Kalabagh Dam -- Development or disaster?

Iftikhar Ahmad

For the past so many years of its planning and designing, the objectives and goals of Kalabagh
Dam (KBD) have been shrouded in secrecy, and the Federal Government’s blind following of the
project, against the wishes of the three provinces of the federation, has made it the most
controversial issue of national integrity.

The project is being pleaded as a turning point in the direction of national development, whereas
the provinces see it as step towards the diversion of common resources towards the development
of one province (Punjab), leaving all the rest to the possible negative impacts perceived from the
project.

The matter becomes more complex in the present state of better possible alternatives, having
greater development potentials and lesser negative impacts on any of the federating units of
Pakistan.

One of the reasons for creating controversy and difference of opinion on the project is attributed
to WAPDA’s failure to adequately consult the provinces at the project planning and design stage,
since the provinces were kept in complete darkness about the design parameters of the dam, till
the completion of its detailed design in 1984-85.

To further fuel the issue, statements from responsible officials of the federal government, the
Punjab and WAPDA, first declared Kalabagh Dam as only a storage dam to offset the storage
loss of Tarbela and Mangla Dams, due to sedimentation. Followed by reasons of rise in fuel costs
and the consequent increased costs due to thermal generation, pleading the ultimate requirement
of cheap hydel power. And, to further confuse the issue, the project was declared to have plans
for a Left and Right Bank canals for irrigation purposes.

In the backdrop of all these events, the role of beneficiaries/affectees has been totally ignored.
For which, they have every right to ask for the public disclosure of all the relevant facts regarding
selection criteria, planning parameters, design guidelines, cost estimates, environmental and
socio-economic assessments, government’s priorities, and financing mechanism of the planned
construction. And it becomes more important for projects towards the harnessing of shared water
resources, like that of River Indus, and for the equitable distribution of their benefits among the
federating units as well as their short and long term impacts on their individual as well as
collective lives.

Brief Introduction of Kalabagh Dam Project

The Kalabagh Dam (KBD) is proposed to be located on the River Indus at about 120 miles
downstream of Tarbela Dam, 92 miles downstream the confluence of Kabul and Indus Rivers and
16 miles upstream of the existing Jinnah Barrage. The site is a narrow and deep channel
extending over 5-mile distance where the river is about 1,300 feet wide.
According to the PC-II of the Project "KBD was initiated by GOP in 1953, and until 1973, the
project was basically considered as a storage project for meeting the irrigation needs, and
consequently, rapid increases in the cost of energy have greatly enhanced the priority of KBD as
a power project".

The project planning report, circulated in March 84, tried to establish the technical and economic
feasibility of the project, and the detailed designs/tender documents, commenced in March 84,
and were completed by December 1985.

The feasibility study and documentation have cost the GOP around one billion rupees so far.

According to one of WAPDA’s latest briefs on the KBD Project, the dam and its objectives are
described in the following words:

"It is expected to be a 260 ft high structure and would create a reservoir 6.1 million acres feet
(MAF) of usable storage. The annual generation of energy would amount to about 11,200 GWh,
generated by hydro power plant of 2400 MW capacity. This capacity may ultimately be increased
to 3600 MW, making KBD one of the largest hydro generation dams in Asia. The total project cost
covering civil and power facilities, as estimated by the consultants at June 1987 prices, will be
about US $ 5.153 billion, including the cost of interest during construction, customs duties, taxes
and price contingencies"

(Note: At the present day’s construction costs, the dam is expected to cost around US $ 8 billion)

Another WAPDA release "WAPDA Projects in Brief" of January 1986, describes the project as:
"Kalabagh Dam is a multipurpose project to be built across the River Indus. Basically, it is a
power project which aims at accelerating the tempo of economic development in Pakistan".

Briefly, in WAPDA’s terms, the proposed KBD has the following aims:

1. To generate large amounts of low cost hydro electric power near major load centers, and
supply the existing grid for meeting the growing power demand of agriculture, industrial and
domestic consumers. In addition, it will increase the energy output of the existing Tarbela scheme
by permitting the conjunctive operation of the two reservoirs.
2. To provide additional storage on the Indus River, and thus reduce the exiting system
shortfalls in irrigation requirements.
3. To provide additional regulation on the River Indus, and thus provide better system control
and management for supplying assured, adequate and timely irrigation water for crops.
4. To compensate for the storage loss due to the silting up of exiting reservoirs till such time
that their substitutes, (presently planned) are actually available.
5. To eliminate and control the flood peaks in the River Indus so as to minimize flood hazards
downstream.
6. To increase Pakistan’s capability to manage its water distribution and power generation
systems through the conjunctive operation of Tarbela and KBD reservoir

It is believed by WAPDA that " the conjunctive operation of Kalabagh Dam will enhance Tarbela’s
generation capacity to 336 million units of energy and 600 MW of peaking power. Which will
increase the share of hydel power on the national grid, thus controlling the overall cost of power
generation, alongwith the reduction in thermal generation to result in savings in fuel import".

Distinctive Characteristics of KBD Project (Ref: WAPDA Reports)

The project has two spillways on the Right Bank for the disposal of floodwater, having a total
maximum discharge capacity of 2 million cusecs.

On the left bank is the powerhouse, which is connected to 12 tunnel conduits, each 36 ft in
diameter, with ultimate power generation capacity of 3600 MW.

The KBD reservoir will extend 92 miles up the Indus from the dam site and 36 miles up the Soan
River, and about 10 miles up the Kabul River from the Kabul-Indus confluence, at its normal
retention level, at which the reservoir area would be 164 sq. miles in total.

The total cultivable affected land under the reservoir, according to WAPDA’s figures, will be
35000 acres, out of which 27500 acres falls under the reservoir and will be permanently acquired
(24500 acres in Punjab and 3000 acres in NWFP); while the floods (of recurrence interval of 1 in
5 yrs) will temporarily submerge 7500 acres of land (6000 acres in Punjab and 1500 acres in
NWFP). The land will be taken on easement, under which the title of the land will remain with the
owners and it will be available for cultivation during normal season flows.

According to WAPDA, the operation schedule will allow the reservoir to be emptied upto the 890-
ft above MSL once every year, and will allow one season cropping in about 14000 acres of land,
lying above that level.
According to them, out of the whole-submerged land under the reservoir, the total irrigated land is
3000 acres (2900 acres in Punjab and 100 acres in NWFP).

As per the 1991 WAPDA estimates, the total population displaced by the KBD will be 83000
(48500 will be from Punjab and 34500 will be from NWFP).

To compensate the dam displaced people; WAPDA has a plan to offer a minimum of 12.5 acres
land as land compensation per land-owning family, for which 74000 acres of irrigated land will be
required.

To efficiently clear the deposited sediment from the reservoir, the dam is proposed to have an
orifice spillway having its crest level 40-ft below the minimum elevation 835-ft level.

It is believed by WAPDA’s experts that the operational rules specifying the retention of reservoir
at the minimum level of El.825-ft above MSL in the month of June and upto 20th July, will enable
direct sluicing of the silt laden early floods, as well as averting the risks of flooding in the
upstream areas of the reservoir.

Salient Features of KBD Project

The Main Reservoir of the Dam

Total Storage

7.9 MAF (9,750 million cu m)

Usable Storage
Dead Storage

6.1 MAF (7,550 million cu m)

1.8 MAF( 2,200 million cu m)

Retention Level

El.915-ft above MSL (278.9 m)

Min Reservoir Level

El.825-ft above MSL (251.5 m)

Area at Retention Level

105,000 acres ; (164 sq.m=425 sq. km)

Main Dam

Crest Elevation

Crest Width

El. 940-ft above MSL (286.5 m)

50 ft (15.2 m)

Max Height
260 ft (79.2)

Length

Length (overall)

4375 ft

11000 ft 3350 m)

Catchment Area of the Dam

110,500 sq. miles

Fill Volume

Main + Closure Embankments

Intake Embankments

Right Auxiliary Embankments

Guide Bunds, Cofferdams etc

5. million cu m

5.9 million cu m

4. million cu. m

10.5 million cu m

6.

Overflow Spillway
Sill Level

El. 860-ft above MSL (262.1 m)

No and size of radial gates

PMF Discharge

10 No. 50ft (15.2 m ) w x 55 ft (16.8m )

0.98 million cusecs (1.07 million cusecs)

7.

Project Cost

Based on Cost at June 1987

US $ 2.65 billion

Present Estimated Cost

US $ 8-10 billion
8.

Orifice Spillway

Sill level

No and size of radial gates

785 ft (239.3m) SPD

10 No. 38 ft (11.6 m) w x 22 ft

9.

10.

Convertible conduits

No & Size of Conduits

Average Length

Lining

No & Size of gates

Upstream bulkhead

Upstream radial
Downstream radial

4-36 ft (11 m) diameter

940 ft (286.5 m)

Steel with concrete encasement

1-36 ft (11 m) w x 36 ft (11m)

4-36 ft (11 m) w x 36 ft (11m)

2-35 ft (10.7m) w x 36 ft (11m)

11.

Power Facilities

No and size of intake gates

Upstream bulkhead

Upstream radial

2-36 ft (11m) w x 36 ft (11m)

8-36 ft (11m) w x 36 ft (11m)

12.

Penstocks

Size and average length

Lining

36 ft (11m) diameter, 850 ft

Steel with concrete encasement

13

Power Station

Type

No. of Units

Installed Capacity

Turbines, design head

Generators, nominal/maximum rating

Indoor

8 (initial); 12 (ultimate)

2400 MW (initial); 3600 MW (ultimate)

Francis Type, 170 ft (51.8m)

13.1

Irrigation Benefits

Increase in future annual irrigation supplies (Average)

4.5 MAF (5.500 million Cum)

13.2

13.3

Energy generation

At KBD

Extra at Tarbela

Total

Power Available (initial eight units)

Max Power

Dependable Power

11413 million kWh

236 million kWh

11749 kWh

2776 MW

1463 MW

References:

1. Rashed A. Saeed, KBD Project; A Scientific Analysis, Print Associates Int’l Islamabad, 1995
2. Kazi Abrar, KBD The Sindh Case, Creative Communications, Hyderabad, 1998

Expected Benefits of the KBD Project

The Kalabagh Dam (KBD) has been pleaded by WAPDA as the only possible choice for saving
the food and energy starved nation of Pakistan. In this respect, it has worked out the following
beneficial aspects of the project:

Enhancement in the Irrigation Water Supply

The dam is designed to have a left bank canal, off-taking from the left bank high level outlet works
of KBD. It will have a capacity of 15,000 cusecs, will be 170 miles long, and will lift about 6.65
MAF water annually from the Kalabagh Dam reservoir.
Through this canal, the province of Punjab wishes to irrigate its 371,000 acres of land, on both
the banks, of Mianwali, Khushab and Jehlum Districts.

To meet the irrigation water requirements, the canal is planned to provide 0.78 MAF in Rabi and
1.23 MAF in Kharif to the new cultivated area, and will discharge the balance 4.64 MAF water into
Jehlum at Rasul Barrage to meet shortage of Mangla command, thus fulfilling water shortages in
the Mangla command.

