1
1. A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980 the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A.
EDILLION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its competence to reinstate
a disbarred member of the bar admits of no doubt. All the relevant factors bearing on
the specific case, public interest, the integrity of the profession and the welfare of the
recreant who had purged himself of his guilt are given their due weight. Respondent
Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978, 1 the vote being unanimous with
the late.
Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he had repeatedly pleaded that he
be reinstated. The minute resolution dated October 23, 1980, granted such prayer. It
was there made clear that it "is without prejudice to issuing an extended opinion." 2
Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to the disbarment
of respondent may not be amiss. As set forth in the resolution penned by the late
Chief Justice Castro: "On November 29. 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP for short) Board of Governors, unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in
Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency
of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues' to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. On January
21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said
resolution to the Court for consideration and approval,. Pursuant to paragraph 2,
Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which. reads: ... Should the
delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly
inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever
action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court
for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of
the action taken should be submit by registered mail to the member and to the
Secretary of the Chapter concerned.' On January 27, 1976, the Court required the
respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above he submitted
his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees
due from him. On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP
Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: On March 24, 1976, they submitted
a joint reply. Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the
hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral
arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution." 3
Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of Governors to
recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from
the Roll of Attorneys as found in Rules of Court: 'Effect of non-payment of dues. —
Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual
dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the
name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. 4
The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized in the aforesaid
resolution "is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his
status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of
deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the
IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. 5 It was pointed out in the
resolution that such issues was raised on a previous case before the Court, entitled
'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the
Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.' The Court exhaustively
considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of
the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. 6The unanimous
conclusion reached by the Court was that the integration of the Philippine Bar raises
no constitutional question and is therefore legally unobjectionable, "and, within the
context of contemporary conditions in the Philippine, has become an imperative
means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively." 7
As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From the time the
decision was rendered, there were various pleadings filed by respondent for
reinstatement starting with a motion for reconsideration dated August 19, 1978.
Characterized as it was by persistence in his adamantine refusal to admit the full
competence of the Court on the matter, it was not unexpected that it would be denied.
So it turned out. 8 It was the consensus that he continued to be oblivious to certain
balic juridical concepts, the appreciation of which does not even require great depth of
intellect. Since respondent could not be said to be that deficient in legal knowledge
and since his pleadings in other cases coming before this Tribunal were quite literate,
even if rather generously sprinkled with invective for which he had been duly taken to
task, there was the impression that his recalcitrance arose from and sheer obstinacy.
Necessary, the extreme penalty of disbarment visited on him was more than justified.
Since then, however, there were other communications to this Court where a
different attitude on his part was discernible. 9 The tone of defiance was gone and
circumstances of a mitigating character invoked — the state of his health and his
advanced age. He likewise spoke of the welfare of former clients who still rely on him
for counsel, their confidence apparently undiminished. For he had in his career been
a valiant, if at times unreasonable, defender of the causes entrusted to him.
This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be ordered
and so it did in the resolution of October 23, 1980. It made certain that there was full
acceptance on his part of the competence of this Tribunal in the exercise of its
plenary power to regulate the legal profession and can integrate the bar and that the
dues were duly paid. Moreover, the fact that more than two years had elapsed during
which he war. barred from exercising his profession was likewise taken into account.
It may likewise be said that as in the case of the inherent power to punish for
contempt and paraphrasing the dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v.
Lukban, 10 the power to discipline, especially if amounting to disbarment, should be
exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. 11
One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is no irretrievable
finality as far as admission to the bar is concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of
membership. What must ever be borne in mind is that membership in the bar, to
follow Cardozo, is a privilege burdened with conditions. Failure to abide by any of
them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrant such drastic move.
Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed and after actuations evidencing that there
was due contrition on the part of the transgressor, he may once again be considered
for the restoration of such a privilege. Hence, our resolution of October 23, 1980.

The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon.
IN RE: EDILLION (A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980)
FACTS:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorneyin the
Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of
the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay
his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the
provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the
organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the
same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to
maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to
pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial
support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is
being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule
and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee
to the IBP.
HELD:
The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a
member of as distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely
optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for
the governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of
the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it
is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not
compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of
his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The
only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality
of professional legal services, may require thet the cost of the regulatory program –
the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.
The right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter
subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory
measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its payment is not void as
unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of
admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation
as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court may compel
all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.
2
2. AM No. 10-10-4-SC
Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the
Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of
Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court.”
Facts:
SC
Allegations of plagiarism were hurled by Atty. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel R.
Bagares against Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo for his ponencia in the case of Vinuya
v. Executive Secretary. In said case, the Court denied the petition for certiorari filed by
Filipino comfort women to compel certain officers of the executive department to
espouse their claims for reparation and demand apology from the Japanese
government for the abuses committed against them by the Japanese soldiers during
World War II. Attys. Roque and Bagares represent the comfort women in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary, which is presently the subject of a motion for reconsideration.
UP Law Faculty
37 members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law
published a statement on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation relative
to the Court’s decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. Essentially, the faculty of the
UP College of Law, headed by its dean, Atty. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, calls for the
resignation of Justice Del Castillo in the face of allegations of plagiarism in his work.
Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the
allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not
only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction
over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the
quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the
articles supposedly plagiarized.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately
delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of “polluted
sources,” the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners, as well as the
supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most
basic values of decency and respect.
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than
objective comments except to discredit the Decision in the Vinuya case and
undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for
its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort women’s claims is not controversial
enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a
resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their
obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they
have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.
Issue:
Whether or not the UP Law Faculty’s actions constitute violations of Canons 10, 11,
and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held:
Issuance of show cause order resolution to the respondents (UP Law Faculty) as to
why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar per issues stated above.
[case is ongoing]
Dissenting Opinion:
(1) Serreno, J.
This Court, as complaining party, must state plainly how its ability to view the motion
for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision can be affected in any way by the UP Law
Faculty’s statement. It must also state plainly how its ability to enforce its future orders
would be eroded by the release of the UP Law Faculty Statement. The milieu in which
the Vinuya decision was received by the public is well-known. It is not as if any
outrage at the Vinuya decision was caused by the UP Law Faculty Statement alone. It
is also incredible how the Court can claim that its honesty, integrity and competence
could be eroded by an extraneous act of any person other than itself. Either one is
honest, has integrity, or is competent – or he is not. No one can undermine those
qualities other than the one in whom they inhere.
Even more important to keep in mind is the apparently redemptive intent of the UP
Law Faculty when it issued its statement. The statement is headlined by the phrase
“Restoring Integrity.” In the second paragraph, the Faculty says: “Given the Court’s
recent history and the controversy that surrounded it, it cannot allow the charges of
such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass without sanction, as this would only further
erode faith and confidence in the judicial system.” In the next paragraph, it says: “The
Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without ensuring
that its own conduct, whether collectively or through its members, is beyond
reproach.” In the same paragraph, it further says: “It is also a very crucial step in
ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all controversies: a
position that requires competence and integrity completely above any and all
reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of judicial and professional
ethics.”
Carpio Morales, J.
The Resolution demonstrates nothing but an abrasive flexing of the judicial muscle
that could hardly be characterized as judicious. This knee-jerk response from the
Court stares back at its own face, since this judicial act is the one that is “totally
unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of misplaced vigilance.”
EN BANC A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011 RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW
FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE
FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON
THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE
SUPREME COURT"
With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust reposed
upon them as teachers in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of the
University of the Philippine College of Law that:
(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is
unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral conduct and
judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme Court;
(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and credibility of the entire
Supreme Court and undermines the foundations of the Philippine judicial system by
3
allowing implicitly the decision of cases and the establishment of legal precedents
through dubious means;
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to
the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all
those who have been left without legal or equitable recourse, such as the petitioners
therein;
(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the dishonesty and to
save the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as an institution, it is necessary for
the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary to resign his position, without prejudice
to any other sanctions that the Court may consider appropriate;
(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the manner by which it
conducts research, prepares drafts, reaches and finalizes decisions in order to
prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and to provide clear and concise guidance to the
Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and writing in
pleadings, practice, and adjudication.
Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27 July 2010.
xxx
WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:
(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his submission, the Court
finds his Compliance to be satisfactory.
(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys. Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T.
Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan,
Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen
G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel
R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica,
Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L.
Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel
S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty,
Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario, is found
UNSATISFACTORY. These 35 respondent law professors are reminded of their
lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
to give due respect to the Court and to refrain from intemperate and offensive
language tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the Court
and the administration of justice and warned that the same or similar act in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.
(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding the charge of
violation of Canon 10 is found UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to
be more mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a
Dean and professor of law, to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the
Court and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is excused from these
proceedings. However, he is reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a
Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of responsible and professional
conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction from this Court.
(5) Finally, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC are denied for lack of merit.

3. A.C. No. 7676 June 10, 2014
AMADO T. DIZON, Complainant, vs. ATTY. NORLITA DE TAZA, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This concerns an administrative complaint1 for disbarment against Atty. Norlita De
Taza (Atty. De Taza) for the latter's demand for and receipt of exorbitant sums of
money from her client purportedly to expedite the proceedings of their case which
was pending before the Court.
The Facts
Amado Dizon (complainant) alleged that sometime in February 2005, he, along with
his siblings engaged the services of Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates to
represent them in the case of Eliza T. Castaneda, et al. v. Heirs of Spouses Martin
and Lucia Dizon with G.R. No. 174552.2 The complainant claimed that sometime in
February 2007, Atty. De Taza demanded the sum of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(₱75,000.00) from him to expedite the proceedings before the Court. This amount
was over and above the parties’ stipulated retainer fee as evidenced by a contract.3
According to the complainant, unknown to him at that time was that, a month earlier
or in January 2007, Atty. De Taza had already demanded and received a total of
Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱800,000.00) from his sibling Aurora Dizon, for the
same reason that Atty. De Taza proffered to him, which was to expedite the
proceedings of their case before the Court. Handwritten receipts4 signed by one Atty.
