DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS

POLITICAL LAW—is that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operations of the
governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the State with the inhabitants of its territory.
(PEOPLE VS. PERFECTO, 43 Phil. 887)

Political law is somewhat different than other laws because of the rule that, political laws are deemed abrogated
in case of change of sovereignty while all other laws may still continue whatever they may dealing at - the
Spaniards, Americans and others. All other laws are in force and in effect, except political law.

Other Terms:

In the present law curriculum prescribed by the Supreme Court, Political Law embraces Constitutional
Law, Administrative Law, Law of Public Officers, Law on Municipal Corporations and Election Law.

Constitutional Law – is a study of the structure and powers of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines. It deals with certain concepts of Political Law such as the nature of the Sate, supremacy of the
Constitution, the separation of powers and the rule of the majority.

Administrative Law – embraces all the law that controls or is intended to control, the administrative
operations of government.

Law on Public Officers ; Law on Municipal Corporations; Election law.

MACARIOLA VS. JUDGE ASUNCION, 114 SCRA 77

Whether or not political law is abrogated when there is change of sovereign?

Judge Asuncion is a Judge at Leyte, at the same time he has a business in Leyte. The plaintiff filed an
action against him on the ground of violating Article 5 of the Code of Commerce. The said article prohibits
justices and judges from engaging business in the place where their courts are located.

SC: It seems that his act is in violation of Article 5 of the Code of Commerce because Code of Commerce is a
commercial law, thus even there is change of sovereignty, said law is still in force and effect. But the Supreme
Court said, he is not liable because Article 5 is a political law.
Our Code of Commerce was copied from the Code of Commerce of 1885 of Spain, and was made
effective in the Philippines in 1887. Commercial laws, criminal laws, tax laws, labor law, civil law is still
implemented from the time of Spaniards until now.
The provision in the Code of Commerce (Made effective in the Philippines in 1887) which prohibits
judges, justices, etc., (public officers) from engaging in business within the territorial jurisdiction of their courts
is political in nature and therefore, said provision was deemed abrogated when there was a change of sovereignty
from Spain to the United States at the turn of the century. Political laws are deemed abrogated if there is a
change of sovereignty and unless re-enacted under the new sovereign, the same is without force and effect.

Political law is abrogated when there is a change of sovereignty while it is only suspended when
there is only a change of government.

 How about if there is change in government? (Example. Japanese Government who governed the
country yet leaded by Filipinos(Laurel) to Philippine Government)
During the Japanese regime, the Constitution was suspended. But when the Japanese was defeated, the
suspended laws including the Constitution were again in force and effect based on the Doctrine of Jus
Postliminium / Postliminy Theory.

THE SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION

The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons,
including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however noble its intentions, if it
conflicts with the Constitution. The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this
law. Expediency must not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude. Right or wrong,
 2

the Constitution must be upheld as long as it has not been changed by the sovereign people lest its disregard
result in the usurpation of the majesty by the pretenders to illegitimate power.

 MUTUC VS. COMELEC, 36 SCRA 228

COMELEC banned Mutuc in using political taped jingles.
COMELEC admitted the factual allegations set forth in the petition, but the justification for the
prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, which made it unlawful for
candidates "to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as
pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats,
matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin." It was its contention that the jingle
proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda
material, under the above statute subject to confiscation.
SC: The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the validity of
any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system
of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the
topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with
which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed. It overrides any governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a
recognition of its being the supreme law. It has been the constant holding of this Court, as it could not have been
otherwise, that respondent Commission cannot exercise any authority in conflict with or outside of the law, and
there is no higher law than the Constitution.

 MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408

Manila Prince Hotel, though lost in the biding for the sale of the shares in the Manila Hotel, asked the
GSIS, that it will matched the bidding made by Renong Berhad (a Malaysian Firm), who won in the bidding.

SC: The Court favored Manila Prince Hotel.

A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is
supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been
defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a
system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes
certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is
a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be
determined and all public authority administered.
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of
the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive
branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any
force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it
is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions
command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline
of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain
fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those
found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision, which is complete in itself
and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient
rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by
the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there
is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

Kinds of Constitution

a) written or unwritten
A written constitution is one whose precepts are embodied in one document or set of documents.
An unwritten constitution consists of rules which have not been integrated into a single, concrete form.
These includes statutes of a fundamental character, judicial decisions, customs and traditions and certain
common law principles.
 3

b) rigid and flexible

A rigid constitution is one that can be amended only by a formal and usually difficult process.
A flexible constitution is one that can be changed by ordinary legislation.

c) cumulative or conventional
A conventional constitution is an enacted constitution, formally “struck off” at a definite time and place
following a conscious effort taken by a constituent body.
A cumulative constitution is the result of political evolution, “not inaugurated at any specific time but
changing by accretion rather than any systematic method.

The Constitution of the Philippines is written, conventional and

rigid.
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AMENDMENT AND REVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION

Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

[1] The Congress upon a vote of ¾ of all its Members; or

[2] A constitutional Convention.

Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voter therein. No amendment under this Section
shall be authorized within five (5) years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every
five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

Section 3. The Congress, by a vote of 2/3 of all its members, cal a constitutional convention, or by a
majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention.

Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than
ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.

Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not later than ninety days after the certification by the COMELEC of the
sufficiency of the petition.

2007 Bar Question in Political Law: Question:
May Congress by ¾ votes of all its members
(whether voting jointly or separately)
AMEND any provision of the Constitution?
Answer: No. It can only propose amendments by
¾ votes of all its members. A provision is amended
only after it was ratified by majority of the votes cast
during the plebiscite called to amend or reject the
proposed amendments.

“Revision” is the alterations of the different portions
of the entire document [Constitution]. It may result in
the rewriting whether the whole constitution, or the
greater portion of it, or perhaps some of its important
provisions. But whatever results the revision may
produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of
revision is the original intention and plan authorized to
be carried out. That intention and plan must
contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the
Constitution to determine which one should be altered
or suppressed or whether the whole document should
be replaced with an entirely new one.
“Amendment” of the Constitution, on the other hand,
envisages a change or only a few specific provisions.
The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the
advisability of changing the entire constitution or of
considering that possibility. The intention rather is to
improve specific parts of the existing constitution or to
add to it provisions deemed essential on account of
changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that
seem obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading in their
effect. (SINCO, Vicente, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL
LAW)

NOTE: Amendments to, or revision of the Constitution is VALID only when approved by a majority of the votes
cast during the plebiscite, not by the votes of the Members of Congress.
CASES.

 RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO , together with 6,327,952 registered

voters vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006, 505
SCRA 160

Facts:
Petitioners filed a Petition for Initiative and Referendum with the COMELEC to amend the 1987
Philippine Constitution, particularly Articles VI and VII to replace the present Presidential-Bicameral system of
 5

government to Parliamentary-Unicameral system using Section 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution. Petitioners
claim that their petition was signed by 6,327,952 million voters all over the country and the same constitutes
over 12% of all the registered voters in the entire country and that more than 3% of the registered voters in every
legislative district signed the same in accordance with Section 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution. The petition to
change the Constitution involves sections 1-7 of Article VI; Sections 1-4 of Article VII and an Article XVII
entitled “Transitory Provisions”. The petitioners prayed with the COMELEC that after due publication of their
Petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters’ ratification:

DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII

OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT
FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL BICAMERAL TO A UNICAMERAL-
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE
SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?

The COMELEC dismissed the petition citing MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC,
270 SCRA 106 where it was held that:

RA 6735 intended to include the System of Initiative on Amendments to the

Constitution, but is, unfortunately, Inadequate to cover that system under Section 2, Art. XVII
of the Constitution. x x x .
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured
by “empowering” the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary
to carry the purposes of this act.

Considering the said dismissal, petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court on Certiorari and
Mandamus alleging rave abuse of discretion and to set aside the COMELEC’ Decision and to compel the latter to
give due course to their initiative petition.

THE ISSUES:

1. WHETHER THE LAMBINO GROUP’S PETITION COMPLIES WITH SECTION 2, ARTICLE XVII OF
THE CONSTITUTION ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH PEOPLE’S
INITIATIVE;
2. WHETHER THE COURT SHOULD REVISIT ITS RULING IN DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC,
DECLARING THAT RA NO. 6735 “INCOMPLETE, INADEQUATE OR WANTING IN ESSENTIAL
TERMS AND CONDITIONS” TO IMPLEMENT THE INITIATIVE CLAUSE ON PROPOSALS TO
AMEND THE CONSTITUTION; and
3. WHETHER THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING DUE
COURSE TO THE LAMBINO GROUP’S PETITION.

H E L D:

There is no merit to the petition.

The Lambino group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for
conducting a people’s initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants
dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group’s glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the
Constitution. As such, there is likewise no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a
people’s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This Section provides:

“Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be

DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE through initiative upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of
registered voters of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered
voters therein.”
 6

The deliberations of the Constitutional Convention vividly explain the meaning of the amendment
“directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition”. Thus:

MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to
propose a constitutional amendment. IS THE DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT READY TO BE SHOWN TO THE PEOPLE
WHEN THEY ARE ASKED TO SIGN?

MR. SUAREZ. That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to
them before they sign? Now, who prepares the draft?

MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President…As it is envisioned,

any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.

Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the people “before they sign such
proposal”. The framers plainly stated that “before they sign there is already a draft shown to
them.” The framers also “envisioned” that the people should sign on the proposal itself because
the proponents must “prepare the proposal and pass it around for signature.”

The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” IS
THAT THE ENTIRE PROPOSAL ON ITS FACE IS A PETITION BY THE PEOPLE. This means two (2)
essential elements must be present:

1. The people must author and must sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign for
and on their behalf;
2. As an initiative upon a petition, THE PROPOSAL MUST BE EMBODIED IN A PETITION.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to
the people who will express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is
“DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETIITON “ ONLY IF THE
PEOPLE SIGN ON A PETITION THAT CONTAINS THE FULL TEXT OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS.

The petitioners bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signatures---that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the
proposed amendments.

1. The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition a copy of the document
containing the proposed amendments and as such, the people signed initiative petition
without knowing the actual amendments proposed in the said initiative. Instead , the alleged 6.3
million people who signed the petition had to rely the representations of Atty. Lambino. Clearly, Atty. Lambino
and his group deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire nation.

2. A people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the

Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress and a Constitutional Convention can propose
both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. This is clear under Section 1 of Art. XVII of the
Constitution.

Where the intent and language of the Constitution under Section 2 of Art. XVIII clearly withhold from
the people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they
are empowered to propose amendments. The two are distinguished as follows:

“Revision” is the alterations of the different portions of the entire document [Constitution]. It
may result in the rewriting whether the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or
perhaps some of its important provisions. But whatever results the revision may produce, the
factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to
be carried out. That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of
 7

the Constitution to determine which one should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole
document should be replaced with an entirely new one.

“Amendment” of the Constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change or only a few
specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of
changing the entire constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention rather is to
improve specific parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions deemed essential on
account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seem obsolete, or dangerous, or
misleading in their effect.

(NOTE: On November 20, 2006, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of the Motion for
Reconsideration of Lambino, while it denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit
insofar as they want the people’s initiative petition to be presented to the people in a plebiscite,
it held that ten (10) members voted to declare that RA No. 6735 IS COMPLETE AND ADEQUATE
and therefore, people’s initiative may be availed of by the people provided they shall comply
with the strict requirements of Section 2, Art. XVII that the proposed amendments/s to the
Constitution must be indicated in the petition itself signed by the people.

 MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, et al. Vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997
& June 10, 1997
- This is about the amendment of the provision of the Constitution on the term-limit of the president.
This was questioned by Santiago. SC decided in favor of her.

RA 6735 intended to include the System of Initiative on Amendments to the Constitution, but is,
unfortunately, Inadequate to cover that system. Section 2 Art. XVII is not self-executory and unless Congress
provides for its implementation , it would remain in the cold niche of the Constitution. RA 6735 in all its 23
sections mentions the word “Constitution” only in section 2 and Section 3 as compared to the initiative on
“statutes” and local legislation. The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that RA 6735 is incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be
cured by “empowering” the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry the purposes of this act.

 MABANAG vs. LOPEZ VITO, 78 Phil. 1

The question of whether or not the Parity proposal had been validly adopted in Congress was political in
nature. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its
sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its change by the Constitution itself. The exercise of the power is
even independent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. In on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention
of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of
a proposal than into that of a ratification.
NOTE: This view had been rejected s early as in the case of Tanada vs Cuenco. The present
doctrine allows the courts to inquire into whether or not the prescribed procedure for
amendment has been observed.

 GONZALES vs. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774

There is no prohibition for Congress to propose amendments to the Constitution and at the same time
call for the convening of a Constitutional Convention to amend the Constitution. The word “or” in the provision
“…Congress, upon a vote of ¾ of all its members; OR [2] A constitutional Convention” under Section 1, Art. XVII
also means “AND”.

 TOLENTINO vs. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702

“Doctrine of Proper Submission” means all the proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be
presented to the people for the ratification or rejection at the same time, not piecemeal.

 SANIDAD vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333

Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction in this case wherein the Solicitor General contended that the
amendments of the Constitution was a political question.
SC held that the amending process, both as to proposal and ratification, raises judicial question.
 8

The case resolved the issue whether the President is allowed to propose amendment. As held, he is allowed to
propose amendment ( this was during martial law). Like Congress, he is allowed to legislate , as a primary
function, then it also follows the right to propose amendment, as the secondary function of the Congress.

 ALMARIO vs. ALBA, 127 SCRA 69

If the question regarding the proposed amendment to the Constitution deals with its “necessity,
expediency or wisdom”, the same is political in nature and beyond the power of the courts to decide.

 MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 ACRA 106*

 9

PREAMBLE

WE, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane
society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good,
conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence
and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain
and promulgate this Constitution.

 AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ, 64 Phil. 201

It is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom. All the officers
of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to support and defend the constitution,
bind themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent
limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is
religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for
religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power
that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest
principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the
preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that
shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and
secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The
elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general
concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.
 10

ARTICLE I - THE NATIONAL TERRITORY

Section 1. The national territory comprises the Philippine Archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced
therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its
terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves,
and other submarine areas. The waters around, between and connecting the islands of the archipelago,
regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.

 The most significant change in this Article is:

See the changes:

1935 1973 1987

“all territory over which the
present Government of the
Philippine Islands exercises
jurisdiction”
- this had reference to the
Batanes Islands which, although
undisputedly belonging to the
Philippines, apparently lay
outside drawn by the Treaty of
Paris)
Territories “belonging to the
Philippines by historic or legal
title”
- includes other territories
which depending on available
evidence, might belong to the
Philippines (e.g. Sabah, the
Marianas)
“all other territories over which
the Philippines has sovereignty
or jurisdiction”
- includes any territory which
presently belongs or might in
the future belong to the
Philippines through any of the
internationally accepted modes
of acquiring territory.

 Archipelago is defined as a body of water studded with islands.

WHAT IS ARCHIPELGO/ARCHIPELAGIC DOCTRINE?

The waters around, between and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth
and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. (2nd sentence , Article 1)

 Methods used in fixing the baseline from which the territorial belt is measured:
a. The normal baseline method – High seas, international seas/ individual states
b. The straight baseline method – connect the outermost point of the islands by a straight
baselines
- Advantage: Security and natural resources.

 By dropping the phrase “belonging to the Philippines by historic right or legal title” has
not the Constitution in effect dropped the Philippine claim to Sabah?
No, it has not. It has, however, avoided the use of language historically offensive to Malaysia and has
used instead the clause “over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.” The clause neither
claims nor disclaims Sabah. It presinds from an evaluation of the strength of the Philippine claim. The
formula is a recognition of the fact that unilateral assertions in a constitution, which is municipal law, by
themselves do not establish an international right to a territory.

Read: The Law of the Sea: Its major

implications to the Philippines, by
Justice Jorge R. Coquia, p. 31,
Philippine Law Gazette, Vol. 8, No.1.

 R.A. 3046 – An act defining the baseline of the territorial sea of the Philippines.
 R.A. 5446 – Amendment include the Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough Shoal

 Presidential Decree No. 1596 - June 11, 1978 (Making the Kalayaan Island Group
[Freedomland] as part of the Philippine Territory) – becoming the 13th town in Palawan in
which the Philippines has sovereignty.

Marcos enacted PD 1596 on June 11, 1978 and other laws, in one day. Why June 11, 1978? Because June 12, 1978,
Batasang Pambansa created the legislative body thus, Marcos can no longer legislate.
 11

TANADA VS. TUVERA: They went to the Supreme Court to order Marcos to publish all Presidential Decrees,
letters of Instruction and General Orders. Whenever they have questions, they will just show the Presidential
decree.

PD 1902 is a Presidential decree creating a small town in Negros Occidental.

PD 1902 – A deals with the jurisdiction of Securities and Exchange Commissions.

 Presidential Decree No. 1599 - June 11, 1978 (Declaring the Exclusive Economic Zone of
the Philippines which is 200 nautical miles from its baseline)

 Section 3 of PD 1599 : In case of Conflict: Settled through peaceful negotiation or if no agreement

it shall be course to the International Court of Justice which is wrong – Requirements: There
must be mutual consent

 Anyone caught fishing or exploring our natural resources within our territory will be imprisoned
for 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. Even the vessels be confiscated in favor of the government.
 12

ARTICLE II. DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES

AND STATE POLICIES

Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them.

 THE BASIC PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE 1935, 1973 AND 1987 CONSTITUTIONS.

1. Democratic and Republican are two different terms.

Republican – there is a representative chosen by the people
Democratic – there is a direct participation of the people. It is manifested under the
following provisions. (Section 2, Article XVII; Section 32, Article VI)

2. Manifestations of a republican state.

A republican state is a state wherein all government authority emanates

from the people and is exercised by representative chose by the people.

Why is the Philippines also called a “democratic state” by the new Constitution?

In the view of the new Constitution, the Philippines is not only a representative or republican state but
also shares some aspects of direct democracy such as “initiative and referendum” in Article VI, Section
32, and Article XVII, Section 2. The word “democratic” is also a monument to the February Revolution
which re-won freedom through direct action of the people.

State – it is a community of persons more or less numerous, permanently occupying a definite portion
of territory, independent of external control, and possessing an organized government to which the great
body of inhabitants render habitual obedience.

3. ELEMENTS of a state
1. people – inhabitants of the State
- a community of persons sufficient in number and capable of maintaining the continued
exercise of the community and held together by a common bond of law. It is of no legal consequence
if they possess diverse racial, crucial or economic interest.

While there is no legal requirement as to their number, it is generally agreed that they must be
numerous to be self-sufficing and to defend themselves and small enough to be easily administered
and sustained.

2. territory – is the fixed portion of the surface of the earth inhabited by the people of the
State.

As a practical requirement only, it must be neither too big as to be difficult to administer and defend
nor too small as to be unable to provide for the needs of the population.

