guilty thereof in the light of the following circumstances
In relation to Crimes against
Property by CBOS
A. Anti-Arson Law (PD 1613)
1. People v. Acosta, GR 126351, Feb 18, 2000
Facts:
 In the morning, Complainant Montesclaros, in the
belief that the accused and his wife were the ones
hiding his live-in partner from him, stormed the house
of the accused and burned their clothes, furniture, and
appliances.
 Thereafter, at about 4:00 to 5:00 o’clock in the
afternoon of that same day, Mona Aquino saw accused
carrying a stove and a knife. She approached the
accused and asked him why he way carrying a gas stove
and a knife, the latter replied that he will burn the
house of complainant Montesclaros.
 A few minutes after, Aquino heard the sound of broken
bottles and the throwing of chair inside the house of
complainant. When she peeped through her kitchen
door, she saw accused inside complainant’s house,
which was unoccupied at that time. Thereafter,
appellant poured kerosene on the bed of complainant
and lighted it with cigarette lighter. The fire was easily
put off by accused’s wife who arrived at the place.
 At around 1:00 am, prosecution witness Videña awoke
from her sleep of the barking of her dogs, she saw that
complainants house was burning. Complainant peeped
through the GI sheets and saw the accused standing
alone in front of the burning house of complainant.
 Accused was charged with Arson and was convicted by
the trial court.
 Accused appealed and questioned the decision on the
ground of insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence
against him.
Issue: WON accused may be guilty of arson with the
circumstantial evidences against him?
Ruling: Yes. Arson is defined as the malicious destruction
of property by fire. In this case, we find the trial court
correctly held that the following circumstances taken
together constitute an unbroken chain of events pointing
to one fair and logical conclusion, that accused started
the fire which gutted the house of private complainant.
Although there is no direct evidence linking appellant to
the arson, we agree with the trial court in holding him
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duly proved and on record.
In prosecutions for arson, proof of the crime charged is
complete where the evidence establishes (1) the corpus
delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and (2)
the identity of the defendants as the one responsible for
the crime. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is generally
satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire and
of its having been intentionally caused. Even the
uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, if credible,
may be enough to prove the corpus delicti and to
warrant conviction.
2. People v. Soriano, GR 142565, July 29, 2003
Facts:
 There was a disagreement between Soriano and
Rosario regarding their child. It stemmed from the fact
that Honey’s brother, Oscar Cimagala, took their child
out without the consent of accused-appellant who
wanted both Honey and Otoy instead to return with
him to Manila. But Honey refused.
 As their discussion wore on accused-appellant
intimated to Honey his desire to have sex with her,
which he vigorously pursued the night before with
much success. This time Honey did not relent to the
baser instincts of Nestor; instead, she kicked him as her
stern rebuke to his sexual importuning.
 In the heated exchanges, Nestor struck Honey in the
forehead. You are hurting me, she snapped back, just
like what you did to me in Manila.
 Nestor then moved away as he muttered: It is better
that I burn this house, and then took a match from the
top of a cabinet, lighted a cigarette and set fire to the
plastic partition that served as divider of Honeys room.
He also set on fire the clothes. As a result, the house
occupied by Honey was totally burned together with
five (5) neighboring houses.
 RTC ruled that the crime committed was destructive
arson.
Issue: WON the defendant has committed the crime of
destructive arson.
Ruling: No. Under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and PD 1613, Arson is classified into two kinds:
(1) Destructive Arson (Art. 320) and (2) other cases of
arson (PD 1613). This classification is based on the kind,
character and location of the property burned,
regardless of the value of the damage caused.
Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA
7659, contemplates the malicious burning of structures,
both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains,
vessels, aircraft, factories and other military,
government or commercial establishments by any
person or group of persons. The classification of this type
of crime is known as Destructive Arson, which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. On the other
hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326-B of The
Revised Penal Code remains the governing law for Simple
Arson. This decree contemplates the malicious burning
of public and private structures, regardless of size, not
included in Art. 320, as amended by RA 7659, and
classified as other cases of arson.
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from
Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness
of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art.
320 of The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive
Arson are characterized as heinous crimes for being
grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by
reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of
decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered
society. On the other hand, acts committed under PD
1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser
degree of perversity and viciousness that the law
punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple
Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social,
economic, political and national security implications
than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under
Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into
Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying
circumstances present.
In the present case, the act committed by accused-
appellant neither appears to be heinous nor represents
a greater degree of perversity and viciousness as
distinguished from those acts punishable under Art. 320
of The Revised Penal Code. No qualifying circumstance
was established to convert the offense to Destructive
Arson. The special aggravating circumstance that
accused-appellant was motivated by spite or hatred
towards the owner or occupant of the property burned
cannot be appreciated in the present case where it
appears that he was acting more on impulse, heat of
anger or risen temper rather than real spite or hatred
that impelled him to give vent to his wounded ego.
Nothing can be worse than a spurned lover or a
disconsolate father under the prevailing circumstances
that surrounded the burning of the Cimagala house. Thus,
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accused-appellant must be held guilty of Simple Arson
penalized under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 for the act of
intentionally burning an inhabited house or dwelling.
3. People v. Macabando, GR 188708, July 31, 2013
Facts:
 On Dec. 21, 2010 the accused burned his house. The
fire spread to several other inhabited houses in their
barangay.
 The RTC convicted him with Destructive Arson.
 This finding was based on the accused’s statement
shortly before the fire that he would get revenge and
burn his house. Neighbors of the accused further
testified that when they arrived at the accused’s
burning house he prevented them from putting out the
fire and even threatened them with a gun.
 Defense denied all the allegations and evidence of the
prosecution, the accused alleged that he made no such
statements and threats, that the fire was accidental
and occurred while he was sleeping.
Issue: Does the burning of inhabited houses or dwellings
constitute Destructive Arson under Art. 320 of the RPC?
Ruling: No, while the evidence of the prosecution is
sufficient, destructive arson was not the proper crime
based on the factual findings of the court. Art. 320 of the
RPC governing destructive arson does not include the
burning of any inhabited house or dwelling. Rather, it
contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both
public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains,
vessels, aircraft, factories and other military,
government or commercial establishments by any
person or group of persons.