Norlita De Taza were submitted by the complainant, which state:
15 Jan. 2007
Receipt
That the amount received ₱300,000 shall be used to expedite the case which, in turn
shall result in the following:
1. Decision favorable to plaintiff w/in 2 mos. from receipt of said amount;
2. Back rentals up to present should be returned, if the same should not be included
in the Decision, the 300,000.00 shall be returned.
Signed
Atty. Norlita De Taza518 Jan. 2007
Receipt
The amount of ₱500,000 has been advanced as part of expense [sic] to expedite the
process before the courts. The said amount has been advanced by Ms. Aurora Dizon
and the same should be reimbursed to her by her siblings upon winning the case with
finality.
Signed
Atty. Norlita De Taza6
On October 24, 2007, the complainant went to this Court in Padre Faura, Manila and
learned that the Court had already denied the petition on November 20, 2006,
4
contrary to Atty. De Taza’s representations that the case was still pending. He tried to
communicate with Atty. De Taza, but she could no longer be found.7
Thereafter, on November 6, 2007, the complainant instituted a complaint for
disbarment8 against Atty. De Taza. He also attached several affidavits and
documents9 from other individuals who attested that Atty. De Taza issued bouncing
checks and/or failed to pay off her debts to them. A certain Ana Lynda Pineda
executed an affidavit10 which was attached to the complaint, alleging that Atty. De
Taza issued 11 checks11 in her favor amounting to ₱481,400.00, which were all
dishonored by the bank. Demand letters sent to her went unheeded.
Likewise, Darwin Tiamzon, a creditor of Atty. De Taza, whose Affidavit12 was
attached to the complaint, averred that Atty. De Taza issued a check13 for
₱50,000.00 as payment for her loan. Said check was dishonored by the bank for
being drawn against a closed account.
Furthermore, a certain Eleanor Sarmiento submitted an affidavit,14 stating that Atty.
De Taza owes her ₱29,560.39 and failed to pay the said amount despite repeated
demands.
On November 14, 2007, the complainant through a letter15 informed the Court that
Atty. De Taza is planning to leave the country as she was joining her husband in the
United States of America (U.S.A.).
In a Resolution16 dated December 10, 2007, Atty. De Taza was required by the Court
to file a Comment. However, the copy of the Resolution was returned unserved with
the postal carrier’s notation "RTS (Return to Sender)-Moved". The Court then
resolved by virtue of the Resolution17 dated July 2, 2008, to send a copy to Atty. De
Taza’s office address at Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates. Said copy was also
returned unserved with the notation "RTS-not connected."
It was then required in the Resolution18 dated October 8, 2008 that the complainant
inform the Court of Atty. De Taza’s new address, which the complainant faithfully
complied with by giving Atty. De Taza’s new address in the U.S.A. The Court, in its
Resolution19 dated January 26, 2009, directed the Clerk of Court to resend a copy of
the Resolution dated December 10, 2007 with a copy of the complaint to Atty. De
Taza using the latter’s U.S.A. address.
Like the previous occasions, the copy of the Resolution dated December 10, 2007
with the complaint was returned; this time, with the postal carrier’s notation "RTS-
Unclaimed". The Court in its Resolution20 dated September 9, 2009, held that the
said copy of the Resolution was deemed served and resolved to consider Atty. De
Taza as having waived the filing of her comment. The case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
A Notice of Mandatory Conference21 was sent to the parties, in which they failed to
appear. Thus, the parties were directed to file their respective position papers. The
complainant, in a letter22 addressed to the IBP, averred that he was already residing
abroad and maintained that he had already submitted his documentary evidence at

the time of the filing of his complaint. Atty. De Taza, for her part, did not file any
position paper.
In its Report and Recommendation23 dated January 4,2011, the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline recommended that Atty. De Taza be suspended for a period of two
years from the practice of law.
The IBP Board of Governors modified the Commission on Bar Discipline’s
recommendation in a Resolution24 dated January 3, 2013, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s demand of
[P]800,000.00 to expedite the case pending in the Supreme Court when, in fact, the
case had long been dismissed, Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year.25 (Emphasis supplied)
The Issue
WHETHER ATTY. DE TAZASHOULD BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR
ISSUING BOUNCING CHECKS, DEMANDING AND/OR RECEIVING MONEY FROM
HER CLIENTS UNDERTHE GUISE OF HAVING THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE
THE COURT EXPEDITED. Ruling
The Court acknowledges the fact that Atty. De Taza was not able to refute the
accusations against her. Numerous attempts were made to afford her an opportunity
to defend herself from the complainant’s allegations, but all these efforts were only
met with silence. Whether her transfer of residence was an unscrupulous move on
her part to evade her creditors, only she would certainly know. But as far as the Court
is concerned, all means were exhausted to give Atty. De Taza an avenue to oppose
the complainant’s charges. Her failure and/or refusal to file a comment will not be a
hindrance for the Court to mete out an appropriate sanction.
The Court has time and again ruled that disciplinary proceedings are investigations by
the Court to ascertain whether a lawyer is fit to be one. There is neither a plaintiff nor
a prosecutor therein. As this Court held in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v.
