Victorino C. Francisco vs. Winai Permskul and The Hon.

Court of Appeals memorandum decision and simply suggests that the court may adopt by reference the findings of
G.R. No. 81006 May 12, 1989 fact and the conclusions of law stated in the decision, order or resolution on appeal before it. When a
law is questioned before the Court, the presumption is in favor of its constitutionality. The Court has
FACTS: On May 21, 1984, the petitioner leased his apartment in Makati to the private respondent for deliberated extensively on the challenge posed against the memorandum decision as now authorized
a period of one year for the stipulated rental of P3,000.00 a month. Pursuant to the lease contract, by law.
the private respondent deposited with the petitioner the amount of P9,000.00 to answer for unpaid
rentals or any damage to the leased premises except when caused by reasonable wear and tear. On
May 31, 1985, the private respondent vacated the property. He thereafter requested the refund of his
deposit minus the sum of P1,000.00, representing the rental for the additional ten days of his
occupancy after the expiration of the lease. The petitioner rejected this request. He said the lessee
still owed him for other charges, including the electricity and water bills and the sum of P2,500.00 for
repainting of the leased premises to restore them to their original condition.

The private respondent sued in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati. After the submission of
position papers by the parties, a summary judgment was rendered, sustaining the complainant and
holding that the repainting was not chargeable to him. This decision was appealed to the Regional
Trial Court of Makati and was affirmed by Judge Jose C. de la Rama on January 14, 1987. This was
done in a memorandum decision reading in full as follows:

MEMORANDUM DECISION
After a careful and thorough perusal, evaluation and study of the records of this case, this Court
hereby adopts by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decision of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63 and finds that there is no cogent
reason to disturb the same.

The decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The defendant went to the Court of
Appeals, his petition for review was denied hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the memorandum decision of the regional trial court violates Article VIII
Section 14 of the Constitution.

RULING: NO. There is no question that the purpose of the law in authorizing the memorandum
decision is to expedite the termination of litigations for the benefit of the parties as well as the courts
themselves. Concerned with the mounting problem of delay in the administration of justice, the
Constitution now contains a number of provisions aimed at correcting this serious difficulty that has
caused much disaffection among the people. The memorandum decision can be welcomed indeed as
an acceptable method of dealing expeditiously with the case load of the courts of justice, but
expediency alone, no matter how compelling, cannot excuse non-compliance with the Constitution; or
to put it more familiarly, the end does not justify the means. In the case at bar, the court finds that a
judgment was made by the metropolitan trial court in compliance with the rule on summary
procedure. It is not really correct to say that the Court of Appeals did not review the memorandum
decision of the regional trial court which was the subject of the petition for review. A reading of its
own decision will show that it dealt extensively with the memorandum decision and discussed it at
some length in the light of the observations and reservations. The law does not define the
 Ong Chiu Kwan vs. CA (G.R. No. 113006)

Facts:

Crazy Feet is a business establishment owned by Mildred Ong. On April 24, 1990, Wilfredo
Infante was ordered by Ong Chiu Kwan to relocate Crazy Feet's telephone, electric and water lines
without a permit from appropriate authorities. Mildred Ong filed a case against Ong Chiu Kwan for
unjust vexation and the Trial Court found Ong Chiu Kwan guilty of unjust vexation under Article 287,
second paragraph.

The Court declared Ong Chiu Kwan guilty of unjust vexation hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Ong Chiu Kwan is liable for unjust vexation?

Decision:

The court ruled that petitioner is liable for unjust vexation. Having admitted that he ordered
the cutting of electric, water and telephone lines without the permit to relocate such, he caused the
annoyance and vexation of Mildred Ong. To add, the electric, water and telephone interruption
happened during the operation of the business.
 Alfredo Ching v. CA, Pedro Asedillo According to Dumlao v. Quality plastic products, the decision of the lower court insofar as the
Facts: deceased is concerned is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not
· Alfredo Ching is the legitimate son of Ching Leng; have been validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality, that its fitness to be
· Ching Leng bought a property from Sps. Nofuente and the former registered the property in her subject of legal relations was lost through death.
name on September 18, 1961, her postal address was in Pasay City;
· Ching Leng died in Boston and his legitimate son was appointed as administrator of her estate; Ching Leng is an innocent purchaser for value as shown by the evidence adduced in his behalf by
· 13 years after the death of Ching Leng, a suit was commenced on December 27, 1978 by private petitioner herein, tracking back the roots of his title since 1960, from the time the decree of
respondent Pedro Asedillo against Ching Leng for the reconveyance of said property; registration was issued.
· An amended complaint was made by private respondent alleging “that on account of the fact that
the defendant has been residing abroad up to the present, and it is not known whether the
defendant is still alive or dead, he or his estate may be served by summons and other The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
processes only by publication.” another’s name after one year from the date of the decree is not to set aside the decree but
· Summons by publication was made through “Economic Monitor”, newspaper of general circulation respecting it and to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for damages if the
in Province of Rizal, Pasay City. Since no responsive pleading was filed after the lapse of 60 days, property has transferred to an innocent purchaser for value.
judgment on the merits in favor of private respondents was made.
· Consequently, the title of Ching Leng was cancelled and transferred to private respondent who sold
the same to Villa Esperanza Dev., Inc.
· Petitioner learned of the decision, and so he filed a petition to set it aside as null and void for lack
of jurisdiction;

