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PHILIP L. SMITH
Department of Psychology, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria, Australia
AND
THERESE WALSH
Department of Psychology, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria, Australia
0749-5978/96 $18.00 68
Copyright q 1996 by Academic Press, Inc.
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
uals place a high priority on achieving both their part- Weingart et al., 1993; Zubek, Pruitt, Peirce, McGillic-
ner’s and their own goals (Pruitt, 1983). Such negotia- cuddy & Syna, 1992).
tions seek to maximize the resource pool and use While this research establishes strong support for a
information exchange as a mechanism for establishing relationship between the frequency with which negoti-
trust, understanding opponents’ needs and prefer- ators use distributive and integrative strategies and
ences, and retaining flexibility until the close of negoti- the outcomes that they achieve, it treats the two styles
ations (Wilson & Putnam, 1990). Integrative outcomes of bargaining and their associated outcomes as mutu-
are more likely to occur when individuals adopt a col- ally exclusive. Such analyses ignore the complex,
laborative orientation, which is characterized by more mixed-motive nature of negotiations, which requires
proposals and counterproposals (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975), individuals to both identify the available resources and
problem-solving (Putnam & Wilson, 1989), discussions determine their distribution (e.g., Lax & Sebenius,
about the workability of solutions (Putnam & Wilson, 1986; Putnam, 1990). It further neglects the possibility
1989), a greater level of agreement with opponents’ that outcomes are not determined solely by the fre-
proposals (Donohue, Diez & Hamilton, 1985; Putnam & quency with which strategies are used, but also their
Jones, 1989; Roloff, Tutzauer & Dailey, 1989), more timing. For example Putnam (1990), in reviewing mod-
effort in uncovering underlying needs, less time in gen- els of negotiation, links the temporal location of integ-
erating specific solutions (Sheppard, Blumenfeld- rative and distributive strategies to negotiation out-
Jones & Roth, 1989), and more systematic concessions comes. On this basis, we consider whether the timing
(Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). Generally, such strategies re- of negotiator strategies is a useful predictor of outcome
flect limited positional commitment and greater flexi- quality.
bility (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Sheppard et al., 1989; Comparatively little research has examined whether
Weingart et al., 1993). the distribution of strategies over time predicts either
Conversely, negotiations characterized by a competi- the resolution of negotiations or the quality of that reso-
tive orientation emphasize differences and are associ- lution. Indirect support for this argument is found in
ated with more coercive processes aimed at influencing the mediation literature, which provides evidence that
opponents’ resistance points while maximizing own tactic use across phases varies as a function of whether
gain (Deutsch, 1973; Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Lewicki & or not disputes are resolved. This research has shown
Litterer, 1985). As a consequence, information ex- that resolved and unresolved disputes differ in terms
change becomes tactical (Putnam & Jones, 1982; Wil- of strategy distribution across mediation phases. Gen-
son & Putnam, 1990), with negotiators being concerned erally, agreement mediators use all tactics available to
to maximize the information they receive while min- them more evenly across the mediation session (Do-
imizing the information that they give (Walton & nohue, 1989). However, they implement information
McKersie, 1965). In such negotiations, the exchange of search earlier in the negotiation (Donohue, 1989) and
information is used as a means to control the negotia- spend more time in the middle stages discussing facts
tion process and is dominated by information seeking and interests (Donohue, Drake & Roberts, 1994) while
rather than information giving (Wilson & Putnam, also managing process (Jones, 1988). By the end of ne-
1990). Increased argumentation, threats, and the as- gotiations, they are more focused on proposal develop-
sertion of needs all signal an attempt to gain power ment (Jones, 1988). This research identifies the timing
within the negotiation (Wilson & Putnam, 1990). Dis- of mediator interventions as critical in determining
tributive outcomes, which are a likely consequence of whether disputes will be successfully resolved.