Another canal was proposed on the Right Bank of the dam, to irrigate certain areas of NWFP
(Pukhtunkhwa), but it has been discarded now, because WAPDA considers it unfeasible.

Enhancement in the Power Generation Capacity

The KBD is expected to have 8 units of 300 MW capacity initially, which will be ultimately
increased to 12 units of 300 MW capacity. The power expected to be generated out of the KBD is
as under:

Capacity (MW)

Generation (GWH)

2400

11413

2800

13216

3200

15103

3600

16990

It is further believed by WAPDA that KBD will generate 336 million units of energy and 600 MW of
peaking power by working in conjunction with Tarbela.
(Reference: WAPDA Brief to Senate Standing Committee on Water and Power, November 1997)

A Critical Analysis of the KBD Project

A lot has been said, and is still being said, both in favour and against the KBD project, and the
debate will continue till a final decision on its fate is achieved.

In this respect, the Federal Government & WAPDA, having all the administrative machinery at
their disposal, have conducted a number of studies and organized various seminars, for
projecting the beneficial aspects of the project and allay fears against its negative impacts.
On the other hand, enlightened professionals and nationalist organizations have, both individually
and collectively, researched on the subject and tried to expose the over-shadowed negative
aspects of KBD.

Whereas the few benefits of KBD project have been extensively propagated through the wide
publicity campaigns of WAPDA, there has been a need to compile the findings of those unknown
researchers, who burnt their midnight oil to expose the multiple destructive capacities of
Kalabagh Dam.

Building upon the work done by the said researchers, the following pages will present a critical
analysis of the KBD project, so as to enable the reader to assess for himself/herself the ultimate
utility of the project to Pakistan.

General Observations on KBD Project

KBD is the only major project in the history of Pakistan, which has been most strongly opposed
by the three, out of the four, provinces for various reasons. In this respect, unanimous resolutions
have been passed by their elected Provincial Assembles to reject the viability of the project. Also,
in the National Assembly and the Senate, the project has been strongly opposed by the elected
representatives.

Apart from the technical flaws, making the construction and operation of the project an ultimate
disaster, the people of the three provinces have certain reservations against its viability for the
integrity of the country, and their common development.

Some of these reservations are described below:

Reservations of NWFP (Pukhtunkhwa)

NWFP objects to the KBD because, a sizable number of its people will be displaced, and a vast
area of its land will either be submerged under the reservoir or rendered waterlogged.

In the original design of KBD, the reservoir elevation was desired at 925-ft above MSL, at which
the water level in River Kabul was feared to rise by 2.5-ft at Nowshera, immediately after
construction and to the ultimate 9.5-ft after 30 years of the project implementation.

To account for this, and as protection against damages in these areas, WAPDA had proposed to
erect 25-ft high dykes around the Kabul River, so as to protect the cities from the water’s
spillover.

However, due to the high risk factor for the flooding eventuality and subsequent drainage
problems, the Government of NWFP seriously objected the designs of the project and conducted
investigations in 1985 to assess the possible impacts of KBD on the Peshawar valley.

As a result, it was revealed that, at the 925-ft reservoir elevation, the following major impacts
were expected to occur:

1. 60000 acres of area will be affected by the 1 in 5 year floods

2. 16 number unprotected villages will be required to be acquired and their population resettled
3. 64933 persons will require resettlement elsewhere.
4. Another 131000 persons will be requiring protection through 24 feet high dykes
5. A total of 28 miles long flood protection dykes will be constructed along the Kabul River, out
of which 18 miles length will be specifically required to protect the Nowshera town alone.
6. The dykes retained water was feared to contribute to the overall rise in water table in the
immediate vicinity of the reservoir.

In addition, the following facilities were feared to be permanently submerged in the reservoir in a
1 in 100 year flood, and therefore required relocation:
i. 20.45 km of National Highway, 2 km Nowshera-Mardan road,

ii. 10 km Nizampur Attock road, 25 km Pir Sabak-Jehangira road

v. 6.92-km Railway line between Khairabad - Nowshera
vi. 5.43 km railway line between Nowshera - Mardan
vii. Bridge at Khushal Garh
viii. Khairabad Bridge at Attock required strengthening and modifications
ix. Jehangira Bridge required raising by 15 ft
x. Nowshera Railway Bridge required raising by 6-ft
xi. Nowshera Mardan Bridge required raising by 6-ft
xi. Telecommunication, power lines and gas lines also required relocation

In the light of these findings, the Government of NWFP requested WAPDA to revise the project.

Lately, WAPDA has revised the designs and reduced the reservoir elevation to 915-ft above MSL
in July 1986. And declared the designs to be safe against all the evils of the previous design.

Whereas, the validity of WAPDA’s statement of a mere 10-ft reduction in reservoir height to solve
all the problems is questionable and worth detailed investigation, the people of NWFP doubt the
predictions of WAPDA’s experts due to their previously ill-conceived designs of KBD, and hold
strong apprehensions against the real objectives of the project.

They, therefore, still believe that:

1. The dam will raise the water level of River Indus throughout the Attock gorge, right through
the Haro river confluence and upto the Akora Khattak on Kabul River. And resultantly, the
Nowshera City, inhibited by 200,000 people falling on both the left and right banks of Kabul River,
will be under severe threat of flooding. And in the long term of about 50 years time, the Nowshera
City and its adjoining areas will become waterlogged swamplands, due to the seepage from the
raised water level.
2. The Mardan and Swabi SCARP projects, covering 123,000 acres of irrigated land, will face
certain threat of failure, because of their outfalls being lower than the high flood levels in KBD
reservoir.
3. WAPDA has prepared a water release pattern of the post KBD irrigation supplies, which will
have an adverse impact on the CRBC project, as it does not provide enough water for
undertaking the lift components of CRBC in future. Similarly, the CRBC is also likely to be
affected for long periods during the construction of the project and during the first ponding of the
reservoir

Therefore, in the absence of an independent assessment of the damages at the 915-ft reservoir
level, and with no-trust in WAPDA’s claims of all-well, the people of NWFP take the previously
arrived figures of social and economic costs as an eye opener on the viability of the project.

People still believe that the mere 10-ft reduction in reservoir level will have a negligible mitigating
impact in taking care of the colossal injury to NWFP.

A detailed discussion on the various dimensions of the project follows later.

Reservations of Baluchistan

The largest province of Pakistan, Baluchistan, does not touch River Indus and is not a riparian in
the strictest sense. Still the Pat Feeder canal from Guddu Barrage, with 3400 cusecs of water,
irrigates about 300,000 acres in the province. And with a recent request of Baluchistan
Government to remodel the Pat Feeder canal, the flow is further expected to be increased to
6000 cusecs, irrigating a further 200,000 acres.

Baluchistan’s opposition to KBD is therefore based on its apprehension that future requests for
more water from River Indus will meet little success if KBD over stretches the demand of water in
Indus River system.

In addition, with the revised distribution of water in the post KBD scenario, Baluchistan fears a
further reduction in its share of irrigation water usage, which is already very low.

Reservations of Sindh

Sindhis believe that KBD left bank canal will divert the waters of Indus to Rasul-Qadirabad sector
in the upper reaches of Punjab, and the whole of River Indus waters will be left to cater to the
needs of Punjab only, whenever their is shortage of water in Jehlum, or in the eventuality of India
appropriating all the waters of Jehlum, or Chenab or both

Sindh, which is a lower riparian of River Indus, has constantly felt threatened by Punjab and has
bitterly disputed the figures of water availability advanced by WAPDA, citing legal, economic,
ecological, geomorphologic and many other reasons for opposing KBD.

From the past experience of the operation of Taunsa-Punjnad and Chashma-Jehlum canal,
people in Sindh perceive that Punjab plans to allow the civil works or the canal system to be
constructed as projects of national survival and run the surplus water for a few years to establish
precedence and develop water users, who will then apply pressure to keep the water supply
running. Later, when the water rights are well established in Punjab, they can force the lower
riparian (or don’t even ask) to accept the fait accompli and keep the water supply running since
the tap is in the hands of the upper riparian.

Therefore, Sindh’s strongly opposes the construction of KBD.

Basic Planning Drawbacks in KBD Project

The KBD project suffers from a multitude of planning and design drawbacks, which makes it the
least desired development alternative, out of the various development opportunities available in
the Indus Basin.
With the KBD as a test case, the following paragraphs exposes the planning capability of WAPDA
and the intelligence level of the decision makers at the top, who are adamant to support and
propagate the case of a technically unfeasible dam on River Indus.

Unavailability of Enough Water in the Indus River System

The amount of water flowing through the River Indus has been a point of acute disagreement
between the planners of KBD project and other impartial engineers.

To technically analyze the issue, the following table, from the year 1922 to 1991, indicates 69
years maximum flow pattern of the western rivers of Pakistan, measured at rim stations (Indus at
KBD, Jehlum at Mangla & Chenab at Marala)

Seasonal and Annual Flows in Western Rivers (MAF)

Years

Kharif Flow

Rabi

Total Flows

1922-23

121.48

25.96

147.44

1923.24

130.41

23.55

154.01

1924-25

109.51
20.13

129.69

1925-26

100.51

18.22

118.73

1926-27

99.16

18.15

117.31

1927-28

90.42

20.41

110.83

1928-29

108.22

22.09

130.31

1929-30

97.20
26.94

124.14

1930-31

117.13

19.73

136.86

1931-32

101.10

22.30

123.40

1932-33

107.62

17.64

125.26

1933-34

125.68

18.77

144.44

1934-35

108.19

18.67
126.86

1935-36

116.81

22.28

139.09

1936-37

124.91

20.91

145.82

1937-38

110.10

21.34

131.44

1938-39

125.36

22.59

147.95

1939-40

127.24

17.54
144.78

1940-41

107.52

15.58

120.10

1941-42

107.75

25.92

133.67

1942-43

143.57

23.51

167.08

1943-44

127.39

19.61

147.00

1944-45

116.08

20.10
136.16

1945-46

131.64

18.86

150.50

1946-47

110.44

18.42

128.86

1947-48

101.36

23.31

124.69

1948-49

132.15

23.57

155.72

1949-50

132.29

23.71

156.00
1950-51

151.28

20.38

171.66

1951-52

93.60

20.21

113.81

1952-53

112.33

17.97

130.30

1953-54

116.31

26.77

143.08

1954-55

119.98

20.27

140.25
1955-56

107.51

25.02

132.53

1956-57

131.92

25.46

157.38

1957-58

123.0

28.10

151.10

1958-59

124.47

34.09

158.56

1959-60

154.74

32.05

186.79

1960-61
124.97

20.74

145.71

1961-62

119.58

20.93

140.51

1962-63

89.96

19.85

109.81

1963-64

113.40

21.66

135.06

1964-65

116.11

22.32

138.43

1965-66
117.81

21.09

138.98

1966-67

116.84

23.83

140.47

1967-68

120.43

25.76

146.19

1968-69

115.63

23.21

138.85

1969-70

114.49

19.77

134.26

1970-71
90.27

15.90

106.17

1971-72

88.40

15.74

104.14

1972-73

101.62

24.45

126.09

1973-74

144.97

19.12

164.09

1974-75

79.47

18.27

97.74

1975-76

116.30
23.22

139.52

1976-77

116.86

18.43

135.28

1977-78

104.36

23.10

127.46

1978-79

137.45

26.03

163.47

1979-80

108.84

23.14

131.98

1980-81

109.81
26.58

136.39

1981-82

117.69

22.93

140.62

1982-83

97.10

25.27

122.38

1983-84

128.28

21.67

149.96

1984-85

115.99

18.93

134.92

1985-86

91.66
26.04

117.70

1986-87

116.38

30.27

146.67

1987-88

111.79

29.28

141.07

1988-89

136.56

24.84

101.42

1989-90

102.01

29.31

131.31

1990-91

130.97

35.14
166.12

1991-92

141.53

30.57

172.10

1992-93

138.62

31.06

169.68

1993-94

104.67

22.80

127.47

Mean

115.24

22.03

137.27

Median

116.20

21.66
137.64

Maximum

154.74

(1959-60)

