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ISRO-PAS-201

Issue 3, November 2012

Failure Reporting,
Analysis and
Corrective Action System

ISRO Reliability Standards

Directorate of Systems Reliability and Quality, ISRO Headquarters, Bangalore


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+xiÉÊ®úIÉ Ê´É¦ÉÉMÉ Department of Space
Government of India
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Antariksh Bhavan
+xiÉÊ®úIÉ ¦É´ÉxÉ New BEL Road, Bangalore - 560 231, India
xªÉÚ ¤ÉÒ.<Ç.B±É. ®úÉäb÷, ¤ÉåMɱÉÚ®ú-560 231, ¦ÉÉ®úiÉ Telephone : +91-80-2341 5241/2217 2333
nÚ®¦ÉɹÉ: +91-80-2341 5241/2217 2333 Fax : +91-80-23415328
¡èòCºÉ: +91-80-23415328 e-mail : chairman@isro.gov.in

Dr. K. Radhakrishnan
Chairman

MESSAGE

ISRO Reliability Standards, addressing the various disciplines of Engineering, have been
in vogue for almost three decades now. These standards are followed across ISRO
centres as well as external work centers for design, fabrication, testing, analysis and
other processes involved in the realization of Launch Vehicles, Spacecraft, Space
Applications, Ground support systems and other launch infrastructure. The need for
standardization of processes towards achieving high reliability systems can never be
over emphasized, and ISRO Reliability Standards are just an attempt towards explicitly
stating this.

With the advent of newer techniques and with the evolution of technology itself, over the last 30 years, it
has become essential to revisit the existing ISRO Reliability Standards and revise and update the standards
wherever essential. Towards this, the Directorate of Systems Reliability and Quality (DSRQ) at ISRO
Headquarters has taken an initiative to re-invigorate the reach and visibility of ISRO Reliability standards
across all the Centres of ISRO. Specific Inter-centre teams were formed to revise each of these documents
and I would like to place on record their commendable efforts in bringing out these documents.

There is a pressing need for ensuring uniformity of practices, across various functions of design, fabrication,
testing, review mechanisms etc., across the centres and units of ISRO. Towards this goal, the mandatory
adoption of ISRO Reliability Standards will ensure standardization in quality processes and products. I am
certain that this will go a long way towards ensuring overall system level Quality and Reliability and in
achieving the goal of zero defects in the delivery of space systems of ISRO.

K Radhakrishnan
Chairman, ISRO
Directorate of Systems Reliability & Quality
ISRO Headquarters
Antariksh Bhavan
New BEL Road, Bangalore -560231
Ph :080 - 2341 5414
Fax :080 – 2341 2826
S Selvaraju Cell:09448397704
Senior Advisor, Systems Reliability and Quality Email: sselvaraju@isro.gov.in

PREFACE

ISRO Reliability standards are a result of the need for standardization of processes towards achieving high
reliability systems. The transfer of knowledge and techniques from the seniors to their successors is best
done with proper documentation and checklists translating the entire know-how into black and white.

This particular document ‘Failure Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action System’, encompasses
the system of reporting, analyzing and correcting failures. The objectives of failure analysis, formation
of Failure Analysis Board (FAB) and its responsibilities and the role of quality professionals is clearly
documented. The concepts of Failure confirmation and procedure for Failure Analysis are also stressed
upon. The details of the aspects of failure notification, local records, impact analysis, initial inspection,
reporting format, trend analysis and close-out of actions are addressed at length. Specific attention is
drawn towards compliance of similar procedures at external work centers as well. Emphasis is also laid on
the development of a lessons learnt database and its dissemination across ISRO centers. Identification and
quarantine of rejected items is also elucidated.

It is deemed essential that these standards be strictly adhered to, in order to ensure uniformity of practices
across ISRO centers and achieve zero defects in the delivery of space systems.

