Lagazo vs CA Case Digest

LAGAZO V. CA 287 SCRA 18

FACTS: Catalina Jacob Vda. de Reyes, a widow and grandmother of plaintiff-appellee, was awarded a 60.10-square
meter lot which is a portion of the Monserrat Estate located in Old Sta. Mesa, Manila. The Monserrat Estate is a public
land owned by the City of Manila and distributed for sale to bona fide tenants under its land-for-the-landless program.
Catalina Jacob constructed a house on the lot.
Shortly before she left for Canada where she is now a permanent resident, Catalina Jacob executed a special power of
attorney in favor of her son-in-law Eduardo B. Español authorizing him to execute all documents necessary for the final
adjudication of her claim as awardee of the lot.

Due to the failure of Eduardo B. Español to accomplish the purpose of the power of attorney granted to him, Catalina
Jacob revoked said authority in an instrument executed in Canada. Simultaneous with the revocation, Catalina Jacob
executed another power of attorney of the same tenor in favor plaintiff-appellee.

Catalina Jacob executed in Canada a Deed of Donation over the subject lot in favor of plaintiff-appellee. Following the
donation, plaintiff-appellee checked with the Register of Deeds and found out that the property was in the delinquent list,
so that he paid the installments in arrears and the remaining balance on the lot and declared the said property in the
name of Catalina Jacob.

Plaintiff-appellee thereafter sent a demand letter to defendant-appellant asking him to vacate the premises. A similar
letter was sent by plaintiff-appellee’s counsel to defendant. However, defendant-appellant refused to vacate the premises
claiming ownership thereof. Hence, plaintiff-appellee instituted the complaint for recovery of possession and damages
against defendant-appellant.

Petitioner contends that the burdens, charges or conditions imposed upon a donation need not be stated on the deed of
donation itself. Thus, although the deed did not categorically impose any charge, burden or condition to be satisfied by
him, the donation was onerous since he in fact and in reality paid for the installments in arrears and for the remaining
balance of the lot in question. Being an onerous donation, his acceptance thereof may be express or implied, as provided
under Art. 1320 of the Civil Code, and need not comply with the formalities required by Art. 749 of the same code. His
payment of the arrearages and balance and his assertion of his right of possession against private respondent clearly
indicate his acceptance of the donation.

ISSUE:
1. Where the deed of donation did not expressly impose any burden — the expressed consideration being purely one of
liberality and generosity — but the recipient actually paid charges imposed on the property like land taxes and installment
arrearages, may the donation be deemed onerous and thus governed by the law on ordinary contracts?

2. Where the acceptance of a donation was made in a separate instrument but not formally communicated to the donor,
may the donation be nonetheless considered complete, valid and subsisting?
HELD:
1. NO. At the outset, let us differentiate between a simple donation and an onerous one. A simple or pure donation
is one whose cause is pure liberality (no strings attached), while an onerous donation is one which is subject to burdens,
charges or future services equal to or more in value than the thing donated. Under Article 733 of the Civil Code, donations
with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts; hence, the formalities required for a valid simple
donation are not applicable.

We rule that the donation was simple, not onerous. Even conceding that petitioner’s full payment of the purchase price
of the lot might have been a burden to him, such payment was not however imposed by the donor as a condition for the
donation.

It is clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden or charge petitioner as the donee. The words in the deed
are in fact typical of a pure donation. We agree with Respondent Court that the payments made by petitioner were merely
his voluntary acts. This much can be gathered from his testimony in court, in which he never even claimed that a burden
or charge had been imposed by his grandmother.

The payments even seem to have been made pursuant to the power of attorney executed by Catalina Reyes in favor of
petitioner, her grandson, authorizing him to execute acts necessary for the fulfillment of her obligations. Nothing in the
records shows that such acts were meant to be a burden in the donation.

2. NO. As a pure or simple donation, the provisions of the civil code apply. The donation, following the theory of cognition
(Article 1319, Civil Code), is perfected only upon the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee.”
Furthermore, “[i]f the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic
form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.”

Acceptance of the donation by the donee is, therefore, indispensable; its absence makes the donation null and void.

