A Critical Assessment of Saññāvedayitanirodha

P.B. Tan (Ph. D in Buddhist Studies)

Dept. of Buddhist Stusies, Mahidol University
Submitted on 30th, April, 2016

CONTENTS :

Abstract
Introduction
An exposition on Vedana
An analytical insight into Saññā
The Wisdom in Saññāvedayitanirodha
Critical assessment on Saññāvedayitanirodha
Conclusion
Abbreviation
Bibliography

Abstract

The prevailing question among the scholars on whether the Buddhist concept of the “cessation of
feeling (vedana) and perception (saññā)” is identical to the notion of Nibbāna is not at all directly
explained in the three Pāli Piṭaka, letting aside the commentarial and sub-commentarial texts. The time,
origin, and authenticity of the commentarial and sub-commentarial literature is another research question
which can also be quite controvertible. This first question commonly arises because the Buddhist novices,
and particularly scholars in the West, find it hard to comprehend the ontological aspect of Nibbāna. But
we may also want to think that perhaps this subject matter had never been unclear in the minds of those
who compiled the Buddha’s teaching into the Tipiṭaka texts. Hence, we find no text had really discussed
about this. However, it is not true to say that the scriptural texts had tried to avoid discussion of this
matter, for then it would be implying that the Gotama Buddha had not been clear throughout his teachings.
Nonetheless, there are several scriptural texts that mentions about the “cessation of feelings and
perceptions (saññāvedayitanirodha) alongside the term “nibbāna”, indicating it only as a process
component in the logical sequence of steps leading to Nibbāna, but none that directly says that
Saññāvedayitanirodha is, or is not, synonymous with Nibbāna. The introductory section of this paper
will cover the explanation of other mental and physical aspect of the phenomena associated with the
“cessation of feeling and perception”.The subsequent three sections will elaborate on the scriptural
aspect of vedana, saññā, and saññāvedayitanirodha accordingly. The last section sets the pace for a
critical appraisal of the relationship between saññāvedayitanirodha and Nibbāna by giving both terms a
more in-depth analysis and an evaluative comparison with examples. As much as it is possible, all
expressive statements and conclusions will be referred to only the Pāli Tipiṭaka.

1
Introduction
To understand the spiritual wisdom coming from the cessation (nirodha) of feeling (vedana) and
perception (saññā), it is vital in this introductoy section to describe the constituents in the chain of
coherent mental process, with which the cessation is associated. The Five Aggregates (pañcakkhandhā)
of phassa (contact), vedanā (sensual feeling), saññā (perception), saṅkhāra (mental formations or
volition), and viññāṇa (mental cognition, consciousness, or ‘mind’ in general) are the ‘formless’ group
of mental existences which are distinct from the ‘form-based’ Four Great Elements 1 of physical
existences. In the analysis of mental-physical phenomenon (nāmarūpa), the immaterial aggregate of
contact (or sense-impression), feeling, perception, mental formation, and including also the
unconditioned element of Nibbāna, are grouped under ‘nāma’ (name, theme, or designation); while rūpa
(form, matter, material, or corporeality) constitutes the Four Great Elements and all the Corporeality that
are dependent on these four physical properties 2 . These suttanta twofold description of existential
phenemena (nāmarūpa) are grouped in Abhidhamma as the three collections of consciousness
(cittuppāda), mental factors (cetasikā) and form or corporeality (rūpakaṇḍa). More distinctly in the
Dhammasaṅgaṇi, the suttanta aggregates of ‘feeling’ and ‘perception’ are taken in as two mental factors,
whereas the aggregate of volition (saṅkhārakkhandha) is further sub-divided into fifty mental factors.
The Madhupiṇḍikasutta explains how ‘contact’ is formed. The objects of visuals, sounds, smells,
tastes, touches, and thoughts (six sensuous cognitions) impinge specifically on our eyes, ears, nose,
tongue, body, mind (six sense-bases) to arise respectively the eye-consciousness, eye-consciousness,
ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, and mind-
consciousness (six-sensuous consciousness). The specific meeting up of forms, sense-bases, and mind
(manoviññāṇa) constitute the six points of ‘contact’ (phassa) accordingly 3. With contacts, feelings arise;
of what are felt, perceptions arise; of what are perceived, mental formations (saṅkhāra), which are the
volitive activities, arise. Saṅkhāra leads to unsettled restlessness and diffusion in sensual consciousness
from our own perceptive knowledge of the past, present and future 4 .
Here it is important to note that the eye-, ear-, nose-, tongue-, and body- faculties are independent
domains which do not ‘know’ one another; that is, they each experiences differently in terms of object-
impression and functions, but all of them are invariably hinge on the mind intellect (mano), that is, the
five faculties commonly reliant upon the mind in cognitive experiences 5.