I am grateful to Chairman ISRO, for being the source of inspiration in the release of these documents.
Thanks are also due to the centre Directors for their encouragement. I am also thankful to the Heads of
SR Entities/Groups of various ISRO centres for their relentless support and guidance. I am also indebted
to the members of the Integrated Product Assurance Board (IPAB) for the meticulous review of these
documents. I also owe gratitude to the task team members and other experts for putting efforts in the
realization of these documents. I am glad to carry forward this rich lineage of ISRO reliability standards,
championed by Shri R Aravamudan, a revered pioneer in the area of Quality & Reliability in ISRO.

S Selvaraju
Sr. Advisor (SRQ)
CONTENTS

1. SCOPE 9

2. DEFINITION 9

3. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS 9

4. OBJECTIVES OF FAILURE ANALYSIS 10

5. FAILURE REPORTING, ANALYSIS AND CORRECTIVE ACTION SYSTEM (FRACAS) 10


5.1 Failure Analysis Board (FAB) 11
5.1.1 Membership 11
5.1.2 Responsibilities 11
5.2 Failure Reporting 12
5.2.1 Failure Notification 12
5.2.2 Local Records 12
5.2.3 Failure Report Format 12
5.3 Failure Analysis (FA) 13
5.3.1 Initial Inspection 13
5.3.2 Failure Confirmation 13
5.3.3 Procedure for FA 13
5.3.4 FA Analysis Format 14
5.4 Corrective Actions and Recommendations 14
5.4.1 Impact Analysis 14
5.4.2 Recommendations 14
5.5 Close-out 14
5.5.1 Closure Report 14
5.5.2 Closure Report Format 14

6. IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF FAILED ITEMS 15

7. FAILURE RECORDS 15
7.1 Trend Analysis and Summary 15
7.2 Records Review 16

8. FRACAS AT VENDOR’S FACILITY 16

9. MISSION FAILURES 16

10. ANNEXURES 17-22


ISRO-PAS-201

1. SCOPE
Failures though not desirable, teach important lessons.To prevent the recurrence of similar failures, it is all the more
essential to have a detailed analysis of the reasons/ root cause of failures and preventive / corrective actions required
to ensure the reliability of the system.

This specification document brings out a systematic approach for the failure reporting, analysis and implementation
of corrective action. These procedures are mandatory and are applicable for hardware and software developed for
all launch vehicles and satellite systems of ISRO.

This document also defines what constitutes failure or non conformance.

2. DEFINITION
Failure
A failure is defined as a defect or malfunction which can prevent successful accomplishment of a mission. To be
precise, a part or a system encompassing hardware or software is considered to have failed under one of the
following three conditions:

(a) Catastrophic failure: When it becomes completely inoperable;


(b) Degradation failure: When the deterioration of its performance has made it unreliable or unsafe for
continued use; and
c) When it is still operable but is no longer able to perform its intended functions satisfactorily.

Condition (a) and (b) above are unambiguous and are easily identified and they necessitate immediate removal of
the part or system from service for repair or replacement. The last condition, however, involves certain amount of
subjective assessment as to what is considered as satisfactory functioning. In such cases functional specification and
the operational tolerances of the system should be the basis for judging the malfunction observed.

Non Conformance
An item, be it a raw material or a finished product, will be identified as non-conforming when it does not conform
to the applicable drawing, specifications or other stipulated criteria during the course of procurement, fabrication,
assembly and testing. Technical judgment indicates that these deviations are not due to component failures. Such
deviations observed will not generally constitute a failure and will be routed to appropriate Non Conformance
Review Boards (NCRB) for assessment.

3. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
The relevant portions of the following specifications generally form part of this document.

ISRO-PAS-100 Non Conformance Control Requirements for ISRO Projects

MIL-STD-2155 Failure Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action System.

Currently valid revision of the documents shall only be considered.