LAGAZO V. CA

287 SCRA 18

FACTS:
Catalina was the grantee of the Monserrat estate. She had to leave for Canada to become a permanent resident therein
and she appointed Espanol to be her attorney-in-fact to fix the requirements needed. Failing to accomplish what he ought
to do, Catalina appointed Lagazo as her new attorney-in-fact. The grant was subsequently given and later, the land was
donated to Lagazo. Lagazo then sought to remove Cabanlit from the property. The latter claims ownership over the land
by virtue of a deed of sale executed in favor of him by Espanol.

HELD:
The donation is simple and pure. There is no showing of any acceptance from Lagazo and thus, there has been no
perfected donation.
EDUARTE V. CA- Revocation of Donation
FACTS:
Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land. He executed a deed of donation inter vivos of ½ of the land
to his niece, Helen Doria. Subsequently, he executed another deed of donation inter vivos ceding the other ½ of the
property to Helen Doria. Helen Doria donated a protion of the lot (157 sqm) to the Calauan Christian Reformed Church.
Helen Doria sold and conveyed the remaining portion save some 700 meters for his residence. Pedro Calapine sought to
annul the sale and donation to eduarte and CCRC on the ground that the deed of donation was a forgery and that Doria
was unworthy of his liberality claiming ingratitude (commission of offense against the person, honor or property of donor
[par. 1])

ISSUE:
W/N the falsification of public document committed by Doria is an act of ingratitude against Calapine (considering that
falsification is a crime against public interest)?

RULING: YES
In commentaries of Tolentino, it is said that “all crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes of
revocation.” Petitioner attempted to categorize the offenses according to their classification under the RPC by deleting the
first sentence. However, this is unwarranted considering that illegal detention, threats and coercion are considered crimes
against the person of the donor despite the fact that they are classified as crimes against personal liberty and security
under the RPC.

Note: Eduarte and the Church still won although the donation was deemed by the Court to be revocable. The Court
applied the CHAIN OF TITLE THEORY because the lands were registered lands and it has already passed from the
forger (Doria) to innocent purchasers for value (Eduarte, et al.).

NOCEDA vs CA Case Digest

NOCEDA vs CA
[G.R. No. 119730. September 2, 1999]
FACTS: Plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo, the daughter, grandson, and widow,
respectively, of the late Celestino Arbizo extrajudicially settled a parcel of land located at Bitaog, San Isidro, Cabangan,
Zambales, which was said to have an area of 66,530 square meters. Plaintiff Directo’s share was 11,426 square meters,
defendant Noceda got 13,294 square meters, and the remaining 41,810 square meters went to Maria Arbizo. Plaintiff
Directo donated 625 square meters of her share to defendant Noceda, who is her nephew being the son of her deceased
sister, Carolina. However, another extrajudicial settlement-partition of Lot 1121 was executed by plaintiff Directo,
defendant Noceda, and Maria Arbizo. Three fifths of the said land went to Maria Arbizo while plaintiff Directo and
defendant Noceda got only one-fifth each. In said extrajudicial settlement-partition as well as in the Tax Declaration 16-
0032 over Lot 1121 in the name of the late Celestino Arbizo, the said parcel of land was said to have an area of only
29,845 square meters.
Sometime in 1981, defendant Noceda constructed his house on the land donated to him by plaintiff Directo. Plaintiff
Directo fenced the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding the donated portion, and constructed
thereon three huts. But in 1985, defendant Noceda removed the fence earlier constructed by plaintiff Directo, occupied
the three huts (3) and fenced the entire land of plaintiff Directo without her consent. Plaintiff Directo demanded from
defendant Noceda to vacate her land, but the latter refused.

Hence, plaintiff Directo filed the present suit, a complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership and
rescission/annulment of donation, against defendant Noceda before the lower court.
Trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff Directo ordering the revocation of the donation.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner Noceda’s acts of usurpation constitute an act of ingratitude sufficient to grant the revocation of the
donation?
HELD: YES. It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the portion donated to him by private respondent
Aurora Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the whole area of Lot C which belongs to private respondent Directo, thus
petitioner’s act of occupying the portion pertaining to private respondent Directo without the latter’s knowledge and
consent is an act of usurpation which is an offense against the property of the donor and considered as an act of
ingratitude of a donee against the donor.[31] The law does not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that the
offense be proved in the action for revocation.

