taken.
II.
The matter of jurisdiction having been
settled, We now proceed to discuss the
remaining contentions of the petitioners.
The petitioners argue that even if it were
to be assumed that Colonel Abadilla is
subject to military law, his confinement
remains illegal because under Article of
War 70, a person subject to military law
can be detained only if he is charged
Page 27 of 100
with a crime or a serious offense under
the Articles of War.
The record of the case discloses that
Colonel Abadilla has been charged by
the military authorities for violation of
Article of War 67 (Mutiny or Sedition)
which is a serious offense, and the
corresponding charge sheets have been
prepared against him.
The important issue in this Petition has
been resolved-the detention of Colonel
Abadilla under the circumstances
obtaining in this case is not illegal. For
this reason, the instant Petition
for habeas corpus should be dismissed
for lack of merit.
In the light of the foregoing discussion,
the motion of petitioners to hold
respondent General Ramos in contempt
of court for approving the filing of court
martial proceedings against Colonel
Abadilla during the pendency of this
case should be and is hereby denied.
The Court has not issued a restraining
order enjoining such proceedings. In
fact We now find that the court martial
proceedings may proceed inasmuch as
the military authorities have jurisdiction
over Colonel Abadilla in the above-
stated cases.
One last word. The man in uniform
belongs to the elite in public service. His
Case 4
G.R. No. 122954 February 15,
2000
NORBERTO FERIA Y
PACQUING, petitioner,
vs.
eminent credential is his absolute loyalty
to the Constitution, the flag, his country
and his people. He is the guardian
against external and internal
aggression.
He is a man of honor and courage. He is
a gentleman. He is given arms to insure
his capability as an instrument of peace.
When he is drafted in the Philippine
Constabulary he becomes a peace
officer, a law enforcer, a law man.
Respect for the law is his article of faith.
However, when he wavers and fails to
live up to the highest standard of fidelity
to his country and people, when he
defies authority and discipline, when he
commits offenses or when he turns
against the very people and government
he is sworn to protect, he becomes an
outlaw and a disgrace to his uniform.
The state has a right to hold him to
account for his transgressions and to
see to it that he can not use the
awesome powers of his status to
jeopardize the security and peace of the
citizenry.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the instant Petition for habeas corpus is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We
make no pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
THE COURT OF APPEALS,
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF
CORRECTIONS, MUNTINLUPA,
METRO MANILA (IN PLACE OF THE
JAIL WARDEN OF THE MANILA CITY
JAIL), THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF
BRANCH II, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MANILA, and THE CITY
Page 28 of 100
PROSECUTOR, CITY OF
MANILA,respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
The mere loss or destruction of the
records of a criminal case subsequent to
conviction of the accused will not render
the judgment of conviction void, nor will
it warrant the release of the convict by
virtue of a writ of habeas corpus. The
proper remedy is the reconstitution of
judicial records which is as much a duty
of the prosecution as of the defense.
Subject of this petition for review
on certiorari are (1) the Decision dated
April 28, 1995, of the Eighth Division of
the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
dismissal of the petition for habeas
corpus filed by petitioner, and (2) the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
December 1, 1995, which denied the
Motion for Reconsideration. As hereafter
elucidated, we sustain the judgment of
respondent appellate court.
Based on the available records and the
admissions of the parties, the
antecedents of the present petition are
as follows:
Petitioner Norberto Feria y Pacquing
has been under detention since May 21,
1981, up to present1 by reason of his
conviction of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, in Criminal Case No. 60677,
by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 2, for the jeepney hold-up and
killing of United States Peace Corps
Volunteer Margaret Viviene Carmona.
Some twelve (12) years later, or on June
9, 1993, petitioner sought to be
transferred from the Manila City Jail to
the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa
City,2 but the Jail Warden of the Manila
City Jail informed the Presiding Judge of
the RTC-Manila, Branch 2, that the
transfer cannot be effected without the
submission of the requirements, namely,
the Commitment Order or Mittimus,
Decision, and Information.3 It was then
discovered that the entire records of the
case, including the copy of the
judgment, were missing. In response to
the inquiries made by counsel of
petitioner, both the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila and the Clerk of
Court of Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 2 attested to the fact that the
records of Criminal Case No. 60677
could not be found in their respective
offices. Upon further inquiries, the entire
records appear to have been lost or
destroyed in the fire which occurred at
the second and third floor of the Manila
City Hall on November 3, 1986.4
On October 3, 1994, petitioner filed a
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ
of Habeas Corpus5 with the Supreme
Court against the Jail Warden of the
Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of
Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, and the City Prosecutor of
Manila, praying for his discharge from
confinement on the ground that his
continued detention without any valid
judgment is illegal and violative of his
constitutional right to due process.
In its Resolution dated October 10,
1994,6 the Second Division of this Court
resolved —
. . . (a) to ISSUE the Writ
of Habeas Corpus; (b) to ORDER
the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila to
conduct an immediate RAFFLE
of this case among the incumbent
Page 29 of 100
 judges thereof; and (c) to
REQUIRE [1] the Judge to whom
this case is raffled to SET the
case for HEARING on Thursday,
October 13, 1994 at 8:30 A.M.,
try and decide the same on the
merits and thereafter FURNISH
this Court with a copy of his
decision thereon; [2] the
respondents to make a RETURN
of the Writ on or before the close
of office hours on Wednesday,
October 12, 1994 and APPEAR
PERSONALLY and PRODUCE
the person of Norberto Feria y
Pa[c]quing on the aforesaid date
and time of hearing to the Judge
to whom this case is raffled, and
[3] the Director General,
Philippine National Police,
through his duly authorized
representative(s) to SERVE the
Writ and Petition, and make a
RETURN thereof as provided by
law and, specifically, his duly
authorized representative(s) to
APPEAR PERSONALLY and
ESCORT the person of Norberto
Feria y Pa[c]quing at the
aforesaid date and time of
hearing.
The case was then raffled to Branch 9 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which
on November 15, 1994, after hearing,
issued an Order7 dismissing the case on
the ground that the mere loss of the
records of the case does not invalidate
the judgment or commitment nor
authorize the release of the petitioner,
and that the proper remedy would be
reconstitution of the records of the case
which should be filed with the court
which rendered the decision.
Petitioner duly appealed said Order to
the Court of Appeals, which on April 28,
1995, rendered the assailed
Decisions8 affirming the decision of the
trial court with the modification that "in
the interest of orderly administration of
justice" and "under the peculiar facts of
the case" petitioner may be transferred
to the Bureau of Corrections in
Muntinlupa City without submission of
the requirements (Mittimus, Decision
and Information) but without prejudice to
the reconstitution of the original records.
The Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforesaid Order having been denied for
lack of merit,9 petitioner is now before us
on certiorari, assigning the following
errors of law:10
I. WHETHER OR NOT, UNDER
THE PECULIAR
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
CASE, WHERE THE RECORDS
OF CONVICTION WERE LOST,
THE PETITIONER'S
CONTINUED INCARCERATION
IS JUSTIFIED UNDER THE LAW.
COROLLARY TO THIS,
WHETHER OR NOT THE
COURT OF APPEALS'
RESOLUTION, AFFIRMING THE
DENIAL OF HEREIN
APPELLANT'S PETITION
FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS, IN
CONTEMPLATION OF LAW, A
JUDGMENT OR A SUBSTITUTE
JUDGMENT, WHICH CAN BE
UTILIZED AS A SUFFICIENT
BASIS FOR HIS
INCARCERATION.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE
RECONSTITUTION OF
OFFICIAL RECORDS
Page 30 of 100
 LOST/DESTROYED SHOULD
BE INITIATED BY THE
GOVERNMENT AND ITS
ORGANS, WHO ARE IN
CUSTODY OF SUCH, OR BY
THE PRISONER, WHOSE
LIBERTY IS RESTRAINED.
Petitioner argues that his detention is
illegal because there exists no copy of a
valid judgment as required by Sections
1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court,11 and that the evidence
considered by the trial court and Court
of Appeals in the habeas
corpus proceedings did not establish the
contents of such judgment. Petitioner
further contends that our ruling
in Gunabe v. Director of Prisons, 77
Phil. 993, 995 (1947), that
"reconstitution is as much the duty of the
prosecution as of the defense" has been
modified or abandoned in the
subsequent case of Ordonez v. Director
of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152, 155 (1994),
wherein we held that "[i]t is not the fault
of the prisoners that the records cannot
now be found. If anyone is to be
blamed, it surely cannot be the
prisoners, who were not the custodians
of those records."
In its Comment,12 the Office of the
Solicitor General contends that the sole
inquiry in this habeas corpus proceeding
is whether or not there is legal basis to
detain petitioner. The OSG maintains
that public respondents have more than
sufficiently shown the existence of a
legal ground for petitioner's continued
incarceration, viz., his conviction by final
judgment, and under Section 4 of Rule
102 of the Rules of Court, the discharge
of a person suffering imprisonment
under lawful judgment is not authorized.
Petitioner's remedy, therefore, is not a
petition for habeas corpus but a
proceeding for the reconstitution of
judicial records.1âwphi1.nêt
The high prerogative writ of habeas
corpus, whose origin is traced to
antiquity, was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, and as
the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom.13 It secures to a
prisoner the right to have the cause of
his detention examined and determined
by a court of justice, and to have the
issue ascertained as to whether he is
held under lawful
authority.14Consequently, the writ may
also be availed of where, as a
consequence of a judicial proceeding,
(a) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the
restraint of a person, (b) the court had
no jurisdiction to impose the sentence,
or (c) an excessive penalty has been
imposed, as such sentence is void as to
such excess.15Petitioner's claim is
anchored on the first ground
considering, as he claims, that his
continued detention, notwithstanding the
lack of a copy of a valid judgment of
conviction, is violative of his
constitutional right to due process.
Based on the records and the hearing
conducted by the trial court, there is
sufficient evidence on record to
establish the fact of conviction of
petitioner which serves as the legal
basis for his detention. Petitioner made
judicial admissions, both verbal and
written, that he was charged with and
convicted of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, and sentenced to suffer
imprisonment "habang buhay".
Page 31 of 100
In its Order dated October 17, 1994, the
RTC-Manila, Branch 9, made the finding
that —16
During the trial and on
manifestation and arguments
made by the accused, his learned
counsel and Solicitor Alexander
G. Gesmundo who appeared for
the respondents, it appears clear
and indubitable that:
(A) Petitioner had been charged
with Robbery with Homicide in
Criminal Case No. 60677, Illegal
Possession of Firearm in Criminal
Case No. 60678 and Robbery in
Band in Criminal Case No.
60867. . . . In Criminal Case No.
60677 (Robbery with
Homicide) the accused admitted
in open Court that a decision was
read to him in open Court by a
personnel of the respondent
Court (RTC Branch II) sentencing
him to Life Imprisonment
(Habang buhay). . . (emphasis
supplied).
Further, in the Urgent Motion for the
Issuance of Commitment Order of the
Above Entitled Criminal Case dated
June 8, 1993,17 petitioner himself stated
that —
COMES NOW, the undersigned
accused in the above entitled
criminal case and unto this
Honorable Court most
respectfully move:
1. That in 1981 the accused was
charge of (sic) Robbery with
Homicide;
2. That after four years of trial,
the court found the accused
guilty and given a Life Sentence
in a promulgation handed down
in 1985; (emphasis supplied).
3. That after the sentence was
promulgated, the Presiding Judge
told the councel (sic) that
accused has the right to appeal
the decision;
4. That whether the de
oficio counsel appealed the
decision is beyond the accused
comprehension (sic) because the
last time he saw the counsel was
when the decision was
promulgated.
5. That everytime there is change
of Warden at the Manila City Jail
attempts were made to get the
Commitment Order so that
transfer of the accused to the
Bureau of Corrections can be
affected, but all in vain;
Petitioner's declarations as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against
him under Section 23 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. This rule is based upon
the presumption that no man would
declare anything against himself, unless
such declaration were true,18 particularly
with respect to such grave matter as his
conviction for the crime of Robbery with
Homicide. Further, under Section 4 of
Rule 129, "[a]n admission, verbal or
written, made by a party in the course of
the proceedings in the same case, does
not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by a showing that it
was made through palpable mistake or
that no such admission was made."
Petitioner does not claim any mistake
Page 32 of 100
nor does he deny making such
admissions.
The records also contain a certified true
copy of the Monthly Report dated
January 198519 of then Judge Rosalio A.
De Leon, attesting to the fact that
petitioner was convicted of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide on January 11,
1985. Such Monthly Report constitutes
an entry in official records under Section
44 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, which is prima facie evidence
of facts therein stated.
Public respondents likewise presented a
certified hue copy of People's Journal
dated January 18, 1985, page 2,20issued
by the National Library, containing a
short news article that petitioner was
convicted of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and was sentenced to "life
imprisonment." However, newspaper
articles amount to "hearsay evidence,
twice removed"21 and are therefore not
only inadmissible but without any
probative value at all whether objected
to or not,22 unless offered for a purpose
other than proving the truth of the matter
asserted. In this case, the news article is
admissible only as evidence that such
publication does exist with the tenor of
the news therein stated.
As a general rule, the burden of proving
illegal restraint by the respondent rests
on the petitioner who attacks such
restraint. In other words, where the
return is not subject to exception, that is,
where it sets forth process which on its
face shows good ground for the
detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent
on petitioner to allege and prove new
matter that tends to invalidate the
apparent effect of such process.23 If the
detention of the prisoner is by reason of
lawful public authority, the return is
considered prima facie evidence of the
validity of the restraint and the petitioner
has the burden of proof to show that the
restraint is illegal. Thus, Section 13 of
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 13. When the return
evidence, and when only a plea.
— If it appears that the prisoner
is in custody under a warrant of
commitment in pursuance of law,
the return shall be
considered prima facie evidence
of the cause of restraint, but if he
is restrained of his liberty by any
alleged private authority, the
return shall be considered only as
a plea of the facts therein set
forth, and the party claiming the
custody must prove such facts.
Public respondents having sufficiently
shown good ground for the detention,
petitioner's release from confinement is
not warranted under Section 4 of Rule
102 of the Rules of Court which
provides that —
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or
discharge authorized. — If it
appears that the person alleged
to be restrained of his liberty is in
the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or
judge or by virtue of a judgment
or order of a court of record, and
that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process,
render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed,
the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the
Page 33 of 100
 process, judgment, or order. Nor
shall anything in this rule be held
to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted
of an offense in the Philippines,
or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful
judgment.
In the case of Gomez v. Director of
Prisons, 77 Phil. 458 (1946), accused
was convicted by the trial court of the
crime of rape, and was committed to the
New Bilibid Prison. Pending appeal with
the Court of Appeals, the records of the
case were, for reasons undisclosed,
completely destroyed or lost. Accused
then filed a petition for the issuance of
the writ of habeas corpus with the
Supreme Court. The Court denied the
petition, ruling thus:
The petition does not make out a
case. The Director of Prisons is
holding the prisoner under
process issued by a competent
court in pursuance of a lawful,
subsisting judgment. The prisoner
himself admits the legality of his
detention. The mere loss or
destruction of the record of the
case does not invalidate the
judgment or the commitment, or
authorize the prisoner's release.
Note further that, in the present case,
there is also no showing that petitioner
duly appealed his conviction of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide, hence
for all intents and purposes, such
judgment has already become final and
executory. When a court has jurisdiction
of the offense charged and of the party
who is so charged, its judgment, order,
or decree is not subject to collateral
attack by habeas corpus.24 Put another
way, in order that a judgment may be
subject to collateral attack by habeas
corpus, it must be void for lack of
jurisdiction.25 Thus, petitioner's
invocation of our ruling in Reyes
v. Director of Prisons, supra, is
misplaced. In the Reyes case, we
granted the writ and ordered the release
of the prisoner on the ground that "[i]t
does not appear that the prisoner has
been sentenced by any tribunal duly
established by a competent authority
during the enemy occupation" and not
because there were no copies of the
decision and information. Here, a copy
of the mittimus is available. And, indeed,
petitioner does not raise any
jurisdictional issue.
The proper remedy in this case is for
either petitioner or public respondents to
initiate the reconstitution of the judgment
of the case under either Act No.
3110,26 the general law governing
reconstitution of judicial records, or
under the inherent power of courts to
reconstitute at any time the records of
their finished cases in accordance with
Section 5 (h) of Rule 135 of the Rules of
Court.27 Judicial records are subject to
reconstitution without exception,
whether they refer to pending cases or
finished cases.28 There is no sense in
limiting reconstitution to pending cases;
finished cases are just as important as
pending ones, as evidence of rights and
obligations finally adjudicated.29
Petitioner belabors the fact that no
initiative was taken by the Government
to reconstitute the missing records of
the trial court. We reiterate, however,
that "reconstitution is as much the duty
of the prosecution as of the
defense."30Petitioner's invocation
of Ordoñez v. Director of Prisons, 235
Page 34 of 100
SCRA 152 (1994), is misplaced since
the grant of the petition for habeas
corpus therein was premised on the loss
of records prior to the filing of
Informations against the prisoners, and
therefore "[t]he government has failed to
show that their continued detention is
supported by a valid conviction or by the
pendency of charges against them or by
any legitimate cause whatsoever." In
this case, the records were
lost after petitioner, by his own
admission, was already convicted by the
trial court of the offense charged.
Further, the same incident which gave
rise to the filing of the Information for
Robbery with Homicide also gave rise to
another case for Illegal Possession of
Case 5
G.R. No. 139789 July 19, 2001
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION
FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA
K. ILUSORIO, petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER,
SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN
DOES and JANE DOES, respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------
-----x
G.R. No. 139808 July 19, 2001
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA.
ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K.
ILUSORIO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
Firearm,31 the records of which could be
of assistance in the reconstitution of the
present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED
for lack of merit, and the decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Fo
PARDO, J.:
Once again we see the sad tale of a
prominent family shattered by conflicts
on expectancy in fabled fortune.
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio,
the matriarch who was so lovingly
inseparable from her husband some
years ago, filed a petition with the Court
of Appeals1 for habeas corpus to have
custody of her husband in consortium.
On April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision dismissing the
petition for lack of unlawful restraint or
detention of the subject, Potenciano
Ilusorio.
Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K.
Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an
appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire
to have custody of her husband
Potenciano Ilusorio.2 This case was
consolidated with another case3 filed by
Potenciano Ilusorio and his children,
Erlinda I. Bildner and Sylvia K. Ilusorio
Page 35 of 100
appealing from the order giving visitation
rights to his wife, asserting that he never
refused to see her.
On May 12, 2000, we dismissed the
petition for habeas corpus4 for lack of
merit, and granted the petition5 to nullify
the Court of Appeals' ruling6 giving
visitation rights to Erlinda K. Ilusorio. 7
What is now before the Court is
Erlinda's motion to reconsider the
decision.8
On September 20, 2000, we set the
case for preliminary conference on
October 11, 2000, at 10:00 a. m.,
without requiring the mandatory
presence of the parties.
In that conference, the Court laid down
the issues to be resolved, to wit:
(a) To determine the propriety of
a physical and medical
examination of petitioner
Potenciano Ilusorio;
(b) Whether the same is relevant;
and
(c) If relevant, how the Court will
conduct the same.9
The parties extensively discussed the
issues. The Court, in its resolution,
enjoined the parties and their lawyers to
initiate steps towards an amicable
settlement of the case through
mediation and other means.
On November 29, 2000, the Court noted
the manifestation and compliance of the
parties with the resolution of October 11,
2000.10
On January 31, 2001, the Court denied
Erlinda Ilusorio's manifestation and
motion praying that Potenciano Ilusorio
be produced before the Court and be
medically examined by a team of
medical experts appointed by the
Court.11
On March 27, 2001, we denied with
finality Erlinda's motion to reconsider the
Court's order of January 31 , 2001.12
The issues raised by Erlinda K. Ilusorio
in her motion for reconsideration are
mere reiterations of her arguments that
have been resolved in the decision.
Nevertheless, for emphasis, we shall
discuss the issues thus:
First. Erlinda K. Ilusorio claimed that she
was not compelling Potenciano to live
with her in consortium and that
Potenciano's mental state was not an
issue. However, the very root cause of
the entire petition is her desire to have
her husband's custody.13 Clearly, Erlinda
cannot now deny that she wanted
Potenciano Ilusorio to live with her.
Second. One reason why Erlinda K.
Ilusorio sought custody of her husband
was that respondents Lin and Sylvia
were illegally restraining Potenciano
Ilusorio to fraudulently deprive her of
property rights out of pure greed.14 She
claimed that her two children were using
their sick and frail father to sign away
