SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996]

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C.
DOMAGTOY, respondent.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed
by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends,
exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar
A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from
his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27,
1994.Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta.
Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's
residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that
the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as
the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private
person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No. 94-980-MTC, which was
dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-
16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of
having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his
wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal
Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen
each other for almost seven years.[1] With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in
solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7,
paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; and that Article 8 thereof applies
to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted
were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case.[2]
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not
been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and respondent
judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the
latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga
states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony
was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A.
Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C.
Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar.[3] The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge,
as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their affidavit, the
affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in
September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida
Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been
heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.

1
 In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof
of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage
ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:

"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse." (Emphasis added.)

There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is
clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary
in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely
incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that
the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead,
in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration
of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida
Pearanda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge
to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law
has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code,
"The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous x x x marriages not
falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's
jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:

"Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;

x x x x x x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court,
in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as
the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point
of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both
parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect."

Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his having
solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his
court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the
judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a
sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the
point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the
respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.[4]
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the
solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory

2
provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the
authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance
herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is
authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An
appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied
with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while
it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative
liability.[5]
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his
misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic
principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The
legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and
uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack
of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in
the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with
basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case.[6] It is not too much to expect them to
know and apply the law intelligently.[7] Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation
indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law.While magistrates
may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge
exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the
status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void,
there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-
month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous
union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the
Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying
the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby
SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

3
G.R. No. L-32473 October 6, 1930

MELECIO MADRIDEJO, assisted by his guardian ad litem, Pedro Madridejo, plaintiff-

appellee,
vs.
GONZALO DE LEON, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

This is a rehearsing of the appeal taken by the defendants, Gonzalo de Leon et al. from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna holding as follows:

Wherefore, the court finds that Melecio Madridejo is Domingo de Leon's next of kin, and
hereby orders the defendants in case No. 5258 to restore and deliver the ownership and
possession of the property described in the complaints filed in the aforesaid case, to
Melecio Madridejo, without cost. So ordered.

In support of their appeal the defendants assign the following alleged errors as committed by
the trial court, to wit:

1. The lower court erred in holding that the marriage between Pedro Madridejo and
Flaviana Perez is valid.

2. The lower court also erred in declaring that solely because of the subsequent
marriage of his parents, the appellee Melecio Madridejo, a natural child, was legitimated.

3. The lower court lastly erred in not rendering judgment in favor of the defendants and
appellants.

The relevant facts necessary for the decision of all the questions of fact and of law raised herein
are as follows:

Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and wife, had but one child, Domingo de Leon. The
wife and son survived Eulogio de Leon, who died in the year 1915. During her widowhood,
Flaviana Perez lived with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. The registry of births of the municipality
of Siniloan, Laguna, shows that on June 1, 1917, a child was born to Pedro Madridejo and
Flaviana Perez, which was named Melecio Madridejo, the necessary data being furnished by
Pedro Madridejo (Exhibit B). On June 17, 1917, a 24-day old child of Siniloan, Laguna, as a son
of Flaviana Perez, no mention being made of the father (Exhibit 2). On July 8, 1920, Flaviana
Perez, being at death's door, was married to Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor, 30 years of age, by
the parish priest of Siniloan (Exhibit A). She died on the following day, July 9, 1920, leaving
Domingo de Leon, her son by Eulogio de Leon, and the plaintiff-appellee Melecio Madridejo, as
well as her alleged second husband, Pedro Madridejo. Domingo de Leon died on the 2nd of
May, 1928.

With regard to the first assignment of error, the mere fact that the parish priest of Siniloan,
Laguna, who married Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, failed to send a copy of the
marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis,
it not appearing that the essential requisites required by law for its validity were lacking in the
ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate is not one of said essential
requisites.

Touching the second assignment of error, there has been no attempt to deny that Melecio
Madridejo, the plaintiff-appellee, is the natural son of the Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez,
The only question to be decided is whether the subsequent marriage of his parents legitimated
him.

Article 121 of the Civil Code provides:

4
 Art. 121. Children shall be considered as legitimated by a subsequent marriage only
when they have been acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration
thereof.

According to this legal provision, in order that a subsequent marriage may be effective as a
legitimation, the natural children born out of wedlock must have been acknowledged by the
parents either before or after its celebration. The Civil Code has established two kinds of
acknowledgment: voluntary and compulsary. Article 131 provides for the voluntary
acknowledgment by the father or mother as follows:

Art. 131. The acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the record of birth, in a
will, or in some other public document.

Article 135 provides for the compulsary acknowledgment by the father, thus:

Art. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following
cases:

1. When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly acknowledging his paternity, is

in existence.

2. When the child has been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural
child of the defendant father, justified by the conduct of the father himself of that of his
family.

3. In cases of rape, seduction, or abduction, the provisions of the Penal Code with
regard to the acknowledgment of the issue, shall be observed.

Article 136 providing for the compulsory acknowledgment by the mother, reads:

Art. 136. The mother may be compelled to acknowlegde her natural child:

1. When the child is, with respect to the mother, included in any of the cases mentioned
in the next preceding article.

2. When the fact of the birth and the identity of the child are fully proven.

Let us see whether the plaintiff-appellee, Melecio Madridejo, has been acknowledged by his
parents Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, under any of the provisions above quoted.

