bpi vs iac

Facts:

Rizaldy T. Zshornack and his wife maintained in COMTRUST a dollar savings account and a peso current
account. An application for a dollar drat was accomplished by Virgillo Garcia branch manager of
COMTRUST payable to a certain Leovigilda Dizon. In the PPLICtion, Garcia indicated that the amount was
to be charged to the dolar savings account of the Zshornacks. There wasa no indication of the name of
the purchaser of the dollar draft. Comtrust issued a check payable to the order of Dizon. When
Zshornack noticed the withdrawal from his account, he demanded an explainaiton from the bank. In its
answer, Comtrust claimed that the peso value of the withdrawal was given to Atty. Ernesto Zshornack,
brother of Rizaldy. When he encashed with COMTRUST a cashiers check for P8450 issued by the manila
banking corporation payable to Ernesto.

Issue: Whether the contract between petitioner and respondent bank is a deposit?

Held: The document which embodies the contract states that the US$3,000.00 was received by the bank
for safekeeping. The subsequent acts of the parties also show that the intent of the parties was really for
the bank to safely keep the dollars and to return it to Zshornack at a later time. Thus, Zshornack
demanded the return of the money on May 10, 1976, or over five months later.

The above arrangement is that contract defined under Article 1962, New Civil Code, which reads:

Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to another,
with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same. If the safekeeping of the thing
delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but some other contract.

agro-industrial development corp vs court of appeals

FACTS:

CA Agro-Industrial Development Corp. (CA Agro) purchased two (2) parcels of land from the
spouses Ramon and Paula Pugao (Pugaos). CA Agro paid a downpayment and issued three (3) post-
dated checks covering the balance of the price. It was contracted that the titles to the lots shall be
transferred to CA Agro upon full payment of the purchase price and that the owner's copies of the
certificates of titles thereto shall be deposited in a safety deposit box of any bank. The same could be
withdrawn only upon the joint signatures of a representative of CA Agro and the Pugaos upon full
payment of the purchase price.
 Forthwith, CA Agro and the Pugaos rented Safety Deposit Box of Security Bank and Trust
Company (Bank). For this purpose, they both signed a contract of lease containing the following
conditions:

13. The bank is not a depositary of the contents of the safe and it has neither the possession nor control
of the same.

14. The bank has no interest whatsoever in said contents, except herein expressly provided, and it
assumes absolutely no liability in connection therewith.

After the execution of the contract, two (2) renter's keys were given to the renters — one to CA Agro
and the other to the Pugaos. A guard key remained in the possession of the Bank. The safety deposit box
has two (2) keyholes, one for the guard key and the other for the renter's key, and can be opened only
with the use of both keys.

Thereafter, a certain Mrs. Margarita Ramos (Ramos) offered to buy from CA Agro the two (2) lots at a
price that will yield a profit for the latter. Accordingly, Ramos demanded the execution of a deed of sale
which necessarily entailed the production of the certificates of title. In view thereof, CA Agro,
accompanied by the Pugaos, then proceeded to the bank to open the safety deposit box and get the
certificates of title. However, when opened in the presence of the Bank's representative, the box yielded
no such certificates. As a result, Ramos withdrew her offer to buy the lots.

As a consequence, CA Agro failed to realize the expected profit, thus, it filed a complaint for damages
against the Bank. The Bank in its answer with a counterclaim invoked paragraphs 13 and 14 of the
contract of lease for its defense.

In due course, the trial court rendered a decision against CA Agro on the ground that the provisions of
the contract of lease are binding on the parties, and that under said paragraphs, the Bank has no liability
for the loss of the certificates of title.

On Appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed decision principally on the theory that the
contract executed by CA Agro and the Bank is in the nature of a contract of lease by virtue of which CA
Agro and its co-renter were given control over the safety deposit box and its contents while the Bank
retained no right to open the said box because it had neither the possession nor control over it and its
contents, thus, the contract is governed by Article 1643 in relation to Article 1975 of the Civil Code.
Hence, CA Agro elevated the case to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court maintaining
that regardless of nomenclature, the contract for the rent of the safety deposit box is actually a contract
of deposit governed by Title XII, Book IV of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Whether the contractual relation between a commercial bank and another party in a contract of
rent of a safety deposit box with respect to its contents placed by the latter one of bailor and bailee or
one of lessor and lessee

HELD:

Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED

The contractual relation between a commercial bank and another party in a contract of rent of a
safety deposit box with respect to its contents placed by the latter is one of a bailor and bailee, the
bailment being for hire and mutual benefit, and it is not an ordinary deposit but special kind of deposit.