3. sovereignty – is the supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a State by which that Sate is
governed.

Two kinds of sovereignty:

a. Legal sovereignty – is the authority which has the power to issue final commands
b. Political Sovereignty – is the power behind the legal sovereign, or the sum of the influences
that operate upon it.

4. government – is the agency or instrumentality through which the will of the State is
formulated, expressed and realized.
 13

 How do state, government and administrator differ from each other?

State is the corporate entity; government is one of the elements of a state and is the institution through
which the state exercises power; administration consists of the set of people currently running the
institution. Administrations change without a change either state or government.

 COLLECTOR VS. CAMPOS RUEDA, 42 SCRA 23

1. It is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign
community independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme
within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of
law. "The political organization of a society legally supreme within and independent of legal control
from without."

2. It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate
society under a government with the legal competence to exact obedience to its commands.
(Willoughby, Fundamental Concepts of Public Law, p. 3 (1925)).

3. It has been referred to as a body-politic organized by common consent for mutual defense and
mutual safety and to promote the general welfare. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, p. 3
(1927)).

4. Correctly has it been described by Esmein as "the juridical personification of the nation." This is
to view it in the light of its historical development. The stress is on its being a nation, its people
occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its
sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international personality.
(Cohen, Recent Theories of Sovereignty, p. 15 (1937).

5. Pitamic speaks of it as a juridical organization of human beings. (Treatise on the State, p. 17

(1933).

6. Laski could speak of it then as a territorial society divided into government and subjects,
claiming within its allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions. (Laski, Grammar of
Polities, p. 25 (1934).

7. McIver similarly would point to the power entrusted to its government to maintain within its
territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into international relations. (McIver, The State,
p. 22 (1926).

4. Different meanings of the word “people” as used in the constitution:

1. as inhabitants (Art. XIII, Sec. 1; Art. III, Sec. 2);
2. as citizens (Preamble; Art. II, Sec. 1 & 4; Art. III, Sec. 7);
3. as voters (Art. VII, Sec. 4)

5. PRESIDENTIAL & PARLIAMENTARY FORMS OF GOVERNMENT

PRESIDENTIAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT.

Its principal identify feature is what is called the “separation of powers”. Legislative power is
given to the Legislature whose members hold office for a fixed term; executive power is give to a
separate Executive who holds office for a fixed term and judicial power is held by an independent
Judiciary. The system is founded on the belief that, by establishing equilibrium among the three
power holders, harmony will result, power will not be concentrated, and thus tyranny will be avoided.
Because of the prominent position, however, which the system

PARLIAMENTARY FORM OF GOVERNMENT.

The essential characteristics of a parliamentary form of government

(1) The members of the government or cabinet or the executive arm are, as a rule. simultaneously
members of the legislature;
 14

(2) the government or cabinet, consisting o the political leaders of the majority party or of a coalition
who are also members of the legislature, is in effect a committee of the legislature;
(3) the government or cabinet has a pyramidal structure at the apex of which is the Prime Minister or
his equivalent;
(4) the government or cabinet remains in power only for as long as it enjoys the support of the
majority of the legislature;
(5) both government and legislature are possessed of control devices with which each can demand of
the other immediate political responsibility. In the hands of the legislature is the vote of non-
confidence (censure) whereby government may be ousted. In the hands of government is the power
to dissolve the legislature and call for new elections.

 FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION VS. OPLE, 108 SCRA 757

The government of the Philippines under the 1973 Constitution is “essentially presidential with
parliamentary features.”

 LEGASPI VS. SEC. OF FINANCE, 115 SCRA 418

The form of government is “essentially parliamentary with presidential features.”

6. Two-fold function of the government.

The functions of government were classified into constituent and ministrant functions.

CONSTITUENT FUNCTIONS are the compulsory functions which constitute the very bonds of
society. For example, the keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property
fro violence and robbery, or the fig of the legal relations between man and wife parents and children
are obligatory or constituent functions of government.

MINISTRANT FUNCTIONS are the optional functions of government. “ The principles for
determining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these optional functions are:
(1) That a government should do for the public welfare those things which private capital
would not naturally undertake and
(2) that a government should do those things which by its very nature it is better equipped
to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals. BACANI
VS. NACOCO, 100 Phil. 468

 ACCFA VS. CUGCO, 30 SCRA 649

Due to complexities of the changing society, the two-fold function of the government as
classified by President Wilson is no longer relevant.

 Is this classification still valid?

The conceptual definitions of constituent and ministrant functions are still
acceptable.
However, the growing complexities of modern society can necessitate a realignment. ACCFA v.
CUCGO, 30 SCRA 649 (1969). Among more recent decisions, housing has been found to be a
governmental function since housing is considered an essential service. PHHC v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 150 SCRA 296, 310 (1987). But undertaking to supply water for a price, as
does the government corporation National Irrigation Authority, is considered a trade and not a
government activity. Spouses Fontanilla V. Hon. Maliaman, G.R. Nos. 55963 and 61045,
February 27, 1991.

7. Parents Patriae – “THE GOVERNMENT AS THE PROTECTOR OF THE PEOPLE”;

“GUARDIAN OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE”

 GOVT. VS. MONTE DE PIEDAD, 35 Phil 738

There was an earthquake wherein thousands were killed, and the Spanish collected certain
amounts to be given to them and; they deposited to the Monte De Piedad Bank. The Monte de Piedad
gave to the Philippines the millions given by Spanish citizens. Until Monte de Piedad said that it was no
 15

longer the money of the Philippines therefore they will be the one to distribute it not the Philippine
Government.

 CABANAS VS. PILAPIL, 58 SCRA 94

The father obtained a Life Insurance for his first son and the proceeds shall be released to his
son. The father said that “ If I will die before my son reached the age of majority, the proceeds from the
insurance shall be given to my brother never to my wife”. After his death, wife went to court that it
should be given to her but the contract between the insurer and his brother is valid. Two conflicts: The
state must come in as parents patriae to determine which is best for the child.

8. HOW ARE GOVERNMENTS CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO THEIR LEGITIMACY?

According to legitimacy, governments are either de jure or de facto merely.

A government de jure is one established by authority of the legitimate sovereign (government formed in
accordance with the Constitution) WHEREAS a government de facto merely is one established in
defiance of the legitimate sovereign.
Ex: A President who become a President in accordance with the Constitution of the Philippines is
a De jure President. But if he becomes a President not in accordance with the Constitution then he
must be a De Facto President.

 AQUINO VS. COMELEC, 62 SCRA 275 (on the de jure aspect)

Marcos was elected President in 1965. Re- elected in 1969, his last term up to noon of December
30, 1970. Can he run again? (No more) But what he did was he declared Martial law and continued to be
President until 1974. Benigno went to the Supreme Court and asked what kind of President is Marcos? Is
he a de Jure or a De Facto President.
The SC said: He is a De Jure President as spoken by the people therefore there is a De Jure government

 In Re: SATURNINO BERMUDEZ, 145 SCRA 160

In 1986 there was Edsa Revolution.Bermudez was asking for the opinion of the SC regarding
section 5, article 18 of the Constitution. (THIS ACTION COULD NOT PURSUE because - you have to
asked them to decide cases but not of legal opinion). Who were the duly elected President during that
February, 1986.
The Congress proclaimed Marcos and Tolentino as the duly elected President and Vice President
because they allegedly obtained the highest number votes. What kind of Government of that of Marcos
and Tolentino? – it should be De Jure because they allegedly obtained the highest number
of votes and proclaimed as such by Congress.
*But because of the Edsa Revolution, Corazon Aquino took the office of Presidency. Bermudez asked
the SC What kind of President is Tita Cory? – De Jure.
 At the height of Edsa Revolution in February of 1986. Coazon Aquino, at the voice of majority took
over the Presidency. – SC said a De Jure because her government was recognized by the majority of
nations. (received congratulatory messages from the US President, Prime Minister of Japan,
England, Germany…etc)

A government formed as a result of a people’s revolution, is considered de jure if it is

already accepted by the family of nations or other countries like the United States,
Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and others.

 ESTRADA VS. MACAPAGAL & DESIERTO,

There was an uprising in Edsa. And on January 14, 2001, Estrada wrote two letters to the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House in accordance of Section 11, Article 7. He state that “In
accordance of Article 7, I am temporarily turning over the Office of the President to the Vice President as
acting President”. When Arroyo learned about the letter, she informed the SC that Estrada had resigned.
And said that “I want my oath taking during the noon of January 20, 2001. She is now the President.

SC said it is a “Constructive Resignation”. Basis: Diary of Sec. Angara, where Angara quoted in the
early morning of January 20, 2001 “ Ayoko na, Pagod na ako”. SC also said that Arroyo is the President.

What kind of government is Arroyo’s government? – SC said De Jure for the following reasons:
 16

1. According to section 9, article 7, if there is a vacant in the office of the President, the
President shall nominate a member of the senate or member of the house of
representative and his appointment is approved by majority of the votes cast.
 Arroyo nominated Sen. Guingona and approved by the Congress – meaning that there
was already a vacancy in the Office of the President, that the VP is now the President.
2. It is now Arroyo who is fully recognized by law. (By Congress) – Reason: SC said that
Everyday Congress approve bills and before the bills become laws, it is given to the
President for approval or veto.
(bad doctrine)

 Four Instances that a Vice President becomes De Jure President (Section 8 of Article 7):
1. In case of Death
2. Permanent Disability
3. Removal from Office – 2/3 votes of all the members of Congress/impeachment
4. Resignation

9. The three (3) kinds of de facto government?

There are several kinds of de facto governments. (CO KIM CHAM VS. VALDEZ TAN KEH, 75
Phil. 113)

SIMPLIFIED.
The first is that government that gets possession and control or, or usurps, by force or by the voice of
the majority.

The second is that which is established and maintained by invading military forces.

And the third is that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who
rise in insurrection against the parent state, such as the government of the Southern Confederacy in
revolt against the Union during the war of secession.

a. The first, or government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that gets
possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal
governments and maintains itself against the will of the latter, such as the government of
England under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by Cromwell as Protector.
Ex. By means of usurp – they will take over the government for or voice of the
majority.

b. The second is that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and
occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of
paramount force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which was reduced to British possession in
the war of 1812, and Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of
the United States.
Ex. Government by paramount force.

c. And the third is that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country
who rise in insurrection against the parent state of such as the government of the Southern
Confederacy in revolt not concerned in the present case with the first kind, but only with the
second and third kinds of de facto governments.
 When a portion of the State will temporarily secede the parent state.
Ex: “ forming Bangsamoro”
East Timor temporarily secede the parent state forming a new government – De Facto
Government.

"But there is another description of government, called also by publicists a government de facto,
but which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of paramount force. Its
distinguishing characteristics are
 17

(1), that its existence is maintained by active military power with the territories, and
against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and
(2), that while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who,
by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, or
wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government.

On the other hand, laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, such as,
among others, the right of assembly, the right to bear arms, the freedom of the press, and the
right to travel freely in the territory occupied, are considered as suspended or in abeyance
during the military occupation. Although the local and civil administration of justice is
suspended as a matter of course as soon as a country is militarily occupied, it is not usual for the
invader to take the whole administration into his own hands. In practice, the local ordinary
tribunals are authorized to continue administering justice; and judges and other judicial officers
are kept in their posts if they accept the authority of the belligerent occupant or are required to
continue in their positions under the supervision of the military or civil authorities appointed,
by the Commander in Chief of the occupant. These principles and practice have the sanction of
all publicists who have considered the subject, and have been asserted by the Supreme Court
and applied by the President of the United States.

The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on
International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): "The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the
territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows
directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political
institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the territory of the
enemy in his possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of
such government are regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly
from the laws war, as established by the usage of the of the world, and confirmed by the writings
of publicists and decisions of courts in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The municipal laws of a
conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during military
occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He,
nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure either change
the existing laws or make new ones."

The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily
follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments,
which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known
principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good and valid
after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under
the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. According to that well-known principle in
international law, the fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again
into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty, "does not, except in a very few cases,
wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his
competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political
complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the
continuance of his control, and the various acts done during the same time by private persons
under the sanction of municipal law, remain good. Were it otherwise, the whole social life of a
community would be paralyzed by an invasion; and as between the state and the individuals the
evil would be scarcely less, it would be hard for example that payment of taxes made under
duress should be ignored, and it would be contrary to the general interest that the sentences
passed upon criminals should be annulled by the disappearance of the intrusive government ."
(Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 518.) And when the occupation and the abandonment have
been each an incident of the same war as in the present case, postliminy applies, even though
the occupant has acted as conqueror and for the time substituted his own sovereignty as the
Japanese intended to do apparently in granting independence to the Philippines and
establishing the so-called Republic of the Philippines. (Taylor, International Law, p. 615.)
 18

10. The doctrine of sovereignty as auto-limitation

 REAGAN VS. COMMISIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 30 SCRA 968
Raegan imported a Cadilac from US. He was asked to pay tax from the profit but he said
“No, his transaction took place outside the Philippines because Clark Airforce Base is under the
jurisdiction of the American and therefore the Philippines has no authority.” Can Philippines tax
the transaction? Yes because it is still a part of the Philippines. Philippines has
jurisdiction but only trying to exercise to limit the right to its jurisdiction.

"By the Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that
the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter
of comity, courtesy, or expediency. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty
over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over
offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has
prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government
retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United
States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first proposition is
implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the second from the express
provisions of the treaty." "Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent
and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof
that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its
laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent
of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it
were not thus, there is a diminution of sovereignty." Then came this paragraph dealing with the
principle of auto-limitation: "It is to be admitted any state may, by its consent, express
or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a
curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty
as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force
due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction." A
state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is
illimitable competence." The opinion was at pains to point out though that even then, there
is at the most diminution of jurisdictional rights, not its disappearance.

 PEOPLE VS. GOZO, 53 SCRA 476

Gozo constructed a very big house inside the subic naval reservation which was turned over by
the Philippines to the US without building permit in accordance of PD 1096. Gozo said “I did not got a
building permit from the City of Olongapo because Subic is not part of the Philippines where the
Philippines cannot apply the National Building Code”.
SC: It is still a part of the Philippines. They was just allowed to exercise some sort of
jurisdiction. Subic is owned by the Philippines allowing Americans to occupy it.
Philippines cannot allow another to use it.

 COMMISSIONER VS. ROBERTSON, 143 SCRA 397

Philippine Government was tend to tax the salaries of civilian employees working in Clark. Can
Philippines tax them although they are obtaining income within its territorial jurisdiction?
SC: Supposedly, Philippines can taxed their salaries BUT due to a provision in the RP –
US agreement exempting their salaries to be taxed, CIR cannot collect taxes from their
salaries. It should be the US government to collect the taxes.

Salaries of American employees in the US Bases in the Philippines are not subject to tax
by the Philippine Government because that is what is provided for the RP US Military
Basis Agreement.

Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national police, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity among all nations.

 We only renounce aggressive war but in so far as defensive war, it is not renounced because it is apart of
the national defense of any country.
 19

 The Constitution prescribes a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons. The policy includes the
prohibition not only of the possession , control, and manufacture of nuclear weapons but also nuclear
arm tests.
Exception to this policy may be made by the political departments; but it must ne justified by the
demands of the national interest. (“Consistent with the national interest.”) But the policy does not
prohibit the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

 IRAQ VS. ISRAEL : Iraq is constructing a nuclear reactor in Baghdad where it can create atomic bomb.
One morning 5 bombers of Israel attacked Baghdad. Iraq went to security council to avenge against
Israel for committing an aggressive war. 14 members of the Council voted against Israel but US sided
with Israel invoking the International law where one cannot get the decision of the security council
unless all the 15 will vote. The defense of Israel, it is a case of defensive war.

 1985; 2003 BAR EXAM: What is the incorporation Theory/Incorporation Clause?

It is the 2nd part of section 2: We adopt the only generally accepted principles of the international laws as
part of the land.

 What is the calling out power of the President? – 1st sentence of section 18, article 7. (memorize)

 MEJOFF VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, 90 Phil. 70

Mejoff has come to the Philippines during the Japanese war. After the war, Philippines found Mejoff
and since he is a Russian National, Philippines wanted to deport him as undesirable alien but the
Russian ship does not want to get him out of the Philippines. Mejoff was placed inside the New Bilibid
Prison. 5 years he went to the SC and said that his detention violates his right under the international
law of human right.
SC said “We have to release him because section 2, article 2 provides that we adopt the
generally accepted principles of the international law as part of the law of the land and
therefore we have to release him from detention.

The Philippines adopts the Universal Declaration of Human Rights since it is a generally
accepted principle of international law. As such, it should be applied to illegal aliens like the petitioner
so that it would be a violation of the said international law to detain him for an unreasonable length of
time since no vessel from his country is willing to take him.
"The meaning of "reasonable time" depends upon the circumstances, specially the difficulties of
obtaining a passport, the availability of transportation, the diplomatic arrangements concerned and the
efforts displayed to send the deportee away. Considering that this Government desires to expel the alien,
and does not relish keeping him at the people's expense, we must presume it is making efforts to carry
out the decree of exclusion by the highest officer of the land. On top of this presumption assurances were
made during the oral argument that the Government is really trying to expedite the expulsion of this
petitioner. On the other hand, the record fails to show how long he has been under confinement since
the last time he was apprehended. Neither does he indicate neglected opportunities to send him abroad.
And unless it is shown that the deportee is being indefinitely imprisoned under the pretense of awaiting
a chance for deportation 3 or unless the Government admits that it can not deport him or unless the
detainee is being held for too long a period our courts will not interfere.

 KURODA VS. JALANDONI, 83 Phil 171

Kuroda is a highest ranking general. After Japan has surrendered, Philippines arrested him and
put him to trial. He was charged in violation of Hague Convention on Land Warfare. He went to the SC
and raised the issue: Can you charged me of a law where the Philippines is a signatory?
SC: Yes because we adopt the generally accepted principles of the international law as
part of the law of the land.

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts
committed in violation of the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and
the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only
in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form,
part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these
rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nation the United State and Japan who were
 20

signatories to the two Convention, Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation
even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has
been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and
principle of international law as continued inn treaties to which our government may have been or shall
be a signatory.

Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the Philippines
was under the sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound together with the United
States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the treaties between the belligerent
countries. These rights and obligation were not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty. If at all our
emergency as a free state entitles us to enforce the right on our own of trying and punishing those who
committed crimes against crimes against our people. In this connection it is well to remember what we
have said in the case of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372):

 SALONGA VS. HERMOSO, 97 SCRA 121

The two most vocal critics of Marcos during Martial Law (Senator Aquino and Senator Salonga). Aquino
was in jail, Salonga had a criminal case and was invited to delivered speeches in favor of the State. But
when already in the airport, an employee from the NAIA said that he was not allowed to leave because
his name is included in the watchlist (re: right to travel - hold departure order). He filed a case and the
SC said that the inclusion of his name in the watchlist violates his right to travel and his right under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which is considered part of the law of the land under section 2,
article 2.