In the instant case, the SC concluded that, based on the
testimonies of the witnesses and the accused himself, as
well as the reports from the Bureau of Fire Protection
and the City Social Welfare and Development
Department, the houses affected were residential or
used as dwellings. It further ruled that the fact that many
families were affected will not convert the crime to
destructive arson, since the appellant’s act does not
appear to be heinous or represents a greater degree of
perversity and viciousness when compared to those acts
punished under Article 320 of the RPC. The established
evidence only showed that the appellant intended to
burn his own house, but the conflagration spread to the
neighboring houses.
Notes: (no need to write this down)
Difference between DA and SA: The nature of
Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by
the degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal
offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The
Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are
characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous,
odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity
and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the
common standards and norms of decency and morality
in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other
hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple
Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and
viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty.
In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with
less significant social, economic, political and national
security implications than Destructive Arson.
Elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No.
1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is
intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.
4. Buebos v. People, GR 163938, March 28, 2008
Facts:
• On January 1, 1994 around 3:00 oclock in the morning,
Adelina B. Borbe was in her house watching over her
sick child.
• She heard some noise around the house, got up and
looked through the window and saw the four accused
congregating in front of her hut.
• When she went out, she saw the roof of her nipa hut
already on fire. She shouted for help. Instead of coming
to her immediate succor, the four fled.
• At some distance away, Olipiano Berjuela heard
Adelina scream for help, immediately ran to the place
and saw a number of people jumping over the fence.
• when he focused his flashlight on them, he was able to
identify Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio
Cornel, Jr. He also saw Rolando Buela running away.
• On complaint of Adelina, petitioners Dante and
Sarmelito Buebos, together with Rolando Buela and
Antonio Cornel, Jr., were indicted for arson.
• RTC held them guilty of arson and sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum
• the CA lowered the penalty ranging from six (6) years
of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of
prision mayor as maximum opined that the accused
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could only be convicted of simple arson, punishable by
prision mayor, and not for burning of an inhabited
house, which is punishable by imprisonment ranging
from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua.
According to the appellate court, the information
failed to allege with specificity the actual crime
committed. Hence, the accused should be found liable
only for arson in its simple form.
Issue: Whether accused were guilty of arson of an
inhabited place which merits a penalty of up to reclusion
perpetua?
Ruling: No. The elements of this form of arson are: (a)
there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally
burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Admittedly,
there is a confluence of the foregoing elements here.
However, the information failed to allege that what was
intentionally burned was an inhabited house or dwelling.
That is fatal.
Under the new rules, the information or complaint must
state the designation of the offense given by the statute
and specify its qualifying and generic aggravating
circumstances. Otherwise stated, the accused will not be
convicted of the offense proved during the trial if it was
not properly alleged in the information.
Here, there was no allegation that the house
intentionally burned by petitioners and their cohorts was
inhabited. Rather, the information merely recited that
accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another, with intent to cause damage, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously set on
fire the nipa roof of the house of ADELINA B. BORBE, to
the latters damage and prejudice.
Although the rule took effect only on December 1, 2000,
while the petitioners were convicted by the RTC on April
7, 1998, it may be applied retroactively. It is elementary
that rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive
application insofar as they benefit the accused.
In fine, petitioners can be convicted only of simple arson,
under Section 1, paragraph 1 of P.D. No. 1613,
punishable by prision mayor.
5. Amora v. People, GR 154466, Jan 28, 2008
Facts:
 June 27, 1993, a fire broke out in the bldg. used by
Amora as residence and as a bakery. The fire also
gutted nearby houses.
 Amora’s edifice was constructed on a lot owned by
Adelfa. Adelfa’s father had earlier entered into a
contract of lease with Amora. It states that Amora
would use the lot and erect a bldg. and upon expiration
of the contract, ownership of the bldg. shall be
transferred to the lessor.
 Jan 4, 1993, Adelfa informed Amora that she would no
longer renew the contract of lease.
 Jan 14, 1993, Amora secured fire insurances from 2
different insurance company: Malayan Insurance
Company and Makati Insurance Company. It appears
that the amounts of insurance coverage were
substantially higher than the bldg’s market value.
 During the actual fire, Amora was within the premises,
heard shouts from his neighbor, ignored the same at
first, and only later on did he finally stand up to see
what was going on.
 Investigation Report concluded that the cause of fire
was intentionally done.
 Amora was charged with the crime of Destructive
Arson.
Issue: WON Amora was guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of Destructive Arson.
Ruling: Yes. The applicability is beyond cavil. The facts
shows that the crime was committed in a place where
bakeries, barber shops, tailoring shops and other
commercial and residential buildings were situated. It is
clear that the place of the commission of the crime was
residential and commercial building located in an urban
and populated area. This qualifying circumstance places
the offense squarly within the ambit of Sec 2(7) of PD
1613, and converts it to “destructive arson.”
It was also established that the subject building was
insured against fire for an amount substantially more
than its market value, a fact that has given rise to the
unrebutted prima facie evidence of arson as provided in
Sec 6 of PD 1613.
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6. People v. Baluntong, GR 182061, March 15,
2010
Facts:
• At around 10:30pm Jovelyn, an occupant, awoke from
her sleep by the heat emanating from the walls of their
house. She, together with another occupant rushed
outside their house and saw appellant putting dry hay
around the house near the terrace where the fire
started, but appellant ran away when he saw them.
• Celerina, the owner of the house, who was outside of
the house that time rushed inside the burning house to
save her grandsons Alvin and Joshua. Unfortunately
both Celerina and Alvin died of 3rd degree burns.
Joshua suffered 2nd degree burns.
• Accused appellant was charged and convicted of the
crime of double murder and frustrated murder in the
information. Apellant questioned the credibility of the
witnesses but the SC upheld the findings of the trial
court. The SC however modified the ruling and
convicted him however of the crime of Arson.
Issue: In what instances will a crime of burning fall under
arson or homicide or both?
Ruling: In cases where both burning and death occur, in
order to determine what crime/crimes was/were
perpetrated whether arson, murder or arson and
homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main
objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is
the burning of the building or edifice, but death results
by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply
arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on
the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular
person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is
resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the
crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the
objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in
fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted
to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two
separate and distinct crimes committed
homicide/murder and arson.
As reflected above, as it was not shown that the main
motive was to kill the occupants of the house, the crime
would only be arson, the homicide being a mere
consequence thereof, hence, absorbed by arson.
Note: When there is variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information and that proved,
and the offense charged is included or necessarily
includes the offense proved, conviction shall be for the
offense proved which is included in the offense charged,
or the offense charged which is included in the offense
proved.
