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RULE 119: TRIAL

MANGUERRA v. RISOS CONDITIONAL EXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS OF THE
PROSECUTION MUST BE MADE BEFORE THE COURT WHERE THE
CASE IS PENDING. It is thus required that the conditional
examination be made before the court where the case is pending.
It is also necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can
attend the examination, subject to his right to waive the same
after reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the
Rules mandate that it be conducted in the same manner as an
examination during trial, that is, through question and answer

PEOPLE v. WEBB DEPOSITION, DEFINED: The testimony of a witness taken upon

oral question or written interrogatories, not in open court, but in
pursuance of a commission to take testimony issued by court, or
under a general law or court rule on the subject, and reduce to
writing and duly authenticated, and intended to be used in
preparation and upon the trial of a civil or a criminal prosecution.
A pretrial discovery device by which one party (through his or her
attorney) ask oral questions of the other party or of a witness for
the other party. The person who is deposed is called the
deponent. The deposition is conducted under oath outside of the
court room, usually in one of the lawyer's offices. A transcript —
word for word account — is made of the deposition. Testimony of
[a] witness, taken in writing, under oath or affirmation, before
some judicial officer in answer to questions or interrogatories

PURPOSES OF DEPOSITIONS: the purposes of taking depositions

are to: 1.] Give greater assistance to the parties in ascertaining
the truth and in checking and preventing perjury; 2.] Provide an
effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent claims
and defenses; 3.] Make available in a simple, convenient and
inexpensive way, facts which otherwise could not be proved
except with great difficulty; 4.] Educate the parties in advance of
trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses thereby
encouraging settlements; 5.] Expedite litigation; 6.] Safeguard
against surprise; 7.] Prevent delay; 8.] Simplify and narrow the
issues; and 9.] Expedite and facilitate both preparation and trial.

DEPOSITIONS MUST BE MADE BEFORE TRIAL: As can be gleaned

from the foregoing, a deposition, in keeping with its nature as a
mode of discovery, should be taken before and not during trial.

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GRANT OF DEPOSITION IS ADDRESSED TO THE DISCRETION OF

THE COURT: The use of discovery procedures is directed to the
sound discretion of the trial judge.48 The deposition taking can
not be based nor can it be denied on flimsy reasons. 49 Discretion
has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and in consonance
with the spirit of the law.

PEOPLE v. MAMARION PLEA TO A LESSER OFFENSE NOT THE SAME WITH DISCHARGE AS
STATE WITNESS: Appellants assail Gale's plea to a lesser offense
arguing that it should have been made during the plea bargaining
stage of the trial and that it should not be subject to the condition
that he will testify against appellants. In the Brief for the State,
the OSG maintains that Gale was validly discharged as a state
witness. Under the circumstances, it is not correct to state that
Gale was discharged as a state witness under Section 9, Rule 119
of the Rules of Court. Gale was allowed to change his plea
pursuant to the then prevailing Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules
of Court.

PLEA BARGAINING ADDRESSED TO THE DISCRETION OF THE

COURT: In the case at bar, the private respondent (accused)
moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense after the prosecution
had already rested its case. In such situation, jurisprudence has
provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor with a
yardstick within which their discretion may be properly exercised.
Thus, in People vs. Kayanan, we held that the rules allow such a
plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence
to establish the guilt of the crime charged. 49 (Emphasis supplied)

Gale's testimony was crucial to the prosecution as there was no

other direct evidence linking appellants to the commission of the
crime. Hence, the trial court did not err in allowing Gale to plead
guilty to a lesser offense.

PEOPLE v. MARCIAL MODIFICATION OF ORDER, ADDRESSED TO THE DISCRETION OF

THE COURT: RTC did not commit any reversible error in denying
the request for a reverse order of trial, a matter which under the
rules is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

Rules of Court, Rule 119, Section 3(e):xxx the order of trial may
be modified.

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Republic Act No. 8493, Section 7: xxx an affirmative defense may

modify the order of trial xxx.