 When can a hold departure order be issued against you? – If you are facing a criminal case
before the RTC or the SandiganBayan.

 The reason why you are not allowed to leave? – Because it is the right of the State to try
and promise something with your criminal case.

 When there is a watchlist? - If the government believes that you committed a crime but they
are still trying to file a case against you or your case is under investigation with the Ombudsman
or before the DOJ or before the Fiscal. They do not know yet whether there is probable cause to
charge you in court.But the government already issued a watchlist and your name is included
there and you are no longer allowed to leave the country but no criminal case yet.

 Re: Policarpio vs. Manila Times – There’s a big difference in the news item that you was charged of
Estafa but the fact is you are only charge of Estafa in the Fiscal’s office.(Presumption: Harassment) But
if already in court there is already a presumption that there is probable cause. It is deemed that the court
has already issued a warrant of arrest.

 AGUSTIN VS. EDU, 88 SCRA 195

Requiring us to have an early warning device and you failed to comply. You will be subjected to
administrative penalty including the impounding of your vehicle. (Purpose: to promote public safety)
Early warning device law is valid because it is a valid exercise of police power and to promote public
safety. This law was enacted inorder to comply with International Law in which we are a signatory.
Geneva Convention on Road Signs and Signals – it mandates all member nations to the united
nation as to enact laws inorder to protect the motoring public.

The Geneva Convention on Road Signs and Signals, is also considered part of the law of
the Philippines since the same is a generally accepted principle of international law in accordance with
the Incorporation clause of the Constitution.

 REYES VS. BAGATSING,125 SCRA 553

 Basis of the Defense of JBL and Co.: They are invoking Section 4, article 3, last part: The right of
the people to peaceably assemble and to petition the government for redress or grievances. There
are two conflicting laws; JBL Reyes invokes Constitutional Right while Bagatsing is invoking
International Law.
 21

SC: Even though we consider the International Law as part of the law of the land, still
they are inferior to our Constitutional Rights.
RULE: We have to comply with International Law but if these are in conflict with the
right under article 3, the right under article 3 must prevail because it is a conflict
between a Constitutional provision and a law. The Constitution is Supreme,
Constitution must prevail.

Respondent Mayor posed the issue of the applicability of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila
prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet
from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. It is to be admitted that it finds support In
the previously quoted Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. There
was no showing, however, that the distance between the chancery and the embassy gate is less than 500
feet. Even if it could be shown that such a condition is satisfied. it does not follow that respondent Mayor
could legally act the way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged.
It could be argued that a case of unconstitutional application of such ordinance to the exercise of the
right of peaceable assembly presents itself. As in this case there was no proof that the distance is less
than 500 feet, the need to pass on that issue was obviated, Should it come, then the qualification and
observation of Justices Makasiar and Plana certainly cannot be summarily brushed aside. The high
estate accorded the rights to free speech and peaceable assembly demands nothing less.

Without saying that the Ordinance is obnoxious per se to the constitution, it cannot be validly invoked
whenever its application would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed right such as freedom of assembly
and/or expression, as in the case at bar, regardless of whether the chancery of any foreign embassy is beyond or
within 500 feet from the situs of the rally or demonstration.

Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times supreme over the military. The armed forces of the
Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of
the State and the integrity of the national territory.
See also: Art. VII, Sec. 18; Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (2); Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (4)

There is civilian supremacy over military.

 Military are inferior over civilians. Rule
See also: (Reasons why military are inferior over civilians)

 How is the principle of civilian supremacy institutionalized?

The principle is institutionalized by the provision which makes the President, a civilian and precisely as
civilian, commander-in-chief of the armed forces. But this does not mean that civilian officials are
superior to military officials. Civilian officials are superior to military officials only when a law makes
them so.

Relate these provisions:

Art. VII, Sec. 18 – First sentence: The President shall be the Commander in Chief of all armed forces
of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. (calling our power of the President).

Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (2) – The State shall strengthen the Patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of
the military, and respect for people’srights in the performance of their duty. (meaning the military are
inferior, the civilians are superior over them)

Art. XVI, Sec. 5 (4) – No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be
appointed or designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including GOCC’s or any of
their subsidiaries. (has not retired yet)

 What is prohibited is if you are still in the military. But if you are already retired – can be.

 What is the goal of the Armed Forces of the Philippines?

 22

Armed forces are the protector of the people of the State and therefore to secure our National
Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity.

SEE:
- In 2001, Angelo Reyes and 3 other Generals were charged of coup d’ etat before the Ombudsman
because instead of protecting President Estrada, they instead went to EDSA and joined Arroyo. When
they took oath of their office, they promise to uphold the Constitution. Their defense was “we did not do
anything, what we did is to comply with the second sentence of section 3, article 2: The armed forces is
the protector of the people and the State – from a very corrupt President. The Ombudsman believed
them then dismissed the case.

- In 2004, Trillanes and Co. just went to Oakwood, they did not fire a single shot, they just want the
press to know their grievances. They were charged of violating the coup d’etat law.

- In 2006, General Lim and Col. Querubin were just planning to run a rally against the Edsa. They were
charged.

Section 4. The prime duty of the government is to serve and protect the people. The
Government may call upon the people to defend the State and in the fulfillment thereof, all
citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal and military
service.

 Common Wealth Act #1 – a law that can compel us to render military service, enacted in 1935.
(Amended already but still in force and effect until now)

 PEOPLE VS. LAGMAN, 66 Phil. 13

He is already 21 y/o. He was sent notice by the AFP, you report for training. He did not report because
he said I do not want to kill and be killed and that is against my Religion. SC: Can be compelled.

“The appellant’s argument that he does not want to join the armed forces because “he
does not want to kill or be killed” and that “he has no military inclination” is not
acceptable because it is his obligation to join the armed forces in connection with the
“defense of the State” provision of the Constitution.

 PEOPLE VS. MANAYAO, 78 Phil. 721

In the 2nd World War in 1941, after 1 yr we lost the war and the famous Gen. said “I will return”.
Filipino soldiers become civilians. Manayao joined the Japanese Imperial Army and took an oath as a
Japanese Citizen. He is the head of “Makapili”(Group of Filipino traitor pure and simple). After the war,
he was arrested and he was charged of treason. His defense was “you cannot charge me of treason
because I am already a Japanesse Citizen, I joined the Japanese Imperial”. Can he validly renounced his
citizenship to become a Japanese citizen.
SC said No because under section 4, it is the obligation of any citizen to defend the State.
You cannot renounced your citizenship during the war by joining the enemy because that
is your Constitutional duty to defend the State. You are still a Filipino, you can be charge
of treason.

All Filipino citizens can be compelled to render personal civil service provided there is a law. But
at present there is no longer a law that will compel us to render personal civil service because
the law enacted by Marcos was already repealed by Aquino.

 PD1706, August 8, 1980; Exec. Order No. 264

Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and
property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all
the people of the blessings of democracy.

Section 6. The separation of church and State shall be inviolable.

 23

SEE: PAMIL VS. TELERON, 86 SCRA 413; GERMAN VS. BARANGAN, 135 SCRA 514
(NOTE: Read the dissenting opinions in both cases)

 Other provisions on church & state:

1. ART. III, Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. NO RELIGIOUS TEST SHALL BE
REQUIRED FOR THE EXERCISE OF CIVIL OR POLITICAL RIGHTS.

2. ART. VI, Sec. 28 (3). Charitable institutions, churches, mosques, non-profit

cemeteries…actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxation.

3. ART. VI, Sec. 29 .(2). No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, for the
benefit, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination or
religion, except when such priest, minister.. is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

4. ART. IX, C, 2(5). Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered…as political parties.
(NOTE: Religious organizations are also prohibited ion connection with sectoral representatives
under Art. VI)

5. ART. XIV, Sec. 3(3). At the option in writing by parents, religion shall be allowed to be taught
to their children in elementary and high schools within the regular class hours by instructors
designated or approved by religious authorities to which said children belong, without additional
cost to the government.

 Bar Question : The principal of the BCNHS wrote the parents informing them that there is
already a trained Catholic Instructor to teach their children Religion during school hours at no
expense on the part of the parents. – At the option in writing by parents, it can be. The
initiative must come from the parents not the government because as if they are
trying to support one particular religion.

Sections 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other
states the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity,
national interest, and the right to self-determination,

Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of
freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.

1. meaning of "nuclear-free" Philippines;

2. Art. XVIII, Secs. 4 & 25

 Allowing US to have military bases here in the Philippines. Is it Constitutional? – maybe it violates
our national sovereignty, violates our territorial integrity, does not violate our national interes but it
violates our right to self determination.

 Having Nuclear weapon. Is it violative of the Constitution? – No if it is consistent with our National
Interest. Ex: our opponent (Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand all of them have nuclear weapons already,
is it consistent with the national interest that we also have? Shall we allow Malaysia to have nuclear
weapon that we do not have?)

Sections 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the
prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies
that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living,
and an improved quality of life for all.
Section 10. The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
 24

Section 11. The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights.

 Read together with entire provisions of Article XIII (answers the question how is the promotion of social
justice to be carried out in all phases if national development)

 What are the underlying premises of Section 9 and 10?

They derive from the premises that poverty and gross inequality are major problems besetting the
nation and that these problems assault the dignity of the human person.

 What is social justice?

Social justice, in the sense it is used in the Constitution, simply means the equalization of economic,
political, and social opportunities with special emphasis on the duty of the state to tilt the balance of
social forces by favoring the disadvantaged in life. In the language of the 1935 Convention, it means
justice for the common tao; in the shibboleth of the 1973 Convention, those who have less n life must
have more in law.

 What has been the special impact of the social justice provision in the Philippines
jurisprudence?
The provision has been chiefly instrumental in the socialization of the state’s attitude to property rights
thus gradually eradicating the vestiges of laissez faire in the Philippines society.

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother
and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents
in the rearing of the youth for civil efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support the support of the government.
 Is the bill on divorce authored by the Akbayan party Constitutional?
No because the State shall strengthen the family, if you allow divorce, you allow the family to break up.

 Can Congress enact a law in court allowing abortion?

Absolutely No. The only instance when abortion is allowed is on therapeutic abortion. (In US: Divorce is
allowed provided it is not beyond the third trimester.(not more than 6 months).

 The government will only come second to parents insofar as the primary duty in dealing with their
children for civic efficiency and development of their moral character.

NOTE: Father Bernas opines that this provision does not take a stand on divorce. As such, a Divorce Law to
be passed by Congress may or may not be unconstitutional. But definitely, a law allowing abortion , other
than therapeutic, is unconstitutional.
Read together with the entire provisions of Article XV.

 What is the meaning of “family” in Section 12?

It simply means a stable heterosexual relationship.

 What effect does the declaration of family autonomy have?

It accepts the principle that the family is anterior to the state and is not a creature of the State. It
protects the family from instrumentalization by the state.

 What is the legal meaning and purpose of the protection that is guaranteed for the
unborn?
First, this is no an assertion that the unborn is a legal person. Second, this is not an assertion that the
life of the unborn is placed exactly on the level of the life of the mother. When necessary to save the
life of the mother, the life of the unborn must be sacrificed; but not when the purpose is
merely to save the mother from emotional suffering, for which other remedies must be sought, or to
spare the child from a life of poverty, which can be attended to by welfare institutions.
 25

 Why is the protection made to begin from the time of conception?

The overriding purpose in asserting that the protection begins from the time of conception is to prevent
the State from adopting the doctrine in the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) which liberalizes abortion any time during the first six months of pregnancy by allowing abortion
any time during the first six months of pregnancy provide it can be done without danger to the mother.
The understanding is that life begins at conception, although the definition of conception can be a
matter for science to specify.
Incidentally, the respect for life manifested by the provision harmonizes with the abolition of the
death penalty and the ban n nuclear arms.

 GINSBERG VS. NEW YORK, 390 US 629 (1969)

There is a law prohibiting the sale of girlie magazines to 15 - 17y/o Is it Unconstitutional? – SC: No
because we are giving the parents the natural and primary right in rearing their children.(Parents may
know if their children is old enough to read such kind of magazine.)

A law prohibiting the sale of “girlie magazines” [bold?) is constitutional and does not violate the
above provision. This is so because parents could buy said magazines for their children if they believe
the same is already suitable to the understanding of their child. This is in accordance with this provision
which states that the parents have the “natural and primary right in rearing their child for civic
efficiency…”

 In the matter of education, how do the respective rights of parents and of the State
compare?

The primary and natural right belongs to the parents. The Constitution affirms the primary rights of
parents in the rearing of children to prepare them for a productive civic and social life and at the same time
it affirms the secondary and supportive role of the State. The principle is also rooted in the basic philosophy
of liberty guaranteed by the due process clause.

 MEYER VS. NEBRASKA, 260 US 260 (1922)

There was a law prohibiting the teaching of German language during the second world war. SC said
there is nothing wrong with teaching the children with the German language.

 PIERCE VS. SOCIETY OF SISTERS, 268 US 510 (1925)

A law requiring small kids to be enrolled in public schools only is unconstitutional since it interferes
with the right of parents in rearing their children. They have the right to choose which school is best
suited for the development of their children without interference from the State.

SEE: PACU VS. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, 97 Phil. 806;CABANAS VS.

PILAPIL, 58 SCRA 94

 Does all this mean that the State cannot intervene in relation of parent and child?
No. As parents patriae the State has the authority and duty to step in where parents fail to or are unable
to cope with their duties to their children.

Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote
and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well being. It shall
inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public
and civic affairs.

 Read: PD 684; PD 935; PD 1102; PD 603; see the objectives of the law.
Ex. The creation of Sangguniang Kabataan.

Sections 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation building, and shall ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of men and women.

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.
 26

Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts,
culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and
promote human liberation and development.
 Read together with Article XIV

 Does Section 14 repeal the inequalities that are found in the Civil Code?
The provision is so worded as not to automatically dislocate the Civil Code and the civil law
jurisprudence on the subject. What it does is to give impetus to the removal, through statues, of existing
inequalities. The general idea is for the law to ignore sex where sex is not a relevant factor in
determining rights and duties. Nor is the provision meant to ignore customs and traditions.

 Does section 16 provide for enforceable rights?

Yes. This provision, as worded, recognizes an enforceable “rights.” Hence, appeal to it has been
recognized as conferring “standing” on minors to challenge logging policies of the government. Oposa v.
Factoran, Jr.,224 SCRA (1993).
On this basis to the Supreme Court upheld the empowerment of the Laguna Lake Development
Authority to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake Area from the deleterious effects of pollutants
coming from garbage dumping and the discharge of wastes in the area s against the local autonomy
claim of local government in the area. Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
Nos. 120865-71, December 7, 1995.

Read :

 VILLEGAS VS. SUBIDO, 109 SCRA 1

 OPOSA VS. FACTORAN, July 30, 1993;

Rules: Test on Personality to Sue

(1) if it involves disbursement of public funds – only to taxpayers
(2) if it does not involve disbursement of public funds – only party in interest; any person who may be
injuired.
The petitioner here are 4,5,6,7 years old.

SC: They have personality to sue because their future is affected.

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful
ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational
responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said
petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine
rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth."
The minors-petitioners have the personality to sue since the case deals with the timber licensing
agreements entered into by the government which if not stopped would be prejudicial to their future.
This is so because the DENR holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations the natural resources of the country. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and
general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties
are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the
court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure
the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit
under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the
instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature."
Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
 27

forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end
that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as
future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently,
the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated
in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding
section of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important
than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation
aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless
the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far
when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations
which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment.

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right

comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and
Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their
present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those
implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.

Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare.

 Read together with Section 3, Article XIII, 1987 Constitution.

 Compare it with Section 9, Article II, 1973 Constitution.
 What is meant when labor is called “a primary social economic force”?
It means that the human factor has primacy over the non human factors in production.

 VICTORIANO VS. ELIZALDE POPE WORKERS UNION, 59 SCRA 54

The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As such, an Iglesia Ni Kristo
member may refuse to join a Union and despite the fact that there is a closed shop agreement in the
establishment where he was employed, his employment could not be validly terminated for his non-
membership in the majority union therein.

Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.
 28

 See Art. XII

 How is this provision related to the article on the National Economy and Patrimony?
This is a guide for interpreting provision on the national economy and patrimony. Any doubt must be
resolved in favor of self-reliance and independence and in favor of Filipinos.

 Espina vs Zamora 21 sept 2010

A Retail trade liberalization act was enacted which provides that foreigners are now allowed to engage in
retail trade. According to him, it is unconstitutional as it is violative of Section 19.
SC: it is constitution al because the law allows only foreigners to enter in 4 categories
business. The law allows any a capital to be inferred in a limited amount.

Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages
private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.

 Do we practice the free enterprise system in the Philippines or is it the welfare state concept?
Distinguish the two.
 ACCFA VS. CUGCO, 30 SCRA 649 (Note: Read the separate opinion of former Chief
Justice ENRIQUE FERNANDO only)
The Philippines never practiced the free enterprise system. It is the welfare-state concept which
is being followed as shown by the constitutional provision on agrarian reform, housing, protection to
labor… (NOTE, however, that the 1987 Constitution have provisions which provide for “free enterprise)

 PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS VS. PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY, 286

SCRA 109
Mendoza, J.
The Philippine Constitutions, starting from the 1935 document, HAVE REPUDIATED laissez
faire (or the doctrine of free enterprise) as an economic principle, and although the present Constitution
enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nevertheless reserves to the government the power to intervene
whenever necessary to promote the general welfare.

As such, free enterprise does not call for the removal of “protective regulations” for the benefit
of the general public. This is so because under Art. XII, Sections 6 and 9, it is very clear that the
government reserves the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare and
when the public interest so requires.

Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform.

 Read together with Secs. 4-10, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution
 Read PD 27 - as to the extent of land reform under the MARCOS regime
 Read RA 3844 & 6389, as amended - THE CODE OF AGRARIAN REFORMS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (Read the policy of the state on this matter)
 Read the COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM LAW, RA No. 6657 as signed into
law by the President on June 7, 1988.
 Association of Small Landowners vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, July 14,
1989

 How comprehensive must rural development be?

It includes not only agrarian reform. It also encompasses a broad spectrum of social, economic,
human, cultural, political, and even industrial development.

 Congress was mandated to enact a law on Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law

- Is this constitutional?
SC: The majority said it is unconstitutional because they are given a choice.
But according to the dissenting opinion: When it talks of CARP, it must be land and
not a piece of paper.

 Hacienda Luisita vs DARAB

Is stock option valid?
 29

Stock option as indicated in CARP is constitutional but subject to referendum or that

the farmers are given a choice.

Sections 22. The State recognizes and promotes the right of indigenous cultural communities
within the framework of national unity and development.
To be discussed later with Art. X, Secs. 15- 21.
 Other provisions on indigenous cultural communities:
1. Art. VI, Sec. 5(2)
2. Art. X, Secs. 15 - 21
3. Art. XII, Sec. 5
4. Art. XIII, Sec. 6
5. Art. XIV, Sec. 17
6. Art. XVI, Sec. 12

Section 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community based, or sectoral
organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.

Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-
building.

Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

 Define "autonomy"
 See Art. X; Read the 1991 New Local Government Code and enumerate its provisions evidencing
"autonomy" to local government units.

Section 26. The State guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law.

 What is the purpose of this provision?

Its purpose is to give substance to the desire for the equalization of political opportunities. However the
definition of “political dynasties” is left to the legislature.

 Does this provision mean that everyone has a right to be a candidate for President?
No. First of all, this provision is not self- executor. The provision does not contain any judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.
Secondly, it is within the power of the state to limit the number of qualified candidates only to those who
can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/are nominated by political parties. Pamatong v.
COMELEC , G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004.

Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive
and effective measures against graft and corruption.
To be discussed under Article XI.
SEE:
 RA 3019, The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended by RA 3047, PD 77 and BP 195..
 PD 749, July 18, 1975, which grants immunity from prosecution to givers of bribes and other gifts and to
their accomplices in bribery other than graft cases against public officers.
 RA 1379. Forfeiture in favor of the State any property found to have been illegally acquired by a public
officer or employee.

Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements
a policy of public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation; Public disclosure of government
transactions
 30

 CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA
704 Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

The Facts:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No.
455 (Senate Res. No. 455, “directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the
Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties
in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.” The pertinent portions of the Resolution read:
WHEREAS, in the last quarter of 2005, the representation and entertainment expense of the PHC
skyrocketed to P4.3 million, as compared to the previous year’s mere P106 thousand;

WHEREAS, some board members established wholly owned PHC subsidiary called Telecommunications
Center, Inc. (TCI), where PHC funds are allegedly siphoned; in 18 months, over P73 million had been allegedly
advanced to TCI without any accountability report given to PHC and PHILCOMSAT;

WHEREAS, the Philippine Star, in its 12 February 2002 issue reported that the executive committee of
Philcomsat has precipitately released P265 million and granted P125 million loan to a relative of an executive
committee member; to date there have been no payments given, subjecting the company to an estimated interest
income loss of P11.25 million in 2004;

WHEREFORE, be it resolved that the proper Senate Committee shall conduct an inquiry in
aid of legislation, on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties
in the operations by their respective board of directors.

On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon,
wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the
resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on
Senate Res. No. 455. On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At
the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted. On August 10, 2006, Senator
Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum, approved by Senate President Manuel Villar, requiring Chairman
Sabio and PCGG Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Nicasio Conti, Tereso Javier and Narciso Nario to
appear in the public hearing scheduled on August 23, 2006 and testify on what they know relative to the matters
specified in Senate Res. No. 455. All were disregarded by the petitioners.
On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his
office at IRC Building, No. 82 EDSA, Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises where he was
detained.
Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with the Supreme Court a petition for habeas corpus against the Senate
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services, their
Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and Members. The case was docketed as G.R. No.
174340.
Chairman Sabio, Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and Javier; and the PCGG’s nominees Andal and
Jalandoni alleged: first, respondent Senate Committees disregarded Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 without any
justifiable reason; second, the inquiries conducted by respondent Senate Committees are not in aid of
legislation; third, the inquiries were conducted in the absence of duly published Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; and fourth, respondent Senate Committees are not vested with the
power of contempt.
In their Consolidated Comment, the above-named respondents countered: first, the issues raised in the
petitions involve political questions over which this Court has no jurisdiction; second, Section 4(b) has been
repealed by the Constitution; third, respondent Senate Committees are vested with contempt power; fourth,
Senate’s Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation have been duly published; fifth,
respondents have not violated any civil right of the individual petitioners, such as their (a) right to privacy; and
(b) right against self-incrimination; and sixth, the inquiry does not constitute undue encroachment into
justiciable controversies.
I S S U E:
 31

Is Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 repealed by the 1987 Constitution? Is its implementation
wherein the petitioners are exempt from appearing in investigations involving their transactions
violates Section 28, Art. II of the Constitution?
HELD:
Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1, which limits the power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG
members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding provides:
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in
any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance.
Said provision of EO No. 1 violates Section 28, Art. II of the Constitution which mandates that “Subject
to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of
all its transactions involving public interest.”

Read together with Section 7, Article III, Sec. 20, Art. VI and Section 1, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.
 32

ARTICLE VI. THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum.

LEGISLATIVE POWER
- it is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them.

BASIC CONCEPTS OF THE GRANT OF LEGISLATIVE POWER

1. it cannot pass irrepealable laws
The Congress CANNOT PASS IRREPEALABLE LAWS. The power of present and future legislature
must remain plenary. When one legislature attempts to pass an irrepealable law, to the extent it attempts to limit
the power of future legislatures. The power of any legislature can be limited only by the Constitution.

2. principle of separation of powers

The PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS is intended to prevent a concentration of
authority in one person or group of persons that might lead to an irreversible error or abuse in its exercise to the
detriment of our republican institutions. This is to secure action, to forestall overaction, to prevent despotism
and to obtain efficiency.
To achieve the above purpose:
 THE LEGISLATURE is generally limited to the enactment of laws and may not enforce or apply them.
 THE EXECUTIVE is limited to the enforcement of laws and may not enact or apply them.
 THE JUDICIARY is limited to the application of laws and may not enact or enforce them.

There are instances under the Constitution when powers are not confined exclusively within one department but
are in fact assigned to or shared by several department but are in fact assigned to or shared by several
departments. There is BLENDING OF POWERS.
Illustration:
1. The power of appointment, which can right fully be exercised by each department over its own
administrative personnel.
2. Enactment of the general appropriations law, which begins with the preparation by the President of
the budget, which becomes the basis of the bill adopted by the Congress and subsequently submitted by
it to the President, who may then approve it.
3. The grant of amnesty by the President which requires the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of the Congress.
4. The Commission on Elections does not alone deputize law-enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the government for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections but does so with the consent of the President.

CHECKS AND BALANCES

- one department is allowed to resist encroachments upon its prerogatives or to rectify mistakes or
excesses committed by the other departments.
Illustration:
1. The lawmaking power of the Congress is checked by the President through his veto power, which in
turn may be overridden by the legislature.
2. The Congress may refuse to give its concurrence to an amnesty proclaimed by the President and the
Senate to a treaty he has concluded.
3. The President may nullify a conviction in a criminal case by pardoning the offender.
4. The Congress may limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and that of inferior courts and even
abolish the latter tribunals.
5. The judiciary has the power to declare invalid an act done by the Congress, the President and his
subordinates, or the Constitutional Commission.

3. non-delegability of legislative powers

POTESTA DELEGATA NON DELEGARI POTEST (What has been delegated cannot be delegated)

 May Congress delegate its legislative power?

 33

No. Legislative power must remain where the people have lodged it. However, there are exceptions to
this rule – PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION (TEPAL)
a) Delegation of Tariff powers to the President (Section 28(2), Article VI)
b) Delegation of Emergency Powers to the President (Section 23 (2), Article VI)
c) Delegation to the People at large
d) Delegation to Local governments
e) Delegation to Administrative bodies.

 Delegation to local governments

The reason behind this delegation is because the local government is deemed to know better the needs of
the people therein.
*Section 5 of Article X

 PEOPLE VS. VERA, 65 Phil 56

A law delegating to the local government units the power to fund the salary of probation officers
in their area is unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection of the laws. In areas where there is a
probation officer because the local government unit appropriated an amount for his salaries, convicts
may avail of probation while in places where no funds were set aside for probation officers, convicts
therein could not apply for probation.

 Delegation of Rule-making power to administrative bodies

What is the completeness test?

A law must be complete in itself in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislature so that
nothing is left to the judgment of the delegate. Otherwise, the statute is an unconstitutional delegation of
power.

When is a statute considered complete?

A statute is complete when the subject, the manner, and the extent of its operation are therein stated. It
is for this reason that the legislature should clearly state the legislative policy to be implemented by the
delegate, who should implement the same, and the scope of authority to the delegate.

What is sufficiency of standard test?

A sufficient standard not only defines the policy fixed by the legislature but also marks its limits by
specifying the extent of the authority of the delegate as well as the conditions under which the said
policy should be implemented.

Without the said standard, “there would be no means to determine with reasonable certainty, whether
the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. When this happens, the power of
legislation will eventually be exercised by a branch of government other than that in which it is lodged
by the Constitution.
 PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL, 15 SCRA 569
Former President Diosdado Macapagal issued Executive Orders under Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, to create thrity-three (33) municipalities. Former Vice President Pelaez contends that
Section 68, as aforementioned is an undue delegation of power and said executive orders are therefore null
and void.

Is section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code an undue delegation of power?

Can the President of the Philippines issue an executive order under Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code and create a municipality?

SC:
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code is not complete in itself as it does not state
the policy to be executed by the delegate, and neither does it fix a standard, the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform.
It is true that the last clause of the said Section provides that the President “xxx may change the seat
government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require”, but the phrase
“as the public welfare may require” qualifies, not the clauses preceding the ones just quoted, but only the
place to which the seat of the government may be transferred.
 34

It is true that “public welfares” and “public interest” are sufficient standards of a valid delegation of
powers, but said cases involved grant to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their
administrative functions which is different from the nature of the powers referred to in Section 68.
The authority to create municipalities is one which essentially legislative in character.

Note: Under Article VI, Section 24 of the 1987 Constitution, all “xxx bills of local application “ shall
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments. Section 24 provides as follows:

“All appropriation, revenue, or tariff bills, authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments.”

The ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General that the authority to create municipal corporations are
essentially legislative in character still applies.

 US VS. ANG TANG HO, 43 Phil. 1

A law was enacted by the Philippine Legislature in 1919 which authorized the Governor General to issue
and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures to implement the purpose of the said law, also
known as Act 2868. The Governor General issued a proclamation fixing the price of rice and penalizing the
violation thereof. The purpose of the law is to regulate the sale and distribution of palay, rice and corn,
particularly the monopoly, hoarding of, and speculation of said commodities.
The defendant who was prosecuted and convicted for selling rice at a price higher than that fixed in
proclamation, appealed to the Supreme Court and questioned the validity of the said proclamation which,
according to him, was issued pursuant to an unconstitutional delegation of power.

Is the contention of the accused tenable and it is questioned law complete as a legislation?

SC: The law is not complete as legislation, and consequently, there is an unconstitutional delegation of
powers for the following reasons:

1. The legislature said that the proclamation may be issued for cause and leaves the question of what is any
cause to the discretion of the General general;
2. The legislature did not define what is an extraordinary increase in the price of palay, rice or other cereal. It
was left to the discretion of the Governor General;

3. The law did not also specify or define what such temporary rules or emergency are, or how long such rules
or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. All these were also
left to the judgment and the discretion of the Governor General;

4. The Governor General cannot by proclamation determine what act shall constitute a crime or not.

 May rules and regulations promulgated by administrative bodies/agencies have the force
of law? penal law? In order to be considered as one with the force and effect of a penal
law, what conditions must concur?
Yes, provided that the following conditions occur: (1) The delegating statute itself must specifically
authorize the promulgation of penal regulations; (2) The penalty must not be left to the administrative
agency but must be provided by the statute itself; (3) The regulation must be published in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.

 Delegation to the people. See Section 2(1) of Art. XVII and Section 32, Article VI-
The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the
exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or
law or part thereof passed by the Congress of local legislative body after the registration of a petition thereof
signed by at least 10% of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least 3% of the registered voters thereof.
 35

Sections 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large
by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided for by law.

Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,

and, on the day of the election, is at least 35 years of age, able to read and write, a registered
voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than 2 years immediately preceding the day
of the election.

Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the 30th day of June next following their election.

No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.

 24 senators elected at large – election: 2nd Monday of May, allowed 2 consecutive terms then after 3
years had lapse they can again run for another term.

 ESPINOSA VS. BENIGNO AQUINO JR.

In November 4, 1969 election, Espinosa is number 9 and Aquino is number 1 Senator. The election was
November 4, 1969 but Aquino was turning 35 on November 27, 1969. Is he qualified?
SC: No person shall be elected senator. On November 27, 1969, he was not yet a senator he become only a
senator at noon of December 30, 1969. Therefore, as long as you are qualified when you will take your oath
as a senator then you need the qualification. But now, that does not apply anymore because under section 3
that on the day of election you must already be 35 years of age.
 Before: as long as you are already 35 when you start discharging the duties of a senator.
 Now: You must be 35 y/o on the day of election, otherwise you are considered to be not qualified
for thae particular office.

 AQUILINO PIMENTEL JR. VS.COMELEC (November 3, 2008)

Questioning RA 9165 requiring all the candidate from the President up to Barangay Kagawad that they
have to submit together with their certificate of candidacy a certification from a national drug testing agency
certifying that they are not positive of prohibited drugs.
 Basis of Questioning by Pimentel: If you require in addition to the 5 requirement under section
3 of article 6 + certification for not being positive of prohibited drugs – as if you are already
amending sec. 3 of article 6, as if you have already added a 6th qualification.
SC: Congress is not allowed to add one more qualification for candidates for senators or congressman or for
the President of the Philippines. Therefore, it is Unconstitutional.

 SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA)
Random drug-testing to high school students is rendered constitutional.

 ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE

DRUG ENFORCEMENT
To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool
for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate
a persons’ right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Article III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused
persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

Sections 5. [1] The House of representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number
of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
 36

[2] The party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. For three (3) consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, ½ of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women youth, and such other sectors, as may be provided
by law, except the religious sector.

[3] Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact
and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least one hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative.
[4] Within 3 years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on standards provided in this section

 ESPINOSA VS. BENIGNO AQUINO JR.

In November 4, 1969 election, Espinosa is number 9 and Aquino is number 1 Senator. The election was
November 4, 1969 but Aquino was turning 35 on November 27, 1969. Is he qualified?
SC: No person shall be elected senator. On November 27, 1969, he was not yet a senator he become only a
senator at noon of Becember 30, 1969. Therefore, as long as you are qualified when you will take your oath
as a senator then you need the qualification. But now, that does not apply anymore because under section 3
that on the day of election you must already be 35 years of age.
 Before: as long as you are already 35 when you start discharging the duties of a senator.
 Now: You must be 35 y/o on the day of election, otherwise you are considered to be not qualified
for the particular office.

Section 5.
Applying Section 5, out of the 250, 200 will be elected as Congressmen and 50 for party list.
 Enactment of Party list law: 2%
 Now: 240 elected, 80% constitute the House of Representative (HR)
20% = 60 party list group members, insisting 2% cannot be, there will be a mathematical
impossibility. That even less than 1% vote, if it is within top 60, the party-list will be entitled to one seat.
(BANAT Case).

In Section 9 – C: the COMELEC has the power to register the different party list groups. The list of the
employees for the party list group shall be submitted to the COMELEC. COMELEC must published all
the list of the nominees from the different party list groups.

 LOKIN VS. COMELEC , 2011 decision

He was #2 in the list of nominees for the party list group of Bro. Eddie Villanueva. After election their party
list group won. Before Congress could open the session, this party list group went to the COMELEC and said
they are changing Luis Lokin with another person as their prerogative. It was allowed by the COMELEC.
Can the COMELEC allow the change of nominees after election? SC said NO.
Can HRET change the nominees after election?
Under section 17 of Article 6, No because the power of HRET applies only if the case involves the
election return and qualifications of members of the HR.
SC: Only the SC can look over on the issue. The act of removing Lokin is Unconstitutional.

 PHILIPPINE GUARDIAN AND BROTHERHOOD INC. VS. COMELEC, April 29, 2010
Under the party list law, there is a requirement that you have to get 2% in order to get 1 seat in the HR. If
you will fail in two consecutive elections (2001 & 2004) to get 2%, your party list group even though already
registered in the COMELEC will not be allowed during the 3 rd election (2007) to participate. Guardian was
registered in 2001, not able to get 2%, 2004 it did not participate, in 2007 the COMELEC did not allow them
to participate.
SC: The petitioner should have been allowed to run in 2007.

SECTION 4: A city be entitled to a Congressman : 3rd Par., section 4 – any city with at least 250
thousand population or any province is entitled to at least 1 member of HR base on population
and the different town comprising the different district must be near each other.

 BENIGNO AQUINO III VS. COMELEC, April 7, 2010

 37

In the Province of Camarines Sur with a population of 1,700,000. 1 st district – 440,000, 2nd – 400,000,
3rd – 400,000, 4rth – 420,000. They want the 1 st district to be divided into 2 – 260,000 & 180,000 (district
of Andaya & Arroyo). Is the law creating the 2nd district of Camarines Sur constitutional?
SC said that population requirement of 250,000 is needed only in so far as giving legislative
district for city but not for provinces.
 SEE: Section 10 of the Local Government Code: Navarro vs. COMELEC – LGC provided that no
LGU can be converted as a province unless it has a population of at least 250,000, it has an
income of 20 million, it must hava an area of at least 2,000 sq. km. The said provision
somewhat deviates the decision in Aquino case.
But SC said as long as there is already an existing province, you want to create
another legislative district, you are not bound by 250,000.

 ALDABA VS. COMELEC, January 25, 2010

Congress enacted a law creating or making Malolos City a highly urbanized city. Basis: there is a
National Census in statistics office reports saying that Malolos will have a population of 254,031 by 2010.
May 10,2010, COMELEC printed ballots for Congressman. There were candidates for the lone district of
Malolos. Is it entitled to be created as one legislative district based on the third par. of sec. 4, article 6?
SC said NO because the population requirement is very important, it is based on
Progressive Ratio. So they should have similar number of population. No assurance to have
a population of 254,031 by 2010 in so far as one district is concern. The law creating the
City of Malolos was declared unconstitutional.

 BAGABUYO CASE
A law was enacted dividing Cagayan De Oro into two legislative districts in accordance with the section
4: 1st district – 250,000, 2nd district 250,000. There was no plebiscite conducted.
Re. section 10, article 10: There must be a law enacted with a valid census and plebiscite which must have
the majority of the registered voter in the political unit affected.
Is the law creating or dividing Cagayan De Oro unconstitutional?
SC: NO because Section 10 , Article 10 of the LGC applies only if you will divide an existing province, city or
municipality and it will result into different local government unit. Section 4 to 5, article 6 is only required
no need for plebiscite. There is only division of 2 districts, not 2 separate local government units.

Section 6. No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural

born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least 25 years of age, able to
read and write, and except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in
which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than 1 year
immediately preceding the day of the election.