7. People v. Cedenio, GR 93485, June 27, 1994
Facts:
• On November 26, 1986, Dorio residence was gutted
with fire. Five members of the family, then occupying
the house were burned to death. The five bodies
retrieved were those of Mario Hilario Dorio, with
wounds on the head and chest, Flora Dorio with a
wound on the leg and head almost severed, Mario
Dorio with wounds on the leg and left nipple, Nicanora
Tabanao with a wound in the stomach and infant
Dioscora with no wounds at all but charred to the bone.
• Two witnesses testified that the three appellants
namely, Pedro Cedenio, Jurito Amarga and Felipe
Antipolo were seen running out of the burning house,
holding bolos stained with blood.
• Another witness testified that Pedro Cedenio
borrowed from him a bolo on the night of November
26, and the following morning, the bolo was returned
to him with a bloodstain on the handle. The accused
Pedro Cedinio, also told him “do not worry, if this
incident reaches the court, I will answer (for)
everything”
• The trial court found the accused-appellants guilty of
Arson with Multiple Murder as defined and penalized
under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613.
Issue: WON the appellant should be charged by a
complex crime of arson with murder.
Ruling: No. The late Mr. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino
cites Groizard-
…when the fire is used with the intent to kill a particular
person who may be in the house and that the objective
is attained by burning the house, the crime is murder
only. When the Penal Code declares that killing
committed by means of fire is murder, it intends that fire
should be purposely adopted as a means to that end.
There can be no murder without a design to take life. In
other words, if the main object of the offender is to kill
by means of fire, the offense is murder. But if the main
objective is the burning of a building, the resulting
homicide may be absorbed by the crime of arson.
From the evidence adduced, it is evident that after the
victims were hacked and stabbed to death, appellants set
the house afire to hide their gruesome act. Thus, the
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appellant are guilty of a separate crime of four counts of
murder and arson. And not the complex crime of arson
with murder.
B. Anti-Carnapping Law (RA No. 6539,
as amended by RA No. 7659)
1. People v. Bustinera, GR 148233, June 8, 2004
Facts:
• Accused was a driver of one of the taxis owned by Elias
Cipriano, an operator of several taxicabs under the
name of ESC transport.
• It was agreed that he would drive the taxi assigned to
him, a Daewoo Racer GTE taxi, from 6 AM to 11 PM,
return it to the ESC garage and remit the daily
boundary fee.
• On Dec. 25, 1996, he took out the taxi however he
failed to return the same within the day. He contended
that he failed to bring it back because was still short of
his boundary. The lower court convicted the accused
for qualified theft.
• Accused, for his part, does not deny his failure to
return the taxi on that day but maintains that his
reason for failing to return the taxi was his inability to
remit the boundary fee, his earnings that day not
having permitted it; and that there was no intent to
gain since the taking of the taxi was not permanent in
character, he having returned it.
1 Issue: In view of the passage of the Anti-Carnapping
Law or R.A. 6539, was the conviction of the accused for
qualified theft still proper?
Ruling: No. By the passage of R.A. 6539, jurisprudence
holds that the unlawful taking of motor vehicles is now
covered by the anti-carnapping law and not by the
provisions on qualified theft or robbery. Since Bustinera
is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo
sedan, it is the anti-carnapping law and not the
provisions of qualified theft which would apply as the
said motor vehicle does not fall within the exceptions
mentioned in the anti-carnapping law.
2 Issue: Can the accused be convicted of carnapping
instead?
Ruling: Yes. All the elements of carnapping are present.
Unlawful taking
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the
motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or
by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from
the moment the offender gains possession of the thing,
even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.
While the nature of appellant’s possession of the taxi
was initially lawful as he was hired as a taxi driver and
was entrusted possession thereof, his act of not
returning it to its owner, which is contrary to company
practice and against the owner’s consent transformed
the character of the possession into an unlawful one.
Intent to gain
Intent to gain is an internal act, presumed from the
unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is
irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to
gain. The term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary
benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other
sense may be derived or expected from the act which is
performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was
taken without the owner’s consent constitutes gain.
Besides, it is well-entrenched in jurisprudence that when
one takes the motor vehicle of another without the
latter’s consent even if the motor vehicle is later
returned, there is theft - there being intent to gain as the
use of the thing unlawfully taken constitutes gain. In this
case, the SC concluded that there was no return even.
2. People v. Lagat, GR 187044, Sept 14, 2011
Facts:
• prosecution presented the wife of the victim to testify
on the circumstances leading to Biags disappearance
and the discovery of his body, the recovery of Biags
tricycle; that around around 2 am her husband left to
operate his tricycle and around 11am she received
news that their tricycle was with the PNP and that her
husband went to an accident; after learning of the
incident, she went to the brgy captain and sought help
and around 2pm the brgy captain told her what
happened to her husband
• second witness for prosecution was the chief tanod
and testified that after he and Brgy. Captain Dulay
received Floridas report, they immediately went to the
Alicia Police Station, wherein they found Biags tricycle.
PNP told them that the tricycle was used in stealing
palay from a store and that the owner of the tricycle
was killed and dumped along the road.
• PO2 salvador took the witness stand next and testified
that they received a report that canvas of palay were
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stolen in a tricycle commandeered by two male
persons; that they formed a team and went to a palay
buying station and saw the tricycle described, with the
cavans of palay, and the two accused. He averred that
when he and his team were about to approach the
tricycle. the two accused scampered to different
directions. After collaring the two accused, they
brought them to the Alicia PNP Station together with
the tricycle and its contents; When they reached the
station, they asked the two accused if they had any
papers to show for both the tricycle and the palay, to
which the two accused did not answer. He also
personally found a wallet containing the tricycles
Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt issued
by the Land Transportation Office in the name of Jose
Biag. When they asked the two accused about their
discoveries, Lagat and Palalay voluntarily answered
that the name in the papers is that of the owner of the
tricycle, whom they killed and dumped along
Angadanan and San Guillermo Road, when they
carnapped his tricyle. Thereafter, they coordinated
with the PNP of Angadanan Police Station, and
together with the two accused, they proceeded to
Angadanan-San Guillermo Road, where they found
Biags body in a ravine just after the bridge near the
road.
• The accused also claimed that the circumstantial
evidence presented by the prosecution was not
sufficient to convict them.
• RTC held that despite the absence of an eyewitness,
the prosecution was able to establish enough
circumstantial evidence to prove that Lagat and Palalay
committed the crime
Issue: Whether the circumstantial evidence presented
were sufficient to convict the accused for the crime of
qualified carnapping?