Lower court decision:

RTC: At first, granted the verified petition to set aside as null and void the prior order of the RTC;
however, on motion by private respondent, the same was set aside. So, petitioner filed for
reconsideration but was denied.
*the case was elevated directly to SC

Issue: WON reconveyance and cancellation of title is in personam which cannot give jurisdiction to
the court by service of summons by publication.
(Note: private respondents argue that they are quasi in rem)

Ruling: Yes, reconveyance and cancellation of title are acts in personam.

Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in that the former are directed against specific persons
and seek personal judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing or property or status of a
person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world.

An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a
particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing.

Private respondent’s action for reconveyance and cancellation of title being in personam, the
judgment in question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased
defendant Ching Leng. Verily, the action was commenced thirteen (13) years after the latter’s death.
 Nocum vs. Lucio Tan and not jurisdiction. These additional allegations would neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor
G.R. No. 145022 would respondent's failure to include the same in the original complaint divest the lower court of its
jurisdiction over the case.
Facts:
Respondent Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali,
ALPAP and Inquirer with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, , seeking moral and exemplary damages
for the alleged malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a news article.

The Regional Trial Court of Makati issued an order dismissing the complaint without prejudice of the
ground on improper venue.

Aggrieved by the dismissal of the complaint, respondent Lucio Tan filed an Omnibus Motion seeking
reconsideration of the dismissal and admission of the amended complaint. In par. 2.01.1 of the
amended complaint, it is alleged that 'This article was printed and first published in the City of
Makati, and in par. 2.04.1, that 'This caricature was printed and first published in the City of Makati
(p. 55, id.).

The lower court, after having the case dismissed for improper venue, admitted the amended
complaint and deemed set aside the previous order of dismissal

The petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA which denied the same.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court acquire jurisdiction over the civil case upon the filing of the original
complaint for damages?

Rulings:
Yes. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since
the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of
action. [11] In the case at bar, after examining the original complaint, we find that the RTC acquired
jurisdiction over the case when the case was filed before it. From the allegations thereof,
respondent's cause of action is for damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of which is vested with
the RTC. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code provides that it is a Court of First Instance [12] that is
specifically designated to try a libel case.

Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. A former colleague, the Hon. Florenz D. Regalado,
[14] differentiated jurisdiction and venue as follows: (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and
determine a case; venue is the place where the case is to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a
matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between
the court and the subject matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and
respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may
be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties.
In the case at bar, the additional allegations in the Amended Complaint that the article and the
caricature were printed and first published in the City of Makati referred only to the question of venue
Villacastin vs Pelaez incidents involving the implementation of the ComprehensiveAgrarian Reform Program

Facts: Pelaez and his wife mortgaged their agricultural lands Development Bank of the Philippines Petitioners' action is clearly for the recovery of physical or material possession of the subject property
(DBP). For failure of the Pelaez spouses to pay their mortgage obligation, the properties were only, a question which both the MCTC and the RTC ruled petitioners are entitled to. It does not
foreclosed and subsequently sold at public auction. involve the adjudication of an agrarian reform matter, nor an agrarian dispute falling within the
jurisdiction of the DARAB.
The purported tenants of the property filed an action to annul the mortgage, foreclosure and sale of
the properties, claiming that they are the owners thereof under Presidential Decree No. 27. Case was
filed in the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator in Cebu

Villacastin filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator in Cebu with
Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with the MCTC of Bantayan, Cebu, against
Pelaez and a certain Elesio Monteseven. The complaint averred that Villacstin are the owners and
actual possessors of the subject landholding.

Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator in Cebu rendered a decision in favor of the tenants.

MCTC rendered judgment in civil case in favor of Villacastin. RTC affirmed this decision.

CA, however, ruled that regular courts should respect the primary jurisdiction vested upon the DARAB
in cases involving agricultural lands such as the property subject of this case.

Villacastin contend that the case they filed did not involve any agrarian matter and thus, the MCTC
correctly exercised jurisdiction over the case.

Issue: Whether or not the MCTC (and also the RTC) has jurisdiction over the case filed by
Villacastin.

Held: MCTC has jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. In ascertaining,
for instance, whether an action is one for forcible entry falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
inferior courts, the averments of the complaint and the character of the relief sought are to be
examined. A review of the complaintreveals that the pertinent allegations thereof sufficiently vest
jurisdiction over the action on the MCTC. The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs are the owners and
legal as well as actual possessors of a parcel of agricultural land. That Pelaez, by strategy and
through stealth entered the above-described land of the Villacstin and took possession thereof.