 OCAMPO VS. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL VS. MARK JIMENEZ, June 15, 2004
Jimenez is a resident of Forbes Park, Makati. He filed a certificate of candidacy in the 6 th district of
Manila. He won as Congressman. The electoral tribunal found out that he is not really from that place and
therefore he was disqualified. Ocampo as the 2nd placer was to be duly proclaimed as elected
Congresswoman for the 6th district of Manila because the #1 candidate was disqualified. Is that correct?
If the disqualification takes place before election (Geronimo vs. COMELEC) reiterated in the case of Fr.
Bernardo Cayat vs COMELEC, April 24, 2007: He was disqualified by the COMELEC on April 1, 2004. He
filed a MR on April 16, 2004 which is within the 15 day period but he failed to pay the fees for MR before the
COMELEC that’s why even if there is no resolution finally disqualifying him, still one elected on May of
2004.
SC: Disqualification became final as early as April 17, 2004, so the 2 nd placer will now be the duly elected
mayor of Buguias, Benguet.
Applying LABO Doctrine: If the final disqualification takes place after the election then the 2 nd placer has no
right to claim the position.
SC: Jimenez Case: His disqualification took place after election, therefore in this case Ocampo the 2 nd
placer could not ask that she be proclaimed as the duly elected Congresswoman for the 6 th district of Manila.
SC said there should be special election in accordance of section 8 of article 6.

1. There must be a final judgment disqualifying a candidate in order that the votes of a disqualified candidate
can be considered “stray”. This final judgment must be rendered BEFORE THE ELECTION. This was the
ruling in the case of CODILLA VS. DE VENECIA. Hence, when a candidate has not been disqualified by final
 38

judgment during the election day he was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do
so would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. The reason behind this is
that the people voted for him bona fide and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be
the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government.
2. The subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes does not entitle
the second placer to be declared the winner. The said principle was laid down as early as 1912 and reiterated
in the cases of LABO VS. COMELEC, ABELLA VS. COMELEC and DOMINO VS. COMELEC.

(Note, however, that if the disqualification became FINAL before election day but still, the
voters elected him, said votes are considered stray votes and the “second placer” will be
declared the winner)

TAKE NOTE:
IF THE DISQUALIFICATION happens:
BEFORE ELECTION -2nd places shall take place (Cayat vs COMELEC)
AFTER ELECTION – succession rule applies. (LABO Doctrine)

 REP. DANILO FERNANDEZ VS. HRET, December 21, 2009

He was the V-Governor for Laguna for 9 years. He has a mansion in Pasanjan, Laguna, 5th district of
Laguna. He was the V-Gov. of Laguna for 3 terms. His address during election is Pagsanjan, Laguna. 1year
and 2 mos. Before the election in 2007, he went to Sta. Rosa, Laguna, a part of the 1 st district and rented an
apartment then he stayed there and open a small SSS and his children was enrolled in elementary school in
Sta. Rosa. When the election time came, he filed his certificate of candidacy. Does he able to meet the
requirements under section 6?
SC said no where from the provision of section 6 require property ownership. What is required only is
residence. So whether you are residing there as a lessee when you have a mansion on the 5 th ddistrict, the
Constitution does not make any distinction. All the requirements are present.

This case is similar to Mitra of Palawan vs COMELEC. Mitra rented a farm situated in a town next to Puerto
Princesa(the original place of Mitra) SC: What is required is only residence. As long as he stayed.

 ANTONIO BENGSON III VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

and TEODORO CRUZ, 357 SCRA 545
In Rep. Act No. 2630, “Sec. 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine Citizenship by rendering service
to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed
Forces of the United states, acquired US citizenship, MAY REACQUIRE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY
TAKING AN OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND REGISTERING
THE SAME WITH THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRY IN THE PLACE WHERE HE RESIDES OR LAST
RESIDED IN THE PHILIPPINES. The said Oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other
citizenship.”

On the other hand, Section 2, Article IV, 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that Natural born
citizens are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform an act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine Citizenship in accordance with par. 3 ,
Section 1 shall be deemed natural born citizens.”

SC: The private respondent is a natural born Filipino citizen and therefore qualified as a Member of the
House of Representatives even though he was a US Citizen for more than 20 years because Rep. Act 2630
provides that there can be reacquisition of citizenship and said respondent complied with it.

Section 7. The members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of 3 years
which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the 30th day of June next
following their election.

No member of the House of Representative shall serve for a period of more than 3
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
 39

Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the
Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.

a. On the manner of nomination and appointment of Sectoral representatives to the House of

Representatives.1. Exec. Order No. 198, June 18, 1987 ; 2.. DELES VS. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS,
September 4, 1989
b. On gerrymandering CENIZA vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763

Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election
may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member
of the House of representatives thus elected shall serve only the unexpired term.

 What happens if a congressman died while he is still in office? – There shall be a special election
conducted as maybe provided for by law.

 LOZADA VS. COMELEC: SC said there is no such thing as automatic election for a replacement of a
member of a senate or HR who died, resigned, or removed. There must be a law enacted by Congress
because COMELEC needs fund for the conduct of special election.
COMELEC cannot call a special election (for the legislative districts whose Congressmen resigned or
died while in office) without a law passed by Congress appropriating funds for the said purpose.

Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be
determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration
of the full term of all the members of the Senate and the House of representatives approving
such increase.

 Can Congress enact a law in increasing their salary?

Yes but it will not take effect during the term of the members approving the same. It will take effect until
after the term of the members approving the same. (Congressmen and senators) – noon of June 30,
2016
Illustration:
September 5 2010(law enacted increasing their salary)
June 30, 2013 ( House of Representative term expires)
June 30 2016 (Senator term expires) – this is only the time that the law will take effect.
It will only take affect after the term of the Senator who passed the law. This is to
maintain the equality in the Congress.

 PHILCOMSAT VS. JIME NEZ, 15 SCRA 479;

Congressmen were not allowed to increase their salary. They enacted a law that after 3 consecutive
terms as congressman, you are now entitled to retirement benefits because the constitution will not allow
you to run for 4rth time as a congressman.
SC declared that law unconstitutional for 2 reasons:
1. It violates the prohibition that they cannot increase their salaries
(What you can do it directly, you cannot do it indirectly.
2. It violates the equal protection clause (all other government. Employees like teachers etc, will retire only
or if they have to. Wait for 65 or 70 before they could receive their retirement benefits.

 Other Prohibition for members of Congress: They are not allowed to hold any public
government during their tenure (while they are still sitting in congress) unless it is allowed by the
Constitution.
 When is Congress allowed by the Constitution to hold any office in government?
Section 8, Article 8: When a senator and a Congressman seat as a member of the judicial and bar
council, no other exceptions.

 Can you resign to accept another position in government?

Yes provided that that office was not created during your tenure as congressman or senator or the salary
for that particular office was increased.
 40

 What if in that law creating a new office or increasing your salary of the highest official to
where you will be appointed, you voted against that law before. Are you now entitled to be
appointed?
The law is very clear, it did not speak whether you voted or not, what is important is it was passed
during your tenure as a congressman, you cannot question that.

- Most unfair prohibition for Congress is the prohibition for lawyers who are congressmen for
appearing as counsel before any court, military commission, the HRET or other administrative bodies.

 PUYAT VS. DE GUZMAN

There is a case before the SEC(fight bet. 2 stockholders: Acero and Puyat group).
1st hearing:Fernandez represented the Acero group but the other lawyer said he is not qualified under the
constitution because he is a congressman, he is not allowed to appear as counsel in any tribunal. It was
adjourned.
2nd hearing: Fernandez was still there as a stockholder to protect his interest.
SC said cannot be, what you can do directly, you cannot do it indirectly.

 How much is the present salary of the members of Congress?

The Congressmen’s salary is P204,000.00 [P17,000.00 per month] as per Section 17, Art. XVIII of the
Constitution.
The President’s salary is P300,000.00 per annum.
The VP, Speaker, Senate President and Chief Justice is P240,000.00 per annum.
The Chairman of the Constitutional Commissions salary is P204,000.00 and the members,
P180,000.00 per annum.

Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for
any debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY ON ARREST

 Congress is in session: re section 15: start at the 4rth Monday of July.
 As long as the congress is in session, no congressman or senator be arrested provided the criminal case
filed against him is punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment. (prision coreccional) (July 26 –
June 24, 2012)
 When can he be arrested? – June 25, 2012 to July 23, 2012.

 OSMENA VS. PENDATUN, 109 Phil. 863

In Cebu, Osmena delivered a privileged speech and he said this administration is very very bad because
pardon is for sale. Can he be charged by President Garcia for libel?
SC: No because there is the parliamentary immunity for speech or debate, however the congressmen
belonging to the group of president Garcia filed an administrative case against him before the HRET
committee of congress.
Osmena said, you can not charge me because the constitution said so.
SC said Osmena cannot be charged outside but you can be charged or even liable in so far as administrative
case is filed before the HR. The only ground where you can charged a member of congress – Section 16:
DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR and if you can obtain a vote of 2/3, you can suspend a member for a period not
exceeding 60 days or even expel him provided you will be able to get 2/3’s.

 JIMENEZ VS. CABANGBANG, 17 SCRA 876 ----- “In any other place”
Cabangbang is a congressman , he delivered a speech where he was a guest of the lion’s club of Manila
and he said “ Members of the different department, some generals and colonels are allegedly planning to
overthrow the government of President Garcia. He mentioned Col. Jimenez.
A case was filed against him for damages arising from his defamatory accusation. He file for a motion to
dismiss: as a member of congress he could not be charged and there was no cause of action against him.
SC said No because that immunity applies only if the speech was made within the four walls of congress.
 41

 ATTY. YABES CASE

An editor of Ilocandia times wrote in his article “I do not believe”. Libel case was filed against him but
he answered it was not libelous.In fact I am telling the whole world that I do not believe. Is it really
defamatory?
SC: It is defamatory because he is the one bringing them out to the people the things which are not known
to the people of San Fernando. It is intended to destroy the reputation of Atty. Yabes.

Section 12. All members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon
assumption of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall
notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a
proposed legislation of which they are authors.

Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned and controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his
term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have
been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.

 ADAZA vs. PACANA, 135 SCRA 431

After taking his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress), he is deemed to have resigned his
position as Governor of Misamis Oriental because as a legislator, he is not allowed to hold any other office
in the government.

 PUNZALAN vs. MENDOZA, 140 SCRA 153

A provincial governor who took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa as “appointed member”
for being a member of the Cabinet is allowed to return to his former position as Governor if he resigns from
the Batasan. This is so because he was just an “appointed” member as distinguished from the Adaza Case.
(Note: It appears that an appointed member of the Batasan is placed in a better position than the elected
members)

Compare with Section 10, Art. VIII of the 1973

Constitution

Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as
counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial bodies
and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested
financially in any contract with, or any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government
owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not
intervene in any matter before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit or where
he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

 PUYAT vs. DE GUZMAN, 113 SCRA 31

What could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly. So a member of Congress who is a
stockholder of the corporation involved in a case is not allowed to appear under the guise that he is
appearing as such, not as counsel for the corporation.
Sections 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the 4th Monday of July for its
regular season, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for
such number of days as it may determine until 30 days before the opening of its next regular
session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special
session at any time.

Section 16. [1] The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its
Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective members.

Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
 42

[2] A majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller
number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent members in
such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.

[3] Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for
disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of 2/3 of all its members, suspend or expel a
Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall mot exceed sixty days.

 U.S. vs. PONS, 34 Phil. 729

On June 24, 2012, there are so many pending bills enacted by congress. They were able to enact a law which
punishes an act where Pons was charged of that particular act for violating a law but according to him that
law is beyond June 24, 2012. They continued enacting laws until the morning of June 25, 2012. There are so
many witnesses telling that the law violated by Pons was enacted in the morning of June 25 where congress
has no more power to enact laws at that time it is in violation of section 5. But the journal states that it was
passed at 11:59pm. Is the law valid?
SC said that the entry in the journal is conclusive as against extraneous evidence. (testimonies of witnesses)
The law is valid because it is within the limit of the congress to enact laws.

The journal prevails over extraneous evidence like accounts of

newspaper journalists and reporters as to what the proceedings all
about.

 Officers of Congress: Senate president pro-tempore, speaker pro-tempore, majority and minority floor
leaders, chairman of the various standing and special committee.

 The only way where a congressman or senator could be suspended is when 2/3 of all the congressmen or
senators depending on the house where he belongs voted for him.

 MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

She implemented several policies which were questioned by even employees, she Was charged of 6
counts of graft and corruption. It was filed 1990-1991 in the Ombudsman. It was only in 1995 when she was
already elected senator that this cases were filed by the ombudsman to the Sandiganbayan. In sec. 11 & 12 of
RA 3019 it provides that a public official arraigned already shall be suspended for 60 days. Sandiganbayan
ordered her suspension but Defensor said you can not suspend me. There is only one body that could
suspend me (section 16, article 6 – only the 2/3 votes of my co-senators can suspend me not the
Sandiganbayan). Is she correct?
SC said NO because RA 3019(anti-graft and corruption act) applies to all government officials from the
president up to the lowest position. When there is already an arraignment and an order of suspension was
issued by the Sandiganbayan, it is not automatic, it has to be transmitted to the senate president who shall
implement the same.

 CONGRESSMAN PAREDES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

Paredes is the governor in Agusan, he was charged of graft when he was still a governor. When he was
already a congressman, that was the time the ombudsman forwarded the graft cases against him before the
Sandiganbayan then there was an order of suspension. He went to the SC and copied the argument of Sen.
Santiago that he cannot be suspended only the members of the HR under sec. 16 could validly suspend him.
SC: No, you can be suspended , only it is not automatic. Sandiganbayan shall coursed the suspension order
to the speaker of the house of representative or the senate president who shall implement. But de Venecia
did no implement the suspension order.

The Supreme Court held that a member of Congress may also be suspended by the Sandiganbayan in
accordance with Section 13 of RA 3019. This preventive suspension applies to all public officials, including
members of Congress. Otherwise, the same will be considered class legislation (there will be violation of the
equal protection clause) if Senators and Congressmen who commit the same is exempt from the preventive
suspension imposed therein. But the Order of Suspension from the court shall be given to the Speaker or
Senate President for his/her implementation.

Other than the foregoing, a member of Congress can be suspended by the Congress itself.
 43

[4] Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and
nays on any question shall, at the request of one fifth of the members present, be entered in the
journal.

Each House shall also keep a record of its proceedings.

[Neither House during the sessions of the Congress, shall without the consent of the
other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any place than that which the 2 Houses shall be
sitting.

See:
1) AVELINO vs. CUENCO, 83 Phil. 17, Read also the motion for reconsideration dated March 14,
1949
2) Disciplinary measures on erring members. Read: OSMENA vs. PENDATUN, 109 Phil. 863
3) Dual purpose for keeping a journal
4) Journal entry and enrolled bill theories; which is conclusive over the other?
The journal prevails over extraneous evidence like accounts of newspaper journalists and
reporters as to what the proceedings all about. (U.S. vs. PONS, 34 Phil. 729)
5) MABANAG vs. LOPEZ VITO, 78 Phil. 1 ;MORALES vs. SUBIDO, 27 Phil. 131; ASTORGA vs.
VILLEGAS,
56 SCRA 714

 CASCO PHIL. VS. GIMENEZ, 7 SCRA 347

The enrolled bill prevails over the journal. If the enrolled bill provides that it is urea formaldehyde
is the one exempt from tax, and not urea and formaldehyde which appears in the journal which was
really approved, the former prevails and only CURATIVE LEGISLATION COULD CHANGE THE SAME,
NOT JUDICIAL LEGISLATION.

(NOTE: The journal prevails over the enrolled bill on all matters required to be entered in the journals, like yeas
and nays on the final reading of a bill or on any question at the request of 1/5 of the members present. )

6) Differentiate a "regular" from a "special" session.

Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all election contests relating to election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective members. Each Electoral tribunal shall be composed of 9
members, 3 of whom shall be justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
justice, and the remaining six shall be members of the Senate or House of Representatives as
the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior justice in the Electoral tribunal shall be its Chairman.

 BONDOC VS. HRET

There were 5 members of HR from Laban, 1 from nacionalista party and 3 justices from the SC.One
of the 5 congressmen voted in favor of Bondoc enableing him to obtain 5 votes. Bondoc went to the SC.
Can he question what was done by the HRET considering section 17.
SC: Yes because of 2nd par, section 1 of article 8 – in case ther is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction by any government official in any office or , the instrumentality then the
SC could come in and it could reverse the decision even if involving an act of the HRET.

 FIDUASI ABBAS VS. THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

During the 1987 election when we were electing the senators for the 1 st time, the constitution says we
may elect 24 senators. Aquino’s candidates occupied # 1 – 22, 23 – Joseph Estrada and 24 – Juan Ponce
Enrile (opposition). Estrada and Enrile or all of them claimed that they were cheated so they filed a
protest before the senate electoral tribunal. The 6 senators should be replaced by congressmen because
any of the 22 is included being a part of that being complained of. (independent congress from the HR)
Can it be done?
 44

SC: Section 17 – senate electoral tribunal, the members should be senators while the house electoral
tribunal, the members should be congressman. No replacement of Congressman, where it should be
filled up by senators only.

 The electoral tribunal has jurisdiction only if it involves the election, returns and
qualifications of the HR whether elected or party list.

 The qualifications of congressmen under section 6 are also qualifications of party list members plus you
must have been a member for at least 6 months before the election and you belong to that particular
group you are representing.

 Different Groups: peasants, women, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities and others. The 8
groups enumerated are not exclusive.

Jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals viz-a-viz the COMELEC to determine the qualifications of Members of
Congress before and after proclamation. (JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG VS. COMELEC, G.R. No.
178831-32, April 1, 2009)
Read:
1) LAZATIN VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 80007, January 25, 1988
2) FIRDAUSI ABBAS, ET AL. VS. THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, October 27, 1988
3) ENRILE VS. COMELEC & SANCHEZ; ENRILE VS. COMELEC & RAZUL AND SANCHEZ VS.
COMELEC,
Aug. 12, 1987, 153 SCRA 57
4) BONDOC VS. HRET, supra

Section 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the Senate President, as
ex-oficio chairman, 12 senators and 12 members of the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The chairman of the commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The commission
shall act on all appointments submitted to it within 30 session days of the Congress from their
submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority of all the members.
Commission on Appointments – the most powerful committee in Congress.
 12 senators: every 2 senators are entitled to 1 seat in the commission on appointments

 RAUL DAZA VS. LUIS SINGSON, December 21, 1989

In 1942, we use to have 240 congressmen, 200 from LDP and 40 from LP. 200: 10 & 40:2. There were 2
oppositionists (Yap and Daza). Out of the 40, 20 went to LDP. So only 20 LP’s were left. After just 4
months, they want to replace the Daza with a member of LDP because there were only 20 which is good only
for 1 member of the Commission on appointments. Can that be done?
Daza and Singson cited only 1 case for their position – Cunanan vs. Tan. Base on this case Daza is entitled to
sit there.
SC: Is there a permanent change in the total # of LP’s? – Yes. There is a permanent change of political party.
Thus, Singson won.

 CUNANAN VS. TAN

In 1971, we only have two political party list (NP & LP). There were 12 Np’s and 12 LP’s. Re. the
Commission on appointments there were 6 from NP and 6 from LP. There was a proposal to amend the
1935 constitution in 1971 and there was a voting made. During the voting, all the 12 NP’s are in favor of
calling for a constitutional convention. 10 from the LP’s said No but 2 are in favor for calling for a
constitutional convention. NP said they should now have 7 from the NP’s and 5 from the LP’s?
SC said NO because these 2 LP’s who voted in favor of calling for a constitutional convention and voted with
the NP’s did not change their political parties, they are just voting in favor of that but they are still LP’s.
Since there was no permanent change in the membership of NP, LP – 12:12 and membership in the
commission on appointments will still be 6:6.