Ruling: Yes. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
if: (a) There is more than one circumstance, (b) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven, and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a
moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, is the one who has committed the crime.
A careful and exhaustive examination of the evidence
presented, excluding those that are inadmissible, show
that the circumstantial evidence, when viewed as a
whole, effectively establishes the guilt of Lagat and
Palalay beyond reasonable doubt. We considered the
following pieces of evidence as convincing:
 First, Lagat and Palalay were found in possession of the
tricycle the same day that it, together with its owner
Biag, was reported missing.
Second, Lagat and Palalay were found at a palay buying
station, with the stolen tricycle packed with cavans of
palay allegedly stolen in Alicia, Isabela.
Third, Lagat and Palalay who were then on board the
tricycle, jumped and ran the moment they saw the
Alicia PNP approaching them.
Fourth, Lagat and Palalay could not explain to the Alicia
PNP why they were in possession of Biags tricycle.
Fifth, Biags wallet and his tricycles registration papers
were found in the tricycle upon its inspection by the
Alicia PNP.
Sixth, Biags body bore hack wounds as evidenced by
the post-mortem autopsy done on him, while his
tricycle had traces of blood in it.
The foregoing circumstantial evidence only leads to the
conclusion that Lagat and Palalay conspired to kill Biag in
order to steal his tricycle. Direct proof that the two
accused conspired is not essential as it may be inferred
from their conduct before, during, and after their
commission of the crime that they acted with a common
purpose and design. The pieces of evidence presented by
the prosecution are consistent with one another and the
only rational proposition that can be drawn therefrom is
that the accused are guilty of killing Biag to carnap his
tricycle.
Further, when a person is killed or raped in the course of
or on the occasion of the carnapping, the crime of
carnapping is qualified and the penalty is increased
pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539. Hence,
accused are guilty of qualified carnapping and RTC
properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
3. People v. Nocum, GR 179041, April 1, 2013
Facts:
 Mahilac is a self-confessed member of “FX gang,” a
syndicate notorious for carjacking Toyota FX vehicles.
The modus operandi of the gang is to carnap Toyota FX
vehicles, transport them to Mindanao and have them
registered and sold to prospective buyers there. He
was previously charged but was discharged to be a
state witness.
 Mahilac testified that “FX gang was active in Metro
Manila and Mindano. Nocum led in Manila and
Pangandag in Mindanao. Ramos, Posadas and Mallari
were members of the gang.
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 They met in Chowking Muntilupa for a meeting which
Pangandag demanded that their group would deliver
two Toyota FX vehicles in Lanao Del Norte.
 As the group was departing from the restaurant, a
Toyota FX taxi passed-by. Mallari flagged it down,
talked to the driver and boarded the same together
with Ramos and Posadas. They proceeded south.
 Sept 14, 1998, Mahilac arrived in CDO. Mallari, Ramos
and Posadas arrived on board the same Toyota FX taxi
that Mallari flagged down in Muntinlupa City. Mallari
told Mahilac not to board the said vehicle because its
back portion reeked of the dried blood of the FX taxi
driver, Medel, who was stabbed to death while
resisting the group. Mallari also informed Mahilac that
Medel’s corpse was dumped somewhere in Quezon.
 Upon their arrival in Illigan City, Pangandag instructed
them to take the vehicle to his residence, where he
gave them P250,000.00 as consideration for the
vehicle.
 Sept 27, 1999, a cadaver in advance state of
decomposition was found along Quezon. It was
positively identified as to be that of Medel.
Issue: Whether or not there is special complex crime of
carnapping with homicide attended in the case.
Ruling: Yes. To prove the special complex crime of
carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not only
of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it
was the original criminal design of the culprit and the
killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission
of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." Thus, the
prosecution in this case has the burden of proving that:
(1) Mallari took the Toyota FX taxi; (2) his original
criminal design was carnapping; (3) he killed the driver,
Medel; and (4) the killing was perpetrated "in the course
of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof."
In fine, all the elements of the special complex crime of
carnapping with homicide, as well as the identity of
Mallari as one of the perpetrators of the crime, were all
proved beyond reasonable doubt. The foregoing
circumstances inevitably lead to the lone, fair and
reasonable conclusion that Mallari participated in
stealing the FX taxi driven by Medel and in killing him.
4. Dimat v. People, GR 181184, Jan 25, 2012
Facts:
• Dimat sold to Delgado a Nissan Safari. However this
same car was already reported by previous owner
Mantequilla to have been stolen from him.
• The car was subsequently flagged down by the Traffic
Management Group for being one of those under their
black lists of cars. Hence, Delgado together with
Montequilla charged Dimat for violation of the Anti-
fencing law.
• Dimat interposed the defense of lack of knowledge
that the car was stolen since he himself merely got it
from a certain Tolentino, hence there is no intent to
violate the law.
Issue: WON Dimat is guilty for violating the Anti-fencing
law?
Ruling: Yes. The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or
theft has been committed; 2) the accused, who took no
part in the robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses,
keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and
sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken
during that robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or
should have known that the thing derived from that
crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain
for himself or for another. All these elements are
apparent in the case.
Dimat should have known that the car was stolen when
he got the same from Tolentino, this fact is shown in
Dimat’s testimony that when Tolentino sold the car to
Dimat, Tolentino was only able to produce the old OR
and CR, that Tolentino just kept promising him to give the
new OR and CR but eventually reneged on the obligation.
There could be no other conclusion why Tolentino could
not produce the new documents, and that is because he
never had it in his possession for the same had been
stolen.
There is no merit on Dimat’s contention that there was
no intent on his part to violate the law. Being a special
law, its violation is malum prohibitum, it requires no
proof of criminal intent.
 Bation  Herrero  Mandi  Piedad  Tinguha 
C. Anti-Fencing Law (PD 1612)
Tan v. People, GR 134298, Aug 26, 1999
Facts:
• Complainant Rosita Lim is the proprietor of Bueno
Metal Industries, located at 301 Jose Abad Santos St.,
Tondo, Manila, engaged in the business of
manufacturing propellers or spare parts for boats.
Manuelito Mendez was one of the employees working
for her.
• Sometime in February 1991, Manuelito Mendez left
the employ of the company.
• Complainant Lim noticed that some of the welding
rods, propellers and boat spare parts, such as bronze
and stainless propellers and brass screws were missing.
She conducted an inventory and discovered that
propellers and stocks valued at P48,000.00, more or
less, were missing.