To begin with the father, no document has been adduced to show that he has voluntarily
acknowledged Melecio Madridejo as his son, except the registry certificate of birth, Exhibit B.
This, of course, is not the record of birth mentioned in the law, for it lacks the requisites of article
48 of the Law of Civil Registry. It, no doubt, is a public instrument, but it has neither been
executed nor signed by Pedro Madridejo, and contains no statement by which he acknowledges
Melecio Madridejo to be his son. Although as Pedro Madridejo testified, he furnished the
municipal secretary of Siniloan with necessary data for recording the birth of Melecio Madridejo,
and although said official inscribed the data thus given in the civil registry of births, this is not
sufficient to bring it under the legal provision regarding acknowledgment by a public document.

As to the mother, it does not appear that Flaviana Perez supplied the data set forth in the civil
registry of births, Exhibit B, or in the baptismal register, where of Exhibit 2 is a certificate, and
which constitutes final proof only of the baptism, and not of the kinship or parentage of the
person baptized (Adriano vs. De Jesus, 23 Phil., 350). Furthermore, church registers of baptism
are no longer considered public documents (United States vs. Evangelista, 29 Phil., 215).

Melecio Madridejo, then, was not voluntarily acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo or Flaviana
Perez, either before or after their marriage. 1awph!l.net

Did Pedro Madridejo acknowledge Melecio Madridejo as his son, by compulsion?

5
The compulsory acknowledgment by the father established in article 135 of the Civil Code, and
by the mother according to article 136, requires that the natural child take judicial action against
the father or mother, or against the persons setting themselves up as the heirs of both, for the
purpose of compelling them to acknowledge him as a natural son through a judgment of the
court.

In the instant action brought by Melecio Madridejo not only has he not demanded to be
acknowledged as a natural child, which is the condition precedent to establishing his
legitimation by the subsequent marriage and his right to the estate of his uterine brother,
Domingo de Leon, but he has not even impleaded either his father Pedro Madridejo, or the heirs
of his mother, Flaviana Perez, in order that the court might have authority to make a valid and
effective pronouncement of his being a natural child, and to compel them to acknowledge him
as such.

The plaintiff-appellee alleges that the second paragraph of the defendants' answer amounts to
an admission that he is indeed Flaviana Perez's son, and relieves him of the burden of proving
that his mother acknowledged him as a son before her marriage. Such an admission would
have been affective if the present action had been brought for the purpose of compelling
Flaviana Perez or her heirs to acknowledge the appellee as her son.

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that Melecio Madridejo has not been acknowledged by
Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, either voluntarily or by compulsion, before or after their
marriage, and therefore said marriage did not legitimate him.

Wherefore, the judgment is reversed, the complaint dismissed, and the defendants absolved
with costs against the appellee without prejudice to any right he may have to establish or
compel his acknowledgment as the natural son of Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez. So
ordered.

6
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside
the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by
respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that,
after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two
children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were
divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada,
this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita,
Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that
petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings
before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the
mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari
proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to
appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an
interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this
Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error
committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie
since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider
the petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal
property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal
property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the
American Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not
established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot
prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts
and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy,
divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations
between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative
community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The
pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

7
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner
who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction
over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco,
California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the
divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community
property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed
in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him
in the divorce proceedings:
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my
behalf and do any things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting,
subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union.
What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction,
the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As
stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed.
794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and
wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the
law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry
again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former
marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered
still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et.
seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the
Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

8
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and
ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce,
only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the
opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved
jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of
Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The
marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate,
Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by
a separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private
respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg
Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they
had been living apart since April, 1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where
the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The
custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said
court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the
dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that
foreign jurisdiction.
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private
respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while
still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as
1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto
A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the
cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city
fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for
adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually
raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was
assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the
Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went
to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court.
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the
aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8
A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The
Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and
directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have
already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to
elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review.

9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to
suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset
the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such
scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension
of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for
review then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the
same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent
judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of
both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty
while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by
respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was
ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent
entered a plea of not guilty.
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court
denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is
without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that
cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not
qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law
prior to his filing the criminal complaint."
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents
from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A.
Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations,
issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the
complaints against the petitioner. 16

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other
crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by
the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that
compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in
point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law,
the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that
complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot
exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person
who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the
prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian
of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first
four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that
while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in
the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her
parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and
concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to
initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to
do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil

10
actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is
determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean
that the same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been
found necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the
State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining
witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted
de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse
assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain
therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer
the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently
argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This
is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where
the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of
the filing of the criminal case.
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to
commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or
capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his
capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the
commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or
was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would
thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is
without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific
issue as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where
a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as
possessed of such status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry
;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the
marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time
of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia
with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer
has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the
innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where,
however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can
have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion.
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or
wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to
have been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and
appellant insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have
repeatedly said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in
explaining the reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the
unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our
jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that
in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined
as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be
an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the
time of the filing of the complaint.