The contract for the rent of the safety deposit box is not an ordinary contract of lease as defined in
Article 1643 of the Civil Code. It cannot be characterized as an ordinary contract of lease under Article
1643 because the full and absolute possession and control of the safety deposit box was not given to the
joint renters. However, the Court does not fully subscribe to the view that the same is a contract of
deposit that is to be strictly governed by the provisions in the Civil Code on deposit; the contract in this
case is a special kind of deposit.

Neither could Article 1975 be invoked as an argument against the deposit theory. Obviously, the first
paragraph of such provision cannot apply to a depositary of certificates, bonds, securities or instruments
which earn interest if such documents are kept in a rented safety deposit box.
The prevailing rule in American Jurisprudence is that the relation between a bank renting out safe-
deposit boxes and its customer with respect to the contents of the box is that of a bailor and bailee, the
bailment being for hire and mutual benefit. While, in the context of our laws, particularly Section 72(a)
of the General Banking Act (now Section 52) which authorizes banking institutions to rent out safety
deposit boxes, it is clear that the prevailing rule in the United States has been adopted.

Sec. 72. In addition to the operations specifically authorized elsewhere in this Act, banking institutions
other than building and loan associations may perform the following services:

(a) Receive in custody funds, documents, and valuable objects, and rent safety deposit boxes for the
safeguarding of such effects.

xxx xxx xxx

The banks shall perform the services permitted under subsections (a), (b) and (c) of this section as
depositories or as agents. . . .

Nevertheless, the primary function is still found within the parameters of a contract of deposit, and, in
relation to Article 1306 of the Civil Code, the parties thereto may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy. Thus, the depositary's responsibility for the safekeeping of the
objects deposited in this case is governed by Title I, Book IV of the Civil Code. Accordingly, the depositary
would be liable if, in performing its obligation, it is found guilty of fraud, negligence, delay or
contravention of the tenor of the agreement, and in the absence of any stipulation prescribing the
degree of diligence required, that of a good father of a family is to be observed. Corollary, any
stipulation exempting the depositary from any liability arising from the loss of the thing deposited on
account of fraud, negligence or delay would be void for being contrary to law and public policy.

Furthermore, it is not correct to assert that the Bank has neither the possession nor control of the
contents of the box since in fact; the safety deposit box itself is located in its premises and is under its
absolute control. Moreover, the Bank keeps the guard key to the said box and renters cannot open their
respective boxes unless the Bank cooperates by presenting and using this guard key. Clearly then, to the
extent above stated, conditions 13 and 14 in the contract in question are void and ineffective.

However, the Court reached the same conclusion which the Court of Appeals arrived at but on grounds
quite different from those relied upon by the latter. The Bank's exoneration cannot be based on or
proceed from a characterization of the impugned contract as a contract of lease, but rather on the fact
that no competent proof was presented to show that Bank was aware of the agreement between CA
Agro and the Pugaos to the effect that the certificates of title were withdrawable from the safety
deposit box only upon both parties' joint signatures, and that no evidence was submitted to reveal that
the loss of the certificates of title was due to the fraud or negligence of the Bank. Since both CA Agro
and the Pugaos agreed that each should have one (1) renter's key, it was obvious that either of them
could ask the Bank for access to the safety deposit box and, with the use of such key and the Bank's own
guard key, could open the said box, without the other renter being present.

Since, however, CA Agro cannot be blamed for the filing of the complaint and no bad faith on its part
had been established, the trial court erred in condemning the CA Agro to pay the Bank attorney's fees.
To this extent, the Decision of Court of Appeals was modified.

The Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro vs. Gregorio De La PeÑa

FACTS: In 1898 Fr. De la Peña assigned as trustee of the sum of P6,641, collected by him for the
charitable purposes he deposited in his personal account P19,000 in the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank at
Iloilo. During the war of the revolution, Father De la Peña was arrested by the military authorities as a
political prisoner. The arrest of Father De la Peña and the confiscation of the funds in the bank were the
result of the claim of the military authorities that he was an insurgent and that the funds deposited had
been collected by him is for revolutionary purposes. The money was taken from the bank by the military
authorities by virtue of such order, was confiscated and turned over to the Government.

ISSUES: Whether or not Father De la Peña is liable for the loss of the funds?

