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AAA. TALAMPAS V.

PEOPLE
NOVEMBER 23, 2011

Eduardo Matic and Ernesto Matic were infront of the witness’ house, along the road in Binan, Laguna.
Virgilio Talampas who was riding a bicycle passed by and alighted three meters from where Eduardo
and Ernesto was located and walked towards them. Talampas then brought out a revolver and
poked the same to Eduardo and fired it hitting Eduardo causing him to take refuge behind
Ernesto. The appellant again fired his gun three times hitting Ernesto at the back causing him to fall
on the ground. Another shot hit Eduardo on his nape and fell down on his back. Thereafter, the
appellant ran away. The fatal shot at the back of Ernesto caused his death.

Talampas interposed self-defense and accident. He insisted that his enemy had been Eduardo not
victim Ernesto and assailed a different scenario of him and the two. RTC ruled against Talampas
which induced him to appeal. CA affirmed his conviction and ruled that his invocation of self-defense
has been an admission of the killing and must be assumed to be his liability.

W/N Talampas can claim his acts as self-defense and said injury caused by it as an accidental death.

No. Talampas cannot invoked self-defense and assail said accidental death.

In the nature of self-defense, the protagonists should be the accused and the victim. In the present
case, Talampas was the one who initiated the attack and neither Eduardo nor Ernesto had commited
any unlawful aggression against him. Thus, Talampas was not repelling any unlawful aggression from
the victim, thereby rendering his plea of self-defense unwarranted as it does not comply with the
elements of the same as enumerated in Article 11 of RPC.

An accident presupposes the lack of intention to commit the wrong done. For it to be validly
assailed, said act must be legal, exercising due care, diligence and prudence, but in the process
produces harm or injury to someone or to something not in the least in the mind of the actor an
accidental result flowing out of a legal act in accordance with Art. 12 sec. 4 of RPC. It cannot be
applied in the case of Talampas because the intention to harm was clearly seen when he poked his
revolver at Eduardo and fired it hitting the latter who quickly rushed to seek refuge behind Ernesto.
Talampas’ acts were by no means lawful.

The fact that the target of Talampas assault was Eduardo, not Ernesto, did not excuse his hitting and
killing of Ernesto. The fatal hitting of Ernesto was the natural and direct consequence of Talampas
felonious deadly assault against Eduardo. Talampas poor aim amounted to aberratio ictus, or mistake
in the blow, a circumstance that neither exempted him from criminal responsibility nor mitigated his
criminal liability. Lo que es causa de la causa, es causa del mal causado (what is the cause of the
cause is the cause of the evil caused).Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is
incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.

CCC. PEOPLE V. ALCONGA


April 30, 1947

On May 27, 1943, in the house of one Mauricio Jepes, several persons were playing prohibited
games. The deceased Silverio Barion was the banker in the game of black jack, and Maria de Raposo
was a player who invited Dioscoro Alconga as her partner. Alconga cheated and posted himself
behind Barion, acting as a spotter of the cards of the latter and communicating by signs to his
partner. Barion appears to have suffered losses in the game because of cheating between Raposo
and the accused Alconga. Upon knowing such act, Barion expressed his anger at the former. In a fit
of anger, the deceased left the house telling the accused Alconga, "tomorrow morning I will give you
a breakfast", which expression would seem to signify an intent to inflict bodily harm when uttered
under such circumstances.

On the morning of May 29, 1943, when the latter was in the guardhouse located in the barrio of
Santol, performing his duties as "home guard", Barion came along and said, "Coroy, this is your
breakfast," followed forthwith by a swing of his "pingahan". Alconga was able to avoid the blows by
falling to the ground and crawling on his abdomen until he was outside the guardhouse. While the
deceased was in the act of delivering the third blow, Alconga, while still in a crawling position, fired at
him with his revolver, causing him to stagger and to fall to the ground. Rising to his feet, Barion drew
forth his dagger and directed a blow at the accused who also resorted to his bolo. A hand-to-hand
fight ensued. Barion ran away sustaining several wounds but was followed by the accused. On about
200 meters, Barion was overtaken, and another fight took place, during which the mortal bolo blow
— the one which slashed the cranium — was delivered, causing Barion to fall to the ground.