11
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized
in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a
United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter
filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property
and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the
right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated
the error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband
of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he
was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree
of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this
case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there
would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is
decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is
said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there
would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond
had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one
would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private
respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333
of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards
declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the
infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that
she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually
secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred
therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such
declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There
being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of
nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated
and within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for
adultery was filed before the termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab
initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the
marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must
suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended
spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was
raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not

12
involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy
herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and
another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of
jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby
made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

13
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-
SANTOS, respondents.

Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the
Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.

The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"),
brings into fore the above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the
decisions of the court a quo1 and the Court of Appeal,2 Leouel persists in beseeching its
application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.

It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine
Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20
September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G.
Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived
with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia
gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did
not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by
Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a
"quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living
independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's
spending a few days with his own parents.

On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite
Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989,
Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home
upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to
visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or
to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.

Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of
Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family
Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in Negros Oriental.

On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and
denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been
irresponsible and incompetent.

A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled
out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).

On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully,
by the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor
submit evidence.

On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.3 Leouel
appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court.4

14
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which
requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.

Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with
him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:

. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia

Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A
wife who does not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a
period of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.

The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the
sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however,
provide an insight on the import of the provision.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

Art. 36. . . .

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.

On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.)
Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo)
Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand,
Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment
but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment
would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that
lack of judgment is more serious than insufficient use of judgment and yet the
latter would make the marriage null and void and the former only voidable.
Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:

"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,

was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made
manifest after the celebration."

Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of
reason of judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to
defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in
subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.

Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental
incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration
or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the
appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable
marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very
essence of marital obligations.

Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally"
be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers
to retain the word "mentally."

Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological

impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be

15
psychologically impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-)
Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.

Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting
the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language
which describes a ground for voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice
Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the
Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is
precisely the reason why they should make a distinction.

Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be
cured.

Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for
void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is
curable and there are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.

On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or
incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest."

Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not
apparent.

Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase
"psychological or mentally incapacitated" — in the first one, there is vitiation of
consent because one does not know all the consequences of the marriages, and
if he had known these completely, he might not have consented to the marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a

ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really
understood the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to make
excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the
obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for
divorce.

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by
reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a
defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable
marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are
cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity
does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to
obligations attendant to marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do

not consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are
really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that,
ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is
not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He objected to
the lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the
obligations attendant to marriage, which are completely different from each other,
because they require a different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for
marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that
psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be

16
classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should be
convalidated but there should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the
defect has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the
defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment
so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that
actually, although one might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time
the action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of the
consequence of marriage.

Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense?
In response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children and
cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been cured.

Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser

degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the
expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological
incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the
consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.

Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in
insanity, there are also momentary periods when there is an understanding of the
consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the
ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted
at the time when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage.5

xxx xxx xxx

Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the
grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances
the impotence that in some instances the impotence is only temporary and only
with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it
is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a different
meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity"
can also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological
incapacity" is incurable.

Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to
show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically
incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with the essential marital
obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that
since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in
void marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He,
however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomes
manifest.

Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the
marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is
cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is
to allow him to remarry.6

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:

Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the
beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization.

17
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the
other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity
becomes manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one
to create the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed
out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of abuse.

Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities,
which are lesser in degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa
explained that mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent while
psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent.

Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their
February 9, 1984 meeting:

"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase
"psychological or mental impotence" is an invention of some
churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is
considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law
would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge . . ."

Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to
distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity"
refers to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of marriage.

Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided
not to go into the classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a
lot of debate on it and that this is precisely the reason why they classified it as a
special case.

At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of
marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile
with Canon Law because it is a new ground even under Canon Law.

Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in
Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect
that marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the ground of
psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other
members replied negatively.

Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or

prospective in application.

Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to
the problem of church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the
Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned
about the avalanche of cases.

Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee
approved.

The members voted as follows:

(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.

(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio
were for retroactivity.

(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.

18
 Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years
within which the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in
court. The Committee approved the suggestion.7

It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to
adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to
allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the
Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita
vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:8

The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear
that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions
of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.

A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,9 which reads:

Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila

matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)

Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no
juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the
code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at
least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.

10
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, giving an account on how the third paragraph
of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:

The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the
legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was
proposed first:

Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage

because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem
anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage
(cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);

then a broader one followed:

. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam

psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);

then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope
(cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);

finally, a new version was promulgated:

because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).

19
 So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term
anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the
conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of
psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to
assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.

Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since
psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.

In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt,

Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:

This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to
the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of
personality can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here described in
legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render
what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer
to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b)
this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage:
the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a
psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations,
which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute
incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which
incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R.
Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this
incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a
psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the
moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of
marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.

Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding
Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1),
who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in
the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.

It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly,
the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all
such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's
"Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting
from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric
Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the
Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction
with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity"
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law
does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."

20
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code.
If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that
may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in
every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity
is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.

Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded

that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article
1 of the Family Code, is that —

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a

woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property
relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family

and shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).

The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on
marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself
can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan
and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

21
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over
troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in
the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.

Who is to blame when a marriage fails?

This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to
respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision
November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution
dated February 14, 1995.

The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court
of Appeals1 its decision are as follows:

From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:

Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, .
. . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")

After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati,
they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.

There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their
married life.

It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they
were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the
defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to
sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The same
thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.