It has not escaped our notice that no landowner-tenant vinculum juris or juridical tie was alleged
between petitioners and respondent, let alone that which would characterize the relationship as an
agrarian dispute.

Rule II of the DARAB Rules17 provides that the DARAB "shall have primary jurisdiction, both original
and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or
 ORDA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 92625; December 26, 1990

FACTS:

Private Respondent Gil Galang (Gil) filed a case with the Trial court of San Pablo City in order to
regain custody of his minor daughter who was staying with her maternal grandparents, petitioner’s
herein. Her mother had already died when the case was initiated. The Trial Court dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction because the petitioners, Orda, had moved to Bataan, hence the court lost
jurisdiction. Subsequently, Gil commenced an original action for habeas corpus with the Court of
Appeals over his minor daughter. The Court of Appeals, finding that based of the arguments
presented by both parties, a full blown trial is required, accordingly, the CA issued the assailed order
remanding the case to the RTC of San Pablo City. The Court of appeals later clarified the order as a
“referral” of the case to the RTC because it was an original case submitted to it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals may refer a petition for habeas corpus originally filed with it to
the Regional Trial Court for a full-blown trial due to conflicting facts presented by the parties.

HELD:

NO. While the case requires a full-blown trial of the facts, the same should be done in the context of
the special proceedings for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, and not a remand
or referral of the original action for a writ of habeas corpus filed with the respondent court.
Parenthetically, the proper venue in this action is the place where the petitioner therein resides.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolutions of
the respondent Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered DISMISSING the petition
for habeas corpus WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the filing by private respondent of the appropriate special
proceedings to gain custody of his minor child.
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents.
FACTS: Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St.
Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of employment executed
between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22,
1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was
intended for payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR).
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle
of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin’s Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private
respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas contract worker, asked for financial assistance
from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent voluntarily
helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.
January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then took over the management of
the business. She then discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other
government fees, although the records purported to show that the same were already paid. Amelita
then made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no
longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a
complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment.
the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring that no
employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, his office had no
jurisdiction over the case.
private respondent appealed to the NLRC. NLRC remanded the case to LA. MR was filed by the
petitioner which was denied.
RULING:
1) HISTORY: the legal history of the NLRC. It was first established in the Department of Labor by
P.D. No. 21 on October 14, 1972, and its decisions were expressly declared to be appealable to the
Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the President of the Philippines.
May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the same to take effect six
months after its promulgation. 8 Created and regulated therein is the present NLRC which was
attached to the Department of Labor and Employment for program and policy coordination only. 9
Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223) thereof also granted an aggrieved party the remedy of appeal
from the decision of the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently amended
said provision and abolished such appeals. No appellate review has since then been provided for.
the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC, and formerly of
the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal provision for appellate review thereof, the Court
nevertheless rejected that thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize
the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given
by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its
jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and
balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.
the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for
any further or subsequent remedy, 12 and then seasonably avail of the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65, 13 for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of sixty days
from notice of the decision. Curiously, although the 10-day period for finality of the decision of the
NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held
that this Court may still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process
considerations if filed within the reglementary period under Rule 65.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of
certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of
the word “appeal” in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus
plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial
review addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them, however, and
with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action of certiorari is within
the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals; 23 whereas to indulge in
the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but
would subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No.
1495.
2) Appeal.
-review of NLRC Decision is through Rule 65.
-jurisdiction: SC AND CA
-by way of hierarchy: the review shall be initially filed before CA.
Russel vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738; GR No. 119347, March 17, 1999

(Civil Procedures – Jurisdiction; Civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation)
Facts: Petitioners discovered a public document, which is a declaration of heirs and deed of
confirmation of a previous oral agreement, of partition, affecting the land executed by and among the
respondents whereby respondents divided the property among themselves to the exclusion of
petitioners who are entitled thereto as legal heirs also.
Petitioners filed a complaint, denominated “DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND PARTITION” against
defendants with the RTC claiming that the document was false and perjurious as the private
respondents were not the only heirs and that no oral partition of the property whatsoever had been
made between the heirs. The complaint prayed that the document be declared null and void and an
order be issued to partition the land among all the heirs.
Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the nature of the case as the total assessed value of the subject land is P5,000.00 which under
section 33 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the MTC.
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the RTC has jurisdiction over the
case since the action is one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation within the contemplation of
Section 19(l) of B.P. 129, as amended.

Issue: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the nature of the civil case.

