Bungcayao v. Fort Ilocandia, G.R. No.
170483, April 19, 2010 Petitioner alleged that his son, Manuel Bungcayao, Jr., who attended the
Facts:
petition for review
Manuel C. Bungcayao, Sr. (petitioner) claimed to be one of the two
entrepreneurs who introduced improvements on the foreshore area of Calayab
Beach in 1978 when Fort Ilocandia Hotel started its construction in the
area. Thereafter, other entrepreneurs began setting up their own stalls in the
foreshore area. They later formed themselves into the D’Sierto Beach Resort
Owner’s Association, Inc. (D’Sierto).
In July 1980, six parcels of land in Barrio Balacad (now Calayad) were
transferred, ceded, and conveyed to the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA)
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1704. Fort Ilocandia Resort Hotel was
erected on the area. In 1992, petitioner and other D’Sierto members applied
for a foreshore lease with the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) and was granted a provisional permit. On 31 January 2002, Fort
Ilocandia Property Holdings and Development Corporation (respondent) filed
a foreshore application over a 14-hectare area abutting the Fort Ilocandia
Property, including the 5-hectare portion applied for by D’Sierto members. The
foreshore applications became the subject matter of a conflict case, docketed
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Case No. 5473,
between respondent and D’Sierto members. In an undated Order, DENR
Regional Executive Director Victor J. Ancheta denied the foreshore lease
applications of the D’Sierto members, including petitioner, on the ground that
the subject area applied for fell either within the titled property or within the
foreshore areas applied for by respondent. The D’Sierto members appealed
the denial of their applications. In a Resolution dated 21 August 2003, then
DENR Secretary Elisea G. Gozun denied the appeal on the ground that the area
applied for encroached on the titled property of respondent based on the final
verification plan.
meeting, manifested that he still had to consult his parents about the offer but
upon the undue pressure exerted by Atty. Marcos, he accepted the payment
and signed the Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim in favor of
respondent.
Petitioner then filed an action for declaration of nullity of contract before the
Regional Trial Court of Laoag, City, Branch 13 (trial court), docketed as Civil
Case Nos. 12891-13, against respondent. Petitioner alleged that his son had no
authority to represent him and that the deed was void and not binding upon
him.
Petitioner and respondent agreed to consider the case submitted for resolution
on summary judgment. Thus, in its Order[8] dated 28 November 2003, the trial
court considered the case submitted for resolution. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration, alleging that he manifested in open court that he was
withdrawing his earlier manifestation submitting the case for
resolution. Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
The trial court ruled that the only issue raised by petitioner was his claim for
damages while respondent’s issue was only his claim for possession of the
property occupied by petitioner and damages. The trial court noted that the
parties already stipulated on the issues and admissions had been made by both
parties. The trial court ruled that summary judgment could be rendered on
the case.
The trial court ruled that the alleged pressure on petitioner’s sons could not
constitute force, violence or intimidation that could vitiate consent. As
regards respondent’s counterclaim, the trial court ruled that based on the
pleadings and admissions made, it was established that the property occupied
by petitioner was within the titled property of respondent.
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court in resorting to summary
judgment as a valid procedural device for the prompt disposition of actions in
which the pleadings raise only a legal issue and not a genuine issue as to any
material fact. The Court of Appeals ruled that in this case, the facts are not in
dispute and the only issue to be resolved is whether the subject property was
within the titled property of respondent. Hence, summary judgment was
properly rendered by the trial court.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the counterclaims raised by respondent were
compulsory in nature, as they arose out of or were connected with the
transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing
party’s claim and did not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties of whom the court could not acquire jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals
ruled that respondent was the rightful owner of the subject property and as
such, it had the right to recover its possession from any other person to whom
the owner has not transmitted the property, including petitioner.
Issue:
Whether summary judgment is appropriate in this case.