In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together
during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so
together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by
the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this
period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her
by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at
the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May
22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual
intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's
private parts nor did he see hers.

Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio
Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.

The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a
virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time.
While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her
husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her
husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.

22
 The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not
show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil
and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the
defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here
in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.

The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled
by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.

But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several
reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and
he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very
young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled
and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no
certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be
cured by the intervention of medical technology or science.

The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation
on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this,
according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with
his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she
always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex
with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like
it. So he stopped.

There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case
against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the
pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will
consummate their marriage.

The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very
young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.

The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by
Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result
thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there,
that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh.
"2-C")

The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he
has an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5)
centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter.
Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not
in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the
defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.

In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the
parties and that the evidence is not fabricated."2

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered

into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica
of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio
de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar
of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.

SO ORDERED.

23
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:

in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse
between the parties without making any findings of fact.

II

in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with
petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.

III

in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to
have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.

IV

in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower
court without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.

We find the petition to be bereft of merit.

Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has
the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent
evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for
the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts
intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the
conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their
pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of
collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.3

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may,
on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always
be proved.

The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to
prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a
judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court
and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse
party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was
presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their
marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual
intercourse between them.

To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil
Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit
such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).

24
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be
annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner
admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each
other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the
challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial
lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:

The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a
stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically
incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both
the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not
have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it
appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality
disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article
36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4,
1995).4

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both
the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical
finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for
such refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there
might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other
discomforts, — why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22,
1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.

First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on
who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other.
The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since
the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the
psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes
immaterial.

Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties
is suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with
private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological
but physical disorder as stated above.

We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent
or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have
sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he
had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in
evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is
capable of erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but
perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to
prove such a claim.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus,
the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity.6

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation
is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the
integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal

25
of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.

As aptly stated by the respondent court,

An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did
not want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically
impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22,
1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of
symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right
seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil
Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity,
the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his
claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage
were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the
Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public
scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put her
life in order and put to rest her marital status.

We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the
unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological
incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten
months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to
perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has
not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a
hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological
incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the
Family Code.7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court
order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with
another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could
not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has
nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness
and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a
function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is
— a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-
way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other
can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children
but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect,
sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime
social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less
but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

26
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those
enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological
incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various
petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had
interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos
vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel
provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be
sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal
divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present
case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25,
1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May
14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the
marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the
ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Facts

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina
of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the
petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin
Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage,
Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he
preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money;
that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in
regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February
1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole
breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a
result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her
job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo
left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown
that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a
highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be
served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null
and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the
start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer
live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent
quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of
friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such
as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:

1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of
St. Augustine, Manila;

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was
born on July 29, 1986;

3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

27
 4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and
of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center.
She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any
evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of
petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence,
the present recourse.

The Issue

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the
Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the
appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world
which is anathema to our culture."

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied5 heavily on the trial court's
findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision
Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our
civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a

broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse
indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal
relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul
for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct
because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason
to leave the spouses to their individual fates.

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in
analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by
the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological
nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled
that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . .
and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing
Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the

28
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological
defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
"irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so,
due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get
along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8

COURT

Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on

your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the
marriage?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q There is no hope for the marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are

psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit
with other parties?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?

A Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive
of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was
made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and
gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of
Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at
all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.

During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this
case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family
Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court
decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar
Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision
Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their
informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which
they followed up with written memoranda.

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:

29
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
the permanence, inviolability and solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not
physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It
is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of
the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature. 14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,

30
great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject
to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly
void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other —
shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition.
Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

SO ORDERED.

31
[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000]
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established
by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent
should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such
declaration.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the July 24, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which
disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is
hereby declared valid."
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for
Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:

"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G.
Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio
pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in
accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52
relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best interest and welfare of
the minor children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of
respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City
where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the
Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."

The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982
which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A);
and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command
Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1).
Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he
was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the Marcos Regime.
Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the
Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from
the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang Palace,
she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand
Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became
sweethearts.

32
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss,
Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when
she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in
different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to
look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a
good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel
and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with
him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight
mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their
cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While
she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to
Malacaang. When she was discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her
business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was
able to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction
Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter
quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house
anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted
him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to
her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought
refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong
Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss
unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After
knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even
[beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella,
Paraaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their
father as cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological
evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude
towards appellee and their children, x x x."[3]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the
totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's
psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently
proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties
to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220
to 225 of the Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged
in the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.

33
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric
evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were
based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or any
one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or
she was assuming, or as would make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he
offered testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root
cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically
identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no
evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was]
psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have known the obligations
he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was]
incurable."

Hence, this Petition.

Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following issue:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional
Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses
should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition."

The Court's Ruling

We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent
is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of
the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.

Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination

Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted to
determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should
not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had not
taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that under the
circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of information in order to
determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such
tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,[8] the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation
of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code[9] were laid down by this
Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally
'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.

