Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
AND
Minds
P03141
Hearts
AND
Minds
Action Plan
A Reaction to
technical
problems
B Job planning
C Personal
planning
D Team
Leadership
E Work related
behaviour
F Communication
G Motivation
& trust
P03141
Shell Exploration & Production
Improving Supervision
SIEP B.V.
Copyright 2004
1
Who is a Supervisor ?
A supervisor is someone who is in charge of one or more people in a
working environment e.g. charge-hand, foreman, manager.
A supervisor is the last link between the planning of a job and the real
action of doing the job.
Barriers
Hazard/ or Controls
Risk WORK
Undesirable
outcome
SIEP B.V.
Supervisors
Copyright 2003
Copyright 2003 SIEP B.V.
HSE Performance over time
Technology
and standards
• Behaviour
• Visible leadership / personal accountability
HSE • Shared purpose & belief
• Aligned performance commitment & external
Management view
• HSE delivers business value
• Engineering improvements Systems
• Hardware improvements
• Safety emphasis
Incident rate
• E&H Compliance
• Integrated HSE-MS
• Reporting Improved
• Assurance
• Competence culture
• Risk Management
Time
SIEP B.V.
Copyright 2003
Copyright 2003 SIEP B.V.
Leadership The right style at the right time
SUPPORTIVE
Key Message: A successful leadership style in one situation will not guarantee success in
another
SIEP B.V.
Copyright 2003
Shell Exploration & Production
1
Session Objectives
Technology
and standards
• Behaviour
• Visible leadership / personal accountability
HSE • Shared purpose & belief
• Aligned performance commitment & external
Management view
• HSE delivers business value
• Engineering improvements Systems
• Hardware improvements
• Safety emphasis
Incident rate
• E&H Compliance
• Integrated HSE-MS
• Reporting Improved
• Assurance
• Competence culture
• Risk Management
Time
SIEP B.V.
Copyright 2003
Culture Ladder
GENERATIVE
HSE is how we do business round here
PROACTIVE
we work on the problems that we still find
Increasingly
informed
CALCULATIVE
we have systems in place to manage all hazards
REACTIVE
Safety is important, we do a lot every time we have an
accident
Increasing Trust/Accountability
PATHOLOGICAL
who cares as long as we’re not caught
SIEP B.V.
Copyright 2003
Culture Ladder – Short exercise
chronic unease
GENERATIVE safety seen as a profit centre
new ideas are welcomed
we cracked it!
CALCULATIVE lots and lots of audits
HSE advisers chasing statistics
Scoring
Culture Ladder
GENERATIVE
HSE is how we do business round here
PROACTIVE
we work on the problems that we still find
Increasingly
informed
CALCULATIVE
we have systems in place to manage all hazards
REACTIVE
Safety is important, we do a lot every time we have an
accident
Increasing Trust/Accountability
PATHOLOGICAL
who cares as long as we’re not caught
SIEP B.V.
Copyright 2003
Working Session 2
Individually
Consider the “Examples of how the culture feels personally” at your
aspired level
Do you fit in? Use these examples of what it looks/feels like as to
generate your own ones to climb the ladder. Write them on stickers
starting with “I will ….”
Jointly in groups
Share your I-statements with the people at your table
Write the best ones on a flip chart (everybody to submit at least one)
Plenary challenge session
One member from each table presents the 2 best “I statements” and
where they lie on the culture ladder. Everybody else to challenge
SIEP B.V.
Copyright 2003
Copyright 2003 SIEP B.V.
Group Work
“I statements”
How can I change my behaviour to shift the
culture to the next level upwards?
Environment
Severity
Reputation
Never Heard of Incident Happens Happens
People
Assets
heard of in …. has several several
in ….. industry occurred times per times per
industry in our year in year in a
Company our location
Company
0 No health No damage No effect No impact
effect/injury
1 Slight health Slight Slight effect Slight impact
effect/injury damage
2 Minor health Minor Minor effect Limited Manage for continuous
effect/injury damage impact improvement
3 Major health Localised Localised Consider- Incorporate risk
effect/injury damage effect able impact
reduction
4 PTD or 1 to 3 Major Major effect National measures &
fatalities damage impact
demonstrate Intolerable
5 Multiple Extensive Massive International ALARP
fatalities damage effect impact
Background 2
Objectives 2
Room layout: 3
Level in the organisation 4
Number 4
What to do when managers join! 4
Roles: 6
A hearts and minds champion- a believer 6
Facilitator – a believer 6
Management representative 7
Administrative support 7
Break 9
Does what you do match your crew’s needs? 3.3 in the Centrefold 9
Break 13
These facilitator’s notes will give some additional information to go with the
Improving Supervision brochure. In the brochure, the different subjects have been
discussed thoroughly but in a compressed form, to avoid the brochure becoming a
book. In these notes we give some extra information on how to facilitate the
workshops that are in the brochure (general and specific information) and some extra
background information and ideas that might be useful.