So also Circular No. 38-98, Section 3: xxx an affirmative defense

may modify the order of trial xxx

MAQUIRAN v. GRAGEDA EVIDENCE MUST BE PRESENTED BEFORE THE COURT: cases are
decided on the basis of evidence presented before the court, thus
it is incumbent upon the party who is to be benefited by such
evidence to produce the same, no matter how voluminous and
burdensome, in accordance with the rules for the court’s
appreciation and evaluation. It is not respondent’s duty to secure
these documents for the defendants, as he is the judge in the
pending case and not the counsel of the defendants.
ESTRADA v. PEOPLE TRIAL IN ABSENTIA, WHEN ALLOWED: The holding of trial in
absentia is authorized under Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987
Constitution which provides that "after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable."

People v. Salas, their escape should have been considered a

waiver of their right to be present at their trial, and the inability
of the court to notify them of the subsequent hearings did not
prevent it from continuing with their trial. They were to be
deemed to have received notice. The same fact of their escape
made their failure to appear unjustified because they have, by
escaping, placed themselves beyond the pale and protection of
the law. This being so, then pursuant to Gimenez v. Nazareno, the
trial against the fugitives, just like those of the others, should
have been brought to its ultimate conclusion. Thereafter, the
trial court had the duty to rule on the evidence presented by the
prosecution against all the accused and to render its judgment
accordingly. It should not wait for the fugitives’ re-appearance
or re-arrest. They were deemed to have waived their right to
present evidence on their own behalf and to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses who testified against them.

PEOPLE v. SUNGA MOTION TO DISCHARGE WITNESS MAY BE DONE AT ANY STAGE

OF THE PROCEEDINGS: Her discharge was ordered in the course
of what originally were hearings on the petition of the accused
for bail and after the prosecution had presented several of its

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witnesses and submitted Locil’s sworn statement. Contrary to

accused’s counsels’ argument that a motion for discharge could
only be filed during trial on the merits, it could be done at any
stage of the proceedings, and discharge can be effected from
the filing of the information to the time the defense starts to
offer any evidence.

HEARING ON DISCHARGE, WHEN SATISFIED: The requirement of

"a hearing in support of the discharge" had been substantially
complied with when the trial court, during the hearings on the
bail petition, already received evidence from the
prosecutionincluding Locil’s sworn statement and also heard in
open court the defense’s arguments in opposition thereto. A
hearing did take place but interspersed with the hearings on the
bail petition. So long as the trial court was able to receive
evidence for and against the discharge, its subsequent order
granting or denying the motion for discharge is in order
notwithstanding the lack of actual hearing on said motion.

PEOPLE v. CHAVES DISCHARGE NOT NECESSARY FOR A CO-ACCUSED TO TESTIFY

AGAINST CO DEFENDANTS: It is true that an accused cannot be
made a hostile witness for the prosecution, for to do so would
compel him to be a witness against himself. However, he may
testify against a co-defendant where he has agreed to do so,
with full knowledge of his right and the consequences of his
acts.12 It is not necessary that the court discharges him first as
state witness. There is nothing in the rules that says so. There is a
difference between testifying as state witness and testifying as a
co-accused. In the first, the proposed state witness has to qualify
as a witness for the state, after which he is discharged as an
accused and exempted from prosecution.13 In the second, the
witness remains an accused and can be made liable should he be
found guilty of the criminal offense.

EVIDENCE REQUIRED DURING HEARING FOR DISCHARGE: The

provision does not make any distinction as to the kind of evidence
the prosecution may present. What it simply requires, in addition
to the presentation of the sworn statement of the accused
concerned, is the presentation of such evidence as are necessary
to determine if the conditions exist for the discharge, so as to
meet the object of the law, which is to prevent unnecessary or
arbitrary exclusion from the complaint of persons guilty of the
crime charged.14 No exemption from the term evidence is

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provided by the law as to exclude the testimony of the accused.

When the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.
There is no other evidence more competent than the testimony
of the proposed witness himself to prove the conditions required
by the Sec. 17, Rule 119.