Atty. Naldoza,26 citing In the Matter of the Proceedings for Disciplinary Action Against
Atty. Almacen, et al. v. Yaptinchay:27 "Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are
sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an
action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They]
may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer
5
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. x x x.28 (Italics supplied)
"In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is
required."29 Based on the documentary evidence submitted by the complainant, it
appears that Atty. De Taza manifested a propensity for borrowing money, issuing
bouncing checks and incurring debts which she left unpaid without any reason. The
complainant even submitted a document evidencing Atty. De Taza’s involvement in
an estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 22 case filed before the Office
of the City Prosecutor in Angeles City (I.S. 07-J-2815-36) for drawing checks against
a closed account, among other complaint-affidavits executed by her other creditors.
Such conduct, while already off-putting when attributed to an ordinary person, is much
more abhorrent when the same is exhibited by a member of the Bar. As a lawyer,
Atty. De Taza must remember that she is not only a symbol but also an instrument of
justice, equity and fairness.
"We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having
been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral
character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. The issuance of a series of
worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the
deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public order.1âwphi1 It also
manifests a lawyer’s low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when
she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession
she should hold in high esteem."30
Atty. De Taza’s actuations towards the complainant and his siblings were even worse
as she had the gall to make it appear to the complainant that the proceedings before
the Court can be expedited and ruled in their favor in exchange for an exorbitant
amount of money. Said scheme was employed by Atty. De Taza just to milk more
money from her clients. Without a doubt, Atty. De Taza’s actions are reprehensible
and her greed more than apparent when she even used the name of the Court to
defraud her client.
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is
bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for that
particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the
lawyer must immediately return the money to his client.31 In this case, the purpose
for which Atty. De Taza demanded money is baseless and non-existent. Thus, her
demand should not have even been made in the first place.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the disbarment or
suspension of a lawyer for any of the following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross
misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without
authority to do so.32

The Court in Victoria C. Heenan v. Atty. Erlinda Espejo33 suspended the respondent
from the practice of law for two years when the latter issued checks which were
dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. In A-1 Financial Services, Inc. v. Valerio,34
the same penalty was meted out by this Court to the erring lawyer who issued
worthless checks to pay off her loan.
Additionally, in Anacta v. Resurreccion,35 the Court held that suspension from the
practice of law for four years was the appropriate sanction for a lawyer who defrauded
his client into paying ₱42,000.00 to him for the purported filing of a petition for
annulment of marriage. The respondent therein presented to his client a copy of the
petition with stamped receipt from the trial court when in reality, no such petition was
filed.
In Celaje v. Atty. Soriano,36 the respondent therein demanded ₱14,000.00 from the
complainant to be put up as injunction bond and asked for additional sums of money
on other occasions, supposedly to pay the judge who was handling the case. When
the complainant verified this with the judge, the judge denied the respondent’s
allegations. The complainant later learned that the bond was also unnecessary, as
the application for a writ was already denied by the trial court. Due to the foregoing,
the Court suspended the respondent from the practice of law for two years.
"Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon
individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important,
morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at
all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the
public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach."37 "The
Judiciary has been besieged enough with accusations of corruption and malpractice.
For a member of the legal profession to further stoke the embers of mistrust on the
judicial system with such irresponsible representations is reprehensible and cannot be
tolerated."38
All told, the Court holds that there is no reason to deviate from the report and
recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline which is to suspend Atty.
De Taza from the practice of law for two years.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for TWO YEARS with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar infraction would be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and
guidance, and let it be entered in Atty. Norlita De Taza's record in this Court.
SO ORDERED.
6
A.C. No. 7676, June 10, 2014 AMADO T. DIZON vs. ATTY. NORLITA DE TAZA•
Facts:
Lawyer asked for P75,000 from each of her clients to “facilitate” a favorable
decision pending in the Supreme Court. They subsequently discovered that the case
had been decided against them all along/ •
Held:
Atty. De Taza’s actuations towards the complainant and his siblings were
even worse as she had the gall to make it appear to the complainant that the
proceedings before the Court can be expedited and ruled in their favor in exchange
for an exorbitant amount of money. Said scheme was employed by Atty.De Taza just
to milk money from her client. Without a doubt, Atty. De Taza’s actions are
reprehensible and her greed more than apparent when she even used the name of
the Court to defraud her client.
4. A.C. No. 5359 March 10, 2014
ERMELINDA LAD VOA. DE DOMINGUEZ, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact,
VICENTE A. PICHON vs. ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON, SR.,
MENDOZA, J.:
Complainant Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez (complainant) was the widow of the
late Felipe Domiguez who died in a vehicular accident in Caraga, Davao Oriental, on
October 18, 1995, involving a dump truck owned by the Municipality of Caraga.
Aggrieved, complainant decided to file charges against the Municipality of Caraga and
engaged the services of respondent Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron, Sr. (Atty. Agleron). On
three (3) occasions, Atty. Agleron requested and received from complainant the
following amounts for the payment of filing fees and sheriffs fees, to wit: (1) June 3,
1996 -₱3,000.00; (2) June 7, 1996 -Pl,800.00; and September 2, 1996 - ₱5,250.00 or
a total of ₱10,050.00. After the lapse of four (4) years, however, no complaint was
filed by Atty. Agleron against the Municipality of Caraga.1
Atty. Agleron admitted that complainant engaged his professional service and
received the amount of ₱10,050.00. He, however, explained that their agreement was
that complainant would pay the filing fees and other incidental expenses and as soon
as the complaint was prepared and ready for filing, complainant would pay 30% of the
agreed attorney’s fees of ₱100,000.00. On June 7, 1996, after the signing of the
complaint, he advised complainant to pay in full the amount of the filing fee and
sheriff’s fees and the 30% of the attorney’s fee, but complainant failed to do so. Atty.