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4. OBJECTIVE(S) OF FAILURE ANALYSIS


A typical failure analysis has the following objectives

(i) The prime objective of failure analysis is to analyze the failure signatures of failed unit, identify the rootcause
of the failure and then take corrective actions so as to improve the performance. A basic requirement of the
failure analysis is that, all failure modes and failure mechanisms of the failed unit are known and
understood.
(ii) An important outcome of failure analysis is improved design, process and testing procedure so as to prevent
the recurrence of similar failures in future.
(iii) One of the derived objectives of failure analysis is that, a well defined failure analysis effort aids the development
of unique experimental techniques to analyze failure symptoms of complex systems, and establishment of a
scientific approach to system realization.
(iv) Another objective is that, failure analyses provides a mechanism for experience retention through
documentation and also adds to the repository of lessons learnt.

5. FAILURE REPORTING, ANALYSIS AND CORRECTIVE ACTION SYSTEM


(FRACAS)
FRACAS is a closed loop failure reporting system wherein all failures are formally reported, analysed and positive
corrective actions are identified and implemented.

Fig .1 Block diagram of FRACAS

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Organized and timely failure reporting is essential in order to alert the project, and all concerned, that a failure has
occurred, which might impede the successful performance and delivery targets. A controlled reporting system is
mandatory for effective failure analysis.

Implementation of FRACAS shall


- emphasize reporting of all failures regardless of their magnitude, so that appropriate evaluation and corrective
action can be accomplished and
- encompass all the failures that have occured during fabrication, handling, testing, subsystem and system level
integration/check-out of the QM/FM hardware and software related to launch vehicles / satellites.

The subsequent analysis and corrective action shall be incorporated for all similar applications in the whole
Project/ Mission.

5.1 Failure Analysis Board (FAB)


The Failure Analysis Board is a formal agency established for the purpose of carrying out failure analysis, identifying
root-cause of the failure, assessing the impact of failure on system performance, recommending necessary corrective/
preventive action and ensuring proper closeout.

5.1.1 Membership
The FAB shall be constituted by the Centre Director as a standing Failure Analysis Board for all the projects of the
Centre. Separate boards may be necessary for disciplines such as electronics, software, mechanical, chemical, etc.The
board shall have a Chairman preferably from the Systems Reliability (SR) agency of the Centre who is knowledgeable
in the area and can provide effective guidelines for carrying out failure analysis. The other members shall be from
design team, SR, project core team, and other specialists in the applicable area. The board shall have a convener/co-
convener preferably from Project/SR.

5.1.2 Responsibilities
In the analysis of the failure reported, the Board shall:
- Verify the failure
- Evaluate the effects of the failure on the performance requirements
- Review records of earlier analysis of similar failures, if any
- Consider alerts from other projects, vendor records, test reports, etc.
- Carry out a systematic investigation to determine the root cause of the failure and the failure mechanisms
- Get in-depth analysis made wherever necessary, by an appropriate failure analysis laboratory to identify
failure modes and reasons
- Evaluate secondary/propagated effects of the failure on other parts in terms of electrical/mechanical
stresses
- Determine the corrective and preventive actions to eliminate the root cause of the failure and to prevent
recurrence of similar failures
- Document the proceedings with all evidences including photographs and other relevant records

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- If multiple failures of same type of components are observed, that batch is to be suspected. Additional tests
shall be done on that batch and based on the test results the batch shall be quarantined and controlled
- Categorise the failures as design related, process related, handling related, workmanship related or test
induced etc.
- Define the re-test guidelines on the refurbished hardware/software

5.2 Failure Reporting


5.2.1 Failure Notification
A numbered failure report must be raised for each case of failure observed to alert the management that a failure
has occurred. Accuracy and timeliness are of prime importance in reporting a failure, as analysis of the failure will
be devoted to the reported problem and speedy repair/replacement action will also be essential to meet project
schedules. The failure report shall be raised by the agency where the failure occurs/ respective quality agency.