34
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.'
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in
Santos v. Court of Appeals:[11] "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root
cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence
that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

35
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case --
including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social
worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to
provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity
on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was
not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he
became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family
home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of
the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable,
especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady
so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided
under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be
rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption,
civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.
At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for
declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the
procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully
observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show
that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion
requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological
incapacity. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

36
KALAW VS FERNANDEZ

A finding of psychological incapacity must be supported by well-established facts. It is the plaintiffs burden
to convince the court of the existence of these facts.

Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) May 27, 2004 Decision[2] and
December 15, 2004 Resolution[3] in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240, which reversed the trial courts declaration of
nullity of the herein parties marriage. The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFOREthe appeal is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision

is SET ASIDE and VACATED while the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973. They
maintained a relationship and eventually married in Hong Kong on November 4, 1976. They had four
children, Valerio (Rio), Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon Miguel (Miggy or Mickey), and Jaime Teodoro (Jay).
Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano
(Jocelyn), who gave birth to a son in March 1983.[5]

In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home (the house of her Kalaw in-laws) and her four children with
Tyrone.] Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, who bore him three more children.[7]
In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. He left his four children
from his marriage with Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver.[8] The
househelp would just call Malyn to take care of the children whenever any of them got sick. Also, in
accordance with their custody agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on weekends.[9]

In 1994, the two elder children, Rio and Ria, asked for Malyns permission to go to Japan for a one-week
vacation. Malyn acceded only to learn later that Tyrone brought the children to the US.[10] After just one
year, Ria returned to the Philippines and chose to live with Malyn.
Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyns family returned to the Philippines and resumed physical custody of the
two younger children, Miggy and Jay. According to Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go to
her house on weekends because of alleged weekend plans with their father.[11]

Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage

On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code.[12] He alleged that Malyn was
psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of
the celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that her psychological incapacity was manifested by
her immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-habitation, as shown
by Malyns following acts:

37
 1. she left the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong
all day and all night;

2. she left the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of
the following day; and

3. she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone discovered in

flagrante delicto.[13]

During trial, Tyrone narrated the circumstances of Malyns alleged infidelity. According to him, on June 9,
1985, he and his brother-in-law, Ronald Fernandez (Malyns brother), proceeded to Hyatt Hotel and
learned that Malyn was occupying a room with a certain Benjie Guevarra (Benjie). When he proceeded to
the said room, he saw Benjie and Malyn inside.[15]At rebuttal, Tyrone elaborated that Benjie was wearing
only a towel around his waist, while Malyn was lying in bed in her underwear. After an exchange of words,
he agreed not to charge Malyn with adultery when the latter agreed to relinquish all her marital and parental
rights.[16] They put their agreement in writing before Atty. Jose Palarca.

Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr.
Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyns psychological incapacity.

Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyns behavior her sexual
infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends may reflect a narcissistic
personality disorder (NPD).[17] NPD is present when a person is obsessed to meet her wants and needs
in utter disregard of her significant others.[18] Malyns NPD is manifest in her utter neglect of her duties as
a mother.[19]

Dr. Gates reported that Malyns personality disorder may have been evident even prior to her marriage
because it is rooted in her family background and upbringing, which the psychologist gathered to be
materially deprived and without a proper maternal role model.[20]

Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts revealed by her interviews with Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw
(Tyrones sister-in-law), and the son Miggy. She also read the transcript of Tyrones court testimony.[21]

Fr. Healy corroborated Dr. Gates assessment. He concluded that Malyn was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her marital duties.[22] He explained that her psychological incapacity is rooted in
her role as the breadwinner of her family. This role allegedly inflated Malyns ego to the point that her needs
became priority, while her kids and husbands needs became secondary.Malyn is so self-absorbed that
she is incapable of prioritizing her familys needs.

Fr. Healy clarified that playing mahjong and spending time with friends are not disorders by themselves.
They only constitute psychological incapacity whenever inordinate amounts of time are spent on these
activities to the detriment of ones familial duties.[23] Fr. Healy characterized Malyns psychological
incapacity as grave and incurable.[24]

38
He based his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the trial transcripts, as well as the report of Dr. Natividad
Dayan (Dr. Dayan), Malyns expert witness.[25] He clarified that he did not verify the truthfulness of the
factual allegations regarding Malyns habits because he believed it is the courts duty to do so.[26] Instead,
he formed his opinion on the assumption that the factual allegations are indeed true.

Malyns version

Malyn denied being psychologically incapacitated.[27] While she admitted playing mahjong, she denied
playing as frequently as Tyrone alleged. She maintained that she did so only two to three times a week
and always between 1 p.m. to 6 p.m. only.[28] And in those instances, she always had Tyrones permission
and would often bring the children and their respective yayaswith her.[29] She maintained that she did not
neglect her duties as mother and wife.

Malyn admitted leaving the conjugal home in May 1985. She, however, explained that she did so only to
escape her physically abusive husband.[30] On the day she left, Tyrone, who preferred to keep Malyn a
housewife, was upset that Malyn was preparing to go to work. He called up the security guards and
instructed them not to let Malyn out of the house. Tyrone then placed cigarette ashes on Malyns head and
proceeded to lock the bedroom doors. Fearing another beating, Malyn rushed out of their bedroom and
into her mother-in-laws room. She blurted that Tyrone would beat her up again so her mother-in-law gave
her P300 to leave the house.[31] She never returned to their conjugal home.