Agleron averred that since the complaint could not be filed in court, the amount of
₱10,050.00 was deposited in a bank while awaiting the payment of the balance of the
filing fee and attorney’s fee.2
In reply,3 complainant denied that she did not give the full payment of the filing fee
and asserted that the filing fee at that time amounted only to ₱7,836.60.
In the Report and Recommendation,4 dated January 12, 2012, the Investigating
Commissioner found Atty. Agleron to have violated the Code of Professional

Responsibility when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him, and recommended
that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of four (4) months.
In its April 16, 2013 Resolution,5 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of
Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner with modification that Atty. Agleron be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of only one (1) month.
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors except as
to the penalty imposed.
Atty. Agleron violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides that:
Rule 18.03-A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his client
with competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion
regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.6 He owes fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.7
In the present case, Atty. Agleron admitted his failure to file the complaint against the
Municipality of Caraga, Davao Oriental, despite the fact that it was already prepared
and signed. He attributed his non-filing of the appropriate charges on the failure of
complainant to remit the full payment of the filing fee and pay the 30% of the
attorney's fee. Such justification, however, is not a valid excuse that would exonerate
him from liability. As stated, every case that is entrusted to a lawyer deserves his full
attention whether he accepts this for a fee or free. Even assuming that complainant
had not remitted the full payment of the filing fee, he should have found a way to
speak to his client and inform him about the insufficiency of the filing fee so he could
file the complaint. Atty. Agleron obviously lacked professionalism in dealing with
complainant and showed incompetence when he failed to file the appropriate
charges.1âwphi1
In a number of cases,8 the Court held that a lawyer should never neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence renders him liable for disciplinary
action such as suspension ranging from three months to two years. In this case, the
Court finds the suspension of Atty. Agleron from the practice of law for a period of
three (3) months sufficient.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Accordingly, respondent ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON, SR.
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar wrongdoing will be dealt
with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the
records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all
7
its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
[ A.C. No. 5359, March 10, 2014 ]
ERMELINDA LAD VDA. DE DOMINGUEZ, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-
IN-FACT, VICENTE A. PICHON VS. ATTY. ARNULFO M. AGLERON, SR.,
Facts:
Complainant Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez (complainant) was the widow of the
late Felipe Domiguez who died in a vehicular accident in Caraga, Davao Oriental, on
October 18, 1995, involving a dump truck owned by the Municipality of Caraga.
Aggrieved, complainant decided to file charges against the Municipality of Caraga and
engaged the services of respondent Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron, Sr. (Atty. Agleron). On
three (3) occasions, Atty. Agleron requested and received from complainant the
following amounts for the payment of filing fees and sheriff’s fees, to wit: (1) June 3,
1996 – P3,000.00; (2) June 7, 1996 – P1,800.00; and September 2, 1996 –
P5,250.00 or a total of P10,050.00. After the lapse of four (4) years, however, no
complaint was filed by Atty. Agleron against the Municipality of Caraga.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent violated the code of professional responsibility
Ruling:
Atty. Agleron violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides that:
Rule 18.03-A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his client
with competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion
regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.
In the present case, Atty. Agleron admitted his failure to file the complaint against the
Municipality of Caraga, Davao Oriental, despite the fact that it was already prepared
and signed. He attributed his non-filing of the appropriate charges on the failure of
complainant to remit the full payment of the filing fee and pay the 30% of the
attorney’s fee. Such justification, however, is not a valid excuse that would exonerate
him from liability. As stated, every case that is entrusted to a lawyer deserves his full
attention whether he accepts this for a fee or free. Even assuming that complainant
had not remitted the full payment of the filing fee, he should have found a way to
speak to his client and inform him about the insufficiency of the filing fee so he could
file the complaint. Atty. Agleron obviously lacked professionalism in dealing with
complainant and showed incompetence when he failed to file the appropriate
charges.

5. A.C. No. 10164 March 10, 2014
STEPHAN BRUNET and VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS BRUNET, Complainants, vs.
ATTY. RONALD L. GUAREN, Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
On August 9, 2002, complainant spouses Stephan and Virginia Brunet
(complainants) filed a complaint against respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren (Atty.
Guaren) before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CED), Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP).
Complainants alleged that in February 1997, they engaged the services of
Atty. Guaren for the titling of a residential lot they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva
Caseres; that Atty. Guaren asked for a fee of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00)
including expenses relative to its proceeding; that it was agreed that full payment of
the fee shall be made after the delivery of the title; that Atty. Guaren asked for an
advance fee of One Thousand Pesos (Pl,000.00) which they gave; that Atty. Guaren
took all the pertinent documents relative to the titling of their lot-certified true copy of
the tax declaration, original copy of the deed of exchange, sketch plan, deed of
donation, survey plan, and original copy of the waiver; that on March 10, 1997, Atty.