Held: Yes. The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is one incapable of pecuniary
estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of said court.
In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, the Supreme Court ruled that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action
or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of
first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions
as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the document in
question. While the complaint also prays for the partition of the property, this is just incidental to the
main action, which is the declaration of nullity of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations
in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled
to all or some of the claims asserted therein.
 incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable by the RTCs.
Villena vs. Payoyo Case Digest
Verily, what determines the nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction over it are the
In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose subject is incapable of pecuniary
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained.
If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
The complaint, albeit entitled as one for collection of a sum of money with damages, is one incapable
pecuniary estimation and the jurisdiction of the court depends on the amount of the
of pecuniary estimation; thus, one within the RTC's jurisdiction. The allegations therein show that it is
claim. But, where the primary issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
actually for breach of contract. A case for breach of contract is a cause of action either for specific
money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal
performance or rescission of contracts. An action for rescission of contract, as a counterpart of an
relief sought, such are actions whose subjects are incapable of pecuniary estimation,
action for specific performance, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore falls under the
hence cognizable by the RTCs.
jurisdiction of the RTC. The averments in the complaint show that Payoyo sought the cancellation of
the contracts and refund of the downpayments since Villena failed to comply with the obligation to
********
deliver the appliances and install the kitchen cabinets subject of the contracts. While the respondent
prayed for the refund, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the rescission or
Facts:
cancellation of the contracts. (Villena vs. Payoyo, G.R. No. 163021, April 27, 2007)
Payoyo and Novaline, Inc., through its president, Villena, entered into a contract for the delivery and
installation of kitchen cabinets in Payoyo's residence. The cabinets were to be delivered within 90
days from downpayment of 50% of the purchase price. Payoyo paid the downpayment. Another
contract was entered into for the delivery of home appliances and Villena also paid the 50%
downpayment. Despite demand, Villena failed to install the kitchen cabinets and deliver the
appliances.

Payoyo filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money and damages against Villena. Villena posits
that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint since it is mainly for recovery of a sum of money
in the amount of P184,821.50 which is below the jurisdictional amount set for RTCs.

Payoyo, on the other hand, contends that the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint as the
allegations therein show that it is actually a case for rescission of the contracts. The recovery of a
sum of money is merely a necessary consequence of the cancellation of the contracts.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

Held:

Yes. In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation,
the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation and the
jurisdiction of the court depends on the amount of the claim. But, where the primary issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, such are actions whose subjects are
De Ungria et al. vs. Court of Appeals Since we find that the case involved the annulment of contract which is not susceptible of pecuniary
G.R. No. 165777 | July 25, 2011 estimation, thus, falling within the jurisdiction of the RTC, the docket fees should not be based on the
assessed value of the subject land as claimed by petitioner in their memorandum, but should be
FACTS based on Section 7(b)(1) of Rule 141. A perusal of the entries in the Legal Fees Form attached to the
This is a petition for review on certiorari for ownership, possession and damages, and records would reflect that the amount of P400.00 was paid to the Clerk of Court, together with the
alternative causes of action either to declare two documents as patent nullities, and/or for recovery other fees, as assessed by the Clerk of Court. Thus, upon respondents' proof of payment of the
of Rosario's conjugal share with damages or redemption of the subject land against petitioner assessed fees, the RTC has properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint. Jurisdiction once
Ceferina de Ungria et al. Respondent Rosario is the surviving wife of the late Fernando Castor, while acquired is never lost, it continues until the case is terminated.
the rest of the respondents are their legitimate children. The documents they (respondents) sought
to annul are (1) the Deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest including Improvements thereon
allegedly executed by Fernando in favor of Eugenio de Ungria, petitioner's father; and (2) the
Affidavit of Relinquishment executed by Eugenio in favor of petitioner.
Petitioner also filed an Addendum to the Motion to Dismiss raising, among others that the
court has no jurisdiction over the case for failure of plaintiffs to pay the filing fee in full. Pending
resolution of the motion, respondents filed a Motion to Allow them to continue prosecuting this case
as indigent litigants. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and clarification on whether plaintiffs
should be allowed to continue prosecuting the case as indigent litigants. Said motion was denied.
The same was filed to the RTC and to the CA; both were denied. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari where petitioner raises the following assignment of error: that the Court of Appeals erred in
not finding that respondent RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s Motion
to Dismiss despite respondent’s non-payment of the correct docket fees.

ISSUE
Was jurisdiction vested to the RTC in this civil case despite the failure of the plaintiff to file
the necessary docket fees?

RULING
YES. It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that when an action is filed in court, the complaint
must be accompanied by the payment of the requisite docket and filing fees. It is not simply the filing
of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that
vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.
Section 7(b)(1) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. - (a) For filing an action or a permissive counter-claim or
money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing with leave of court a third-party,
fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint-in-intervention, and for all clerical services in the same, if
the total-sum claimed, exclusive of interest, or the stated value of the property in litigation, is:
xxxx
(b) For filing:
1. Actions where the value of the subject matter
cannot be estimated ........ P400.00
2. x x x
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value
thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees.
SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R. BAUTISTA VS. LINDO The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil action incapable
G.R. No. 208232, March 10, 2014 of pecuniary estimation.