such tactics, are characterized by positional and irrele- Further indirect support is provided by Lim and
vant argumentation (Lewis & Fry, 1977; Lewicki & Murnighan (1994), who tested patterns of negotiator
Litterer, 1985; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Putnam & Wilson, activity against four models. Although they found some
1989), personal attacks (Lewis & Fry, 1977), and high evidence of increases in concessions as the deadline
demands and concessions (Bateman, 1980; Hamner & approached, they also reported considerable individual
Harnett, 1975; MacMurray & Lawler, 1986; Putnam & differences in the frequency and pattern with which
Wilson, 1989; Smith, Pruitt & Carnevale, 1982). Fur- different tactics were used. A plausible explanation is
thermore, increases in positional argumentation are that there is a direct relationship not only between the
associated with more false information, pressure tac- frequency, but also the pattern of tactics and eventual
tics, and the demand for concessions (Pruitt & Lewis, outcomes. Finally, Putnam, Wilson, and Turner (1990)
1975), as well as an increased possibility of deadlock provide direct support by demonstrating that the tim-
(Roloff et al., 1989). These tactics result in reduced in- ing of strategies predicts outcome quality: integrative
formation exchange, greater positional commitment outcomes are associated with greater flexibility and
and increased hostility (Carnevale & Lawler, 1987; creativity in the final stages of negotiation, whereas
distributive outcomes are associated with more posi- sistency (Wilson & Putnam, 1990) require some level
tional argument in these stages. of contentiousness. Therefore, within the class of integ-
In this research, we consider how the frequency and rative outcomes, the use of distributive tactics will dis-
timing of strategies distinguishes resolved from unre- tinguish optimum from suboptimum outcomes: Con-
solved disputes, and how it affects the quality of resolu- tentious tactics aimed at testing the limits of the nego-
tion. We consider two broad classes of outcomes, dis- tiation should be higher for negotiations ending in
tributive and integrative, and further consider the pos- optimum agreements. Further, negotiations ending in
sibility of more fine-grained distinctions between two optimum outcomes will be characterized by a greater
kinds of distributive outcome (impasse and win–lose) use of contentious tactics early in the negotiation pro-
and two kinds of integrative outcome (suboptimum and cess, whereas suboptimum outcomes will be character-
optimum). Win–lose outcomes are characterized by low ized by an increasing use of contentious tactics towards
joint profit; suboptimum and optimum outcomes are the end of negotiations.
characterized by high joint profit and are distinguished
on the basis of their integrativeness quotient (Tripp & METHOD
Sondak, 1992).
Past research has demonstrated that distributive Subjects
and integrative outcomes are distinguished by the One hundred twenty-eight undergraduate psychol-
more frequent use, respectively, of distributive and in- ogy students at the University of Melbourne partici-
tegrative strategies. Given the need for all negotiators pated in the negotiation of an employment contract.
to both create and claim value (Lax & Sebenius, 1986) Participants were run in pairs in separate sessions.
we expect the two classes of outcomes to differ not only Outcomes were classified as falling into one of four out-
in the frequency with which these tactics are used, but comes types (stalemate, distributive, suboptimum, op-
also their distribution over time: Negotiations ending timum) according to the criteria outlined below. Thirty-
in distributive outcomes will be dominated by the use of nine outcomes were classifiable according to these cri-
distributive tactics, with integrative tactics increasing teria.
over time to facilitate settlement; negotiations ending
in integrative outcomes will be dominated by the use Procedure
of integrative tactics, with distributive bargaining in-
creasing over time as individuals claim value. Subjects participated in the negotiation of an em-
When negotiations end in distributive outcomes, the ployment contract. Written instructions assigned the
principal task for negotiators is to avoid a conflict spiral role of either an employer or employee, described the
that results in stalemate (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984; Pru- task, and gave them their payoff schedule and a con-
itt, 1981, 1983) and this is most likely to be achieved tract for recording their final outcome. They were re-
through the incorporation of some integrative strategies quired to reach agreement on the eight issues shown
(Pruitt, 1981). Therefore, within the class of distributive in Table 1. As can be seen from the table, salary, annual
outcomes, stalemates and win–lose outcomes will be raise, location, and package allowed trade-offs; vaca-
differentiated on the basis of the frequency of conces- tion, start date, and medical benefits were distributive,
sions, which will be higher for win–lose outcomes. It is, whereas contract duration was compatible (i.e., both
however, unlikely that such concessions will be evenly negotiators earned their highest points by agreeing to
spread throughout the negotiation; rather, the use of sign a 6-year contract). Subjects were instructed to
this tactic is more likely to increase during the latter maximize the value of the contract for themselves. A
part of the negotiation, as predicted by deadline models lottery offering a small cash prize was used to provide
(Lim & Murnighan, 1994). Two patterns should, there- an incentive for this; lottery tickets were allocated on
fore, distinguish win–lose outcomes from stalemates: a the basis of contract value. No points were awarded
decline in positional arguing over time and a comple- for stalemates. Negotiation were conducted face-to-face
mentary increase in concessions over time. and were videotaped for subsequent analysis.