GO v. PEOPLE DEPOSITION OF PROSECUTION’S WITNESS MUST BE BEFORE THE

COURT TRYING THE CASE: (REITERATED MANGUERRA RULING
and CONTRASTED IT WITH WEBB RULING) The condition of the
private complainant being sick and of advanced age falls within
the provision of Section 15 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
However, said rule substantially provides that he should be
conditionally examined before the court where the case is
pending. Thus, this Court concludes that the language of Section
15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to require the parties to present
testimony at the hearing through live witnesses, whose
demeanor and credibility can be evaluated by the judge presiding
at the hearing, rather than by means of deposition. No where in
the said rule permits the taking of deposition outside the
Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not.
CABARLES v. JUDGE MACEDA REQUISITES FOR REOPENING OF CASES: Section 24, Rule 119 and
existing jurisprudence stress the following requirements for
reopening a case: (1) the reopening must be before the finality of
a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on
his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only
after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a
miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional
and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days
from the issuance of the order.

REOPENING NEED NOT BE MADE ONLY AFTER PROMULGATION

OF JUDGMENT: Generally, after the parties have produced their
respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting
evidence only. However, the court, for good reasons, in the
furtherance of justice, may allow new evidence upon their
original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate
court where no abuse of discretion appears.25 A motion to reopen
may thus properly be presented only after either or both parties
had formally offered and closed their evidence, but before
judgment is rendered,26 and even after promulgation but before
finality of judgment27 and the only controlling guideline governing
a motion to reopen is the paramount interest of justice. 28 This
remedy of reopening a case was meant to prevent a miscarriage

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of justice.

HEARING REQUIRED FOR MOTION TO REOPEN: However, while

Judge Maceda is allowed to reopen the case before judgment is
rendered, Section 24 requires that a hearing must first be
conducted. Judge Maceda issued the April 1, 2003 Order without
notice and hearing and without giving the prosecution and
accused an opportunity to manifest their position on the matter.
This failure, to our mind, constitutes grave abuse of discretion
and goes against the due process clause of the Constitution which
requires notice and opportunity to be heard. 30 The issuance of
the said order, without the benefit of a hearing, is contrary to the
express language of Section 24, Rule 119.
PEOPLE v DE LA CRUZ DISCHARGED WITNESS MUST NOT APPEAR TO BE THE MOST
GUILTY: The provision does not require that a state witness
should appear to be the "least guilty" among the accused. Rather,
it provides that he "does not appear to be the most guilty." The
findings of the lower court revealed that Tano merely facilitated
the commission of the crime. He merely boarded the car and sat
beside accused-appellant De la Cruz throughout the whole ride
and accompanied accused-appellant Martinez in going back to
Batasan Hills after leaving Aaron and accused-appellant De la Cruz
in Bulacan. True, he was the one who placed the call to Erwin to
demand ransom. However, he was neither the mastermind nor
the one who hatched the plan to kidnap Aaron in exchange for
money. Clearly, he did not appear to be the most guilty among
the accused. Thus, we uphold the propriety of the trial court's
designation of Tano as state witness.
ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY: Moreover, his testimony was
absolutely necessary as it was the only direct evidence
establishing the presence of conspiracy,14 from the planning stage
up to the commission of the crime.

PEOPLE v. ROSARIO CROSS EXAMINATION, DEFINED: Cross-examination serves as

a safeguard to combat unreliable testimony, providing means for
discrediting a witness' testimony, and is in the nature of an attack
on the truth and accuracy of his testimony. The purpose of cross-
examination, however, is not limited to bringing out a falsehood,
since it is also a leading and searching inquiry of the witness for
further disclosure touching the particular matters detailed by him
in his direct examination, and it serves to sift, modify, or explain
what has been said, in order to develop new or old facts in a view
favorable to the cross-examiner. The object of cross-examination
therefore is to weaken or disprove the case of ones adversary,

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and break down his testimony in chief, test the recollection,

veracity, accuracy, honesty and bias or prejudice of the witness,
his source of information, his motives, interest and memory, and
exhibit the improbabilities of his testimony.

