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VOL. 479, JANUARY 24, 2006 585

Republic vs. Naguiat

*
G.R. No. 134209. January 24, 2006.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

CELESTINA NAGUIAT, respondent.

Public Lands; Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless

declassified and released by positive act of the Government so that
they may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, are not capable of private appropriation; Rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.—Public forest lands
or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by positive act
of the Government so that they may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, are not capable of private
appropriation. As to these assets, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.
Same; Forests do not necessary refer to a large tract of wooded
land or an expanse covered by dense growth of trees and
underbrush.—Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act
and the Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into
“agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks,”
do not necessarily refer to a large tract of wooded land or an
expanse covered by dense growth of trees and underbrush.

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* SECOND DIVISION.

586

586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Naguiat

Same; Public lands not shown to have been reclassified or

released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private
person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain;
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The prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands of the public

domain belongs to the Executive Branch of the government and not
the court.—Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which
embodies the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State—the source of any asserted right to ownership
of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion
presumptively belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not
shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State
remain part of the inalienable public domain. Under Section 6 of
the Public Land Act, the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying
lands of the public domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to
agricultural and vice versa, belongs to the Executive Branch of
the government and not the court. Needless to stress, the onus to
overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the
land subject of an application for registration is alienable or
disposable rests with the applicant.
Same; Declassification of forest and mineral lands and their
conversion into alienable and disposable lands need an express
and positive act from the government.—It cannot be
overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of public lands
has been a notorious practice resorted to in land registration
cases. For this reason, the Court has made it a point to stress,
when appropriate, that declassification of forest and mineral
lands, as the case may be, and their conversion into alienable and
disposable lands need an express and positive act from the
government.
Same; Unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse
occupation or possession, occupation thereof in the concept of
owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be
registered as title.—The issue of whether or not respondent and
her predecessor-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and
continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is now of
little moment. For, unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired
by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the
concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership and be registered as title.

587

VOL. 479, JANUARY 24, 2006 587

Republic vs. Naguiat

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

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     The Solicitor General for respondent.

     Jose Torres Pacis for respondent.

GARCIA, J.:

Before the Court is this petition for review under Rule 45 of1
the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision
dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- 2
G.R. CV No. 37001 which affirmed an earlier decision of
the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69 in
Land Registration Case No. N-25-1.
The decision under review recites the factual backdrop,
as follows:

“This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of

land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, more particularly
described in the amended application filed by Celestina Naguiat
on 29 December 1989 with the Regional Trial Court of Zambales,
Branch 69. Applicant [herein respondent] alleges, inter alia, that
she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them
by purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired
the same from Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto
Monje and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in
possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the
best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or
encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any
interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.
On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein
petitioner]. . . filed an opposition to the application on the ground
that

_______________

1 Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero (ret.), with Associate

Justices Arturo B. Buena (ret.) and Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, concurring; Rollo,
pp. 22-27.
2 Rollo, pp. 28-38.

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588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Naguiat

neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have been

in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior
thereto; that the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of
applicant do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a
bona fide acquisition of the lands applied for or of his open,

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continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation

thereof in the concept of (an) owner; that the applicant’s claim of
ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can
no longer be availed of . . .; and that the parcels of land applied for
are part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines not subject to private appropriation.
On 15 October 1990, the lower court issued an order of general
default as against the whole world, with the exception of the
Office of the Solicitor General, and proceeded with the hearing of
this registration case. After she had presented and formally
offered her evidence . . . applicant rested her case. The Solicitor
General, thru the Provincial Prosecutor, interposed no objection to
the admission of the exhibits. Later . . . the Provincial Prosecutor
3
manifest (sic) that the Government had no evidence to adduce.
4
In a decision dated September 30, 1991, the trial court
rendered judgment for herein respondent Celestina
Naguiat, adjudicating unto her the parcels of land in
question and decreeing the registration thereof in her
name, thus:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby

adjudicates the parcels of land situated in Panan, Botolan,
Zambales, appearing on Plan AP-03-003447 containing an area of
3,131 square meters, appearing on Plan AP-03-003446 containing
an area of 15,322 containing an area of 15,387 square meters to
herein applicant Celestina T. Naguiat, of legal age, Filipino
citizen, married to Rommel Naguiat and a resident of Angeles
City, Pampanga together with all the improvements existing
thereon and orders and decrees registration in her name in
accordance with Act No. 496, Commonwealth Act No. 14, [should
be 141] as amended, and Presidential

_______________

3 Ibid., pp. 22-23.

4 Id., pp. 28-38.

589

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Republic vs. Naguiat

Decree No. 1529. This adjudication, however, is subject to the

various easements/reservations provided for under pertinent
laws, presidential decrees and/or presidential letters of
instructions which should be annotated/ projected on the title to
be issued. And once this decision becomes final, let the

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corresponding decree of registration be immediately issued.

(Words in bracket added)

With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by

the trial court, petitioner Republic went on appeal to the
CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001.
As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein
assailed decision of May 29, 1998, affirmed that of the trial
court, to wit:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from

is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.”