All failures that occur during


- Realization/ testing of QM/FM unit
- Realization/ testing of sub assemblies
- Testing at integrated launch vehicle/ satellite level
- Testing of software at various phases

shall be reported to FAB for analysis and shall not be simply kept aside without proper failure analysis. Failure of
ground equipments involved in the critical operation also shall be reported to FAB.

The failure report should be marked to Convener, Chairman and other members of the appropriate FAB, the SR
agency, System Development/ production agency, and the Project concerned.

5.2.2 Local Records


All failures shall be recorded initially on local records, such as discrepancy notes, test records, inspection records,
log book/sheets, etc., applicable to the area of operation. Then a failure report shall be raised with sufficient data to
enable analysis.

5.2.3 Failure Report Format


The failure report should contain the following mandatory information:
- Report number and failure date
- Project identification
- Identification of the failed item
- Next higher assembly
- Identification number of part, drawing number, etc.
- Manufacturer
- Location where failure occurred
- Number of hours operated before failure
- Test category

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- Operating environment
- Description of failure
- Circuit diagram/ drawing indicating the failed component & the operating conditions
- Effect of failure on system/subsystem performance
- Suspected cause
- Earlier failure history, if any

A notification format can be standardized by each centre, as found fit. Sample formats are given in annexures I & Ia.

5.3 Failure Analysis (FA)


Failure analysis efforts should be directed to determine the root cause of the failure and to determine whether the
deficiency was due to design, workmanship or other factors. The analysis should explicitly bring out the corrective/
preventive actions to be implemented.

5.3.1 Initial Inspection


Whenever a failure is observed, the testing or other operations such as integration or simulation during which the
failure occurred shall be halted to enable an on-the-spot inspection of the failed hardware by the failure analysis board.
This allows valuable information on the failure to be collected for failure analysis. Decision regarding continuation of
tests or disassembly of hardware shall then be made with the concurrence of the failure analysis board.

All necessary precautions are to be taken to prevent the loss of evidence.

5.3.2 Failure Confirmation


All reported failures shall be verified. Failure verification is determined either by repeating the failure mode on the
reported item, by evidence of failure and also by suitable analysis. Even if the failure could not be recreated, it shall
be treated as a one time anomaly and has to be properly investigated.

5.3.3 Procedure for FA


FAB shall, at first, establish step-by-step procedures in detail for the analysis of the failures. Further, a checklist must
be used to ensure systematic analysis of failures. The checklist should indicate the steps of procedures such as :
• Identification and history
• Visual inspection
• Non-destructive testing
• Disassembly and special examinations
• Destructive testing/ de-cap analysis of the failed element including metallography/ fractography/ Scanning
Electron Microscopy (SEM) etc
• Simulations and investigations to bring out/confirm root cause of failure.
• Failed part/material history collection
• Failure-mode review
• Review of impact of unforeseen events like power-failure, surge, short-circuit, lightening, uneven neutral
ground voltage etc.

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5.3.4 Failure Analysis Format


The FA format should be devised by each centre as found fit. Sample format is attached in the annexures II & IIa.

5.4 Corrective Actions and Recommendations


5.4.1 Impact Analysis
The FAB shall review the impact of the failed unit on the peripheral parts or interfaces as well as those parts which
are directly preceding or succeeding the unit. This impact assessment should bring out the immediate health as well
as long term health of such parts which are connected with the failed unit by way of direct physical connection or
a coupled connection.

5.4.2 Recommendations
FAB should bring out, based on studies/deliberations, the root cause of failure and circumstances for the same. Based
on detailed analysis and tests, FAB should recommend a set of corrective actions required for the removal of not
only the faulty or malfunctioning part but also other parts that may have been affected beyond their rated thresholds.
FAB should also recommend preventive actions to avoid recurrence of such failures in future. FAB should bring out
clearly, whether the failure is due to operational, workmanship or design related discrepancy.

It will be the responsibility of System Development Agency or Project/Product Engineer/Manager concerned to


implement all recommendations of FAB.