35.09

(1958-59)

186.79

(1959-60)

Reference: Surface Water Availability for Further Development, WAPDA, December 1994

From the table five parameters are evident

i. Maximum flow of the 3 western rivers 186.79 MAF evidenced in 1959-60

ii. Minimum flow of the 3 western rivers 100.31 MAF evidenced in 1974-75

iii. Average (per year) flow of the 3 western is 137.27 MAF

iv. 4 out 5 years flow of 3 western rivers is 123.59 MAF

A closer analysis of the flow pattern reveals that super floods occur approximately once in 5 years
time, which may jack up the average flow to the respectable 137.27 MAF per year, but in the
remaining four years, availability of water remain around 123.59 MAF only, or lower.

In all its calculations of the availability of water for KBD, WAPDA has insisted upon the average
flow figures i.e. 137.27 MAF, whereas the criteria for designing a storage dam is of using the 4
out of 5 years flows, giving an 80% probability of water coming down the rivers to enable its
storage. By adopting this criteria for our storage reservoirs, we end with a figure of 123.59 MAF
available in our Indus River system.

If in the above table of 69 years flow, the 9 years of exceptionally low flows of less than 120.0
MAF are disregarded, the next consecutive 2 years of low flows are 1931-32 (123.59 MAF) and
1932-33 (125.26 MAF), with an average of 124.4 MAF, which is very close to the 123.59 MAF,
the figure of 4 out of 5 years water availability (80% probability flow).

To support this theory, the US Supreme Court Ruling is " to be available in a practical sense the
supply must be fairly dependable, storage dams cannot be filled on expectations of average flows
which do not come, nor on recollections of unusual flows which have passed down the stream in
previous year".

Considering the Indus Water Apportionment Accord to be the benchmark, the simple and correct
arithmetic of our water resources availability in the Indus River System should read as follows:

Availability of Water in 3 Western Rivers (below rim station) 123.59 MAF

Requirement of the 4 Provinces (according to the Water Accord) 114.35 MAF

Release below Kotri (provisionally agreed in Water Accord) 10.00 MAF

Remainder -0.76 MAF

The negative balance in the calculation shows that, there is virtually not enough water in River
Indus, to be stored for usage in later part of any year. And if storage is tried, it will only be at the
cost of the downstream riparian, depriving them of their legitimate rights of water use.

Contrary to realizing this fact, WAPDA has been publicizing the news of floods in River Indus and
its breaching of protective bunds at various places, to try create a perception that enormous
quantities of water go "waste" every year, and that if this water was stored in KBD, Pakistan
would not only be saved from the damages of these high flows, but its agriculture would take a
giant leap towards self-sufficiency. It has been argued that 34.84 MAF of water pass below the
Kotri Barrage every year to the sea, and is therefore going waste.

To clarify the misconception of exceptionally high discharges of 34.84 MAF below Kotri, the
following points needs to be closely followed:

1. At present all the barrages and the canals of Pakistan can take about 105 MAF against the
allocated 114.35 MAF under the Indus Water Apportionment Accord 1991.
The remaining 9.35 MAF ends up on its way to the sea through Kotri. And this will eliminate if
the irrigation network is completed to accommodate this additional allocated flow.
2. Outflow from the eastern rivers of Sutlej, Beas and Ravi into Indus is about 6.97 MAF. Since
all three rivers are committed to India, and with the progressive development going on in India,
these flows will be reduced to zero (except in the few years of exceptionally high flood season
flows), thereby reducing the Kotri discharges by that amount.
3. As per the Indus Water Treaty, India has also been given an unrestricted use of water to
cultivate 1343477 acres from the western rivers, in addition to all the rights of eastern river. India,
to date, has utilized 6.75 MAF and will draw another 4.79 MAF from the system, to further reduce
the flows at Kotri by that amount.
4. The 34.83 MAF flow to sea is in fact the mean discharge, and is bound to be lower by 10.0 to
14 MAF in any specific year.

The correct calculations in this respect will be:

Waste flows below Kotri Barrage = 34.84 MAF

Less

i. Additional allocations under Indus Water Accord 1991 = 9.35 MAF

ii. India’s flow in the Eastern Rivers = 6.97 MAF

iii. India additional water rights under the Indus Water Treaty = 4.79 MAF

iv. Yearly flow under Kotri barrage (lower by14 MAF than average) = 14.0 MAF

Net available flow below Kotri Barrage = - 0.27 MAF

Hence, the net available water to flow to the sea reduces to a negative balance, leaving nothing
for storage into KBD. Therefore, the news of floods "wasting enormous amount of water" does not
hold true
Still for people, who consider the flood water to be a mere waste do not realize that there is no
mechanical method of removing millions of tons of deposited silt from the river beds of the
barrages, and it is the force of water from these high floods that helps in washing away much of
the accumulated silt.

References:

KBD; The Sindh Case by Kazi Abrar, 1998

Look before you leap by Abdul Majeed Kazi & A.N.G Abbassi

Geophysical and Geological Environment of Kalabagh Dam

To fully comprehend the KBD impacts in the long run, its geophysical and geological environment
alongwith the mechanics of water flow through soils needs to be understood in more detail.

In this respect, two important pointers appear in the topographic view of the proposed site of KBD
i.e., the salt range and the location of the five oil fields near the proposed dam site.

To be able to visualize the role of the salt range in the KBD’s feasibility, it is necessary to magnify
and elaborate the section of the ground between the Murree thrust and Salt Range thrust.

Figure of Earth Crust under the Proposed Kalabagh Lake

Salt Range

KALABAGH LAKE

Thickness in Meters

Thrust

(Maximum Water Pressure of 70 Tones/sq.m)

Recent
S

Conglomerate, Coarse Stone, Clay, Sandstone

600 Miocene

Clay, Limestone, Sandstone, Coal

250 Tertiary
L

Sandstone, Argillites

130 Cretaceous

Limestone, Dolomites

200 Jurassic
Marl, Limestone, Fauna

300 Triassic

S
Argillites, Sandstone

20 Indeterminate

Glacial Conglomerates

200 Permian
L

Argil. Limestone

300 Carbonifier
T

Lime-Sandstone

300 Cambrian

Upperfold of the Salt Range Decollement

PRE-CAMBRIAN BASEMENT

Location of the Dam on a Fault line

The proposed KBD site is situated in an area known to have fault lines and fractures.

The LANDSAT and SPOT imagery of the proposed KBD site indicates a right lateral fault known
as Kalabagh Fault and another known as Kharjawan Fault, cutting the KBD site NE-SW between
Indus and Kharjawan Nala on the Right Bank.

Geologically, the tectonic plates known as Pak Plate and the Asian Plate (Tibetan Plateau) are
both greatly compressed and tectonically active.

It is a known fact that the compression and collision of moving earth plates cause mountains to
rise, and the Himalayan and Karakoram Mountains continue to rise by a few millimeters each
year due to the same compression. Such a phenomenon is bound to create instability in the area
to a substantial degree, thereby making the dam structure prone to seismic damages in future.

Further it has also been observed that large dams induce earthquakes, because of their large
water masses, and plays an important role in intensifying the impacts of small-scale earthquakes.
Thus the construction of Kalabagh Dam at the proposed location is to play with the dangerous
consequences of earthquakes, and putting the life of downstream inhabitants at stake.

Design Drawbacks in KBD Project

Apart from the inherent planning drawbacks, the KBD also suffers from a variety of technical
shortcomings. These vary from selecting a site, having the poorest capacity inflow ratio to that of
proposing engineering designs making it the most unpredictable dam to operate.

Some of these aspects of the KBD are briefly discussed in the following paragraphs :

Site with Poor Capacity-Inflow Ratio

The selection of site for a dam and its hydraulic design depends on the capacity-inflow (CI) ratio,
and a favorable CI ratio indicates a longer life of the reservoir.

For KBD, the capacity-inflow ratio is 6.1/90 = 0.07 i.e. 7% with respect to the live storage of the
reservoir (for both the Indus and Soan limbs). Since Soan River is an Indirect limb of Indus,
therefore the actual capacity inflow ratio for the main Indus stem would be 3.5/90= 0.04 = 4%,
which is very poor, for the design of a storage dam.

Disastrous Sedimentation

Sedimentation and silting are a regular feature of irrigation structures, weirs and dams.

One of the most important contribution of Civil Engineering in this field has probably been the use
of the energy of flowing water to maintain the balance of the system.

The science has been extensively researched, but is considered to be still in its empirical stage.

In this respect, Prof.G.G Stokes has contributed a scientific approach and has developed the
famous "Stokes Law" to form the basic principle of sedimentation process. It says ;

Vs = (3.3 g d (Ss-1))0.5

Where "Vs" is the Settling Velocity of the Particle, "Ss" is the Specific Gravity of the Particle

"g" is the Gravitational Pull and "d" is the Diameter of the Particle.

The "Stokes Law" suggests a relation between the Settling Velocity of Particles to their Diameter,
while in suspension. And it states that, for a given specific gravity of particles and under a
constant gravitational pull, the settling velocity will be directly proportional to the diameter of the
particles. Which implies that, the courser particles will have a higher settling velocity than those of
the smaller sizes.

The application of "Stokes Law" is found in the design of sedimentation tanks and in the study of
sedimentation process in large dams.

As a confirmation of Stokes Law, it has generally been found that the courser particles, in
suspension, gets deposited earlier than the finer ones because of a higher settling velocity.

This phenomenon has been further confirmed by G.L Assawa in his excellent book; Irrigation
Engineering (Published by Wiley Eastern Ltd., 1993, ) as "The courser sediment deposits farther
away from the dam, while the finer sediment is deposited closer to the dam".
The applicability of this theory has been further confirmed in the case of Tarbela Dam, where a
huge sediment mound has been developed, over the past twenty years, at a certain distance from
the dam body.