If the changes (which are permanent) in the political party affiliations of the
members of Congress is substantial so as to dramatically decrease the
 45

membership of one party while reducing the other, the number of

representatives of the different parties in the Commission on Appointments
may also be changed in proportion to their actual memberships. (NOTE: In
Cunanan vs. Tan, the membership of the Senators was only “temporary” so as
not to result in the change of membership in the Commission on Appointments)

 Who are those subject to confirmation? (section 16, article 7)

 GUINGONA VS. GONZALES, October 20, 1992

 During 1992 elections, 24 senators elected.

15 – LDP/2(7.5) = 8 = 7 (SC decision)=10 senators
5 – NPC/2 (2.5) = 2 = 2 (no such thing as rounding off)
3 - LAKAS/2 (1.5) = 1 = 1
1 – LP/2(.5) =1=0
= 12 rep. in commission of appointments

 There is no such thing as rounding off, senate will only have 10 members in the commission of
appointments and then all of them filed a MR.
 SC said if you want to have 12, you have to Coalesce with one another.
Coalesce – means group together

Since 12 Senators are members of the Commission on Appointments, in addition to the Senate
President as the head thereof, every two (2) Senators are entitled to one (1) representative in the
Commission. Parties, however, are not allowed to “round off” their members, I.e., 7 Senators are
entitled to 3 representatives in the Commission on Appointments, not 4 since 7/2 is only 3.5.

Further, there is nothing in the Constitution which requires that there must be 24 members of the
Commission. If the different parties do not coalesce, then the possibility that the total number of
Senators in the CA is less than 12 is indeed a reality. (Example: Lakas---13 Senators; LDP---11
Senators. In this case, Lakas is entitled to 6 members in the CA (13/2= 6.5) while LBP would have 5
members (11/2= 5.5)

Read also: GUINGONA S. GONZALES, March 1, 1993 (Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration of
the October 20, 1992 Decision)
To be discussed later together with Sec. 16, Art. VII.

 RAUL DAZA VS. LUIS SINGSON, December 21, 1989

If the changes (which are permanent) in the political party affiliations of the members of Congress is
substantial so as to dramatically decrease the membership of one party while reducing the other, the
number of representatives of the different parties in the Commission on Appointments may also be
changed in proportion to their actual memberships. (NOTE: In Cunanan vs. Tan, the membership of
the Senators was only “temporary” so as not to result in the change of membership in the Commission
on Appointments)

Section 19. The electoral tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted
within 30 days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized
with the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall
meet only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its
members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it.

Sec. 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to
the public in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit
which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for
each member.
Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
 46

 Most important provision of Article VI.

 What should we do with the expenses of the congressmen?

It must be published by the COA for us to see.

In INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION, the RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

MUST BE PROTECTED.
Section 21 - Main rights of persons invited in congress that must be respected.
Section 17, Article 3 – No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

 ARNAULT vs. NAZARENO, 87 Phil. 29

In 1950, there was that controversy when 2 big parcels of land are being sold by the government. The
senate blue ribbon committee conducted investigation and the first resource speaker was Arnault. The agent
was invited but refuse to answer any question on the ground that it might incriminate him. SBRC cited him
for contempt and sent to jail up to the time that he will answer all the questions. After 2 years, the agent said
that “my stay in jail is too long and went to SC and said you have to release me.

Issue of the SC: How long may a person cited for contempt by Congress be validly under detention?

SC said if you answer the questions , you have to be released. But if you refuse to answer: (2 yardsticks given
by the SC)
1. The detention should not be longer than the term of the house citing you for contempt (lower house
or upper house).
2. But the detention should not be too long as to violate the right of that person to due process of law.

“A witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee may be detained during the
term of the members imposing said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to
violate the witness’ right to due process of law.”

Illustration:
The detention shall not be longer the term of the house citing you for contempt.
September 7, 2010(date of detention by the HoR) ----- June 30, 2013 (allowed period of
detention)
July 1, 2010 (detention by Senate) ---- till the expiration of the term of
Senate.

 DRILON VS. ERMITA, April 20, 2006

IN July 5, 2005- Arroyo said “I am sorry” (Garci’s scandal). Congress started investigating, they
subpoena members of the congress and generals to appear before the Senate at 2pm. At 12noon, Arroyo
issued her EO telling the members of the cabinet and the generals that they are not allowed to appear in any
inquiry in aid of legislation of congress without her written consent.
Senators went to the SC. SC said tha EO is unconstitutional for 4 grounds:
1. It will violate section 21, Article 6
2. It will violate Section 28, Article 2 – requirement of public disclosure on all transactions
affecting public interest.
3. It will violate the right to information under Article 3.
4. It will violate section 1,Article 11 – Public office is a public trust.

SC: Senators won, so you can force them to appear before the senate in aid of legislation.

 How shall public official and employees perform?

Highest degree of Responsibility, Integrity, Loyalty…..and they should live modest lives.

 NBN-ZTE Deal Case

Neri alleged that he was offered 200M to turn over the NBNZTE. Was invited to congress and was asked
“is it true that Chairman Abalos offered you 200M to favorably indorsed the project? Yes. What did you do?
I informed Pres. Arroyo about the Bribery. What was the answer of the President? I refuse to answer, I
invoke Executive Privilege. The senate cited him for contempt and be imprisoned. Neri went to the SC.
SC said “while you can compel him to appear, you cannot compel him to answer.
 47

Two instances when a person cannot be compelled to answer in investigation in the aid of legislation:
1. Last phrase in section 21: the rights of the person appearing therein shall be affected.
(right against self incrimination).
2. When you can validly invoke executive privilege.
- This is a bad decision. There was a crime committed but the decision favors Neri.

 EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE – any conversation or written opinion between members of the cabinet
and the President could not be the subject of investigation.
Two Kinds of Executive Privilege:
1. Presidential Communication Privilege – those are the words spoken of or uttered by the President to
the members of the cabinet or members of the Armed Forces. It is coming from the President to the
members of the cabinet.
2. Deliberative Process Privilege – communication written or verbal like legal opinions, advisory
opinions by the members of the cabinet to the President.

 US VS. NIXON
In 1974 Decision with the Doctrine – While executive privilege cannot be invoked during inquiry in aid
of legislation if the subject matter between the President and the members of the cabinet involves the
commission of the crime that is not covered by executive privilege. Nixon and the members of the cabinet in
order for them to have Nixon be easily re-elected – re: Watergate scandal. Nixon won with the biggest
margin in US. But they were caught by 2 enterprising reporters.
Can they refuse to answer the questions of the senator by invoking executive privilege?
US SC said you cannot because if the subject matter between the president and the
members of the cabinet involves the commission of the crime, you cannot invoke executive
privilege

 Grounds for impeachment (Section 2, Article 11): Treason, Bribery, Graft and Corruption, Other
high crimes, Betrayal of Public Trust.

 GEN. DELA PAZ VS. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS represented by Sen.
Defensor Santiago
Case involving EURO generals. Top General of PNP excluding the PNP Chief but his wife Mrs. Versoza
was there. Mrs Versoza went to Moscow and was found out that she is in possession of Euro. Defensor
conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation and she subpoena the General. De la Paz does not want to appear.
Can the committee of congress conduct investigation in aid of legislation for an offense that took place
outside the Philippines? – YES because the rules of congress says they are entitled to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation for any act which involves Filipino citizens and will affect the relation of the Philippines
with other nations.

 SABIO VS GORDON (Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation; Right to

Privacy; Public disclosure of government transactions; right to information on matters of
public concern; accountability of public officers; and right against self-incrimination)
Even though the law creating the PCGG said “they cannot be invited in Congress even in inquiry in aid of
legislation. SC said that cannot be done, thet will violate the equal protection clause. Other government
officials could be invited but members of PCGG could not, that cannot be. It violates section 28, Article 2
and also accountability of public officers or Section 1, Article 11.

 DRILON VS. ERMITA

In investigating the General and members of the cabinet because of the Garci Tape.
Can Garci refuse to answer when he invoke executive privilege? – No, he belongs to the COMELEC, he
does not belong to the executive department. But when he was invited, he invoked (Section 21) that “you do
not have a duly published rules of procedure to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation”. So the congress
published their rules where Garci could no longer be found. He resurface saying only “Hello” then he refuse
to answer.
Congress did not publish their rules but they put it in their website for all to see. Under the Electronic
evidence of 2000: those documents that you can download and printed from the internet are admissible as
evidence but it is not equivalence to publication because there are only two ways of publishing laws, rules
and regulations. (Re: Tanada vs. Tuvera – trough the official gazette and newspaper of general circulation.)
 48

No such thing as publication in the internet. Follow the publication requirement in Civil Code.

 Congress must have a duly published rule; otherwise, the Senate or the House of Representatives could
not investigate in aid of legislation. (VIRGILLO GARCILLANO VS. HOUSE OF
REEPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION ET AL, December 23,
2008)

 BENGZON III VS. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE (SBRC)

During the time of Marcos, the favorite dummy of Marcos was Popoy Romualdez holding 36
corporations. When Cory took over, the 36 corporations were sequestered by the government and another
relative of her took over. One of them is Bengzon III. As a result, the group of Popoy filed several cases for
graft and corruption against him before the Ombudsman and later on part of the Sandiganbayan. SBRC
conducted an investigation in aid of legislation. They invited Bengzon but he refuse because he invoked his
right against self incrimination.
SC: If there is already a pending criminal case against you in the Ombudsman or before the court or
Sandiganbayan, you cannot be asked to appear before the committee in congress because if you will answer
their questions you will be incriminating yourself and they can use that as evidence against you in the
criminal case.

 NEGROS ORIENTAL COOPERATIVE VS. SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OG

DUMAGUETE CITY
Can they invite you? – Yes. But if you refuse to go, you cannot be cited to contempt because while
congress delegated legislative power to the LGU, they did not delegate their power of contempt.
LGU can invite you in inquiries in aid of legislation but they can never force you to answer
or to cite you for contempt because they do not have contempt power.

Sections 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, as the Rules of each House shall provide,
appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments.
Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the HR at
least 3 days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written
questions, but may not cover matter matters related thereto. When the security of the State or
the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be
conducted in executive session.

 If you are being invited during question hour: Congressmen and senator wants to know about
what is happening in your department.

 Can the President validly refuse to allow you to go to Congress?

– YES. If it is base on section 22, there must be approval or consent by the President. But if it base on
section 21, with or without the consent of the President, the mebers of the cabinet must go under pain of
contempt. BUT if it is question hour under section 22, Consent of the President is needed.

 Obligation of Congress to you: At least 3 days before the question hour, they must give you their
questions.

 If the subject matter to be asked affects National Security or Public interest, it must be done in Executive
session. (Close door session)

Section 23 [1] The Congress, by a vote of 2/3 of both Houses in a joint session assembled, voting
separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.

[2] In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize
the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by a resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
 49

- To declare the existence of state of war, the Congress, by a vote of 2/3 of both Houses in a joint session
assembled, voting separately.

- If there is a national emergency, congress may enact a law authorizing the president to exercise
legislative power.

- The president declared war and issued PD declaring war against Malaysia as well as declaring the
existence of state of war.
Is the proclamation valid? Can the President declare war with another country? – Yes,
under section 18, Article 7 as commander in chief.
Can the President declare the existence of war? – No, only congress could declare the existence
of state of war.

- If there is an existence of state of war, no need for congressmen to go to congress for sessions. The
congress will only delegate legislative power to the president.

- As a rule, if there is no more emergency that President should stop already exercising legislative power.
If he will not stop, the congress shall enact a resolution to withdraw that power.

 ARANETA VS. DINGLASAN, 84 Phil. 369

- the first emergency powers cases
In December 9, 1941, 2nd world war started. Congress enacted a law granting legislative powers to the
President. 1945, the war ended. But the President was still exercising legislative power until 1950 while
congress was already in session and enacting laws. Is that allowed? (Congress – 3 readings to enact a law)
Congress enacted a law withdrawing the legislative power that they gave to the President. But when they
submitted it to the president, he vetoed it and continued exercising legislative power. So they enacted
another a law withdrawing it gave it to him but he vetoed it. So they went to the SC.
SC: It cannot be done because the emergency has cease to exist. It can be withdrawn by mere resolution.

 How about if congress is so ashamed of the president that they do not want to enact a resolution
withdrawing the legislative power?
 Ex. Sept. 7, 2007 there is an emergency and ceased to exist December 30, 2011.Can the
president still exercise emergency powers? – Yes, under our Constitution unless there
is resolution.

 Congress start their session on the 4th Monday of July and will last on June 24, 2012. Shall the
emergency powers ( if there is no resolution) be declared automatically withdrawn on June 24,
2012, because the congress will now adjourn? – No, because it says “next adjournment”. There
is another session up to June, 2013. He can exercise up to June 2013 because it says “next
adjournment”, it does not say that until it ceased on the adjournment of congress. It is the duty
of the congress and senator to issue a resolution, next adjournment.

Congress will have a resolution approved by the majority that is already in force and in effect.
There is no need to present it to the President. But if it is a law, it has to be submitted to the
President for his approval or veto.

Illustration:
Sept. 7, 2011 -- December 25, 2011 - The President can still exercise emergency power when
There is an emergency -- The emergency ceased. there is no resolution.

June 20, 2012 – the last day of session. The President can still exercise.
Till June 2013 - It can still continue until the next adjournment.

If there is a national emergency, congress may enact a law authorizing the president to
exercise legislative power in accordance of Sec. 7, Art. XII.
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 RANDY DAVID VS. ARROYO, May 2, 2006

- February 25, 2006, EDSA Revolution. Arroyo learned that members of scout ranger and marines headed
by Gen. Lim and Col. Are participating. Arroyo said they are trying to tackle me from power. She issue
proclamation 1017 declaring a state of national emergency. She ordered the arrest of Gen. Lim and
others, she said by virtue of my powers under section 18, article 7 and section 17, Article 12 “I am now
declaring a state of national emergency”. She can now issue decrees, proclamation orders etc.
- SC said that cannot be done, you can do that only if it is a Martial law yet it was not.
- The State beefing referred to in Section 7, Article XII, is the Congress.
 2nd par. section 23 – Congress will be the one to declare the emergency and enumerate what are
businesses to be taken over by the government not the President.

Sections 24. All appropriations, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
 Six Kinds of bills that must exclusively originates from the HR:
1. Appropriation
2. Revenue
3. Tariff
4. Bill increasing the public debt
5. Bill of local application
6. Private bills

 TOLENTINO VS. SEC. OF FINANCE

Is the decision questioning the Constitutionality of E-VAT Law. If it is an attack measure, it falls under
sec. 24 – it must exclusively originate from the HR.
E-VAT Law originated from the HR but when it reached the Senate, there is the senate version and they
completely replaced the version coming from the HR and the approved E-VAT Law is 100% copied from the
Senate Version not a single provision coming from the HR became part of the E-VAT Law. Is that
constitutional when under sec. 24?
SC said even if they replaced it 100%, that is still amendments. SC held that the E-
VAT Law is constitutional even if the same was the VERSION which came from the Senate, not from the
House of Representatives. This is so because the Senate is allowed to “propose amendments” to bills
which must exclusively originate from the House of Representatives.
 Re: section 2, Article 17 – People’s Initiative – they can just propose amendments to the
Constitution but not revision.

Section 25 [1] The Congress may not increase the appropriation recommended by the President
for the operation of the government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner
of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.

[2 No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill

unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any provision or
enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.

[3] The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the
procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies.

[4] A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and
shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the national treasurer, or to be
raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein.

[5] No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the house of Representatives, the Chief
justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the constitutional commissions may, by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices
from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
 51

[6] Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for
the purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be
prescribed by law.

[7] If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general
appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the
preceding year shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general
appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.

 1st par. - The Congress are the one’s to distribute the money collected by the government.

 The budget is submitted to the Congress for the executive department for the year 2012, the President is
asking 1.5 trillion. Why is it that congress could not give more than what is being asked for? Reason –
equivalent to Bribery

RULE: The Congress cannot allow the increase of the requested fund by the President.

 2nd par. – Technical Malversation is committed if you used the money for the purpose other than for
which was intended. Note the clause – “which it relates”.

 4th par. Certification of the National Treasury is needed.

In January, 2004 – Lito Lapid filed a bill in congress asking for an increase of salary of government
officials 5,000 pesos per month. Is that fair? – No. If you file a bill involving expenditure of public fund:
(Ways in supporting a bill)
1. You must show in your bill that there is money in your purpose otherwise there could be nothing to
be done in connection with the bill.
Enacted if: there is a certification from the national treasurer that there is money available from the
government.
2. If there is no money from the national treasury, you must attach a revenue measure telling the
government how will you able to raise that amount.

 5th par. Congress is not allowed to enact a law transferring appropriation.

 DEMETRIA vs. ALBA, 148 SCRA 208

The petitioners are the 40 oppositionists Congressmen in 1984 Batasang Pambansa questioning the act
of Marcos in transferring appropriation during his time. There was plenty of money from the executive
department because he is the one appropriating at that time. He transferred appropriation to Judicial
bodies, COMELEC and other offices of the government. Can that be done?
SC: No because that is tantamount of bribing the other departments by giving them money.

 Instance when can there be a valid transfer of appropriation:

1. President can transfer appropriation of funds to the other departments but not outside the
executive department/ judicial departments

Section 26. [1] Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.

[2] No bill shall be passed unless it has passed 3 readings on separate days, and printed
copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its members 3 days before its passage,
except when the President certifies as to its necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of the bill, no amendment thereto shall be
allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal.

 Three readings is needed.

- 1st reading – they will just read the title of the bill. The speaker will refer it to the appropriate
committee. The committee will study it then indorse it to the plenary.
- 2nd reading where amendments will be made and they will discuss thoroughly.
 52

After the 2nd reading, it will be printed and have the 3 rd reading. (Before the 3rd reading comes, all the
members must be given copies of the bill at least 3 days).
- 3rd reading - you will only vote in favor or against. You cannot propose anymore amendments whether
just to change a single word.
- After congress approved a bill, it should be submitted to the president for his approval.
- the President may approve or veto the bill.

 GR: Three readings in three different dates.

EXCEPTION:
1. 1st, 2nd, 3rd reading can be done if the President issued a certificate of urgency.
But after congress approved that bill, they have to submit to the President for his
Approval.
2. Section 10, Article 7 (calling for Presidential Election)

 Is there an instance that congress could validly enact a law on a single day without any request or
certification made by the President? – Yes in only one instance under Section 10, Article 7 of the
Constitution.(When the President is dead, no one could request) Congress must immediately enact a law
calling for a special presidential election and no need to have 3 readings because as if that bill is being
certified by the president.