RULLING: No, he is not liable because there is no negligent act on the part of Fr. De la Peña. It was so
happened that during that time the money was taken from him by the U.S. military forces which is
unforeseen event. Although the Civil Code states that “a person obliged to give something is also bound
to preserve it with the diligence pertaining to a good father of a family”, it also provides, following the
principle of the Roman law that “no one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen, or which
having been foreseen were inevitable, with the exception of the cases expressly mentioned in the law or
those in which the obligation so declares.”

Durban Apartments Corporation v Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation

Facts: Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation, by right of subrogation, filed a Complaint for Recovery
of Damages against Durban Apartment Corporation. Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation is the
insurer of Jeffrey S. See,’s 2001 Suzuki Grand Vitara. Loss occured when See‘s Vitara was carnapped
while it was in the possession of petitioner Durban Apartment Hotel.

Issue: WON there exist a contract of deposit

Held: there exist a contract of necessary deposit

Article 1962, in relation to Article 1998, of the Civil Code defines a contract of deposit and a
necessary deposit made by persons in hotels or inns:

Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to another,
with the obligation of safely keeping it and returning the same. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered
is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but some other contract.
 Art. 1998. The deposit of effects made by travelers in hotels or inns shall also be regarded as
necessary. The keepers of hotels or inns shall be responsible for them as depositaries, provided that
notice was given to them, or to their employees, of the effects brought by the guests and that, on the
part of the latter, they take the precautions which said hotel-keepers or their substitutes advised
relative to the care and vigilance of their effects.

Facts shows that the contract of depost was perfected from See’s delivery, when he handed over to
Justimbaste the keys to his vehicle, which Justimbaste receive with the obligation of the safely keeping
and returning it. Evidence was show that Justimbaste issued a valet parking customer claim stub.

yht realty v. ca

FACTS

Respondent McLoughlin would always stay at Tropicana Hotel every time he is here in thePhilippines
and would rent a safety deposit box. The safety deposit box could only be openedthrough the use of 2
keys, one of which is given to the registered guest, and the other remaining inthe possession of the
management of the hotel.McLoughlin allegedly placed the following in his safety deposit box – 2
envelopes containingUS Dollars, one envelope containing Australian Dollars, Letters, credit cards,
bankbooks and acheckbook.On 12 December 1987, before leaving for a brief trip, McLoughlin took some
items from thesafety box which includes the ff: envelope containing Five Thousand US Dollars
(US$5,000.00), theother envelope containing Ten Thousand Australian Dollars (AUS$10,000.00), his
passports and hiscredit cards. The other items were left in the deposit box. Upon arrival, he found out
that a fewdollars were missing and the jewelry he bought was likewise missing.Eventually, he
confronted Lainez and Paiyam who admitted that Tan opened the safetydeposit box with the key
assigned to him. McLoughlin went up to his room where Tan was stayingand confronted her. Tan
admitted that she had stolen McLouglin’s key and was able to open thesafety deposit box with the
assistance of Lopez, Paiyam and Lainez. Lopez also told McLoughlinthat Tan stole the key assigned to
McLouglin while the latter was asleep.McLoughlin insisted that it must be the hotel who must assume
responsibility for the loss hesuffered. Lopez refused to accept responsibility relying on the conditions for
renting the safetydeposit box entitled “Undertaking For the Use of Safety Deposit Box”

ISSUE
WON the “Undertaking for the Use of Safety Deposit Box” admittedly executed by privaterespondent is
null and void.

HELD

YES Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an expression of public policyprecisely to
apply to situations such as that presented in this case. The hotel business like thecommon carrier’s
business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers arebound to provide not
only lodging for hotel guests and security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty constitutes the
essence of the business. The law in turn does not allow such duty tothe public to be negated or diluted
by any contrary stipulation in so-called “undertakings” thatordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed
by hotel keepers on guests for their signature.In an early case (De Los Santos v. Tan Khey), CA ruled that
to hold hotelkeepers orinnkeeper liable for the effects of their guests, it is not necessary that they be
actually delivered tothe innkeepers or their employees. It is enough that such effects are within the
hotel or inn. Withgreater reason should the liability of the hotelkeeper be enforced when the missing
items aretaken without the guest’s knowledge and consent from a safety deposit box provided by the
hotelitself, as in this case.Paragraphs (2) and (4) of the “undertaking” manifestly contravene Article
2003, CC for theyallow Tropicana to be released from liability arising from any loss in the contents
and/or use of thesafety deposit box for any cause whatsoever. Evidently, the undertaking was intended
to bar anyclaim against Tropicana for any loss of the contents of the safety deposit box whether or
notnegligence was incurred by Tropicana or its employees. The New Civil Code is explicit that
theresponsibility of the hotel-keeper shall extend to loss of, or injury to, the personal property of
theguests even if caused by servants or employees of the keepers of hotels or inns as well as
bystrangers, except as it may proceed from any force majeure.