• Complainant Rosita Lim informed Victor Sy, uncle of
Manuelito Mendez, of the loss. Subsequently,
Manuelito Mendez was arrested in the Visayas and he
admitted that he and his companion Gaudencio Dayop
stole from the complainant’s warehouse some boat
spare parts such as bronze and stainless propellers and
brass screws. Manuelito Mendez asked for
complainant’s forgiveness.
• He pointed to petitioner Ramon C. Tan as the one who
bought the stolen items and who paid the amount of
P13,000.00, in cash to Mendez and Dayop, and they
split the amount with one another.
Issue: Whether or not the prosecution has successfully
established the elements of fencing as against petitioner.
Ruling: No. In Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People of the
Philippines, we set out the essential elements of the
crime of fencing as follows:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in
the commission of the crime of robbery or theft,
buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals,
sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner
deals in any article, item, object or anything of value,
which has been derived from the proceeds of the
said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the
said article, item, object or anything of value has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft; and
4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for
himself or for another.

There was no showing at all that the accused knew or
should have known that the very stolen articles were the
ones sold to him. One is deemed to know a particular fact
if he has the cognizance, consciousness or awareness
thereof, or is aware of the existence of something, or has
the acquaintance with facts, or if he has something
within the minds grasp with certitude and clarity. When
knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an
element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a
person is aware of a high probability of its existence
unless he actually believes that it does not exist. On the
other hand, the words should know denote the fact that
a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would
ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another
or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such
fact exists. Knowledge refers to a mental state of
awareness about a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate
the mind of an accused and state with certainty what is
contained therein, it must determine such knowledge
with care from the overt acts of that person. And given
two equally plausible states of cognition or mental
awareness, the court should choose the one which
sustains the constitutional presumption of innocence.
D. Bouncing Checks Law (BP Blg. 22)
1. Lim v. People, GR 130038, Sept 18, 2000
Facts:
• On two occasions, petitioner bought several pieces of
jewelry from Seguan. She paid through the checks. She
sent the checks through a certain Nadera.
• Upon deposit by Seguan however, the checks were
dishonored by the bank and petitioner promised
Seguan that she would pay the amounts in cash but she
never did.
• As a consequence, she was charged for violation of B.P.
22.. Trial court convicted her in the two cases. ----
Petitioner, for her part, argues that she never knew
Seguan and much more, had any "transaction" with
her. According to petitioner, she issued the two checks
and gave them to Aurelia Nadera, not to Seguan. She
gave the two checks to Aurelia Nadera from whom she
got two sets of jewelry, as a "security arrangement" or
"guarantee" that she would return the jewelry
received if she would not be able to sell them.
Issue: Should the conviction be sustained in light of the
accused’s claim that she did not issue the checks as
 Bation  Herrero  Mandi  Piedad  Tinguha 
payment for the jewelry to Seguan but only as security to
Nadera?
Ruling: Yes. All the elements of a B.P. 22 violation are
present. The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1) The making,
drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account
or for value; (2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or
issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment
of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) The
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment.
Petitioner never denied issuing the two checks. The
accused’s defenses cannot save the day for her. The first
and last elements of the offense are admittedly present.
To escape liability, she must prove that the second
element was absent, that is, at the time of issue of the
checks, she did not know that her funds in the bank
account were insufficient - she did not prove this. Since
Sec. 2 of B.P. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that
the second element prima facie exists when the first and
third elements of the offense are present, the conviction
should be sustained. She failed to rebut the presumption.
The gravamen of B.P. No. 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored upon
its presentment for payment. And the accused failed to
satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for
its payment within five (5) banking days from notice of
dishonor. The act is malum prohibitum, pernicious and
inimical to public welfare. Laws are created to achieve a
goal intended and to guide and prevent against an evil or
mischief. Why and to whom the check was issued is
irrelevant in determining culpability. The terms and
conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks are
also irrelevant.
Unlike in estafa, under B. P. No. 22, one need not prove
that the check was issued in payment of an obligation, or
that there was damage. The damage done is to the
banking system.
2. Nierras, GR 59568-76, Jan 11, 1990
Facts:
• petitioner, a customer of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation, purchased oil products from it.
Simultaneous with the delivery of the products, he
issued nine (9) checks in payment thereof. Upon
presentation to the Philippine National Bank, said
 checks were dishonored for the reason that his
account was already closed. Thereafter, Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation repeatedly demanded of
petitioner either to deposit funds for his checks or pay
for the oil products he had purchased but he failed and
refused to do either.
• Petitioner was charge of 9 counts for estafa; he
subsequently filed a motion to quash the complaint on
the ground of double jeopardy as these offenses were
already included in another 9 criminal cases for
violation of BP 22 pending before the lower court.
• Petitioner argues that he would be placed in double
jeopardy as all the elements of estafa under Article 315
(2-d) of the Revised Penal Code are also present in that
crime punishable under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
namely (1) "the postdating or issuance of a check in
payment of an obligation contracted at the time the
check was issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to
cover the check and (3) damage to the payee thereof."
Issue: Can petitioner be held liable for the nine criminal
cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and
separately also be held liable for the crime of estafa
under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code for the
issuance of the same bouncing checks?
Ruling: Yes. Petitioner is charged with two (2) distinct
and separate offenses. What petitioner failed to mention
in his argument is the fact that deceit and damage are
essential elements in Article 315 (2-d) Revised Penal
Code, but are not required in Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.
Under the latter law, mere issuance of a check that is
dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge
on the part of the drawer that he issued the same
without sufficient funds and hence punishable which is
not so under the Penal Code.
Other differences between the two also include the
following: (1) a drawer of a dishonored check may be
convicted under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 even if he had
issued the same for a pre-existing obligation, while under
Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code such
circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific and
different penalties are imposed in each of the two
offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a crime against property,
while violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is principally
a crime against public interest as it does injury to the
entire banking system; (4) violations of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code are mala in se, while those of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 are mala prohibita.
 Bation  Herrero  Mandi  Piedad  Tinguha 
3. Wong v. CA, GR 117857, Feb 2, 2001
Facts:
 Luis Wong is a collector of Limtong Press, Inc., a
company which prints calendars. Wong was assigned
to collect check payments from LPI’ clients.