These notes are not meant as something you have to read from cover to cover, you
can just take out of it what you need or want. The suggestions in the facilitators notes
are just that; suggestions. It is not a recipe. The way described here is just one
possibility, not the only one. You might find not all the information you are looking
for here or you have some comments, ideas or experiences that you think others might
be interested in or find useful. This is useful feedback for the Hearts & Minds team,
which we can use to improve these notes so please contact us.
Go to top of the document
Objectives
This brochure gives an overall tool for improving non-technical supervision skills. It
does this by providing a number of specific micro-tools and a way to use these (the
workshops) for supervisors and their teams.
The specific aim of these tools is to improve the non-technical skills needed to be a
good supervisor through:
1. Understanding more about supervision skills and leadership styles
2. Self-assessment of personal styles, how they impact team behaviour and how
you may need to adapt or modify your own style
3. Assessing supervision skill levels and focusing on areas for improvement
4. The development of personal action plans
Go to top of the document
Material and Equipment: What if…..
The Improving Supervision
brochure and its inserts that are - You cannot get the PDF files printed on
handed out to participants at the A0 sheets; just copy the information onto a
flipchart by hand
start of the workshop.
Presentation PowerPoint slides - People have to get their coffee somewhere
for supervisor’s role in safety else;
management (section 3.2) leave some time for this in your timetable
including your own local
examples. - Somebody has to be reachable (e.g. wife
might be going into labour); let them put
Overhead projector or laptop and their phone on silent mode. Only tell them
projector. this if they object to turning their phone off
Flipcharts; pre-printed A0 from
PDFs and empty ones.
Wall space or easels for
flipcharts and posters
Refreshments (coffee, tea etc.)
Red and green pens and notepaper
Enough chairs and tables (See room layout)
Room layout
Tables - preferably small tables in cabaret
style with 3 or 4 at each table.
Table for facilitator’s stuff, including laptop
and projector; place this table where
everyone can see the facilitator from their Cabaret style
chair.
Let people sit wherever they like when they arrive (the groups will be made later and
those people who work together or regularly interact will probably sit with each other
anyway.)
Go to top of the document
Style:
The notes are based upon the brochure being used as a one-day workshop but the
different elements can also be used independently. Either way the material is designed
to be informal, highly interactive and to allow for discussion, practice and giving and
receiving feedback. It is geared towards self-assessment and action planning; the
focus being on the participants to learn about themselves and what they need to do
differently.
Go to top of the document
Participants:
Level in the organisation
This series of exercises is intended for people who have a The group that is
supervisory role (supervisors, team leaders or managers), or going to do the
are being developed as ‘supervisors of the future’, either in workshops can consist
operational or non-operational roles. of only supervisors or
supervisors with some
of their crew.
Number
There is a maximum of 18 participants for the workshop. The
most value will be gained from the exercises if the group is split up into smaller
subgroups i.e. 3 or 4 people who work together or regularly interact.
When you are facilitating these exercises on behalf of someone else make sure you
have agreed on the deliverables of this training and what will be done with these, in
advance. This way everyone knows what can be expected, and problems because of
different expectations can be avoided. The deliverables can vary from detailed plans
on how to deal with a problem indicated beforehand to mere awareness of the subject
at hand.
Go to top of the document
Time frame
How long should it take?
The aim is to spend about 6 to 7 hour(s) on the exercises all together and no more. If
the participants have not worked with the micro tools before, you will probably need
the time. When people become more experienced and practiced it will take much less
time. The individual exercises can be done in private as well at a later time.
What do I do the second time I run the workshop with the same group?
The second time you run the Improving Supervision workshop with the same group,
you do not have to do all of the exercises again. The preferred styles of the
participants will probably not have changed and unless there is a good reason to
assume that the needs of people’s teams have changed (e.g. different team or suddenly
much more motivated) you can move straight to the skills exercise. If people have
already worked on one of there skills before, have them pick another that could use
some development.
Go to top of the document
How do you know how you are doing during a workshop?
WELL BADLY
• People come up • People are only What to do when people just
with lots of bitching about complain?
examples and what other
discuss amongst people are doing Don’t immediately stop a complaining
themselves. wrong. session, it can be useful. Be careful,
though, that it doesn’t get out of hand.
• You can’t get a • Everybody is Give them five minutes, you can even
tell them so- “You have five minutes
word in; everyone talking but not then we get down to serious business”.
is very busy and about the things You can also try to steer a complaining
talking about the that they are here session towards the subject, this can be
matter at hand. for. very difficult though.
Roles:
A hearts and minds champion- a believer
• Is the sponsor for the workshops, engages the necessary workforce and
management support and provides any funding required
• Responsible for identifying and inviting participants
• Identifies and enrols the management representative and a facilitator if this is a
different person from the believer or management representative. The Champion
may act as facilitator first time – a believer can cascade facilitation down one level
• Ensures that everyone is aware of their responsibilities
Facilitator – a believer
(Most effective when this is someone from the line e.g. the management rep or the
champion, external consultants can be used for the 1st time but this is not usually
necessary or recommended.)