Potenciano and Erlinda's property to
companies controlled by Lin and Sylvia.
She also argued that since Potenciano
retired as director and officer of Baguio
Country Club and Philippine Oversees
Telecommunications, she would logically
assume his position and control. Yet, Lin
Page 36 of 100
and Sylvia were the ones controlling the
corporations.15
The fact of illegal restraint has not been
proved during the hearing at the Court
of Appeals on March 23,
1999.16Potenciano himself declared that
he was not prevented by his children
from seeing anybody and that he had no
objection to seeing his wife and other
children whom he loved.
Erlinda highlighted that her husband
suffered from various ailments. Thus,
Potenciano Ilusorio did not have the
mental capacity to decide for himself.
Hence, Erlinda argued that Potenciano
be brought before the Supreme Court so
that we could determine his mental
state.
We were not convinced that Potenciano
Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to
choose whether to see his wife or not.
Again, this is a question of fact that has
been decided in the Court of Appeals.
As to whether the children were in fact
taking control of the corporation, these
are matters that may be threshed out in
a separate proceeding, irrelevant
in habeas corpus.
Third. Petitioner failed to sufficiently
convince the Court why we should not
rely on the facts found by the Court of
Appeals. Erlinda claimed that the facts
mentioned in the decision were
erroneous and incomplete. We see no
reason why the High Court of the land
need go to such length. The hornbook
doctrine states that findings of fact of the
lower courts are conclusive on the
Supreme Court.17 We emphasize, it is
not for the Court to weigh evidence all
over again.18 Although there are
exceptions to the rule,19 Erlinda failed to
show that this is an exceptional
instance.
Fourth. Erlinda states that Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution and Articles 68
and 69 of the Family Code support her
position that as spouses, they
(Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound
to live together and care for each other.
We agree.
The law provides that the husband and
the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity.20 The sanction therefor is the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order" to enforce
consortium.21
Obviously, there was absence of
empathy between spouses Erlinda and
Potenciano, having separated from bed
and board since 1972. We
defined empathy as a shared feeling
between husband and wife experienced
not only by having spontaneous sexual
intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual
communion. Marital union is a two-way
process.
Marriage is definitely for two loving
adults who view the relationship with
"amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice
and a continuing commitment to
togetherness, conscious of its value as
a sublime social institution.22
On June 28, 2001, Potenciano Ilusorio
gave his soul to the Almighty, his
Creator and Supreme Judge. Let his
soul rest in peace and his survivors
continue the much prolonged fracas ex
aequo et bono.
Page 37 of 100
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we DENY
Erlinda's motion for reconsideration. At
any rate, the case has been rendered
moot by the death of subject.
Case 6
G.R. No. 158802 November 17,
2004
IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA
(detained at the New Bilibid Prisons,
Muntinlupa City)
JUNE DE VILLA, petitioner-relator,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID
PRISONS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus under Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court. Petitioner Reynaldo
de Villa, joined by his son, petitioner-
relator June de Villa, seeks a two-fold
relief: First, that respondent Director of
Prisons justify the basis for the
imprisonment of petitioner Reynaldo de
Villa; and second, that petitioner be
granted a new trial.1 These reliefs are
sought on the basis of purportedly
exculpatory evidence, gathered after
performing deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
testing on samples allegedly collected
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Kapunan and
Ynares-Santiago, JJ ., concur.
from the petitioner and a child born to
the victim of the rape.
By final judgment dated February 1,
2001, in People of the Philippines v.
Reynaldo de Villa,2 we found petitioner
guilty of the rape of Aileen Mendoza, his
niece by affinity; sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of reclusión perpetua; and
ordered him to pay the offended party
civil indemnity, moral damages, costs of
the suit, and support for Leahlyn
Corales Mendoza, the putative child
born of the rape. Petitioner is currently
serving his sentence at the New Bilibid
Prison, Muntinlupa City.
As summarized in our Decision dated
February 1, 2001, Aileen Mendoza
charged petitioner Reynaldo de Villa
with rape in an information dated
January 9, 1995, filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City. When
arraigned on January 26, 1995,
petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty." 3
During the trial, the prosecution
established that sometime in the third
week of April 1994, at about 10:00 in the
morning, Aileen Mendoza woke up in
her family's rented room in Sagad,
Pasig, Metro Manila, to find petitioner on
top of her. Aileen was then aged 12
years and ten months. She was unable
to shout for help because petitioner
covered her mouth with a pillow and
threatened to kill her. Aileen could not
do anything but cry. Petitioner
succeeded in inserting his penis inside
her vagina. After making thrusting
motions with his body, petitioner
Page 38 of 100
ejaculated. This encounter allegedly
resulted in Aileen's pregnancy, which
was noticed by her mother, Leonila
Mendoza, sometime in November 1994.
When confronted by her mother, Aileen
revealed that petitioner raped her.
Aileen's parents then brought her to the
Pasig Police Station, where they lodged
a criminal complaint against petitioner. 4
Dr. Rosaline Cosidon, who examined
Aileen, confirmed that she was eight
months pregnant and found in her
hymen healed lacerations at the 5:00
and 8:00 positions. On December 19,
1994, Aileen gave birth to a baby girl
whom she named Leahlyn Mendoza. 5
In his defense, petitioner alleged that, at
the time of the alleged rape, he was
already 67 years old. Old age and
sickness had rendered him incapable of
having an erection. He further averred
that Aileen's family had been holding a
grudge against him, which accounted for
the criminal charges. Finally, he
interposed the defense of alibi, claiming
that at the time of the incident, he was in
his hometown of San Luis, Batangas. 6
The trial court found petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified rape, and sentenced him to
death, to indemnify the victim in the
amount of P50,000.00, to pay the costs
of the suit and to support the child,
Leahlyn Mendoza.7
On automatic review,8 we found that the
date of birth of Aileen's child was
medically consistent with the time of the
rape. Since it was never alleged that
Aileen gave birth to a full-term nine-
month old baby, we gave credence to
the prosecution's contention that she
prematurely gave birth to an eight-
month old baby by normal
delivery.9 Thus, we affirmed petitioner's
conviction for rape, in a Decision the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court, finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusión perpetua and ordered
to pay the offended party
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
P50,000.00 as moral damages;
costs of the suit and to provide
support for the child Leahlyn
Corales Mendoza.
SO ORDERED.10
Three years after the promulgation of
our Decision, we are once more faced
with the question of Reynaldo de Villa's
guilt or innocence.
Petitioner-relator in this case, June de
Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He alleges
that during the trial of the case, he was
unaware that there was a scientific test
that could determine once and for all if
Reynaldo was the father of the victim's
child, Leahlyn. Petitioner-relator was
only informed during the pendency of
the automatic review of petitioner's case
that DNA testing could resolve the issue
of paternity.11 This information was
apparently furnished by the Free Legal
Assistance Group (FLAG) Anti-Death
Penalty Task Force, which took over as
counsel for petitioner.
Thus, petitioner's brief in People v. de
Villa sought the conduct of a blood type
test and DNA test in order to determine
Page 39 of 100
the paternity of the child allegedly
conceived as a result of the rape.12 This
relief was implicitly denied in our
Decision of February 21, 2001.
On March 16, 2001, Reynaldo de Villa
filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the Decision,
wherein he once more prayed that DNA
tests be conducted.13 The Motion was
denied with finality in a Resolution dated
November 20, 2001.14 Hence, the
Decision became final and executory on
January 16, 2002.15
Petitioner-relator was undaunted by
these challenges. Having been informed
that DNA tests required a sample that
could be extracted from saliva,
petitioner-relator asked Billy Joe de
Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo de Villa
and a classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza, to
ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile
cup.16 Leahlyn readily agreed and did so.
Billy Joe took the sample home and
gave it to the petitioner-relator, who
immediately labeled the cup as
"Container A."
Petitioner-relator then gathered samples
from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de
Villa. These samples were placed in
separate containers with distinguishing
labels and temporarily stored in a
refrigerator prior to transport to the DNA
Analysis Laboratory at the National
Science Research Institute
(NSRI).17 During transport, the
containers containing the saliva samples
were kept on ice.
Petitioner-relator requested the NSRI to
conduct DNA testing on the sample
given by Leahlyn Mendoza, those given
by the grandchildren of Reynaldo de
Villa, and that given by Reynaldo de
Villa himself. The identities of the donors
of the samples, save for the sample
given by Reynaldo de Villa, were not
made known to the DNA Analysis
Laboratory.18
After testing, the DNA Laboratory
rendered a preliminary report on March
21, 2003, which showed that Reynaldo
de Villa could not have sired any of the
children whose samples were tested,
due to the absence of a match between
the pertinent genetic markers in
petitioner's sample and those of any of
the other samples, including Leahlyn's. 19
Hence, in the instant petition for habeas
corpus, petitioner argues as follows:
DNA ANALYSIS ON PATERNITY
SHOWS CONCLUSIVELY THAT
PETITIONER DE VILLA IS NOT
THE FATHER OF LEAHLYN
MENDOZA; HIS CONVICTION
FOR RAPE, BASED ON THE
FACT THAT LEAHLYN WAS
SIRED AS A RESULT OF THE
ALLEGED RAPE, CANNOT
STAND AND MUST BE SET
ASIDE.20
xxx xxx xxx
A NEW TRIAL TO CONSIDER
NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE IS PROPER AND
MAY BE ORDERED BY THIS
COURT IN VIEW OF THE
RESULTS OF THE DNA TESTS
CONDUCTED.21
Considering that the issues are inter-
twined, they shall be discussed together.
In brief, petitioner relies upon the DNA
evidence gathered subsequent to the
Page 40 of 100
trial in order to re-litigate the factual
issue of the paternity of the child
Leahlyn Mendoza. Petitioner alleges
that this issue is crucial, considering that
his conviction in 2001 was based on the
factual finding that he sired the said
child. Since this paternity is now
conclusively disproved, he argues that
the 2001 conviction must be overturned.
In essence, petitioner invokes the
remedy of the writ of habeas corpus to
collaterally attack the 2001 Decision.
The ancillary remedy of a motion for
new trial is resorted to solely to allow the
presentation of what is alleged to be
newly-discovered evidence. This Court
is thus tasked to determine, first, the
propriety of the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus to release an individual
already convicted and serving sentence
by virtue of a final and executory
judgment; and second, the propriety of
granting a new trial under the same
factual scenario.
The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus
has long been a haven of relief for those
seeking liberty from any unwarranted
denial of freedom of movement. Very
broadly, the writ applies "to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by
which a person has been deprived of his
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of
any person has been withheld from the
person entitled thereto".22 Issuance of
the writ necessitates that a person be
illegally deprived of his liberty. In the
celebrated case of Villavicencio v.
Lukban,23 we stated that "[a]ny restraint
which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient."24
The most basic criterion for the issuance
of the writ, therefore, is that the
individual seeking such relief be illegally
deprived of his freedom of movement or
placed under some form of illegal
restraint. If an individual's liberty is
restrained via some legal process, the
writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.
Concomitant to this principle, the writ of
habeas corpus cannot be used to
directly assail a judgment rendered by a
competent court or tribunal which,
having duly acquired jurisdiction, was
not deprived or ousted of this jurisdiction
through some anomaly in the conduct of
the proceedings.
Thus, notwithstanding its historic
function as the great writ of liberty, the
writ of habeas corpus has very limited
availability as a post-conviction remedy.
In the recent case of Feria v. Court of
Appeals,25 we ruled that review of a
judgment of conviction is allowed in a
petition for the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus only in very specific
instances, such as when, as a
consequence of a judicial proceeding,
(a) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the
restraint of a person; (b) the court had
no jurisdiction to impose the sentence;
or (c) an excessive penalty has been
imposed, as such sentence is void as to
such excess.26
In this instance, petitioner invokes the
writ of habeas corpus to assail a final
judgment of conviction, without,
however, providing a legal ground on
which to anchor his petition. In fine,
petitioner alleges neither the deprivation
of a constitutional right, the absence of
jurisdiction of the court imposing the
sentence, or that an excessive penalty
has been imposed upon him.
In fine, petitioner invokes the remedy of
habeas corpus in order to seek the
Page 41 of 100
review of findings of fact long passed
upon with finality. This relief is far
outside the scope of habeas corpus
proceedings. In the early case of Abriol
v. Homeres,27 for example, this Court
stated the general rule that the writ of
habeas corpus is not a writ of error, and
should not be thus used. The writ of
habeas corpus, whereas permitting a
collateral challenge of the jurisdiction of
the court or tribunal issuing the process
or judgment by which an individual is
deprived of his liberty, cannot be
distorted by extending the inquiry to
mere errors of trial courts acting
squarely within their jurisdiction.28 The
reason for this is explained very simply
in the case of Velasco v. Court of
Appeals:29 a habeas corpus petition
reaches the body, but not the record of
the case. 30 A record must be allowed to
remain extant, and cannot be revised,
modified, altered or amended by the
simple expedient of resort to habeas
corpus proceedings.
Clearly, mere errors of fact or law, which
did not have the effect of depriving the
trial court of its jurisdiction over the case
and the person of the defendant, are not
correctible in a petition for the issuance
of the writ of habeas corpus; if at all,
these errors must be corrected on
certiorari or on appeal, in the form and
manner prescribed by law.31 In the past,
this Court has disallowed the review of a
court's appreciation of the evidence in a
petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus, as this is not the
function of said writ.32 A survey of our
decisions in habeas corpus cases
demonstrates that, in general, the writ of
habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ
which furnishes an extraordinary
remedy; it may thus be invoked only
under extraordinary circumstances.33 We
have been categorical in our
pronouncements that the writ of habeas
corpus is not to be used as a substitute
for another, more proper remedy. Resort
to the writ of habeas corpus is available
only in the limited instances when a
judgment is rendered by a court or
tribunal devoid of jurisdiction. If, for
instance, it can be demonstrated that
there was a deprivation of a
constitutional right, the writ can be
granted even after an individual has
been meted a sentence by final
judgment.
Thus, in the case of Chavez v. Court of
Appeals,34 the writ of habeas corpus was
held to be available where an accused
was deprived of the constitutional right
against self-incrimination. A defect so
pronounced as the denial of an
accused's constitutional rights results in
the absence or loss of jurisdiction, and
therefore invalidates the trial and the
consequent conviction of the accused.
That void judgment of conviction may be
challenged by collateral attack, which
precisely is the function of habeas
corpus.35 Later, in Gumabon v. Director
of the Bureau of Prisons,36 this Court
ruled that, once a deprivation of a
constitutional right is shown to exist, the
court that rendered the judgment is
deemed ousted of jurisdiction and
habeas corpus is the appropriate
remedy to assail the legality of the
detention.37Although in Feria v. Court of
Appeals38 this Court was inclined to
allow the presentation of new evidence
in a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus, this was an exceptional
situation. In that case, we laid down the
general rule, which states that the
burden of proving illegal restraint by the
respondent rests on the petitioner who
attacks such restraint. Where the return
Page 42 of 100
is not subject to exception, that is,
where it sets forth a process which, on
its face, shows good ground for the
detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent
on petitioner to allege and prove new
matter that tends to invalidate the
apparent effect of such process.39
In the recent case of Calvan v. Court of
Appeals,40 we summarized the scope of
review allowable in a petition for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
We ruled that the writ of habeas corpus,
although not designed to interrupt the
orderly administration of justice, can be
invoked by the attendance of a special
circumstance that requires immediate
action. In such situations, the inquiry on
a writ of habeas corpus would be
addressed, not to errors committed by a
court within its jurisdiction, but to the
question of whether the proceeding or
judgment under which a person has
been restrained is a complete nullity.
The probe may thus proceed to check
on the power and authority, itself an
equivalent test of jurisdiction, of the
court or the judge to render the order
that so serves as the basis of
imprisonment or detention.41 It is the
nullity of an assailed judgment of
conviction which makes it susceptible to
collateral attack through the filing of a
petition for the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus.
Upon a perusal of the records not
merely of this case but of People v. de
Villa, we find that the remedy of the writ
of habeas corpus is unavailing.
First, the denial of a constitutional right
has not been alleged by petitioner. As
such, this Court is hard-pressed to find
legal basis on which to anchor the grant
of a writ of habeas corpus. Much as this
Court sympathizes with petitioner's plea,
a careful scrutiny of the records does
not reveal any constitutional right of
which the petitioner was unduly
deprived.
We are aware that other jurisdictions
have seen fit to grant the writ of habeas
corpus in order to test claims that a
defendant was denied effective aid of
counsel.42 In this instance, we note that
the record is replete with errors
committed by counsel, and it can be
alleged that the petitioner was, at trial,
denied the effective aid of counsel. The
United States Supreme Court requires a
defendant alleging incompetent counsel
to show that the attorney's performance
was deficient under a reasonable
standard, and additionally to show that
the outcome of the trial would have
been different with competent
counsel.43 The purpose of the right to
effective assistance of counsel is to
ensure that the defendant receives a fair
trial.44
The U.S. Supreme Court asserts that in
judging any claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, one must
examine whether counsel's conduct
undermined the proper functioning of
the adversarial process to such an
extent that the trial did not produce a fair
and just result.45 The proper measure of
attorney performance is "reasonable"
under the prevailing professional norms,
and the defendant must show that the
representation received fell below the
objective standard of
reasonableness.46 For the petition to
succeed, the strong presumption that
the counsel's conduct falls within the
wide range or reasonable professional
assistance must be overcome.47
Page 43 of 100
In the case at bar, it appears that in the
middle of the appeal, the petitioner's
counsel of record, a certain Atty. Alfonso
G. Salvador, suddenly and inexplicably
withdrew his appearance as counsel,
giving the sole explanation that he was
"leaving for the United States for an
indefinite period of time by virtue of a
petition filed in his favor."48 In the face of
this abandonment, petitioner made an
impassioned plea that his lawyer be
prevented from this withdrawal in a
handwritten "Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and Opposition of
Counsel's Withdrawal of Appearance
with Leave of Court" received by this
Court on September 14,
1999.49 Petitioner alleged that his
counsel's withdrawal is an "untimely and
heartbreaking event", considering that
he had placed "all [his] trust and
confidence on [his counsel's]
unquestionable integrity and dignity." 50
While we are sympathetic to petitioner's
plight, we do not, however, find that
there was such negligence committed
by his earlier counsel so as to amount to
a denial of a constitutional right. There is
likewise no showing that the
proceedings were tainted with any other
jurisdictional defect.
In fine, we find that petitioner invokes
the remedy of the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus to seek a re-examination
of the records of People v. de Villa,
without asserting any legal grounds
therefor. For all intents and purposes,
petitioner seeks a reevaluation of the
evidentiary basis for his conviction. We
are being asked to reexamine the
weight and sufficiency of the evidence in
this case, not on its own, but in light of
the new DNA evidence that the
petitioner seeks to present to this Court.
This relief is outside the scope of a
habeas corpus petition. The petition for
habeas corpus must, therefore, fail.
Coupled with the prayer for the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner
seeks a new trial to re-litigate the issue
of the paternity of the child Leahlyn
Mendoza.
It must be stressed that the issue of
Leahlyn Mendoza's paternity is not
central to the issue of petitioner's guilt or
innocence. The rape of the victim Aileen
Mendoza is an entirely different
question, separate and distinct from the
question of the father of her child.
Recently, in the case of People v.
Alberio,51 we ruled that the fact or not of
the victim's pregnancy and resultant
childbirth are irrelevant in determining
whether or not she was raped.
Pregnancy is not an essential element
of the crime of rape. Whether the child
which the victim bore was fathered by
the purported rapist, or by some
unknown individual, is of no moment in
determining an individual's guilt.
In the instant case, however, we note
that the grant of child support to Leahlyn
Mendoza indicates that our Decision
was based, at least in small measure,
on the victim's claim that the petitioner
fathered her child. This claim was given
credence by the trial court, and, as a
finding of fact, was affirmed by this
Court on automatic review.
The fact of the child's paternity is now in
issue, centrally relevant to the civil
award of child support. It is only
tangentially related to the issue of
petitioner's guilt. However, if it can be
conclusively determined that the
petitioner did not sire Leahlyn Mendoza,
Page 44 of 100
this may cast the shadow of reasonable
doubt, and allow the acquittal of the
petitioner on this basis.
Be that as it may, it appears that the
petitioner once more relies upon
erroneous legal grounds in resorting to
the remedy of a motion for new trial. A
motion for new trial, under the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, is
available only for a limited period of
time, and for very limited grounds.
Under Section 1, Rule 121, of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a
motion for new trial may be filed at any
time before a judgment of conviction
becomes final, that is, within fifteen (15)
days from its promulgation or notice.
Upon finality of the judgment, therefore,
a motion for new trial is no longer an
available remedy. Section 2 of Rule 121
enumerates the grounds for a new trial:
SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial.
—The court shall grant a new trial
on any of the following grounds:
(a) That errors of law or
irregularities prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the accused
have been committed during the
trial;
(b) That new and material
evidence has been discovered
which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have
discovered and produced at the
trial and which if introduced and
admitted would probably change
the judgment.
In the case at bar, petitioner anchors his
plea on the basis of purportedly "newly-
discovered evidence", i.e., the DNA test
subsequently conducted, allegedly
excluding petitioner from the child
purportedly fathered as a result of the
rape.
The decision sought to be reviewed in
this petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus has long attained finality,
and entry of judgment was made as far
back as January 16, 2002. Moreover,
upon an examination of the evidence
presented by the petitioner, we do not
find that the DNA evidence falls within
the statutory or jurisprudential definition
of "newly- discovered evidence".
A motion for new trial based on newly-
discovered evidence may be granted
only if the following requisites are met:
(a) that the evidence was discovered
after trial; (b) that said evidence could
not have been discovered and produced
at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; (c) that it is
material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching; and (d)
that the evidence is of such weight that
that, if admitted, it would probably
change the judgment.52 It is essential
that the offering party exercised
reasonable diligence in seeking to
locate the evidence before or during trial
but nonetheless failed to secure it. 53
In this instance, although the DNA
evidence was undoubtedly discovered
after the trial, we nonetheless find that it
does not meet the criteria for "newly-
discovered evidence" that would merit a
new trial. Such evidence disproving
paternity could have been discovered
and produced at trial with the exercise of
reasonable diligence.
Petitioner-relator's claim that he was
"unaware" of the existence of DNA
testing until the trial was concluded
Page 45 of 100
carries no weight with this Court. Lack of
knowledge of the existence of DNA
testing speaks of negligence, either on
the part of petitioner, or on the part of
petitioner's counsel. In either instance,
however, this negligence is binding upon
petitioner. It is a settled rule that a party
cannot blame his counsel for negligence
when he himself was guilty of
neglect.54 A client is bound by the acts of
his counsel, including the latter's
mistakes and negligence.55 It is likewise
settled that relief will not be granted to a
party who seeks to be relieved from the
effects of the judgment when the loss of
the remedy at law was due to his own
negligence, or to a mistaken mode of
procedure.56
Even with all of the compelling and
persuasive scientific evidence presented
by petitioner and his counsel, we are not
convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is
entitled to outright acquittal. As correctly
pointed out by the Solicitor General,
even if it is conclusively proven that
Reynaldo de Villa is not the father of
Leahlyn Mendoza, his conviction could,
in theory, still stand, with Aileen
Mendoza's testimony and positive
identification as its bases.57 The Solicitor
General reiterates, and correctly so, that
the pregnancy of the victim has never
been an element of the crime of
rape.58Therefore, the DNA evidence has
failed to conclusively prove to this Court
that Reynaldo de Villa should be
discharged. Although petitioner claims
that conviction was based solely on a
finding of paternity of the child Leahlyn,
this is not the case. Our conviction was
based on the clear and convincing
testimonial evidence of the victim,
which, given credence by the trial court,
was affirmed on appeal.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the instant petition for habeas corpus
and new trial is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales,
Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and
Garcia, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., and Panganiban, J.,
joins Carpio and Callejo, Sr., JJ., in their
separate opinion.
Carpio, J., please see separate
concurring opinion.
Callejo, Sr., J., please see separate
opinion.
Corona, J., on leave.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I concur with the ponencia. The DNA
evidence presented by petitioner-relator
is not material and relevant to the crime
of rape. Even assuming petitioner is not
the father of the child that was
conceived within the period of the rape,
such fact does not prove that petitioner
could not have committed the crime.
The remedies of habeas corpus and
new trial are thus unavailing in this case.
However, this case should not close the
door to a convicted felon who after final
judgment acquires DNA results
exonerating him of the crime for which
he was convicted. Legal relief is still
available, for instance, to a felon
Page 46 of 100
convicted by final judgment of rape who
subsequently gains access to DNA
results showing that the semen in the
victim's vagina does not match that of
the convicted felon.
While final judgments enjoy the
presumption of correctness, the
confining and traditional legal
procedures must respond to the
revolutionary way that DNA results have
been proving the innocence of convicts.
American jurisprudence has shown the
way in this regard.
Before the enactment of statutes in
some states providing for post-
conviction DNA testing, American courts
had no precedents to work on to justify
post-conviction DNA testing and the
reversal of final judgments of conviction
when the DNA results turned out to be
exculpatory. Before the passage of the
DNA testing statutes, it was unclear
under what right and procedure a
convict was entitled to post-conviction
DNA testing. Even in the absence of
statutes, American courts allowed post-
conviction DNA testing by requiring the
convict to apply for such testing before
the verdict could be vacated.1 The
application enables the courts to
determine the basis for the application
and to set the standards in case the
request is granted. Once the DNA result
confirms the innocence of the convict,
American courts conduct a motion in
limine hearing on admissibility or order a
new trial.2 The prosecution usually
refuses to re-try the case and the
convict is released.
Under American jurisprudence, post-
conviction DNA testing is availed
through a petition for habeas corpus and
motion for new trial. These conventional
modes of relief, however, have built-in
restrictions that pose problems to the
granting of post-conviction DNA testing.
In habeas corpus cases, relief could not
be had unless a constitutional violation
was committed during the convict's trial.
In a motion for new trial, the convict
must show that the DNA test is a newly
discovered evidence and must not be
time-barred to warrant a new trial.
Despite these legal obstacles, American
courts granted, albeit restrictively, the
request for post-conviction DNA testing
on a case-by-case basis. The approach
to the legal issues varied from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
In Summerville v. Warden State
Prison3 the Supreme Court of
Connecticut ruled that when evidence is
so strong that innocence is highly likely
and that evidence alone establishes
innocence, that in itself is already a
basis fro habeas corpus review of
convictions and imprisonment. Thus,
habeas corpus warranted the granting of
a new trial based on the petitioner's
claim of actual innocence. In People v.
Callace,4 the New York court considered
post-conviction DNA testing as newly
discovered evidence because the type
of DNA analysis available at the post-
conviction stage was not available at the
time of the trial. In State v.
Thomas,5 fundamental fairness allowed
the convict to post-conviction DNA
testing even when the request was
already stale.
Habeas corpus review and new trial
proved to be narrow remedies as
American courts still adhere to the strict
requirements of these two models of
relief. Nonetheless, post-conviction DNA
testing has been granted on other
Page 47 of 100
grounds. When the application of DNA
testing has strong indications that the
result could potentially exonerate the
convict, American courts recognized the
convict's right to exculpatory evidence.
In Dabbs v. Vergari,6 citing Brady v.
Maryland,7 the court categorically
upheld the convict's constitutional right
to exculpatory evidence despite the
absence of a law providing a right to
post-conviction discovery. DNA results
exonerated Charles Dabbs and his
conviction was eventually vacated.8 On
other cases,9 the exculpatory potential
of DNA evidence compelled the
American courts, in the interest of
justice, to allow access to post-
conviction DNA testing.
The rectification of a wrong is the
underlying reason for the allowance of
post-conviction DNA testing and the
eventual reversal of the verdict based
on exclusionary DNA result. Even the
most stringent of rules have to give way
upon a showing that there is a strong
probability that DNA result could prove
the convict's actual innocence. For
ultimately, it is the primary duty of the
court to prevent the miscarriage of
justice.
Every person has a right to avail of a
new technology that irrefutably proves
his innocence despite a prior final
conviction, provided the new technology
was not available during his trial. This
right is part of a person's constitutional
right to due process of law. A person
convicted by final judgment does not
lose his constitutional right to due
process, and he may invoke it whenever
there is a compelling and valid ground to
do so.
The 1987 Constitution expressly
empowers the Court to "[p]romulgate
rules concerning the protection and
enhancement of constitutional
rights."10 Even in the absence of a law
allowing post-conviction DNA testing,
the Court under its constitutional
mandate may order a new trial if the
post-conviction DNA testing will
establish that the convicted felon could
not have possibly committed the crime.
This is the case when the post-
conviction DNA testing shows that the
semen in the victim's vagina does not
match that of the convicted felon.
A new trial on the ground of post-
conviction DNA testing is different from a
new trial under Rule 121,11 which is
available only before final judgment.
Unlike a new trial under Rule 121, a new
trial for post-conviction DNA testing
does not vacate the judgment of
conviction, which stands until recalled
by the court as a result of the new trial.
A new trial after final conviction may be
ordered only on the sole ground that
DNA testing will establish that the
convicted felon could not have
committed the crime. Moreover, DNA
testing must not have been available or
possible during the original trial.
Thus, I submit that a felon convicted by
final judgment who could establish
through DNA testing that he could not
have committed the crime is not without
remedy to prove his innocence and
regain his liberty.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Page 48 of 100
I concur with the ponencia and the
separate concurring opinion of Justice
Antonio T. Carpio that the convicted
felon must be allowed an opportunity to
adduce DNA evidence. However, such a
remedy is sui generis to give the
convicted felon a chance to adduce
DNA evidence until Rule 121 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is
revised anew. Such a remedy is akin to
a motion for a new trial in the original
case on the ground of newly discovered
evidence under Section 2(b), Rule 121
of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which reads:
Case 7
G.R. No. 160792 August 25, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION
FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT.
GARY ALEJANO, PN (MARINES)
CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN
(MARINES) CAPT. GERARDO
GAMBALA, PA LT. SG JAMES LAYUG,
PN CAPT. MILO MAESTRECAMPO,
PA LT. SG ANTONIO TRILLANES IV,
PN HOMOBONO ADAZA, and
ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL)
PULIDO, Petitioners,
vs.
GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, GEN.
NARCISO ABAYA, SEC. ANGELO
REYES, and SEC. ROILO
GOLEZ,Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial. –
The court shall grant a new trial
on any of the following grounds:
(a) That errors of law or
irregularities prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the accused
have been committed during the
trial;
(b) That new and material
evidence has been discovered
which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have
discovered and produced at the
trial and which if introduced and
admitted would probably change
the judgment.
This petition for review1 seeks to nullify
the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals
dated 17 September 2003 and
Resolution dated 13 November 2003 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 78545. The Court of
Appeals’ Decision and Resolution
dismissed the petition for habeas
corpus filed by lawyers Homobono
Adaza and Roberto Rafael Pulido
("petitioners") on behalf of their detained
clients Capt. Gary Alejano (PN-
Marines), Capt. Nicanor Faeldon (PN-
Marines), Capt. Gerardo Gambala (PA),
Lt. SG James Layug (PN), Capt. Milo
Maestrecampo (PA), and Lt. SG Antonio
Trillanes IV (PN) ("detainees").
Petitioners named as respondent Gen.
Pedro Cabuay ("Gen. Cabuay"), Chief of
the Intelligence Service of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines ("ISAFP"), who
has custody of the detainees.
Petitioners impleaded Gen. Narciso
Abaya ("Gen. Abaya"), Sec. Angelo
Reyes and Roilo Golez, who are
respectively the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines
Page 49 of 100
("AFP"), Secretary of National Defense
and National Security Adviser, because
they have command responsibility over
Gen. Cabuay.
Antecedent Facts
Early morning of 27 July 2003, some
321 armed soldiers, led by the now
detained junior officers, entered and
took control of the Oakwood Premier
Luxury Apartments ("Oakwood"), an
upscale apartment complex, located in
the business district of Makati City. The
soldiers disarmed the security officers of
Oakwood and planted explosive devices
in its immediate surroundings. The junior
officers publicly renounced their support
for the administration and called for the
resignation of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet
members.
Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the
soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities after several negotiations
with government emissaries. The
soldiers later defused the explosive
devices they had earlier planted. The
soldiers then returned to their barracks.
On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the
Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a
directive to all the Major Service
Commanders to turn over custody of ten
junior officers to the ISAFP Detention
Center. The transfer took place while
military and civilian authorities were
investigating the soldiers’ involvement in
the Oakwood incident.
On 1 August 2003, government
prosecutors filed an Information for coup
d’etat with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 61, against the
soldiers involved in the 27 July 2003
Oakwood incident. The government
prosecutors accused the soldiers
of coup d’etat as defined and penalized
under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal
Code of the Philippines, as amended.
The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 03-2784. The trial court later
issued the Commitment Orders giving
custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio
Trillanes IV ("Trillanes") and Capt.
Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding
Officers of ISAFP.
On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a
directive to all Major Service
Commanders to take into custody the
military personnel under their command
who took part in the Oakwood incident
except the detained junior officers who
were to remain under the custody of
ISAFP.
On 11 August 2003, petitioners filed a
petition for habeas corpus with the
Supreme Court. On 12 August 2003, the
Court issued a Resolution, which
resolved to:
(a) ISSUE the WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS; (b) require respondents to
make a RETURN of the writ on Monday,
18 August 2003, at 10:00 a.m. before
the Court of Appeals; (c) refer the case
to the Court of Appeals
for RAFFLE among the Justices thereof
for hearing, further proceedings and
decision thereon, after which
a REPORT shall be made to this Court
within ten (10) days from promulgation
of the decision.3
Thus, the Court issued a Writ of Habeas
Corpus dated 12 August 2003 directing
respondents to make a return of the writ
and to appear and produce the persons
of the detainees before the Court of
Page 50 of 100
Appeals on the scheduled date for
hearing and further proceedings.
On the same date, the detainees and
their other co-accused filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City a
Motion for Preliminary Investigation,
which the trial court granted.
On 18 August 2003, pursuant to the
directives of the Court, respondents
submitted their Return of the Writ and
Answer to the petition and produced the
detainees before the Court of Appeals
during the scheduled hearing. After the
parties filed their memoranda on 28
August 2003, the appellate court
considered the petition submitted for
decision.
On 17 September 2003, the Court of
Appeals rendered its decision
dismissing the petition. Nonetheless, the
appellate court ordered Gen. Cabuay,
who was in charge of implementing the
regulations in the ISAFP Detention
Center, to uphold faithfully the rights of
the detainees in accordance with
Standing Operations Procedure No.
0263-04. The appellate court directed
Gen. Cabuay to adhere to his
commitment made in court regarding
visiting hours and the detainees’ right to
exercise for two hours a day.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals found the petition
bereft of merit. The appellate court
pointed out that the detainees are
already charged of coup d’etat before
the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in
this case as the detainees’ confinement
is under a valid indictment, the legality
of which the detainees and petitioners
do not even question.
The Court of Appeals recognized
that habeas corpus may also be the
appropriate remedy to assail the legality
of detention if there is a deprivation of a
constitutional right. However, the
appellate court held that the
constitutional rights alleged to have
been violated in this case do not directly
affect the detainees’ liberty. The
appellate court ruled that the regulation
of the detainees’ right to confer with their
counsels is reasonable under the
circumstances.
The appellate court declared that while
the opening and reading of Trillanes’
letter is an abhorrent violation of his
right to privacy of communication, this
does not justify the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus. The violation does not
amount to illegal restraint, which is the
proper subject of habeas
corpus proceedings.
The Court of Appeals thus dismissed the
petition and ordered Gen. Cabuay to
fulfill the promise he made in open court
to uphold the visiting hours and the right
of the detainees to exercise for two
hours a day. The dispositive portion of
the appellate court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing
considered, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED. Respondent Cabuay is
hereby ORDERED to faithfully adhere to
his commitment to uphold the
constitutional rights of the detainees in
accordance with the Standing
Operations Procedure No. 0263-04
regarding visiting hours and the right of
the detainees to exercise for two (2)
hours a day.
Page 51 of 100
SO ORDERED.4
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for
resolution:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN REVIEWING AND REVERSING A
DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN NOT ACKNOWLEDGING THE
APPROPRIATENESS OF THE
REMEDY PETITIONERS SEEK; and
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN ASSERTING THE LEGALITY OF
THE CONDITIONS OF THE DETAINED
JUNIOR OFFICERS’ DETENTION.5
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners claim that the Court’s 12
August 2003 Order granted the petition
and the Court remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals only for a factual
hearing. Petitioners thus argue that the
Court’s Order had already foreclosed
any question on the propriety and merits
of their petition.
Petitioners’ claim is baseless. A plain
reading of the 12 August 2003 Order
shows that the Court referred to the
Court of Appeals the duty to inquire into
the cause of the junior officers’
detention. Had the Court ruled for the
detainees’ release, the Court would not
have referred the hearing of the petition
to the Court of Appeals. The Court
would have forthwith released the
detainees had the Court upheld
petitioners’ cause.
In a habeas corpus petition, the order to
present an individual before the court is
a preliminary step in the hearing of the
petition.6 The respondent must produce
the person and explain the cause of his
detention.7 However, this order is not a
ruling on the propriety of the remedy or
on the substantive matters covered by
the remedy. Thus, the Court’s order to
the Court of Appeals to conduct a
factual hearing was not an affirmation of
the propriety of the remedy of habeas
corpus.
For obvious reasons, the duty to hear
the petition for habeas
corpus necessarily includes the
determination of the propriety of the
remedy. If a court finds the alleged
cause of the detention unlawful, then it
should issue the writ and release the
detainees. In the present case, after
hearing the case, the Court of Appeals
found that habeas corpus is
inapplicable. After actively participating
in the hearing before the Court of
Appeals, petitioners are estopped from
claiming that the appellate court had no
jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of
their petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
the remedy of habeas corpus is not the
proper remedy to address the detainees’
complaint against the regulations and
conditions in the ISAFP Detention
Center. The remedy of habeas
corpus has one objective: to inquire into
the cause of detention of a person.8 The
purpose of the writ is to determine
whether a person is being illegally
deprived of his liberty.9 If the inquiry
reveals that the detention is illegal, the
court orders the release of the person.
If, however, the detention is proven
lawful, then the habeas
Page 52 of 100
corpus proceedings terminate. The use
of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It
is not a writ of error.10 Neither can it
substitute for an appeal.11
Nonetheless, case law has expanded
the writ’s application to circumstances
where there is deprivation of a person’s
constitutional rights. The writ is available
where a person continues to be
unlawfully denied of one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is
denial of due process, where the
restraints are not merely involuntary but
are also unnecessary, and where a
deprivation of freedom originally valid
has later become arbitrary.12
However, a mere allegation of a
violation of one’s constitutional right is
not sufficient. The courts will extend the
scope of the writ only if any of the
following circumstances is present: (a)
there is a deprivation of a constitutional
right resulting in the unlawful restraint of
a person; (b) the court had no
jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or
(c) an excessive penalty is imposed and
such sentence is void as to the
excess.13 Whatever situation the
petitioner invokes, the threshold remains
high. The violation of constitutional right
must be sufficient to void the entire
proceedings.14
Petitioners admit that they do not
question the legality of the detention of
the detainees. Neither do they dispute
the lawful indictment of the detainees for
criminal and military offenses. What
petitioners bewail is the regulation
adopted by Gen. Cabuay in the ISAFP
Detention Center preventing petitioners
as lawyers from seeing the detainees –
their clients – any time of the day or
night. The regulation allegedly curtails
the detainees’ right to counsel and
violates Republic Act No. 7438 ("RA
7438").15 Petitioners claim that the
regulated visits made it difficult for them
to prepare for the important hearings
before the Senate and the Feliciano
Commission.
Petitioners also point out that the
officials of the ISAFP Detention Center
violated the detainees’ right to privacy of
communication when the ISAFP officials
opened and read the personal letters of
Trillanes and Capt. Milo Maestrecampo
("Maestrecampo"). Petitioners further
claim that the ISAFP officials violated
the detainees’ right against cruel and
unusual punishment when the ISAFP
officials prevented the detainees from
having contact with their visitors.
Moreover, the ISAFP officials boarded
up with iron bars and plywood slabs the
iron grills of the detention cells, limiting
the already poor light and ventilation in
the detainees’ cells.
Pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their
constitutional rights upon
confinement.16 However, the fact that the
detainees are confined makes their