 One time, six of LPI’s clients were not able to give the
check payments to Wong. Wong then made
arrangements with LPI so that for the meantime, Wong
can use his personal checks to guarantee the calendar
orders of the LPI’s clients. LPI however has a policy of
not accepting personal checks of its agents. LPI instead
proposed that the personal checks should be used to
cover Wong’s debt with LPI which arose from
unremitted checks by Wong in the past. Wong agreed.
So he issued 6 checks dated December 30, 1985.
 Before the maturity of the checks, Wong persuaded LPI
not to deposit the checks because he said he’ll be
replacing them within 30 days. LPI complied however
Wong reneged on the payment.
 On June 5, 1986 or 157 days from date of issue, LPI
presented the check to RCBC but the checks were
dishonored (account closed). On June 20, 1986, LPI
sent Wong a notice of dishonor. Wong failed to make
good the amount of the checks within five banking
days from his receipt of the notice. LPI then sued Wong
for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
 Among others, Wong argued that he’s not guilty of the
crime of charged because one of the elements of the
crime is missing, that is, prima facie presumption of
“knowledge of lack of funds” against the drawer.
According to Wong, this element is lost by reason of
the belated deposit of the checks by LPI which was 157
days after the checks were issued; that he is not
expected to keep his bank account active beyond the
90-day period – 90 days being the period required for
the prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of
fund to arise.
Issue: Whether or not Wong is guilty of BP 22.
Ruling: Yes. Wong is guilty of violating BP 22. There are
two ways of violating BP 22: (1) by making or drawing and
issuing a check to apply on account or for value knowing
at the time of issue that the check is not sufficiently
funded; and (2) by having sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank at the time of issue but failing to
keep sufficient funds theirn or credit with said bank to
cover the full amount of the check when presented to
the drawee bank within a period of 90 days.
The elements of violation of BP 22 pertinent to this case
are:
1. The making, drawing and issuance of any check
to apply for account or for value;
2. The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer
that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and
3. The subsequent dishonor of the check by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
or dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the
bank to stop payment.
Under the second element, the presumption of
knowledge of the insufficiency arises if the check is
presented within 90 days from the date of issue of the
check. This presumption is lost, as in the case at bar, by
failure of LPI to present it within 90 days. But this does
not mean that the second element was not attendant
with respect to Wong. The presumption is lost but lack of
knowledge can still be proven, LPI did not deposit the
checks because of the reassurance of Wong that he
would issue new checks. Upon his failure to do so, LPI
was constrained to deposit the said checks. After the
checks were dishonored, Wong was duly notified of such
fact but failed to make arrangements for full payment
within five (5) banking days thereof. There is, on record,
sufficient evidence that Wong had knowledge of the
insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the drawee
bank at the time of issuance of the checks.
The Supreme Court also noted that under Section 186 of
the Negotiable Instruments Law, “a check must be
presented for payment within a reasonable time after its
issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability
thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay.”
By current banking practice, a check becomes stale after
more than six (6) months, or 180 days. LPI deposited the
checks 157 days after the date of the check. Hence said
checks cannot be considered stale.
4. People v. Grospe, GR L-74053-54, Jan 20, 1988
Facts:
• Accused issued two checks in favor of SMB, for
payment of its obligation. The checks were issued in
Bulacan and was drawn in Pampanga, however it was
subsequently dishonored for lack of funds. Hence SMB
filed a case for estafa and violation of B.P 22 in RTC
Pampanga.
 Bation  Herrero  Mandi  Piedad  Tinguha 
• Accused interposed the defense of lack of jurisdiction,
it contended that the proper venue of the action
should have been in Bulacan. Deceit and damage,
which make up the essential elements for offenses
involving dishonored checks occurred at the place
where it was issued.
Issue: WON venue was properly laid?
Ruling: Yes. In both information for estafa and violation
of B.P.22, the SC held that these offenses are “continuing
offenses”, hence venue may be laid either where it was
issued or where it was drawn.
In estafa, the ingredient of the crime of deceit took place
where it was issued (Bulacan) and damage where it was
drawn (Pampanga). What is of decisive importance is the
“delivery” thereat, the delivery of the instrument is the
final act essential to its consummation as an obligation.
Delivery should be by one who could take the check as a
holder, that is, as a payee or indorsee thereof, with the
intent to transfer title thereto. Such delivery took place
at Pampanga when the finance officer took the check
and presented it to the bank.
In violation of B.P 22, it is true however that the offense
is committed by the very fact of its performance and that
the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the fact of
dishonor of a check but also the act of making or drawing
and issuance of a bouncing check. However, it is likewise
true that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer
of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an
essential ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing
eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory
or another.
5. Llamado v. CA, GR 99032, March 26, 1997
Facts:
• Private complainant, Leon Gaw, delivered to accused
the amount of P180,000.00, with the assurance of Aida
Tan, the secretary of the accused in the corporation,
that it will be repaid on 4 November 1983, plus
interests thereon at 12% plus a share in the profits of
the corporation, if any.
• Upon delivery of the money, accused Ricardo Llamado
took it and placed it inside a deposit box. Accused
Jacinto Pascual and Ricardo Llamado signed Philippine
Trust Company Check No. 047809, postdated 4
November 1983, in the amount of P186,500.00 in the
presence of private complainant.
• On 4 November 1983, private complainant deposited
the check in his current account with the Equitable
Banking Corporation which later informed the
complainant that said check was dishonored by the
drawee bank because payment was stopped, and that
the check was drawn against insufficient funds. Private
complainant was also notified by the Equitable Banking
Corporation that his current account was debited for
the amount of P186,500.00 because of the dishonor of
the said check.
• Private complainant returned to Aida Tan to inform her
of the dishonor of the check. Aida Tan received the
check from private complainant with the assurance
that she will have said check changed with cash.
However, upon his return to Aida Tan, the latter
informed him that she had nothing to do with the
check. TC ruled that Llamado is guilty of violation of BP
22.
Issue: WON petitioner, as treasurer of a corporation, can
be held liable under BP 22 for checks issued on behalf of
the corporation?
Ruling: Yes. Petitioner denies knowledge of the issuance
of the check without sufficient funds and involvement in
the transaction with private complainant. However,
knowledge involves a state of mind difficult to establish.
Thus, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption,
i.e., that the drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency
of his funds in or credit with the bank at the time of the
issuance and on the check's presentment for payment.