Held:
Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. - A party
seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim
or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the
pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with
supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary
judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
Summary judgment has been explained as follows:
Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in
order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless
delays. When the pleadings on file show that there are no
genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to
obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is,
when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to
decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material
facts. Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue,
summary judgment is not proper. A “genuine issue” is such
issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false
claim. Section 3 of the said rule provides two (2) requisites for
summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine
issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of
damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary
judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if,
while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the
affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the
moving party show that such issues are not genuine.
Since we have limited the issues to the damages claimed by the parties,
summary judgment has been properly rendered in this case.
A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or any relief, which a
defending party may have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit
arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the same transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiffs complaint.
 does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties
 will be barred in the future if not set up in the answer
 test of compulsoriness: if there should exist a logical relationship
between the main claim and the counterclaim. here exists such a
relationship when conducting separate trials of the respective claims of
the parties would entail substantial duplication of time and effort by
the parties and the court
(a) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim
largely the same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim, absent the
compulsory rule?
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim
as well as defendants counterclaim?
(d) Is there any logical relations between the claim and the
counterclaim?
positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is
compulsory.
C@B
Respondent filed three counterclaims.
 only counterclaim that remained was for the recovery of possession of
the subject property.
 hile this counterclaim was an offshoot of the same basic controversy
between the parties, it is very clear that it will not be barred if not set
up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Respondents
second counterclaim, contrary to the findings of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, is only a permissive counterclaim. It is not a
compulsory counterclaim. It is capable of proceeding independently of
the main case.
The rule in permissive counterclaim is that for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.
Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck
down at any time, even on appeal before this Court. In this case, respondent
did not dispute the non-payment of docket fees. Respondent only insisted that
its claims were all compulsory counterclaims. As such, the judgment by the trial
court in relation to the second counterclaim is considered null and void without
prejudice to a separate action which respondent may file against petitioner.
(PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIM)
G.R. No. 158090, October 04, 2010
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS
OF FERNANDO F. CABALLERO
FACTS:
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
Fernando and his wife, Sylvia Caballero, secured a mortgage secured by their
residential lot from petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in
the amount of P20,000.00. However, Fernando defaulted on the payment of
his loan with the GSIS. GSIS wrote a letter to Fernando, informing him of the
consolidation of title in its favor, and requesting payment of monthly rental in
view of Fernando's continued occupancy of the subject property. Negotiation
as to repurchase also takes place.
GSIS scheduled the subject property for a 2nd public bidding after a failed
negotiation with Fernando to buy back his property. In this bidding, Jocelyn
Caballero, Fernando’s daughter submitted a bid but unfortunately defeated by
CMTC. With this, Fernando, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint against CMTC, the GSIS and its responsible
officers Fernando prayed, among others, that judgment be rendered: declaring
GSIS Board of Trustees Resolution No. 199, dated May 16, 1989, null and void
for the irregularities in the conduct of the bidding.
GSIS and its officers filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and
Counterclaim. GSIS alleged that Fernando owed of P130,365.81, representing
back rentals, including additional interests from January 1973 to February
1987, and the additional amount of P249,800.00. Caballero, on the other hand,
alleged that GSIS's counterclaim is permissive and its failure to pay the
prescribed docket fees results into the dismissal of its claim.
After trial, the RTC, in its Decision, 1994, ruled in favor of GSIS and dismissed
the complaint. In the same decision, the trial court granted GSIS's counterclaim
and directed Fernando to pay GSIS the rentals paid by CMTC in the amount of
P249,800.00.
he CA, in its Decision dated December 17, 2002, affirmed the decision of the
RTC with the modification that the portion of the judgment ordering Fernando
to pay rentals in the amount of P249,800.00, in favor of petitioner, be deleted.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a
Resolution dated April 29, 2003. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed an error of law in holding that GSIS’s
counterclaim of rentals collected by the Caballero’s against CMTC is in the
nature of a permissive counterclaim which required the payment of GSIS of
docket fees before the Trial Court can acquire jurisdiction over the said
counterclaim.
Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that petitioner's counterclaim is
permissive and its failure to pay the prescribed docket fees results into the
dismissal of its claim.
HELD
YES. The test was also established by the Supreme Court in this case to
determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not. The Court has devised
the following tests: (a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by
the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent
suit on defendant's claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will
substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's claim as well as the
defendant's counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation between the
claim and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would
indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory.
Tested against the above-mentioned criteria, the SC agreed with the CA's
view that GSIS's counterclaim for the recovery of the amount representing
rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is permissive. The evidence
needed by Fernando to cause the annulment of the bid award, deed of
absolute sale and TCT is different from that required to establish GSIS's claim
for the recovery of rentals.
The issue in the main action, i.e., the nullity or validity of the bid award, deed
of absolute sale and TCT in favor of CMTC, is entirely different from the issue in
the counterclaim, i.e., whether GSIS is entitled to receive the CMTC's rent
payments over the subject property when it (GSIS) became the owner of the
subject property by virtue of the consolidation of ownership of the property in
its favor.
The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.
This, GSIS did not do, because it asserted that its claim for the collection of
rental payments was a compulsory counterclaim. Since petitioner failed to pay
the docket fees, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its permissive
counterclaim. The judgment rendered by the RTC, insofar as it ordered
Fernando to pay GSIS the rentals which he collected from CMTC, is considered
null and void. Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and
may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court.
Court ruled that the provision in the Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of
Republic Act No. 8291, which exempts it from all taxes, assessments, fees,
charges or duties of all kinds, cannot operate to exempt it from the payment of
legal fees. Supreme Court now has the sole authority to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Judge Asuncion: Where the trial court acquires
jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment
of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a
lien on the judgment.
Petitioner's claim for payment of rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC
did not arise after the filing of the complaint; hence, the rule laid down in Sun
Insurance finds no application in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
CALO vs. AJAX INTERNATIONAL
appeal
plaintiff-appellant Calo ordered from defendant-appellee Ajax International,
Inc., 1,200 ft. of John Shaw wire rope at P2.85 per foot
 evidenced by Charge Order No. 37071, for P3,420.00.
plaintiff: “when delivered -> short 300 ft.”
Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. IV-93062 was filed in the Municipal Court
of Manila by one Adolfo Benavides who claimed to have acquired the
outstanding credit account of Calo from defendant Ajax
judgment by default was entered,
writ of execution issued, against plaintiff Calo.
plaintiff resorted to this Court on a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus. We set aside the judgment of default and writ of execution issued
against plaintiff Calo and remanded the case for further proceedings.
plaintiff Calo, assisted by her husband, Marcos Calo, filed in the Court of First
Instance of Agusan a complaint against defendant asking (1) that the latter
either effect complete delivery of Charge Order No. 37071 or that she be
relieved from paying P855.00 and (2) that the latter indemnify her for P12,000
as attorney's fees, damages and expenses of litigation.2 The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 860.
Instead of filing an answer, defendant moved for the dismissal of Civil
Case 860 on the ground, inter alia, that the subject thereof was involved and
intimately related to that in Civil Case No. IV-93062 of the Municipal Court of
Manila. The court a quo sustained the motion and dismissed the case.
Plaintiff-appellant moved for reconsideration and new trial. When this
failed, she instituted the present appeal.
TC: plaintiff's claim is a compulsory counter-claim that should be filed in the
latter case. There is no question that it arises out of the same transaction which
is the basis of the complaint in Civil Case No. IV-93062 and does not require the
presence of third parties over whom the municipal court of Manila could not
acquire jurisdiction.
 However, plaintiff's claim is not a compulsory counterclaim in Civil Case
No. IV-93062 for the simple reason that the amount thereof exceeds the
jurisdiction of the municipal court. The rule that a compulsory counterclaim
not set up is barred, when applied to the municipal court, presupposes that
the amount involved is within the said court's jurisdiction. Otherwise, as this
Court had already noted in Yu Lay v. Galmes 3 we would come to the absurd
situation where a claim must be filed with the municipal court which it is
prohibited from taking cognizance of, being beyond its jurisdiction.