RULES ON ADMISIBILITY OF CROSS EXAMINATIONS: The basic

rule is that the testimony of a witness given on direct
examination should be stricken off the record where there was
no adequate opportunity for cross-examination. Of course, there
are notable modifications to the basic rule which make its
application essentially on a case-to-case basis. Thus, where a
party had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed
to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits his right to cross-
examine and the testimony given by the witness on direct
examination will be allowed to remain on record. [7] But when the
cross-examination is not or cannot be done or completed due to
causes attributable to the party offering the witness, or to the
witness himself, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered
incompetent and inadmissible in evidence.[8] The direct
testimony of a witness who dies before the conclusion of the
cross-examination can be stricken only insofar as not covered by
the cross-examination,[9] and the absence of a witness is not
enough to warrant striking of his testimony for failure to appear
for further cross-examination where the witness has already been
sufficiently cross-examined, which is not true in the present case,
or that the matter on which further cross-examination is sought is
not in controversy
PEOPLE v. DE GUZMAN DISCHARGE IS NOT REVERSIBLE, EXCEPTION: While this Court
agrees that some of the requirements under Section 9 of Rule 119
for the discharge of Mosqueda to become state witness were not
strictly and properly met, nonetheless, this Court does not
subscribe to the suggestion of the defense that Mosqueda's
testimony should be disregarded. This issue has long been
settled. Although the trial court may have erred in discharging the
accused, such error would not affect the competency and the
quality of the testimony of the defendant.8 The discharge of an
accused under these circumstances is not reversible. Once his
discharge is effected, the legal consequence of acquittal follows
unless the accused so discharged fails or refuses to testify
pursuant to his commitment. The order for his discharge may
only be recalled in one instance, and that is when he
subsequently fails to testify against his co-accused.
YU v. JUDGE OF RTC RA 6981 and SEC 17, RULE 119 DISTINGUISHED: The discharge of
an accused under Republic Act No. 6981 as availed of by the

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TAGAYTAY prosecution in favor of the private respondents, is distinct and

separate from the discharge of an accused under Section 17, Rule
119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

The discharge of an accused to be a state witness under Republic

Act No. 6981 is only one of the modes for a participant in the
commission of a crime to be a state witness. Rule 119, Section 17,
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, is another mode of
discharge. The immunity provided under Republic Act No. 6981 is
granted by the DOJ while the other is granted by the court.

Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,

contemplates a situation where the information has been filed
and the accused had been arraigned and the case is undergoing
trial. The discharge of an accused under this rule may be ordered
upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, that is, at
any stage of the proceedings, from the filing of the information to
the time the defense starts to offer any evidence.10

On the other hand, in the discharge of an accused under Republic

Act No. 6981, only compliance with the requirement of Section
14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure11 is
required but not the requirement of Rule 119, Section 17.

REQUIREMENT OF EVIDENCE NOT NEEDED IN RA 6981: At this

level, the procedural requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 on the
need for the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge do not yet come into play. This is because, as correctly
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the determination of who
should be criminally charged in court is essentially an executive
function, not a judicial one.

NOTE: Remedy when the accused discharged under RA 6981 is

charged in court already is to move for AMENDMENT OF
INFORMATION. (see Sec. 14, Rule 110)

MERCIALES v CA EVIDENCE MUST BE PRESENTED FOR DISCHARGEBy refusing to

comply with the trial court's order to present evidence, the public
prosecutor grossly violated the above-quoted rule. Moreover, the
public prosecutor violated his bounden duty to protect the
interest of the offended party, at least insofar as the criminal
aspect is concerned. After the trial court denied his motion to

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discharge Nuada as a state witness, he should have proceeded to

complete the evidence of the prosecution by other means.
Instead, he willfully and deliberately refused to present an
available witness, i.e., the NBI Agent who was present in court on
that date and time. The public prosecutor was duty-bound to
exhaust all available proofs to establish the guilt of the accused
and bring them to justice for their offense against the injured
party.