Petitioner failed to rebut the presumption by paying the
amount of the check within five (5) banking days from
notice of the dishonor. His claim that he signed the check
in blank which allegedly is common business practice, is
hardly a defense. If as he claims, he signed the check in
blank, he made himself prone to being charged with
violation of BP 22. It became incumbent upon him to
prove his defenses. As Treasurer of the corporation who
signed the check in his capacity as an officer of the
corporation, lack of involvement in the negotiation for
the transaction is not a defense.
Petitioner's argument that he should not be held
personally liable for the amount of the check because it
was a check of the Pan Asia Finance Corporation and he
signed the same in his capacity as Treasurer of the
corporation, is also untenable. The third paragraph of
Section 1 of BP Blg. 22 states: “Where the check is drawn
by a corporation, company or entity, the person or
persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such
drawer shall be liable under this Act.”
 Bation  Herrero  Mandi  Piedad  Tinguha 
6. Que v. People, GR 75217-18, Sept 21, 1987
Facts:
• Petitioner was convicted for violation of BP 22 by the
RTC of Quezon City, his conviction was affirmed by the
appellate court.
• He then filed this petition for review before the SC
which was denied by minute resolution.
• He challenges such denial in the instant case based on
the following grounds: (1) petition for review was
invalidly denied by a mere resolution with nothing else
but the statement “lack of merit”, (2) the lower court
has no jurisdiction to try the case, and (3) appellate
court erred in considering one of the most important
elements of a BP 22 violation, the place of issuance of
check which was absent in the instant case.
• He maintains among others that his issuance of the
check was not for payment but merely to guarantee an
obligation.
Issue: Are the decisions of both the trial court and
appellate court and the denial of the Petition for Review
in accordance with law and evidence?
Ruling: Yes. The findings of fact of the trial court reveal
that the checks in question were issued at Quezon City
as admitted by petitioner himself in his answer when he
was sued by the complainant on his civil liability. It is of
no moment whether the said checks were deposited by
the complainant in a bank located outside of Quezon City.
The determinative factor is the place of issuance which is
in Quezon City and thus within the court's jurisdiction.
Further, B.P. 22 applies even in cases where dishonored
checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a
guarantee. The enactment in question does not make
any distinction as to whether the checks within its
contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or
merely to guarantee the said obligation. The intention of
the framers of BP 22 to make the mere act of issuing a
worthless check malum prohibitum and thus punishable
under such law.
7. Cabrera v. CA, GR 150618, July 24, 2003
Facts:
• Luis Go was the sole proprietor of the Davao Mindanao
Pioneer Hardware & Company (DMPH Co.). One of his
customers was Boni Co, a travelling salesman.
• The two had agreed that Go would sell lumber
materials and merchandise to Co on a thirty to forty-
 day credit basis. Go, however, required Co to issue
postdated checks in payment for his purchases.
• Since Co had no checking account with any bank, he
offered to pay for his purchases with postdated checks
drawn and issued by the petitioner. Co assured Go that
he and the petitioner had a business arrangement.
• Go made inquiries at the bank and was told that the
petitioner handled her checks well. Since Go also
believed that Co was a good businessman, he finally
agreed to accept the postdated checks issued by the
petitioner. Go and Co also agreed that on the due date
of the checks, Co would either pay the amount thereof
in cash by way of replacement for the same, or Go
would negotiate, or deposit the checks in his account
and/or the account of DMPH Co.
• Co purchased merchandise from Go and delivered
postdated checks drawn against the petitioners
checking account with the Davao City Branch of
Prudential Bank.
• When Co failed to pay for his purchases, Go deposited
the three postdated checks in his account with the Far
East Bank & Trust Company (FEBTC) on August 3, 1992.
When the checks were deposited, the petitioners
account with the bank had a balance of only P100.04.
The bank had closed the petitioners account on August
4, 1992 after applying the said amount to the payment
of bank charges. The drawee bank thus dishonored the
petitioners postdated checks, and duly stamped
Account Closed on the front and dorsal portions of
each check. The drawee bank returned the checks to
the FEBTC with the corresponding check return slips.
• Nevertheless, Go continued selling merchandise to Co,
who likewise continued to draw and issue postdated
checks; this time drawn against his personal account.
Go accepted Cos personal checks, hoping that he
would eventually be paid. Cos personal checks were all
dishonored by the drawee bank.
• Go notified the petitioner that her three checks were
dishonored by the drawee bank. She saw Go in his
office and confirmed that she and Co had a business
arrangement. She asked Go to give Co more time to
redeem the postdated checks with cash. Go agreed.
However, Co again failed to redeem the checks. The
petitioner likewise failed to pay the amounts of the
checks despite Gos repeated demands.
Issue: Whether or not accused is liable under BP 22
Ruling: No. The law enumerates the elements of the
offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 as follows:
1. the drawing, making and issuance of any check to
apply to account or for value;
 Bation  Herrero  Mandi  Piedad  Tinguha 
2. the knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at
the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its presentment; and
3. subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
The barefaced fact that the petitioner was the signatory
to the checks that were subsequently dishonored merely
gave rise to a prima facie presumption that she knew of
the insufficiency of funds; it did not render her
automatically liable for violating B.P. Blg. 22. The
prosecution is burdened to prove all the elements of the
crime beyond reasonable doubt.
In order to create the prima facie presumption, that the
issuer knew of the insufficiency of funds, it must be
shown that he or she received a notice of dishonor and
within five banking days thereafter, failed to satisfy the
amount of the check or shall arrange for its payment.
In this case, the prosecution failed to adduce in evidence
any notice of dishonor of the three postdated checks or
any letter of demand sent to and received by the
petitioner. The bare testimony of Luis Go that he sent
letters of demand to the petitioner notifying her of the
dishonor of her checks is utterly insufficient. It is not
enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of
dishonor was sent to the drawee of the check. It must
also show that the drawer of the check received the said
notice because the fact of service provided for in the law
is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by
the drawee of the check.
For failure of the prosecution to show that notices of
dishonor of the three postdated checks were served on
the petitioner, or at the very least, that she was sent a
demand letter notifying her of the said dishonor, the
prima facie presumption under Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22
that she knew of the insufficiency of funds cannot arise.
Thus, there can be no basis for establishing the presence
of actual knowledge of insufficiency of funds.
8. Svendsen v. People, GR 175381, Feb 26, 2008
Facts:
 Cristina extended a loan to Svendsen. After Svendsen
had partially paid his obligation, he failed to settle the
balance. Cristina thus filed a collection suit against
Svendsen, which was eventually settled when
Svendsen paid her P200,000 and issued in her favor an
 International Exchange Bank check postdated Feb 2,
1999 in the amount of P160,000 representing interest.