rights more limited than those of the
public.17 RA 7438, which specifies the
rights of detainees and the duties of
detention officers, expressly recognizes
the power of the detention officer to
adopt and implement reasonable
measures to secure the safety of the
detainee and prevent his escape.
Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides:
Section 4. Penalty Clause. – a) x x x
b) Any person who obstructs, prevents
or prohibits any lawyer, any member of
the immediate family of a person
arrested, detained or under custodial
Page 53 of 100
investigation, or any medical doctor or
priest or religious minister or by his
counsel, from visiting and conferring
privately chosen by him or by any
member of his immediate family with
him, or from examining and treating him,
or from ministering to his spiritual
needs, at any hour of the day or, in
urgent cases, of the night shall suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of not less
than four (4) years nor more than six (6)
years, and a fine of four thousand pesos
(₱4,000.00).
The provisions of the above Section
notwithstanding, any security officer with
custodial responsibility over any
detainee or prisoner may undertake
such reasonable measures as may be
necessary to secure his safety and
prevent his escape. (Emphasis
supplied)
True, Section 4(b) of RA 7438 makes it
an offense to prohibit a lawyer from
visiting a detainee client "at any hour of
the day or, in urgent cases, of the night."
However, the last paragraph of the
same Section 4(b) makes the express
qualification that "notwithstanding" the
provisions of Section 4(b), the detention
officer has the power to undertake such
reasonable measures as may be
necessary to secure the safety of the
detainee and prevent his escape.
The last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA
7438 prescribes a clear standard. The
regulations governing a detainee’s
confinement must be "reasonable
measures x x x to secure his safety and
prevent his escape." Thus, the
regulations must be reasonably
connected to the government’s objective
of securing the safety and preventing
the escape of the detainee. The law
grants the detention officer the authority
to "undertake such reasonable
measures" or regulations.
Petitioners contend that there was an
actual prohibition of the detainees’ right
to effective representation when
petitioners’ visits were limited by the
schedule of visiting hours. Petitioners
assert that the violation of the detainees’
rights entitle them to be released from
detention.
Petitioners’ contention does not
persuade us. The schedule of visiting
hours does not render void the
detainees’ indictment for criminal and
military offenses to warrant the
detainees’ release from detention. The
ISAFP officials did not deny, but merely
regulated, the detainees’ right to
counsel. The purpose of the regulation
is not to render ineffective the right to
counsel, but to secure the safety and
security of all detainees. American
cases are instructive on the standards to
determine whether regulations on pre-
trial confinement are permissible.
In Bell v. Wolfish,18 the United States
(U.S.) Supreme Court held that
regulations must be reasonably related
to maintaining security and must not be
excessive in achieving that purpose.
Courts will strike down a restriction that
is arbitrary and
purposeless.19 However, Bell v.
Wolfish expressly discouraged courts
from skeptically questioning challenged
restrictions in detention and prison
facilities.20 The U.S. Supreme Court
commanded the courts to afford
administrators "wide-ranging deference"
in implementing policies to maintain
institutional security.21
Page 54 of 100
In our jurisdiction, the last paragraph of
Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides the
standard to make regulations in
detention centers allowable: "such
reasonable measures as may be
necessary to secure the detainee’s
safety and prevent his escape." In the
present case, the visiting hours
accorded to the lawyers of the detainees
are reasonably connected to the
legitimate purpose of securing the safety
and preventing the escape of all
detainees.
While petitioners may not visit the
detainees any time they want, the fact
that the detainees still have face-to-face
meetings with their lawyers on a daily
basis clearly shows that there is no
impairment of detainees’ right to
counsel. Petitioners as counsels could
visit their clients between 8:00 a.m. and
5:00 p.m. with a lunch break at 12:00
p.m. The visiting hours are regular
business hours, the same hours when
lawyers normally entertain clients in
their law offices. Clearly, the visiting
hours pass the standard of
reasonableness. Moreover, in urgent
cases, petitioners could always seek
permission from the ISAFP officials to
confer with their clients beyond the
visiting hours.
The scheduled visiting hours provide
reasonable access to the detainees,
giving petitioners sufficient time to
confer with the detainees. The
detainees’ right to counsel is not
undermined by the scheduled visits.
Even in the hearings before the Senate
and the Feliciano
Commission,22 petitioners were given
time to confer with the detainees, a fact
that petitioners themselves
admit.23 Thus, at no point were the
detainees denied their right to counsel.
Petitioners further argue that the bars
separating the detainees from their
visitors and the boarding of the iron grills
in their cells with plywood amount to
unusual and excessive punishment. This
argument fails to impress us. Bell v.
Wolfish pointed out that while a
detainee may not be punished prior to
an adjudication of guilt in accordance
with due process of law, detention
inevitably interferes with a detainee’s
desire to live comfortably.24 The fact that
the restrictions inherent in detention
intrude into the detainees’ desire to live
comfortably does not convert those
restrictions into punishment.25 It is when
the restrictions are arbitrary and
purposeless that courts will infer intent
to punish.26 Courts will also infer intent to
punish even if the restriction seems to
be related rationally to the alternative
purpose if the restriction appears
excessive in relation to that
purpose.27 Jail officials are thus not
required to use the least restrictive
security measure.28 They must only
refrain from implementing a restriction
that appears excessive to the purpose it
serves.29
We quote Bell v. Wolfish:
Page 55 of 100
One further point requires discussion.
The petitioners assert, and respondents
concede, that the "essential objective of
pretrial confinement is to insure the
detainees’ presence at trial." While this
interest undoubtedly justifies the original
decision to confine an individual in some
manner, we do not accept respondents’
argument that the Government’s interest
in ensuring a detainee’s presence at trial
is the only objective that may justify
restraints and conditions once the
decision is lawfully made to confine a
person. "If the government could confine
or otherwise infringe the liberty of
detainees only to the extent necessary
to ensure their presence at trial, house
arrest would in the end be the only
constitutionally justified form of
detention." The Government also has
legitimate interests that stem from its
need to manage the facility in which the
individual is detained. These legitimate
operational concerns may require
administrative measures that go beyond
those that are, strictly speaking,
necessary to ensure that the detainee
shows up at trial. For example, the
Government must be able to take steps
to maintain security and order at the
institution and make certain no weapons
or illicit drugs reach detainees.
Restraints that are reasonably related to
the institution’s interest in maintaining
jail security do not, without more,
constitute unconstitutional punishment,
even if they are discomforting and are
restrictions that the detainee would not
have experienced had he been released
while awaiting trial. We need not here
attempt to detail the precise extent of
the legitimate governmental interests
that may justify conditions or restrictions
of pretrial detention. It is enough simply
to recognize that in addition to ensuring
the detainees’ presence at trial, the
effective management of the detention
facility once the individual is confined is
a valid objective that may justify
imposition of conditions and restrictions
of pretrial detention and dispel any
inference that such restrictions are
intended as punishment.30
An action constitutes a punishment
when (1) that action causes the inmate
to suffer some harm or "disability," and
(2) the purpose of the action is to punish
the inmate.31 Punishment also requires
that the harm or disability be
significantly greater than, or be
independent of, the inherent discomforts
of confinement.32
Block v. Rutherford,33 which
reiterated Bell v. Wolfish, upheld the
blanket restriction on contact visits as
this practice was reasonably related to
maintaining security. The safety of
innocent individuals will be jeopardized
if they are exposed to detainees who
while not yet convicted are awaiting trial
for serious, violent offenses and may
have prior criminal conviction.34 Contact
visits make it possible for the detainees
to hold visitors and jail staff hostage to
effect escapes.35 Contact visits also
leave the jail vulnerable to visitors
smuggling in weapons, drugs, and other
contraband.36 The restriction on contact
visits was imposed even on low-risk
detainees as they could also potentially
be enlisted to help obtain contraband
and weapons.37 The security
consideration in the imposition of
blanket restriction on contact visits was
ruled to outweigh the sentiments of the
detainees.38
Page 56 of 100
Block v. Rutherford held that the
prohibition of contact visits bore a
rational connection to the legitimate goal
of internal security.39 This case
reaffirmed the "hands-off" doctrine
enunciated in Bell v. Wolfish, a form of
judicial self-restraint, based on the
premise that courts should decline
jurisdiction over prison matters in
deference to administrative expertise.40
In the present case, we cannot infer
punishment from the separation of the
detainees from their visitors by iron
bars, which is merely a limitation on
contact visits. The iron bars separating
the detainees from their visitors prevent
direct physical contact but still allow the
detainees to have visual, verbal, non-
verbal and limited physical contact with
their visitors. The arrangement is not
unduly restrictive. In fact, it is not even a
strict non-contact visitation regulation
like in Block v. Rutherford. The
limitation on the detainees’ physical
contacts with visitors is a reasonable,
non-punitive response to valid security
concerns.
The boarding of the iron grills is for the
furtherance of security within the ISAFP
Detention Center. This measure intends
to fortify the individual cells and to
prevent the detainees from passing on
contraband and weapons from one cell
to another. The boarded grills ensure
security and prevent disorder and crime
within the facility. The diminished
illumination and ventilation are but
discomforts inherent in the fact of
detention, and do not constitute
punishments on the detainees.
We accord respect to the finding of the
Court of Appeals that the conditions in
the ISAFP Detention Center are not
inhuman, degrading and cruel. Each
detainee, except for Capt. Nicanor
Faeldon and Capt. Gerardo Gambala, is
confined in separate cells, unlike
ordinary cramped detention cells. The
detainees are treated well and given
regular meals. The Court of Appeals
noted that the cells are relatively clean
and livable compared to the conditions
now prevailing in the city and provincial
jails, which are congested with
detainees. The Court of Appeals found
the assailed measures to be reasonable
considering that the ISAFP Detention
Center is a high-risk detention facility.
Apart from the soldiers, a suspected
New People’s Army ("NPA") member
and two suspected Abu Sayyaf
members are detained in the ISAFP
Detention Center.
We now pass upon petitioners’
argument that the officials of the ISAFP
Detention Center violated the detainees’
right to privacy when the ISAFP officials
opened and read the letters handed by
detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo
to one of the petitioners for mailing.
Petitioners point out that the letters were
not in a sealed envelope but simply
folded because there were no
envelopes in the ISAFP Detention
Center. Petitioners contend that the
Constitution prohibits the infringement of
a citizen’s privacy rights unless
authorized by law. The Solicitor General
does not deny that the ISAFP officials
opened the letters.
Courts in the U.S. have generally
permitted prison officials to open and
read all incoming and outgoing mail of
convicted prisoners to prevent the
smuggling of contraband into the prison
facility and to avert coordinated
escapes.41 Even in the absence of
Page 57 of 100
statutes specifically allowing prison
authorities from opening and inspecting
mail, such practice was upheld based
on the principle of "civil
deaths."42 Inmates were deemed to have
no right to correspond confidentially with
anyone. The only restriction placed upon
prison authorities was that the right of
inspection should not be used to delay
unreasonably the communications
between the inmate and his lawyer. 43
Eventually, the inmates’ outgoing mail to
licensed attorneys, courts, and court
officials received respect.44 The
confidential correspondences could not
be censored.45 The infringement of such
privileged communication was held to
be a violation of the inmates’ First
Amendment rights.46 A prisoner has a
right to consult with his attorney in
absolute privacy, which right is not
abrogated by the legitimate interests of
prison authorities in the administration of
the institution.47 Moreover, the risk is
small that attorneys will conspire in plots
that threaten prison security.48
American jurisprudence initially made a
distinction between the privacy rights
enjoyed by convicted inmates and pre-
trial detainees. The case of Palmigiano
v. Travisono49 recognized that pre-trial
detainees, unlike convicted prisoners,
enjoy a limited right of privacy in
communication. Censorship of pre-trial
detainees’ mail addressed to public
officials, courts and counsel was held
impermissible. While incoming mail may
be inspected for contraband and read in
certain instances, outgoing mail of pre-
trial detainees could not be inspected or
read at all.
In the subsequent case of Wolff v.
McDonnell,50 involving convicted
prisoners, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that prison officials could open in the
presence of the inmates incoming mail
from attorneys to inmates. However,
prison officials could not read such mail
from attorneys. Explained the U.S.
Supreme Court:
The issue of the extent to which prison
authorities can open and inspect
incoming mail from attorneys to inmates,
has been considerably narrowed in the
course of this litigation. The prison
regulation under challenge provided that
‘(a)ll incoming and outgoing mail will be
read and inspected,’ and no exception
was made for attorney-prisoner mail. x x
x
Petitioners now concede that they
cannot open and read mail from
attorneys to inmates, but contend that
they may open all letters from attorneys
as long as it is done in the presence of
the prisoners. The narrow issue thus
presented is whether letters determined
or found to be from attorneys may be
opened by prison authorities in the
presence of the inmate or whether such
mail must be delivered unopened if
normal detection techniques fail to
indicate contraband.
xxx
x x x If prison officials had to check in
each case whether a communication
was from an attorney before opening it
for inspection, a near impossible task of
administration would be imposed. We
think it entirely appropriate that the State
require any such communications to be
specially marked as originating from an
attorney, with his name and address
being given, if they are to receive
special treatment. It would also certainly
Page 58 of 100
be permissible that prison authorities
require that a lawyer desiring to
correspond with a prisoner, first identify
himself and his client to the prison
officials, to assure that the letters
marked privileged are actually from
members of the bar. As to the ability to
open the mail in the presence of
inmates, this could in no way constitute
censorship, since the mail would not be
read. Neither could it chill such
communications, since the inmate’s
presence insures that prison officials will
not read the mail. The possibility that
contraband will be enclosed in letters,
even those from apparent attorneys,
surely warrants prison officials’ opening
the letters. We disagree with the Court
of Appeals that this should only be done
in ‘appropriate circumstances.’ Since a
flexible test, besides being unworkable,
serves no arguable purpose in
protecting any of the possible
constitutional rights enumerated by
respondent, we think that petitioners, by
acceding to a rule whereby the inmate is
present when mail from attorneys is
inspected, have done all, and perhaps
even more, than the Constitution
requires.51
In Hudson v. Palmer,52 the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that an inmate has
no reasonable expectation of privacy
inside his cell. The U.S. Supreme Court
explained that prisoners necessarily
lose many protections of the
Constitution, thus:
However, while persons imprisoned for
crime enjoy many protections of the
Constitution, it is also clear that
imprisonment carries with it the
circumscription or loss of many
significant rights. These constraints on
inmates, and in some cases the
complete withdrawal of certain rights,
are "justified by the considerations
underlying our penal system." The
curtailment of certain rights is
necessary, as a practical matter, to
accommodate a myriad of "institutional
needs and objectives" of prison facilities,
chief among which is internal security.
Of course, these restrictions or
retractions also serve, incidentally, as
reminders that, under our system of
justice, deterrence and retribution are
factors in addition to correction.53
The later case of State v.
Dunn,54 citing Hudson v. Palmer,
abandoned Palmigiano v.
Travisono and made no distinction as
to the detainees’ limited right to
privacy. State v. Dunn noted the
considerable jurisprudence in the United
States holding that inmate mail may be
censored for the furtherance of a
substantial government interest such as
security or discipline. State v.
Dunn declared that if complete
censorship is permissible, then the
lesser act of opening the mail and
reading it is also permissible. We
quote State v. Dunn:
[A] right of privacy in traditional Fourth
Amendment terms is fundamentally
incompatible with the close and
continual surveillance of inmates and
their cells required to ensure institutional
security and internal order. We are
satisfied that society would insist that
the prisoner’s expectation of privacy
always yield to what must be considered
a paramount interest in institutional
security. We believe that it is accepted
by our society that "[l]oss of freedom of
choice and privacy are inherent
incidents of confinement."
Page 59 of 100
The distinction between the limited
privacy rights of a pre-trial detainee and
a convicted inmate has been blurred as
courts in the U.S. ruled that pre-trial
detainees might occasionally pose an
even greater security risk than convicted
inmates. Bell v. Wolfish reasoned that
those who are detained prior to trial may
in many cases be individuals who are
charged with serious crimes or who
have prior records and may therefore
pose a greater risk of escape than
convicted inmates.55 Valencia v.
Wiggins56 further held that "it is
impractical to draw a line between
convicted prisoners and pre-trial
detainees for the purpose of maintaining
jail security."
American cases recognize that the
unmonitored use of pre-trial detainees’
non-privileged mail poses a genuine
threat to jail security.57 Hence, when a
detainee places his letter in an envelope
for non-privileged mail, the detainee
knowingly exposes his letter to possible
inspection by jail officials.58 A pre-trial
detainee has no reasonable expectation
of privacy for his incoming
mail.59 However, incoming mail from
lawyers of inmates enjoys limited
protection such that prison officials can
open and inspect the mail for
contraband but could not read the
contents without violating the inmates’
right to correspond with his lawyer.60 The
inspection of privileged mail is limited to
physical contraband and not to verbal
contraband.61
Thus, we do not agree with the Court of
Appeals that the opening and reading of
the detainees’ letters in the present case
violated the detainees’ right to privacy of
communication. The letters were not in a
sealed envelope. The inspection of the
folded letters is a valid measure as it
serves the same purpose as the
opening of sealed letters for the
inspection of contraband.
The letters alleged to have been read by
the ISAFP authorities were not
confidential letters between the
detainees and their lawyers. The
petitioner who received the letters from
detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo
was merely acting as the detainees’
personal courier and not as their
counsel when he received the letters for
mailing. In the present case, since the
letters were not confidential
communication between the
detainees and their lawyers, the
officials of the ISAFP Detention
Center could read the letters. If the
letters are marked confidential
communication between the detainees
and their lawyers, the detention officials
should not read the letters but only open
the envelopes for inspection in the
presence of the detainees.
That a law is required before an
executive officer could intrude on a
citizen’s privacy rights62 is a guarantee
that is available only to the public at
large but not to persons who are
detained or imprisoned. The right to
privacy of those detained is subject to
Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the
limitations inherent in lawful detention or
imprisonment. By the very fact of their
detention, pre-trial detainees and
convicted prisoners have a diminished
expectation of privacy rights.
In assessing the regulations imposed in
detention and prison facilities that are
alleged to infringe on the constitutional
rights of the detainees and convicted
prisoners, U.S. courts "balance the
Page 60 of 100
guarantees of the Constitution with the
legitimate concerns of prison
administrators."63 The deferential review
of such regulations stems from the
principle that:
[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of
prison officials to an inflexible strict
scrutiny analysis would seriously
hamper their ability to anticipate security
problems and to adopt innovative
solutions to the intractable problems of
prison administration.64
The detainees in the present case are
junior officers accused of leading 300
soldiers in committing coup d’etat, a
crime punishable with reclusion
perpetua.65 The junior officers are not
ordinary detainees but visible leaders of
the Oakwood incident involving an
armed takeover of a civilian building in
the heart of the financial district of the
country. As members of the military
armed forces, the detainees are subject
to the Articles of War.66
Moreover, the junior officers are
detained with other high-risk persons
from the Abu Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus,
we must give the military custodian a
wider range of deference in
implementing the regulations in the
ISAFP Detention Center. The military
custodian is in a better position to know
the security risks involved in detaining
the junior officers, together with the
suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA
members. Since the appropriate
Case8
regulations depend largely on the
security risks involved, we should defer
to the regulations adopted by the
military custodian in the absence of
patent arbitrariness.
The ruling in this case, however, does
not foreclose the right of detainees and
convicted prisoners from petitioning the
courts for the redress of grievances.
Regulations and conditions in detention
and prison facilities that violate the
Constitutional rights of the detainees
and prisoners will be reviewed by the
courts on a case-by-case basis. The
courts could afford injunctive relief or
damages to the detainees and prisoners
subjected to arbitrary and inhumane
conditions. However, habeas corpus is
not the proper mode to question
conditions of confinement.67 The writ
of habeas corpus will only lie if what is
challenged is the fact or duration of
confinement.68
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the
petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
78545.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
FIRST DIVISION
FELIPE N. MADRIAN, G.R. No. 159374
Petitioner,
Page 61 of 100
Present: Petitioner Felipe N. Madrian and
respondent Francisca R. Madrian were
married on July 7, 1993 in Paraaque
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, City. They resided in San Agustin
Village, Brgy. Moonwalk, Paraaque City.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,*
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
Their union was blessed with
AZCUNA and three sons and a daughter: Ronnick,
GARCIA,** JJ. born on January 30, 1994; Phillip, born
on November 19, 1996; Francis Angelo,
born on May 12, 1998 and Krizia Ann,
born on December 12, 2000.