Besides, the reason underlying the rule, which is to settle all related
controversies in one sitting only, does not obtain. For, even if the counterclaim
in excess of the amount cognizable by the inferior court is set up, the
defendant cannot obtain positive relief. The Rules allow this only for the
defendant to prevent plaintiff from recovering from him.4 This means that
should the court find both plaintiff's complaint and defendant's counterclaim
(for an amount exceeding said court's jurisdiction) meritorious, it will simply
dismiss the complaint on the ground that defendant has a bigger credit. Since
defendant still has to institute a separate action for the remaining balance of
his counterclaim, the previous litigation did not really settle all related
controversies.
Plaintiff Calo's claim of P12,000.00 not being a compulsory counterclaim
in Civil Case No. VI-93062, it need not be filed there. The pendency then of said
civil case could not be pleaded in abatement of Civil Case No. 860.
Consequently, the lower court erred in dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby reversed and
the case remanded for further proceedings. Costs against appellee Ajax
International, Inc. So ordered.
CivPro – 120
ICTSI vs CA (1992)
Doctrine: The dismissal of the complaint operates to dismiss the counterclaim
since (1) ICTSI itself moved for the dismissal of the complaint and (2) also
because this is a compulsory counterclaim so intertwined with the complaint.
this petition for review
Facts:
• SHARP filed a COMPLAINT FOR PROHIBITION WITH PRAYER FOR WRIT
OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION against (1) Sec of Transportation and
Communication, (2) Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), (3) E. Razon, Inc. and (4)
International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI) with RTC, Manila.
• ICTSI filed ANSWER with COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM against SHARP
for its “unfounded and frivolous action, the consequence of which it had
suffered injuries”.
• RTC nullified the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier issued on the
grounds that SHARP is not a proper party to stop the negotiationa nd awarding
of contract for the developlment. Furthermore, SHARP violated the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
• In view of the nullification of the writ of PI, PPA and ICTSI filed a motion
to dismiss.
• RTC: dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim.
• SC: ICTSI filed this petition for review, alleging that the dismissal of the
counterclaim by the RTC was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Issue/s: WON RTC erred in dismissing the counterclaim? NO!
Held/Ratio:
• ICTI’s counterclaim in this case is COMPULSORY.
Requisites for a compulsory counterclaim:
1. it arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party�s claim;
2. it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and
3. the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
In this case, the evidence needed to sustain the counterclaim would
also refute the cause of action alleged in the complaint. It is clear that the
counterclaim would succeed only if the claim would not.
• The dismissal of the complaint operated also to dismiss the
counterclaim for 2 reasons:
1. ICTSI itself joined PPA in moving for the dismissal of the complaint.
2. The compulsory counterclaim was so intertwined with the complaint
that it could not remain pending for adjudicaton by the court after the dismisal
of the complaint which had provoked the counterclaim in the first place.
• In this case, ICTSI sould’ve objected to the dismissal of the complaint or
at least reserved its right to prosecute it.
• (OBITER, but might be impt) Distinction between compulsory and
permissive counterclaim: the latter does not arise out of nor is necessarily
connected with the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim. It is not
barred even if not set up in the action.
Digested by: Cari Mangalindan (A2015)
LUALHATI A. COJUANGCO, petitioner,
vs.
PURIFICACION VILLEGAS and the PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH XVII, MALOLOS, BULACAN,respondents.
petition for certiorari and prohibition
Petitioner Lualhati Aldaba Cojuangco is the widow of Don Juan Cojuangco, the
registered owner of the disputed parcel of residential land
parents of private respondent Purificacion Villegas, with the acquiescence of
Don Juan Cojuangco,
 constructed a residential house
 without paying rentals on condition that they would vacate the
premises when needed by the owner.