The Act of Usurpation by the donee of the donor’s land is an act of ingratitude. The law does not require conviction in
order to revoke the donation; only preponderance of evidence is needed in an action to revoke instituted by the donor.

Note: An action for revocation of a donation based on ingratitude must file the action to revoke his donation within 1 year
from the time he had knowledge of the ingratitude of the donee (not from the occurrence of the act of ingratitude).

NOCEDA VS. DIRECTO- Revocation of a Donation Based on Ingratitude

FACTS:
Directo, Noceda, and Arbizo (the daughter, grandson, and widow, respectively of the late Celestino Arbizo) extra-judicially
settled a parcel of land. Directo’s share was 11,426 square meters, Noceda got 13,294 square meters, and the remaining
41,810 square meters went to Maria Arbizo. On the same day, Directo donated 625 sq.m. of her share to her nephew.

However, a few months later, another extra-judicial settlement-partition of the same lot was executed. 3/5 of the lot was
awarded to Arbizo (widow) while Directo and Noceda (daughter and grandson) got only 1/5 each.

Sometime on the same year when the partitions happened, the nephew (donee) constructed his house on the land
donated to him by Directo. On the other hand, Directo fenced the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement,
excluding the donated portion, and constructed thereon three huts.
Around 3 years later, the nephew removed the fence earlier constructed by Directo, occupied the 3 huts, and fenced the
entire land of Directo without her consent. The latter demanded Noceda to vacate her land, but Noceda refused.

Hence, Directo filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership and rescission/annulment of donation,
against Noceda before the lower court. A survey was conducted and it was found that the area stated in the settlement
was smaller than the actual area of the lot. The TC declared the second extra-judicial settlement-partition and the deed of
donation revoked (because of ingratitude). The court ordered the nephew (done) to vacate and reconvey the property to
Directo. CA affirmed.

The nephew contends that there was no real partition and thus, there is no basis for the charge of usurpation and
ingratitude. He also contends that granting revocation is proper, the 1 year period for such revocation has already lapsed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in revoking the deed of donation
RULING: NO
The court held that:
“We find unmeritorious petitioner’s argument that since there was no effective and real partition of the subject lot there
exists no basis for the charge of usurpation and hence there is also no basis for finding ingratitude against him.

It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the portion donated to him by Directo but he also fenced the
whole area of Lot C which belongs to Directo; thus, petitioner’s act of occupying the portion pertaining to Directo without
the latter’s knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation which is an offense against the property of the donor and
considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor. The law does not require conviction of the donee; it is
enough that the offense be proved in the action for revocation.

Donee alleged that he usurped donor’s property in the 1st week of September 1985 while the complaint for revocation
was filed on September 16, 1986; thus, more than one (1) year had passed from the alleged usurpation by petitioner of
private respondent’s share in Lot 1121.
Article 769 expressly states that:

a. the donor must file the action to revoke his donation within one year from the time he had knowledge of the ingratitude
of the done; and that;

b. it must be shown that it was possible for the donor to institute the said action within the same period.
The concurrence of these two requisites must be shown by the donee in order to bar the present action, which he failed to
do so. He reckoned the one year prescriptive period from the occurrence of the usurpation and not from the time the latter
had the knowledge of the usurpation. He also failed to prove that at the time Directo acquired knowledge of his
usurpation, it was possible for him to institute an action for revocation of her donation.

C-J YULO & SONS, INC vs. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF SAN PABLO, INC.
[G.R. No. 133705. March 31, 2005]
FACTS: On September 24, 1977, petitioner donated unto respondent a parcel of land at Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna on
the condition that it shall be used for the construction of a home for the aged and infirm and for other charitable purposes
and cannot be used for any other purposes without the consent of the former said land with all real improvements thereon
shall revert in otherwise trust to the Donor for prompt disposition in favor of some other charitable organization that Donor
may deem best suited to the care of the aged.
Thereafter, or sometime in 1980, the donee, for purposes of generating funds to build the perimeter fence on the donated
property and the construction of a nucleus building for the aged and the infirm, leased a portion of the donated property to
one Martin Gomez who planted said portion with sugar cane. There is no dispute that the lease agreement was entered
into by the donee without the prior written consent of the donor, as required in the deed of donation. The lease to Gomez
ended in 1985.

