TIROL, MARK JASON S.

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. SALIENTES, ORLANDO B. SALIENTES, and ROSARIO C. SALIENTES,

Petitioners,

vs. LORAN S.D. ABANILLA, HONORABLE JUDGE PEDRO SABUNDAYO, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 203, MUNTINLUPA CITY, Respondents

G.R. No. 162734 August 29, 2006

FACTS:

Minor, Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla is the son of private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner
Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes. His parents live with his mother, Marie Antonette’s parents,
petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes. Due to in-laws problems, private respondent
suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but Marie Antonette refused. So, he alone left
the house of the Salientes. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his son.

Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity and as the representative of his son, filed a Petition for
Habeas Corpus and Custody, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 03-004 before the Regional Trial Court
of Muntinlupa City. On January 23, 2003, the trial court issued the following order:

Upon verified Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by Petitioners, the Respondents Marie Antonette
Abigail C. Salientes, Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes are hereby directed to produce and
bring before this Court the body of minor Lorenzo Emmanuel Salientes Abanilla on January 31, 2003 at
1:00 o’clock in the afternoon and to show cause why the said child should not be discharged from
restraint

Petitioners moved for reconsideration which the court denied.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was denied on March 19, 2004.

Hence, petitioners interposed this appeal by certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the petition for certiorari against the trial
court’s orders dated January 23, 2003 and February 24, 2003.

HELD:
NO.

As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the assailed January 23, 2003 Order of the trial court did
not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor
in court and explain why they are restraining his liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory order
precedent to the trial court’s full inquiry into the issue of custody, which was still pending before it.

Under Rule 41, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, an interlocutory order is not appealable but the aggrieved
party may file an appropriate special action under Rule 65. The aggrieved party must show that the court
gravely abused its discretion in issuing the interlocutory order. In the present case, it is incumbent upon
petitioners to show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order.

Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled
thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have
joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is
separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial
grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present
case, private respondent’s cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his
petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.

In a petition for habeas corpus, the child’s welfare is the supreme consideration. The Child and Youth
Welfare Code unequivocally provide that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others,
of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.

Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a
guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for
private respondent’s petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own
child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of
age.
 In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of CEZARI GONZALES and JULIUS MESA
ROBERTO RAFAEL PULIDO, petitioner, vs. Gen. EFREN ABU, as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and all persons acting in his stead and under his authority, and GEN. ERNESTO DE
LEON, in his capacity as the Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy, and all persons acting
in his stead and under his authority, respondents.

G.R. No. 170924 July 4, 2007

FACTS:

At around one o’clock in the morning of 27 July 2003, three hundred twenty-one (321) junior officers and
enlisted personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) entered and took over the premises of the
Oakwood Premiere Luxury Apartments (Oakwood) located at the Glorietta Complex, Ayala Avenue, Makati
City. They disarmed the security guards of said establishment and planted explosives in its immediate
surroundings.

The soldiers publicly announced that they went to Oakwood to air their grievances against the
administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (President Arroyo). They declared their withdrawal of
support from the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP – President Arroyo – and demanded her resignation
and that of the members of her cabinet and top officers of both the AFP and the Philippine National
Police (PNP).

At about one o’clock in the afternoon, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring the
country to be under a "state of rebellion." Consequently, she issued General Order No. 4 directing the AFP
and the PNP to carry out all reasonable measures, giving due regard to constitutional rights, to suppress
and quell the "rebellion."

Among those involved in the occupation of Oakwood were Cezari Gonzales and Julius Mesa, both enlisted
personnel of the Philippine Navy. It is in their behalf that the Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed before
the Court of Appeals.

On 2 August 2003, then AFP Chief of Staff Narciso L. Abaya issued a directive 3 to all Major Service
Commanders and to the Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP)
regarding the Custody of Military Personnel Involved in the 27 July 2003 Mutiny. On the strength thereof,
Gonzales and Mesa were taken into custody by their Service Commander.

On 8 December 2003, Gonzales and Mesa were dischargedfrom military service.

In an Order dated 8 July 2004, the RTC resolved the petitions for bail filed by the accused-soldiers. It
admitted Gonzales and Mesa, and twenty-five other co-accused to bail pegging the amount thereof at
P100,000.00 each.

Since Gonzales and Mesa continued to be in detention, a Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed by
petitioner Pulido on their behalf on 22 July 2005. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90546 and
raffled to the Third Division. In support thereof, it was argued that since Gonzales and Mesa are no longer
subject to Military Law as they had been discharged from the service on 8 December 2003, and since they
are not charged before a court martial, the military authorities have no jurisdiction to detain them, and
there is no legal ground to detain them further because a court order for their release had already been
issued.

On 10 August 2005, the Court of Appeals (3 rd Division) issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus directing
respondents Gen. Efren Abu, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and all persons acting
in his stead and under his authority, and Gen. Ernesto de Leon, Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine
Navy, and all persons acting in his stead and under his authority, to produce the bodies of Gonzales and
Mesa before the Court and to appear and show the cause and validity of their detention.