FRANCISCA R. MADRIAN,
After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002,
Respondent. Promulg
petitioner allegedly left their conjugal
ated:
abode and took their three sons with
July him to Ligao City, Albay and
12, subsequently to Sta. Rosa, Laguna.
2007 Respondent sought the help of her
parents and parents-in-law to patch
things up between her and petitioner to
x------------------------------ no avail. She then brought the matter to
------------x the Lupong Tagapamayapa in their
barangay but this too proved futile.

Thus respondent filed a petition

DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When a family breaks up, the
children are always the victims. The
ensuing battle for custody of the minor
children is not only a thorny issue but
also a highly sensitive and heart-rending
affair. Such is the case here. Even the
usually technical subject of jurisdiction
became emotionally charged.
for habeas corpus of Ronnick, Phillip
and Francis Angelo in the Court of
Appeals, alleging that petitioners act of
leaving the conjugal dwelling and going
to Albay and then to Laguna disrupted
the education of their children and
deprived them of their mothers care.
She prayed that petitioner be ordered to
appear and produce their sons before
the court and to explain why they should
not be returned to her custody.
Petitioner and respondent appeared at
the hearing on September 17, 2002.
They initially agreed that petitioner
would return the custody of their three

Page 62 of 100
sons to respondent. Petitioner, however,
had a change of heart[1] and decided to
file a memorandum.
On September 3, 2002, petitioner filed
his memorandum[2] alleging that
respondent was unfit to take custody of
their three sons because she was
habitually drunk, frequently went home
late at night or in the wee hours of the
morning, spent much of her time at a
beer house and neglected her duties as
a mother. He claimed that, after their
squabble on May 18, 2002, it was
respondent who left, taking their
daughter with her. It was only then that
he went to Sta. Rosa, Laguna where he
worked as a tricycle driver. He submitted
a certification from the principal of the
Dila Elementary School in Sta. Rosa,
Laguna that Ronnick and Phillip were
enrolled there. He also questioned the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA
8369 (otherwise known as the Family
Courts Act of 1997) family courts have
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and
decide the petition for habeas
corpus filed by respondent.[3]
For her part, respondent averred
that she did not leave their home on
May 18, 2002 but was driven out by
petitioner. She alleged that it was
petitioner who was an alcoholic,
gambler and drug addict. Petitioners
alcoholism and drug addiction impaired
his mental faculties, causing him to
commit acts of violence against her and
their children. The situation was
aggravated by the fact that their home
was adjacent to that of her in-laws who
frequently meddled in their personal
problems.[4]
On October 21, 2002, the Court
of Appeals[5] rendered a
decision[6] asserting its authority to take
cognizance of the petition and ruling
that, under Article 213 of the Family
Code, respondent was entitled to the
custody of Phillip and Francis Angelo
who were at that time aged six and four,
respectively, subject to the visitation
rights of petitioner. With respect to
Ronnick who was then eight years old,
the court ruled that his custody should
be determined by the proper family court
in a special proceeding on custody of
minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court.
Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the Court of Appeals
decision but it was denied. Hence, this
recourse.
Petitioner challenges the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over
the petition for habeas corpus and
insists that jurisdiction over the case is
lodged in the family courts under RA
8369. He invokes Section 5(b) of RA
8369:
Section
5. Jurisdiction of Family
Courts. The Family
Courts shall have
exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and
decide the following
cases:
Page 63 of 100
 xxxxxxxxx
b) Petitions for
guardianship,
custody of
children, habe
as corpus in
relation to the
latter;
xxxxxxxxx
Petitioner is wrong.
In Thornton v. Thornton,[7] this Court
resolved the issue of the Court of
Appeals jurisdiction to issue writs
of habeas corpus in cases involving
custody of minors in the light of the
provision in RA 8369 giving family courts
exclusive original jurisdiction over such
petitions:
The Court of
Appeals should take
cognizance of the case
since there is nothing in
RA 8369 that revoked its
jurisdiction to issue
writs of habeas
corpus involving the
custody of minors.
xxxxxxxxx
We rule therefore that RA
8369 did not divest the
Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court of
their jurisdiction
over habeas
corpus cases involving
the custody of minors.
xxxxxxxxx
The provisions of
RA 8369 reveal no
manifest intent to revoke
the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court to issue
writs of habeas
corpus relating to the
custody of minors.
Further, it cannot be said
that the provisions of RA
8369, RA 7092 [An Act
Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals] and BP 129
[The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of
1980] are absolutely
incompatible since RA
8369 does not prohibit the
Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court from
issuing writs of habeas
corpus in cases involving
the custody of minors.
Thus, the provisions of
RA 8369 must be read in
harmony with RA 7029
and BP 129 that family
courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the
Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court in
petitions for habeas
corpus where the
Page 64 of 100
 custody of minors is at judicial
issue.[8] (emphases region to
supplied) which the
Family
Court
belongs.

The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals xxxxxxx

over petitions for habeas corpus was xx
further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-
SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on
Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas The
Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors: petition
may
In any likewise be
case, whatever filed with
uncertainty there was the Suprem
has been settled with e
the adoption of A.M. No. Court, Cour
03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on t of
Custody of Minors and Appeals, or
Writ of Habeas Corpus with any of
in Relation to Custody its
of Minors. Section 20 of members a
the rule provides that: nd, if so
granted,
the writ
Secti shall be
on enforceabl
20. Petition e
for writ of anywhere
habeas in the
corpus. A Philippines
verified . The writ
petition for may be
a writ of made
habeas returnable
corpus to a Family
involving Court or to
custody of any regular
minors shall court within
be filed with the region
the Family where the
Court. The petitioner
writ shall be resides or
enforceable where the
within its minor may

Page 65 of 100
 be found for
hearing and
decision on
the merits.
From the
foregoing, there is no
doubt that the Court of
Appeals and Supreme
Court have concurrent
jurisdiction with family
courts in habeas
corpus cases where the
custody of minors is
involved.[9] (emphases
supplied)
We note that after petitioner moved out
of their Paraaque residence on May 18,
2002, he twice transferred his sons to
provinces covered by different judicial
regions. This situation is what
the Thornton interpretation of RA 8369s
provision on jurisdiction precisely
addressed:
[The reasoning that by
giving family courts
exclusive jurisdiction
over habeas
corpus cases, the
lawmakers intended them
to be the sole courts
which can issue writs
of habeas corpus] will
result in an iniquitous
situation, leaving
individuals like
[respondent] without legal
recourse in obtaining
custody of their children.
Individuals who do not
know the whereabouts of
minors they are looking
for would be helpless
since they cannot seek
redress from family courts
whose writs are
enforceable only in their
respective territorial
jurisdictions. Thus, if a
minor is being
transferred from one
place to another, which
seems to be the case
here, the petitioner in
a habeas corpus case
will be left without legal
remedy. This lack of
recourse could not have
been the intention of
the lawmakers when
they passed [RA 8369].
[10]
Moreover, a careful reading of
Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that
family courts are vested with original
exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases,
not in habeas corpus cases. Writs
of habeas corpuswhich may be issued
exclusively by family courts under
Section 5(b) of RA 8369 pertain to
the ancillary remedy that may be
availed of in conjunction with a petition
for custody of minors under Rule 99 of
the Rules of Court. In other words, the
issuance of the writ is merely ancillary to
the custody case pending before the
family court. The writ must be issued by
the same court to avoid splitting of
jurisdiction, conflicting decisions,
interference by a co-equal court and
judicial instability.
The rule therefore is: when by
law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or
Page 66 of 100
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, Associate Justice
processes and other means necessary
to carry it into effect may be employed
by such court or officer.[11] Once a court
acquires jurisdiction over the subject C E RTI F I CATI O N
matter of a case, it does so to the
exclusion of all other courts, including
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
related incidents and ancillary matters.
VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
Accordingly, the petition is conclusions in the above decision had
hereby DENIED. been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
Costs against petitioner.

REYNATO S. PUNO
SO ORDERED. Chief Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice *
On leave.
**
No part.
WE CONCUR: [1]
Both parties accused each others
parents of constant meddling in their
family life.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 44-56.
[3]
REYNATO S. PUNO Id.
[4]
Id., pp. 37-43.
Chief Justice [5]
First Division.
[6]
Chairperson Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca
de Guia-Salvador with Associate
Justices Cancio C. Garcia (now a
(On leave) member of the Supreme Court)
and Bernardo P. Abesamis
ANGELINA SANDOVAL- (retired) concurring. Rollo, pp.
GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA 19-26.
Associate Justice Associate Justice [7]
G.R. No. 154598, 16 August 2004,
436 SCRA 550.
[8]
Id.
[9]
Id.
[10]
Id.
(No part) [11]
Section 6, Rule 135, Rules of Court.
CANCIO C. GARCIA

Page 67 of 100
Case 9
G.R. No. 169482 January 29,
2008
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION
OF HABEAS CORPUS OF EUFEMIA
E. RODRIGUEZ, filed by EDGARDO E.
VELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
LUISA R. VILLANUEVA and TERESITA
R. PABELLO, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review1 of the
resolutions2 dated February 2, 2005 and
September 2, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 88180
denying the petition for habeas
corpus of Eufemia E. Rodriguez, filed by
petitioner Edgardo Veluz, as well as his
motion for reconsideration, respectively.
Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old
widow, allegedly suffering from a poor
state of mental health and deteriorating
cognitive abilities.4 She was living with
petitioner, her nephew, since 2000. He
acted as her guardian.
In the morning of January 11, 2005,
respondents Luisa R. Villanueva and
Teresita R. Pabello took Eufemia from
petitioner Veluz’ house. He made
repeated demands for the return of
Eufemia but these proved futile.
Claiming that respondents were
restraining Eufemia of her liberty, he
filed a petition for habeas corpus5 in the
Court of Appeals on January 13, 2005.
The Court of Appeals ruled that
petitioner failed to present any
convincing proof that respondents (the
legally adopted children of Eufemia)
were unlawfully restraining their mother
of her liberty. He also failed to establish
his legal right to the custody of Eufemia
as he was not her legal guardian. Thus,
in a resolution dated February 2,
2005,6 the Court of Appeals denied his
petition.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but
it was also denied.7 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that, in determining
whether or not a writ of habeas
corpus should issue, a court should limit
itself to determining whether or not a
person is unlawfully being deprived of
liberty. There is no need to consider
legal custody or custodial rights. The
writ of habeas corpus is available not
only if the rightful custody of a person is
being withheld from the person entitled
thereto but also if the person who
disappears or is illegally being detained
is of legal age and is not under
guardianship. Thus, a writ of habeas
corpus can cover persons who are not
under the legal custody of another.
According to petitioner, as long as it is
alleged that a person is being illegally
deprived of liberty, the writ of habeas
corpus may issue so that his physical
body may be brought before the court
that will determine whether or not there
is in fact an unlawful deprivation of
liberty.
In their comment, respondents state that
they are the legally adopted daughters
of Eufemia and her deceased spouse,
Maximo Rodriguez. Prior to their
adoption, respondent Luisa was
Eufemia’s half-sister8 while respondent
Page 68 of 100
Teresita was Eufemia’s niece and
petitioner’s sister.9
Respondents point out that it was
petitioner and his family who were
staying with Eufemia, not the other way
around as petitioner claimed. Eufemia
paid for the rent of the house, the
utilities and other household needs.
Sometime in the 1980s, petitioner was
appointed as the "encargado" or
administrator of the properties of
Eufemia as well as those left by the
deceased Maximo. As such, he took
charge of collecting payments from
tenants and transacted business with
third persons for and in behalf of
Eufemia and the respondents who were
the only compulsory heirs of the late
Maximo.
In the latter part of 2002, Eufemia and
the respondents demanded an inventory
and return of the properties entrusted to
petitioner. These demands were
unheeded. Hence, Eufemia and the
respondents were compelled to file a
complaint for estafa against petitioner in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Consequently, and by reason of their
mother’s deteriorating health,
respondents decided to take custody of
Eufemia on January 11, 2005. The latter
willingly went with them. In view of all
this, petitioner failed to prove either his
right to the custody of Eufemia or the
illegality of respondents’ action.
We rule for the respondents.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention
by which any person is deprived of his
liberty or by which the rightful custody of
a person is being withheld from the one
entitled thereto.10 It is issued when one
is either deprived of liberty or is
wrongfully being prevented from
exercising legal custody over another
person.11 Thus, it contemplates two
instances: (1) deprivation of a person’s
liberty either through illegal confinement
or through detention and (2) withholding
of the custody of any person from
someone entitled to such custody.
In this case, the issue is not whether the
custody of Eufemia is being rightfully
withheld from petitioner but whether
Eufemia is being restrained of her
liberty. Significantly, although petitioner
admits that he did not have legal
custody of Eufemia, he nonetheless
insists that respondents themselves
have no right to her custody. Thus, for
him, the issue of legal custody is
irrelevant. What is important is
Eufemia’s personal freedom.
Fundamentally, in order to justify the
grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the
restraint of liberty must be in the nature
of an illegal and involuntary deprivation
of freedom of action.12
In general, the purpose of the
writ of habeas corpus is to
determine whether or not a
particular person is legally
held. A prime specification of an
application for a writ of habeas
corpus, in fact, is an actual and
effective, and not merely nominal
or moral, illegal restraint of liberty.
"The writ of habeas corpus was
devised and exists as a speedy
and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint,
and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal
freedom. A prime specification of
Page 69 of 100
 an application for a writ
of habeas corpus is restraint of
liberty. The essential object and
purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and
to relieve a person therefrom if
such restraint is illegal. Any
restraint which will preclude
freedom of action is
sufficient."13 (emphasis supplied)
In passing upon a petition for habeas
corpus, a court or judge must first
inquire into whether the petitioner is
being restrained of his liberty.14 If he is
not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into
the cause of detention will proceed only
where such restraint exists.15 If the
alleged cause is thereafter found to be
unlawful, then the writ should be granted
and the petitioner
discharged.16 Needless to state, if
otherwise, again the writ will be refused.
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it
will not issue as a matter of course or as
a mere perfunctory operation on the
filing of the petition.17 Judicial discretion
is called for in its issuance and it must
be clear to the judge to whom the
petition is presented that, prima
facie, the petitioner is entitled to the
Case 10
SECOND DIVISION
CARLOS T. GO, SR.,
Petitioner,
- versus -
writ.18 It is only if the court is satisfied
that a person is being unlawfully
restrained of his liberty will the petition
for habeas corpus be granted.19 If the
respondents are not detaining or
restraining the applicant or the person in
whose behalf the petition is filed, the
petition should be dismissed.20
In this case, the Court of Appeals made
an inquiry into whether Eufemia was
being restrained of her liberty. It found
that she was not:
There is no proof that Eufemia
is being detained and
restrained of her liberty by
respondents. Nothing on
record reveals that she was
forcibly taken by
respondents. On the contrary,
respondents, being Eufemia’s
adopted children, are taking care
of her.21 (emphasis supplied)
The Court finds no cogent or compelling
reason to disturb this finding.22
WHEREFORE, the petition is
hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
LUIS T. RAMOS, CARP
Respondent. CARP
x----------------------------------------x DEL C
ABAD
JIMMY T. GO, G.R. N
Petitioner,
- versus -
LUIS T. RAMOS,
Page 70 of 100
 Respondent.
x----------------------------------------x
HON. ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., in his
capacity as the Commissioner of the
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION; ATTY.
FAISAL HUSSIN and ANSARI M.
MACAAYAN, in their capacity as
Intelligence Officers of the BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION,
Petitioners,
- versus -
JIMMY T. GO a.k.a. JAIME
T. GAISANO,
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-----------------------x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us are three
petitions. G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570
are petitions for review on certiorari to
set aside the October 25, 2004
Decision[1] and February 16, 2005
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 85143 that affirmed the
Decision[3] dated January 6, 2004 and
Order[4] dated May 3, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City,
Branch 167 in SCA No. 2218 upholding
the preparation and filing of deportation
charges against Jimmy T. Go, the
corresponding Charge
Sheet[5] dated July 3, 2001, and the
deportation proceedings thereunder
conducted.
On the other hand, G.R. No.
171946, also a petition for review on
certiorari, seeks to set aside
the December 8,
2005 Decision[6] and March 13,
2006 Resolution[7] of the appellate court
in CA-G.R. SP No. 88277.
Considering that the three cases
arose from the same factual milieu, the
Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos.
167570 and 167569 with G.R. No.
171946 per Resolution[8] dated February
26, 2007.
These petitions stemmed from
the complaint-affidavit[9] for deportation
initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
(now Bureau of Immigration) against
Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an
illegal and undesirable alien. Luis
alleged that while Jimmy represents
himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmys
personal circumstances and other
records indicate that he is not so. To
prove his contention, Luis presented the
birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City,
which indicated Jimmys citizenship as
FChinese. Luis argued that although it
appears from Jimmys birth certificate
that his parents, Carlos and Rosario
Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems
to be tampered, because only the
citizenship of Carlos appears to be
handwritten while all the other entries
were typewritten. He also averred that in
September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy,
through stealth, machination and
scheming managed to cover up his true
citizenship, and with the use of falsified
documents and untruthful declarations,
was able to procure a Philippine
passport from the Department of
Foreign Affairs.
Jimmy refuted the allegations in
his counter-affidavit,[10] averring that the
complaint for deportation initiated by
Luis was merely a harassment case
Page 71 of 100
designed to oust him of his rightful share
in their business dealings. Jimmy
maintained that there is no truth to the
allegation that he is an alien, and
insisted that he is a natural-born
Filipino. Jimmy alleged that his father
Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese
father and Filipina mother, elected
Philippine citizenship in accordance with
Article IV, Section 1, paragraph 4[11] of
the 1935 Constitution and
Commonwealth Act No. 625[12] (Com.
Act No. 625), as evidenced by his
having taken the Oath of Allegiance on
July 11, 1950 and having executed an
Affidavit of Election of Philippine
citizenship on July 12, 1950. Although
the said oath and affidavit were
registered only on September 11, 1956,
the reason behind such late registration
was sufficiently explained in an
affidavit. Jimmy added that he had even
voted in the 1952 and 1955 elections.
[13]
He denied that his father arrived in
the Philippines as an undocumented
alien, alleging that his father has no
record of arrival in this country as
alleged in the complaint-affidavit
precisely because his father was born
and raised in the Philippines, and in fact,
speaks fluent Ilonggo and Tagalog.[14]
With regard to the erroneous
entry in his birth certificate that he is
FChinese, he maintained that such was
not of his own doing, but may be
attributed to the employees of the Local
Civil Registrars Office who might have
relied on his Chinese-sounding surname
when making the said entry. He
asserted that the said office has control
over his birth certificate; thus, if his
fathers citizenship appears to be
handwritten, it may have been changed
when the employees of that office
realized that his father has already
taken his oath as a Filipino.[15] As
regards the entry in his siblings
certificates of birth, particularly Juliet Go
and Carlos Go, Jr., that their father is
Chinese, Jimmy averred that the entry
was erroneous because it was made
without prior consultation with his father.
[16]
In a Resolution[17] dated February
14, 2001, Associate Commissioner
Linda L. Malenab-Hornilla dismissed the
complaint for deportation against
Jimmy. Associate Commissioner
Hornilla affirmed the findings of the
National Bureau of Investigation tasked
to investigate the case that Jimmys
father elected Filipino citizenship in
accordance with the provisions of the
1935 Philippine Constitution. By
operation of law, therefore, the
citizenship of Carlos was transmitted to
Jimmy, making him a Filipino as well.
On March 8, 2001,[18] the Board of
Commissioners (Board) reversed said
dismissal, holding that Carlos election of
Philippine citizenship was made out of
time. Finding Jimmys claim to Philippine
citizenship in serious doubt by reason of
his fathers questionable election thereof,
the Board directed the preparation and
filing of the appropriate deportation
charges against Jimmy.
On July 3, 2001, the corresponding
Charge Sheet was filed against Jimmy,
charging him of violating Section 37(a)(9)
[19]
in relation to Section 45(c)[20] of Com.
Act No. 613, otherwise known as The
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940,[21] as
amended, committed as follows:
xxxx
1. That Respondent
was born on October 25,
1952 in Iloilo City, as
Page 72 of 100
evidenced by a copy of his
birth certificate wherein his
citizenship was recorded
as Chinese;
2. That Respondent
through some stealth
machinations was able to
subsequently cover up his
true and actual citizenship
as Chinese and illegally
acquired a Philippine
Passport under the name
JAIME T. GAISANO, with
the use of falsified
documents and untruthful
declarations, in violation of
the above-cited provisions
of the Immigration Act[;]
3. That
[R]espondent being an
alien, has formally and
officially represent[ed] and
introduce[d] himself as a
citizen of the Philippines,
for fraudulent purposes
and in order to evade any
requirements of the
immigration laws, also in
violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO
[22]
LAW.
On November 9, 2001, Carlos
and Jimmy filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition[23] with application for
injunctive reliefs before the RTC of
Pasig City, Branch 167, docketed as
SCA No. 2218, seeking to annul and set
aside the March 8, 2001 Resolution of
the Board of Commissioners, the
Charge Sheet, and the proceedings had
therein. In essence, they challenged the
jurisdiction of the Board to continue with
the deportation proceedings.
In the interim, the Board issued a
Decision[24] dated April 17, 2002, in BSI-
D.C. No. ADD-01-117, ordering the
apprehension and deportation of
Jimmy. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, the
Board of Commissioners
hereby Orders the
apprehension of
respondent JIMMY T. GO
@ JAIME T. GAISANO and
that he be then deported to
CHINA of which he is a
citizen, without prejudice,
however, to the
continuation of any and all
criminal and other
proceedings that are
pending in court or before
the prosecution arm of the
Philippine Government, if
any. And that upon
expulsion, he is thereby
ordered barred from entry
into the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.[25]
In view of the said Decision,
Carlos and Jimmy filed on June 13,
Page 73 of 100
2002 a supplemental petition for
certiorari and prohibition[26] before the
trial court and reiterated their application
for injunctive reliefs. The trial court
issued a writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction pending litigation on the main
issue, enjoining the Bureau from
enforcing the April 17, 2002 Decision.
[27]
Later, however, the trial court
dissolved the writ in a
Decision[28] dated January 6, 2004 as a
consequence of the dismissal of the
petition.
Carlos and Jimmy moved for
reconsideration. But their motion was
likewise denied.[29]
Following the dismissal of the
petition in SCA No. 2218, the Board
issued a warrant of deportation[30] which
led to the apprehension of
Jimmy. Jimmy commenced a petition for
habeas corpus, but the same was
eventually dismissed by reason of his
provisional release on bail.[31]
Carlos and Jimmy then
questioned the Decision in SCA No.
2218 as well as the Resolution denying
their motion for reconsideration by way
of a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 85143. They imputed grave
abuse of discretion by the trial court for
passing upon their citizenship, claiming
that what they asked for in their petition
was merely the nullification of the March
8, 2001 Resolution and the charge
sheet.
The appellate tribunal dismissed
the petition.[32] It did not find merit in their
argument that the issue of citizenship
should proceed only before the proper
court in an independent action, and that
neither the Bureau nor the Board has
jurisdiction over individuals who were
born in the Philippines and have
exercised the rights of Filipino
citizens. The appellate tribunal also
rejected their claim that they enjoy the
presumption of being Filipino citizens.
The Court of Appeals held that
the Board has the exclusive authority
and jurisdiction to try and hear cases
against an alleged alien, and in the
process, determine their citizenship.
The appellate court agreed with
the trial court that the principle of jus
soli was never extended to the
Philippines; hence, could not be made a
ground to ones claim of Philippine
citizenship. Like the trial court, the
appellate tribunal found that Carlos
failed to elect Philippine citizenship
within the reasonable period of three
years upon reaching the age of
majority. Furthermore, it held that the
belated submission to the local civil
registry of the affidavit of election and
oath of allegiance in September 1956
was defective because the affidavit of
election was executed after the oath of
allegiance, and the delay of several
years before their filing with the proper
office was not satisfactorily explained.
The course of action taken by the
trial court was also approved by the
appellate tribunal. The Court of Appeals
stated that the trial court necessarily had
to rule on the substantial and legal
bases warranting the deportation
proceeding in order to determine
whether the Board acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion. Moreover, the
appellate court found that due process
was properly observed in the
Page 74 of 100
proceedings before the Board, contrary
to the claim of Jimmy.
Unfazed with the said ruling, they
moved for reconsideration. Their motion
having been denied,[33] Carlos and
Jimmy each filed a petition for review on
certiorari before this Court, respectively
docketed as G.R. Nos. 167569 and
167570.
Meanwhile, in view of the
dismissal of CA-G.R. SP. No. 85143,
Bureau of Immigration Commissioner
Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr. issued Warrant
of Deportation No. AFF-04-
003[34] dated November 16, 2004 to
carry out the April 17, 2002Decision in
BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-117. This resulted
in the apprehension and detention of
Jimmy at the Bureau of Immigration
Bicutan Detention Center, pending his
deportation to China.[35]
On account of his detention,
Jimmy once again filed a petition for
habeas corpus[36] before the RTC of
Pasig City, Branch 167, docketed as SP.
Proc. No. 11507 assailing his
apprehension and detention despite the
pendency of his appeal and his release
on recognizance.
In an Order[37] dated December 6,
2004, the trial court dismissed the said
petition ruling that the remedy of habeas
corpus cannot be availed of to obtain an
order of release once a deportation
order has already been issued by the
Bureau. Jimmy moved for
reconsideration of the Order, but this
was also denied by the trial court in an
Order[38] dated December 28, 2004.
Jimmy assailed the Orders of the
trial court in a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the appellate court,
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 88277. The
Court of Appeals granted the petition
and enjoined the deportation of Jimmy
until the issue of his citizenship is settled
with finality by the court. The Court of
Appeals held as follows:
xxxx
the issuance of a
warrant to arrest and
deport the petitioner
without any proof
whatsoever of his violation
of the bail conditions [that
he was previously granted]
is arbitrary, inequitable and
unjust, for the policies
governing the grant of his
bail should likewise apply
in the cancellation of the
said bail. Although a
deportation proceeding
does not partake of the
nature of a criminal action,
yet considering that it is
such a harsh and
extraordinary
administrative proceeding
affecting the freedom and
liberty of a person who all
his life has always lived in
the Philippines, where he
has established his family
and business interests,
one who appears to be not
completely devoid of any
claim to Filipino
citizenship, being the son
of a Filipina, whose father
is alleged to also have
elected to be a Filipino, the
constitutional right of such
person to due process
cannot be peremptorily
dismissed or ignored
Page 75 of 100
 altogether, and indeed The parties have raised the
should not be denied. If it following grounds for their respective
later turns out that the petitions:
petitioner is a Filipino after
all, then the overly eager G.R. No. 167569
Immigration authorities I.
would have expelled and THE PROCEEDINGS
relegated to statelessness HAD BEFORE THE
one who might in fact be a BUREAU OF
Filipino by blood. IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION (B.I.D.)
xxxx ARE NULL AND VOID
FOR ITS FAILURE TO
WHEREFORE, in
IMPLEAD AN
view of the foregoing, the
INDISPENSABLE PARTY
petition with reference to
IN THE PERSON OF
the Warrant of Deportation
PETITIONER CARLOS
issued by the BID is
GO, SR.
hereby GRANTED. The
Bureau of Immigration and II.
Deportation, through
Commissioner Alipio F. GIVEN THE
Fernandez, Jr., Atty. Faizal SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Hussin and Ansari Maca TO PROVE HEREIN
Ayan, and any of their PETITIONER CARLOS
deputized agents, GO SR.S FILIPINO
are ENJOINED from CITIZENSHIP, A FULL
deporting petitioner Jimmy BLOWN TRIAL UNDER
T. Go, a.k.a. Jaime T. THE MORE RIGID RULES
Gaisano, until the issue of OF EVIDENCE
petitioners citizenship is PRESCRIBED IN COURT
finally settled by the courts PROCEEDINGS SHOULD
of justice. HAVE BEEN
CONDUCTED TO
SO ORDERED.[39] DETERMINE HIS
FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP
Their motion for AND NOT THROUGH
reconsideration[40] having been denied MERE SUMMARY
on March 13, 2006, Hon. Alipio PROCEEDINGS SUCH AS
Fernandez, in his capacity as the THE ONE HAD BEFORE
Commissioner of the Bureau of THE B.I.D. AS WELL AS IN
Immigration, and Atty. Faisal Hussin and THE COURT A QUO.
Ansari M. Macaayan, in their capacity as
III.
Intelligence Officers of the Bureau of
Immigration, are before this Court as A FILIPINO CITIZEN IS
petitioners in G.R. No. 171946. NOT REQUIRED TO