Malyn explained that she applied for work, against Tyrones wishes, because she wanted to be self-
sufficient. Her resolve came from her discovery that Tyrone had a son by Jocelyn and had secretly gone
to the US with Jocelyn.[32]

Malyn denied the allegation of adultery. She maintained that Benjie only booked a room at the Hyatt Hotel
for her because she was so drunk after partying with friends. She admitted finding her brother Ronald and
Tyrone at the door of the Hyatt Hotel room, but maintained being fully clothed at that time.[33] Malyn insisted
that she wrote the letter relinquishing all her spousal and parental rights under duress.[34]

After the Hyatt Hotel incident, Malyn only saw her children by surreptitiously visiting them in school. She
later obtained partial custody of the children as an incident to the legal separation action filed by Tyrone
against her (which action was subsequently dismissed for lack of interest).

As an affirmative defense, Malyn maintained that it was Tyrone who was suffering from psychological
incapacity, as manifested by his drug dependence, habitual drinking, womanizing, and physical
violence.[35] Malyn presented Dr. Dayan a clinical psychologist, as her expert witness.

Dr. Dayan interviewed Tyrone, Malyn, Miggy/Mickey, Jay, and Ria for her psychological evaluation of the
spouses. The factual narrations culled from these interviews reveal that Tyrone found Malyn a lousy
mother because of her mahjong habit,[36] while Malyn was fed up with Tyrones sexual infidelity, drug habit,
and physical abuse.[37] Dr. Dayan determined that both Tyrone and Malyn were behaviorally immature.
They encountered problems because of their personality differences, which ultimately led to the demise
of their marriage. Her diagnostic impressions are summarized below:
39
 The marriage of Tyrone and Malyn was a mistake from the very beginning. Both of them
were not truly ready for marriage even after two years of living together and having a
child. When Malyn first met Tyrone who showered her with gifts, flowers, and affection
she resisted his overtures. She made it clear that she could take him or leave him. But the
minute she started to care, she became a different person clingy and immature, doubting
his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most important person in
his life. She became relationship-dependent. It appears that her style then was when she
begins to care for a man, she puts all her energy into him and loses focus on herself. This
imbalance between thinking and feeling was overwhelming to Tyrone who admitted that
the thought of commitment scared him. Tyrone admitted that when he was in his younger
years, he was often out seeking other women. His interest in them was not necessarily for
sex, just for fun dancing, drinking, or simply flirting.

Both of them seem behaviorally immature. For some time, Malyn adapted to her husband
who was a moody man with short temper and unresolved issues with parents and
siblings. He was a distancer, concerned more about his work and friends tha[n] he was
about spending time with his family. Because of Malyns and Tyrones backgrounds (both
came from families with high conflicts) they experienced turmoil and chaos in their
marriage. The conflicts they had struggled to avoid suddenly galloped out of control Their
individual personalities broke through, precipitating the demise of their marriage.[38]

Dr. Dayan likewise wrote in her psychological evaluation report that Malyn
exhibited significant, but not severe, dependency, narcissism, and
compulsiveness.[39]

On the stand, the psychologist elaborated that while Malyn had relationship problems with Tyrone, she
appeared to have a good relationship with her kids.[40] As for Tyrone, he has commitment issues which
prevent him from committing himself to his duties as a husband. He is unable to remain faithful to Malyn
and is psychologically incapacitated to perform this duty.[41]

Childrens version

The children all stated that both their parents took care of them, provided for their needs, and loved
them. Rio testified that they would accompany their mother to White Plains on days that she played
mahjong with her friends. None of them reported being neglected or feeling abandoned.

The two elder kids remembered the fights between their parents but it was only Ria who admitted actually
witnessing physical abuse inflicted on her mother.[42] The two elder kids also recalled that, after the
separation, their mother would visit them only in school.[43]

The children recalled living in Valle Verde with only the househelp and driver during the time that their dad
was abroad.[44] While they did not live with their mother while they were housed in Valle Verde, the kids
were in agreement that their mother took care of them on weekends and would see to their needs. They
had a common recollection that the househelp would call their mother to come and take care of them in
Valle Verde whenever any of them was sick.[45]
Other witnesses

40
Dr. Cornelio Banaag, Tyrones attending psychiatrist at the Manila Sanitarium, testified that, for the duration
of Tyrones confinement, the couple appeared happy and the wife was commendable for the support she
gave to her spouse.[46] He likewise testified that Tyrone tested negative for drugs and was not a drug
dependent.[47]

Malyns brother, Ronald Fernandez, confirmed Tyrones allegation that they found Malyn with Benjie in the
Hyatt hotel room. Contrary to Tyrones version, he testified that neither he nor Tyrone entered the room,
but stayed in the hallway. He likewise did not recall seeing Benjie or Malyn half-naked.[48]

Tyrone then presented Mario Calma (Mario), who was allegedly part of Malyns group of friends. He stated
on the stand that they would go on nights-out as a group and Malyn would meet with a male musician-
friend afterwards.[49]