The following year, 1986, a portion of the donated property was again leased by the donee, this time to one Jose Bostre
who used the leased area as a ranch. As explained by the donee, it entered into a lease agreement with Bostre to protect
the premises from vandals and for the electrification of the nucleus building of the home for the aged and in the infirm,
which was named as “Casa dela Merced.” As before, however, the donee executed the lease contract without the prior
written consent of the donor.

After the termination of the Bostre lease agreement, the donee, for the third time, leased a portion of the donated property
to one Rudy Caballes who used the leased area for fattening cattles. The donee explained that the lease agreement with
Bostre was also for the purposes of generating funds for the completion of “Casa dela Merced.” Again, however, the
donee did not secure the prior written consent of the donor.

Hence, on September 20, 1990, pursuant to a board resolution, the donor, through its president Miguel A. Yulo,
addressed a letter to the donee informing the latter that it was revoking the donation in accordance with Section 5 of the
deed due to the donee’s non-compliance with and material breach of the conditions thereunder stipulated.

ISSUE: W/N revocation is proper?

HELD: NO. In Republic vs. Silim, where the donor sought to revoke the donation on the ground that the donee breached
the condition to exclusively and forever use the land for school purpose only, the Court ruled in favor of the donee:
Without the slightest doubt, the condition for the donation was not in any way violated when the lot donated was
exchanged with another one. The purpose for the donation remains the same, which is for the establishment of a school.
The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in
furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved way for the release
of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be accommodated by the limited area of
the donated lot.

As in Silim, the three (3) lease contracts herein entered into by the donee were for the sole purpose of pursuing the
objective for which the donation was intended. In fact, such lease was authorized by the donor by express provision in
the deed of donation, albeit the prior written consent therefor of the donor is needed. Hence, considering that the donee’s
acts did not detract from the very purpose for which the donation was made but precisely to achieve such purpose, a lack
of prior written consent of the donor would only constitute casual breach of the deed, which will not warrant the revocation
of the donation.

Besides, this Court cannot consider the requirement of a prior written consent by the donor for all contracts of lease to be
entered into by the donee as an absolute ground for revocation of the donation because such a condition, if not correlated
with the purpose of the donation, would constitute undue restriction of the donee’s right of ownership over the donated
property.

SHOPPER’S PARADISE REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs ROQUE

G.R. No. 148775. January 13, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner Shopper’s Paradise Realty & Development Corporation, represented by its president, Veredigno
Atienza, entered into a twenty-five year lease with Dr. Felipe C. Roque, now deceased, over a parcel of land in the name
of Roque. Petitioner issued to Dr. Roque a check for P250,000.00 by way of “reservation payment.” Simultaneously,
petitioner and Dr. Roque likewise entered into a memorandum of agreement for the construction, development and
operation of a commercial building complex on the property. Conformably with the agreement, petitioner issued a check
for another P250,000.00 “downpayment” to Dr. Roque.
The contract of lease and the memorandum of agreement, both notarized,were never notarized because of the untimely
demise of Roque. Roque’s death constrained petitioner to deal with respondent Efren P. Roque, one of the surviving
children of the late Dr. Roque, but the negotiations broke down due to some disagreements. In a letter, respondent
advised petitioner “to desist from any attempt to enforce the aforementioned contract of lease and memorandum of
agreement”. On 15 February 1995, respondent filed a case for annulment of the contract of lease and the memorandum
of agreement, with a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction before the RTC alleging that he had long been the
absolute owner of the subject property by virtue of a deed of donation inter vivos executed in his favor by his parents, Dr.
Felipe Roque and Elisa Roque, and that the late Dr. Felipe Roque had no authority to enter into the assailed agreements
with petitioner. The donation was made in a public instrument duly acknowledged by the donor-spouses before a notary
public and duly accepted on the same day by respondent before the notary public in the same instrument of donation.
The title to the property, however, remained in the name of Dr. Felipe C. Roque, and it was only transferred to and in the
name of respondent sixteen years later.