Facts:
Alfredo R. Bautista (Bautista), petitioner’s predecessor, inherited in 1983 a free-patent land located in
Davao Oriental and covered by OCT No. (1572) P-6144.A few years later, he subdivided the property
and sold it to several vendees, herein respondents, via a notarized deed of absolute sale dated May
30, 1991. Two months later, OCT No.(1572) P-6144 was canceled and Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCTs) were issued in favor of the vendees.
On August 1994, Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against respondents before the RTC,
anchoring his cause of action on Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 141, otherwise known
as the “Public Land Act,” which reads:
It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint
and the character of the relief sought. In this regard, the Court, in Russell v. Vestil, wrote that "in
determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action
or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the RTCs
would depend on the amount of the claim." But where the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of,
the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the
litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation.

“SECTION 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions,
when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a
period of five years from the date of the conveyance.”

During the pendency of the action, Bautista died and was substituted by petitioner, Efipania.
Respondents, Sps. Lindo entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners, whereby they agree
to cede to Epifania 3,230 sq.m..portion of the property as well as to waive, abandon, surrender, and
withdraw all claims and counterclaims against each other. RTC approve the compromise agreement
on January 2011.

Other respondents, filed a Motion to Dismissed on February 2013 alleging lack of jurisdiction of the
RTC on the ground that the complaint failed to state the value of the property sought to be recovered
and alleges that the total value of the properties in issue is only P16,500 pesos. RTC ruled in favor of
the respondent dismissing the case.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in granting the motion for the dismissal of the case on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Ratio:

Yes. Jurisdiction of courts is granted by the Constitution and pertinent laws. Jurisdiction of RTCs, as
may be relevant to the instant petition, is provided in Sec. 19 of BP 129.

Issue:
Whether the action filed by petitioners is one involving title to or possession of real property or any
interest therein or one incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Ratio:
Hilario v. Salvador, G.R. No. 160384 (April 29, 2005) Case Digest
Ownership > Ownership in General > Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership > Actions Available
to Owner > Recovery of Real Property > Accion Publiciana and Accion Reinvindicatoria
Facts:
The law also explicitly excluded from the determination of the jurisdictional amount the demand for
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs.
Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings therein, including the decision
of the RTC, were null and void.

Hilario filed a complaint with the RTC against Salvador alleging that they were the co-owners of the
parcel of land where Salvador constructed his house without their knowledge and refused to vacate
despite their demands.

Salvodor filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. He contended
that the complaint did not state the assessed value of the property, which determines the jurisdiction
of the court.

Hilario maintained that the RTC had jurisdiction since their action was an accion reinvindicatoria, an
action incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, regardless of the assessed value of the subject
property, exclusive jurisdiction fell within the said court. Also, in their opposition to Salvador's motion
to dismiss, they mentioned the increase in the assessed value of the land in the amount of P3.5
million. Moreover, they maintained that their action was also one for damages exceeding P20,000.00,
over which the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction.

Issue:

Whether or not the action filed by Hilario was an accion reinvindicatoria.

Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by Hilario.

Held:

The action filed by Hilario did not involve a claim of ownership over the property. They prayed that
Salvador vacate the property and restore possession to them. Hence, it was an accion publiciana, or
one for the recovery of possession of the real property. It was not an aaccion reinvindicatoria or a
suit for the recovery of possession over the real property as owner.

The nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction is determined by the
material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect
when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims
asserted therein.

The complaint did not contain an allegation stating the assessed value of the property. Absent any
allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it could not thus be determined
whether the RTC or the MTC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the action.
Darma Maslag vs Elizabeth Monzon, William Geston, and Registry of Deeds of Benguet Neither would the active participation of the parties nor estoppel operate to confer original and
GR. No. 174908 exclusive jurisdiction where the court or tribunal only wields appellate jurisdiction over the case.
June 17, 2013
The present court looks at what type of jurisdiction was actually exercised by the RTC, and not into
FACTS: what type of jurisdiction the RTC should have exercised.

In 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for reconveyance of real property with declaration of nullity of Inquiring into what the RTC should have done in disposing of the case is a question that already
original certificate of title against respondents. The Complaint was filed before the Municipal Trial involves the merits of the appeal, but the court obviously cannot go into that where the mode of
Court. appeal was improper to begin with.

After trial, the MTC found respondent Monzon guilty of fraud in obtaining an OCT over petitioner’s Wherefore, Petition for Review is denied for lack of merit. The Court affirms the decision of the Court
property. of Appeals.

Respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring the MTC without jurisdiction over
petitioner’s cause of action. The presiding judge declared that it will take cognizance of the case
pursuant to Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court which provides for appeal from orders dismissing
the case without trial; lack of jurisdiction.

RTC thereafter reversed the decision of the MTC, prompting the petitioner to file a Notice of Appeal.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the said appeal and affirmed the respondents’ contention that the
proper remedy is a Petition for Review under Rule 42, and not an ordinary appeal.