Social worker

The trial court ordered the court social worker, Jocelyn V. Arre (Arre), to conduct a social case study on
the parties as well as the minor children. Arre interviewed the parties Tyrone and Malyn; the minor
children Miggy/Mickey and Jay; Tyrones live-in partner, Jocelyn;[50] and Tyrone and Malyns only daughter,
Ria. While both parents are financially stable and have positive relationships with their children, she
recommended that the custody of the minor children be awarded to Malyn. Based on the interviews of
family members themselves, Malyn was shown to be more available to the children and to exercise better
supervision and care. The social worker commended the fact that even after Malyn left the conjugal home
in 1985, she made efforts to visit her children clandestinely in their respective schools. And while she was
only granted weekend custody of the children, it appeared that she made efforts to personally attend to
their needs and to devote time with them.[51]
On the contrary, Tyrone, who had custody of the children since the couples de facto separation, simply
left the children for several years with only a maid and a driver to care for them while he lived with his
second family abroad.[52] The social worker found that Tyrone tended to prioritize his second family to the
detriment of his children with Malyn. Given this history during the formative years of the children, the social
worker did not find Tyrone a reliable parent to whom custody of adolescents may be awarded.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court[53]

After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court concluded that both parties are
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations under the Family Code. The
courts Decision is encapsulated in this paragraph:

From the evidence, it appears that parties are both suffering from psychological incapacity
to perform their essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. The
parties entered into a marriage without as much as understanding what it entails. They
failed to commit themselves to its essential obligations: the conjugal act, the community
of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of their
children to become responsible individuals. Parties psychological incapacity is grave, and
serious such that both are incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage. The incapacity has been clinically established and was found to be pervasive,
grave and incurable.[54]

41
The trial court then declared the parties marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.[55]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals[56]

Malyn appealed the trial courts Decision to the CA. The CA reversed the trial courts ruling because it is
not supported by the facts on record. Both parties allegations and incriminations against each other do not
support a finding of psychological incapacity. The parties faults tend only to picture their immaturity and
irresponsibility in performing their marital and familial obligations. At most, there may be sufficient grounds
for a legal separation.[57] Moreover, the psychological report submitted by petitioners expert witness, Dr.
Gates, does not explain how the diagnosis of NPD came to be drawn from the sources. It failed to satisfy
the legal and jurisprudential requirements for the declaration of nullity of marriage.[58]

Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration[59] but the same was denied on December 15, 2004.[60]

Petitioners arguments

Petitioner Tyrone argues that the CA erred in disregarding the factual findings of the trial court, which is
the court that is in the best position to appreciate the evidence. He opines that he has presented
preponderant evidence to prove that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations, to wit:

a) the expert witnesses, Dr. Gates and Fr. Healy, proved on the stand that respondents
egocentric attitude, immaturity, self-obsession and self-centeredness were manifestations of
respondents NPD;[61]

b) these expert witnesses proved that respondents NPD is grave and incurable and
prevents her from performing her essential martial obligations;[62] and

c) that respondents NPD existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage because it
is rooted in her upbringing, family background, and socialite lifestyle prior to her marriage.[63]

Petitioner stresses that even respondent insisted that their marriage is void because of psychological
incapacity, albeit on petitioners part.[64]

Respondents arguments

Respondent maintains that Tyrone failed to discharge his burden of proving her alleged psychological
incapacity.[65] She argues that the testimonies of her children and the findings of the court social worker to
the effect that she was a good, loving, and attentive mother are sufficient to rebut Tyrones allegation that
she was negligent and irresponsible.[66]

She assails Dr. Gatess report as one-sided and lacking in depth. Dr. Gates did not interview her, their
common children, or even Jocelyn. Moreover, her report failed to state that Malyns alleged psychological

42
incapacity was grave and incurable.[67] Fr. Healys testimony, on the other hand, was based only on
Tyrones version of the facts.[68]
Malyn reiterates the appellate courts ruling that the trial court Decision is intrinsically defective for failing to
support its conclusion of psychological incapacity with factual findings.
Almost four years after filing her memorandum, respondent apparently had a change of heart and filed a
Manifestation with Motion for Leave to Withdraw Comment and Memorandum.[69] She manifested that she
was no longer disputing the possibility that their marriage may really be void on the basis of Tyrones
psychological incapacity. She then asked the Court to dispose of the case with justice.[70] Her manifestation
and motion were noted by the Court in its January 20, 2010 Resolution.[71]
Issue
Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological incapacity
Our Ruling
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial courts Decision
for lack of legal and factual basis.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.

Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the
basic marital obligations.[72] The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff.[73] The plaintiff
must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious
psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging the
essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at
the time of marriage, and must be incurable.[74]

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity.
He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts
or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven.Petitioners experts heavily relied on
petitioners allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out
with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged
habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as
mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions
of his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these
allegations of the petitioner.

For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their children
as a result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong
so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioners
allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a week
and always with the permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home. The children

43
corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother when she played mahjong in their relatives
home. Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were
so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the
second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondents mahjong-playing. The least that could
have been done was to prove the frequency of respondents mahjong-playing during the years when these
two children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent
played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioners claim about respondents alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going
out with friends, and obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to
prove her visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an
alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs
with other men, but Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even
assuming arguendo that petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with
another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for
attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but it does not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as
constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically
incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of
the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing
her marital and parental duties. Not once did the children state that they were neglected by their
mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of them, was around when they were sick, and
cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent made real efforts to see and take care of her children
despite her estrangement from their father. There was no testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment
and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed
the second elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their academic shortcomings to
Malyns actions.

