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Packenham, R., Legislatures and political development. In: Legislatures, Norton, Philip, pp.81-96. Oxford
University Press, 1990.
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political science. For example, Ernst Nagel cites six meanings of the term,
only one of which is ‘consequence’; the meaning used throughout this paper:
see Structure of Science (New York, 1961), 523–5. When I say ‘we are all
LEGISLATURES AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 83
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE BRAZILIAN NATIONAL
CONGRESS
6
The second Institutional Act of 27 Oct. 1965, and subsequent
amendments to the Constitution, further restricted the powers of the
Congress. See Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems,
Brazil: Election Factbook Number 2 (suppl.; Washington, Nov. 1966), 3, 28.
From that date to Mar. 1967, when a new Constitution took place in Brazil,
the Congress was even less powerful than it had been from Apr. 1964 to July
1965. The Constitution of 1967 incorporated many of the main features of the
Institutional Acts regarding presidential-congressional relations.
LEGISLATURES AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 85
armed services… Only they can appropriately state the norms and
processes for constituting the new government and provide for it
[the new government] the powers and juridical instruments which
may assure the exercise of power in the exclusive interest of the
country. In order to demonstrate that we do not intend to radicalize
the revolutionary process, we have decided to maintain the
Constitution of 1946, restricting ourselves to modifying it only
regarding the powers of the president of the Republic… In order to
reduce still further the complete [plenos] powers of the victorious
revolution, we equally resolve to maintain the National Congress,
except for the reservations with respect to its powers contained in
this Institutional Act.
It is thus quite dear that the revolution does not seek to legitimate
itself through the Congress. It is rather the Congress which receives
from this Institutional Act, the consequence [resultante] of the
exercise of the Constituent Power inherent in all revolutions, its
legitimacy. [My translation, emphasis added]
Two points may be noted about this passage. First, there is
the attempt to justify, in terms of a democratic ideal and ‘the
people’, what was obviously an unconstitutional seizure of
power. Second, there is an explicit assertion, little emphasized
in the subsequent rhetoric of the revolutionary government,
that the revolution does not derive its legitimacy from the
Congress, but rather vice versa. Both features warn both mass
and élites alike that the revolutionary group in the military
means to rule, constitutional traditions notwithstanding. But
the references to popular sovereignty, and the fact that the
substance of the final two sentences was seldom, if ever,
publicly emphasized after the Institutional Act was issued,
reveal that the revolutionary group did not want to push its
point too far. For the maintenance of an active congress, even if
that action had little consequence for the allocation of values in
Brazilian politics, was an important determinant of the
legitimacy of the revolutionary government, despite what the
proclamation declares.
Now I may proceed to offer some hypotheses about the
functions of the Brazilian Congress from April 1964 to July
1965. I shall discuss these functions roughly in the order of
their importance, i.e. starting with the ways in which the
Congress—especially the Chamber of Deputies, the lower
house—had the greatest consequences for the Brazilian
86 ROBERT A.PACKENHAM