W/N Alconga can assail self-defense.

No. Alconga cannot assail self-defense, thus, he is guilty of the crime Homicide.

It will be observed that there were two stages in the fight between appellant and the deceased. The
initial stage commenced when the deceased assaulted appellant without sufficient provocation on the
part of the latter and considering that Alconga was in the crawling position when the deceased was
about to strike his third blow on account that Alconga could not have effectively used his remaining
weapon. In this stage, Alconga was then acting in self-defense. But during the second stage when
the deceased flees and was pursued by Alconga who then inflicted many additional wounds, he was
no longer acting in self-defense, there being then no more aggression to defend against, the same
having ceased from the moment the deceased flees. There can be no defense where there is no
aggression. It was also on the second stage that the deceased was fatally wounded proven that after
the first stage he still has the power to flee at the distance of 200 meters. In accordance under the
doctrine in United States vs. Vitug, appellant "had no right to pursue, no right to kill or injure" said
deceased — for the reason that "a fleeing man is not dangerous to the one from whom he flees."

Upon the foregoing facts, we hold that appellant's guilt of the crime of homicide has been established
beyond reasonable doubt. The learned trial court appreciated in his favor of two mitigating
circumstances: voluntary surrender and provocation on the part of the deceased. The second was not
properly appreciated since it is very clear that from the moment he fled after the first stage of the
fight to the moment he died, the deceased did not give any provocation for appellant to pursue much
less further to attack him. The only provocation given by him was the aggression with which he
started the first stage of the fight. Appellant did not testify nor offer other evidence to show that
when he pursued the deceased he was still acting under the impulse of the effects of what
provocation, be it anger, obfuscation or the like as to be in accordance with Art. 13 of the Revised
Penal Code. Said required provocation to be such a mitigating circumstance that it not only
immediately precede the act but that it also be sufficient or "adecuada" which
means proportionate to the damage caused by the act.
EEE. MAMANGUN V. PEOPLE
FEBRUARY 2, 2007

On the evening of July 31, 1992, Policeman (PO2) Rufino Mamangun, with his fellow police officers,
responded to the robbery-holdup in Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan from a call that a certain
Liberty Contreras was heard shouting, “Magnanakaw Magnanakaw”. With the permission of Abacan,
petitioner Mamangun, PO2 Diaz and PO2 Cruz went to the rooftop of the house whereat the suspect
was allegedly taking refuge, each armed with a drawn handgun. There, they saw a man whom they
thought was the robbery suspect. At that instance, petitioner Mamangun, who was walking ahead of
the group, fired his handgun once, hitting the man. The man turned out to be Gener Contreras who
was not the robbery suspect. Contreras died from the gunshot wound.

According to Ayson, lone eyewitness for prosecution, Mamangun pointed his .45 cal. pistol at
Contreras who said, “Hindi ako, hindi ako!” to which Mamangun replied, “Anong hindi ako?” Before
Ayson could say anything, Mamangun already shot Contreras. Mamangun however assailed that the
person raised a stainless steel pipe towards his head but he was able to evade the attack. This
prompted him to shoot the person on the left arm. It was only at that point that the man told them,
“hindi ako, hindi ako.”

Petitioner insists that the shooting, which ultimately caused the demise of Contreras, was justified
because he was repelling Contreras unlawful attack on his person, as Contreras was then about to
strike him on the head with a steel pipe. Sandiganbayan rejected the petitioners claim that the
shooting was justified by self-defense and convicted petitioner with homicide attended by an
incomplete justifying circumstance of the petitioner having acted in the performance of his duty as a
policeman, and also the generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Petitioner appealed and assailed that he should be absolved from criminal liability on the basis of his
submission that the shooting in question was done in the performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office.

W/N the shooting which caused the death of the victim was done in fulfillment of a duty as a
policeman.

No. Mamangun’s acts were which caused the death of the victim were not done in the valid
performance of a duty.