guingona vs city fiscal

Facts:

From March 1979 to March 1981, Clement David made several investments with the National Savings
and Loan Association. On March 21, 1981, the bank was placed under receivership by the Bangko
Sentral. Upon David’s request, petitioners Guingona and Martin issued a joint promissory note,
absorbing the obligations of the bank. On July 17, 1981, they divided the indebtedness. David filed a
complaint for estafa and violation of Central Bank Circular No. 364 and related regulations regarding
foreign exchange transactions before the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. Petitioners filed the herein
petition for prohibition and injunction with a prayer for immediate issuance of restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the public respondents to proceed with the preliminary
investigation on the ground that the petitioners’ obligation is civil in nature.
Issue:

(1) Whether the contract between NSLA and David is a contract of depositor a contract of loan, which
answer determines whether the City Fiscal has the jurisdiction to file a case for estafa

(2) Whether there was a violation of Central Bank Circular No. 364

Held

(1) When private respondent David invested his money on nine. and savings deposits with the aforesaid
bank, the contract that was perfected was a contract of simple loan or mutuum and not a contract of
deposit. Hence, the relationship between the private respondent and the Nation Savings and Loan
Association is that of creditor and debtor; consequently, the ownership of the amount deposited was
transmitted to the Bank upon the perfection of the contract and it can make use of the amount
deposited for its banking operations, such as to pay interests on deposits and to pay withdrawals. While
the Bank has the obligation to return the amount deposited, it has, however, no obligation to return or
deliver the same money that was deposited. And, the failure of the Bank to return the amount
deposited will not constitute estafa through misappropriation punishable under Article 315, par. l(b) of
the Revised Penal Code, but it will only give rise to civil liability over which the public respondents have
no jurisdiction.

But even granting that the failure of the bank to pay the time and savings deposits of private respondent
David would constitute a violation of paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code,
nevertheless any incipient criminal liability was deemed avoided, because when the aforesaid bank was
placed under receivership by the Central Bank, petitioners Guingona and Martin assumed the obligation
of the bank to private respondent David, thereby resulting in the novation of the original contractual
obligation arising from deposit into a contract of loan and converting the original trust relation between
the bank and private respondent David into an ordinary debtor-creditor relation between the
petitioners and private respondent. Consequently, the failure of the bank or petitioners Guingona and
Martin to pay the deposits of private respondent would not constitute a breach of trust but would
merely be a failure to pay the obligation as a debtor. Moreover, while it is true that novation does not
extinguish criminal liability, it may however, prevent the rise of criminal liability as long as it occurs prior
to the filing of the criminal information in court. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioners
Guingona and Martin executed a promissory note on June 17, 1981 assuming the obligation of the bank
to private respondent David; while the criminal complaint for estafa was filed on December 23, 1981
with the Office of the City Fiscal. Hence, it is clear that novation occurred long before the filing of the
criminal complaint with the Office of the City Fiscal. Consequently, as aforestated, any incipient criminal
liability would be avoided but there will still be a civil liability on the part of petitioners Guingona and
Martin to pay the assumed obligation.

(2) Petitioner Guingona merely accommodated the request of the Nation Savings and loan Association in
order to clear the bank draft through his dollar account because the bank did not have a dollar account.
Immediately after the bank draft was cleared, petitioner Guingona authorized Nation Savings and Loan
Association to withdraw the same in order to be utilized by the bank for its operations. It is safe to
assume that the U.S. dollars were converted first into Philippine pesos before they were accepted and
deposited in Nation Savings and Loan Association, because the bank is presumed to have followed the
ordinary course of the business which is to accept deposits in Philippine currency only, and that the
transaction was regular and fair, in the absence of a clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

In conclusion, considering that the liability of the petitioners is purely civil in nature and that there is no
clear showing that they engaged in foreign exchange transactions, We hold that the public respondents
acted without jurisdiction when they investigated the charges against the petitioners. Consequently,
public respondents should be restrained from further proceeding with the criminal case for to allow the
case to continue, even if the petitioners could have appealed to the Ministry of Justice, would work
great injustice to petitioners and would render meaningless the proper administration of justice.