Guaren asked for additional payment of Six Thousand Pesos (₱6,000.00) which they
dutifully gave; that from 1997 to 2001, they always reminded Atty. Guaren about the
case and each time he would say that the titling was in progress; that they became
bothered by the slow progress of the case so they demanded the return of the money
they paid; and that respondent agreed to return the same provided that the amount of
Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) be deducted to answer for his professional fees.
Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an attorney-client
relationship between them, Atty. Guaren made a special appearance against them in
a case pending before the Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court, Oslob, Cebu (MCTC).
Atty. Guaren admitted that he indeed charged complainants an acceptance
fee of ₱10,000.00, but denied that the amount was inclusive of expenses for the titling
of the lot. He claimed, however, that he received the payment of ₱1,000.00 and
₱6,000.00; that their agreement was that the case would be filed in court after the
complainants fully paid his acceptance fee; that he did not take the documents
relative to the titling of the lot except for the photocopy of the tax declaration; and that
he did not commit betrayal of trust and confidence when he participated in a case filed
against the complainants in MCTC explaining that his appearance was for and in
behalf of Atty. Ervin Estandante, the counsel on record, who failed to appear in the
said hearing.
In the Report and Recommendation,1 dated August 24, 2012, the
Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Guaren to have violated the Canon of
Professional Responsibility when he accepted the titling of complainants’ lot and
despite the acceptance of ₱7,000.00, he failed to perform his obligation and allowed 5
long years to elapse without any progress in the titling of the lot. Atty. Guaren should
also be disciplined for appearing in a case against complainants without a written
consent from the latter. The CBD recommended that he be suspended for six (6)
months.
In its May 20, 2013 Resolution,2 the IBP Board of Governors, adopted and
approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of the CBD, suspending
Atty. Guaren from the practice of law for three (3) months only.
8
The Court adopts the findings of the IBP Board of Governors on the
unethical conduct of Atty. Guaren, except as to the penalty.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public
service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to
be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields
profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to
public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration
of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves.3
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of
₱7,000.00 as partial payment of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform
his obligation to file the case for the titling of complainants' lot despite the lapse of 5
years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to serve his client with competence and
diligence when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren is found GUILTY of
having violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS
effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that a similar infraction in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in
the records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to
all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all
courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 10164, March 10, 2014 ]
STEPHAN BRUNET AND VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS BRUNET, COMPLAINANTS,
VS. ATTY. RONALD L. GUAREN, RESPONDENT.
Facts:
Complainants alleged that they engaged the services of Atty. Guaren for the
titling of a residential lot they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva Caseres; that Atty. Guaren
asked for a fee of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) including expenses relative to
its proceeding; that it was agreed that full payment of the fee shall be made after the
delivery of the title; that Atty. Guaren asked for an advance fee of One Thousand
Pesos (P1,000.00) which they gave; that Atty. Guaren took all the pertinent
documents relative to the titling of their lot-certified true copy of the tax declaration,
original copy of the deed of exchange, sketch plan, deed of donation, survey plan,
and original copy of the waiver; that on March 10, 1997, Atty. Guaren asked for
additional payment of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) which they dutifully gave; that
from 1997 to 2001, they always reminded Atty. Guaren about the case and each time
he would say that the titling was in progress; that they became bothered by the slow
progress of the case so they demanded the return of the money they paid; and that
respondent agreed to return the same provided that the amount of Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) be deducted to answer for his professional fees.

Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an attorney-client
relationship between them, Atty. Guaren made a special appearance against them in
a case pending before the Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court, Oslob, Cebu (MCTC).
Issue:
Whether or not resondent violated the code of professional responsibility
Ruling:
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public
service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to
be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields
profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to
public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration
of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves.
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of
P7,000.00 as partial payment of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform
his obligation to file the case for the titling of complainants’ lot despite the lapse of 5
years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to serve his client with competence and
diligence when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him.
6. A.C. No. 10543, March 16, 2016 SANCHEZ vs. ATTY. AGUILOS
This administrative case relates to the performance of duty of an attorney
towards his client in which the former is found and declared to be lacking in
knowledge and skill sufficient for the engagement. Does quantum meruit attach when
an attorney fails to accomplish tasks which he is naturally expected to perform during
his professional engagement?
FACTS
Complainant Nenita D. Sanchez has charged respondent Atty. Romeo G.
Aguilos (respondent) with misconduct for the latter's refusal to return the amount of
P70,000.00 she had paid for his professional services despite his not having
performed the contemplated professional services.
• She avers that in March 2005, she sought the legal services of the
respondent to represent her in the annulment of her marriage with her estranged
husband.
• She subsequently withdrew the case from him, and requested the refund of
the amounts already paid, but he refused to do the same as he had already started
working on the case; that she had sent him a letter, through Atty. Isidro S.C. Martinez,
9
to demand the return of her payment less whatever amount corresponded to the legal
services he had already performed
• That the respondent did not heed her demand letter despite his not having
rendered any appreciable legal services to her;5 and that his constant refusal to
return the amounts prompted her to bring an administrative complaint against him6 in
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 20, 2007.
IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. declared that the
respondent's insistence that he could have brought a petition for legal separation
based on the psychological incapacity of the complainant's husband was sanctionable
because he himself was apparently not conversant with the grounds for legal
separation; that because he rendered some legal services to the complainant, he was
entitled to receive only P40,000.00 out of the P70,000.00 paid to him as acceptance
fee, the P40,000.00 being the value of the services rendered under the principle of
quantum meruit; and that, accordingly, he should be made to return to her the amount
of P30,000.00.
IBP also recommended that Atty. Aguilos be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six months.
ISSUE(S)
(a) Whether or not the respondent should be held administratively liable for
misconduct; and (b) Whether or not he should be ordered to return the attorney's fees
paid.
RULING
Respondent was liable for misconduct, and he should be ordered to return the entire
amount received from the client
Clearly, the respondent misrepresented his professional competence and skill to the
complainant. As the foregoing findings reveal, he did not know the distinction between
the grounds for legal separation and for annulment of marriage. Such knowledge
would have been basic and expected of him as a lawyer accepting a professional
engagement for either causes of action. His explanation that the client initially
intended to pursue the action for legal separation should be disbelieved. The case
unquestionably contemplated by the parties and for which his services was engaged,
was no other than an action for annulment of the complainant's marriage with her
husband with the intention of marrying her British fiancee. They did not contemplate
legal separation at all, for legal separation would still render her incapacitated to re-
marry. That the respondent was insisting in his answer that he had prepared a petition
for legal separation, and that she had to pay more as attorney's fees if she desired to
have the action for annulment was, therefore, beyond comprehension other than to
serve as a hallow afterthought to justify his claim for services rendered.
As such, the respondent failed to live up to the standards imposed on him as an
attorney. He thus transgressed Canon 18, and Rules 18.01, 18.02 and 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.

Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal serviee which he knows or should
know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with
the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is
competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated
September 20, 2008 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, with
the MODIFICATION that Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos is hereby FINED P10,000.00 for
misrepresenting his professional competence to the client, and REPRIMANDS him for
his use of offensive and improper language towards his fellow attorney, with the stern
warning that a repetition of the offense shall be severely punished.
The Court ORDERS Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos to RETURN to the complainant within
thirty (30) days from notice the sum of P70,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per
annum reckoned from the date of this decision until full payment.
7. Arnold Pacao Vs. Atty. Sinamar Limos; A.C. No. 11246; June 14, 2016
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is a verified complaint[1] filed on November 4, 2011 by
Arnold Pacao (complainant), seeking the disbarment of Atty. Sinamar Limos (Atty.
Limos) for conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar.
The Facts
Sometime in March 2008, complainant’s wife Mariadel Pacao, former vault
custodian of BHF Pawnshop (BHF) branch in Mandaluyong City, was charged with
qualified theft by BHF. At the preliminary investigation, Atty. Limos appeared as
counsel for BHF. Thereafter, the case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City.[2]
To buy peace, the complainant initiated negotiation with BHF, through Atty.
Limos, for a possible settlement. A meeting was then arranged between the
complainant and Atty. Limos, where the latter represented that she was duly
authorized by BHF. After a series of negotiations, Atty. Limos relayed that BHF is
demanding the sum of P530,000.00 to be paid in full or by installments. Further
negotiation led to an agreement whereby the complainant would pay an initial amount
of P200,000.00 to be entrusted to Atty. Limos, who will then deliver to the complainant
a signed affidavit of desistance, a compromise agreement, and a joint motion to
approve compromise agreement for filing with the court.[3]
On October 29, 2009, the complainant gave the initial amount of
P200,000.00 to Atty. Limos, who in turn, signed an Acknowledgment Receipt[4]
10
recognizing her undertakings as counsel of BHF. However, Atty. Limos failed to meet
the terms of their agreement. Notwithstanding such failure, Atty. Limos still sought to
get from the complainant the next installment amount of their purported agreement,
but the latter refused.[5]
Thereafter, in June 2010, the complainant met BHF’s representative, Camille
Bonifacio, who informed him that Atty. Limos was no longer BHF’s counsel and was
not authorized to negotiate any settlement nor receive any money in behalf of BHF.
The complainant also learned that BHF did not receive the P200,000.00 initial
payment that he gave to Atty. Limos.[6]
This prompted the complainant to send a demand letter[7] to Atty. Limos to
return the P200,000.00 initial settlement payment, but the latter failed and refused to
do so.[8]
The complainant then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Limos before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) – Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). The
IBP-CBD required Atty. Limos to file an answer but she did not file any responsive
pleading.[9] A mandatory conference was then set on March 1 and 29, 2012, and
April 19, 2012, but Atty. Limos failed to attend. Thereafter, the IBP-CBD ordered the
parties to submit their position paper, but once again, Atty. Limos did not bother to
submit her position paper.