The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under paragraph 5, Article II, of the Revised Penal
Code may be invoked only after the defense successfully proves that: (1) the accused acted in the
performance of a duty; and (2) the injury inflicted or offense committed is the necessary
consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty.

Concededly, the first requisite is present in this case. Petitioner, a police officer, was responding to a
robbery-holdup incident. However, proof that the shooting and ultimate death of Contreras was a
necessary consequence of the due performance of his duty as a policeman is essential to exempt him
from criminal liability, which Mamangun failed to show. His defense that Contreras tried to strike him
with a steel pipe was a mere afterthought and there was no plausible basis for the shooting on the
ground that Contreras was unarmed and had already uttered “Hindi po ako, Hindi po ako” before the
petitioner fatally shot him on the left arm. Mamangun’s reply to such utterance, “Anong hindi ako”
was said to be self-serving and biased.
Self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, cannot be appreciated as a valid justifying
circumstance in this case. For, from the above admitted, uncontroverted or established facts, the
most important element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim to justify a claim of self
defense was absent. Lacking this essential and primary element of unlawful aggression, petitioners
plea of self-defense, complete or incomplete, must have to fail.

To be sure, acts in the fulfillment of a duty, without more, do not completely justify the petitioners
firing the fatal gunshot at the victim. True, petitioner, as one of the policemen responding to a
reported robbery then in progress, was performing his duty as a police officer as well as when he was
trying to effect the arrest of the suspected robber and in the process, fatally shoot said suspect,
albeit the wrong man. However, in the absence of the equally necessary justifying circumstance that
the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty,
there can only be incomplete justification, a privileged mitigating circumstance under Articles 13 and
69 of the Revised Penal Code.

There can be no quibbling that there was no rational necessity for the killing of Contreras. Petitioner
could have first fired a warning shot before pulling the trigger against Contreras who was one of the
residents chasing the suspected robber. Thus, Mamangun was guilty of Homicide.

GGG. PEOPLE V. JACINTO


MARCH 16, 2011

In the evening of January 28, 2003 at about 6 o’clock in the evening, the father of the victim sent his
8 year old daughter to buy cigarettes at the store, without knowing that his other daughter who is 5
years old followed. His 8 year old daughter came back without her younger sister but did not return
with the latter. The father was not worried as he thought his younger daughter was watching
television at her aunt Rita Lingcay’s house. Witness Julito Apike went to the same store to buy a
bottle of Tanduay Rum and saw Hermie Jacinto placing the said child in his lap. Apike, Jacinto and
child left the store at the same time, Julito proceeded to Rita’s house while Hermie and child to the
“lower area.” Jacinto brought the child to the ricefield near the house of spouses Perocho, there the
child was made to lie down on the ground, her panties removed and was boxed by the accused in
the chest. Half-naked, accused mounted her and made a push and pull movement causing her to
cry. Appellant then went to the house of the Perochos while the victim went home crying. The child
underwent a check-up which leads to findings that she had been raped.

Jacinto interposed an alibi that he was at the birthday party when alleged crim took place and that
the victim merely followed him. The RTC found Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. It was then stated that Jacinto was bron on March 1 1985, being
merely 17 years old at the commitment of the crme..

W/N the condition that Jacinto was a child in conflict with law when the crime was committed will
affect his sentence.

Yes, Jacinto, being a child in conflict with law at the time of the commission of the crime, can assail
the suspension of his sentence in accordance with R.A. 9344.

Sec. 6 of the Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above 15 but below 18 from criminal liability
unless the child has acted with discernment. Even said law only took effect on 2006, it shall be given
a retrospective effect. The promotion of the welfare of the child in conflict with law should extend
even to one who has exceeded the age limit of 21 years of age as long as he or she was a minor
when the crime was committed.

In the present case, Even though Jacinto has acted with discernment proven by his acts to be done
in an isolated and dark place to prevent detection and he also boxed the victim to weaken her
defense, he chall be afforded of the rights of child in conflict with law. The offender or the minor who
had done the crime shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in
order that he or she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the
community. Thus, Jacinto is found guilty of rape but his sentence is suspended in accordance to said
RA 9344 and shall be confined to an agricultural camp or other training facility established,
maintained, and controlled by BUCOR in coordination with the DSWD.