Respondent, while he resided in the United States of America, delegated to his father the mere administration of the
property. Respondent came to know of the assailed contracts with petitioner only after retiring to the Philippines upon the
death of his father.

The trial court dismissed the complaint of respondent.

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court and held to be invalid the Contract of Lease and Memorandum
of Agreement.

ISSUE: W/N there was valid donation to respondent?

HELD: YES. The existence, albeit unregistered, of the donation in favor of respondent is undisputed. The trial court and
the appellate court have not erred in holding that the non-registration of a deed of donation does not affect its validity. As
being itself a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor
to the donee. In donations of immovable property, the law requires for its validity that it should be contained in a public
document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. The Civil
Code provides, however, that “titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or
annotated in the Registry of Property (now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds) shall not prejudice third persons.” It is
enough, between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, that the donation be made in a public document but,
in order to bind third persons, the donation must be registered in the registry of Property (Registry of Land Titles and
Deeds)

SUMIPAT vs BANGA Case Digest

SUMIPAT vs BANGA
G.R. No. 155810. August 13, 2004
FACTS: The spouses Placida Tabo-tabo and Lauro Sumipat acquired three parcels of land.
The couple was childless.

Lauro Sumipat, however, sired five illegitimate children out of an extra-marital affair, namely: herein defendants-appellees.

Lauro Sumipat executed a document denominated “DEED OF ABSOLUTE TRANSFER AND/OR QUIT-CLAIM OVER
REAL PROPERTIES” (the assailed document) in favor of defendants-appellees covering the three parcels of land (the
properties). On the document appears the signature of his wife Placida indicating her marital consent thereto.

It appears that when the assailed document was executed, Lauro Sumipat was already very sick and bedridden; that upon
defendant-appellee Lydia’s request, their neighbor Benjamin Rivera lifted the body of Lauro Sumipat whereupon Lydia
guided his (Lauro Sumipat’s) hand in affixing his signature on the assailed document which she had brought; that Lydia
thereafter left but later returned on the same day and requested Lauro’s unlettered wife Placida to sign on the assailed
document, as she did in haste, even without the latter getting a responsive answer to her query on what it was all about.

After Lauro Sumipat’s death, his wife Placida, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff-appellant, and defendants-appellees
jointly administered the properties 50% of the produce of which went to plaintiff-appellant.

As plaintiff-appellant’s share in the produce of the properties dwindled until she no longer received any and learning that
the titles to the properties in question were already transferred/made in favor of the defendants-appellees, she filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of titles, contracts, partition, recovery of ownership now the subject of the present
appeal.

Defendant-appellee Lydia disclaims participation in the execution of the assailed document, she claiming to have acquired
knowledge of its existence only five days after its execution when Lauro Sumipat gave the same to her.

RTC decided the case in favor of defendants-appellees holding that by virtue of the assailed document the due execution
of which was not contested by plaintiff-appellant, the properties were absolutely transferred to defendants-appellees.

ISSUE: Whether the questioned deed by its terms or under the surrounding circumstances has validly transferred title to
the disputed properties to the petitioners?
HELD: NO. A perusal of the deed reveals that it is actually a gratuitous disposition of property — a donation — although
Lauro Sumipat imposed upon the petitioners the condition that he and his wife, Placida, shall be entitled to one-half (1/2)
of all the fruits or produce of the parcels of land for their subsistence and support.
Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it
has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very
same instrument of donation. If the acceptance does not appear in the same document, it must be made in another.
Where the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a
separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed of donation and in the separate
acceptance, the donation is null and void.

In this case, the donees’ acceptance of the donation is not manifested either in the deed itself or in a separate document.
Hence, the deed as an instrument of donation is patently void.

Neither can we give effect to the deed as a sale, barter or any other onerous conveyance, in the absence of valid cause or
consideration and consent competently and validly given.