• Takes responsibility for the process outlined in the brochure
• Is familiar with all the materials and knows when and how to use them
• Provides some knowledge of the Leadership models and supervisor skills
• Can challenge the participants as well as offer support and feedback
Management representative
• Is familiar with the background to the workshop and can welcome the participants
• Is prepared to deliver the introductory presentation on the importance of
supervision in safety management and understands how it fits into the workshop
process
• Understands how the workshop process changes attitudes
• Is welcome to stay for the workshop (they can learn for themselves!)
• Preferably someone the group knows and respects
• Could be very senior. If they are willing to make the commitment this will have a
major effect on its own∗.
Administrative support
• Liaises with the participants in terms of arrangements, timing, place etc.
• Responsible for the venue arrangements
∗
In one operation an EP company MD personally taught the Accident Investigation Course. People
were still talking about this a year later!
Overview of workshop Centrefold
Start 3.1 in the Centrefold
Time: approximately 20 minutes
Preparation – homework before the workshop
Collect a number of local and recent problems due to lack of or ineffective
supervision (pictures/ videos/ stories) before starting with the exercises. Consider
recent incidents, audits and site observations. People relate best to their own incidents
and they can’t say, “It wouldn’t happen here”; because it did.
Identify where improvement is needed most in supervision (asset, workgroup, team)
and select a maximum of 18 people who are going to try to improve their supervisory
skills. The group that is going to do the exercises can consist of only supervisors or
supervisors with their crew.
Safety briefing
Covering local rules, fire alarms and exits, hazards in the room if any, location of
toilets etc. If you are in a hotel or conference centre, maps of the location are probably
available here (in projector form or on paper).
Welcome
Thank you for coming, background to Hearts and Minds and this workshop;
preferably given by the Management Representative.
Objectives
Put on a Flipchart and run through, check that the group is ok with the objectives.
Facilitator agenda and style - put on flipchart and run through, check ok with group,
especially the timing, emphasise informal, interactive style.
You can show that the people in the room have the most important role in preventing
incidents by translating the company’s HSE policy into action, by making a plot.
Draw a line graph with the axis; “Proximity” and “Influence” and plot a diagonal line
from bottom left to top right. The people at the top right (the people in the room) are
the closest to the hazards and can exert the most influence on them. Put names and/ or
functions on the graph based on their distance and influence on the work site starting
with the Managing Director and ending with the supervisors in the room.
Managing
Director
Distance
Line
manager
Supervisors and
teams
Influence
Do you find it surprising that incident reports often show a lack of non- technical
supervision is a problem? Why do you think this happens? (Possible questions are
included in the presentation notes as part of the PowerPoint presentation).
Go to top of the document
Break
Time: 15 - 30 minutes
During the break; put up pre-printed flipchart 1 which shows the 7 aspects of
supervision and the 4 styles in which they can be done and have the slide ready which
explains the four styles.
Go to top of the document
Does what you do match your crew’s needs? 3.3 in the Centrefold
Time: approximately 30 minutes
Self-assessment using worksheet H
All the participants should get out worksheet H and look at table 1. Everyone should
circle the description that best represents/fits their own preferred style for each aspect
(A – G) of supervision.
When participants have circled a description for each aspect they should consider if
their overall style is consistent. Do the circled behaviours all belong to the same style,
or are they examples of different styles?
If your overall style is made up of different styles for different aspects, something
needs to change; your style, some of your skills (categorised as the aspects of
supervision) or both.
The style a supervisor needs to use should change with the changing needs of the
crew. If a supervisor gets a new crew, or their competence or motivation changes,
their supervisor’s style might have to change as well. It is important that the style
matches the situation/ the needs of the team.
Provide an overview of the leadership styles (summary of the 4 styles using slide 12
provided). Explain the rationale behind ‘the right style at the right time’ (situational
leadership) when to use and not to use particular styles.
Discuss the concept of using different styles for different crews/crew members. Why
do different people need different leadership styles?
Other contexts e.g. children, relationships etc can be used in the discussion as well to
clarify situational leadership. Talk about what happens when styles are taken to
extremes. Keep reminding the participants that there is no one RIGHT style; all are
valid depending on the team and the situation. It is about being able to adapt.
Have the participants identify their crew’s level of motivation and competence. They
can do this by themselves or with colleagues who know the crew in question.
Identification is done the following way:
• Decide if your crew is high or low in motivation
• Decide if your crew is high or low in competence for the work they have to do.
After this the most appropriate leadership style for the combination of these two
factors can be selected. Table 2 on worksheet H can be used as a guide to decide on
the appropriate style.
Is their crew highly motivated to do the job well, or not motivated at all? Is their crew
competent or not (e.g. because they are new on the job and still learning)?
When the participants have determined the motivation and competence of their crew
they can select the leadership style that best fits their needs. Put the required styles for
each participant’s crew on flipchart 1 as well. What style do the participants want to
work on personally? If people already master the style required by their crew, they
might want to go for a style that they aren’t too comfortable with yet, but might need
in the future. If participants are ‘perfect’ and don’t think they need to work on
anything, make them facilitate for the others.
When a supervisor has a mixed group, for example newcomers to the job and very
experienced people as well in one team, more than one style might be required.