Likewise guilty for serious nonfeasance was the trial court.

Notwithstanding its knowledge that the evidence for the
prosecution was insufficient to convict, especially after the public
prosecutor tenaciously insisted on utilizing Nuada as state
witness, the trial court passively watched as the public prosecutor
bungled the case. The trial court was well aware of the nature of
the testimonies of the seven prosecution witnesses that have so
far been presented. Given this circumstance, the trial court, motu
proprio, should have called additional witnesses for the purpose
of questioning them himself in order to satisfy his mind with
reference to particular facts or issues involved in the case. 13

DEMURRER MAY BE SET ASIDE IF STATE WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE

PROCESS: Based on the foregoing, it is evident that petitioner was
deprived of her day in court. Indeed, it is not only the State, but
more so the offended party, that is entitled to due process in
criminal cases. Inasmuch as the acquittal of the accused by the
court a quo was done without regard to due process of law, the
same is null and void. It is as if there was no acquittal at all, and
the same cannot constitute a claim for double jeopardy.

VALENCIA v. SB DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, DEFINED: A demurrer to evidence

tests the sufficiency or insufficiency of the prosecution’s
evidence. As such, a demurrer to evidence or a motion for leave
to file the same must be filed after the prosecution rests its case.
But before an evidence may be admitted, the rules require that
the same be formally offered, otherwise, it cannot be considered
by the court. A prior formal offer of evidence concludes the case
for the prosecution and determines the timeliness of the filing of
a demurrer to evidence.

DEMURRER MUST BE FILED AFTER PROSEUTION RESTS ITS CASE:

In the present case, petitioner’s motion for leave to file demurrer
to evidence is premature because the prosecution had yet to

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formally rest its case. When the motion was filed on January 19,
2004, the latter had not yet marked nor formally offered the Joint
Stipulation of Facts as evidence.

DEMURRER MAY BE SET ASIDE IF STATE WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE

PROCESS: In Merciales v. Court of Appeals,32 the Court annulled
the acquittal of the accused based on the demurrer to evidence
filed by the defense. It was held that the prosecutor’s failure to
present sufficient evidence to convict the accused and the
indifference displayed by the trial court in not requiring the
prosecutor to present additional evidence resulted in the denial
of the State’s right to due process warranting the reversal of the
judgment of acquittal on the ground of absence of jurisdiction.

PEOPLE v SB and MARCOS DEMURRER OPERATES AS AN ACQUITTAL. DJ ATTACHES.

EXCEPTIONS: As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the
grant amounts to an acquittal; any further prosecution of the
accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double
jeopardy.20 Notably, the proscription against double jeopardy
only envisages appeals based on errors of judgment, but not
errors of jurisdiction. Jurisprudence recognizes two grounds
where double jeopardy will not attach, these are: (i) on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction;21 and/or (ii) where there is a denial of a party’s
due process rights.

PEOPLE v. CRISTOBAL MOTION TO DEFER EVIDENCE IS NOT A MOTION FOR LEAVE OF

COURT FOR DEMURRER: A motion to defer evidence does not
constitute a request for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. In
fact, such motion indicates that appellant wanted the Trial Court
to consider the demurrer before proceeding to hear her evidence.
Furthermore, there is nothing in appellant’s Demurrer from which
it can be inferred that appellant was asking the Trial Court
permission to move for the dismissal of the case.

NO NEED TO INQUIRE INTO VOLUNTARINESS OF DEMURRER TO

EVIDENCE: The RTC did not need to inquire into the voluntariness
and intelligence of the waiver, for her opting to file her demurrer
to evidence without first obtaining express leave of court
effectively waived her right to present her evidence.