III. PEOPLE V. TORING


OCTOBER 26, 1990

In the evening of May 25, 1980, a benefit dance was held at sitio Naga, Babag II, Lapu-lapu City for
the last canvassing of votes for the candidates for princesses who would reign at the sitio fiesta. As
one of the candidates was the daughter of Samuel Augusto, he and the members of his family
attended the affair. The members of the kwaknit gang, a group which was noted for their bird-like
way of dancing and their propensity for drunkenness and provoking trouble, including its President .
"alas" king Luis Toring, were also present.

Samuel's daughter was proclaimed the winner in the contest. Beer and softdrinks were served.
Samuel was tipsy and stepped out of the dancing area to answer the call of nature. Luis Toring,
Carmelo Berdin and Diosdado Berdon were together when Berdon handed a knife to Toring, who
then approached Samuel from behind and stabbed with the knife the right side of Samuel's
abdomen. Afterwards, the gang ran towards the dark. Samuel was brought to Hospital where he died
on arrival. The death weapon, a kitchen knife made of stainless steel and with a red-colored handle,
was recovered from the house of Luis Toring by the aid of Berdin.

The three were charged with conspiracy in killing Samuel Augusto. The crime was purportedly
committed with the attendance of the generic aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation
and nighttime. All three accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Toring then testified that
his acts were in self-defense for a stranger, said to be one Amion. Witness Joel Escobia claimed that
it was him who was thrusted by Samuel with his shotgun. There has been such discrepancy as to the
person of the victim. Toring assailed that he should be exonerated of the crime on the ground that
his act was a valid defense for Excobia, being his first cousin.

W/N the act of Toring was justified as defense for his relative.

No, Toring’s contention should not be given merit on the ground that it does not qualify for the
elements for the defense of a stranger in Art. 11 Sec. 3 of RPC. There was no reasonable cause to
believe Toring’s assertion regarding Samuel’s unlawful aggression. There is also a discrepancy to the
defense which is fatal in appreciating the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger. There is
also lack of proof of provocation on the part of Toring notwithstanding. Toring was rather motivated
by revenge, resentment or evil motive because of a "running feud" between the Augusto and the
Toring brothers as he admitted in court that in 1979, he was shot with a .22 caliber revolver by
Edgar Augusto, Samuel's brother. It cannot be said, therefore, that in attacking Samuel, Toring was
impelled by pure compassion or beneficence or the lawful desire to avenge the immediate wrong
inflicted on his cousin. Thus, it was ruled to have Luis Toring convicted as principal in the murder of
Samuel Augusto and Diosdado Berdon as an accomplice thereto.

(The court appreciated nighttime as an aggravating circumstance.

The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code being reclusion
temporal maximum to death, the imposable penalty is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal
medium in view of the presence of the mitigating circumstances of incomplete defense of relative and
voluntary surrender (Art. 64 [5]). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty to be
meted on Toring is prision correctional maximum as minimum to prision mayor maximum as
maximum penalty.

Pursuant to Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code, as an accomplice by his previous act of supplying
Toring the death weapon, Diosdado Berdon should be meted the penalty of prision mayor maximum
to reclusion temporal medium which is the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion
temporal maximum to death, the penalty prescribed for murder by Article 248 (Article 6 [3]). There
being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty should be in its medium period
or reclusion temporal minimum (Article 64 [1]). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum penalty should be taken from prision mayor minimum while the maximum penalty should
be within the period of reclusion temporal minimum.)

RRR. PEOPLE VS AGAPINAY, ET AL.