Working on more than one style can be necessary in that case. Choose one style to
work on right now and do the other one later (Don’t wait too long with this).
There are two main options for how people can work on their chosen leadership style
depending on the mix of people in the workshop
If there are people who have as their current style a style that others want to improve
upon, they can pair up and provide coaching. The pairs could practise by role-playing
the new style if they feel comfortable with this.
If a number of people want to work on developing the same style then they can be
paired up to practise and provide support.
Break the group up into smaller groups to work on the chosen styles; discuss the
styles they want to develop.
The questions people should try and answer in the discussion will vary depending on
the group and style discussed, but could include the following: What would it sound
like to use this style? Why do you feel uncomfortable using this style? What do others
who frequently use this style do differently from me? What do you need to do
differently? What kinds of behaviours do you display that are not in concordance with
the desired style, which behaviour do you need to change?
After the group discussion all participants should note in their booklets under My
Leadership Style and on flipchart 1, which behaviours they need to change.
People, who have the same current style as People can also examine their leadership styles on their
chosen style, should participate in this exercise own (this is not recommended though, as others can give
as well. different insights) or with their crew if they feel
They can help others who want to improve on comfortable doing this.
the style they have as a current style, or join
others in improving a style that is not their This is for advanced level supervisors who can cope
current /chosen style. with having their crew teach them how to supervise.
Which style they choose, depends on their
team; what style will the crew/team need when NB. Some cultures might feel uncomfortable if a
their motivation and competence improves or supervisor admits ‘weakness’ and a need to improve. In
deteriorates? Which one is more likely? those cases examining the leadership styles among
supervisors is advised.
Ask for examples for each of the aspects, what do the participants do well and what
could they improve on as
supervisors? Write the examples on If participants have several aspects that are
flipchart 2. candidates for improvement they can quickly
read through the relevant worksheets to
Use the worksheets (A – G) decide which of the aspects needs the most
Each participant should select an improvement and hence is the one they want
aspect that they would like to to work on. This may require some
improve on most. explanation of the culture ladder from the
The skill aspects from table 1 Understanding Your Culture tool.
(exercise 3.3) with differences
between preferred and desired styles are the best candidates for improvement. Write
the selected aspect down on flipchart 1.
Skills Gap analyses
Break into groups of people (3 – 5 + a facilitator) who share common aspects they
wish to improve on e.g. a group working on aspect A, and 2 groups working on
aspect C.
• Select the worksheet from A –G that covers the Another possibility is to first
aspect the people in the groups wants to improve circle where you want to be in
upon. green, and then your current
• For each of the sub elements: skill in red.
o First: circle in red the statements that described your current skill.
o Second: circle in green the statements that best describe what you would
like to become.
The differences between the red and green circles form the gaps you need to
bridge.
• Organise the subgroups into pairs who have identified the same or similar
improvement areas. Discuss the outcomes of the previous action in these pairs,
swap the worksheets and challenge each other on where your skill is for each sub-
element. Do you really do that or is that If there is an uneven number,
something you think you ought to or are thinking the remaining person should
about doing? If we asked your crew/team just join one of the pairs. Swap
members what would they say about that? the worksheets as well and do
what you would have done if it
The green circles should be closer to generative had been a pair.
then the red, as the idea is to aim for a more
advanced HSE culture. If it is the other way around you might want to reconsider
Working on the area that has been identified for improvement, individuals
should focus on specific gaps and what they can do to improve, ideally
highlighting specific changes that can be made. Improvement actions that are
your current skill (or explain again what they should be doing).
Go to top of the document
Break
Time: 15 - 30 minutes
Are the plans people have SMART actions, i.e. Specific, Measurable, Achievable,
Realistic and Time based. Participants should challenge each others actions on these
features.
Emphasis that this workshop is not a “fit and forget” tool and that to get the benefit
out of the time that has been put in, it is up to the participants to follow through on
what they have committed to in their personal action plans. Tell the participants to
carry the Personal Action Plan booklet in your pocket or put it on the wall, this will
make your plan prominent every day and will allow you to review your improvement
progress.
P03141
Hearts
AND
Minds
Items 1-5 Items 6-10 Items 11-20 Items 21-30 Items 31-40 Items 41-45
Type of
Types of problem
P03141
Hearts
AND
Minds
Possible solutions
Solutions chosen
Ensuring compliance
P03141
Hearts
AND
Minds
Action Plan
ACTION
What are we
going to do ?
Who will do it ?
When will it
be done ?
Who will
review it ?
P03141
Culture Ladder
chronic unease
GENERATIVE safety seen as a profit centre
new ideas are welcomed
we cracked it!