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner’s ordinary appeal is the proper remedy

HELD:

No. The CA is correct in holding that the proper mode of appeal should have been a Petition for
Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, and not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.

Under the present state of the law, in cases involving title to real property, original and exclusive
jurisdiction belongs to either the RTC or the MTC, depending on the assessed value of the subject
property.

Since the assessed value of the disputed property is only P12,400, MTC has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

In fact and in law, the RTC Resolution was a continuation of the proceedings that originated from the
MTC. It was a judgment issued by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

It cannot be overemphasized that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by law and it
is “not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside.”
Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. vs. Cyborg Leasing Corp.

Facts:
Cyborg Leasing Corp filed before the MTC of Manila a case captioned "Damages with prayer for a writ
Replevin" against Conpac and Movers. It was alleged that pursuant to a lease agreement, Cyborg had
delivered one forklift to Conpac. The lease agreement stipulated a monthly rental of P11,000.00 for
the use of the equipment. Conpac failed and refused to pay the stipulated rentals. Petitioner took
control of the operations of Conpac and seized all the cargoes and equipment in ludi g the subject
porklift. Petitioner ignored Cyborg's demand for the return to it of the equipment and the formal
disclaimer of ownership made by Conpac. A Writ of Replevin was issued.

Petitioner was served with a copy of the summons and the latter filed a motion to dismiss the case
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the of MTC since the complaint had asked for the
actual market value of the equipment, actual damage,, exemplary damages and atty's fees. MTC
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Cyborg filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injuction against MTC Judge,
COnpac and Movers before the RTC f Manila. RTC granted Cyborg's application for premininary
injunction. Petitiner assails the decision of RTC. Hence this petition.

Issue: WON, MTC has jurisdiction over the complaint?

Held: NO
MTC's jurisdiction over the action filed by Cyborg is the concern of the case. The jurisdiction of the
court and the nature of the action must be determined by the averments in the complaints and the
character of the relief sought. The complaint filed by Cyborg with the MTC prayed for the return of
the Nissan Forklift to it as the owner or in the alternative for the payment of 150T plus damages,
amount of unpaid lease and atty's fees.

It would be incorrect to argue that the actual damages in the form of unpaid rentals were just in
incident of the action for the return of the forklift considering that private respondent specifically
sought in the complaint not only seizure of the forklift from petitioner Movers but also payment of
unpaid and outstanding rentals. MTC's dismissing the complaint was properly decreed,

Petition for review is granted.