It should be brought to the notice of Project as well as Project Configuration Management Board in case the
recommendations call for a change in configuration.

5.5 Close-out
5.5.1 Closure Report
The close-out should be presented to the FAB. The project, through the Project Engineer/ Manager concerned,
shall ensure that all actions on failures are closed appropriately. To prepare a Close-out, the following shall be
complied with:
- Corrective actions have been accomplished and verified
- Effectiveness of preventive actions (including review of relevant reliability analysis) has been established and
confirmed
- Close out documentation has been signed by appropriate authority and by the SR agency certifying the completion
of all close-out actions
Wherever interim corrective actions are necessary, these should be authorized by formal and standard procedures
to satisfy the immediate mission requirements. Further, in such cases the close-out should be completed prior to
subsequent missions of similar nature.

5.5.2 Closure Report Format


The project/System Development Agency (SDA) will be responsible for preparing the Failure Closure Report.
The closure reports should be sent to the FAB, Design review committee, SR agency of the centre concerned,
Project, the originator of the failure report and other related agencies.

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ISRO-PAS-201

The Failure Closure Report should contain the following mandatory information:
• Report number and date of failure
• Project identification
• Identification of failed item
• Next higher assembly
• Identification of part drawing number, etc.
• Manufacturer
• Number of hours operated before failure
• Reporting agency
• Failure report reference and a summary
• FAB recommendations
• List of parts replaced/repaired, if any with identification
• Close-out status (whether action closed, waivers requested etc.)

A closure report format can be devised by each centre, as found fit. Sample formats are attached in
annexures III & IIIa.

6. IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL OF FAILED ITEMS


All failed items shall be conspicuously marked or tagged and controlled to assure proper disposition. Each centre
shall formalize a procedure to identify/mark the failed unit. Separate record and identification number shall be
maintained, listing clearly the details of the item and its failure history. Failed items shall be stored in separate
quarantine area (wherein flight units are not stored) and these shall not be distributed for use.

7. FAILURE RECORDS
Convener of the FAB is responsible for maintaining all the failure records and corrective actions. In addition, minutes
of all FAB meetings shall be maintained to provide a continuous record of attendance and actions. Such records shall
be in a form showing the complete history of each failure including its identification, time, dates, locations, activities
in progress and environments prevailing at the time of occurrence of the failure as well as implications, actions taken
and traceability information.

A database of all failures/ corrective actions shall be maintained in an easily retrievable electronic form in each
centre. A repository of lessons learnt from the failures shall be maintained, updated periodically and intimated to the
concerned as alert notes. A lessons learnt document shall be brought out by SR team, after each mission along with
specific recommendations. Suitable higher level fora such as LV-FRR/SRC/Sub-system PSR shall review this document
and suggest mandatory actions further on.

7.1 Trend Analysis and Summary


The SR agency of the respective Centre shall implement a system of failure trend analysis to review and analyse
failure data for revealing trends. Periodic status summaries shall also be prepared and up-dated for:
- Types of failure reported and frequency of such events with their analysis
- Status on corrective/preventive actions

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- Request for deviations/waivers, if any, resulting from the failure analysis


- Technology and process limitations noticed

SR agency should also send alerts on failures periodically to all the concerned design groups/projects highlighting
such failures for suitable corrective/preventive actions. These alerts as applicable, may also be shared with other
ISRO centres.

7.2 Records Review


Summary data records of all actions pertaining to failures shall be reviewed periodically by the project executives in
the respective area/ SR agency for the purpose of evaluating the progress made in correcting failure conditions and
determining the overall effectiveness of the failure analysis system. These records shall also form a part of the input
data package for specific project reviews such as design review, pre-shipment review and launch readiness reviews.

8. FRACAS AT VENDOR’S FACILITY


All failures occurring at vendor’s facility during fabrication/testing shall also be communicated to the appropriate
identified agency in the respective centers/focal point for external production, for necessary analysis and closeout.

Procedures discussed in this document for failure reporting, failure analysis, closeout etc., are applicable to these
cases also. Failure records and trend analysis are also to be carried out as stipulated.

SR agency shall send alerts wherever required based on inputs of any lapses or use of non- standard practices to all
production agencies for corrective and preventive actions. The alerts as applicable, may also be shared with other
ISRO centres.

9. MISSION FAILURES
Analysis of mission failures (such as launch failures, in-orbit anomalies, major test failures etc.) is generally more
complex in nature and have a significant impact on ISRO programs.The nature/diversity of evidences vary vastly with
limited availability of data for analysis. It is therefore necessary to systematize special procedures for the analysis of
mission failures.

Specialist teams shall be constituted including National level experts from academia and industry to carry out
failure analysis at mission level. Such teams shall be constituted by Chairman, ISRO with clear definition of the scope
of work.

In-orbit anomaly or failures on-board the satellites shall also be analyzed by suitable expert teams and the root
cause established. The recommendations shall be communicated to SR and FABs involved in the mission and are to
be incorporated in all the missions thereafter.

The quality agencies involved, should establish a database tracking all the failures and close-out actions for both
launch vehicle and satellite missions.The dissemination of the failure analysis should be done to the lowest possible
level of the Project.

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ANNEXURE-I:
FAILURE NOTIFICATION FORMAT
IN-HOUSE / VENDOR’S
( ISRO Center) / (Vendor under Contract)

PROJECT: SYSTEM: SUB-SYSTEM:


MODEL: IDENTIFICATION NO. : DATE:
PART/UNIT/MODULE NO./ BOX NO./ DRG. NO./REV MATERIAL TYPE /RMC No
SUB ASSEMBLY:
CIRCUIT/ SUB-SYSTEM Fn. : PART/ MATERIAL LOCATION MANUFACTURER/ SUPPLIER
PART / MATERIAL TRACEABILITY (BS - ID)
DESCRIPTION OF FAILURE :
i) DEVELOPMENT STAGE AT WHICH FAILURE OBSERVED:
ii) FAILURE CATEGORY
a) CATASTROPHIC/ MAJOR/ MINOR
b) GRADUAL/ INTERMITTENT/ CYCLIC
iii) TEST STAGE WHEN FAILURE OBSERVED
OPTIMIZATION AND INTERFACING/ T&E /PPT/
ACCEPTANCE/QUALIFICATION TEST
iv) DEVELOPMENTAL STAGE WHEN FAILURE OBSERVED
CIRCUIT/ SUBSYSTEM/ SYSTEM / PANEL/ SPACE-CRAFT
v) TEST SET-UP LOCATION
PROJECT CLEAN AREA/ T &E TEST FACILITY/INTEGRATION AREA/PPT
vi) TEST SET-UP VALIDATION STATUS
VERIFIED TEST SET-UP/ CLEAN AREA/ STANDARD BIAS SOURCES/ ESD-SAFETY ...
vii) APPROXIMATE OPERATIONAL LIFE PRIOR TO FAILURE
(Accumulation of operational time duration till failure)
viii) ANY ANAMOLOUS OBSERVATION
TEST SET-UP MALFUNCTION/ POWER-FAILURE/ SURGE/ MIS-HANDLING/AE/STRAIN/
DISPLACEMENT/LOAD
ix) PRECEDING/ SUCCEEDING FUNCTIONAL BLOCK OF THE INTEGRATED ASSEMBLY
x) IMP ACT ON PRECEDING/ SUCCEEDING FUNCTIONAL BLOCK DUE TO
MALFUNCTION/ FAILURE OF UNIT CONCERNED
xi) TEST TEAM WHEN FAILURE OBSERVED
xii) WHETHER STRESS/ DERATING ANALYSIS PENDING FOR THE CIRCUIT
xiii) ANY OTHER DETAILS FELT NECESSARY TO BE REPORTED
SUSPECTED CAUSE, IF ANY, AS PER TEST TEAM
PREVIOUS FAILURE HISTORY FOR THE UNIT/ MATERIAL, IF ANY