After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological
incapacity. There is no error in the CAs reversal of the trial courts ruling that there was psychological
incapacity. The trial courts Decision merely summarized the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the
respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the
witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve
as bases for its legal conclusion of psychological incapacity.

What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have
constrained them from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children. There may
be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals May 27, 2004
Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED.

44
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12790 August 31, 1960

JOEL JIMENEZ, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
REMEDIOS CAÑIZARES, defendant.
Republic of the Philippines, intervenor-appellant.

Acting Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for appellant.
Climaco, Ascarraga and Silang for appellee.

PADILLA, J.:

In a complaint filed on 7 June 1955 in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga the plaintiff Joel
Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant Remedios Cañizares
contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge of the municipal court of Zamboanga City, upon the
ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was to small to allow the penetration of a male
organ or penis for copulation; that the condition of her genitals as described above existed at
the time of marriage and continues to exist; and that for that reason he left the conjugal home
two nights and one day after they had been married. On 14 June 1955 the wife was summoned
and served a copy of the complaint. She did not file an answer. On 29 September 1956,
pursuant to the provisions of article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court directed the city attorney of
Zamboanga to inquire whether there was a collusion, to intervene for the State to see that the
evidence for the plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted or fabricated. On 17 December 1956 the
Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a physical examination by a
competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation and to submit, within
ten days from receipt of the order, a medical certificate on the result thereof. On 14 March 1957
the defendant was granted additional five days from notice to comply with the order of 17
December 1956 with warning that her failure to undergo medical examination and submit the
required doctor's certificate would be deemed lack of interest on her part in the case and that
judgment upon the evidence presented by her husband would be rendered.

After hearing, at which the defendant was not present, on 11 April 1957 the Court entered a
decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant. On 26 April 1957 the city
attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the decree thus entered, upon the ground, among
others, that the defendant's impotency has not been satisfactorily established as required by
law; that she had not been physically examined because she had refused to be examined; that
instead of annulling the marriage the Court should have punished her for contempt of court and
compelled her to undergo a physical examination and submit a medical certificate; and that the
decree sought to be reconsidered would open the door to married couples, who want to end
their marriage to collude or connive with each other by just alleging impotency of one of them.
He prayed that the complaint be dismissed or that the wife be subjected to a physical
examination. Pending resolution of his motion, the city attorney timely appealed from the
decree. On 13 May 1957 the motion for reconsideration was denied.

The question to determine is whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength
only of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is
impotent. The latter did not answer the complaint, was absent during the hearing, and refused to
submit to a medical examination.

Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The state
has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The
security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest of each and
every member of the community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake
its foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction. The incidents of the status are governed by
law, not by will of the parties. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds, that must be

45
proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment
of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was
expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he
sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been
satisfactorily established, becase from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of
the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined or
failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption
arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because women of this
country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination
unless compelled to by competent authority. This the Court may do without doing violence to
and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any offense. She is
not being compelled to be a witness against herself.1 "Impotency being an abnormal condition
should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency."2 The lone testimony of the
husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder
the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.

The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings in accordance with this decision, without pronouncement as to costs.

46
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

GR No. 47101 April 25, 1941

GODOFREDO BUCCAT, applicant-appellant,

v.
LUGO MANGONON DE BUCCAT, defendant-appealed.

D. Feliciano Leviste, D. Tomas P. Panganiban and Mrs. Sotera N. Megia in representation of

the appellant.
Mrs. Luida Mangonon of Buccat in her own representation.

HORRILLENO, J .:

This matter has been raised to this Superiority by the Court of First Instance of Baguio, since it
only raises a purely legal question.

On March 20, 1939, the plaintiff initiated the present case, in which the defendant did not
appear, despite having been duly summoned. As a result, since the plaintiff was allowed to
present his evidence, the lower court ruled in favor of the defendant. Hence this appeal.

The applicant seeks the annulment of his marriage to the defendant Luida Mangonon de Buccat
on November 26, 1938, in the City of Baguio, on the grounds that, by consenting to that
marriage, he did so because the defendant had assured her that she was Virgin.

From the decision of the lower court, the following facts emerge:

The complainant met the defendant in March 1938. After several interviews, both were
committed on September 19 of the same year. On November 26 of the same year, the plaintiff
married the defendant in the Catholic cathedral of the City of Baguio. Desoues to live together
for a period of eighty-nine days, the defendant gave birth to a nine-month-old boy, on February
23, 1939. As a result of this event, the plaintiff abandoned the defendant and did not return to
marital life with she.

We see no reason to revoke the judgment appealed. In fact, the plaintiff's and appellant's
allegation that the defendant and appellant had not even suspected the defendant's pregnant
state was improbable, as it is proven, in very advanced pregnancy. So there is no place to
estimate the fraud of which the appellant speaks. The allegation that it is not uncommon to find
people with a developed abdomen seems puerile to deserve our consideration, especially since
the plaintiff was a first-year student of law.

Marriage is a sacratistical institution: it is the foundation on which society rests. To clear it, clear
and reliable evidence is needed. There is no such evidence in this case.

Finding the appellate judgment adjusted to law, must be confirmed, as we hereby confirm, in all
its parts, with the costs to the appellant. That is how it is commanded.

Avanceña, Pres., Imperial, Diaz and Laurel, MM., Are satisfied.

47