Hence, the Republic’s present recourse on its basic

submission that the CA’s decision “is not in accordance
with law, jurisprudence and the evidence, since respondent
has not established with the required evidence her title in
fee simple or imperfect title in respect of the subject lots
which would warrant their registration under . . . (P.D.
1529 or Public Land Act (C.A.) 141.” In particular,
petitioner Republic faults the appellate court on its finding
respecting the length of respondent’s occupation of the
property subject of her application for registration and for
not considering the fact that she has not established that
the lands in question have been declassified from forest or
timber zone to alienable and disposable property.
Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified
and released by positive act of the Government so that they
may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of 5the
public domain, are not capable of private appropriation. As
to

_______________

5 Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69 (1983);

Director of Forestry vs. Muñoz, 126 SCRA 1148 (1983).

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Republic vs. Naguiat

these assets,
6
the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do
not apply. Given this postulate, the principal issue to be
addressed turns on the question of whether or not the
areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest or
other inalienable lands of the public domain.
7
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7
Forests, in the
8
context of both the Public Land Act and
the Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into
“agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national
parks,” do not necessarily refer to a large tract of wooded
land or an expanse covered by dense growth of 9trees and
underbrush. As we stated in Heirs of Amunategui —

“A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does

not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest
land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by
kaingin cultivators or other farmers. “Forest lands” do not have to
be on mountains or in out of the way places. x x x. The
classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks
like. x x x”
10
Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which
embodies the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State—the
11
source of any asserted
right to ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be
clearly12 of private dominion presumptively belong to the
State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or

_______________

6 Ibid.
7 Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.
8 Art. XII, Sec. 3.
9 See Note # 5, supra.
10 Sec. 2—All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other resources are owned
by the State. x x x
11 Seville vs. National Development Company, 351 SCRA 112 (2001).
12 Bracewell vs. Court of Appeals, 323 SCRA 193 (2000).

591

VOL. 479, JANUARY 24, 2006 591

Republic vs. Naguiat

released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a

private person 13by the State remain part of the inalienable
public domain. Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act,
the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands of the
public domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to agricultural

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and vice versa, belongs to the 14Executive Branch of the

government and not the court. Needless to stress, the
onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the
presumption that the land subject of an application for
registration
15
is alienable or disposable rests with the
applicant.
In the present case, the CA assumed that the lands in
question are already alienable and disposable. Wrote the
appellate court:

“The theory of [petitioner] that the properties in question are

lands of the public domain cannot be sustained as it is directly
against the above doctrine. Said doctrine is a reaffirmation of the
principle established in the earlier cases . . . that open, exclusive
and undisputed possession of alienable public land for period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon
completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and without the need
of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes
private property . . . .” (Word in bracket and italics added.)

The principal reason for the appellate court’s disposition,

finding a registerable title for respondent, is her and her
predecessor-in-interest’s open, continuous and exclusive
occupation of the subject property for more than 30 years.
Prescinding from its above assumption and finding, the
appellate court went on to conclude, citing16 Director of
Lands vs.17
Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) and Herico
vs. DAR, among

_______________

13 Menguito vs. Republic, 348 SCRA 128 (2000).

14 Bilog LAND TITLES and DEEDS, 2005 ed., p. 59, citing Director of
Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 708 (1989).
15 Pagkatipunan vs. Court of Appeals, 379 SCRA 621 (2000).
16 146 SCRA 509 (1986).
17 95 SCRA 437 (1980).

592

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Republic vs. Naguiat

other cases, that, upon the completion of the requisite

period of possession, the lands in question cease to be
public land and become private property.
Director of Lands, Herico and the other cases cited by
the CA are not, however, winning cards for the respondent,

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for the simple reason that, in said cases, the disposable and
alienable nature of the land sought to be registered was
established, or, at least, not put in issue. And there lies the
difference.
Here, respondent never presented the required
certification from the proper government agency or official
proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable
and disposable. Matters of land classification 18
or
reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for proof. Aside
from tax receipts, respondent submitted in evidence the
survey map and technical descriptions of the lands, which,
needless to state, provided no information respecting the
classification of the property. As the Court has held,
however, these documents are not sufficient to overcome
the presumption that the land 19
sought to be registered
forms part of the public domain.
It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted
appropriation of public lands has been 20
a notorious practice
resorted to in land registration cases. For this reason, the
Court has made it a point to stress, when appropriate, that
declassification of forest and mineral lands, as the case
may be, and their conversion into alienable and disposable
lands need 21 an express and positive act from the
government.
The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not
respondent and her predecessor-in-interest have been in
open,

_______________

18 Director of Lands vs. Funtilar, 142 SCRA 57 (1986); Republic vs.

Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 476 (1987).
19 Republic vs. Lao, 405 SCRA 291 (2003).
20 Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701 (1984).
21 Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry; supra; Republic vs.
Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 1 (1991).

593

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Republic vs. Naguiat

exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land

in question is now of little moment. For, unclassified land,
as here, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or
possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner,
however long, cannot 22
ripen into private ownership and be
registered as title.
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WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and

the assailed decision dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, respondent’s application for original
registration of title in Land Registration Case No. N-25-1 of
the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, is
DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

          Puno (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona

and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Petition granted, assailed decision reversed and set

aside. Respondent’s application for original registration of
title denied.

Note.—The classification of public lands is a function of

the executive branch of the government specifically the
director of lands (now the director of Lands Management
Bureau). (Roble vs. Arbasa, 362 SCRA 69 [2001])

——o0o——

_______________

22 De Ocampo vs. Arlos, 343 SCRA 716 (2000); Republic vs. Animas, 56
SCRA 499 (1974); Lacson vs. Del Rosario, 151 SCRA 714 (1987).

594

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