An exposition on Vedana
Feeling (vedana) is one of the four foundations of mindfulness (satipaṭṭhāna) which underpins the
factor ‘right mindfulness’ (sammāsati) of the Noble Eightfold Path Factors. The Satipaṭṭhāna emphasizes
‘mindfulness’ through practising ardently and be fully mindful in the contemplation of ‘body in the
body’, ‘feelings in feelings’, ‘the mind in the mind’, and ‘things in various things’, and consequently
one would be able to subdue avarice, envy, sorrow, and all the unwholesome proclivities 6. Satipaṭṭhāna
method instructs the meditator to keep attention focused respectively on the body, feelings, mind, and
things, without wandering off.

1
MN 28: Mahāhatthipadopamasutta. Cattāro Mahābhūtā: pathavīdhātu, āpodhātu, tejodhātu, vāyodhātu—mean, in
physiological sense, ‘material, liquid, heat, air’ respectively.
2
DhS par. [1316], [1317] ; KN: Cūḷaniddesa 23, Khaggavisāṇasuttaniddesa.
3
MN 18: Madhupiṇḍikasutta.
4
MN 18 Madhupiṇḍikasutta; Vb 15.
5
MN 43: Mahāvedallasutta. “…pañcannaṃ indriyānaṃ nānāvisayānaṃ nānāgocarānaṃ, na aññamaññassa
gocaravisayaṃ paccanubhontānaṃ, mano paṭisaraṇaṃ, mano ca nesaṃ gocaravisayaṃ paccanubhoti”.
6
DN 22: Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasutta.
2
which includes such thinking like “I will not feel...; I will not think of the mental forming of…; I don’t
want to have that consciousness of…’, all of which do not correspond with the stark annihilation of the
aggregates of feeling and perception. Such ‘perceived’ nature of saññāvedayitanirodha is driven,
conditioned, and caused to arise which will also eventually subside, and thus is impermanent which can
not be attributed to the unconditioned element of Nibbāna 29. Besides, the latent nature of the volition
(saṅkhārakkhandha) which is the equivalence of the fifty mental factors (cetasikā), and the
‘representative element of the mind ideation’ (manoviññāṇadhātuviññāṇa), still remain with the person.
These explanations by no means can adequately account for the reason why the Buddha did not enter the
ultimate emancipation at the stage of saññāvedayitanirodha.
However, an answer is provided in the Sarvāstivādin Mahāvibhāṣā-śastra which points out that the
Gotama Buddha at the time of Parinibbāna, instead of emerging at any wholesome consciousness
(kusalacittāni), He had abided in the indeterminate consciousness (abyākatakiriyācitta). According to
the śastra, any kind of wholesome consciousness would also be rendered dysfunctional at the eventual
moment of death. For that reason, all the Arhants had abided in Nibbāna with the “indeterminate”
consciousness 34. Abyākatakiriyācittanī are the type of consciousness that are neither kamma nor the
result of kamma, are neither wholesome nor unwholesome, are neither good nor bad, which are
accompanied by disinterestedness and void of volitive activities 35. The Abyākatakiriyācittanī, do not
take sides, belong only to the Aryā, and is unconditioned. This is one explanation to differentiate the
Saññāvedayitanirodha from Nibbāna.
An interesting point to note in the attaining of saññāvedayitanirodha is that one sometimes does not
make his/her awareness of setting a predesignated time for emerging from jhāna. Because perception is
stifled, the meditator could end up indefinitely in dormant mental absorption such as the case of a monk
who was awaken by others only several weeks later after having gotten into deep mental absorption 36.
Setting a digital timer-alarm device would help.
I have so far described to some length, the cessation of feelings and perceptions, and what aspects
of the relationship it has to Nibbāna. In this regard, I thought it may be useful to also include in my
ending space, a brief review of some Western accounts as regard Saññāvedayitanirodha and Nibbāna.
Their views, whether agreeable or controvertible, would be respected in their own merits as their views
are from the different hierarchical functions of the varied cultures belonging to different historical times.
On Nibbāna, Mrs. C. A. F. Rhys Davids once wrote: “Gotama attaining his supreme enlightenment
is said to have ‘experienced emancipation-bliss’ (vimutti-sukha-paṭisaṃvedi)…and to King Milinda, the
Sage declares Nirvana to be “absolute happiness” (ekanta-sukhaṃ)” …Buddhism defined all right
conduct and the sufficient motive for it in terms of escape from ill or suffering…again their psychological
proclivity is manifested… The Buddhist, then, was a Hedonist…” 37.
Lance Cousins, summarizing from the final six of the twenty-two triads of the Mātikā in
Dhammasaṅgaṇi, in his words: “the unconditioned is not matter, it is inactive from a kammic point of
view and does not depend upon an object as a reference point. It is not any kind of mental event or
activity nor is it the consciousness which is aware of mind and matter… ‘immeasurable’, all ‘refined’…
not classifiable in terms of arising or as past, present or future.” 38.