Page 76 of 100
ELECT PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP.
IV.
ASSUMING CARLOS GO,
SR. STILL NEEDS TO
ELECT PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP, HE HAD
COMPLIED WITH ALL
THE REQUIREMENTS OF
COM. ACT NO. 625.
V.
PETITIONER CARLOS
GO, SR. ENJOYS THE
PRESUMPTION OF
CITIZENSHIP.
VI.
RESPONDENTS CAUSE
OF ACTION HAD LONG
PRESCRIBED.[41]
G.R. No. 167570
I.
THE PROCEEDINGS HAD
BEFORE THE BUREAU
OF IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION (B.I.D.)
ARE NULL AND VOID
FOR ITS FAILURE TO
IMPLEAD AN
INDISPENSABLE PARTY
IN THE PERSON OF
PETITIONERS FATHER,
CARLOS GO, SR.
III.
THE B.I.D.S CAUSE OF
ACTION AGAINST
HEREIN PETITIONER
JIMMY T. GO HAD
ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
IV.
GIVEN THE
SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE TO PROVE
HEREIN PETITIONERS
FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP, A
FULL BLOWN TRIAL
UNDER THE MORE
RIGID RULES OF
EVIDENCE PRESCRIBED
IN COURT
PROCEEDINGS SHOULD
HAVE BEEN
CONDUCTED TO
DETERMINE HIS
FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP
AND NOT THROUGH
MERE SUMMARY
PROCEEDINGS SUCH
AS THE ONE HAD
BEFORE THE B.I.D.[42]
G.R. No. 171946
THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF LAW IN
ENJOINING
RESPONDENTS
DEPORTATION.[43]

II. Succinctly stated, the issues for

our resolution are: (a) whether the
THE DEPORTATION cause of action of the Bureau against
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE Carlos and Jimmy had prescribed; (b)
THE B.I.D. ARE NULL whether the deportation proceedings
AND VOID FOR ITS are null and void for failure to implead
FAILURE TO OBSERVE Carlos as an indispensable party
DUE PROCESS. therein; (c) whether the evidence