For negotiations ending in integrative outcomes the
Classification of Outcomes
principal task for negotiators is to avoid ending negoti-
ations before all solutions have been satisfactorily ex- Outcomes were classified as follows (the number of
plored (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984; Pruitt, 1981, 1983; outcomes so classified is given in brackets). Stalemates
Thompson, 1990; Weingart et al., 1993) and this is most (9) were negotiations that were unresolved at the end of
likely to be achieved by using a proportion of distribu- the 25-min negotiating period. The remaining outcome
tive strategies. Both the expansion of the resource pool types were defined on the basis of joint outcome.
(Pruitt, 1981) and a test of opponent integrity and con- The integrativeness of outcomes was determined by
TABLE 1
Payoff Matrices for Employers and Employees
Employer payoffs
Salary (Gains) Vacation (Gains) Start date (Gains) Annual raise (Gains)
Employee payoffs
Salary (Gains) Vacation (Gains) Start due (Gains) Annual raise (Gains)
TABLE 2
Factor Analysis of Cues
Factor
Positional information Deny relevance Of an opponent’s arguments .88 .31 0.14 .11
Give positional info Arguments in support of own position .87 .06 0.001 0.01
Initial offers Makes or repeats an initial offer .85 .12 .24 .24
Treats/promises Uses threats or promises to change .79 0.06 0.21 0.12
opponent’s position
Find fault Attributes bad faith to opponent .78 .25 0.08 .26
Restructuring Restructuring Proposes a new way for proceeding 0.06 .87 .19 0.05
Openings Makes an open-ended, non-directional .25 .71 0.05 0.02
statement
Seek positional info Requests additional information .45 .65 .17 .11
about opponent’s position
Priority information Seek priority info Requests information about the value 0.15 .15 .85 0.14
of issue(s)
Give priority info Provides information about the value 0.04 .41 .75 .19
of issue(s)
Indicate flexibility Suggests a range of options or trade- .06 0.21 .73 .36
offs across issues
Concessions Request acceptance Proposes modifications to an 0.01 0.08 0.001 .91
opponent’s offer
Offer concession Makes an offer that has a lower .25 .12 .21 .77
value to self than the immediately
preceding offer
Eigen value 4.52 2.54 1.79 1.01
% variance 34.8 19.6 13.7 7.8
factor analyzed to explore the possibility that tactics tion strategy. Finally, the two tactics of proposing mod-
could be grouped together in a meaningful way. Subse- ifications to an opponent’s offer or making concessions
quent analyses are based on the factors that emerge lead us to interpret Factor 4 as representing conces-
from these analyses, which could be considered to rep- sionary behavior.
resent strategies.
Factor analysis of cues. A principal components Factor analysis of responses. A principal compo-
analysis with Varimax rotation yielded four distinct nents analysis with Varimax rotation yielded three dis-
cue factors, shown in Table 2. Factor 1 includes tactics tinct response factors, shown in Table 3. Two of the fac-
that, according to Donohue et al.’s (1981) classificatory tors that emerged in this analysis again fit the descrip-
scheme, represent either attacking or defending moves. tions of distributive and integrative bargaining. Factor
This factor includes tactics aimed at establishing and 1 is represented by attacking and defending tactics that
supporting a negotiator’s position while attempting to focus on opponents’ positional arguments, coupled with
change an opponent’s position. These tactics are typical contentious tactics aimed at changing that position. This
of a distributive bargaining style (e.g., Lewicki & Lit- factor is interpreted as representing a positional infor-
terer, 1985) and are interpreted as providing positional mation strategy. Factor 2, which is interpreted as repre-
information. The second factor better represents tactics senting a priority information strategy, is composed of
that attempt to break negotiating scripts by either en- what Donohue et al. (1981) classify as integrative tac-
gaging in nondirectional discussion or proposing a new tics: giving and seeking priority information, as well as
way of tackling the negotiation. Factor 2 is therefore a willingness to accept offers. Finally, the third factor
interpreted as negotiator attempts to restructure the also represents a contentious style of bargaining in
negotiation. Consistent with descriptions of integrative which negotiators either reject opponents’ offers or re-
bargaining (e.g., Lewicki & Litterer, 1985), Factor 3 is state their demands. This factor is interpreted as rejec-
composed of tactics that either seek or provide priority tion, as these tactics reject opponents’ positions either
information, or suggest tradeoffs; consequently, this explicitly or implicitly. It will be noted that one response
factor is interpreted as representing a priority-informa- tactic, accepts arguments, has a negative loading on the
TABLE 3
Factor Analysis of Responses
Factor
Positional information Give positional info Arguments in support of own position .88 0.05 0.05
Seek positional info Requests additional information about opponent’s .85 0.25 0.14
position
Reject argument Opponent’s arguments are treated as irrelevant to .85 0.19 .23
settlement
Continue discussion . . . Of previous topic .82 .28 .03
Personal insult Rejects opponent’s argument with a personal insult .63 0.03 .54