The evidence of the prosecution shows that the brothers Agapinays, Romeo Agapinay who is Delfin's
son, and that along with Virgilio Paino, and his brothers Amor Flores and Eufemio Paino, were
hirelings of Julia Rapada, an operator of fishing boats. On a regular fishing day, after said work, all
except for Romeo Agapinay, mended the net, with thread and small knives, under portable shed.
Meanwhile, Virgilio Paino took the shed and placed it where he and Alex and Cirilo Agapinay were.
Moments later, Romeo Agapinay appeared and confronted Virgilio, and berated him for taking the
shed without permission. Virgilio said that they were going to use it. Shortly, the two exchanged
words and tempers apparently flared. Romeo lunged at Virgilio with a hunting knife, six inches long,
that hit his right arm. Virgilio ran away but Delfin and Fortunato Agapinay met him and held on to his
arms. Romeo approached him and dealt him a second stab at the right side of his back. Virgilio,
however, managed to extricate himself again and ran away. While he was running, Delfin, Alex,
Fortunato, Dante, and Cirilo took turns in stoning him. All of a sudden Amor Flores appeared and
plunged a knife at the back of Virgilio. It was then that Virgilio collapsed. Meanwhile Julia cried, "Kill
him and we will bury him."

The prosecution also established that Cirilo and Delfin had attacked Eufemio Paino, a brother of
Virgilio, with their own knives but the latter defended himself with a paddle. The former ran away.
The rest of the Agapinays likewise fled. The brothers of Virgilio, and Artemio Siababa brought the
wounded Virgilio to his house wherein the the latter supposedly executed an ante-mortem statement
saying that the Agapinays as well as Amor Flores are responsible for the incident. Thereafter, he was
brought to the hospital and was pronounced as dead on arrival.

The court held the accused "all principals by participation,” but all six accused pleaded "not guilty." It
found that no evident premeditation attended the killing but appreciated treachery and conspiracy.
1. W/N conspiracy exist in the crime committed and thus, parties should be held jointly as co-
principals.
2. W/N there has been unlawful aggression acted by Virgilio.

1. No. No conspiracy exists in the Agapinays on the ground that the stabbing happened in the "spur
of the moment." Conspiracy means an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and a
decision to commit it. If the tragedy was a chance stabbing, there can be no conspiracy to speak
of. Hence, the parties' liability should be considered individually.

Only Romeo, Delfin, and Fortunato should be held as principals in the crime of murder. Romeo has
confessed to be a principal by direct participation, while Delfin and Fortunate are liable as principals
by cooperation. In holding the victim by his arms, both allowed Romeo to inflict upon him a stab
wound. It is indeed plain from the records that the trio of Romeo, Delfin, and Fortunato had taken
advantage of their strength to overcome the victim who, at that time, was already injured.

Alex, Dante, and Cirilo, on the other hand, should be held as simple accomplices for their acts of
pelting the victim with rocks. Since the deceased had already sustained two stab wounds, the act of
hurling rocks at him was not indispensable to justify holding them legally liable as principals. There is
further no doubt that murder has been committed, but not because of treachery, as ruled by the trial
court. Treachery depends on the suddenness of the attack, by which the victim is deprived of all
defenses, and in which the malefactor faces no risk to himself.

2. Of these three requisites for “defense of relatives”, "unlawful aggression" is said to be the most
essential and primary, without which any "defense" is not possible or justified. In the present case,
Virgilio Paino had not acted with unlawful aggression that might have provoked the Agapinays' deadly
wrath. The records show that all that Virgilio did was to address offensive language to Delfin
Agapinay. In one case, this Court held that 'injurious words or threats do not amount to unlawful
aggression. Assuming that Virgilio did strike Delfin and Romeo Agapinay with a paddle, the
expedients reveals that thereafter and upon having been stabbed in the right arm by Romeo, he,
Virgilio, ran away. It has also been ruled that: "Self-defense does not justify the unnecessary killing
of an aggressor who is retreating from the fray." However, the accused should be entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of provocation since clearly, the deceased uttered offending words ("vulva of
your mother, if you are talking as if you have no debts, not like me, I have no debts") that made the
Agapinays, especially Romeo, react violently. While the trial court disregarded this particular piece of
evidence, the entire picture seems to indicate that Virgilio Paino did say bad words that made the
Agapinays act in retaliation.

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