DEMURRING ADMITS THE FACTS ADDUCED: The accused and her

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counsel should not have ignored the potentially prejudicial

consequence of the filing of a demurrer to evidence without the
leave of court required in Section 15, Rule 119, of the Revised
Rules of Court.20They were well aware of the risk of a denial of
the demurrer being high, for by demurring the accused impliedly
admitted the facts adduced by the State and the proper
inferences therefrom.21 We cannot step in now to alleviate her
self-inflicted plight, for which she had no one to blame but
herself; otherwise, we may unduly diminish the essence of the
rule that gave her the alternative option to waive presenting her
own evidence.

RE: PINTO MOTION TO REOPEN MUST BE BEFORE FINALITY OF JUDGMENT

OF CONVICTION: a motion to reopen a criminal case is not the
proper procedural recourse when there is already a final
judgment of conviction. This rule is consistent with the doctrine
of finality of judgment which Judge Pinto failed to apply. "The
doctrine of finality of judgment, which is grounded on
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice,
dictates that at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of the
courts must become final and executory at some definite date set
by law."4 In this case, the final decision of the CA should have
been given effect.

PEOPLE v SB, BELICENA RA 6770 GRANTS THE OMBUDSMAN THE POWER TO GRANT
IMMUNITY: Section 17. Immunities. – x x x Under such terms and
conditions as it may determine, taking into account the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may grant
immunity from criminal prosecution to any person whose
testimony or whose possession and production of documents or
other evidence may be necessary to determine the truth in any
hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the
Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the
furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory
objectives. The immunity granted under this and the immediately
preceding paragraph shall not exempt the witness from criminal
prosecution for perjury or false testimony nor shall he be exempt
from demotion or removal from office.

ONCE THE COURT HAS ACQUIRED JURISIDICTION, DISCHARGE IS

WITH THE COURT’S DISCRETION: The Ombudsman had already
filed with the Sandiganbayan the criminal action against Mercado

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and the other respondents in Criminal Cases 27511-14 prior to

the Ombudsman’s grant of immunity to Mercado. Having already
acquired jurisdiction over Mercado’s case, it remained within the
Sandiganbayan’s power to determine whether or not he may be
discharged as a state witness in accordance with Section 17, Rule
119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure

JIMENEZ v PEOPLE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY: Absolute necessity exists for the

testimony of an accused sought to be discharged when he or she
alone has knowledge of the crime. In more concrete terms,
necessity is not there when the testimony would simply
corroborate or otherwise strengthen the prosecution’s evidence.

NOT THE MOST GUILTY: "most guilty" refers to the highest

degree of culpability in terms of participation in the commission
of the offense and does not necessarily mean the severity of the
penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the same
penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered to
have lesser orthe least guilt taking into account his degree of
participation in the commission of the offense.

MARI v. GONZALES EXCLUSION FOR DELAY MUST BE CONERNING THE ACCUSED

NOT THE PROSECUTOR: A careful reading of the above rule
would show that the only delays that may be excluded from the
time limit within which trial must commence are those resulting
from proceedings concerning the accused. The time involved in
the proceedings in a petition for transfer of venue can only be
excluded from said time limit if it was the accused who instituted
the same. Hence, in this case, the time during which the petition
for transfer of venue filed by the private complainant is pending,
cannot be excluded from the time limit of thirty (30) days from
receipt of the pre-trial order imposed in Section 1, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court.
DE LIMA v AMPATUAN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RA 6981 and SEC. 17, RULE 119:

6981 RULE 119

Discretion of DOJ Discretion of the court
No requirement that the Requires that the person be
person be charged first charged, otherwise no person
overwhich the jurisdiction to
discharge may be applied
Bars future prosecutions Bars future prosecution

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Automatic Not automatic to attain

benefits under 6981.
OLBES v BUEMIO FLEXIBLE CONCEPT OF RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL: R.A. No. 8493
and its implementing rules and the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure enumerate certain reasonable delays as exclusions in
the computation of the prescribed time limits. They also provide
that "no provision of law on speedy trial and no rule
implementing the same shall be interpreted as a bar to any
charge of denial of speedy trial as provided by Article III, Section
14(2), of the 1987 Constitution." Thus, in spite of the prescribed
time limits, jurisprudence continues to adopt the view that the
concept of "speedy trial" is a relative term and must necessarily
be a flexible concept.