CALCULATIVE lots and lots of audits
HSE advisers chasing statistics
Environment
Severity
Reputation
Never Heard of Incident Happens Happens
People
Assets
heard of in …. has several several
in ….. industry occurred times per times per
industry in our year in year in a
Company our location
Company
0 No health No damage No effect No impact
effect/injury
1 Slight health Slight Slight effect Slight impact
effect/injury damage
2 Minor health Minor Minor effect Limited Manage for continuous
effect/injury damage impact improvement
3 Major health Localised Localised Consider- Incorporate risk
effect/injury damage effect able impact
reduction
4 PTD or 1 to 3 Major Major effect National measures &
fatalities damage impact
demonstrate Intolerable
5 Multiple Extensive Massive International ALARP
fatalities damage effect impact
Reputation
Assets
HSE-MS
industry in our year in year in a
y
sin
lit
CALCULATIVE
ta
cr
participate in improvement
Ac
d
activities.
an
REACTIVE
st
PATHOLOGICAL
In
Who cares as long as The HSE cultural change. We must balance our
we're not caught
Culture Ladder resources and efforts such that each
element receives the necessary focus.
Hearts
AND
Minds
TM
What will be the right action at the • Individual “Top Seven HSE Negative Consequences
right time to achieve this balance will priorities” identified aligned with • Coaching
vary across the business as a function job tasks • Criticism, Distrust
of differing levels of HSE cultural • People accept roles and are held • Just and Fair Discipline
maturity and local issues and accountable through meaningful • Dismissal
priorities. personal performance contracts • Injury and illness
that drive new pro-active
However, Hearts and Minds behaviours. 3. Pro-active Interventions
methodology across EP is common We work safely because we
and will focus on these Three Key 2. Individual Consequences are intrinsically motivated to
Elements and the supporting We understand and accept do the right things naturally,
processes. The tools and techniques that there is a fair system for not just because we are told
should be chosen from the Hearts and reward and discipline. to, and make interventions
Minds Toolkit. and actively participate in
The journey to bring HSE-MS to life improvement activities
1. Personal Responsibility is about changing habits, adopting
We understand and accept new pro-active behaviours and This element is the very essence of
what should be done and instilling a new level of compliance. bringing HSE MS to life, but also the
know what is expected of us. Showing appreciation and providing hardest to achieve. This requires
encouragement should continue. personal interventions to influence
This is about being “crystal clear” in There also needs to be a clear formal the behaviour of others and accept
our HSE expectations. Know exactly link between actions and conse- interventions by others. Intervention
what you expect of others and what quences to reinforce and reward the tools are accepted as part of a broader
others expect of you. Agreeing how required behaviours and actions, and change process towards improvement.
you are going to deliver on those to discourage incorrect ones.
commitments, and whether you have Appraisal systems also need to reflect There is a practical Hearts and Minds
the skills and competence to do it. the aspired goals, rewarding those toolkit that provides a process and a
who deliver but with the appropriate set of tools to support most general
To support this and remove ambigu- mechanisms in place when coaching HSE improvement programs as well
ous messages, these expectations and is needed. Unsafe acts at all levels as helping to solve specific problems
intentions must be part of a clear line must be dealt with immediately in a commonly observed in our
of accountability that is regularly just, fair and transparent way. operations. The tools are designed to
discussed so that people only accept Several of our operations already have allow those who wish to improve to
for what they can deliver. The foun- tools to make individuals clear what find their own best way forward,
dation for this is part of the existing the personal consequences will be for based on research and operational
management system. To support our their HSE behaviours and actions experience inside and outside Shell
behaviours towards Personal and should be applied uniformly. EP. They are designed on a “by you,
Responsibility, specific tools and They provide a framework for for you” basis, without the need for
techniques are integrated into the holding all people accountable for consultants. Leaders at all levels can
Global Hearts and Minds toolbox. their actions. Typical characteristics use these tools, and can act as
are: facilitators for those they manage.
Specific sub-elements are : They comprise:
• CMS identifies risks and controls Positive Consequences • Understanding your culture
• Roles and Responsibilities from the • Coaching • Managing Rule Breaking
CMS are made crystal clear for all • Recognition, praise, trust • Risk Assessment Matrix
• Create clarity and passion through • Just and Fair Reward • Making Change Last
1-to-1 discussions of Roles and • Career enhancing • Improving Supervision
Responsibilities • Feel better, be healthy, be safe • Seeing yourself as others see you
Hearts
AND
Minds
TM
• Driving Safely direction and coordination; but the are then you can use the specific tools
• Working Safely people who drive and facilitate any (Route A in diagram). Otherwise you
• Achieving situation awareness - program have to believe in the can use descriptions of the culture
The Rule of Three processes. Through their dimensions to identify specific
commitment to improve, a pull is improvement areas (Route B in
They are available in the form of generated whereby others want to diagram). Use the general tools and
controlled packages of brochures, participate, see the benefits, and plan how to make the change using
slide presentations, instructions etc. themselves become champions. In the Making Change Last framework
more advanced HSE cultures the and Hearts and Minds methodology
workforce will take the initiative, but to get everyone onboard from the
What do you do in practice? whatever the cultural maturity, the start.