On 12 September 2005, the Court of Appeals (3 rd Division) dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus for
violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.

On 5 September 2005, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals (Special
Former Third Division) denied in its resolution dated 6 January 2006.

ISSUES:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS ON THE GROUND OF FORUM SHOPPING.

A. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE NATURE
OF THE ACTION AND LIMITED ITSELF TO THE ISSUE OF FORUM SHOPPING.

B. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONER THE
PENALTY OF CENSURE.

C. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT PASSING UPON THE
EXISTENCE OR ABSENCE OF VALID GROUNDS TO DETAIN JULIUS MESA AND CEZARI GONZALES.

HELD:

NO.

When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed is
effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. With the release of both
Mesa and Gonzales, the Petition for Habeas Corpus has, indeed, been rendered moot. Courts of justice
constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions where no actual interests are
involved. Thus, the well-settled rule that courts will not determine a moot question. Where the issues have
become moot and academic, there ceases to be any justiciable controversy, thus rendering the resolution
of the same of no practical value. This Court will therefore abstain from expressing its opinion in a case
where no legal relief is needed or called for.

The only remaining issues to be resolved are: (1) Is petitioner guilty of forum shopping? (2) Should
petitioner be penalized when he failed to inform the 3 rd Division of the Court of Appeals of the pendency
of the Petition for Certiorari filed by respondents before the 7th Division of the same court which asked for
the annulment of the RTC’s order granting Gonzales and Mesa’s petition for bail?
For filing a Petition for Habeas Corpus despite the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari that questioned
the validity of the order granting bail, which order is precisely the very basis of the Petition for Habeas
Corpus, petitioner is guilty of forum shopping.

It has been held that forum shopping is the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been
rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possibly favorable) opinion in another forum (other than
by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari), or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition. Thus, it has been held that there is forum shopping — (1) when, as a result of an adverse
decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another;
OR (2) if, after he has filed a petition before the Supreme Court, a party files a motion before the Court of
Appeals, since in such a case, he deliberately splits appeals in the hope that even in one case in which a
particular allowable remedy sought for is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be
open; OR (3) where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after failing to
obtain the same from the original court.

The Court has laid down the yardstick to determine whether a party violated the rule against forum
shopping, as where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the other. Stated differently, there must be between the two cases: (a) identity of
parties; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.2

As lucidly explained by the Court of Appeals, the ultimate relief sought by petitioner in both the certiorari
and habeas corpus cases is the release of Gonzales and Mesa. Petitioner should not have filed the Petition
for Habeas Corpus because the relief he is seeking therein is the same relief he is asking for in the
certiorari case. Moreover, the main issue in both cases boils down to whether Gonzales and Mesa should
be released on bail. Because of the presence of the elements of litis pendentia -- parties, reliefs and issue
are substantially the same/similar in the two cases; and any decision in the certiorari case will be binding
on the habeas corpus case – petitioner is thus guilty of forum shopping.

For his failure to inform the Court of Appeals of the pendency of the certiorari case, petitioner clearly
violated his obligation to disclose within five days the pendency of the same or a similar action or claim as
mandated in Section 5(c), Rule 7of the Rules of Court.
 IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE
FRANCISCO THORNTON, petitioner, vs. ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, respondent.

G.R. No. 154598 August 16, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August 28, 1998 in the Catholic
Evangelical Church at United Nations Avenue, Manila. A year later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl
whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton.

However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife. She wanted to
return to her old job as a "guest relations officer" in a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her
friends. In fact, whenever petitioner was out of the country, respondent was also often out with her
friends, leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp.

Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her carefree ways. On
December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying her
husband. She told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan,
Basilan Province.

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but this was
dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to
Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However, he did not find them
there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a certification 3 that respondent was no
longer residing there.

Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondent’s cellular phone bills showing calls from
different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner then filed
another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas
corpus enforceable in the entire country.

However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction
over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive
original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving
custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over such petitions.
HELD:

YES.

Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors
(A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May 15, 2003) has rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of the rule
provides that a petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with
any of its members and, if so granted; the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.

The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked
its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.

The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We rule therefore that RA 8369
did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases
involving the custody of minors. Again, to quote the Solicitor General:

This is not the first time that this Court construed the word "exclusive" as not foreclosing resort to another
jurisdiction. As correctly cited by the Solicitor General, in Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation, the heirs
of miners killed in a work-related accident were allowed to file suit in the regular courts even if, under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction
over such cases.

Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense.
Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in mind is not accurately reflected in the language of a
statute, and its literal interpretation may render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice or
contradiction.7 In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word "exclusive" will result in grave injustice
and negate the policy "to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children" under the Constitution
and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This mandate must prevail over legal
technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in construing the provisions of RA 8369.

The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said
that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not
prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases
involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029
and BP 129 ― that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.

In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC
Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors.

From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent
jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved.