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G.R. No. 172035. July 4, 2012.

FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.

Criminal Procedure; Information; Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules)
requires, inter alia, that the information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute and the
acts or omissions imputed which constitute the offense charged.—In deference to the constitutional right of
an accused to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him, Section 6, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules) requires,  inter alia, that the information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which constitute the
offense charged. Additionally, the Rules requires that these acts or omissions and its attendant
circumstances “must be stated in ordinary and concise language” and “in terms sufficient to enable a person
of common understanding to know what offense is being charged x x x and for the court to pronounce
judgment.”
Same; Same; Same; The test of the information’s sufficiency is whether the crime is described in
intelligible terms and with such particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed
of the offense charged.—The test of the information’s sufficiency is whether the crime is described in
intelligible terms and with such particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed
of the offense charged. In particular, whether an information validly charges an offense depends on whether
the material facts alleged in the complaint or information shall establish the essential elements of the
offense charged as defined in the law. The  raison d’etre  of the requirement in the Rules is to enable the
accused to suitably prepare his defense.
Same; Suspension; The suspension requires a prior hearing to determine “the validity of the information”
filed against him, “taking into account the serious and far reaching consequences of a suspen-

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* SECOND DIVISION.

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sion of an elective public official even before his conviction.”—While the suspension of a public officer
under this provision is mandatory, the suspension requires a prior hearing to determine “the validity of the
information” filed against him, “taking into account the serious and far reaching consequences of a
suspension of an elective public official even before his conviction.” The accused public official’s right to
challenge the validity of the information before a suspension order may be issued includes the right to
challenge the (i) validity of the criminal proceeding leading to the filing of an information against him, and
(ii) propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts charged do not constitute a violation of R.A. No.
3019 or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code.
Same; Pre-Suspension Hearing; While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair
and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the information or the regularity of the proceedings
against him, no hard and fast rule exists in regulating its conduct.—While a pre-suspension hearing is
aimed at securing for the accused  fair and adequate opportunity  to challenge the validity of the
information or the regularity of the proceedings against him, Luciano likewise emphasizes that no hard and
fast rule exists in regulating its conduct. With the purpose of a pre-suspension hearing in mind, the absence
of an actual hearing alone cannot be determinative of the validity of a suspension order.
Same; Right to be Heard; It is well settled that “to be heard” does not only mean oral arguments in court;
one may be heard also through pleadings.—Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process
requirement, when an accused public official is given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible
defenses against the mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then an accused would have no reason to
complain that no actual hearing was conducted. It is well settled that “to be heard” does not only mean oral
arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of procedural due process exists.
Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019); Suspension; Suspension under
R.A. No. 3019 being a mere preventive measure whose duration shall in no case exceed ninety (90)

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COURT
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ANNOTATED

Miguel vs.
Sandiganbayan

days, the adequacy of the opportunity to contest the validity of the information and of the proceedings
that preceded its filing vis-à-vis the merits of the defenses of the accused cannot be measured alone by the
absence or presence of an actual hearing.—Suspension under R.A. No. 3019 being a mere preventive
measure whose duration shall in no case exceed ninety (90) days, the adequacy of the opportunity to contest
the validity of the information and of the proceedings that preceded its filing  vis-à-vis  the merits of the
defenses of the accused cannot be measured alone by the absence or presence of an actual hearing. An
opportunity to be heard on one’s defenses, however unmeritorious it may be, against the suspension
mandated by law equally and sufficiently serves both the due process right of the accused and the
mandatory nature of the suspension required by law.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.


   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Ferrer and Associates Law Office for petitioner.
  Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for  certiorari  under Rule 651  filed by Fernando Q. Miguel
(petitioner), assailing the January 25, 2006 and March 27, 2006 resolutions2  of the
Sandiganbayan. These resolutions (i) ordered the petitioner’s suspension from public office and
(ii) denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the suspension order.

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1 RULES OF COURT.
2  Penned by Associate Justice Godofredo L. Legaspi, and concurred in by Associate Justices Efren N. dela Cruz and
Norberto Y. Geraldez, Sr.

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The Antecedent Facts


On May 29, 1996, then Vice Mayor Mercelita M. Lucido and other local officials3 of Koronadal
City, South Cotabato filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
(Ombudsman)4 charging the petitioner, among others,5with violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019, in connection with the consultancy services for the architectural aspect, the engineering
design, and the construction supervision and management of the proposed Koronadal City public
market (project).6
In a June 27, 1996 order, the Ombudsman directed the petitioner, among others, to submit his
counter-affidavit. On October 23, 1996, after moving for an extension, the petitioner filed his
counter-affidavit.7 In its July 29, 1999 resolution, the Ombudsman found probable cause against
the petitioner and some private individuals for violation of R.A. No. 3019 and against the
petitioner alone for Falsification of Public Document under Article 171, par. 4 of the Revised
Penal Code.8
On March 1, 2000, the Ombudsman filed the corresponding informations with the
Sandiganbayan.9The information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads:

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3  The  Sangguniang Bayanmembers-complainants are as follows: Rose Dideles, Rene Jumilla, Pablito Subere and
Edwin Abris; Rollo, p. 5.
4 Id., at p. 83.
5  Gaspar E. Nepomuceno, Jesus G. Casus, Ernesto R. Lagdameo, Jr., Bonifacio M. Madarcos, and Vinci Nicholas R.
Villaseñor; id., at p. 103.
6 Id., at pp. 110-113.
7 Id., at pp. 124-125.
8 Id., at pp. 5 and 83.
9 The case for violation of R.A. No. 3019 was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25819 (id., at p. 103). The Office of the
Special Prosecutor filed a Motion to drop Ernesto R. Lagdameo, Jr., Bonifacio M.

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REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Miguel vs.
Sandiganbayan

“That on 10 January 1995 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Koronadal,
South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the [petitioner], a high
ranking public officer in his capacity as former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South Cotabato, and as such
while in the performance of his official functions,  committing  the offense in relation to his
office, taking advantage of his official position, conspiring and confederating with the private [individuals]
xxx acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally give unwarranted benefits and advantages to said [accused], by inviting them to participate in
the prequalification of consultants to provide the Detailed Architectural & Engineering Design and
Construction Supervision and Management of the proposed Koronadal Public Market, without causing the
publication of said invitation in a newspaper of general circulation, thereby excluding other consultants
from participating in said prequalification.”10 (Emphases and underscoring added)
On motions separately filed by two of the petitioner’s co-accused,11 the Sandiganbayan ordered
the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to conduct a reinvestigation. On August 21, 2000, the
petitioner, through counsel, followed suit and orally moved for a reinvestigation, which the
Sandiganbayan likewise granted. The Sandiganbayan gave the petitioner ten (10) days within
which to file his counter-affidavit with the OSP.12
Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, the petitioner asked13  the Sandiganbayan for a
thirty-day extension to submit his counter-affidavit. Shortly before the expiry of the

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Madarcos, Jesus G. Casus and Vinci Nicholas R. Villaseñor from the Information (id.,  at pp. 106 and 108). The
falsification case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25820 (id., at p. 103).
10 Id., at p. 117.
11  On March 3, 2000 and June 5, 2000, Bonifacio M. Madarcos and Ernesto R. Lagdameo, Jr., respectively, filed a
Motion for Reinvestigation; id., at pp. 103-104.
12 Id., at p. 104.
13 Dated August 30, 2000; ibid.

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extension requested, the petitioner asked14 the OSP for an additional thirty-day period to file
his counter-affidavit. Despite the two extensions asked and granted, the petitioner asked the OSP
anew for a twenty-day extension period.15
Despite the extension period asked and given, the petitioner failed to file his counter-affidavit,
prompting Prosecutor Norberto B. Ruiz to declare that the petitioner had waived his right to
submit countervailing evidence (April 25, 2001 resolution). On July 31, 2001, then Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto approved the resolution.16
On August 7, 2001, Prosecutor Ruiz asked the Sandiganbayan for the arraignment and trial of
the petitioner and of the other accused private individuals.17
On August 6, 2002, after several extensions sought and granted, the petitioner filed a Motion
to Quash and/or Reinvestigation for the criminal cases against him. On February 18, 2003, the
Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner’s motion because of the pending OSP reinvestigation—this,
despite the OSP’s earlier termination of the reinvestigation for the petitioner’s continuous failure
to submit his counter-affidavit.18 The petitioner did not question the denial of his motion.
On November 3, 2004, the petitioner was arraigned; he pleaded not guilty in both criminal
cases.19
On April 28, 2005, the OSP filed a Motion to Suspend [the petitioner] Pendente Lite. On June
27, 2005, the petitioner filed his “Vigorous Opposition” based on the “obvious and fatal defect of
the [i]nformation” in failing to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages was
done

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14 Dated September 28, 2000; id., at p. 105.
15 Dated October 29, 2000; ibid.
16 Id., at p. 106.
17 Ibid.
18 Id., at p. 27.
19 Id., at p. 6.

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ANNOTATED
Miguel vs.
Sandiganbayan

through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.20


On January 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed resolution21suspending
the petitioner pendente lite—
“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Prosecution’s Motion is GRANTED. As prayed for, the
Court hereby orders the suspension of [the petitioner] from his position as City Mayor, Koronadal City,
South Cotabato, and from any other public position he now holds. His suspension shall be for a period of
ninety (90) days only.”22

On February 2, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of his suspension order and
demanded for a pre-suspension hearing.23  The Sandiganbayan denied his motion,24  prompting
him to file this certiorari petition to challenge the validity of his suspension order.

The Petition

The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ordering his
suspension despite the failure of the information to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits
and advantages  by the petitioner  was made through “manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence.” He alleges that the phrases “evident bad faith” and “manifest
partiality” actually refers not to him, but to his co-accused,25rendering the information fatally
defective.
The petitioner bewails the lack of hearing before the issuance of his suspension order.
Citing Luciano, et al. v. Hon.

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20 Id., at pp. 6-7.
21 Id., at pp. 21-24.
22 Id., at p. 24.
23 Id., at p. 13.
24 Id., at pp. 26-28.
25 Id., at p. 67.

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Mariano, etc., et al.,26  he claims that “[n]owhere in the records of the [case] can [one] see any
order or resolution requiring the [p]etitioner to show cause at a specific date of hearing why he
should not be ordered suspended.”27  For the petitioner, the requirement of a pre-suspension
hearing can only be satisfied if the Sandiganbayan ordered an actual hearing to settle the “defect”
in the information.

The OSP’s Comment

The OSP argues for the sufficiency of the information since all the elements of the offense
under Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 are specifically pleaded by way of ultimate facts. These
elements are:
1. The petitioner was the Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South Cotabato at the time
material to the acts complained of;
2. The petitioner acted with manifest partiality and evident bad faith when he invited only
his co-accused private individuals to participate in the prequalification of consultants for
the project instead of publishing it in a newspaper of general circulation; and
3. The petitioner’s actions, performed in relation to his office, gave unwarranted benefits and
advantages to his co-accused.28
The OSP faults the petitioner for his attempt to mislead the Court on the sufficiency of the
allegations in the information, by conveniently failing to cite the phrase “acting with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality” when the petitioner quoted the “relevant” portions of the
information in his petition.

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26 148-B Phil. 178; 40 SCRA 187 (1971).
27 Rollo, pp. 13-14.
28 Rollo, p. 45.

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REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Miguel vs.
Sandiganbayan

Citing  Juan v. People,29the OSP argues that while no actual pre-suspension hearing was
conducted, the events preceding the issuance of the suspension order already satisfied the
purpose of conducting a pre-suspension hearing—i.e., basically, to determine the validity of the
information. Here, the petitioner was afforded his right to preliminary investigation both by the
Ombudsman and by the OSP (when the petitioner moved for a reinvestigation with the
Sandiganbayan); the acts for which the petitioner was charged constitute a violation of R.A. No.
3019 and Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code; and the petitioner already moved to quash
the information, although unsuccessfully, after he had been declared to have waived his right to
submit countervailing evidence in the reinvestigation by the OSP.30

Issues

There are only two issues presented for our resolution:


1. Whether the information, charging the petitioner with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, is valid; and
2. If it is valid, whether the absence of an actual pre-suspension hearing renders invalid the
suspension order against the petitioner.

The Court’s Ruling

We dismiss the petition for failure to establish any grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of
the assailed resolutions.

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29 379 Phil. 125; 322 SCRA 125 (2000).
30 Citing Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 324 Phil. 151; 253 SCRA 773 (1996).

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The information for violation 


of R.A. No. 3019 is valid
In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and the
cause of the accusation against him,31Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure (Rules)32  requires,  inter alia, that the information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which constitute the offense
charged. Additionally, the Rules requires that these acts or omissions and its attendant
circumstances “must be stated in ordinary and concise language” and “in terms sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged x x x and for the
court to pronounce judgment.”33

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31 Constitution, Article III, Section 14(2).
32 Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.—A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name
of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and
the place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information.
33 Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation.—The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in
the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstance and for the court to pronounce
judgment.

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REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Miguel vs.
Sandiganbayan

The test of the information’s sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms
and with such particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the
offense charged. In particular, whether an information validly charges an offense depends on
whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information shall establish the essential
elements of the offense charged as defined in the law. The raison d’etre of the requirement in the
Rules is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.34
In arguing against the validity of the information, the petitioner appears to go beyond the
standard of a “person of common understanding” in appreciating the import of the phrase “acting
with evident bad faith and manifest partiality.” A reading of the information clearly reveals that
the phrase “acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality” was merely a continuation of
the prior allegation of the acts  of the petitioner, and that he ultimately acted with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality in giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to his co-accused
private individuals. This is what a plain and non-legalistic reading of the information would
yield.
Notably, in his petition, the petitioner would have us believe that this elemental phrase was
actually omitted in the information35  when, in his reaction to the OSP’s comment, what the
petitioner actually disputes is simply the  clarity  of the phrase’s position, in relation with the
other averments in the information. Given the supposed ambiguity of the subject being qualified
by the phrase “acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality,” the remedy of the
petitioner, if at all, is merely to move for a bill of particulars and not for the

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34 Lazarte, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180122, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 431.
35 See Dela Chica v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 144823, December 8, 2003, 417 SCRA 242.

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quashal of an information which sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense charged.36
The pre-suspension order is valid
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
“Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits.—Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution
under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is
pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement
and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.”

While the suspension of a public officer under this provision is mandatory,37  the suspension
requires a prior hearing to determine “the validity of the information”38filed against him, “taking
into account the serious and far reaching consequences of a suspension of an elective public
official even before his conviction.”39 The accused public official’s right to challenge the validity of
the information before a suspension order may be issued includes the right to challenge the (i)
validity of the criminal proceeding leading to the filing of an information against him, and (ii)
propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts charged do not constitute a viola-

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36 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 116, Section 9; and Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152259, July
29, 2004, 435 SCRA 371, 388-389.
37 Flores v. Layosa, G.R. No. 154714, August 12, 2004, 436 SCRA 337, 345.
38 Luciano, et al. v. Hon. Mariano, etc., et al., supra note 26, at pp. 183-184; and People v. Albano, Nos. L-45376-77,
July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 511, 517.
39 Ibid.

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REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Miguel vs.
Sandiganbayan

tion of R.A. No. 3019 or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code.40
In Luciano v. Mariano41that the petitioner relied upon, the Court required, “by way of broad
guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension,” that—
“(c) …upon the filing of such information, the trial court should issue an order with proper notice
requiring the accused officer to show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered
suspended from office pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act.  Where either the
prosecution seasonably files a motion for an order of suspension or the accused in turn files a
motion to quash the information or challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause order of the
trial court would no longer be necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear the
parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the information, and thereafter hand down its
ruling, issuing the corresponding order of suspension should it uphold the validity of the information or
withholding such suspension in the contrary case.
 (d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state
that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the
criminal proceedings against him,  e.g.that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary
investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3019 or of the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his
mandatory suspension from office under section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the
information on any of the grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.” (Emphasis supplied)

The petitioner questions the absence of any show cause order issued by the Sandiganbayan
before his suspension in office was ordered. As clear as the day, however, Luciano

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40 People v. Albano, supra note 38, at pp. 518-519; and Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 30, at pp. 179; p. 779.
41 Supra note 26, at pp. 192-193; p. 202.

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considered it unnecessary for the trial court to issue a show cause order when the motion, seeking
the suspension of the accused  pendente lite, has been submitted by the prosecution, as in the
present case.
The purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension hearing is to determine the validity of
the information so that the trial court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed
with the trial on the merits of the case, withhold the suspension and dismiss the case, or correct
any part of the proceedings that impairs its validity. That hearing is similar to a challenge to the
validity of the information by way of a motion to quash.42
While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused  fair and adequate
opportunity  to challenge the validity of the information or the regularity of the proceedings
against him,43  Luciano  likewise emphasizes that no hard and fast rule exists in regulating its
conduct.44  With the purpose of a pre-suspension hearing in mind, the absence of
an actual hearing alone cannot be determinative of the validity of a suspension order.
In  Bedruz v. Sandiganbayan,45  the Court considered the opposition of the accused (to the
prosecution’s motion to suspend pendente lite) as sufficient to dispense with the need to actually
set the prosecution’s motion for hearing. The same conclusion was reached in  Juan v.
People,46 where the Court ruled:

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42 Talaga, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169888, November 11, 2008, 570 SCRA 622, 632.
43 Segovia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 124067, March 27, 1998, 288 SCRA 328, 339.
44 Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001, 356 SCRA 636, 645; and Flores v. Layosa, G.R. No.
154714, August 12, 2004, supra note 37, at pp. 345-346.
45 G.R. No. 161640, December 9, 2005, 513 Phil. 400; 477 SCRA 286 (2005).
46 Supra note 29, at p. 140; p. 138.

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REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Miguel vs.
Sandiganbayan

“In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension hearing held to determine the validity of the
Informations that had been filed against petitioners, we believe that the numerous pleadings filed for and
against them have achieved the goal of this procedure. The right to due process is satisfied nor just by an
oral hearing but by the filing and the consideration by the court of the parties’ pleadings, memoranda and
other position papers.”

Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused public
official is given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against the
mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then an accused would have no reason to complain
that no actual hearing was conducted.47 It is well settled that “to be heard” does not only mean
oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of procedural
due process exists.48
In the present case, the petitioner (i) filed his Vigorous Opposition (to the OSP’s Motion to
Suspend Accused Pendente Lite), and after receiving an adverse ruling from the Sandiganbayan,
(ii) moved for reconsideration of the suspension order issued against him, and (iii) filed a Reply to
the OSP’s Opposition to his plea for reconsideration.49 Given this opportunity, we find that the
petitioner’s continued demand for the conduct of an actual pre-suspension hearing—based on the
same alleged “defect in the information,”50 which we have found wanting—has legally nothing to
anchor itself on.
Another reason that militates against the petitioner’s position relates to the nature of Section
13 of R.A. No. 3019; it is not a penal provision that would call for a liberal interpreta-

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47 Flores v. Layosa, supra note 37, at pp. 345-346.
48 Tan v. Atty. Balon, Jr., A.C. No. 6483, August 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 645, 655-656.
49 Rollo, p. 109.
50 Id., at p. 95.

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tion in favor of the accused public official and a strict construction against the State.51  The
suspension required under this provision is  not  a penalty, as it is not imposed as a result of
judicial proceedings; in fact, if acquitted, the accused official shall be entitled to reinstatement
and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during his suspension.52
Rather, the suspension under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 is a mere  preventive
measure53 that arises from the legal presumption that unless the accused is suspended, he may
frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same way that
upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest
of the accused.54
Suspension under R.A. No. 3019 being a mere preventive measure whose duration shall in no
case exceed ninety (90) days,55the adequacy of the opportunity to contest the validity of the
information and of the proceedings that preceded its filing vis-à-visthe merits of the defenses of
the accused cannot be measured alone by the absence or presence of an actual hearing. An
opportunity to be heard on one’s defenses, however unmeritorious it may be, against the
suspension mandated by law equally and sufficiently serves both the due process right of the
accused and the mandatory nature of the suspension required by law.

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51 Villaseñor v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180700, March 4, 2008, 547 SCRA 658, 666-668.
52 Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, No. L-61776 to No. L-61861, March 23, 1984, 128 SCRA 383.
53 Villaseñor v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 50, at pp. 666-667; and Segovia v. Sandiganbayan, supra  note 43, at p.
336.
54 Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110503, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 103, 108.
55 Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 86899-903, May 15, 1989, 173 SCRA 409, 419.
576

576 SUPREME COURT


REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Miguel vs.
Sandiganbayan

Lest it be forgotten, Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reinforces the principle enshrined in the
Constitution that a public office is a public trust.56  In light of the constitutional principle
underlying the imposition of preventive suspension of a public officer charged under a valid
information and the nature of this suspension, the petitioner’s demand for a trial-type hearing in
the present case would only overwhelmingly frustrate, rather than promote, the orderly and
speedy dispensation of justice.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Carpio (Chairperson), Perez, Sereno and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Petition dismissed.

Notes.—The suspension from office of an elective official, whether as a preventive measure or


as a penalty, will undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services of the person they have
conscientiously chosen and voted into office. (Garcia, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals [12th Division], 586
SCRA 799 [2009]).
An information, under Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, is
deemed sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed. (People vs. Teodoro, 607 SCRA 307 [2009])

——o0o——

_______________
56 Constitution, Article XI, Section 1; Berona v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 142456, July 27, 2004, 435 SCRA 303.

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