Topic change Introduces a new topic for discussion .66 .23 .13
Priority information Give priority info Provides information about the value of issue(s) .07 .92 0.11
Seek priority info Requests information about the value of issue(s) .06 .88 .04
Accept offer Explicit acceptance of opponent’s proposal 0.09 .55 .28
Rejection Reject offer Explicit rejection of opponent’s offer .48 .08 .71
Assert wants States requirements and expects compliance .55 .22 .56
Accept argument Accepts opponent’s point of view, but not offer .24 0.02 0.72
Eigen value 4.72 2.29 1.43
% variance 39.3 19.1 12.0
third response factor. Consequently, it is retained as a VAs, one for cues and one for responses, were con-
single tactic in further analyses. ducted.2
The preceding discussion of tactics and outcomes
RESULTS suggested (a) that tactical differences would distin-
guish integrative from distributive outcomes; (b) that
Negotiations ranged in length from 10 to 25 min, optimum integrative outcomes would be distinguished
consequently differing in the total number of strategies from suboptimum ones; (c) that win–lose outcomes
used. This raises the possibility that any differences would be distinguished from stalemates. A series of
that emerged if analyses were conducted on raw fre- three planned comparisons on the Outcome factor was
quencies might simply reflect these differences in over- used to test these hypotheses: Contrast 1 compared
all length. Because our hypotheses involve the relative, distributive and integrative outcomes, Contrast 2 com-
rather than the absolute, frequency with which partic- pared optimum and suboptimum outcomes, and Con-
ular strategies are used, the analysis was carried out trast 3 compared stalemates and win–lose outcomes.
on the proportion of times a particular strategy was We argued that the use of strategies and tactics could
used by a dyad during a given phase of the negotiation. differ over time; we further argued that trends over
To avoid problems of linear dependency between values time may serve to differentiate between the four cate-
of the dependent variable (because the sets of propor- gories of outcomes. To test these hypotheses, each tran-
tions always sum to one), one of the strategies was script was divided into six equal segments, determined
arbitrarily dropped from the analysis to create a lin- by the number of utterances. To test for differences
early independent set, in the manner described by Har- in the distribution of tactics over time, the linear and
ris (1985, pp. 109–115). Before carrying out the analy- quadratic trend components were also extracted.
sis, the remaining proportions were subject to a 2arc-
q
sin p transformation to stabilize the variances, as Analysis of Cuing Strategies
described by Winer (1971, pp. 399–400).1 The trans-
The relationship between Time, Outcome and Cuing
formed proportions were then subject to a multivariate
Strategy was examined using MANOVA, with the pro-
analysis of variance (MANOVA). Two separate MANO-
portion of strategies within each time segment provid-
ing the dependent variable. Four significant interac-
1
Because there are only n 0 1 degrees of freedom in a set of n tions were found: Strategy interacted with Outcome
proportions, this procedure does not result in any loss of information.
In the subsequent analysis of the simple effects of tactic type, how-
2
ever, all n tactics were analyzed so that their effects over time could As neither analysis violated sphericity assumptions, univariate
be characterized individually. results are reported (Tabachnik & Fidell, 1983).
FIG. 2. Mean frequency of cuing strategy use as a function of outcomes and time.
interactions emerged. Strategy interacted with both in negotiations suggests that their role varies as a func-
Outcome (distributive vs integrative), F(2,70) Å 3.69, tion of temporal context: They signal flexibility, test
p õ .05, and Time, F(10,350) Å 2.41, p õ .01. To further firmness and define the bargaining zone early in the
explore these effects, the interactions were decomposed negotiations while late in the negotiations they are
by strategy into their simple effects. used to reach settlement. (Note that this is consistent
Analysis of simple effects showed that three response with the arguments made by several authors [Lewis &
strategies varied in their use over time. These trends Fry, 1977; Putnam, 1990; Putnam & Wilson, 1989;
are shown in Fig. 3. A significant quadratic trend in Roloff et al., 1989] that the same strategy may serve
the use of positional-information responses, F(1,175) Å either integrative or distributive functions, depending
14.06, p õ .001, showed this strategy to peak in the on context.) Second, negotiators become progressively
middle stages of the negotiation. Conversely, a qua- less willing to respond by accepting opponent’s argu-
dratic trend in the use of rejection responses, F(1,175) ments as the negotiation progresses. Thus, the limits
Å 8.32, p õ .005, was lowest in the middle stages of of the negotiation are defined early in the negotiation
the negotiation. Finally, a linear trend, F(1,175) Å 6.83, process. The key means for challenging these limits is
p Å .01, showed the acceptance of opponent’s argu- in the high levels of positional-information cuing and
ments to decrease over time. responding cuing and responding during the middle
The use of one response strategy differentiated dis- phases of the negotiation.