Page 77 of 100
adduced by Carlos and Jimmy to prove
their claim to Philippine citizenship is
substantial and sufficient to oust the
Board of its jurisdiction from continuing
with the deportation proceedings in
order to give way to a formal judicial
action to pass upon the issue of
alienage; (d) whether due process was
properly observed in the proceedings
before the Board; and (e) whether the
petition for habeas corpus should be
dismissed.
The arguments raised by Carlos
and Jimmy in their respective petitions
are merely a rehash of the arguments
they adduced before the appellate
tribunal and the trial court. Once again,
they raised the same argument of
prescription. As to Carlos, it is his
position that being recognized by the
government to have acquired Philippine
citizenship, evidenced by the Certificate
of Election issued to him on September
11, 1956, his citizenship could no longer
be questioned at this late date. As for
Jimmy, he contends that the Boards
cause of action to deport him has
prescribed for the simple reason that his
arrest was not made within five (5) years
from the time the cause of action arose,
which according to him commenced in
1989 when he was alleged to have
illegally acquired a Philippine passport.
In any event, they argue that the
deportation proceeding should be
nullified altogether for failure to implead
Carlos as an indispensable party
therein. Jimmy posits that the
deportation case against him was made
to depend upon the citizenship of his
father, Carlos, in that the Board found
justification to order his deportation by
declaring that his father is a Chinese
citizen even though the latter was never
made a party in the deportation
proceedings. They argue that the Board
could not simply strip Carlos of his
citizenship just so they could question
the citizenship of Jimmy. To do so
without affording Carlos the opportunity
to adduce evidence to prove his claim to
Philippine citizenship would be the
height of injustice. For failing to accord
him the requisite due process, the whole
proceeding should perforce be stuck
down.
While they concede that the
Board has jurisdiction to hear cases
against an alleged alien, they insist that
judicial intervention may be resorted to
when the claim to citizenship is so
substantial that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the claim is
correct, like in this case. Their claim to
Philippine citizenship, they said, is
clearly shown by the fact that they were
born, had been raised and had lived in
this country all their lives; they speak
fluent Tagalog and Ilonggo; they engage
in businesses reserved solely for
Filipinos; they exercise their right to
suffrage; they enjoy the rights and
privileges accorded only to citizens; and
they have no record of any Alien
Certificate of Registration. More
importantly, they contend that they were
validly issued Philippine passports. They
further posit that the judicial intervention
required is not merely a judicial review
of the proceedings below, but a full-
blown, adversarial, trial-type
proceedings where the rules of evidence
are strictly observed.
Considering that his citizenship
affects that of his son, Carlos opted to
present controverting arguments to
sustain his claim to Philippine
citizenship, notwithstanding the fact that
Page 78 of 100
according to him, he was never
impleaded in the deportation
proceedings.
Carlos takes exception to the
ruling of the appellate court that the
doctrine of jus soli failed to accord him
Philippine citizenship for the reason that
the same was never extended to
the Philippines. He insists that if his
Philippine citizenship is not recognized
by said doctrine, it is nonetheless
recognized by the laws enforced prior to
the 1935 Constitution, particularly the
Philippine Bill of 1902[44] and the
Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29,
1916 (Jones Law of 1916).[45]
According to Carlos, the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones
Law of 1916 deemed all inhabitants of
the Philippine Islands as well as their
children born after the passage of said
laws to be citizens of
the Philippines. Because his father, Go
Yin An, was a resident of
the Philippines at the time of the
passage of the Jones Law of 1916, he
(Carlos) undoubtedly acquired his
fathers citizenship. Article IV, first
paragraph, of the 1935 Constitution
therefore applies to him. Said
constitutional provision reads:
ARTICLE
IV. Citizenship
SECTION 1. The
following are citizens of
the Philippines:
(1) Those who are
citizens of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the
adoption of this
Constitution.
xxxx
Even assuming that his father
remained as a Chinese, Carlos also
claims that he followed the citizenship of
his Filipina mother, being an illegitimate
son, and that he even validly elected
Philippine citizenship when he complied
with all the requirements of Com. Act
No. 625. He submits that what is being
disputed is not whether he complied
with Com. Act No. 625, but rather, the
timeliness of his compliance. He
stresses that the 3-year compliance
period following the interpretation given
by Cuenco v. Secretary of Justice[46] to
Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935
Constitution and Com. Act No. 625
when election must be made, is not an
inflexible rule. He reasoned that the
same decision held that such period
may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when the person
concerned has always considered
himself a Filipino, like in his case.[47]
We deny the appeal of Carlos
and Jimmy for lack of merit.
Carlos and Jimmys claim that the
cause of action of the Bureau has
prescribed is untenable. Cases involving
issues on citizenship are sui
generis. Once the citizenship of an
individual is put into question, it
necessarily has to be threshed out and
decided upon. In the case of Frivaldo v.
Commission on Elections,[48] we said
that decisions declaring the acquisition
or denial of citizenship cannot govern a
persons future status with finality. This is
because a person may subsequently
reacquire, or for that matter, lose his
citizenship under any of the modes
recognized by law for the purpose.
[49]
Indeed, if the issue of ones
citizenship, after it has been passed
upon by the courts, leaves it still open to
Page 79 of 100
future adjudication, then there is more
reason why the government should not
be precluded from questioning ones
claim to Philippine citizenship, especially
so when the same has never been
threshed out by any tribunal.
Jimmys invocation of prescription
also does not persuade us. Section 37
(b) of Com. Act No. 613 states:
Section 37.
xxxx
(b) Deportation may
be effected under clauses
2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of this
section at any time after
entry, but shall not be
effected under any other
clause unless the arrest in
the deportation
proceedings is made
within five years after the
cause of deportation
arises.
xxxx
As shown in the Charge Sheet,
Jimmy was charged for violation of
Section 37(a)(9),[50] in relation to Section
45(e)[51] of Com. Act No. 613. From the
foregoing provision, his deportation may
be effected only if his arrest is made
within 5 years from the time the cause
for deportation arose. The court a quo is
correct when it ruled that the 5-year
period should be counted only from July
18, 2000, the time when Luis filed his
complaint for deportation. It is the legal
possibility of bringing the action which
determines the starting point for the
computation of the period of
prescription.[52] Additionally, Section 2 of
Act No. 3326,[53] as amended, entitled
An Act to Establish Periods of
Prescription for Violations Penalized by
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances
and to Provide When Prescription Shall
Begin to Run, provides:
Sec. 2. Prescription
shall begin to run from the
day of the commission of
the violation of the law, and
if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its
investigation and
punishment.
xxxx
The counting could not logically
start in 1989 when his passport was
issued because the government was
unaware that he was not a Filipino
citizen. Had the government been aware
at such time that he was not a Filipino
citizen or there were certain anomalies
attending his application for such
passport, it would have denied his
application.
As to the issue of whether Carlos
is an indispensable party, we reiterate
that an indispensable party is a party in
interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action,
and who shall be joined either as plaintiff
or defendant.[54]To be indispensable, a
person must first be a real party in
interest, that is, one who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment of
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit.[55] Carlos clearly is not an
indispensable party as he does not
stand to be benefited or injured by the
judgment of the suit. What is sought is
Page 80 of 100
the deportation of Jimmy on the ground
that he is an alien. Hence, the principal
issue that will be decided on is the
propriety of his deportation. To recall,
Jimmy claims that he is a Filipino under
Section 1(3),[56] Article IV of the 1935
Constitution because Carlos, his father,
is allegedly a citizen.[57] Since his
citizenship hinges on that of his fathers,
it becomes necessary to pass upon the
citizenship of the latter. However,
whatever will be the findings as to
Carlos citizenship will in no way
prejudice him.
Citizenship proceedings, as
aforestated, are a class of its own, in
that, unlike other cases, res
judicata does not obtain as a matter of
course. In a long line of decisions, this
Court said that every time the
citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the
corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered
as res judicata; hence, it has to be
threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand.[58] Res
judicata may be applied in cases of
citizenship only if the following concur:
1. a persons
citizenship must be
raised as a material
issue in a controversy
where said person is a
party;
2. the Solicitor
General or his
authorized
representative took
active part in the
resolution thereof; and
3. the finding or
citizenship is affirmed
by this Court.[59]
In the event that the citizenship of
Carlos will be questioned, or his
deportation sought, the same has to be
ascertained once again as the decision
which will be rendered hereinafter shall
have no preclusive effect upon his
citizenship. As neither injury nor benefit
will redound upon Carlos, he cannot be
said to be an indispensable party in this
case.
There can be no question that the
Board has the authority to hear and
determine the deportation case against a
deportee and in the process determine
also the question of citizenship raised by
him.[60] However, this Court, following
American jurisprudence, laid down the
exception to the primary jurisdiction
enjoyed by the deportation board in the
case of Chua Hiong v. Deportation
Board[61] wherein we stressed that
judicial determination is permitted in
cases when the courts themselves
believe that there is substantial evidence
supporting the claim of citizenship, so
substantial that there are reasonable
grounds for the belief that the claim is
correct.[62] Moreover, when the evidence
submitted by a deportee is conclusive of
his citizenship, the right to immediate
review should also be recognized and
the courts shall promptly enjoin the
deportation proceedings.[63]
While we are mindful that resort
to the courts may be had, the same
should be allowed only in the sound
discretion of a competent court in proper
proceedings.[64] After all, the Boards
jurisdiction is not divested by the mere
Page 81 of 100
claim of citizenship.[65] Moreover, a
deportee who claims to be a citizen and
not therefore subject to deportation has
the right to have his citizenship reviewed
by the courts, after the deportation
proceedings.[66] The decision of the
Board on the question is, of course, not
final but subject to review by the courts.
[67]
After a careful evaluation of the
evidence, the appellate court was not
convinced that the same was sufficient
to oust the Board of its jurisdiction to
continue with the deportation
proceedings considering that what were
presented particularly the birth
certificates of Jimmy, as well as those of
his siblings, Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr.
indicate that they are Chinese
citizens. Furthermore, like the Board, it
found the election of Carlos of Philippine
citizenship, which was offered as
additional proof of his claim, irregular as
it was not made on time.
We find no cogent reason to
overturn the above findings of the
appellate tribunal. The question of
whether substantial evidence had been
presented to allow immediate recourse
to the regular courts is a question of fact
which is beyond this Courts power of
review for it is not a trier of facts.
[68]
None of the exceptions[69] in which
this Court may resolve factual issues
has been shown to exist in this
case. Even if we evaluate their
arguments and the evidence they
presented once again, the same
conclusion will still be reached.
One of the arguments raised to
sustain Carlos claim to Philippine
citizenship is the doctrine of jus soli, or
the doctrine or principle of citizenship by
place of birth. To recall, both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals ruled that
the doctrine of jus soli was never
extended to the Philippines. We
agree. The doctrine of jus soli was for a
time the prevailing rule in the acquisition
of ones citizenship.[70] However, the
Supreme Court abandoned the principle
of jus soli in the case of Tan Chong v.
Secretary of Labor.[71] Since then, said
doctrine only benefited those who were
individually declared to be citizens of
the Philippines by a final court decision
on the mistaken application of jus soli.[72]
Neither will the Philippine Bill of
[73]
1902 nor the Jones Law of
1916[74] make Carlos a citizen of
the Philippines. His bare claim that his
father, Go Yin An, was a resident of
the Philippines at the time of the
passage of the said laws, without any
supporting evidence whatsoever will not
suffice.
It is a settled rule that only
legitimate children follow the citizenship
of the father and that illegitimate
children are under the parental authority
of the mother and follow her nationality.
[75]
Moreover, we have also ruled that an
illegitimate child of a Filipina need not
perform any act to confer upon him all
the rights and privileges attached to
citizens of the Philippines; he
automatically becomes a citizen himself.
[76]
However, it is our considered view
that absent any evidence proving that
Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a
Filipina, the aforestated established rule
could not be applied to him.
Page 82 of 100
 As to the question of whether the
election of Philippine citizenship
conferred on Carlos Filipino citizenship,
we find that the appellate court correctly
found that it did not.
Com. Act No. 625 which was
enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article
IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes
the procedure that should be followed in
order to make a valid election of
Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1
thereof, legitimate children born of
Filipino mothers may elect Philippine
citizenship by expressing such intention
in a statement to be signed and sworn
to by the party concerned before any
officer authorized to administer oaths,
and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany
the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines.[77]
However, the 1935 Constitution
and Com. Act No. 625 did not prescribe
a time period within which the election of
Philippine citizenship should be
made. The 1935 Charter only provides
that the election should be made upon
reaching the age of majority. The age of
majority then commenced upon
reaching 21 years. In the opinions of the
then Secretary of Justice on cases
involving the validity of election of
Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was
resolved by basing the time period on
the decisions of this Court prior to the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In
these decisions, the proper period for
electing Philippine citizenship was, in
turn, based on the pronouncements of
the Department of State of the United
States Government to the effect that the
election should be made within a
reasonable time after attaining the age
of majority. The phrase reasonable time
has been interpreted to mean that the
election should be made within three (3)
years from reaching the age of majority.
[78]
It is true that we said that the 3-
year period for electing Philippine
citizenship may be extended as when
the person has always regarded himself
as a Filipino. Be that as it may, it is our
considered view that not a single
circumstance was sufficiently shown
meriting the extension of the 3-year
period. The fact that Carlos exercised
his right of suffrage in 1952 and 1955
does not demonstrate such belief,
considering that the acts were done
after he elected Philippine
citizenship. On the other hand, the mere
fact that he was able to vote does not
validate his irregular election of
Philippine citizenship. At most, his
registration as a voter indicates his
desire to exercise a right appertaining
exclusively to Filipino citizens but does
not alter his real citizenship, which, in
this jurisdiction, is determined by blood
(jus sanguinis). The exercise of the
rights and privileges granted only to
Filipinos is not conclusive proof of
citizenship, because a person may
misrepresent himself to be a Filipino and
thus enjoy the rights and privileges of
citizens of this country.[79]
It is incumbent upon one who
claims Philippine citizenship to prove to
the satisfaction of the court that he is
really a Filipino. No presumption can be
indulged in favor of the claimant of
Philippine citizenship, and any doubt
regarding citizenship must be resolved
in favor of the state.[80]
Page 83 of 100
 As Carlos and Jimmy neither
showed conclusive proof of their
citizenship nor presented substantial
proof of the same, we have no choice
but to sustain the Boards jurisdiction
over the deportation proceedings. This
is not to say that we are ruling that they
are not Filipinos, for that is not what we
are called upon to do. This Court
necessarily has to pass upon the issue
of citizenship only to determine whether
the proceedings may be enjoined in
order to give way to a judicial
determination of the same. And we are
of the opinion that said proceedings
should not be enjoined.
In our considered view, the
allegation of Jimmy that due process
was not observed in the deportation
proceedings must likewise fail.
Deportation proceedings are
administrative in character, summary in
nature, and need not be conducted
strictly in accordance with the rules of
ordinary court proceedings.[81] The
essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain ones side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of.[82] As
long as the parties are given the
opportunity to be heard before judgment
is rendered, the demands of due
process are sufficiently met.[83] Although
Jimmy was not furnished with a copy of
the subject Resolution and Charge
Sheet as alleged by him, the trial court
found that he was given ample
opportunity to explain his side and
present controverting evidence, thus:
x x x It must be
stressed that after
receiving the Order dated
September 11, 2001
signed by BSI Chief
Ronaldo P. Ledesma on
October 4, 2001, petitioner
Jimmy T. Go admitted that
when his representative
went to the B.I.D. to
inquire about the said
Order, the latter chanced
upon the Resolution
dated February 14, 2001
and March 8, 2001 as well
as the Charge Sheet dated
July 3, 2001. Hence
on October 5, 2001, he
filed a Motion for
Extension of Time to File
Memorandum and as
such, was allowed by
Ronaldo P. Ledesma an
extension of ten (10) days
to submit his required
memorandum. x x x[84]
This circumstance satisfies the
demands of administrative due process.
As regards the petition in G.R.
No. 171946, petitioners contend that the
appellate tribunal erred in enjoining
Jimmys deportation.[85]
Petitioners question the remedy
availed of by Jimmy. They argue that the
existence of the remedy of an ordinary
appeal proscribes the filing of the
petition for certiorari as was done in this
case. They point out that the appeal
period in habeas corpus cases is only
48 hours, compared to a special civil
action under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court which is 60 days. This clearly
shows that an ordinary appeal is the
more plain, speedy and adequate
Page 84 of 100
remedy; hence, it must be the one
availed of.[86]Since the decision of the
trial court was not properly appealed,
the same may be said to have attained
finality, and may no longer be disturbed.
[87]
They maintain that the dismissal
of the petition for habeas corpus by the
trial court was proper. A petition for
habeas corpus has for its purpose only
the determination of whether or not
there is a lawful ground for Jimmys
apprehension and continued
detention. They urge that the decision of
the Board dated April 17, 2002 that
ordered Jimmys deportation has already
attained finality by reason of the belated
appeal taken by Jimmy from the said
decision on April 2, 2004 before the
Office of the President, or after almost
two years from the time the decision
was rendered. Said decision of the
Board, they insist, is the lawful ground
that sanctions Jimmys apprehension
and detention.[88]
Petitioners in G.R. No. 171946
also argue that Jimmy cannot rely on
the bail on recognizance he was
previously granted to question his
subsequent apprehension and
detention. Under the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, the power to
grant bail can only be exercised while
the alien is still under investigation, and
not when the order of deportation had
already been issued by the Board.
[89]
Hence, the bail granted was irregular
as it has no legal basis. Furthermore,
they said the petition for habeas corpus
necessarily has to be dismissed
because the same is no longer proper
once the applicant thereof has been
charged before the Board, which is the
case with Jimmy.[90] Nonetheless, they
claim that the habeas corpus case is
rendered moot and academic as Jimmy
is no longer being detained.[91]
On the other hand, Jimmy
counters that the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition is the most
appropriate, speedy and adequate
remedy in spite of the availability of
ordinary appeal considering that what is
involved in this case is his cherished
liberty. Grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the petitioners in ordering his
arrest and detention, he argues, all the
more justifies the avails of the
extraordinary writ.[92] Contrary to the
petitioners stand, Jimmy argues that the
April 17, 2002 Decision of the Board has
not attained finality owing to the
availability of various remedies, one of
which is an appeal, and in fact is actually
void because it was rendered without due
process.[93] He also insists that the bail
issued to him is valid and effective until
the final determination of his citizenship
before the proper courts.[94] Moreover, he
maintains that the petition for habeas
corpus was proper since its object is to
inquire into the legality of ones detention,
and if found illegal, to order the release of
the detainee.[95] As in his petition in G.R.
No. 167570, Jimmy also contends that
the proceedings before the Board is void
for failure to implead therein his father,
and that he should have been given a full
blown trial before a regular court where
he can prove his citizenship.[96]
Considering the arguments and
contentions of the parties, we find the
petition in G.R. No. 171946 meritorious.
We have held in a litany of cases
that the extraordinary remedies of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
available only when there is no appeal
Page 85 of 100
or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of
law. The writ of certiorari does not lie
where an appeal may be taken or where
another adequate remedy is available
for the correction of the error.[97]
The petitioners correctly argue
that appeal should have been the
remedy availed of as it is more plain,
speedy and adequate. The 48-hour
appeal period demonstrates the
adequacy of such remedy in that no
unnecessary time will be wasted before
the decision will be re-evaluated.
A petition for the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus is a special
proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The objective of
the writ is to determine whether the
confinement or detention is valid or
lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be
issued. What is to be inquired into is the
legality of a persons detention as of, at
the earliest, the filing of the application
for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if
the detention is at its inception illegal, it
may, by reason of some supervening
events, such as the instances
mentioned in Section 4[98] of Rule 102,
be no longer illegal at the time of the
filing of the application.[99]
Once a person detained is duly
charged in court, he may no longer
question his detention through a petition
for issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. His remedy would be to quash
the information and/or the warrant of
arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas
corpus should not be allowed after the
party sought to be released had been
charged before any court. The term
court in this context includes quasi-
judicial bodies of governmental
agencies authorized to order the
persons confinement, like the
Deportation Board of the Bureau of
Immigration.[100] Likewise, the
cancellation of his bail cannot be
assailed via a petition for habeas
corpus. When an alien is detained by
the Bureau of Immigration for
deportation pursuant to an order of
deportation by the Deportation Board,
the Regional Trial Courts have no power
to release such alien on bail even in
habeas corpus proceedings because
there is no law authorizing it.[101]
Given that Jimmy has been duly
charged before the Board, and in fact
ordered arrested pending his
deportation, coupled by this Courts
pronouncement that the Board was not
ousted of its jurisdiction to continue with
the deportation proceedings, the petition
for habeas corpus is rendered moot and
academic. This being so, we find it
unnecessary to touch on the other
arguments advanced by respondents
regarding the same subject.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in
G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570
are DENIED. The Decision
dated October 25, 2004 and Resolution
dated February 16, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85143
are AFFIRMED. The petition in G.R. No.
171946 is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision dated December 8, 2005 and
Resolution dated March 13, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
88277 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The December 6,
2004 and December 28, 2004 Orders of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 167 are hereby REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Page 86 of 100
SO ORDERED. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
L
EONA
RDO
A. CERTIFI
QUIS CATION
UMBI Pursuant to Section 13, Article
NG VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Associate Justice Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision
WE CONCUR: had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

MARIANO C.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate
*
Justicemember per Raffle of June
Additional
Associate Justice
29, 2009 in place of Associate
Justice Arturo D. Brion who
concurred in the assailed Resolution.
[1]
Rollo (G.R. No. 167569), pp. 597-
ROBERTO A. ABAD 609. Penned by Associate Justice
Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., with
Associate Justices Edgardo F.
ATTEST Sundiam and Japar B. Dimaampao
ATION concurring.
[2]
Id. at 611.
[3]
Id. at 612-617. Penned by Judge
I attest that the conclusions in the above Alfredo C. Flores.
[4]
Decision had been reached in Id. at 618-619.
[5]
consultation before the case was Rollo (G.R. No. 167570), p. 157.
[6]
assigned to the writer of the opinion of Rollo (G.R. No. 171946), pp. 35-
the Courts Division. 49. Penned by Associate Justice
Eliezer R. De los Santos with
Associate Justices Eugenio S.
Labitoria and Jose C. Reyes, Jr.
concurring.

Page 87 of 100
[7]
Id. at 50. Penned by Associate Justice
Eliezer R. De los Santos with
Associate Justices Arturo D. Brion
(now a member of this Court) and
Jose C. Reyes, Jr. concurring.
[8]
Rollo (G.R. No. 167570), p. 530.
[9]
Rollo (G.R. No. 167569), pp. 631-634.
[10]
Id. at 636-646.
[11]
ARTICLE IV. Citizenship
SECTION 1. The following are citizens
of the Philippines:
xxxx
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of
the Philippines and, upon
reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.
xxxx
[12]
AN ACT PROVIDING THE MANNER
IN WHICH THE OPTION TO ELECT
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP SHALL
BE DECLARED BY A PERSON
WHOSE MOTHER IS A FILIPINO
CITIZEN, approved on June 7, 1941.
[13]
Rollo (G.R. No. 167569), pp. 642-
643.
[14]
Id. at 645-646.
[15]
Id. at 644.
[16]
Id.
[17]
Id. at 685-687.
[18]
Rollo, (G.R. No. 167570), pp. 155-
156.
[19]
Section 37. (a) The following aliens
shall be arrested upon the warrant of
the Commissioner of Immigration or
of any other officer designated by
him for the purpose and deported
upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration after a
determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of
the ground for deportation as
charged against the alien:
xxxx
(9) Any alien who commits any of the
acts described in sections forty-five
and forty-six of this Act, independent
of criminal action which may be
brought against them: Provided, That
in the case of an alien who, for any
reason, is convicted and sentenced
to suffer both imprisonment and
deportation, said alien shall first
serve the entire period of his
imprisonment before he is actually
deported: Provided, That the
imprisonment may be waived by the
Commissioner of Immigration with
the consent of the Department Head,
and upon payment by the alien
concerned of such amount as the
Commissioner may fix and approved
by the Department Head;
xxxx
[20]
Section 45. Any individual who−
xxxx
(c) Obtains, accepts or uses any
immigration document, knowing it to
be false; or
xxxx
[21]
AN ACT TO CONTROL AND
REGULATE THE IMMIGRATION OF
ALIENS INTO THE PHILIPPINES,
approved on August 26, 1940.
[22]
Rollo (G.R. No. 167570), p. 157.
[23]
Rollo (G.R. No. 167569), pp. 692-
742.
[24]
Rollo (G.R. No. 171946), pp. 106-
124.
[25]
Id. at 124.
[26]
Rollo (G.R. No. 167569), pp. 743-
761.
[27]
Rollo (G.R. No. 171946), pp. 125-
126.
[28]
Rollo (G.R. No. 167569), pp. 612-
617.
[29]
Rollo (G.R. No. 171946), pp. 135-
136.
[30]
Id. at 137.
[31]
Records, p. 71, SP. Proc. No. 11447.
[32]
Rollo (G.R. No. 167569), p. 609.
[33]
Rollo (G.R. No. 171946), p. 308.
[34]
Id. at 309.
Page 88 of 100
[35] [53]
Id. at 310. Approved on December 4, 1926.
[36] [54]
Id. at 311-316. RULES OF COURT, Rule 3,
[37]
Id. at 327-330. SEC 7. Compulsory joinder of
[38]
Id. at 331-332. indispensable parties.Parties in
[39]
Id. at 46-48. interest without whom no final
[40]
Id. at 50. determination can be had of an
[41]
Rollo (G.R. No. 167569), pp. 566- action shall be joined either as
588. plaintiffs or defendants.
[42] [55]
Rollo (G.R. No. 167570), pp. 32-46. RULES OF COURT, Rule 3,
[43]
Rollo (G.R. No. 171946), p. 18. SEC. 2 Parties in interest.A real party in
[44]
AN ACT TEMPORARILY TO interest is the party who stands to be
PROVIDE FOR THE benefited or injured by the judgment
ADMINISTRATION OF THE in the suit, or the party entitled to the
AFFAIRS OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, AND authorized by law or these Rules,
FOR OTHER PURPOSES, approved every action must be prosecuted or
on July 1, 1902. defended in the name of the real
[45]
AN ACT TO DECLARE THE party in interest.
PURPOSE OF THE PEOPLE OF See also Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v.
THE UNITED STATES AS TO THE NLRC, G.R. No. 116236, October 2,
FUTURE POLITICAL STATUS OF 1996, 262 SCRA 623, 630.
[56]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ARTICLE IV. Citizenship
ISLANDS, AND TO PROVIDE A SECTION 1.
MORE AUTONOMOUS xxxx
GOVERNMENT FOR THOSE (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of
ISLANDS, approved on August 29, the Philippines.
1916. xxxx
[57]
Rollo (G.R. No. 167569), p. 642.
[46] [58]
No. L-18069, May 26, 1962, 5 SCRA Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of
108. Immigration, No. L-21289, October
[47]
Id. at 110. 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 292, 367; Lee v.
[48]
G.R. Nos. 120295 & 123755, June Commissioner of Immigration, No. L-
28, 1996, 257 SCRA 727. 23446, December 20, 1971, 42
[49]
Id. at 761. SCRA 561, 565; Board of
[50]
Supra at 19. Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa,
[51]
Section 45. Any individual who − G.R. Nos. 95612-13, May 31, 1991,
xxxx 197 SCRA 854, 877-878.
[59]
(e) Being an alien, shall for any Board of Commissioners (CID) v.
fraudulent purpose represent himself Dela Rosa, supra at 878. See
to be a Philippine citizen in order to also Burca v. Republic, No. L-
evade any requirement of the 24252, June 15, 1973, 51 SCRA
immigration laws; or 248, 259-260.
[60]
xxxx Lao Gi v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
[52]
Tolentino v. Court of Appeals, No. L- 81798, December 29, 1989, 180 SCRA
41427, June 10, 1988, 162 SCRA 66, 756, 761.
[61]
72. 96 Phil. 665 (1955).

Page 89 of 100
[62]
Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board,
supra at 672. See also Co v. The
Deportation Board, No. L-
22748, July 29, 1977, 78 SCRA 104,
107.
[63]
Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board, id.
at 671. See also Co v. The
Deportation Board, id. at
107; Calacday v. Vivo, No. L-
26681, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 413,
416.
[64]
Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board,
supra at 672. See also Co v. The
Deportation Board, supra at 107-
108.
[65]
Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board,
supra at 670, citing Miranda, et al. v.
Deportation Board, 94 Phil. 531, 533
(1954).
[66]
Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board,
supra at 671.
[67]
Vivo v. Montesa, No. L-24576, July
29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155, 159.
[68]
Civil Service Commission v.
Bumogas, G.R. No. 174693, August 31,
2007, 531 SCRA 780, 785.
[69]
Ong v. Bogalbal, G.R. No. 149140,
September 12, 2006, 501 SCRA
490, 501; Heirs of Dicman v. Cario,
G.R. No. 146459, June 8, 2006, 490
SCRA 240, 261-262; Almendrala v.
Ngo, G.R. No. 142408, September
30, 2005, 471 SCRA 311, 322.
[70]
See United States v. Ang, 36 Phil.
858 (1917); United States v. Lim Bin,
36 Phil. 924 (1917); Santos Co v.
Government of the
Philippine Islands, 52 Phil. 543
(1928); Haw v. Collector of Customs,
59 Phil. 612 (1934); Lam Swee Sang
v. Commonwealth of the Philippines,
73 Phil. 309 (1941); Gallofin v.
Ordoez, 70 Phil. 287 (1940).
[71]
79 Phil. 249, 257-258 (1947). See
also Tio Tiam v. Republic of the
Philippines, 101 Phil. 195, 198-199
(1957).
[72]
R. JOSON AND R. LEDESMA,
MANUAL ON THE ALIEN
REGISTRATION ACT OF 1950
10 (1999).
[73]
SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands continuing to reside
therein who were Spanish subjects on
the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine and then
resided in said Islands, and their
children born subsequent thereto,
shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands and
as such entitled to the protection of
the United States, except such as
shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain signed at Paris,
December tenth, eighteen hundred
and ninety-eight.
[74]
SECTION 2. That all inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands who were Spanish
subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine,
and then resided in said islands, and
their children born subsequent
thereto, shall be deemed and held to
be citizens of the Philippine Islands,
except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain in accordance with
the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris, December tenth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight,
and except such others as have since
become citizens of some other
country: PROVIDED, That the
Philippine Legislature, herein
provided for, is hereby authorized to
provide by law for the acquisition of
the Philippine citizenship by those
Page 90 of 100
 natives of the Philippine Islands who No. 111933, July 23, 1997, 276
do not come within the foregoing SCRA 1, 7.
[83]
provisions, the natives of the insular Montemayor v. Bundalian, G.R. No.
possessions of the United States, and 149335, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA 264,
such other persons residing in the 269.
[84]
Philippine Islands who are citizens of Rollo (G.R. No. 171946), p. 131.
[85]
the United States, or who could Id. at 18.
[86]
become citizens of the United States Id. at 21-23.
[87]
under the laws of the United States if Id. at 24.
[88]
residing therein. Id. at 25-28.
[75] [89]
J. BERNAS, CONSTITUTIONAL Id. at 28.
[90]
RIGHTS AND SOCIAL DEMANDS: Id. at 28-29.
[91]
NOTES AND CASES PART II 929 Id. at 29.
[92]
(2004 ed.), citing Ching Leng v. Id. at 432-433.
[93]
Galang, 104 Phil. 1058 (1958), Id. at 435-436.
[94]
unreported; Serra v. Republic, 91 Id. at 441.
[95]
Phil. 914 (1952), Id. at 442.
[96]
unreported; Zamboanga Id. at 443-449.
[97]
Transportation Co., Inc. v. Lim, 105 Dwikarna v. Domingo, G.R. No.
Phil. 1321 (1959), unreported; Board 153454, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 748,
of Immigration Commissioners v. Go 754.
[98]
Callano, No. L-24530, October 31, SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or
1968, 25 SCRA 890. discharged authorized. If it appears
[76]
In re: Florencio Mallare, Adm. Case that the person alleged to be
No. 533, September 12, 1974, 59 restrained of his liberty is in the
SCRA 45, 52; Re: Application for custody of an officer under process
Admission to the Philippine Bar of issued by a court or judge or by
Vicente D. Ching, B.M. No. virtue of a judgment or order of a
914, October 1, 1999, 316 SCRA 1, court of record, and that the court or
10-11. judge had jurisdiction to issue the
[77]
Re: Application for Admission to the process, render the judgment, or
Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching, make the order, the writ shall not be
supra at 8. allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears
[78]
Id. at 8-9. after the writ is allowed, the person
[79]
I R. LEDESMA, AN OUTLINE OF shall not be discharged by reason of
PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION AND any informality or defect in the
CITIZENSHIP LAWS 405 (2006 ed.) process, judgment, or order. Nor
[80]
Paa v. Chan, No. L-25945, October shall anything in this rule be held to
31, 1967, 21 SCRA 753, 762. authorize the discharge of a person
[81]
Lao Tang Bun v. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682, charged with or convicted of an
691 (1948). offense in the Philippines, or of a
[82]
CMP Federal Security Agency, Inc. v. person suffering imprisonment under
NLRC, G.R. No. 125298, February lawful judgment.
[99]
11, 1999, 303 SCRA 99, Office of the Solicitor General v. De
111; Philippine Long Distance Castro, A.M. No. RTJ-06-
Telephone Company v. NLRC, G.R.