 After her parent's death, Villegas remained in the property, renovating
the same and spending P300,000.00 in the process.
 leased out a portion without the knowledge and consent of Don Juan
Cojuangco
 Don Juan Cojuangco, demanded that she leave the property.
 Cojuangco to institute ejectment proceedings against her before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch I on August 23,
1978. 1
Don Juan Cojuangco died intestate. In the trial court's order of October 22,
1979, his wife Lualhati, herein petitioner, together with nephews and nieces,
were sub-constituted as parties-plaintiffs.2
inferior court dismissed the action for ejectment for lack of jurisdiction
 the suit into an accion publiciana which is properly cognizable by courts
of first instance (now regional trial courts).

 appeal to Court of First Instance (CFI) of Malolos, Branch XV, :reversed
insofar as it had erroneously denied jurisdiction over the ejectment
case. ordered Villegas to vacate the premises and to surrender
possession thereof to herein petitioner Cojuangco. 4
CA and SC: Cojuangco's right of possession over the land was upheld.
petitioner Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Branch XV,
 filed a motion for execution of the judgment, which the court granted
on June 30, 1986. On July 29, 1986, a
 writ of demolition was issued against Villegas, who did not oppose the
ordered demolition but instead
 asked the lower court to give her more time (forty days from August
7, 1986) to effect the transfer of her personal properties and to
remove the improvements on the subject lot to which motion the
court acceded.
CASE2:
Villegas filed a separate civil action docketed as Civil Case No. 9094-M against
petitioner Cojuangco and the provincial sheriff "for specific performance with
urgent prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction."
was raffled to another Malolos branch of the Bulacan Trial Court, specifically
Branch XVII which issued on the same day, September 16, 1986, a temporary
restraining order enjoining Cojuangco and particularly the sheriff "from
enforcing or implementing the Order of Demolition issued in Civil Case No.
7042-M . . . 5 This was followed by another order dated October 6, 1986
granting a writ of preliminary injunction. 6 The twin orders are now the
subject of the instant petition for certiorari on the ground that they have been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner Cojuangco : undue interference by the respondent court with a final
and executory decision of a co-equal court
SC: The argument is impressed with merit. As early as 1922 in the case of
Cabigao v. Del Rosario, this Court laid down the doctrine that "no court has
power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having power to grant the relief sought by
injunction." 7
The various branches of the court of first instance of a province or city, having
as they have the same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent
and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot and are not permitted to
interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments.
A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the
administration of justice.
Based on the foregoing, it is plainly evident that the injunction was improperly
issued by the respondent court.
Petitioner Cojuangco has further raised the issue of whether Villegas can still
legally institute a separate independent action against the adjudged owner of
the disputed lot on the ground that Villegas and her predecessors-in-interest
are builders in good faith and are therefore entitled to recover the value of
the improvements they had introduced on the lot.
Rule 9, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court on compulsory counterclaim
provides the answer.1âwphi1 It states:
A counterclaim or cross-claim not set up shall be barred if it arises out of or is
necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-
matter of the opposing party's or co-party's claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction.
Villegas' claim to recover compensation for improvements made on the land is
essentially in the nature of a counterclaim since it is inter-woven with the fact
of possession. Said claim for compensation should have been presented as a
counterclaim in the ejectment suit. It is deemed barred if not raised on time
and the party in error is precluded from setting it up in a subsequent
litigation. The rule on compulsory counter-claim is designed to enable the
disposition of the entire conflict at one time and in one action. The philosophy
of the rule is to discourage multiplicity of suits. 10
Villegas: it became a "ripe issue" only after the ejectment proceedings.