 Is there an instance where after a bill was approved by congress, it becomes a law without the president
approving it? – Yes. Section 10, Article VII.

 Rule: For every bill, it must involve only one subject which shall be indicated in the title thereof in order
not to surprise the people as well as the congressmen and the senators to prevent “log-rolling
legislation”.

 Log rolling legislation – congressmen will draft a bill for many provinces and they will move it in a
single bill and filed by all the congressmen.

 DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569

The title of the bill is “ An act regulating the operation of night club”. But a section there is allowing local
government units to prohibit the operation of night club. – Unconstitutional

 INSULAR LUMBER VS. CTA, 104 SCRA 710

“An act increasing the highway fund”.(Project of arroyo in 2004 – in every barangay, at least 10
individual paid in cleaning the streets). She used the highway fund for 3 months. Subject to a condition that
“the following vehicles are not entitled to be paid from this highway fund A,B,C,D,E”. Lumber said that law
is unconstitutional because the title says an act increasing the highway fund, but under section 5 it has the
tendency to decrease the highway fund. Lumber said the title should be “an at increasing and decreasing the
highway fund”.
SC said it is normal for every law that there is always the exception but the totality of that law is still to
increase the highway fund and only very few are exempt.

 LIDASAN VS. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 496

“An act creating the municipality of Dianaton in Lanao Del Sur”. Approved by congress. But when it was
implemented, it became a new province of Lanao Del Sur but more than ½ of the barrios are part of the
province of Cotabato. Is that constitutional?
SC: No because the people in Cotabato do not know that part of their territory is being taken away from
them and given to the province of Lanao Del Sur. (Decreasing the land area of Cotabato)

Section 27. [1] Every bill passed by Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto it and return the
same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at
large in its journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such consideration , 2/3 of all the
members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections
 53

, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by 2/3 of all the
members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each house shall be
determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the members voting for or against shall be
entered in its journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where
it originated within 30 days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law
as if he signed it.

[2] The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he
does not object.

 1979 BAR Exam: President Marcos went to the US for a State visit. While he was at the US embassy of
Washington, he was given 2 bills by the executive secretary and it was the 30th day form the time it was
given to him. He signed the 2 bills at the Philippine embassy in Washington. He signed 2 bills before
delivering his speech before the US congress. He did not act on 2 other bills. Were the 2 first bills signed
in Washington valid? – Yes because under section 27, as long as he signed it, it become a law.

 Obligation of the President if he vetoed a bill approved by the congress:

1. He must indicate therein his veto message.
2. He must return it from the house where it originated. (Depends on that house if they want to
override the veto)

 What is the veto message? – the reason (s) why the president vetoed a particular law.

 Requirement when the congress may override the veto

Congress where it originated must have a favorable vote of 2/3. After overriding the veto that house
where it was able to override the veto must pass it to the other house.

 NEPTALI GONZALES VS. MACARAIG, November 19, 1990

The fundamental issue raised is whether or not the veto by the President of Section 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Bill (Section 55 FY'89), and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990
Appropriations Bill (Section 16 FY'90), is unconstitutional and without effect.
Petitioners contend that Section 55 FY '89) and Section 16 (FY'90) are provisions and not items and are,
therefore, outside the scope of the item veto power of the President.
The focal issue for resolution is whether or not the President exceeded the item veto
power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto
"provisions" of an Appropriations Bill?
The Court upheld the authority of the President and other key officials to augment any item or any
appropriation from savings in the interest of expediency and efficiency. The Court stated that:
There should be no question, therefore, that statutory authority has, in fact, been granted. And once
given, the heads of the different branches of the Government and those of the Constitutional Commissions
are afforded considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources (Demetria v. Alba, supra). The
doctrine of separation of powers is in no way endangered because the transfer is made within a department
(or branch of government) and not from one department (branch) to another.

 BENGZON VS. DRILON, April 15, 1992

It invalidated a veto by the President. The case involved the General Appropriation Act of 1992. The law
appropriated 500,000,000 pesos. “for general fund adjustment for operational and special
requirements as indicated hereunder.” Among the several authorized by an earlier law. The President
vetoed the use of the fund for the adjustment of the pension of justices. In declaring the veto invalid, the
Court said that it was the veto of an item. The item was the entire 500,000,000 pero allocation out of
which unavoidable obligations not adequately funded in separate items could be met. What the
President had vetoed, according to the Court, was the method of meeting unavoidable obligations or the
manner of using the 500,000,000 pesos. [This case however, grew not so much out of a failure to
understand item veto as from some unfortunate historical misimpressions on the part of Congress and
of the President.]
 54

 May the President approve some part or parts of a bill and veto the rest?
As a general rule, if the President disapproves a bill approved by the Congress, he should veto the entire
bill. He is not allowed to veto separate items of a bill. It is only in the case of appropriation, revenue and
tariff bills that he is authorized to exercise item-veto.

 What is a "pocket veto?"

When there is an inaction of the President of the bill from the date of its submission.(?)

 What are the three ways by which a bill becomes a law?

1. inaction of the President within 30 days from submission
2. signing of the bill by the President
3. vetoed by the President and overriding by the Congress.

PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ, 235 SCRA 506

What is the so-called “executive impoundment”?
It means that although an item of appropriation is not vetoed by the President, he however refuses for
whatever reason, to spend funds made possible by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget
authority of any type. Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three (3) principal sources of authority
of the President. [1] authority to impound given to him by Congress, either expressly or impliedly; [2] the
executive power drawn from his power as Commander-in-chief; and [3] the Faithful execution clause of the
Constitution.

 Note that in this case the SC held that the Countryside Development Fund (CDF) of Congressmen and
Senators is CONSTITUTIONAL because the same is “set aside for ‘infrastructure, purchase of
ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities, and credit facilities to qualified
beneficiaries as proposed and identified by said Senators and Congressmen.

Section 28. [1] The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation.

[2] The Congress, may by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the government.

[3] Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto,

mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly,
and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from
taxation.

[4] No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a
majority of all the members of the Congress.

Section 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.

No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid or employed…directly

or indirectly for the benefit, use, or support of any sect, denomination, or system of
religion…except when such preacher, priest… is assigned to the AFP, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

All money collected on any tax for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund
and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has
been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the
Government.

 PROVINCE OF ABRA VS. HERNANDO, 107 SCRA 104

 55

The Province of Abra went to the SC and questioned Judge Hernado for allowing the exemption of the
properties of the RC from taxation because allegedly they are used for religious purposes.
Is that correct? – Yes under the previous Constitution but under the new Constitution it must not only be
actually done but actually, directly and exclusively used for religious purposes.

 PASCUAL VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS, 110 Phil. 331

A case where millions were appropriated for the construction of a road. It turn out that the road was not
a government road but a road at the middle of a subdivision owned by Senator Zulueta. It was a senator who
proposed it, it became a law. When he was caught, he immediately executed a deed of donation donating
that road to the government. Valid?
SC: No because when that law was appropriated, that property where it was used was still a private property
which was illegal. (Public funds cannot be appropriated for a private purpose.)

 AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ, 64 Phil. 201

In 1933, the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress was held in the city of Manila. The sec. of Public
Works and Communications together with the Director were able to conceive a way of advertising the
Philippines. They had a stamp where the center was a chalice (symbol of the local catholic church). Aglipay
of the Aglipayan Church went to SC and SC said “hindi pwede yung chalice”. So they replacedthe chalice
with a new stamp, the map of the Philippines indicating Manila as the cite of the 33 rd IEC. But still Aglipay
went to SC and said that is still advertising the Roman Catholic because they mentiond the 33 rd IEC which is
an activity of the RC church.
SC said “What is being promoted or advertise is Manila not the RC church. RC might have obtain benefits
but it is “merely incidental” as long as it is not directly doing it as a member of the catholic church.

 MANUEL ALBA VS. PEREZ, G.R. No. 65917, Sept. 24, 1987
Respondent Dr. Francisco A. Perez was named outstanding Health Worker for 1980 by the Ministry of
Health on January 22, 1981. Being such an awardee, Dr. Perez was granted by the Ministry of Health a two-
step salary increase in accordance with the merit increase program as enunciated in Letter of Instructions
(LOI) No. 562. Thereafter, the Ministry of Health requested the Sangguniang Panglunsod of San Pablo City,
which is paying Dr. Perez' salary in full to appropriate the amount corresponding to the merit increase in its
current budget. For lack of legal basis, the Bureau of Local Government opposed the proposed merit
increase because the provisions of LOI No. 562 apply only to officials/employees in the national
government, and consequently, awardee Dr. Perez was not entitled thereto, since he is an employee of the
local government as provided for in the charter of San Pablo City. This prompted Dr. Perez to request the
Ministry of Health to make the corresponding allocation to issue a notice of salary adjustment effective
January 1, 1981. The Minister of Justice, upon a query made by the Ministry of Health, in his Opinion No.
177, Series of 1981, dated November 20, 1981, acknowledged that the merit increase program applies only to
the officials/employees of the national government but declared Dr. Perez as one such official or employee
and concluded that the Ministry of Health should pay the merit increase to him. Relying on such opinion,
the Ministry of Health issued to respondent Dr. Perez on December 1, 1981 a notice of salary adjustment
which release of the amount was denied by the Office of the Budget and Management which insisted that the
awardee is an employee of the local or city government who is not covered by the merit increase program.
Dr. Perez made his appeal therefrom to the Ministry of Health who forwarded it, recommending favorable
action thereon to the Office of the President of the Philippines. The latter referred the appeal to the Minister
of the Budget who affirmed his earlier decision of disallowing the merit increase and reiterating the same
reasons. A petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Budget and Management to pay the merit
increase was filed by Dr. Perez before the lower court which granted the aforementioned favorable decision,
subject matter of the present petition for review on certiorari before Us by petitioners arguing that:

1. The position of private respondent as the City Health Officer of San Pablo City is embraced in Sec. 7 of
Pres. Decree (P.D.) No. 1136 which states among other things that the salary plan provided for in Sec. 8 of
the same decree shall cover the City Officer, among other officials, whose salary shall be paid out of city
funds and therefore a local government employee whose position does not appear in the list of national
government employees defined under another law (P.D. 985).

2. The constitution provides that no money shag be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law. Since there is no such appropriation, the Minister of the Budget cannot be
compelled to release the amount for the payment of the merit salary increase because such allocation entails
the exercise of judgment and discretion of the Minister of the Budget which cannot be controlled by
mandamus.
 56

3. The decision declaring respondent Dr. Perez as an employee of the national government would have far
reaching effects such that all other city health officers and local officials similarly situated would also be so
entitled to an personal benefits given to national employee. Dr. Perez's exemplary accomplishment which
merited for him the grant to a two-step increase must yield to the overriding economic consideration of
availability of funds which the government must set aside for the purpose.

SC: We do not agree with the arguments set down by petitioners. Private respondent invites Our attention to
the City Charter of San Pablo City (CA #5201, Sec. 87, May 7, 1940) more specifically, Art. IV thereof, which
provides that the position of a City Health Officer is not included among the heads of the regular
departments of the city but included among the national officials performing municipal functions under the
direct control of the Health Minister and not the city mayor as provided for in Art. XIV of the same charter.
Such principle is reiterated in the Decentralization Act of 1967 which shows that the appointing authority is
the Health Minister and not the local officials. Petitioner Minister of the Budget admitted thru the testimony
of its representative, Alice S. Torres, chief of the Compensation and Position Classification and a specialist
thereon that the City Health Officer is under the administrative and technical supervision of the Ministry of
Health (p. 69, tsn, June 16, 1983, p. 72, Rollo). Be it noted that, Section 7 of PD 1136 relied upon by
petitioners provides that the basic salary of the City Health Officer is paid from city funds. However, the last
paragraph of the same Sec. 7, excludes the city health officer from the classification of local government
official as can be gathered from the phrase "... except those occupied by (a) officials whose compensation is
fixed in the constitution, Presidential Decrees and other laws and (b) officials and employees who are under
the direct supervision and control of the National Government or its agencies and who are paid wholly or
partially from national funds."

Provincial and city health officers are all considered national government officials irrespective of the
source of funds of their salary because the preservation of health is a national service. Also their positions
are partially funded by the national government. Some are receiving one-half of their salary from the
national funds and the other one-half from local funds.

We cannot likewise ignore the opinions of the Ministry of Justice cited by private respondent to wit:
1) Opinion No. 26, Series of 1976 which categorically rules that "Officials and employees of provincial and
city health offices render service as officials and employees of the Bureau of Health (Ministry of Health) and
they are for that reason not local but national officials under the direct supervision and control of the
Ministry of Health; 2) Opinion No. 177, Series of 1981, which is specific and definitive that the private
respondent is a national government employee and the Ministry of Health should pay the merit increase
awarded to him. In this 1981 opinion, it was explained in detail how the said funds corresponding to his
merit increase could be legally disbursed contrary to the unfounded speculations expressed by the
petitioners.

Lastly, there is no basis in petitioner's allegations that they cannot be compelled by mandamus as
the appropriation is not authorized by law and it is discretionary on the part of the Ministry of the Budget
whether or not to allocate. Respondent Dr. Perez has been proven to be a national government official,
hence covered by the merit promotion plan of the government more particularly the Health Ministry
wherein private respondent is its lone beneficiary for the year 1980 in Region IV. It thus becomes the
ministerial duty of the Budget Minister to approve the request for allotment. Having failed to do so, he could
be compelled by mandamus.

Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
as provided in the Constitution without its advice and concurrence.

 TERESITA FABIAN VS. HONORABLE ANIANO DESIERTO, G.R. No. 129742, September
16, 1998)
Section 27 of RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides:
“In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for Certiorari within 10 days from receipt of the
written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the Motion for Reconsideration in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court”

Issue: Is Section 27 of RA 6770 constitutional?

 57

Held: Section 27 of RA 6770 is unconstitutional since it increases the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court without its advice and consent as provided under Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. As
explained in FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS INC. VS. CA, 237 SCRA 519, the aforesaid constitutional
provision “was intended to give the Supreme Court a measure of control over cases placed under its
appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would
unnecessarily burden the Court.”
Appeal of cases decided by the Office of the Ombudsman covered by Section 27 of RA 6770 shall be filed
with the Court of Appeals.

Section 32. The Congress, shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and
referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact
laws or approve or reject any law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative
body after the registration of a petition therefore signed by at least 10% of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the
registered voters thereof.
Read again RA 6735 & SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC & PIRMA
 58

ARTICLE VII. THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

EXECUTIVE POWER
- The power to administer and enforce the law, thus vested to the President.

 May the President refuse to enforce a law on the ground that in his opinion it is
unconstitutional?
No. Otherwise, he will be violating the doctrine of separation of powers because by doing so, he will be
arrogating unto himself the power to interpret the law, not merely to implement it.

 LS MOON & CO. VS HARRISON

The Petitioner resisted to implement the law enacted by the Congress because he thought it was
unconstitutional.
SC: The President is encroaching the power of the judiciary to interpret laws. He has to implement the
same regardless of his belief that said law is unconstitutional.
Section 5 of Article VII cannot be use as a defense, as the President alleged that whenever a law causes
injustice, he must do his part to restrain such. The court ruled that if the President sees a law to be injustice,
it is like he is interpreting the law, which is not a power provided for by him by the Constitution.
The Remedy is to file a case before the Supreme Court so as to question the constitutionality of the
enacted law.

 OPLE VS TORRES
This is the case regarding the implementation of the National ID system. An executive order was issued
by the President to implement the same. The said order provides for the appropriation of fund to realize the
implementation of the ID System.
SC: Only Congress can do such appropriation of funds. No executive order be issued so as to enact a law.
The enactment of law is only vested in the Legislature. The issuance of such is encroaching the power of the
Congress.

 What is the extent of the executive or administrative orders that may be issued by the
President as the Chief Executive, under the Administrative Code of 1987?
Administrative power, which is supposed to be exercised by the President, is concerned with the work of
applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the
President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his
agents. Prescinding from the foregoing precepts, AO 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be
covered by an Administrative Order. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President
which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of the government. It must be in
harmony with the law and carrying out the legislative policy. The subject of AO 308 therefore is beyond
the power of the President and it is a usurpation of legislative power. (Ople vs Torres)

Sections 2. No person shall be elected President unless he is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years o f age on the day of
the election, and a resident o f the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding the
election.

Section 3. There shall be a Vice President who shall have the same qualifications and term of
office and be elected with and in the same manner as the President. He may be removed from
Office in the same manner as the President.

The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the cabinet. Such appointment
requires no confirmation.

 The only difference of the President and Vice President is that the President is not allowed for re-
election but the Vice President is allowed (2 terms for Vice President).

 IMELDA MARCOS VS COMELEC

 59

In February 25, 1986, the Marcos family left the Philippine – heading to Hawaii. In December 1991,
Imelda Marcos came back to the Philippines. In 1992, the Presidential Election was held wherein Imelda
Marcos ran for presidency. There was a question whether or not Marcos is qualified to ran, considering her
residency period?
SC: She is qualified to run. As long as there is intention to return, he is deemed to be a resident of the
Philippines.

- The only constitutional function of the VP is to on hand to act as President when needed or to succeed to
the presidency in case of a permanent vacancy in the office. The President may also appoint him as a
Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment does not need the consent of the Commission on
Appointments.

Section 4. The President and the Vice President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for
a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of June next following their
election and shall end at noon of the same date six years thereafter. The President shall not be
eligible for any reelection. No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such
for more than 4 years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.

No Vive President shall serve for more than 2 successive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of the service for the full term for which he was elected.
The returns of every election for President and Vice President duly certified by the
Board of canvassers of each province or city shall be transmitted to the congress….

The candidate having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in
case two or more shall have an equal number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen
by the vote of a majority of all the members of both Houses of Congress voting separately.

 2nd sentence of Section 4. The Phrase “at any” means not allowed anymore. President is not allowed for
re-election.
 Last sentence of Section 4. “No person who has succeeded as President and has served for more than
four years..”.- there is no re election of the President.

Section 5…Oath
Section 6. Residence…Salary may not be decreased…not increased until after the
expiration of his terms…shall not received any other emolument from the government of from
any source during their tenure.

Section 7. ..shall assume office at the beginning of their terms.

…P & VP not qualified, the Senate President shall act as President or the Speaker, if SP is not
yet qualified..

Congress shall pass a law if the SP & Speaker are not qualified to act as President…
Section 9. VP is vacant, the President shall nominate from the Senate of HR and who
shall become VP upon confirmation of majority vote of the members of the Senate & H of R
voting separately.

Section 10. …In case of vacancy in the office of the President and VP, Congress shall
convene on the 3rd day after the vacancy to enact a law calling for special election to be held
not later than 60 days…the law is deemed certified under Section 26, par. 2 of Art. VI and shall
become a law upon 3rd reading.. Special elections cannot be postponed but no special election if
the vacancy occurs within 18 months before the next presidential election.