Page 91 of 100

2018, August 3, 2007, 529 SCRA
157, 168-169.
[100]
Id. at 169-170; Kiani v. Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID),
G.R. No. 160922, February 27,
2006, 483 SCRA 341, 357.
Case 11
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 182497 June 29,
2010
NURHIDA JUHURI
AMPATUAN, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA,
BRANCH 37, DIRECTOR GENERAL
AVELINO RAZON, JR., DIRECTOR
GEARY BARIAS, PSSUPT. CO YEE M.
CO, JR. and POLICE CHIEF
INSPECTOR AGAPITO
QUIMSON, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 651 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Order dated 25 April
2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 37, in Special
Proceeding No. 08-119132 which denied
the petition for Habeas Corpus filed by
herein Petitioner Nurhida Juhuri
Ampatuan in behalf of her husband
Police Officer 1 Basser B.
Ampatuan2 (PO1 Ampatuan).
[101]
Bengzon v. Ocampo, 84 Phil. 611,
613 (1949); Ong See Hang v.
Commissioner of Immigration, No. L-
9700, February 28, 1962, 4 SCRA
442, 447.
Petitioner alleged in her petition that her
husband PO1 Ampatuan was assigned
at Sultan Kudarat Municipal Police
Station. On 14 April 2008, he was asked
by his Chief of Police to report to the
Provincial Director of Shariff Kabunsuan,
Superintendent Esmael Pua Ali (Supt.
Ali). The latter brought PO1 Ampatuan
to Superintendent Piang Adam,
Provincial Director of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Maguindanao.
PO1 Ampatuan was directed to stay at
the Police Provincial Office of
Maguindanao without being informed of
the cause of his restraint. The next day,
15 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was
brought to the General Santos City
Airport and was made to board a
Philippine Airlines plane bound for
Manila. Upon landing at the Manila
Domestic Airport, PO1 Ampatuan was
turned over to policemen of Manila and
brought to Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim by
Police Director Geary Barias and
General Roberto Rosales. A press
briefing was then conducted where it
was announced that PO1 Ampatuan
was arrested for the killing of two
Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Officials. He was then detained at the
Police Jail in United Nations Avenue,
Manila. Thereafter, PO1 Ampatuan was
brought to inquest Prosecutor Renato
Gonzaga of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila due to the alleged
murder of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, head
of the Law Department of the
COMELEC. On 20 April 2008, PO1
Ampatuan was turned-over to the
Page 92 of 100
Regional Headquarters Support Group
in Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City.3
Petitioner continues that on 21 April
2008, Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson
Salva ordered the release for further
investigation of PO1 Ampatuan.4 The
Order was approved by the City
Prosecutor of Manila. But Police Senior
Superintendent Co Yee Co, Jr., and
Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson
refused to release PO1 Ampatuan.
This prompted Petitioner to file the
petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
RTC of Manila, Branch 37.5
Private respondents had another
version of the antecedent facts. They
narrated that at around 7:08 o’clock in
the evening of 10 November 2007, a
sixty-four-year-old man, later identified
as Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the
COMELEC Legal Department, was
killed at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and
Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila.
Investigation conducted by the Manila
Police District (MPD) Homicide Section
yielded the identity of the male
perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan.
Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was
commanded to the MPD District Director
for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest
proceedings were conducted by the
Manila Prosecutor’s Office.
On 18 April 2008, Police Senior
Superintendent Atty. Clarence V. Guinto,
rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation
Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding
probable cause to charge PO1
Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct
(Murder) and recommending that said
PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to
summary hearing.
On even date, a charge sheet for Grave
Misconduct was executed against PO1
Ampatuan, the accusatory portion of
which reads:
CHARGE SHEET
THE UNDERSIGNED NOMINAL
COMPLAINANT hereby charges above-
named respondent of the administrative
offense of Grave Misconduct (murder)
pursuant to Section 52 of R.A. 85516 in
relation to NAPOLCOM Memorandum
Circular 93-024, committed as follows:
That on or about 7:08 in the evening of
November 10, 2007, in M.H. Del Pilar
and Pedro Gil St., Ermita, Manila,
above-named respondent while being
an active member of the PNP and within
the jurisdiction of this office, armed with
a cal .45 pistol, with intent to kill, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, shot Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig,
Jr., COMELEC official on the different
parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon
the latter mortal gunshot wounds which
directly cause (sic) his death.
Acts contrary to the existing PNP Laws
rules and Regulations.7
Also, through a Memorandum dated 18
April 2008, Police Director General
Avelino I. Razon, Jr. directed the
Regional Director of the National Capital
Regional Police Office (NCRPO) to
place PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive
custody, thus:
1. Reference: Memo from that
Office dated April 15, 2008 re
Arrest of PO1 Busser Ampatuan,
suspect in the killing of Atty.
Alioden Dalaig and Atty. Wynee
Page 93 of 100
 Asdala, both COMELEC Legal
Officers.
2. This pertains to the power of
the Chief, PNP embodied in
Section 52 of RA 8551, to place
police personnel under restrictive
custody during the pendency of a
grave administrative case filed
against him or even after the
filing of a criminal complaint,
grave in nature, against such
police personnel.
3. In this connection, you are
hereby directed to place PO1
Busser Ampatuan, suspect in the
killing of Atty. Alioden Dalaig and
Atty. Wynee Asdala, both
COMELEC Legal Officers, under
your restrictive custody.
4. For strict compliance.8
On 19 April 2008, through a
Memorandum Request dated 18 April
2008, respondent Police Director Geary
L. Barias requested for the creation of
the Summary Hearing Board to hear the
case of PO1 Ampatuan.9
On 20 April 2008, Special Order No. 921
was issued by Police Director Edgardo
E. Acuña, placing PO1 Ampatuan under
restrictive custody of the Regional
Director, NCRPO, effective 19 April
2008. Said Special Order No. 921,
reads:
Restrictive Custody
PO1 Basser B. Ampatuan 128677, is
placed under restrictive custody of the
Regional Director, NCRPO effective
April 19, 2008. (Reference:
Memorandum from CPNP dated 18 April
2008).
BY COMMAND OF POLICE DIRECTOR
GENERAL RAZON:10
Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City
Prosecutor of Manila recommended that
the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set
for further investigation and that the
latter be released from custody unless
he is being held for other charges/legal
grounds.11
Armed with the 21 April 2008
recommendation of the Manila City’s
Prosecution Office, petitioner, who is the
wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition
for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Corpus before the RTC of Manila on 22
April 2008. The petition was docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 08-119132 and
was raffled to Branch 37.
On 24 April 2008, finding the petition to
be sufficient in form and substance,
respondent Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig
ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus commanding therein
respondents to produce the body of
PO1 Ampatuan and directing said
respondents to show cause why they
are withholding or restraining the liberty
of PO1 Ampatuan.12
On 25 April 2008, the RTC resolved the
Petition in its Order which reads:
Essentially, counsels for petitioner
insists that PO1 Basser Ampatuan is
being illegally detained by the
respondents despite the order of release
of Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson
Salva dated April 21, 2008. They further
claim that as of April 23, 2008, no
Page 94 of 100
administrative case was filed against
PO1 Ampatuan.
Respondents, while admitting that to
date no criminal case was filed against
PO1 Ampatuan, assert that the latter is
under restrictive custody since he is
facing an administrative case for grave
misconduct. They submitted to this
Court the Pre-charge Evaluation Report
and Charge Sheet. Further, in support of
their position, respondents cited the
case of SPO2 Manalo, et al. v. Hon.
Calderon, G.R. No. 178920 claiming
that habeas corpus will not lie for a PNP
personnel under restrictive custody.
They claim that this is authorized under
Section 52, Par. 4 of R.A. 8551
authorizing the Chief of PNP to place
the PNP personnel under restrictive
custody during the pendency of
administrative case for grave
misconduct.
Petitioner countered that the
administrative case filed against PO1
Ampatuan was ante-dated to make it
appear that there was such a case filed
before April 23, 2008.
The function of habeas corpus is to
determine the legality of one’s detention,
meaning, if there is sufficient cause for
deprivation or confinement and if there
is none to discharge him at once. For
habeas corpus to issue, the restraint of
liberty must be in the nature of illegal
and involuntary deprivation of freedom
which must be actual and effective, not
nominal or moral.
Granting arguendo that the
administrative case was ante-dated, the
Court cannot simply ignore the filing of
an administrative case filed against PO1
Ampatuan. It cannot be denied that the
PNP has its own administrative
disciplinary mechanism and as clearly
pointed out by the respondents, the
Chief PNP is authorized to place PO1
Ampatuan under restrictive custody
pursuant to Section 52, Par. 4 of R.A.
8551.
The filing of the administrative case
against PO1 Ampatuan is a process
done by the PNP and this Court has no
authority to order the release of the
subject police officer.
Lastly, anent the contention of the
petitioner that the letter resignation of
PO1 Ampatuan has rendered the
administrative case moot and academic,
the same could not be accepted by this
Court.1avvph!1 It must be stressed that
the resignation has not been acted (sic)
by the appropriate police officials of the
PNP, and that the administrative case
was filed while PO1 Ampatuan is still in
the active status of the PNP.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the petition for habeas corpus is hereby
DISMISSED.13
Distressed, petitioner is now before this
Court via a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
question the validity of the RTC Order
dated 25 April 2008. The issues are:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED
TO CONSIDER THAT THE
ARREST AND DETENTION OF
PO1 BASSER B. AMPATUAN
WAS MADE WITHOUT ANY
WARRANT AND THEREFORE,
ILLEGAL;
Page 95 of 100
 II. THE RESPONDENT COURT
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT
CONCEDED THE AUTHORITY
OF RESPONDENT AVELINO
RAZON, JR. UNDER SEC. 52,
PAR. 4, R.A. 8551 TO PLACE
AMPATUAN UNDER
RESTRICTIVE CUSTODY FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS;
III. THE RESPONDENT COURT
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT
SHIRKED FROM ITS JUDICIAL
DUTY TO ORDER THE
RELEASE OF PO1 AMPATUAN
FROM THE CUSTODY OF
RESPONDENTS MAMANG
PULIS.14
Essentially, a writ of habeas corpus
applies to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty.15
Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Court
sets forth the procedure to be followed
in the issuance of the writ. The Rule
provides:
RULE 102
HABEAS CORPUS
SECTION 1. To what habeas corpus
extends. – Except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, the writ of
habeas corpus shall extend to all cases
of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of
any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto.
SEC 2. Who may grant the writ. – The
writ of habeas corpus may be granted
by the Supreme Court, or any member
thereof, on any day and at any time, or
by the Court of Appeals or any member
thereof in the instances authorized by
law, and if so granted it shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines,
and may be made returnable before the
court or any member thereof, or before
a Court of First Instance, or any judge
thereof for hearing and decision on the
merits. It may also be granted by a
Court of First Instance, or a judge
thereof, on any day and at any time, and
returnable before himself, enforceable
only within his judicial district.
xxxx
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or
discharge authorized. – If it appears that
the person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or
judge or by virtue of a judgment or order
of a court of record, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render the judgment, or make
the order, the writ shall not be allowed;
or if the jurisdiction appears after the
writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality
or defect in the process, judgment, or
order. Nor shall anything in this rule be
held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an
offense in the Philippines, or of a person
suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.
The objective of the writ is to determine
whether the confinement or detention is
valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be
issued. What is to be inquired into is the
legality of a person's detention as of, at
Page 96 of 100
the earliest, the filing of the application
for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if
the detention is at its inception illegal, it
may, by reason of some supervening
events, such as the instances
mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be
no longer illegal at the time of the filing
of the application.16
Plainly stated, the writ obtains
immediate relief for those who have
been illegally confined or imprisoned
without sufficient cause. The writ,
however, should not be issued when the
custody over the person is by virtue of a
judicial process or a valid judgment.17
The most basic criterion for the issuance
of the writ, therefore, is that the
individual seeking such relief is illegally
deprived of his freedom of movement or
placed under some form of illegal
restraint. If an individual’s liberty is
restrained via some legal process, the
writ of habeas corpus is
unavailing.18 Fundamentally, in order to
justify the grant of the writ of habeas
corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in
the nature of an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action.19
In general, the purpose of the writ of
habeas corpus is to determine whether
or not a particular person is legally held.
A prime specification of an application
for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an
actual and effective, and not merely
nominal or moral, illegal restraint of
liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was
devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, and as the best and
only sufficient defense of personal
freedom. A prime specification of an
application for a writ of habeas corpus is
restraint of liberty. The essential object
and purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished
from voluntary, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any
restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient.20
In passing upon a petition for habeas
corpus, a court or judge must first
inquire into whether the petitioner is
being restrained of his liberty. If he is
not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into
the cause of detention will proceed only
where such restraint exists. If the
alleged cause is thereafter found to be
unlawful, then the writ should be granted
and the petitioner discharged. Needless
to state, if otherwise, again the writ will
be refused.21
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it
will not issue as a matter of course or as
a mere perfunctory operation on the
filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is
called for in its issuance and it must be
clear to the judge to whom the petition is
presented that, prima facie, the
petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only
if the court is satisfied that a person is
being unlawfully restrained of his liberty
will the petition for habeas corpus be
granted. If the respondents are not
detaining or restraining the applicant or
the person in whose behalf the petition
is filed, the petition should be
dismissed.22
Petitioner contends that when PO1
Ampatuan was placed under the
custody of respondents on 20 April
2008, there was yet no administrative
case filed against him. When the
release order of Chief Inquest
Prosecutor Nelson Salva was served
upon respondents on 21 April 2008,
Page 97 of 100
there was still no administrative case
filed against PO1 Ampatuan. She also
argues that the arrest on 14 April 2008
of PO1 Ampatuan in Shariff Kabunsuan
was illegal because there was no
warrant of arrest issued by any judicial
authority against him.
On the other hand, respondents, in their
Comment23 filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General, argue that the trial
court correctly denied the subject
petition. Respondents maintain that
while the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila had recommended that PO1
Ampatuan be released from custody,
said recommendation was made only
insofar as the criminal action for murder
that was filed with the prosecution office
is concerned and is without prejudice to
other legal grounds for which he may be
held under custody. In the instant case,
PO1 Ampatuan is also facing
administrative charges for Grave
Misconduct. They cited the case
of Manalo v. Calderon,24 where this
Court held that a petition
for habeas corpus will be given due
course only if it shows that petitioner is
being detained or restrained of his
liberty unlawfully, but a restrictive
custody and monitoring of movements
or whereabouts of police officers under
investigation by their superiors is not a
form of illegal detention or restraint of
liberty.25
The Solicitor General is correct.
In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been
placed under Restrictive Custody.
Republic Act No. 6975 (also known as
the Department of Interior and Local
Government Act of 1990), as amended
by Republic Act No. 8551 (also known
as the Philippine National Police Reform
and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly
provides that members of the police
force are subject to the administrative
disciplinary machinery of the PNP.
Section 41(b) of the said law
enumerates the disciplinary actions,
including restrictive custody that may be
imposed by duly designated supervisors
and equivalent officers of the PNP as a
matter of internal discipline. The
pertinent provision of Republic Act No.
8551 reads:
Sec. 52 – x x x.
xxxx
4. The Chief of the PNP shall have the
power to impose the disciplinary
punishment of dismissal from the
service; suspension or forfeiture of
salary; or any combination thereof for a
period not exceeding one hundred
eighty (180) days. Provided, further,
That the Chief of the PNP shall have the
authority to place police personnel
under restrictive custody during the
pendency of a grave administrative case
filed against him or even after the filing
of a criminal complaint, grave in nature,
against such police personnel.
[Emphasis ours].
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been
placed under restrictive custody, such
constitutes a valid argument for his
continued detention. This Court has held
that a restrictive custody and monitoring
of movements or whereabouts of police
officers under investigation by their
superiors is not a form of illegal
detention or restraint of liberty.26
Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal
restraint which is beyond the ambit
of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor
Page 98 of 100
effective restraint that would call for the
grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a
permissible precautionary measure to
assure the PNP authorities that the
police officers concerned are always
accounted for.27
Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuan’s
restrictive custody is the administrative
case filed against him, his remedy is
within such administrative process.
We likewise note that PO1 Ampatuan
has been under restrictive custody since
19 April 2008. To date, the
administrative case against him should
have already been resolved and the
issue of his restrictive custody should
have been rendered moot and
academic, in accordance with Section
55 of Republic Act No. 8551, which
provides:
SEC. 55. Section 47 of Republic Act No.
6975 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension
Pending Criminal Case. – Upon the
filing of a complaint or information
sufficient in form and substance against
a member of the PNP for grave felonies
where the penalty imposed by law is six
(6) years and one (1) day or more, the
court shall immediately suspend the
accused from office for a period not
exceeding ninety (90) days from
arraignment: Provided, however, That if
it can be shown by evidence that the
accused is harassing the complainant
and/or witnesses, the court may order
the preventive suspension of the
accused PNP member even if the
charge is punishable by a penalty lower
than six (6) years and one (1) day:
Provided, further, That the preventive
suspension shall not be more than
ninety (90) days except if the delay in
the disposition of the case is due to the
fault, negligence or petitions of the
respondent: Provided, finally, That such
preventive suspension may be sooner
lifted by the court in the exigency of the
service upon recommendation of the
Chief, PNP. Such case shall be
subject to continuous trial and shall
be terminated within ninety (90) days
from arraignment of the accused.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Having conceded that there is no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court, we have to dismiss the
petition.
In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge
the burden of showing that she is
entitled to the issuance of the writ
prayed for in behalf of her husband,
PO1 Ampatuan. The petition fails to
show on its face that the latter is
unlawfully deprived of his liberty
guaranteed and enshrined in the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the instant petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Page 99 of 100
 TERESITA J.
PRESBITERO J.
LEONARDO-DE
VELASCO, JR.
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the

Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Page 100 of 100