The application of this law to our KBD case suggests that, the courser particles, in suspension of
KBD waters, will have a higher settling velocity than those of the finer ones, and will hence
deposit earlier than the finer particles. This suggests that the courser particles will start depositing
at the farthest end of the reservoir, followed by next higher size and ultimately the finest in more
close proximity to the dam body.

Therefore, within the present design parameters of KBD, it is feared that the sedimentation
process will initiate near Nowshera City (the farthest end of the reservoir) and progress
downwards, thereby putting the thickly populated towns to high flood risks from the very outset.

In addition, a major impact of the sedimentation process is Aggradation, which causes the bed
level, and correspondingly flood levels, to rise to unforeseeable heights, causing heavy losses.

In this respect, G.L Assawa in his book; Irrigation Engineering (Wiley Eastern Ltd. Dehli, 1993),
states:

"Where the sediment load in a River is in excess of the sediment transporting capacity, the
excess sediment gets deposited in the river bed and the sediment load entering a given reach is
greater than the sediment load leaving the reach during the same time. This causes a rise in the
bed level (and hence the flood level) and decrease the bed slope with time. This phenomenon is
known as Aggradation"

The high sediment load carried by River Indus has an important bearing on the design and
operating rules of the KBD. This becomes more important, because a number of towns, upstream
of Attock, are sensitive to the flood levels, feared to be aggravated with the increased
sedimentation overtime.

In the case of Kalabagh Dam, the hydraulic drop will be far greater than that of Tarbela, or even
Mangla, which will consequently accelerate the sedimentation process.

The siltation process at the reservoir of KBD is feared to be further accelerated due to the
diminished velocity from water diversion into the Ghazi Barotha channel, and the reduction in
hundred Monsoon days in River Indus to fifty days.

On top of all this, the silt delta in Tarbela reservoir is travelling at a rate of ½ mile per year, and is
feared to ultimately get deposited in the KBD reservoir, thus reducing the life span of the dam.

Silt Clearance Problems

The KBD is proposed to have an orifice spillway, 40-ft below the minimum water level of the
reservoir. And is believed to work as the ultimate remedy for all the sedimentation problems.

A significant relation of sediment sluicing has been found with the occurrence of piping action
under the foundations of the dam.

Its has been reported by K.R Sharma in his book; Irrigation Engineering (2nd edition, India
Printers, Jullundar, 1949) that, the Aswan Dam on Nile, constructed on the strongest footings of
granite stone, has been found to suffer from foundation damages with each sluicing operation
(which discharge the silt at a mean 20 ft/sec velocity). And correspondingly, the sluicing operation
consumes a major portion of the operation and maintenance budget of the dam.
 Given the 40-ft lower orifice spillway to exclude the sediment of the reservoir, and the geological
formations (discussed earlier), it is feared that the recurring sluicing operations would result into
piping actions under the dam footing, thereby putting the stability of structure at stake.

Uncertain & Inefficient Mode of Operation

There is no established mode of reservoir operation to sluice the silt, and the recommended
mechanism of lower draw down, longer sluicing period, and higher escapages will make the dam
act more like a barrage, apart from wasting precious stored water.

In any case, the stored water in the reservoir will have to be emptied each year for the removal of
the silt in May, which will be a significant loss of valuable stored water.

And during this process of emptying, sluicing and refilling (3 months approx.) operation, the
power generation would be adversely affected, and would ultimately depend on the normal
discharge of the river (after the live storage is exhausted), making the dam generate power on the
run-off the river, or thermal systems.

Relation of KBD to Tarbela Dam

Originally planned, KBD was to be completed in 1996, and the designers assumed that significant
quantities of sand would not be passed downstream of Tarbela Dam, therefore benefiting from its
silt retention capability. However, due to the long delay and extensive sedimentation in Tarbela
Dam, it is unlikely that any benefit will be derived of the position of Tarbela Dam.

On the other hand, the "Action Plan" suggested by Tarbela Sediment Management Consultants
(TAMS), in their latest report of March 1998, to install a sediment sluicing system at Tarbela Dam,
so as to recover its lost storage and extend its life by preserving its live storage, leaves little
sense in constructing another silt trap to the sluiced sediment of Tarbela Dam.

Backwater Effect on Ghazi-Barotha Power Channel

Part of the River Indus waters have been diverted, at Ghazi (downstream of Tarbela), in the
Ghazi-Barotha Power channel to generate cheap hydropower at Barotha power station. The
60,000 cusecs water passes through a 52 mile long concrete lined channel on the east of River
Indus, and after passing through the power generating turbines, joins the same waters, upstream
of proposed KBD site.

Since the KBD is supposed to store, and therefore head-up, the water into its tributaries. It is
feared that the net fall at the hydropower station may be reduced in high floods, thereby reducing
the power generation capacity.

Although, WAPDA claims to have studied the flood water reduction aspect of Ghazi-Barotha
project on KBD, and found to be insignificant. Yet the backwater effects of KBD reservoir on the
Ghazi-Borotha project itself has not been investigated. This becomes more important in the
eventualities of highest possible flood levels, since a one-time backwater inundation of the power
station may burn up the whole power station.

Unfeasible Right Bank Canal

The Right bank canal proposed was to have 10.5 miles long tunnels of 34.5 ft diameter, 8 mile
long tunnels of 40 ft diameter, 4040 ft aqueduct on Kurram River, 12 drainage siphons and 42
drainage culverts, apart from its 80 miles regular length, for irrigating DI Khan, Bannu, Karak, Isa
Khel and DG Khan areas. It was lately declared technically and economically unfeasible.
With this, the last hopes of any possible benefit to NWFP were killed, thus leaving the dam to
irrigate and earn royalty (on power generation) to Punjab only.
Short-term Impacts of Kalabagh Dam Project

The KBD is feared to cast its sinister shadows from its very first day of construction. They will
vary from the dislocation of a large number of people and the submergence of their lands, houses
and settlements, to the ultimate disappearance of long established cultures and ways of life.
These are discussed as follows :

Population to be Displaced

There had been confusing figures about the number of people to be dislocated by KBD. WAPDA
has been claiming a figure of 83000 persons, with 48500 belonging to Punjab and 38500 from
NWFP. Whereas, independent observers claim a figure of more than 100,000 persons, to be the
direct affectees of the dam.

In addition, there will be people indirectly dependent on the water of River Indus, like boatmen,
herdsmen etc, who will loose their livelihood because of the KBD.

The investigation of the actual number of affectees is beyond the scope of this research,
however, independent researchers have strongly questioned the reality of WAPDA’s figures, and
consider them invalid.

The WAPDA’s figures do not include the thousands of people who would, it is feared, be
displaced in the long run, due to the feared water-logging and salinity in Mardan, Charsadda and
Nowshera Districts, and the salinisation of sweet water aquifers in Karak and Lakki Districts.

Further, WAPDA’s claims of the provincial distribution of dislocated people from the two provinces
of Punjab and NWFP, becomes more intriguing when one investigates the background of the
proposed resettlers. As the majority of people to be dislocated from their homelands in Punjab
are Bangi-Khel and Saghari Khattaks and Isa-Khel Niazis, all from Pukhtoon tribes, like their
brethren, settled in the Peshawar and adjoining valleys.

While it has been pleaded that the dislocated people will be adequately compensated, the fact
that the resettlement of these thousands of people will generate acute intractable social,
administrative and political problems has totally been overlooked.

It is worth mentioning that, a number of Tarbela resettlers at Guddu Barrage command have long
sold off their compensation land and are leading a rudderless life, because of their failure to settle
down in an alien environment. Whereas many still remain without a shelter or compensation after
two decades of the commissioning of Tarbela.

Area to be Submerged

There have been varying figures of the actual area to be submerged under the reservoir.
WAPDA has been indicating the minimum possible figures, assuming provisional facility for one
season cropping, and leaving the title with the landholders.

Whereas the calculation of the total area, expected to be submerged under the KBD waters is
beyond the scope of this research. However, the point worth emphasizing is that the land to be
affected by the KBD reservoir will not only be the one that gets submerged under the water, but
will also be the one that gets inundated every five years (by 1 in 5 year flood).

In fact, it is not only the land area that will be snatched by the waters of KBD, but is the total area
declared dangerous for safe development due to the increase in its risk factor for productive
investment. And since flood plains are never regarded as safe boundaries for development,
hence the actual land area to be affected by the KBD would be many times more than what is
being claimed by KBD under its waters, as projected by WAPDA in its reports.

Moreover, and as a matter of great concern, the thousands of acres of rich cultivable land in
Mardan, Charsadda and Nowshera Districts is feared to turn into swampy marshlands in the long
run. Since the area has been fully developed with tremendous cost, its submergence will be a
major loss to NWFP in particular and Pakistan in general.

At the same time, the creation of a 164 sq. miles of water pond in the middle of a fully inhibited
area will be a major and perpetual hazard for accidents to happen.

Long-term Impacts of Kalabagh Dam Project

Like its short-term impacts, KBD is going to have a long standing extremely injurious impact on
the lives of the people both living in the immediate vicinity of project, as well as in the rest of the
country.

The details of these impacts would vary in nature and in magnitude, and will appear in different
moments of coming times to have devastating effects on the civilization of this whole region.

Some of the most important long-term impacts of the KBD are discussed below :

Increase in Surface Water Salinity

Water of the Indus River system carry a variety of salts that are left on the surface of irrigated
land, while the irrigation water filters down or evaporates. To comprehend this, we need to
understand the relation of irrigation water suitability to that of its salt contents.

Soil scientists believe that, when the contents of salt deposits increase to about 2.5%, the
productivity of the land is visibly impaired and when it reaches a level of 7.0 %, no biological life is
then possible in the soils.

The following table describes the categorization of the quality of water with the varying degree of
salt content in the soils.

Water Classification

Total Dissolved Salts

Sodium

Concentration MEQ/L

EC x 10-5 25o C

PPM

%
Chlorides

Sulfates

Excellent (less than)

25

175

20

Good

25-75

175-525

20-40

4-7

4-7

Permissible

75-200

525-1400

40-60

7-12

7-12
Doubtful

200-300

1400-2100

60-80

12-20

12-20

Unsuitable (more than)

300

2100

80

20

20

Reference: Dr. Iqbal Ali; Irrigation Engineering, 1975

Some authors propose slightly lower permissible limits for chlorides than for sulphates, due to
their more injurious characteristics.

To study the potential of Indus water to induce salinity, the following table from Dr. Nazir
Ahmad’s research describes the salinity ratings at various points in Indus River:

Indus Water Salinity

Observation Point

Salinity gms/tonne

Difference

Ghaziabad
138

--

Attock

164

26

Kalabagh

216

52

DI Khan

226

10

DG Khan

242

16

Chechran

260

18

Reference: Dr.Nazir Ahmad, Groundwater Resources of Pakistan

From the above table, it can be observed that the quantum of salinity between Attock and
Kalabagh (52 gms/tonne) is 100% more than between any other of the two (2) points observed in
the analysis.