SA: The argument is untenable. In pleadings, Villegas repeatedly stressed that
the residential house which her parents had constructed was already there on
the questioned lot for as long as she could remember, that she herself has lived
there all her life and that in the honest belief that the land had been "donated"
to her parents by her "Aunt Tecla", she made various improvements and
renovation thereon. Obviously, such declarations on the part of Villegas
completely negate her absurd claim that the factual basis for her subsequent
action arose after the ejectment suit became final.1âwphi1
Thus, Villegas should have set forth, simultaneously with the assertion that she
was entitled to the parcel of land by right of inheritance, the alternative claim
that assuming she was not legally entitled to the disputed lot, at least as a
builder in good faith, she has the right to the value of the buildings and
improvements which she and her parents had introduced on the land. 11 And
while it may be argued that the defense of being a builder in good faith would
have been inconsistent with her claim of ownership, in the case of Castle Bros.,
Wolf and Sons v. Go-Juno 12 the Court held that a party may set forth as many
defenses and counterclaims as he may have, whatever be their nature. These
may even be inconsistent with each other because what is sufficient is that
each is consistent with itself.
Since Villegas failed to set up such alternative defense (i.e. a builder in good
faith is entitled to recover the value of improvements) and instead relied on
the sole defense that she inherited the land from her parents, the rejection
thereof was a complete resolution of the controversy between the parties
which bars a later case based upon the unpleaded defense. The adjudication of
the issue joined by the parties in the earlier case constitutes res judicata, the
theory being that what is barred by prior judgment are not only the matters
actually raised and litigated upon, but also such other matters as could have
been raised but were not. 13
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The respondent court is hereby ordered
to DISMISS Civil Case No, 9094-M and all proceedings held therein are declared
null and void. The Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch XV is
ordered to immediately execute the decision in the ejectment case. Civil Case
No. 7042-M. Costs against private respondent Villegas. This decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Singapore Airlines v. CA, 243 SCRA (1995) that Rayo was not entitled to damages from Singapore because his contract
Facts: petition for review, with Aramco was not renewed because of his unsatisfactory performance.
Rayos was an overseas contract worker who had a renewed contract
with the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco). As part of Aramco's policy, Issue:
its employees returning to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia from Manila are allowed to Whether or not PAL can validly assail for the first time on appeal the
claim reimbursement for amounts paid for excess baggage of up to 50 trial court's decision sustaining the validity of Rayo’s complaint against SIA if
kilograms, as long as it is properly supported by receipt. PAL did not raise this issue in the lower court.
On April 1980, Rayos took a Singapore Airlines (SIA) flight to report for
his new assignment, with a 50-kilogram excess baggage for which he paid Held:
P4,147.50. Aramco reimbursed said amount upon presentation of the excess Judgment for Rayo being final, PAL may not question it. A 3rd-party
baggage ticket. defendant is allowed to set up in his answer the defenses which the 3rd-party
In December 1980, Rayos learned that he was one of several plaintiff (original defendant) has or may have against the original plaintiff's
employees being investigated by Aramco for fraudulent claims. He immediately claim. However, he must do so in his 3rd party answer, and not raise it for the
asked his wife to seek a written confirmation from SIA that he indeed paid for 1st time on appeal. PAL should have raised in its 3rd party answer everything
an excess baggage of 50 kilograms. On December 10, 1980, SIA's manager, that it may conceivably interpose by way of its defense, including specific
Johnny Khoo, notified Beatriz of their inability to issue the certification denials of allegations in the main complaint which implicated it along with
requested because their records showed that only three kilograms were Singapore.
entered as excess and accordingly charged. SIA issued the certification
requested by the spouses Rayos only on April 8, 1981, after its investigation of
the anomaly and after Beatriz, assisted by a lawyer, threatened it with a
lawsuit. This delay caused Rayo’s contract with Aramco not being renewed.
Rayo sues SIA. SIA blames PAL, SIA claimed that it was not liable to the
Rayoses because the tampering was committed by its handling agent,
Philippine Airlines (PAL). SIA files a 3rd party complaint against PAL. PAL
answers that the tampering was Singapore’s fault. Judge rules for Rayo on the
main case, and for Singapore in the 3rd party complaint. Judgment for Rayo
became final. PAL appeals the 3rd party complaint claiming for the first time