Before setting of on this Roadmap to
Winning Hearts and Minds, we need
to ascertain “Why Bother?” Only if ARE YOU READY
TO CHANGE?
leaders are personally motivated to
make a difference to our HSE Understand Your Culture
performance, is this approach going (A) (B)
to deliver results. Only then will Realise you have problems Discover you still have a
from incidents, audits etc. way to go
people in our organisations truly Want to improve
change their perceptions of what is
expected from them. Using the Select the right tools to fix Identify what parts of the
Hearts and Minds process will the problem culture is lagging
Design change program
identify significant opportunities for
improvement, so everyone involved,
Find believers
especially senior managers, must see People willing to try
HSE Understanding What: An engagement tool to identify local strengths and weaknesses identifying a way to improve.
your Culture When: Use 1st to engage people, discover their aspirations and build a case for change (2-3 hours + follow up).
Seeing Yourself as Others What: HSE upwards appraisal tool to understand other’s perceptions and identify how commitment is turned into action.
See You When: Use 2nd to challenge the commitment and behaviours of any "safety leaders", (20 minutes + follow up).
Making Change Last What: A general tool for managing change and supporting any improvement process or organisational change
programmes.
When: To design your own tools (1 –2 hours to start).
Risk Assessment Matrix: What: Helps people understand their risks, makes them personal and stimulate action.
Bringing it to life When: Anytime to better manage the risks. (1 hour).
Achieving Situation What: To help everyone make better risk based decisions and be able to justify them.
Awareness: The Rule of 3 When: If people lose sight of their risks, or if complacency threatens to set in. Can be used anytime, especially when
there is change (<5 minutes).
Working Safely What: Intervention programme that builds on and supports existing programmes or can be run by itself.
When: If safe working practices are not being followed (8 hours in total, 1 hour slots).
What: A suite of exercises to change the behaviour of drivers and the people who manage them.
Driving For Excellence When: When driving is a significant risk, professionally or personally (8 hours in total, 1 hour slots).
5. Specific focus on supervision, holders are viewed as senior managers behaviour of their teams. They
contractors and contract by their contractors and will benefit therefore have to be ‘believers’,
holders. from the feedback they will receive demonstrating the commitment of
This group contains key players in on how their commitment to safety is top management and supporting and
building a strong safety culture perceived, by using ‘Seeing Yourself encouraging their staff when they
because most of our serious incidents As Others See You’. The other tools want to use the tools.
occur with contractors and involve an are just as applicable for contractors
element of ineffective supervision. and staff when specific issues are Creating Buy-in
Their Hearts and Minds strategy identified, such as weak supervision. Winning Hearts and Minds for HSE
should not differ markedly from the Underpinning the above proactive is about getting all to work safely not
overall strategy and ‘Understanding interventions must be the same firm just because they have been ordered
Your Culture’ is also for this group an basis of, crystal clear expectations to, but because that is what they
appropriate first step, but another from the client, commitments from want to do. The art of good manage-
useful approach is for contractors to the contractor, and commercial ment is to get people to want to do
use this tool to appraise their clients consequences for delivery. Supervisors what you may have already decided
commitment to safety. The contract have most impact on the day-to-day they should do. Help them to do so.
The Hearts and Minds logo is a Trademark of Shell and can only be
This brochure has been developed by SIEP B.V. for use by Shell
Hearts Group Companies but can also be made available to third
used with written permission from SIEP, EP-HSE. Documents with the
AND
Minds parties. SIEP B.V. does not accept responsibility for any
Trademark have been checked for their correctness and effectiveness.
TM consequences whatsoever of its use.
Shell International Exploration and Production B.V. ECCN: Not subject to EAR - No US content Unclassified
Postbus 60, 2280 AB Rijswijk, The Netherlands Copyright SIEP B.V. EP 2003-9103
P03978 – November 2003
Shell Exploration & Production
Unsafe Acts:
Human Error and Violations
SIEP B.V.
Copyright 2004
1
HSE Management
Barriers
Hazard/ or Controls
Risk WORK
Undesirable
outcome
SIEP B.V.
Copyright 2003
Human errors and violations
SIEP B.V.
Copyright 2003
Working Session on Why we break the rules
and Violation Types
14 % 30 %
Sheep in Wolves
wolves
Accept
violations clothing
VIOLATION + ERROR
= DISASTER
SIEP B.V.
Copyright 2003
Types of violation
fault
1 2 3 4 5
Expectation
Planning
Opportunity
Pow erfulness
Personal Norms
SIEP B.V.
Abstract
The criteria for making Go - No Go decisions are often conservative because the decision rule (i.e. to stop flying helicopters, to go
around with a tanker, to shut down a platform or halt concurrent operations) does not take the interaction of multiple factors into
account. All of the situations and events leading to an incident are sub-standard, but taken in isolation none of them usually appear
dangerous enough to warrant halting operations and taking stock. Accidents rarely happen because of a single catastrophic failure,
except when that failure is at the end of a chain of non-catastrophic failures and organisational oversights. Go - No Go decisions are
hard to make, especially when situations have been deteriorating slowly, and a clear decision rule can help. The Rule of Three is
proposed as a way of combining information to make operational decisions in order to maximize opertunities and minimize regrets..