34
Mahāvibhāṣā-śastra, Chap. 191.
35
DhS par. [566], [568], [574], [576], [577].
36
Huimin Bhikkhu, 2009: “An Inquiry into Master Xuyun's Experiences of Long-dwelling in Samādhi”. Taiwan: Journal
of the Chinese Buddhist Studies. (釋惠敏《虛雲和尚長時住定經驗之探索》), 臺灣中華佛學學報: 22 2009.07, 45-
67 頁.
37
Cf. C.A.F. Rhys Davids (ed.), 1900. “A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics”, pp. ixxxiv-ixxxv.
38
Cf. Cousins, Lance, 1983-4: “Nibbana and Abhidhamma”. An excerpt from Buddhist Studies Review (Journal of the
UK Association for Buddhist Studies), Vol.1, No.2, pp. 99-101, 102-103.
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 Mathieu Boisvert distinguishes the Nibbāna that the Buddha attained at age thirty-five under the
Bodhi tree and the Nibbāna He entered into when he passed away as the ‘nibbāna with residue’
(sopādisesa) and ‘nibbāna without residue’ (nirupādisesa). He attributes sopādisesa-nibbāna to some
subtle kamma that still remain, and as such the kamma-resultants (kammavipāka) and kamma-process
(kammabhava) continues, by which the Five Aggregates are regenerated 39 . I noticed the term
‘sopādisesā nibbānadhātu’ is being mentioned only in Peṭakopadesa (Pe 6). Here I presume what he
meant by the ‘residual subtle kamma’ is alluding to the lurking ‘mental factors’. He also highlights what
Ven. Dhammapāla wrote about the similarity between the term saññāvedayitanirodha and ‘nibbāna
without residue’ 40, but beyond just that nothing else appears cogent as to the correlation between the
two terms. The “nibbāna -with and -without residue” that Boisvert has mentioned bears certain
resemblance with the so-called “nibbāna attained as a result of comprehension of dhamma here and now,
here and there, in the four jhānā” (diṭṭhadhammanibbānavādā), mentioned in the Brahmajālasutta (MN
1). But as soon as one getting off from the jhāna, sense pleasures and distress set in with change and
impermanence that have taken place, there is no more “nibbāna” in that sense.
Buddhaghosa Thera mentions in Visuddhimagga that: “the element of saññāvedayitanirodha does
not exist in its intrinsic nature; it is just the cessation of the twofold elements (element of mind-
consciousness and element of state). The element of sense-desire is just the element of state, or the
Eighteen Elements. 41 …and cessation of the Five Aggregates is the permanent nibbana 42 … the mind
of the monk who has emerged from the attainment of saññāvedayitanirodha is inclined towards inward
aloofness 43 ”.
Y. Karunadasa explains this conundrum from the Abhidhamma standpoint: “for the attainment of
cessation (of perceptions and feelings), the stream of consciousness and its concomitants are only
temporarily arrested although the physical body remains alive ...what keeps the physical body of the
person who attains “cessation” alive is the ‘material life-faculty’. In this plane of existence, what operates
is not the mental but the material life-faculty 44 ”
Having examined this enigma to this extent, I would say that a scholastic or ontological study to
Nibbāna will be just as good as a theory, for Nibbāna is inexpressible. It can only be realized through
one’s own utter spiritual development, and after ridding oneself of all defilements. In a narrow sense,
Nibbāna is liken to an assured inner state of “neither-nor” universality—one does not affirm nor
disaffirm. The closest words can assign to it is: “indeterminate, unconditioned, and dissociated from any
of the Five Aggregates and the Four Great Elements”. In Mūlapariyāya Vagga, the Buddha says that,
the monk, having directly known Nibbāna as Nibbāna, he does not conceive himself as Nibbāna, or in
Nibbāna, or different from Nibbāna, or perceiving Nibbāna to be ‘his’, or delight in Nibbāna. Why ?
Because he fully understands the ‘unconditionality’ of Nibbāna 45 . Saññāvedayitanirodha, however,
does not contain any of these attributes, and just as Prof. Y. Karunadasa had explained, that the cetasikā
are only being kept temporarily at bay in the state of saññāvedayitanirodha. Unlike Nibbāna, the monk
in attaining Saññāvedayitanirodha may not be totally free of taints, and may not possess the requisite
wisdom qualifying him for Nibbāna. Moreover, away from the diṭṭhadhammanibbānavādā as I
mentioned earlier, the monks must return to the reality of managing daily trivialities of the monastic