BPI vs reyes

FACTS:

On December 7, 1990, respondent Jesusa Reyes together with her daughter, went to BPI Zapote Branch
to open an ATM account.

Respondent informed one of petitioners employees, Mr. Capati, that they wanted to open an ATM
account for the amount of P200,000.00, P100,000.00 of which shall be withdrawn from her exiting
savings account with BPI bank which is account no. 0233-2433-88 and the other P100,000.00 will be
given by her in cash.

Capati allegedly made a mistake and prepared a withdrawal slip for P200,00.00 to be withdrawn from
her existing savings account with said bank and the respondent believing in good faith that Capati
prepared the papers with the correct amount signed the same unaware of the mistakes in figures.

Minutes later after the slips were presented to the teller, Capati returned to where the respondent was
seating and informed the latter that the withdrawable balance could not accommodate P200,000.00.

Respondent explained that she is withdrawing the amount of P100,000.00 only and then changed and
correct the figure two (2) into one (1) with her signature super-imposed thereto signifying the change,
afterwhich the amount of P100,000.00 in cash in two bundles containing 100 pieces of P500.00 peso bill
were given to Capati with her daughter Joan witnessing the same. Thereafter Capati prepared a deposit
slip for P200,000.00 in the name of resondent Jesusa Reyes with the new account no. 0235-0767-48 and
brought the same to the teller's booth.

After a while, he returned and handed to the respondent her duplicate copy of her deposit to account
no. 0235-0767-48 reflecting the amount of P200,000.00 with receipt stamp showing December 7, as the
date.
Later on, respondent would become aware that her ATM account only contained the amount of
P100,000.00 with interest. Hence, she filed an action before the RTC.

Petitioner claimed that there was actually no cash involved with the transactions which happened on
December 7, 1990 as contained in the bank’s teller tape.

On August 12, 1994, the RTC issued a Decision upholding the versions of respondents.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision with modification

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in sustaining the RTC's finding that respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit of
P200,000.00 in her newly opened Express Teller account on December 7, 1990.

HELD:

It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must prove his own affirmative allegations by the
degree of evidence required by law. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish
his case by preponderance of evidence, or that evidence which is of greater weight or is more
convincing than that which is in opposition to it. It does not mean absolute truth; rather, it means that
the testimony of one side is more believable than that of the other side, and that the probability of truth
is on one side than on the other.

For a better perspective on the calibration of the evidence on hand, it must first be stressed that the
judge who had heard and seen the witnesses testify was not the same judge who penned the decision.
Thus, not having heard the testimonies himself, the trial judge or the appellate court would not be in a
better position than this Court to assess the credibility of witnesses on the basis of their demeanor.

Hence, to arrive at the truth, we thoroughly reviewed the transcripts of the witnesses' testimonies and
examined the pieces of evidence on record.

After a careful and close examination of the records and evidence presented by the parties, we find that
respondents failed to successfully prove by preponderance of evidence that respondent Jesusa made an
initial deposit of P200,000.00 in her Express Teller account.

Citibank NA vs sabeniano

FACTS: Petitioner Citibank is a banking corporation duly authorized under the laws of the USA to do
commercial banking activities n the Philippines. Sabeniano was a client of both Petitioners Citibank and
FNCB Finance. Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners claiming to have substantial deposits,
the proceeds of which were supposedly deposited automatically and directly to respondent’s account
with the petitioner Citibank and that allegedly petitioner refused to despite repeated demands.
Petitioner alleged that respondent obtained several loans from the former and in default, Citibank
exercised its right to set-off respondent’s outstanding loans with her deposits and money. RTC declared
the act illegal, null and void and ordered the petitioner to refund the amount plus interest, ordering
Sabeniano, on the other hand to pay Citibank her indebtedness. CA affirmed the decision entirely in
favor of the respondent.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner may exercise its right to set-off respondent’s loans with her deposits and
money in Citibank-Geneva

RULING: Petition is partly granted with modification.

1. Citibank is ordered to return to respondent the principal amount of P318,897.34 and P203,150.00
plus 14.5% per annum

2. The remittance of US $149,632.99 from respondent’s Citibank-Geneva account is declared illegal, null
and void, thus Citibank is ordered to refund said amount in Philippine currency or its equivalent using
exchange rate at the time of payment.

3. Citibank to pay respondent moral damages of P300,000, exemplary damages for P250,000, attorney’s
fees of P200,000.

4. Respondent to pay petitioner the balance of her outstanding loans of P1,069,847.40 inclusive off
interest.