On May 5, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the
disbarment of Atty. Limos.[10] The Investigating Commissioner found enough
evidence on record to prove that Atty. Limos committed fraud and practiced deceit on
the complainant to the latter’s prejudice by concealing or omitting to disclose the
material fact that she no longer had the authority to negotiate and conclude a
settlement for and on behalf of BHF, nor was authorized to receive the P200,000.00
from the complainant. Atty. Limos was likewise ordered to return to the complainant
the full amount of P200,000.00 with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum
from the date of her receipt of the said amount to the date of her return of the full
amount.[11]
In a Resolution[12] dated April 19, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s report and recommendation.
On March 8, 2016, the IBP transmitted the notice of the resolution and the
case records to the Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.[13] As per verification of the Court, neither party has filed a motion for
reconsideration or a petition for review thereafter.
The Issue
Whether or not the instant disbarment complaint constitutes a sufficient basis
to disbar Atty. Limos from the practice of law?[14]
Ruling of the Court
To begin with, the Court notes that this is not the first time that Atty. Limos is
facing an administrative case, for she had already been twice suspended from the

practice of law, by this Court, for three months each in Villaflores v. Atty. Limos[15]
and Wilkie v. Atty. Limos.[16] In Villaflores, Atty. Limos received attorney’s fees of
P20,000.00 plus miscellaneous expenses of P2,000.00, but she failed to perform her
undertaking with her client; thus she was found guilty of gross negligence and
dereliction of duty. Likewise, in Wilkie, Atty. Limos was held administratively liable for
her deceitful and dishonest conduct when she obtained a loan of P250,000.00 from
her client and issued two postdated checks in the latter’s favor to pay the said loan
despite knowledge of insufficiency of funds to cover the same. In both cases, the
Court, gave Atty. Limos a warning that repetition of the same or similar acts by her will
merit a more severe penalty.
Once again, for the third time, Atty. Limos is facing an administrative case before this
Court for receiving the amount of P200,000.00 from the complainant purportedly for a
possible amicable settlement with her client BHF. However, Atty. Limos was no longer
BHF’s counsel and was not authorize to negotiate and conclude a settlement for and
on behalf of BHF nor was she authorized to receive any money in behalf of BHF. Her
blunder is compounded by the fact that she did not turn over the money to BHF, nor
did she return the same to the complainant, despite due demand. Furthermore, she
even tried to get the next installment knowing fully well that she was not authorized to
enter into settlement negotiations with the complainant as her engagement as
counsel of BHF had already ceased.
The fact that this is Atty. Limos’ third transgression exacerbates her offense.
The foregoing factual antecedents demonstrate her propensity to employ deceit and
misrepresentation. It is not too farfetched for this Court to conclude that from the very
beginning, Atty. Limos had planned to employ deceit on the complainant to get hold of
a sum of money. Such a conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well of a
member of the Bar.
Atty. Limos’ case is further highlighted by her lack of regard for the charges
brought against her. Similar with Wilkie, despite due notice, Atty. Limos did not bother
to answer the complaint against her. She also failed to file her mandatory conference
brief and her verified position paper. Worse, Atty. Limos did not even enter
appearance either personally or by counsel, and she failed to appear at the scheduled
date of the mandatory conferences which she was duly notified.[17]
By her failure to present convincing evidence, or any evidence for that
matter, to justify her actions, Atty. Limos failed to demonstrate that she still possessed
the integrity and morality demanded of a member of the Bar. Her seeming
indifference to the complaint brought against her was made obvious by her
unreasonable absence from the proceedings before the IBP. Her disobedience to the
IBP is, in fact, a gross and blatant disrespect for the authority of the Court.
Despite her two prior suspensions, still, Atty. Limos is once again
demonstrating to this Court that not only is she unfit to stay in the legal profession for
her deceitful conduct but is also remiss in following the dictates of the Court, which
has supervision over her. Atty. Limos’ unwarranted obstinacy is a great insolence to
the Court which cannot be tolerated.
The present case comes clearly under the grounds given in Section 27,[18]
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Court, however, does not hesitate to
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impose the penalty of disbarment when the guilty party has become a repeat
offender. Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of Atty.
Limos’ prior misconduct which grossly degrades the legal profession, the imposition of
the ultimate penalty of disbarment is warranted.
In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon Atty. Limos, the Court is aware
that the power to disbar is one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as
a legal professional and as an officer of the Court.[19] However, Atty. Limos’
recalcitrant attitude and unwillingness to heed with the Court’s warning, which is
deemed to be an affront to the Court’s authority over members of the Bar, warrant an
utmost disciplinary sanction from this Court. Her repeated desecration of her ethical
commitments proved herself to be unfit to remain in the legal profession. Worse, she
remains apathetic to the need to reform herself.
“[T]he practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State
upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions.”[20] “Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is
most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all
men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to
ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office, and sets
a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body
politic.”[21]
Indeed, Atty. Limos has disgraced the legal profession. The facts and
evidence obtaining in this case definitely establish her failure to live up to her duties
as a lawyer in accordance with the strictures of the lawyer’s oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby making
her unworthy to continue as a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sinamar Limos, having violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility by committing grave misconduct and willful
insubordination, is DISBARRED and her name ordered STRICKEN OFF the Roll of
Attorneys effective immediately.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the records of Atty. Sinamar Limos.
Further, let other copies be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the
Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in
the country for their information and guidance.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
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