tributive and integrative outcomes. In a pattern paral- Consistent with past research, our results showed
leling findings for the use of cue strategies, when nego- that integrative and distributive outcomes were associ-
tiations ended in distributive outcomes, dyads used ated with different levels of positional and priority in-
fewer priority-information strategies, F(1,35) Å 8.62, formation exchange. Whereas distributive outcomes
p õ .01, than when negotiations ended in integrative were characterized by a higher proportion of positional-
outcomes. A second strategy, the use of position infor- information cues and responses, as well as a lower pro-
mation, was a marginally significant differentiator, portion of priority-information cues, the reverse was
F(1,35) Å 3.83, p Å .058, between distributive and in- true for integrative outcomes. These results clearly fit
tegrative outcomes. with Fisher and Ury’s (1981) distinction between posi-
tional and principled bargaining and further demon-
DISCUSSION strate that low levels of positional arguing are associ-
ated with functional outcomes. They are also consistent
Several strategies varied over time independent of with past research showing that integrative outcomes
the way in which negotiations ended. Not only are the are characterized by higher levels of information ex-
temporal patterns broadly consistent with phase mod- change (Thompson, 1990; Thompson & Hastie, 1990).
els of negotiation (as described by Holmes, 1992), they The frequency with which tactics are used did not, how-
also portrayed the negotiating process as one of de- ever, enable more fine-grained distinctions within the
creasing flexibility. First, the more frequent use of con- two outcome types to be made. This suggests that, al-
cessionary cues and rejection responses early and late though the frequency with which strategies are used
channels negotiators to either a distributive or an in- be the ability to define the negotiation in common
tegrative path, it does not determine the quality of out- terms. Pinkley and Northcraft (1994) have shown that
comes within those paths. representations of conflict converge over time and spec-
Extending this point, negotiations that ended in opti- ulate that this may be a necessary condition for resolu-
mum and suboptimum outcomes differed in the use of tion. On this basis, we propose that impasse dyads fail
two cuing strategies (positional information; restructur- to develop a common understanding of the problem,
ing) over time. Two patterns differentiated optimum from and further speculate that this may, in turn, affect
suboptimum outcomes: The relative stability of these information processing. Why such differences occur in
strategies over time and the extent to which their use distributive negotiations is an open question. At a
had converged or diverged by the end of negotiations. macro-level, situational and dispositional factors may
Putnam (1994) argues that the way in which negotiators impact on cognitive representations of conflict. At a
respond to their partners’ cues conveys implicit messages micro-level, it may be the specific sequencing of strate-
about how negotiations should be interpreted and struc- gies (rather than their frequency or temporal distribu-
tured. We propose that how cues are distributed over tion) that facilitates or inhibits the development of
time also conveys an implicit message, signalling a nego- shared meaning.
tiators’ dominant motive. Because its use is more predict- We were able to distinguish distributive and integ-
able, the more stable of the two strategies establishes rative outcomes in terms of the frequency of strategy
the negotiating context; use of the less stable strategy is use, suggesting that information availability or suc-
interpreted within this context. cessful differentiation moves negotiators from distribu-
Earlier, we argued that negotiators must both create tive to integrative outcomes: priority information ex-
and claim value to optimize outcomes. For example, change and negotiator flexibility provide the informa-
Pinkley, Griffith, and Northcraft (1995) demonstrated tion necessary for recognizing differing priorities.
that the self-reported use of mixed-motive strategies However, maximizing benefits also requires effective
is associated with better joint outcomes. The second information processing or integration. This is achieved
pattern described above identifies the management of when negotiators are able to restructure the negotiat-
these strategies as critical to achieving optimum out- ing process, achieving a balance between conten-
comes. Achieving optimum outcomes is a cognitively tiousness and cooperation. Our results suggest that,
complex task that requires dyads to both differentiate, whereas the frequency with which priority and posi-
recognizing multiple perspectives on a problem, and tional-information strategies (as both cues and re-
integrate, building relationships between these per- sponses) are used is sufficient to move negotiators from
spectives (definitions as given by Gruenfeld, 1995). In distributive to integrative outcomes, the temporal dis-
the present case, positional information seems better tribution of two cuing strategies (positional informa-
suited to differentiation and restructuring better suited tion and restructuring) is critical to whether dyads
to integration. Our results then suggest that when fully integrate.
these tasks are accomplished affects outcome opti-
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