Mangaliag v. Pastoral
Facts: Respondent Serquina filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against petitioners Mangaliag and
Solano. This complaint alleges that the Serquina and his co-passengers sustained serious injuries and permanent
deformities from the collision of their tricycle with the petitioners’ dump truck and the gross negligence,
carelessness and imprudence of the petitioners in driving the dump truck. Respondents seek damages in the
form of medical expenses amounting to P71,392.00. Respondents also claim P500,000.00 by way of moral
damages, as a further result of his hospitalization, lost income of P25,000.00 or the nominal damages, and
attorney’s fees.
Petitioners filed their answer with counterclaim. After pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued. After the
respondent rested his case, petitioners testified in their defense. Subsequently, petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. They alleged that since the principal
amount prayed for, in the amount of P71,392.00, falls within the jurisdiction of MTC. Petitioners maintain that
the court’s jurisdiction should be based exclusively on the amount of actual damages, excluding therefrom the
amounts claimed as moral, exemplary, nominal damages and attorney’s fee, etc.
The respondent opposed the motion saying that since the claim for damages is the main action, the totality of
the damages sought to be recovered should be considered in determining jurisdiction. He relied on
Administrative Circular No. 09-94 which provides that “in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause
of action. . . the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court” Also, the
petitioners’ defense of lack of jurisdiction has already been barred by estoppel and laches. He contends that
after actively taking part in the trial proceedings and presenting a witness to seek exoneration, it would be unfair
and legally improper for petitioners to seek the dismissal of the case.
RTC ruled in favor of respondent. Petitioners filed an MR which was denied. Subsequently, they filed a petition
for certiorari with the SC.
Issues: (1) Whether petitioners are barred from raising the defense of the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction? NO
(2) Whether it is the amount of P71,392.00 as medical expenses, excluding moral, nominal damages and
attorney’s fees, which determines jurisdiction, hence it is MTC which has jurisdiction? NO
Ruling:
(1) On the matter of estoppel and laches: In the present case, no judgment has yet been rendered by
the RTC. As a matter of fact, as soon as the petitioners discovered the alleged jurisdictional defect, they did not
fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion to dismiss. Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches to be
absent, the Sibonghanoy doctrine does not control the present controversy. What happened in the Sibonghanoy,
the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had
already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches. But in
this case, there is no laches. Thus, the general rule that the question of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings must apply. Petitioners are not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
RTC.
(2) On the issue which of the amounts is determinative of jurisdiction: The well-entrenched
principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the material
allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or
some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. In the present case, the allegations in the complaint plainly show
that private respondent seeks to recover not only his medical expenses, lost income but also damages for
physical suffering and mental anguish due to permanent facial deformity from injuries sustained in the vehicular
accident. Viewed as an action for quasi-delict, the present case falls squarely within the purview of Article 2219
(2), which provides for the payment of moral damages in cases of quasi-delict causing physical injuries.
Private respondent’s claim for moral damages of P500,000.00 cannot be considered as merely incidental to or a
consequence of the claim for actual damages. It is a separate and distinct cause of action or an independent
actionable tort. It springs from the right of a person to the physical integrity of his or her body, and if that
integrity is violated, damages are due and assessable. Hence, the demand for moral damages must be
considered as a separate cause of action, independent of the claim for actual damages and must be included in
determining the jurisdictional amount.
If the rule were otherwise, i.e., the court’s jurisdiction in a case of quasi-delict causing physical injuries would
only be based on the claim for actual damages and the complaint is filed in the MTC, it can only award moral
damages in an amount within its jurisdictional limitations, a situation not intended by the framers of the law.
(3) (Not really an issue raised by the respondent himself, but was nonetheless discussed by
the SC) On the issue whether a direct recourse by petition for certiorari to the SC from the order of
RTC: Generally a direct recourse to this Court is highly improper, for it violates the established policy of strict
observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. Although this Court, the RTCs and the CA have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. This Court is a court of
last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution
and immemorial tradition.
Thus, this Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in
the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of
serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise
of its primary jurisdiction.
Be that as it may, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. It generally applies to cases involving
warring factual allegations. For this reason, litigants are required to repair to the trial courts at the first instance
to determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of the evidence of the
parties. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot be brought immediately before appellate
courts as they are not triers of facts. Therefore, a strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not
necessary when the cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions.
In the present case, petitioners submit a pure question of law involving the interpretation and application of
paragraph 2 of Administrative Circular No. 09-94. This legal question and in order to avoid further delay are
compelling enough reasons to allow petitioners’ invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction in the first instance.
(Maybe it is important to note that the petition for certiorari was filed from the denial of the RTC of the
petitioners’ motion to dismiss. There is no final adjudication yet as to the complaint for damages.)
 G.R. No. 181416, November 11, 2013 Applying the two tests it was held that the case involves intra-corporate controversy.
It obviously arose from the intra-corporate relations between the parties as petitioner is a
MEDICAL PLAZA MAKATI CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, Petitioners, v.ROBERT H. condominium corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, and respondent,
CULLEN, Respondent. on the other hand, is the registered owner of Unit No. 1201 and is thus a
stockholder/member of the condominium corporation. Clearly, there is an intra-corporate
PERALTA, J.: relationship between the corporation and a stockholder/member.
Facts: Further, the questions involved pertain to their rights and obligations under the
Respondent purchased from Meridien Land Holding, Inc. (MLHI) a condominium unit of Corporation Code and matters relating to the regulation of the corporation.
the Medical Plaza Makati Condominium Corporation (MPMCC). On September 19 2002, petitioner
demanded from respondent payment for alleged unpaid association dues and assessments
amounting to P145,567.42.
Respondent disputed this demand claiming that he had been paying his dues as shown by
the fact that he was previously elected president and director of petitioner. Petitioner, on the other
hand, claimed that respondent’s obligation was a carry-over of that of MLHI. Consequently,
respondent was prevented from exercising his right to vote and be voted for during the 2002 election
of petitioner’s Board of Directors.
Respondent clarified from MLHI the said claim but MLHI claimed that such had already been
settled. Thereafter, a Complaint for Damages was filed by respondent against petitioner and MLHI.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, two of the grounds for the dismissal were the RTC’s lack
of jurisdiction as the case involves an intra-corporate controversy and citing prematurity for failure of
respondent to exhaust all intra-corporate remedies.
Issues:
Whether or not the controversy involves intra-corporate issues as would fall within the
jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a special commercial court.

Ruling:
Yes. In determining whether a dispute constitutes an intra-corporate controversy, two tests
are used, namely, the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test.