The check was co-signed by Bolton.
 When the check was presented for payment on Feb 9,
1999, it was dishonored for having been Drawn Against
Insufficient Funds (DAIF).
 Cristina, through counsel, thus sent a letter to
petitioner by registered mail informing him that the
check was dishonored by the drawee bank, and
demanding that he make it good within 5 days from
receipt.
 No settlement having been made by Svendsen, Cristina
filed a complaint against Svendsen and his co-signatory
to the check, Bolton, for violation of BP 22.
Issue: Whether or not Cristina is guilty of the crime of BP
22.
Ruling: No. For petitioner to be validly convicted of the
crime under B.P. Blg. 22, the following requisites must
thus concur: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any
check to apply for account or for value; (2) the
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the
time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment.
Petitioner admits having issued the postdated check to
Cristina. The check, however, was dishonored when
deposited for payment in Banco de Oro due to DAIF.
Hence, the first and the third elements obtain in the case.
The evidence for the prosecution failed to prove the
second element. While the registry receipt, which is said
to cover the letter-notice of dishonor and of demand
sent to petitioner, was presented, there is no proof that
he or a duly authorized agent received the same.
Receipts for registered letters including return receipts
do not themselves prove receipt; they must be properly
authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters.
Petitioner is civilly liable, however. For in a criminal case,
the social injury is sought to be repaired through the
imposition of the corresponding penalty, whereas with
respect to the personal injury of the victim, it is sought
to be compensated through indemnity, which is civil in
nature.
 Bation  Herrero  Mandi  Piedad  Tinguha 
9. Tan v. Mendez, GR 138669, June 6, 2002
Facts:
• Tan is an owner of a Bus Liner who opened a credit line
with Mendez who owns gasoline stations in Iriga City.
At the same time, Mendez was also designated by Tan
as the booking and ticketing agent of the latter’s Bus
Liner.
• Tan issued an FEBTC check for payment of the
purchased fuel, however it was dishonored by the bank
for being drawn against insufficient funds.
• After several failed demands to pay, Mendez instituted
this criminal case for violation of B.P 22 against Tan.
Tan interposed the defense of compensation. He
contended that he issued a memorandum to Mendez
saying that the remittances the latter gave to him for
the sale of the tickets were to be applied for his (Tan’s)
credit for the fuel purchases.
1 Issue: May compensation be a defense against a B.P 22
case?
Ruling: No. The law has made the mere act of issuing a
bum check a malum prohibitum, an act proscribed by
legislature for being deemed pernicious and inimical to
public welfare. The gravamen of the offense under this
law is the act of issuing a worthless check or a check that
is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. Thus,
even if there had been payment, through compensation
or some other means, there could still be prosecution for
violation of B.P. 22.
2 Issue: When the SC imposed a penalty of fine instead
of imprisonment, did it operate to remove the penalty of
imprisonment for B.P 22 violations?
Ruling: No. As clarified by Administrative Circular 13-
2001, the clear tenor and intention of Administrative
Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as
an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of
preference in the application of the penalties provided
for in B.P. 22. Where the circumstances of the case, for
instance, clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of
fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine
alone may be considered as the more appropriate
penalty. This rule of preference does not foreclose the
possibility of imprisonment for violators of B.P. 22.
Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the
law. Needless to say, the determination of whether the
circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone
rests solely upon the judge. Should the judge decide that
imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty,
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not to be conditions specified in the trust receipt. A violation of
deemed a hindrance. this undertaking constitutes estafa under Sec. 13, PD 115.

The wording of Sec. 13 covers failure to turn over the

E. Trust Receipts law (PD No. 115) proceeds of the sale of entrusted goods, or to return said
goods if unsold or disposed of in accordance with the
Allied Banking Corp v. Ordonez, GR 82495, Dec 10, terms of the trust receipts. Private respondent claims
that at the time of PBM's application for the issuance of
1990
the LC's, it was not represented to the petitioner that the
items were intended for sale, hence, there was no deceit
Facts:
resulting in a violation of the trust receipts which would
• On 23 January 1981, Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM,
constitute a criminal liability. Again, we cannot uphold
for short) thru its duly authorized officer, private
this contention. The non-payment of the amount
respondent Alfredo Ching, applied for the issuance of
covered by a trust receipt is an act violative of the
commercial letters of credit with petitioner's Makati
entrustee's obligation to pay. There is no reason why the
branch to finance the purchase of 500 M/T Magtar
law should not apply to all transactions covered by trust
Branch Dolomites and one (1) Lot High Fired Refractory
receipts, except those expressly excluded.
Sliding Nozzle Bricks.
• Petitioner issued an irrevocable letter of credit in favor
The penal provision of PD 115 encompasses any act
of Nikko Industry Co., Ltd. (Nikko) by virtue of which
violative of an obligation covered by the trust receipt; it
the latter drew four (4) drafts which were accepted by
is not limited to transactions in goods which are to be
PBM and duly honored and paid by the petitioner bank.
sold (retailed), reshipped, stored or processed as a
• To secure payment of the amount covered by the
component of a product ultimately sold.
drafts, and in consideration of the transfer by
petitioner of the possession of the goods to PBM, the
To uphold the Justice Department's ruling would
latter as entrustee, thru private respondent, executed
contravene not only the letter but the spirit of PD 115.
four (4) Trust Receipt Agreements with maturity dates
on 19 May, 3 and 24 June 1981 acknowledging
petitioner's ownership of the goods and its (PBM'S)
obligation to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the
goods, if sold, or to return the same, if unsold within
the stated period.
• Out of the said obligation resulted an overdue amount
of P1,475,274.09. Despite repeated demands, PBM
failed and refused to either turn over the proceeds of
the sale of the goods or to return the same.

Issue: Does the penal provision of PD 115 (Trust Receipts

Law) apply when the goods covered by a Trust Receipt
do not form part of the finished products which are
ultimately sold but are instead, utilized/used up in the
operation of the equipment and machineries of the
entrustee-manufacturer?

Ruling: Yes. The trust receipts, there is an obligation to

repay the entruster. Their terms are to be interpreted in
accordance with the general rules on contracts, the law
being alert in all cases to prevent fraud on the part of
either party to the transaction. The entrustee binds
himself to sell or otherwise dispose of the entrusted
goods with the obligation to turn over to the entruster
the proceeds if sold, or return the goods if unsold or not
otherwise disposed of, in accordance with the terms and
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