39
Cf. Boisvert, Mathieu, 1995: “The Five Aggregates: Understanding Theravāda Psychology and Soteriology”, pp.54-57.
40
Ibid., pp. 60 ; Añña: Visuddhimagga-mahāṭīkā 2: “Nibbānaṃ patvā ti anupādisesanibbānaṃ patvā viya”.
41
Pe Maung Tin, 1922: “The Path of Purity, Being a Translation of Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga”, pp.575-576.
42
Ibid., pp. 738.
43
Ibid., pp. 872.
44
Cf. Y. Karunadasa, 2010: “The Theravāda Abhidhamma: Its Inquiry into the Nature of Conditioned Reality”, pp.182-
183.
45
MN 1: Mūlapariyāyasutta.
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events and helping fettered laities with all of their life's little vexations, let aside the enticements that
come forth in all attractive forms.
But, is it really none at all in the three Piṭakas that ever mention of Saññāvedayitanirodha being
synonymous with Nibbāna, or anything that comes closer to it? There are several suttas in Majjhima
Nikāya that can give us more clarity. The Buddha says, “the perfect method that He formulated,
conduces surely the renunciation, detachment, cessation, tranquility, erudition, enlightenment, and
Nibbāna 46 ”. As well as his method, He says: “is serene, is sublime, that is, it halts all volitive
activities, it relinquishs all attachments, it destroys all cravings, it forsakes lusts, it conduces cessation
and Nibbāna 47 ”. From these words of the Buddha, we can see that the “cessation of perceptions and
feelings”, or indeed be it any “cessation”, is not the same as Nibbāna.

Conclusion
Insofar as I have examined, even though that there are many direct and obvious indicators in the
suttas which may be pointing to suggest that the Saññāvedayitanirodha is not the same as Nibbāna,
however, we need to be cautious on making a distinction of the two. The scholars may be happy if they
can clearly distinguish between the two. From the perspective of a Buddhist practitioner, I would
strongly advocate the adherence to the ‘unconditionality’ and ‘indeterminate’ aspect of Nibbāna. The
main purpose of Saññāvedayitanirodha is for the attainment of Nibbāna. The authenticity and
perpetuity of ‘utter Nibbāna’ is attested only to its utter accomplishment in Saññāvedayitanirodha. The
two sublime qualities are co-dependent and coherent, and any imperfection from either of which will
pave the way for kamma to resettling in. The Arhants have no differentiation as to
Saññāvedayitanirodha and Nibbāna, as much as is between the good and the evil, as we have seen the
Gotama Buddha had chosen the “indeterminate” rather than the “wholesome” consciousness at the
moment of Parinibbāna.

46
MN 83: Makhādeva. “etarahi mayā kalyāṇaṃ vattaṃ nihitaṃ ekantanibbidāya virāgāya nirodhāya upasamāya
abhiññāya sambodhāya nibbānāya saṃvattati.”
47
MN 46: Mahāmālukyasutta. “etaṃ santaṃ etaṃ paṇītaṃ yadidaṃ sabbasaṅkhārasamatho sabbūpadhipaṭinissaggo
taṇhākkhayo virāgo nirodho nibbāna”. Also mentions in MN 26: Ariyapariyesanā.
9
 Abbreviation

DN : Dīgha Nikāya
MN : Majjhima Nikāya
SN : Saṃyutta-Nikāya
AN : Aṅguttara Nikāya
KN : Khuddaka Nikāya
DhS : Dhammasaṅgaṇi
DhSA : Dhammasaṅgaṇi-Aṭṭhakathā (Aṭṭhasālinī)
Vb : Vibhaṅga
Kv : Kathāvatthu
Mil : Milindapañha

Bibliography

Edward Muller, 1897: “The Atthasālinī”. Oxford: PTS.

C.A.F. Rhys Davids (ed.), 1900: “A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics”. Oxford: PTS, 1900.

Cousins, Lance, 1983-4: “Nibbana and Abhidhamma”. An excerpt from Buddhist Studies Review
(Journal of the UK Association for Buddhist Studies), Vol.1, No.2, pp. 95-109.

Boisvert, Mathieu, 1995: “The Five Aggregates: Understanding Theravāda Psychology and
Soteriology”. Canada: Wilfred Laurier University Press.

Pe Maung Tin, Rhys Davids (ed), 1976: “The Expositor (Atthasālinī): Buddhaghosa’s Commentary on
the Dhammasangani”. Oxford: PTS.

Pe Maung Tin, 1922: “The Path of Purity, Being a Translation of Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga”.
Oxford: PTS.

Y. Karunadasa, 2010: “The Theravāda Abhidhamma: Its Inquiry into the Nature of Conditioned
Reality”. HK: The University of Hong Kong.

10