To visualize the effect of the use of saline water in irrigation systems, Saeed A. Rashid, in his
excellent Treatise "KBD; A Scientific Analysis" has stated the problem in the following words

"If 10 inches of water carrying 200 PPM of dissolved salts leave behind 4.72 gms of solids per
cubic foot and if 10 inches of such water is given to a piece of land and is allowed to soak and
evaporate in the same pattern as is practiced in our canal irrigated agriculture, then 4.72 gms of
salt will be deposited in each cubic foot of soil.

Given the salinity of water of River Indus at DIKhan of 226 PPM for every 3 soaking per year, or
30 inches of water, about 16 gms of salt will be added to each cubic foot. And in 30 years time,
about 2.54% salts will be added to the top 8 inches of soil making the damage to crop field
perceptible".

Saeed A. Rashid advances the interesting theory that, "perhaps that is the reason why the crop
yield has started declining in the command areas of the canal system below DI Khan, 30 years
after the commissioning of the barrage system when maximum coverage is achieved".

To study the effect of saline water’s use in the backdrop of KBD, it is revealed that, the billions of
tons of the stored water in KBD is likely to exert tremendous pressure on alkali brine strata, which
will then rise in vast sheets to mix with water of the reservoir and further increasing its saline
content to unacceptable limits.

This water when used for irrigation purposes will play havoc with any soil that comes in contact
with it through irrigation, or otherwise.

These observations indicate a very grave threat of destructive salinity to all agricultural lands
below KBD site, if a dam were to be built at the proposed site, and its waters used for irrigation
purposes. This needs to be further viewed into the purview of the already saline 24 million acres
of irrigated land, out of our total of 34.5 million acres of irrigated land of Pakistan.

Flooding in Nowshera Valley

It has been repeatedly stated that the water for KBD will cause severe flooding in Nowshera
valley, and has been constantly refuted by WAPDA through various tactics.

The flooding history of Nowshera describes the flood of 28th and 29th August, 1929, as having
reached a maximum of 951-ft level above the mean sea level. The hydrologists have worked out
the average return period of such a flood as 1 in 100 years.

A relatively lesser intensity of flood was experienced in 1978, which touched the heights of 945-ft
above mean sea level. (Ref: Dr. Kennedy Report).

It is feared that, if the water level rises to the 1929 heights, or even the 1978 levels, it would be
fairly high above the normal reservoir retention levels, thereby causing major destruction in the
towns on the River Kabul banks, and overtopping the Kalabagh Dam itself.

To further aggravate the problem, the increased sedimentation overtime, may raise this height in
River Kabul much further, and bring large-scale destruction in the surroundings.

To technically address the issue, the following monthly average flows of River Indus needs
analysis :

Inflow at Indus (MAF)

Month

Low
High

Av.

April

2.49

5.59

4.00

May

5.74

9.00

7.99

June

14.68

19.00

15.46

July

15.01

24.94

21.96

August

18.23
23.39

20.96

September

6.24

17.92

9.58

October

2.30

7.01

3.51

November

1.47

3.65

2.15

December

1.20

2.42

1.86

January

1.25
1.99

1.77

February

1.20

1.82

1.65

March

1.94

3.37

2.36

Reference: Dr.Nazir Ahmad, Water Resources of Pakistan and their Utilization

Form the above table, it becomes evident that more than 65% of the annual water flow of Indus
takes place between the months of June to September each year, when the snow melts in
Himalayas and Karakoram Range combines with the monsoon season flows. And the remaining
35% flow is spread over the 8 months period from October to May.

Saeed A. Rashid, in his book "KBD; A Scientific Analysis", has analysed the problem. He reveals
that "Assuming a normal distribution, 68 percent of the times, high floods could bring an inflow of
27 MAF in July, showing the most possible probability of larger flows coming into the Indus River
System. Only 4.6 percent of the times a flood could bring an inflow of 34.02 MAF, and there is
0.01 percent chance of a flood bringing in 46.06 MAF in the month of July.

As per the design parameters, the retention level of Water at KBD is just sufficient to contain the
September inflow and the peaks are planned to be passed on, as it is.

Even if there is a capacity to contain a flood of 34 MAF, it will only flood the country upstream,
instead of flooding downstream. Whereas the downstream river regime is better adjusted to
handle large volumes. And there would be large-scale devastation in upstream habitat areas".

In the original design, WAPDA had provided for the construction of protective dykes around the
major cities of Kabul River, so as to protect the water from over-spilling the banks of the river and
destroying life and property. Which, upon the objections from NWFP (Pukhtunkhwa), had been
eliminated with the reduction of 10-ft reservoir level, claiming to solve all the flooding problems.

Intriguingly, the revised designs show the dam height as the same El.940-ft above MSL, leaving
a ridiculous 25-ft freeboard over the normal reservoir level, as against 5 to 7 ft common practice.
This raises the questions:

1. Why was the flooding danger ignored in the first instance ?

2. How will the 10-ft reduction in reservoir level altogether avoid the 25-ft dykes at Nowshera?
3. Why has the dam level been maintained at the same 940-ft elevation, leaving the ridiculous
looking 25-ft freeboard over the normal retention level ?
4. Why has the WAPDA been overshadowing the sedimentation effect in Kabul River, feared to
raise the bed level and exacerbate the flooding problem.
5. Why has the WAPDA been pleading the utility of Munda Dam in reducing the flooding
problem at KBD, when the Munda Dam has only 0.37 MAF of flood storage, and can play only an
insignificant role in reducing the extreme seriousness of floods at KBD?
(Ref : PC-II for Feasibility Study of Munda Dam Project, March 1997, WAPDA)
6. Why has real model analysis of sedimentation behavior been avoided, so as to technically
address the issue ?

Drainage/Water-logging Problems in Nowshera

The raised water level in the River Kabul is feared to create excessive drainage problems in the
area and lead to increasing and ruinous waterlogging.

In the originally designed dykes plan, it was provided to use sludge pumps to drain out any rain
water accumulating behind the 25-ft dykes, and which was declared an impractical solution.
In the revised scenario as well, no notice has been taken of the problem and little practical
solutions identified for its remedy.

In addition, the raised water table in River Kabul will ultimately seep into the foundations of the
buildings, both in and around Nowshera city, and render the old as well as new constructions
habitat-risky. This effect will not only result in the desertification of the important Nowshera
Cantonment, but also the historical villages lying on the banks of River Kabul.

Failure of Mardan/Swabi SCARPs

Most of the NWFP human and material resources lie in Peshawar, Charsadda, Nowshera and
Mardan and Swabi Districts, and the area is both culturally and economically the heart of the
province. The land in these districts can be classified amongst the richest soils in the country and
is the mainstay of agriculture in NWFP.

The fertility of these lands has further been ensured by the implementation of Mardan and Swabi
Salinity Control and Reclamation Projects (SCARP), with billions of rupees investment.

Incidentally, the outfalls of these SCARPs discharge their effluents through two major drains i.e.
The Hissara Drain and The Murdara Drain, into River Kabul.

Investigation of their outfall levels suggest that, they will probably continue functioning during the
normal reservoir level of KBD (at 915-ft elevation), but will backflow once in every five years time
(with the floods of 1 in 5 year), with disastrous circumstances.

WAPDA has admitted this phenomenon to occur for about 12 hours, with which the lands will be
inundated in about one mile area, after which the waters will recede.

This is an irresponsible statement because the exact effects of such a regular occurrence, and in
the eventuality of a 1 in 10 year flooding and a 1 in 100 year flooding, have not been forecasted
by WAPDA, which will surely be much more than the 12 hours blockage of outfall drains claimed.
 Therefore, the negative impacts of KBD will extend deep into the lands of Peshawar, Charsadda,
Nowshera and Mardan districts, and will significantly reduce the productivity of these only
cultivable lands of NWFP. The destruction of such valuable and scarce assets in a province with
limited resources would have catastrophic repercussions on the life of the people of the province.
And the people in the said districts will not be able to support life in their ancient habitats, and
would be forced to migrate to other places.

Danger of Shallow Wells in Karak turning Brackish

As discussed earlier, the lateral permeability of soils in the vicinity of KBD is relatively higher than
its vertical permeability, which translates into higher seepage from the dam.

Earlier in the Report, the increase in surface water salinity due to the salt dissolution, from the
geological salt formations, has been explained at length in the above sections.

Hence, the fate of thousands of people living on the right bank of River Indus near KBD, is feared
to be under another threat due to the combined effect of these two soil characteristics.

In the Karak District, and its surroundings, the drinking water needs of the local population are
fulfilled by shallow wells. Which provide the basic necessity of life through the storage of the
surface water seepage into localized alluvial formation, forming the sweet water aquifer.

This shallow aquifer is distinctly separated from the deep-water reservoir of the saline zones,
which is heavily polluted with salt concentrations. With the construction of KBD in the proposed
geological environment, it is feared that this life giving sweet-water aquifer will be lost due to:

1. the lateral flow of saltish water into it and

2. its vertical mixing with deep-water saltish reservoir.

With the result, the shallow water wells, presently used for water supply purposes of the people
living in the Karak and its surrounding Districts, will turn brackish, thereby making life impossible
in the area. And forcing the people to migrate to other places.

Effect on "KATCHO" in Sindh

During its voyage through Sindh, the River Indus inundates about 1.9 million acres of rich and
fertile land, known as "Katcho", which averages about 5 miles in width for the whole 600 miles
length. The "Katcho" contains 600,000 acres of thick riverine forests and about 1.3 million acres
of rich grazing land, out of which about 600,000 acres is brought under plough to raise various
cash crops.

The life at "Katcho" depends entirely upon the inundation of River Indus. And whenever, the flow
reduces to an insufficient level, so as not been able to submerge this land, the crops, food and
fodder are all affected and even wells for drinking water run low in all this area. This was
experienced in the 1985-86 drought year, when the "Katcho" was not inundated, forcing many
families to migrate to other areas for want of food and living.

It is feared that, with an unnatural storage on River Indus, the surface moisture in "Katcho" will be
lost, resulting in soil degradation, salinity and wind erosion.
The soil erosion causes decline in succession of plants, and it is feared that in "Katcho", the
whole forest belt will become extinct in about 50 years time.

Such a devastation in "Katcho" will not only force the migration of directly dependant 100,000
inhabitants, but will also severely affect another 200,000 persons attached to the trade of the
riverine forests.
Effect on Mangrove Forests in Sindh

In the Indus delta, about 650,000 acres of mangrove forest, the sixth largest in the world, lie
dependent on the nutrients from the silt carried by the waters of River Indus.
According to an IUCN paper of 1991 "The mangroves are the principle components of the delta
ecosystem. Without them and the nutrients they recycle, and the protection they provide, the
other components of ecosystem will not survive. Mangrove estuaries provide ideal nursery
grounds for many commercial fish species , especially prawns".