ENGINEER

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ANNEXURE-Ia:
FAB (AVN) FORM NO. 01: FAILURE REPORTING FORMAT

1. Reporting Agency :

2. Reference No: 3. Date:

4. Project: 5. Sub Assembly:

6. Package Name & Package ID:

8. Manufacturer/Fabricating agency:

9. Test phase & Location:

10. Operating environment (Eg. SRC/Vibration/Thermal/EMI/Thermovacuum):

11. Description of failure:

12. Effect of the failure on system/subsystem performance:

13. Suspected cause:

14. Failure precedence, if any:

ENGINEER

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ANNEXURE-II:
FAILURE ANALYSIS SUMMARY FORMAT
IN-HOUSE / VENDOR’S
(ISRO Center) / (Vendor under Contract)

PROJECT: SYSTEM: SUB-SYSTEM:

MODEL: REPORT. SR. NO. : DATE:

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF FAILURE OBSERVED

PART/UNIT/MODULE OR MATERIAL DETAILS (TYPE NO./FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION/


BATCH-LOT/ QUALITY/ MANUFACTURER/ TRACEABILITY)

FAILED PART/ MATERIAL HISTORY AND REVIEW OF PREVIOUS FAILURE HISTORY, IF ANY

FAILED PART/ MATERIAL INSPECTION AND SIGNATURE RECORDS

FAILURE MECHANISM -HYPOTHESIS

ROOT CAUSE IDENTIFICATION BASED ON SIMULATIONS AND ANALYSIS

Convener, FAB Chairman, FAB

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ANNEXURE-IIa:
FAB (AVN) FORM NO. 02: FAILURE ANALYSIS FORMAT
(Package/Part)

1. Reference number & Date: 2. Failure note Reference:

3. Identification and history:

2. Visual inspection (before opening (Package/Part)):

3. Testing (before opening (Package/Part))

4. Visual inspection (after opening (Package/Part))

5. Simulations and investigations to bring out/confirm cause of failure:

6. Failure precedence, if any:

7. Conclusion:

Convener, FAB Chairman, FAB

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ANNEXURE-III:
CLOSURE REPORT FORMAT

IN-HOUSE / VENDOR’S
(ISRO Center) / (Vendor under Contract)

PROJECT: SYSTEM: SUB-SYSTEM:

MODEL: SR. NO. : DATE:

PART/UNIT/MODULE NO. : BOX NO./ DRG. NO. MATERIAL TYPE

CIRCUIT/ SUB-SYSTEM Function. : PART/ MATERIAL LOCATION MANUFACTURER/ SUPPLIER

FAILURE NOTIFICATION REFERENCE AND FAILURE SUMMARY

TEST TEAM REPORTING THE FAILURE

FAB RECOMMENDATIONS

LIST OF PARTS REPLACED/REPAIRED, IF ANY, WITH IDENTIFICATION

MODIFICATIONS IN CONFIGURATION, IF ANY

CMRB APPROVAL OBTAINED, IF ANY

CLOSE-OUT STATUS (WHETHER ACTION CLOSED OR OPEN FOR REVIEW)

PROJECT/SDA ENGINEER

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ANNEXURE-IIIa:
FAB (AVN) FORM NO. 03: ANALYSIS AND CLOSURE REPORT FORMAT

1. Reference No. & Date: 2. Failure note Reference.

3. Failure Analysis Reference: 4. Project:

5. Subassembly: 6. Package name & Package ID:

7. Fabricating agency: 8. Reporting Agency:

9. Failure summary:

10. FAB recommendations/Actions:

11. List of parts replaced/repaired, if any with identification:

12. Root cause:

13. Close-out status (whether action closed, waivers requested etc.):

14. Name & Signature:

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