Introduction
Accidents don’t just happen. Rather than having just one cause, it takes a great many factors, often in excess of 50, to lead to an
accident1. Analyses of accidents, both within the Shell Group and outside, show how accidents all too often happen because of
combinations of relatively trivial events and situations2. While any one particular accident can be avoided by stopping any one of
those causes, most accidents happen in the middle of situations which, afterwards, people see as “an accident in the making”. Fixing
one potential cause out of 50 may stop that accident, but with 49 other factors still around we may find ourselves in a state of
permanent near-miss, what we might call Living on the Edge. The Rule of Three is proposed as a way of finding out just how close
we are to the edge and helping us decide what to do, whether to stop operations or manage the risks down to manageable proportions.
The main factors causing accidents are increasingly the result of the human factor, especially as we obtain more control over the
technical causes2,3. As technical safety and integrity is assured, we are left with finding ways of providing the same assurance with
people as we have with equipment. While the absolute number of accidents will fall as technical controls take effect, the remaining
accidents will become increasingly bizarre as human ingenuity is left to test what someone has regarded as foolproof.
One reason why people create problems is because they often fail to understand how small problems, that no one would regard as
particularly dangerous, may interact to become big ones, that suddenly threaten life or limb. Immediate operating conditions can
become such that simple everyday errors, such as turning the wrong control handle or forgetting a part of a check sequence, can
become suddenly dangerous, as when someone who is bending the rules fails to tell his colleagues. Violations interact with errors to
create novel and dangerous situations out of the blue4. The Tripod concept of Error Enforcing Conditions was set up to highlight how
some working conditions make the occurrence of errors much more likely5.
Incidents at the Edge. An analysis of a helicopter accident in the North Sea6 found that there were no specific reasons, in advance,
why the pilots could have reasonably stopped flying. The weather was marginal, but within ‘acceptable limits’; the pilots were close
to the limit of their allowable flying hours, and would have exceeded them on the final leg, but they were still within limits at the time
of the accident; the operational requirements were not impossible, but were changed many times in the course of the mission. The
accident, in which 13 people died, was in hindsight almost inevitable.
In oil tanker operations, one of the most sensitive undertaken by Oil and Gas companies in today’s environmentally-sensitive climate,
a similar picture arises. When a vessel is approaching an unknown harbour in poor weather, having taken on board a pilot whom the
master may not trust entirely, where the draft of the vessel and the available clearance may not leave a large margin, it might be more
sensible to stand off and wait for daylight than press on under the burden of a tight sailing schedule. A grounding and a major
pollution threat would, again, make it seem obvious in hindsight that caution is the only sensible course. Nevertheless such incidents
still occur, unfortunately frequently, even after the a number of major shipping accidents have highlighted how vulnerable
organisations are to such disasters.
Learning from Hindsight. The problem is: How can we acquire the benefits of hindsight, and prevent such accidents, without
unnecessarily curtailing operations by excessive caution? The issue appears not to be one associated with individual limits on
permissible operations, but rather on the way in which the sum total of marginal conditions can be computed in such a way that safe
and sensible decisions are made, whether it be to carry on or to stop. Go - No Go decisions which can lead to shutdown are easily
influenced by production pressures, on the one hand, and the belief of those involved that things will be all right as long as they,
personally, are running the operation (although they may recognise that others might well be less fortunate). The kind of decision that
is required is, also, almost always made under conditions of haste, pressure and expectation, exactly the conditions that are less than
ideal for making such decisions7.
This paper proposes a way of combining information to help in making safe decisions called the Rule of Three. Because much of the
necessary information can be collected and judgements made in advance, outside of the pressure of immediate circumstances,
decisions can be made and, possibly more important, safe conditions can be managed, without losing sight of overall goals of an
2 HUDSON, VAN DER GRAAF & BRYDEN
operation. This should be applicable to a wide range of operations where critical shutdown or go-around decisions need to be made,
and such decisions are often being made under conditions that are not ideal for taking rational decisions.
Number of Action
Critical Go or Nogo
Dimensions
All Green Proceed normally
One Orange Proceed normally
Two Oranges Proceed with caution
Three Oranges Halt operation
Reduce problems
One Red Halt operation
Table I. The Rule decision criteria framed in terms of Reds and oranges.
Dimensions and Sub-dimensions. The rule is applied using a number of major dimensions, such as Weather, Experience of
Crew/operators, Commercial Setting, quality of plan etc. (See Table II), each of which can be subdivided into a small number of sub-
dimensions. If more than one sub-dimension goes Orange, then we can mark the major dimension as Orange. If any sub-dimension
goes Red then the major dimension is immediately Red. The Rule of Three states that if there is a single Red Dimension, or Three
THE RULE OF THREE: SITUATION AWARENESS IN HAZARDOUS SITUATIONS 3
Orange Dimensions, then operations should be halted (i.e. three strikes). Three or more Oranges represents an accident in the making,
where hindsight would say, “we should have stopped earlier”.