BAUTISTA v CA CONTINUANCE IS DISCRETIONARY UPON THE COURT: grant of a

motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right.
It is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Action
thereon will not be disturbed by appellate courts, in the absence
of clear and manifest abuse of discretion resulting in a denial of
substantial justice
PEOPLE v. CALVARIO TESTIMONY MAY BE USED AS EVIDENCE AGAINST DISCHARGED
ACCUSED WHEN CONDITION NOT FULFILLED: As will be seen, the
appellant was to be used as a government witness which was not
done because he later denied the facts that he had revealed in his
confession. This Court has earlier held that where one of several
co-defendants tums state's evidence on a promise of immunity by
the prosecuting attorney, but later retracts and fails to keep his
part of the agreement, his confession made under such a promise
may then be used against him.21 In view thereof, the extra-judicial
confession of the appellant is admissible as evidence against him.

GALVEZ v CA SUBSTITUTION RULE 110 and RILE 119: Rule 119 is the rule
specifically governing the trial stage where evidence is necessarily
being presented, hence the trial court is now in a better position
to conclude that manifestly the accused cannot be convicted of
the offense charged or of one that it necessarily includes. It would
primarily be the function of the court to motu proprio order the
dismissal of the case and direct the filing of the appropriate
information. We do not discount the possibility of either the
prosecution or the defense initiating such dismissal and
substitution at that stage, although, from a realistic point of view,
that would be a rare situation. This provision, therefore, is more

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directly and principally directed to the trial court to invest it with

the requisite authority to direct by itself the dismissal and refiling
of the informations therein contemplated.

Rule 110, on the other hand, provides the procedural governance

for the prosecution of offenses. Section 14 thereof, quoted infra,
provides in its second paragraph the procedure and requisites for
the substitution of a defective information by the correct one.
Although, just like Section 11 of Rule 119 the permissible stage
for effecting that substitution is "at any time before judgment,"
unlike the latter situation it is sufficient that "it appears . . . that a
mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, . . . ." The
situation under said Section 14 contemplates a longer time span,
inclusive of the period from the filing of the information up to and
before trial. Since no evidence has been presented at that stage,
the error would appear or be discoverable from a review of the
records of the preliminary investigation. Of course, that fact may
be perceived by the trial judge himself but, again, realistically it
will be the prosecutor who can initially determine the same. That
is why such error need not be manifest or evident, nor is it
required that such nuances as offenses includible in the offense
charged be taken into account. It necessarily follows, therefore,
that the prosecutor can and should institute remedial measures
for the dismissal of the original information and the refiling of the
correct one, otherwise he would be recreant to his duties.

WHEN IS AMENDMENT OR SUBSTITUTION THE PROPER REMEDY:

t may accordingly be posited that both amendment and
substitution of the information may be made before or after the
defendant pleads, but they differ in the following respects:

1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes,

while substitution necessarily involves a substantial change from
the original charge;

2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected

without leave of court, but substitution of information must be
with leave of court as the original information has to be
dismissed;

3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for

another preliminary investigation and the retaking of the plea of
the accused; in substitution of information, another preliminary
investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the

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new information; and

4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in

the original information or to an offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the original charge, hence
substantial amendments to the information after the plea has
been taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused,
for if the original information would be withdrawn, the accused
could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution
requires or presupposes that the new information involves a
different offense which does not include or is not necessarily
included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot claim
double jeopardy.

In determining, therefore, whether there should be an

amendment under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or
a substitution of information under the second paragraph
thereof, the rule is that where the second information involves
the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of
the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new
information charges an offense which is distinct and different
from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.

ARROYO v PEOPLE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, DENIAL MAY BE PETITIONED FOR

CERTIORARI: Notwithstanding the interlocutory character and
plunder law. effect of denial of demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the
accused could avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when
the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

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