Another IUCN report on the Korangi Ecosystem, 1991, state; "The other wildlife species
supported by mangroves is porpoises, jackals, wild bears, reptiles, migratory fowl bids and three
species of dolphins. If the mangrove habitat is destroyed, the continued existence in the Indus
delta of all those will be threatened".

IUCN estimates the mangrove estuaries (like those of Indus delta) to be 4 to 5 times more
productive than tropical estuaries without mangroves.

Apart from this, the Mangrove forests have the following advantages as well:

1. They provide timber resource for buildings, and fuel wood for the vast population living in
coastal areas.
2. They provide fodder and grazing land for cattle, goats, camels etc.
3. They provide opportunity to hatch 44 different species of fish in the delta area
4. They provide livelihood to 85000 fisherman

Like the "Katcho", the Mangrove forests totally depend on water in the River Indus, and with any
reduction in the volume of sweet-water into their roots, they will dry up, resulting into the salt-
water intrusion, and subsequent soil-erosion, over a short period of time.

Salt Water Intrusion in Sindh

The flow of water in River Indus effectively checks salt-water intrusion from the Arabian Sea into
the flood plains of Indus. During the past few decades, as the storage and consumption of water
has continued to increase in the northern plains, seawater has started flowing up in to Indus and
its estuaries.

With the reverse flow of salt water into the southern part of Sindh, the sweet water aquifer gets
contaminated, adding to the salinity of irrigated lands.

A symposium conducted by Pakistan National Institute of Oceanography and National Science

Foundation in October 1982 at Karachi established that salt-water intrusion into the plains of
lower Sindh is directly related to the decrease of flow in the River Indus.

To counter the problem, 10 MAF have tentatively been provided for in the Indus Water Accord
1991.

Until adequate water is released to Indus downstream of Kotri, it is feared that the seawater
intrusion, combined with raised level of the Arabian Sea, will make Thatta, Badin and southern
parts of Hyderabad District waterlogged marshlands.

Problem to Agriculture with Increased Seepage

The rate of aquifer recharge varies with the source and the composition of soil strata.

To develop a relation of the water seepage with the source, in the Indus Basin, HARZA has
conducted a study in 1975, and its results are as under:
Indus Basin Aquifer Recharge

Post 1975 by Harza (MAF)

River Percolation

1.9

Canal Percolation

24.2

Water Courses

4.4

Fields

12

Rainfall

2.5

Total

46.3

These aquifer recharges for the water seepage are mainly due to the run-off water in the
riverbed, the flow in canals and watercourses, sinkage in the fields and rainfall.

From the above table, the relatively high value of seepage from the canal system is worth noting,
since the enhanced water supply due to KBD is feared to further aggravate the aquifer recharge,
and pose a major system and water management problem in future.

The relation of vertical and lateral permeability of local rocks in different canal command areas of
Pakistan has already been discussed at length in the preceding section. And it was deduced that,
there is a gradual decline in lateral permeability as we move downstream towards south.

Given the dangerously high values of lateral permeability in the vicinity of KBD site, the seepage
from the reservoir is feared to become a major contributing factor to the aquifer recharge.

The situation becomes more precarious in the light of the dangerously high water table in the 2.4
million acres of irrigated agriculture, since a further push in the water table will render these land
uncultivable by turning them into marshy swamp lands.

And the dam water, rather than increasing the irrigated agriculture area, will reduce the already
commanded areas of Pakistan.

The Issue of Water Distribution as a Replacement Water

In all its advocacy campaigns, WAPDA has been pleading the reasons of storage loss in Tarbela
and Mangla dams, due to sedimentation. And has been, repeatedly emphasizing the need for
additional water storage to compensate for the lost capacity in our existing system.

This statement becomes more important in the backdrop of the Indus Water Apportionment
Accord 1991, water distribution formulas.

According to the Accord, the existing water resources of Pakistan, as of 1991, shall be distributed
in the following proportions among the provinces :

Province

Percentage Share

Province

Percentage Share

Punjab

47.65 %

NWFP

7.5 %

Sindh

41.55 %

Baluchistan

3.3 %

In addition, another clause of the Accord stipulates the distribution of future water resources to be
in the following ratio among the provinces:
Province

Percentage Share

Province

Percentage Share

Punjab

37 %

NWFP

14 %

Sindh

37 %

Baluchistan

12 %

The comparison of these two tables reveals that:

Province

Percentage Share in Existing Water Resources

Percentage Share in

Future Water Resources

Punjab

47.65 %

37 %

Sindh
41.55 %

37 %

NWFP

7.5 %

14 %

Baluchistan

3.3 %

12 %

Keeping these provisions of Indus Water Apportionment Accord in view, the provinces of NWFP
and Baluchistan will get more proportionate water out of the new water storages, as compared to
what they are getting from the existing water storage. And correspondingly, the provinces of
Punjab and Sindh will get less proportionate water out of the new water storages, as compared to
what they are getting from the existing water storages.

Therefore, the WAPDA’s statements of considering the KBD storage as a compensation of lost
storage of Tarbela and Mangla Dam, will create another controversy of water distribution among
the provinces. Because a decision on the consideration of KBD storage (if at all built) on whether
to consider it as a new water storage or as a compensation of lost existing storage, will be
required, so as to apply the requisite clause of Indus Water Accord for water distribution.

Operational Problems of Kalabagh Dam Project

The dam is designed for 28 weeks operation (or equivalent), but the model used for analyzing this
aspect of the operation shows that the dam will not work efficiently for anything more than 21
weeks (or possibly less). This has been studied in detail by Saeed. A Rashed in his book "KBD, A
Scientific Analysis", and the under-mentioned paragraphs from his work will try to summarize his
findings.

Irrigation System Management Problems

An Indus Basin Model has been developed by the Development Research Center of World Bank
in 1982, which stands as the only major optimization exercise for the Indus Basin Irrigation
system, so far.

According to Pakistan Statistical YearBook, the country’s water resources are divided into two
major commands, the Mangla Command and the Tarbela Command. This classification does not
include the NWFP canals above Kalabagh.

The Mangla Command includes the link canals and the canals originating from the upper reaches
of eastern rivers. Whereas, the Tarbela command includes Thal, Haveli, Rangpur, Paharpur,
Taunsa, Punjnad, Guddu, Sukkar and Kotri canals.

The following table gives the command wise withdrawals in MAF, for these two command areas.

Command wise Canal Withdrawals (MAF)

Year

Mangla Command

Tarbela Command

Kharif

Rabi

Total

Kharif

Rabi

Total

1980-81

19.27

11.98

31.25

48.48

24.74

73.22
1981-82

19.34

10.89

33.23

46.01

22.79

68.80

1982-83

18.80

11.62

30.42

46.82

23.19

70.01

1983-84

16.44

11.73

28.17

44.41
25.11

69.52

1984-85

19.70

10.88

30.58

44.54

23.59

67.93

1985-87

18.53

12.49

31.02
40.14

22.45

62.59

1986-88

18.81

12.76

31.57

46.70

24.85

71.55

1987-89

18.78

12.36

31.14

50.66

24.48

75.14

1988-89

18.55

10.74
29.29

46.42

26.77

73.19

1989-90

19.14

11.24

30.38

44.20

24.57

68.97

Reference: Saeed A. Rashed; KBD; A Scientific Analysis, 1995

It is a fact that the period of maturation for Rabi crops varies considerably from south to north,
and the Rabi wheat matures in lower Sindh by end of February, while in north Punjab it matures
by end April.

Given the crops’ requirements, any addition to the waters of Mangla Command for meeting the
water shortages will be of no beneficial use, since the already optimized model of Indus Basin
caters fully for the water requirements in these two command areas. And any random figure of
water addition to the command water will only result in spoiling the balance of the optimized Indus
Basin Model, and wastage of precious water.

In this respect, apart from bringing additional areas under the direct command of left bank KBD
off-take, through the utilization of 0.78 MAF of water, the addition of 4.64 MAF water into Jehlum
at Rasul Barrage will have no significant impact on our irrigation system management.

Therefore, the utility of a 15000 cusecs left bank canal from KBD will be nothing more than the
provision of 0.78 MAF waters to its direct command and a little replenishment of Mangla storage’s
in the Jehlum River command.

The Real Power Generation Potential of KBD Project

The need for electric power has been increasing at a tremendous rate. This is evident from the
analysis of our annual power requirements, which shows that between 1985 to 1989, 12.5% more
power was required each year, and the power consumption doubled every 4 years, before 1985.
Presently, despite the economic recession of the last number of years, demand for electric power
grows by an estimated 8.3% each year.

Presently, Pakistan produces 11869 Megawatts (MW) of electric power (6907 MW by thermal
power generating units, 4825 MW by hydel and 137 MW by the Pakistan’s only nuclear power
station at Karachi)

According to a World Bank study, the country will be needing upto 21267 MW electric power by
the year 2002, and between year 2002 to 2010, another 10358 MW will be needed, raising the
total required generating capacity to 31265 MW.

The following data pertain to the large power generation units, both hydel and thermal, already in
operation in 1992-93

Power Station

Units (kWh)

Generated Cost Paisa/kWh

Hydel

Tarbela

13955

7.34

Mangla

5780

4.35

Thermal
Pipri

5899

48.02

Jamshoro

4337

122.22

Kot Addu

3243

129.88

Guddu (5-10)

3877

4096

Guddu (1-4)

2742

62.51

Reference: Energy YearBook 1993, KBD; The Sindh Case by Abrar Kazi

It can be observed that, the present cost of production of power, varies between hydel and
thermal as 5.65 paisa per kWh to 72.12 paisa per kWh respectively, indicating that the hydel
power is the most suitable source of cheap power generation.

However, there are certain disadvantages inherent in the hydel power systems because of their
dependency on the waters to flow through the turbines.

From the above table, it can be observed that; the top three stations in terms of installed capacity
are Tarbela, Pipri and Kot Addu, whereas the top three in terms of power output are Tarbela,
Mangla and Pipri Power Station.

Further the Cost-wise, lowest are Mangla, Tarbela and Guddu (5-10), whereas Cost-wise, most
expensive unit is Kot Addu Thermal Power Station. The total generation of the utility system was
48,156 GWH in 92-93, in which the share of Tarbela in the total generation was 28.98 % at 7.34
pa/kWh.

In the flood season (June to September) each year, hydel power peaks to the maximum,
thereafter tapering off to insignificance in the winter months, generating less than 25% energy.
Therefore the constant supply of energy from each hydel power unit will need an additional
thermal unit for back up in the winter months, unless some method is used to maintain a constant
flow of water into a hydel power dam.

The most important aspect of our present power generation system of the country is that, all the
power stations are independent, in structure and in operation, which will not hold true for the
relation of KBD to Tarbela. In which case, the water to the Power Station at KBD will first have to
flow through Tarbela, to a very large extent. In fact the two power stations will work in tandem.

An interesting problem is to find out how the two reservoirs on the same river, will behave while
generating power and supplying irrigation water to the downstream command areas.

The problem has been thoroughly studies by Saeed A. Rashid in his book; "KBD, A Scientific
Analysis", through a mathematical model analysis (with the given installed capacity in the upper
and lower reservoirs). Which makes the important revelation that, it is practically not possible to
maintain generation capacity over a period of 8 weeks (appears to have been provided for by
design of the project).

Even if high peaks are obtained in the IRS within the time period, it is not possible to avoid load
shedding towards the end of December and beyond, in any year. And it is particularly important to
note that the marked difference in behavior of the two reservoirs, when they will be working in
tandem.

From the WAPDA’s calculations, it appears that the average inflow is about 92 MAF above
Kalabagh, of which 70 MAF is utilized in Thal, Haveli, Rangpur, Sidhnai, Paharpur, Panjnad,
Taunsa, Guddu, Sukkar and Kotri canals and other outlets of Tarbela Command.

Of the total inflow, 68 MAF (73%) occurs in June to September and by December the inflow is
reduced to a trickle i.e. 1.86 MAF with which the power generation also is reduced to a minimum
at Tarbela.

When the level in the upper and lower reservoir drops to the same point for power generation, it
is not possible either to distribute more irrigation water or to generate more power. And by that
time, the country has to revert to thermal power, unless there are some run-of-the-river type
power generation arrangements.

Therefore, to get additional power at a lower cost for ensuring reliability and protection against
drop in pressure, it would be necessary to get out of the "water cycle". And the conjunctive
operation of KBD and Tarbela Dam will be of not much help in providing cheap hydropower,
because of their inter-dependence for water releases.

Flood Regulation Risks

It has been discussed earlier that the possibility of sedimentation and flood regulation cannot be
left at the mercy of WAPDA’s mathematical model analysis, because of the assumptions and
constraints involved in the solution of complex mathematical equations, making the solutions
questionable in real life.

This becomes more important with the limitation of present knowledge on sediment transport.
And, in the absence of a concrete evidence on the behavior of sediment load, carried by River
Indus and River Kabul, the mathematical solutions of obsolete silt carriage figures cannot be
trusted for KBD’s case.

Since the sedimentation science has an important bearing on the behavior of floods, alongwith
the unpredictable nature of hydrology to predict the occurrence of floods, the operational model of
KBD to discharge the early floods at the 890-ft level in the early days of monsoon becomes
questionable. With WAPDA having no divine power to predict the non-occurrence of any floods in
the later days of monsoon, by which time the reservoir will be ulmost full i.e. by the end of August,
the whole exercise of mathematical modeling will be left as a futile exercise, resulting into large-
scale devastation, particularly in the initial reaches of KBD reservoir.

Further, the present state of development on the banks of River Kabul (virtually into the
Riverbed), and its continued expansion towards the River (in the absence of any building control),
restricts the waterway. This will, naturally, enhance the possibility of raising the height of
floodwaters to unimaginable levels, resulting into much more disastrous impacts then ever
perceived by WAPDA’s engineers, thus increasing the damage to property and life.

It is also worth mentioning that the downstream regimes have adopted themselves to the high
flood waters of the last so many years, as the flood water has carved its way out in the river bed
of the flatter reaches of Punjab and Sindh. In contrast, the upstream reaches of River Kabul i.e.
areas around Nowshera, Akora Khattak Jehangira, and Attock are new to the phenomenon of
floods, because of their lesser eventuality, and they will take years to adopt to the high flows, may
be by drowning the aforementioned towns.

Economic Impact Analysis of KBD

Economic Impact on Various Provinces of Pakistan

Economic Evaluation of Kalabagh Dam

to assess its Impacts on Individual Provinces

It is being pleaded by the Government that, the Kalabagh Dam is the sole savior of Pakistan’s
economic system, and is the only path left to put the country back on the real path to
development.

This, it is said, will be achieved by bringing more area under irrigation to produce food, and
generating cheap hydel power to keep the industrial machinery running at economical cost. In
addition, it is pleaded that the high cost of damages due to floods will be reduced (eliminated) by
constructing the Dam at Kalabagh.

The determination of KBD’s potential to eliminate the flood-damages requires little investigation,
since it has already been discussed at length in the technical section of this report, and it has
been deduced that the net impact may even be to exacerbate the losses because of upstream
flooding probability and because of the no flood-storage provision in the reservoir or in the
operating schedule of the dam.

The economic impact of KBD in bringing more area under irrigation and meeting the power
needs of the country requires an analysis, in the purview of the present irrigation and power
system of Pakistan, so as to assess the possible distribution of economic benefits among the
various federating units of Pakistan, and for an indication of the net beneficial impact on the
people living in various parts of the country.

At this stage, a clarification on the true meaning of the word " development" would not be out of
place, since it has often been confused with the implementation of certain high profile projects or
with the provision of certain basic facilities to the people.

According to Dr. Mahbub-ul-Haq "the purpose of development is not just to enlarge incomes, but
to enlarge people’s choices, and that these choices extend to a decent education, good health,
political freedom, cultural identity, personal security, community participation, environmental
security, and many other areas of human well being".

Also "economic growth does not automatically translate into human development; a link between
growth and human lives must be created through conscious national policies".

Another school of thought portrays the ultimate objective of development as the equitable
distribution of income (resources) among the people, which is commonly represented by the Gini-
Coefficient, indicating the relative distribution of resources among the various income groups.

According to the Economic Survey of Pakistan 1996-97, the situation has deteriorated in
Pakistan, since the Gini-Coefficient has increased from 0.386 to 0.410 in the period of 1962-63 to
1992-93.

Thus, the establishment of a number of industrial units by a group of millionaires, the construction
of a motorway or the upgradation of an airport terminal to a most modern one does not
necessarily mean the country getting developed.

Similarly, the provision of phone booths at street level or the villages’ getting connected to the
national electricity grid does not entitled the country to be called as a developed nation.

Therefore, the objective of Pakistan’s developmental policies should not only be to increase the
choices of its people towards the basic necessities of life, but to ensure an equitable distribution
of the benefits among its people, living in its different parts. And it will be this premise of
development that will be analyzed in the following paragraphs, to check the suitability of KBD in
increasing the people’s choices of the various parts of the country, in an equitable proportion.

Irrigation Water Utilization

The irrigation system plays an important role in ensuring the continued supply of the basic
necessity of human life; the food, since the agriculture system cannot survive without the timely
application of irrigation water to produce food grain.

Pakistan is fortunate to have an extensive irrigation network, which commands a large area to
produce food for its people and cotton for export to earn precious foreign exchange.

The Kalabagh Dam will surely enhance the limits of this network and bring additional land under
the command. However, it is also feared to negatively affect a good enough proportion of land
through seepage’s and surface salinity, and which has been discussed at length in the technical
part of this report.

To estimate the positive impact of KBD in achieving the ultimate development objective, we will
analyze the irrigation enhancement capability of KBD in the purview of our aforementioned
definition of "development".

In this respect, a closer analysis of the irrigation network of Pakistan, and its distribution in the
various divisions of the country is discussed below.

Province-wise distribution of actual Culturable, Canal Command and Canal Irrigated Areas

Province
Total Cultivable Area (Million Acres)

Canal Command Area (Million Acres)

Actual Canal Irrigated Area (MA)

Punjab

36.4

19.5

16.41

Sindh

24.5

12.2

10.0

NWFP

7.6

1.8

1.32

Baluchistan

15.5

1.0

0.94
84

34.5

28.67

The true meaning of above figures will become more evident when they are viewed in their
respective percentages. These are shown below :

Province-wise percentage distribution of Culturable, Canal Command and Canal Irrigated Areas

Province

Total Cultivable Area (% of total)

Canal Command Area

(% of the province’s cultivable area)

Actual Canal Irrigated Area

(% of the province’s cultivable area)

Punjab

43 %

55 %

45 %

Sindh

30 %

50 %

41 %

NWFP

9%
24 %

17 %

Baluchistan

18 %

6%

6%

A further closer view will be achieved when the above figures are viewed in the purview of the
total available geographical areas of the different provinces. Which are as mentioned below :

Province

Area

(as % of total area of Pakistan)

Punjab

25.6 %

Sindh

17.7 %

NWFP (inc. FATA)

12.8 %

Baluchistan

43.6 %

Considering the land area to be the common denominator for comparison, it is observed that :

i. Punjab, comprising 25.6 % of the total country’s area, contributes 43% to the total cultivable
area figure of Pakistan;

ii. The Province of Sindh, comprising 17.7 % of the total country’s area, contributes 30 % to the
total cultivable area figure of Pakistan;

iii. NWFP, comprising 12.8 % of the total country’s area, contributes 9 % to the total cultivable
area figure of Pakistan;

iv. Baluchistan, the largest province making 43.6 % of the total land area of Pakistan, can only
boast of contributing 18 % to the total cultivable area figure of the country.

The above evaluation clearly indicates the relative importance of Punjab and Sindh, to work as
the food (and cotton export) machine for the whole of Pakistan, because of their major share in
the total cultivable area of the country, with Punjab claiming 43%, followed by Sindh contributing
30% of the total cultivable area of the country.

However, the second column of the above table presents the relative distortion in the relative
Canal Command Areas of the various provinces. Which depicts that :

i. For Punjab, 55% of the total cultivable area is under the canal command;

ii. For Sindh, 50% of the total cultivable area is under the canal command;

ii. For NWFP, 24% of the total cultivable area is under the canal command;

ii. For Baluchistan, 6% of the total cultivable area is under the canal command.

Whereas, part of this huge disproportion can be blamed on the particular landscape of NWFP and
Baluchistan, the difference is too big to be overlooked. And, it can very well be attributed to the
lack of suitable infrastructure, such as canals for carrying the irrigation water to the available
cultivable areas or installation of tubewells to explore the groundwater table, for bringing the
neglected provinces at par with the other ones.

The availability (or lack of it) of suitable canal infrastructure for bringing the cultivable areas under
canal irrigation can further be observed from the third column of the above table. Which shows
that :

i. 45 % of the total cultivable area of Punjab is under canal irrigation

ii. 41 % of the total cultivable area of Sindh is under canal irrigation

iii. 17 % of the total cultivable area of NWFP is under canal irrigation

iv. 6 % of the total cultivable area of Baluchistan is under canal irrigation

Whereas, the above illustration indicates the relative importance of constructing more canals for
bringing the additional canal command area under irrigation, i.e. 10% in Punjab, 9% in Sindh and
7% in NWFP, the important aspect will be to evaluate their overall economic impact in the various
provinces with respect to each other, due to the concentration of overall benefits in one or more
provinces of the country, with expenditure common resources of all the four federating units.

In the above tables, the relative percentages of canal command (or canal irrigated) areas to the
available cultivable areas work as an eye opener to reveal the story of negligible investment, over
the years, in NWFP and Baluchistan in developing 17 % and 6% of the available cultivable area
respectively, as compared to the Punjab and Sindh Provinces where the same has been
developed to the tune of 45% and 41% .

Thus for producing more food for the growing population, with an equitable distribution of
resources out of the common kitty, the first priority should be to utilize the available 94 %
cultivable area of Baluchistan and 83 % cultivable area of NWFP, through canal or tubewell
irrigation, rather than pumping more resources into a project that will increase the canal
command areas of Punjab and Sindh, resultantly acting to further concentrate the benefits in
these areas.

The anomaly in distribution of basic agricultural inputs can further be observed from the water
distribution of "Water Apportionment Accord 1991". Which says that :

1. Distribution of existing water resources among the provinces will be as follows:

Province

Water Share

(% of total)

Punjab

47.6 %

Sindh

41.6 %

NWFP (inc. FATA)

7.5 %

Baluchistan

3.3 %

2. Distribution of future water resources among the provinces will be as follows :

Province

Water Share

(% of total)

Punjab

37 %

Sindh

37 %

NWFP (inc. FATA)

14 %

Baluchistan

12 %

An analysis of these figures in the backdrop of the total geographical areas and the total
cultivable land areas of the provinces reveal that :

i. Punjab, for a geographical area of 25.6 % of the total and a cultivable land area of 43 % of the
total, gets 47.6 % of water share out of the existing water resources and 37 % of the future water
resources

ii. Sindh, for a geographical area of 17.7 % of the total and a cultivable land area of 30 % of the
total, gets 41.6 % of water share out of the existing water resources and 37 % of the future water
resources

iii. NWFP, for a geographical area of 12.8 % of the total and a cultivable land area of 9 % of the
total, gets only 7.5 % of water share out of the existing water resources and 14 % of the future
water resources

iv. Baluchistan, for a geographical area of 43.6 % of the total and a cultivable land area of 18 % of
the total, gets only 3.3 % of water share out of the existing water resources and 12 % of the future
water resources

This distribution of the major agricultural input, water, is anything but disproportionate from every
angle and will only act to push one province against the other in the long run. Therefore, the need
of the hour is to identify the priority development areas from the point of view of an equitable
distribution of resources so as to equally benefit all the residents of the country.

Electric Power Utilization

Before venturing into the economic evaluation of KBD on the various provinces due to the electric
power benefits, it is required to study the present pattern of electricity consumers and electricity
utilization in the four Provinces.

In this respect, the following tables from the WAPDA’s statistical data will work as a basis of our
analysis.

Category-wise Number of Consumers (as on 30-09-1997)

Total Connections

AEB

Domestic

Commercial

Industrial

Agricultural

Others

Lahore

1296619

273681

43453

31849

1380

1646983

17%

Gujranwala

866083

122796

25310
22828

212

1037230

10%

Faisalabad

1233692

182384

32311

22824

851

1472063

15%

Islamabad

1303539

196848

15592

11232

1094

1528306
15%

Multan

1363296

207618

26295

29614

919

1627743

16%

Punjab

6063229

983327
142961

118347

4456

7312324

73%

Peshawar (NWFP)

1322097

181194

21605

21470

1258

1547625

16%

Hyderabad (Sindh)

661487

153697

18398

17446

1386
852414

9%

Quetta (Baluchistan)

189224

47391

2135

11410

247

250407

3%

Pakistan

8236037

1365609

185099

168673

2826

9962771

100%

Ref : Power Distribution Progress Report for October 1997 by Statistics Directorate WAPDA
Electricity Consumption (1992-93)

million kWh

as % of total

Punjab

21879

58.89%

NWFP (inc. FATA)

4688

12.62%

Sindh
9220

24.82%

Baluchistan

1365

3.67%

Pakistan (total)

37152

Analysis of the above tables reveals the following percentages of category-wise electricity
consumers, and total electricity consumption in various provinces of Pakistan :

Electricity Consumers and Power Utilization in Various Provinces

%age as of total

Province

Total Number of Consumers

Total Power Supply

Punjab

73 %

65 %

NWFP

16 %

16 %

Sindh

9%

11 %

Baluchistan

3%

4%

Ref : WAPDA Statistics Division Report

Percentage of Prominent Consumers in various Provinces

%age as of total

Province

Domestic Consumers

Commercial

Consumers

Industrial Consumers

Agricultural

Consumers
Punjab

74 %

72 %

77 %

70 %

NWFP

16 %

13 %

12 %

13 %

Sindh

8%

11 %

10 %

10 %

Baluchistan

2%

3%

1%
7%

Ref : WAPDA Statistics Division Report

From a closer look of the above tables, it is observed that:

1. Punjab has a total number of consumers, which are :

- 4.56 times that of NWFP

- 8.12 times that of Sindh, and

- 24.34 times that of Baluchistan

2. The composition of Electricity Consumers in Pakistan reveals that, Punjab has the following
category of consumers in the under-mentioned proportion :

a. Domestic Consumers

- 4.62 times that of NWFP

- 9.25 times that of Sindh, and

- 37 times that of Baluchistan

b. Commercial Consumers

- 5.53 times that of NWFP

- 6.54 times that of Sindh, and

- 24 times that of Baluchistan

c. Industrial Consumers

- 6.41 times that of NWFP

- 7.7 times that of Sindh, and

- 77 times that of Baluchistan

d. Agricultural Consumers

- 5.38 times that of NWFP

- 7 times that of Sindh, and

- 10 times that of Baluchistan

3. Punjab utilizes electricity, which is :

- 4.06 times that of NWFP

- 5.9 times that of Sindh, and

- 16.25 times that of Baluchistan

To develop a common basis of comparison, the analysis of these figures are required to be
viewed in purview of the area and population of the various provinces. Which are as follows

Percentage Area & Population of the Various Provinces

Province

Area

as % of total

Province

Population

as % of total

(as per 1981 census)

Punjab

25.6 %

Punjab

55.6 %

NWFP (inc. FATA)

12.8 %
NWFP(inc. FATA)

15.7 %

Sindh

17.7 %

Sindh

22.6 %

Baluchistan

43.6 %

Baluchistan

5.1 %

Ref : NWFP Development Statistics 1995 & 1996

From a closer look of the above table, it is revealed that :

Punjab has a total area, which is :

- 2 times that of NWFP

- 1.45 times that of Sindh, and

- 60% of Baluchistan

Punjab has a total population, which is :

- 3.54 times that of NWFP

- 2.46 times that of Sindh, and

- 10.9 times that of Baluchistan

A Comparison of this table with the previous figures suggest that :

For an area of Punjab, which is

- 2 times that of NWFP

- 1.45 times that of Sindh, and

- 60% of Baluchistan

and a population, which is :

- 3.54 times that of NWFP

- 2.46 times that of Sindh, and

- 10.9 times that of Baluchistan

Punjab has a total number of consumers, which are :

- 4.56 times that of NWFP

- 8.12 times that of Sindh, and

- 24.34 times that of Baluchistan

Punjab utilizes electricity, which is :

- 4.06 times that of NWFP

- 5.9 times that of Sindh, and

- 16.25 times that of Baluchistan

Thus for any investment into the power sector, out of the common resources, the Punjab
Province will benefit in an advantageous manner due to the comparatively wider network of
consumers and greater use of electricity.

This could be studied further under two possible perspectives :

1. Considering the land to be the common denominator between the Provinces

The additional power benefits will distribute as follows :

a. Number of consumers benefited

- 2.28 times of consumers will benefit in Punjab as that of NWFP

- 5.6 times of consumers in Punjab as that of Sindh

- 40.46 times of consumers in Punjab as that of Baluchistan

b. Electricity utilized

- 2 times in Punjab as that of NWFP

- 4 times in Punjab as that of Sindh

- 27 times in Punjab as that of Baluchistan

2. Considering the population as the common denominator between the Provinces

The additional power benefits will distribute in the following manner :

a. Number of consumers benefited

- 1.29 times of consumers will benefit in Punjab as that of NWFP

- 3.3 times of consumers will benefit in Punjab as that of Sindh

- 2.24 times of consumers will benefit in Punjab as that of Baluchistan

b. Electricity utilized

- 1.15 times in Punjab as that of NWFP

- 2.4 times in Punjab as that of Sindh

- 1.5 times in Punjab as that of Baluchistan

Going back to the table of consumer analysis in various provinces we observe that :

From every single rupee investment in Power Sector of Pakistan

I. For Punjab Vs NWFP

- 4.62 Domestic Consumers benefit in Punjab against every individual consumer in NWFP

- 5.53 Commercial Consumers benefit in Punjab against every individual consumer in NWFP

- 6.41 Industrial Consumers benefit in Punjab against every individual consumer in NWFP

- 5.38 Agricultural Consumers benefit in Punjab against every individual consumer in NWFP

II. For Punjab Vs Sindh

- 9.25 Domestic Consumers benefit in Punjab against every individual consumer in Sindh

- 6.54 Commercial Consumers benefit in Punjab against every individual consumer in Sindh

- 7.7 Industrial Consumers benefit in Punjab against every individual consumer in Sindh
- 7.0 Agricultural Consumers benefit in Punjab against every individual consumer in Sindh

III. For Punjab Vs Baluchistan

- 37 Domestic Consumers benefit in Punjab against every individual consumer in Baluchistan

- 24 Commercial Consumers benefit in Punjab against every individual consumer in Baluchistan

- 77 Industrial Consumers benefit in Punjab against every individual consumer in Baluchistan

- 10 Agricultural Consumers benefit in Punjab against every individual consumer in Baluchistan

To analyze the impact of above distortions on the economic development of the various provinces
with respect to Punjab, we can derive some interesting & revealing impacts.

If we assume that, the domestic consumers’ electricity use is solely for non-productive purposes,
and the commercial, industrial and agricultural electricity consumers utilize the electric power for
economic development, we arrive at:

I. Economically Productive Consumers in Punjab are, on the average, 5.77 times that of NWFP

I. Economically Productive Consumers in Punjab are, on the average, 7.1 times that of Sindh

I. Economically Productive Consumers in Punjab are, on the average, 37 times that of NWFP

Thus any developmental activity in the power sector will push Punjab up, 5.77 times that of
NWFP, 7.1 times that of Sindh and 37 times that of Baluchistan, in the economically productive
sectors.

In view of this, the power generated at Kalabagh Dam will act to make the Province of Punjab,
and its people, develop further and the other three provinces getting progressively dependent on
it for employment and basic necessities of life.

In addition, the people of the other three provinces will also be discredited for their basic right to
an equal opportunity to facilities and opportunities created out of the common resources.

Therefore, for a balanced development in future, the disparities in power consumption should first
be eliminated before any more investment, out of the common kitty, that makes the rich more
richer and further develops the comparatively developed province at the cost of under-developed
provinces of the country.

Conclusion

Based on the above technical drawbacks, the project is expected to get the most intense reaction
from population to be affected, and disrupt the piece and tranquility of the entire country.

Sane considerations therefore demand that KBD should be dropped in the face of better
alternatives.

Iftikhar Ahmad

B.Eng'g (Civil), MBA (Finance), P.G.Diploma in Public Administration

Peshawar, NWFP (Pukhtunkhwa), Pakistan

E-mail:- ifti@galaxycorp.com

BACK