An intra-corporate controversy is one which pertains to any of the following

relationships: (1) between the corporation, partnership or association and the public; (2)
between the corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as its franchise,
permit or license to operate is concerned; (3) between the corporation, partnership or
association and its stockholders, partners, members or officers; and (4) among the
stockholders, partners or associates themselves. Thus, under the relationship test, the
existence of any of the above intra-corporate relations makes the case intra-corporate.
Under the nature of the controversy test, “the controversy must not only be rooted in
the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but must as well pertain to the enforcement
of the parties’ correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal
and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation.” In other words, jurisdiction should
be determined by considering both the relationship of the parties as well as the nature of the
question involved.
SAMSON V. DAWAY AND CATERPILLAR, INC.
G.R. NO. 160054-55
DATE: July 21, 2004
PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO
FACTS: Two informations for unfair competition were filed against Samson, the registered owner of
ITTI shoes. The infomations state that Samson did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
distribute, sell and/or offer for sale CATERPILLAR products such as footwear, garments, clothing,
bags, accessories and paraphernalia which are closely identical to and/or colorable imitations of the
authentic Caterpillar products and likewise using trademarks, symbols and/or designs as would cause
confusion, mistake or deception on the part of the buying public to the damage and prejudice of
CATERPILLAR, INC., the prior adopter, user and owner of the following
internationally: “CATERPILLAR,” “CAT,” “CATERPILLAR & DESIGN,” “CAT AND DESIGN,” “WALKING
MACHINES” and “TRACK-TYPE TRACTOR & DESIGN.”
Samson filed a motion to suspend the arraignment and other proceedings in view of the existence of
an alleged prejudicial question involving a civil case for unfair competition pending with the same
branch, and also in view of the pendency of a petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice
assailing the Chief State Prosecutor’s resolution finding probable cause to charge petitioner with
unfair competition.
The TC judge denied the motion and arraignment ensued. Thereafter, Samson filed a motion to
quash the informations contending that since under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, the penalty of
imprisonment for unfair competition does not exceed six years, the offense is cognizable by the
Municipal Trial Courts and not by the Regional Trial Court, per R.A. No. 7691. The TC judge denied
the motion. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
1. Which court has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases for violation of intellectual property
rights?
2. Did the TC judge commit grave abuse of discretion when he refused to suspend the proceedings
on the ground of existence of prejudicial question and a pending petition for review before the Sec.
of Justice on the finding of probable cause for unfair competition?
RULING:
1. RTC. Under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, which took effect on January 1, 1998, the criminal
penalty for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false
description or representation, is imprisonment from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from Fifty
Thousand Pesos to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos. Corollarily, Section 163 of the same Code states
that actions (including criminal and civil) under Sections 150, 155, 164, 166, 167, 168 and 169 shall
be brought before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws.
The existing law referred to in the foregoing provision is Section 27 of R.A. No. 166 (The Trademark
Law) which provides that jurisdiction over cases for infringement of registered marks, unfair
competition, false designation of origin and false description or representation, is lodged with the CFI
(now RTC). We find no merit in the claim of Samson that R.A. No. 166 was expressly repealed by
R.A. No. 8293. The use of the phrases “parts of Acts” and “inconsistent herewith” only means that
the repeal pertains only to provisions which are repugnant or not susceptible of harmonization with
R.A. No. 8293.7 Section 27 of R.A. No. 166, however, is consistent and in harmony with Section 163
of R.A. No. 8293. Had R.A. No. 8293 intended to vest jurisdiction over violations of intellectual
property rights with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, it would have expressly stated so under Section
163 thereof.
Moreover, the settled rule in statutory construction is that in case of conflict between a general law
and a special law, the latter must prevail. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law to Regional Trial
Courts must prevail over that granted by a general law to Municipal Trial Courts. In the case at bar,
R.A. No. 8293 and R.A. No. 166 are special laws conferring jurisdiction over violations of intellectual
property rights to the Regional Trial Court. They should therefore prevail over R.A. No. 7691, which is
a general law. Hence, jurisdiction over the instant criminal case for unfair competition is properly
lodged with the Regional Trial Court even if the penalty therefor is imprisonment of less than 6 years,
or from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from P50,000.00 to P200,000.00.
In fact, to implement and ensure the speedy disposition of cases involving violations of intellectual
property rights under R.A. No. 8293, the Court issued A.M. No. 02-1-11-SC dated February 19, 2002
designating certain Regional Trial Courts as Intellectual Property Courts. On June 17, 2003, the Court
further issued a Resolution consolidating jurisdiction to hear and decide Intellectual Property Code
and Securities and Exchange Commission cases in specific Regional Trial Courts designated as Special
Commercial Courts.
2. NO. Samson failed to substantiate his claim that there was a prejudicial question. He made no
discussion in support of said prayer in his petition and reply to comment. Neither did he attach a copy
of the complaint in Civil Case nor quote the pertinent portion thereof to prove the existence of a
prejudicial question. At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action
can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.
In the case at bar, the common element in the acts constituting unfair competition under Section 168
of R.A. No. 8293 is fraud. Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may be brought by the injured party. Hence, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, which as admitted by
Caterpilar also relate to unfair competition, is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil
Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the
criminal cases at bar.
While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the
aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the
filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said
period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.
In the instant case, Samson failed to establish that respondent Judge abused his discretion in
denying his motion to suspend. His pleadings and annexes submitted before the Court do not show
the date of filing of the petition for review with the Secretary of Justice.15Moreover, the Order dated
August 9, 2002 denying his motion to suspend was not appended to the petition. He thus failed to
discharge the burden of proving that he was entitled to a suspension of his arraignment and that the
questioned orders are contrary to Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Indeed, the age-old but familiar rule is that he who alleges must prove his allegations.