Major Sub-dimensions
Dimension
Weather Rain
Wind
Lightning
Experience of Individuals in training
crew Percentage with 5+ years
competence
Commercial Profit push
Setting Deadline approach
Sort term Day/night
variation Shift change
Equipment Fit for purpose
Recently maintained
Task Novel
Unpractised
Difficult
Planning Change of Plan
Change of plan timing
Table II. Possible Major and sub-dimensions. The particular thresholds for any operation should be filled in by those with local
experience.
Calibrating Thresholds. Once such a set of dimensions and associated thresholds has been defined for a specific operation, there are
two ways to proceed. One would involve collecting data systematically about incidents, normal conditions, acceptable shut-downs
and unacceptable missed opportunities, followed by a formal optimisation of the settings. This rigorous approach can not always be
applied because there may not be enough decisions made, capable of evaluation afterwards, in a reasonable time period. A more
informal approach would involve renegotiating the thresholds from time to time on the basis of continued experience.
In each case (See Figure 1) we wish to continually minimise the amount we would regret if we either had an accident or, out of
unreasonable fear, stopped operating too early. As the thresholds are directly associated with the line between regret and no-regret, we
can consider using the Rule of Three in a continuous way, aiming to minimise regret, converting hindsight into foresight.
Regret No Regret
Go Accident N ormal
Operations
direct control, such as the weather or the time of day, and others which people quickly grow accustomed to, such as high levels of
work pressure or unusual operating requirements. Finally there are factors, such as time on shift and time of day, or remaining fuel,
that deteriorate inexorably and, at some point, become unacceptable, but prior to that have already become a matter of concern.
Because most systems fail to acknowledge the creeping effect of deteriorating conditions, the Rule of Three provides a way of
bringing their potential into the decision process without, necessarily, immediately leading to a halt of the operation.
In Tripod theory5, when a triggering event happens, it is up to the barriers to avert damage; when and while those barriers are
temporarily weakened, an incident becomes much more likely. People who are insufficiently aware of how close they are to the edge
are those most likely to short-circuit established procedures or actively remove existing defences. The Rule of Three is intended to be
a way of combating such problems by providing a framework which improves situation awareness.
Situation Awareness. The best and most experienced managers recognise the situations they find themselves in. Less experienced or
effective managers often concentrate upon the most obvious problems. Fighter pilots and top-level team sportsmen show similar
abilities to understand the whole situation and profit from it, lesser pilots get shot down, lesser sportsmen lose. The Rule of Three, in
practice, is intended to provide and support situation awareness, to support the risk management process by reminding those involved
of how deep in trouble they are and just how close to the edge they may have come 9. Armed with such knowledge it is easier to
decide whether to halt operations or, minimally, which factors need to be managed down to return to safe operating conditions.
One significant factor in many accident scenarios is the creeping acceptance of a situation that has slowly deteriorated. The fact that
people habituate to initially unacceptable conditions means that they often lose sight of which conditions have become too serious to
ignore. The use in the Rule of Three of a set of predetermined dimensions and associated sub-dimensions helps the decision-maker to
reconsider the sum total of conditions. The specific nature of the rule means that attention has to be directed to the total set of
dimensions, rather than being captured by what appears to be most important at the time.
Applications.
Possible application areas for the Rule, within the Exploration and Production setting, include aircraft operations and platform
shutdowns. Other areas include oil tanker (VLCC) and coal mine operations. The time to apply such a rule can be before starting, on
shift handover, or at critical periods such as prior to coming into harbour in a tanker.
The list is short enough to function like the sort of checklist that is common in the aviation industry, where safety standards are of the
highest. In the aviation industry one of the indications of the existence of a safety culture is the disciplined way in which such
checklists are gone through every time, regardless of how unnecessary it might seem. Such a level of commitment is what can ensure
that problems are not simply accepted and lived with, that everyone is aware of exactly what the situation really is.
Conclusion
The Rule of Three is a decision-making rule intended to upgrade the quality of decision-making. Within Shell companies it is
accepted as providing valuable insights, but it has still to be turned into an effective and working tool. Such a tool has the potential to
be developed further in concrete settings where it is applicable, but has yet to mature into a calibrated tool . One always hopes to
make critical decisions with all the best people available and under ideal conditions, in practice this is not always possible. The Rule
of Three is intended to access the benefits of the best managers’ past experience, set into a simple rule-of-thumb tool that can aid the
less experienced before situations turn nasty.
References
1. Wagenaar, W.A. & Groeneweg, J. 100 Accidents at Sea. International Journal of Man-Machine Studies. (1987)
2. Reason, J.T. OrganisationalAccidents. (1997)
3. Perrow, C. “Normal Accidents: Living with high-risk technologies. Basic Books (1984).
4. Free. R.J. The Role of Procedural Violations in Railway Accidents. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Manchester. (1994)
5. Hudson et al. The Tripod Manuals Vols I – III. Shell International SIPM EP 93-2800 (1993)
6. Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.
7. Reason, J.T. Human Error. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. (1990)
8. Wagenaar, W.A., Hudson, P.T.W. & Reason, J.T. Cognitive Failures and Accidents. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 4, 273-294. (1990)
9. Eindsleigh, M.R. “Toward a theory of situation awareness in dynamic systems”. Human Factors, 37, 32-64. (1995)