Section 11. When President transmits to Congress his written declaration of inability to
perform his duties, the VP shall be acting President until the President transmits another
declaration to the contrary.
 60

When majority of the members of the cabinet transmit to the Senate President a written
declaration that the President is unable to perform his duties, the VP shall act as the President.

If the President transmits to the SP his declaration that there is no disability, he shall
reassume his post but if the majority of all the members of the Cabinet still insists that the
President is unable to discharge his powers, CONGRESS SHALL DECIDE THE ISSUE. IT MUST
CONVENE WITHIN 48 HOURS if not in session without need of a call.

If 2/3 of both Houses, voting separately, determines that the President is unable to
discharge his powers, the VP shall act as President. Otherwise, the President shall continue
exercising his powers and duties of his office.

Section 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of the
state of his health. The members of the cabinet in charge of national security and foreign
relations and the Chief of the AFP shall not be denied access to the President.

Congress shall pass a law if the SP & Speaker are not qualified to act as President…

SEE: Section 26, Article 6: Congress can conduct 3 readings on the same day without any
certification from the president if the Pres. And VP will both die. Congress will enact a law
calling for special presidential election. They can have it done in a single day. Upon approval, it
becomes a law.

- The President of the Philippines is elected at large. All the registered voters will vote. The result will be
forwarded to the congress acting as the National Board of Canvassers and whoever is proclaimed by the
congress shall become the President.

- In order to be a de jure President, after the canvassing by the congress, you must be proclaimed as
the duly elected President of the Philippines by the congress.

- If two person received the 2 highest number of votes. – Congress shall decide it.

- If the VP has been proclaimed but the Pres. Has not been proclaimed. – section 6,7,8,9,10 – the VP
should be acting President.

- If both are not been proclaimed yet. – it will be the Senate President. If no SP, the Speaker of the House.
If no S, then there should be a law.

Section 8. The four instances when the VP become the President:

1. Death
2. Permanent Disability
3. Resignation (not impeachment – 2/3 vote from HR)
4. Removal from office

 If the Pres. Dies – the VP becomes the Pres. There is now a vacancy in the office of the VP. The President
shall nominate from the Senate or from the HR who shall become the President, approved by the
Congress, house and senate voting separately.

 ATTY. PORMENTO VS ESTRADA

Pormento is questioning before the May 10 Election because Estrada had already served as President ,
and now what he is running again for the same position.
SC: (The decision was released after the Election)
The case is moot and academic because (1) Estrada did not win in the Election and (2) the Supreme
Court has no duty look into the issue of the case. The Presidential Electoral Tribunal must be the tribunal to
answer such question. But PET only comes into play after election if there is protest regarding election
returns and qualifications of the President and the Vice President.

 Is the SC differ from the Presidential Electoral Tribunal(PET)?

 61

Membership is the same. Justices are the same members of PET but their powers are different. The
PET is the sole judge of all contest relating to the election returns and qualifications of the President or VP.

 TECSON VS FPJ
The case cannot be decided by the Supreme Court but by the PET. You cannot raise the question the
citizenship of FPJ before the SC. It must before the PET.

 MACALINTAL VS PET
See: last par, section 4, Article 7: The justices are members of the electoral tribunal and they are
authorized to promulgate rules and regulation.
SC created rules promulgating the PET. Macalintal is questioning that in PET rules they will be receiving
salaries other that their salaries as justices of the SC. That they should be entitled to appoint their own staff
and personnel. That electoral tribunal should have a separate seat. Macalintal is questioning that they are
paid salaries as justices of the SC 7 days a week, 30 days a month. 30 days a month as members of PET
meaning that they were not working 30 days as justices for SC but they were receiving salaries as justices of
the SC and 30 days as member of PET. Is that allowed?
SC: Yes because what is being questioned are the justices of the SC who promulgated the rules. Since
the Constitution allowed the Supreme Court to promulgate the rules, it is valid in accordance with the
Doctrine of Necessary Implication.

Sections 7-12

 Is President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo a de jure or a de facto President? If de jure, how did
she succeed? Resignation or permanent disability of former President Estrada?

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO, G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and 146738, March 2,
2001
In the early morning of January 20, 2001, Estrada wrote the Speaker of the house and the Senate
President saying “By virtue of section 11, Article 7 of the Constitution, I am temporarily turning over the
office of the Presidency to the VP acting as President.” VP should only be acting Pres. But Arroyo requested
the members of the SC to be present at EDSA Shrine 12 noon of January 20, 2001 to witness her oath taking.
It was questioned by Estrada and said “My temporary incapacity is gone, I am now reclaiming my post as
President.”
SC could not do anything because when Arroyo already sworn as the President of the Philippines not
acting. Arroyo is now the President. Estrada has resigned. Even there is no written communication made by
the members of the cabinet of Estrada just using the letter that she should be acting president. Arroyo
should be a de facto president not de jure. But as further held - there was constructive resignation made by
Estrada thus, making Arroyo a de jure president.

Section 13. The President, VP, Members of the Cabinet or their assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure.. They shall not during their tenure, directly or indirectly practice any profession,
participate in any business or be financially interested in any contract with…the government
or any government owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

 Offices allowed by the Constitution to hold any public office:

1. VP could be appointed as a member of the cabinet without confirmation by the Commission of
appointment.
2. Secretary of Justice under Section 8, Article 8, as a member of judicial or bar council.

 DENNIS FUNA VS. EXEC. SEC. ERMITA, February 11, 2011

Ma. Elena “Lenlen” Bautista, spokesperson of the president was the undersecretary of DOTC. When
there was vacancy in the office of administrator in MARINA, Arroyo also appointed her as administrator of
MARINA. Is that allowed? Since MARINA is under DOTC, can she be appointed as administrator of
MARINA?
SC said “No, it is a clear violation of Section 13, Article 7” of the Constitution.
 62

 ONGPIN CASE
 Bobby Ongpin is the DTI Secretary of Marcos during his time. He was also given by Marcos 30
directorships and other Phil. Gov’t corporations. – cannot be.

Sections 14 Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective, unless

revoked by the elected President within 90 days from his assumption of office.

Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential election and up to the end of
his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.

(NOTE: Section 9, Article VIII. The President shall issue the appointments within 90 days from the
submission of the list)

Illustration:

March 10 2010 ------- May 10 2010 ------- June 30 2010

<----------60 days---------------> <-------------------50 days---------------
<<-------------------------------------110 days-------------------------------------------->
NO APPOINTMENT ON THIS 110 DAYS EXCEPT
TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS

Executive -- Judiciary(not allowed) -- CoA, CSC, COMELEC (not

allowed)

Only temporary appointments

 Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010. Can Arroyo appoint the new chief justice? Can she make
appointments outside executive department during the 110 days period? – Valenzuela and Vallarta case.

 IN RE JUDGE VALENZUELA AND VALLARTA

In April of 1998, Pres. Ramos appointed Judge Valenzuela for the RTC of Isabela and Judge Vallarta for
the RTC of Samar. It was questioned before the SC. Can that be done because in section 9, article 8,
vacancies in the judiciary shall be filled within 60 days from the time there was a vacancy. Which shall
prevail, appoint within that period or respect the prohibition.
SC: 15 justices unanimous,4 of those 15 had become chief justice of SC. That President has no power to
make appointment during that period.

 ARTURO DE CASTRO VS. JUDICIAL BAR COUNCIL, March 17, 2010(MR – April 20,
2010)
Can Pres. Arroyo appoint a new chief justice during his period?
SC said “Yes she can appoint the chief justice but she cannot appoint any justice or even
the lowest ranking judge in the judiciary.”(MTC,RTC)

 NO MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENTS. AYTONA VS CASTILLO.

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers
of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law, and those whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint…
 63

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only
until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.

The usual steps in the appointing process are the nomination, which is made by the President; the
confirmation, which is the prerogative of ht e Commission on Appointments; and the issuance of the
commission, also done by the President. This is where the appointment is REGULAR. The nomination of the
regular appointee is made and approved during the session, when the Commission on Appointments is
authorized to meet.
On the other hand, in the case of ad interim appointment, the appointment comes before the
confirmation, which is made by the Commission when it reconvenes following the legislative recess. In ad
interim appointment, it is made during the recess and becomes effective then, subject to confirmation or
rejection later, during the next legislative session.

 NATURE OF AD-INTERIM APPOINTMENTS

Ad-interim appointments are appointments made by the President during the recess of Congress (during
which the Commission on Appointments do not meet).
Ad-interim appointments are permanent.
Ad-interim appointments are effective immediately, even without the need for confirmation by the
Commission but the effectivity lasts only until disapproval by the Commission or until the next adjournment
of the Congress.

Regular Appointment Ad interim appointment

- is made during the legislative session
- made only after the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointment
-once confirmed by the Commission on Appointments,
continues until the end of the term of the appointee
- made during recess
- made before such confirmation
- shall cease valid if disapproved by the Commission
on Appointments or upon the next adjournment of
the Congress

Temporary Appointments for members of the Cabinet; Ad interim appointments.

 SEN. AQUILINO PIMENTEL, et al., vs. EXEC. SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, et al., 472
SCRA 587
On July 26, 2004, Congress commenced its Regular Session. On August 25, 2004, the Commission on
appointments was constituted. While Congress was in session, the President issued appointments as Acting
Secretaries. On September 8, 2004, the petitioners questioned said appointments as “Acting Secretary” as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL since Congress was in session and it was an act of circumventing the power of the
Commission on Appointments confirm the said appointments. They claimed that “while Congress is in
session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first having obtained its consent.” On
September 22, 2004, Congress adjourned its session. On September 23, 2004, the president issued “ad-
interim appointments” to the above-named appointees to the departments to which they were previously
appointed in an acting capacity.
Thereafter, the respondents moved for the dismissal of this case on the ground that it is now moot and
academic considering the issuance of ad-interim appointments and subsequent submission of the
appointments of the above-named members of the cabinet to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation.

I s s u e s:
1. Shall the case be dismissed since it is already moot and academic?
2. Do all the petitioners have the personality to sue?
3. Were the temporary appointments made while Congress was in session to positions subject of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments unconstitutional?

H e l d:

1. While it is a rule that courts should not decide moot cases, the courts, as an exception, will rule on it if it
is capable of repetition yet evading review (TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC, 420 SCRA 438; ACOP VS.
 64

SECRETARY GUINGONA, 383 SCRA 577; VIOLA VS. HON. ALUNAN III, 277 SCRA 409; ALUNAN III
VS. MIRASOL, 276 SCRA 501).
2. Only those members of the Commission on Appointments have the personality to sue and not the other
petitioners who are not. While it was held in SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 421 SCRA 656
that members of Congress have the personality to sue if the President’s act has the effect of impairing
the powers of Congress, the same is not applicable in this case. This is so because the Commission on
Appointments is independent from Congress itself. President Arroyo’s issuance of acting appointments
while Congress is in session impairs no power of Congress.
3. The temporary appointments are valid. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature and the
legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when
the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is
its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the
appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter
ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily
appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice
could assume office. Congress, through a law cannot impose on the President the obligation of
automatically appointing the Undersecretary as her alter ego. He must be of the President’s confidence
and provided that the temporary appointment does not exceed one (1) year.
4. There is a need to distinguish ad interim appointments and appointments in an acting capacity. While
both are effective upon acceptance, ad interim appointments are extended only during the recess of
Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time that there is a vacancy. Moreover, ad
interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection;
acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on appointments. Acting appointments are a
way of temporarily circumventing the need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

 2007 Bar Exam

(1) What are the different officials that can be appointed by the President?
- Section 16.
(2) Which needs confirmation of CoA?
- Only those covered by Section 16. Sentence 1 only needs confirmation of CoA.

 SARMIENTO VS MISON
BIR is under the Department of Finance. The appointment of the Commissioner of BIR is not the head
of an executive department head. The BIR is under the Department of Finance, yet it is not an executive
office.
SC: There is no need of confirmation.

The purpose of confirmation is to screen who is the best to be appointed (dissenting opinion of the Justices)

 2nd sentence – “shall also appoint”. The word “ALSO” refers to the power of the President to
appoint.

 CALDERON VS CARALE
A law was enacted for the creation of the NLRC. A provision of the said law is that NLRC chairman and
Commissioners appointment shall be subject of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Carale
being appointed as one did not file his credentials.
SC: Need not to be confirmed. The Congress cannot expand the list of those whose appointment needs
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

If you are appointed by the President – it must be confirmed by the Commission on

Appointments
If you are appointed by virtue of a law – thee is no need for confirmation.

 QUINTOS-DELS ET AL VS COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS.

In Article VI, it provides that there is appointment of representatives. The President appointed Edgar
Avila representing the youth – this needs confirmation. In the part of Deles – yes, it also needs confirmation.
 65

 BAUTISTA VS SALONGA
Mary C. Bautista was appointed as chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. Such law was
enacted to create said commission.
SC: There is no need for confirmation because, the office is not under the offices mentioned in sentence 1,
Section 16. The enumeration is exclusive.

 TAROSA VS SINGSON
Congress enacted a law for the creation of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. As one of the provision of the
law, the Governor of the BSP should be subjected for confirmation by the Commission on Appointment.
SC: Need not to be confirmed.

* THE CONGRESS COULD NOT ENACT A LAW THAT TELLS THAT THE PRESIDENT’S
APPOINTMENT BE SUBJECTED FOR CONFIMATION.

b. Distinguish adjournment from recess.

 Differentiate the status of an appointment made by the President while Congress is in session
compared to that when it is in recess.
While Congress is not in session (in recess) while Congress is in session
- Ad interim appointments - Appointment in an acting capacity
-refers to positions which need confirmation by the -refers to those which do not need confirmation
Committee on Appointments

Section 17, The President shall have control of all the executive departments , bureaus and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

 MONDANO VS SILVOSA (Distinguish the power of control over the power of supervision)
In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.

 YARANON CASE.
Mayor Yaranon put the law in his hands He mandated the policemen and welders to destroy such property
of the Jadewell. He is charged by Jadewell. The case took two years to be heard. The president can look up into
this activity of the local government because this is contrary to law.

 In December 1989, there was coup attempt in Aquino’s Administration. Cory appeared in TV saying she is
accepting the resignation of Enrile. However, Enrile denied such resignation saying He never pass any
resignation letter at all.
SC: There is a valid resignation. The act of the President is in accordance of her power of control.

 PIMENTEL VS ERMITA
Ten member of the Cabinet tagged as HYATT 10 resigned. Because of the vacancy, GMA made an
appointment but she did not submit such list to the Commission on Appointments where such appointment be
subject for confirmation. This was questioned by Pimentel.
SC: GMA is allowed to make appointments as according to the Revised Administrative Code but such
appointment shall not exceed for one year.
 66

 DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY

As a result of the multifarious works of the President, the heads of the different departments are authorized
to decide in his behalf and be considered to be the act of the President unless it was reversed by him.

 LACSON VS MAGALLANES
There was mining claim before the NLRC. Because of the unfavorable decision, it was appealed to the
Secretary of DENR. The decision of the Secretary was appealed again to the Assistant Executive Secretary of the
President. Is the decision of the Assistant Executive Secretary valid?
SC: Yes.. as long as there is a clause “ by and the authority of the President”, such decision is valid. This is in
application of the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency.

 Atty Vanda questions the transfer of the works from the National Printing Office because this will lessen
their defined works.
SC: The act is valid. Application of the doctrine of Qualifies Political Agency.

 BAYAN MUNA; KILOS BAYAN VS ERMITA

The National ID System for government employees was declared constitutional because this is an exercise of
the power of control of the President.
The issuance by the President of Proclamation No. 420 is not a usurpation of legislative powers. This is so
because EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards
pursuant to their regular functions…and does not grant such government entities any power that they do not
already posses under existing laws. It is not similar to AO 308 because it does not create a notional ID system
since it the same applies only to the executive branch of the government, including government owned and
controlled corporations but not the judiciary nor the independent constitutional commissions. This only shows
that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system
which is compulsory to all branches of the government. EO 420 makes existing sectoral card systems of the
government entities like the GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and Land Transportation Office less costly, more efficient,
reliable and user-friendly to the public. Finally, the issuance of Proclamation No. 420 is a proper subject of
executive issuance under the President’ constitutional power of control over government entities in the executive
department as well as under the President’s constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.

 ECHECHE VS. CA, 198 SCRA 577

The act of the Executive Secretary in reversing the decision of the Secretary of the DENR allowing the
payment of the backwages of petitioner is considered an act of the President and therefore valid in accordance
with the doctrine of qualified political agency.

 GANZON VS. CA, 200 SCRA 271

The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed
against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority,
oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the
Constitution, and arbitrary detention.
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego, can suspend and/or
remove local officials.
The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in
deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the President of the power to investigate,
suspend, discipline, and/or remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the
Local Government Code? (3) What is the significance of the change in the constitutional language?

It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional
language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her
prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials.
It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to
underscore local governments' autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local
government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive
the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.
The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory
powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly
embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, "supervision" is not
incompatible with disciplinary authority.
 67

It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884, this Court had
occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local
government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our
government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different
things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. Thus in that case the Court has made the
following digression: "In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of
an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them
the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter." But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the
power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power of
investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, as postulated in Section
64(c) of the Revised Administrative Code. ...

xxx xxx xxx

"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for test of the latter." 36 "Supervision" on the other hand means "overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. 37 As we held, 38 however,
"investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering". The
impression is apparently exacerbated by the Court's pronouncements in at least three cases, Lacson v.
Roque, 39 Hebron v. Reyes, 40 and Mondano v. Silvosa, 41 and possibly, a fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor
General.42 In Lacson, this Court said that the President enjoyed no control powers but only supervision
"as may be provided by law," 43 a rule we reiterated in Hebron, and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that
the President "may not . . . suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary
action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board." 44
However, neither Lacson nor Hebron nor Mondano categorically banned the Chief Executive from
exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but because no law
allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority.
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers
is without doubt not well taken. Removal and suspension of public officers are always controlled by the
particular law applicable and its proper construction subject to constitutional limitations.
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization."

NOTE: The successive suspensions of the Mayor, however, was declared invalid by the Supreme
Court.

 LACSON-MAGALLANES VS. PANO, 21 SCRA 895

What is the doctrine of Qualified Political agency?
Sec. 10. The President shall have control of the ministries. (1973 Constitution, Art. VII)
Control means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify, or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."
(Hebron vs. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175) The President can, by virtue of his power of control, review, modify, alter or
nullify any action, or decision of his subordinate in the executive departments, bureaus or offices under him.
(Oliveros-Torre vs. Bayot, 58 SCRA 272; Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, et al., 118 Phil. 1468). He can exercise this
power motu proprio without need of any appeal from any party. (Oliveros-Torre vs. Bayot, supra).

The President is not expected to perform in person an the multifarious executive and
administrative functions. The Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxillary unit which assists
the President. Under our constitutional set-up, the Executive Secretary acts for and in behalf of
the President: and by authority of the President, he has undisputed jurisdiction to affirm,
modify, or even reverse any order of the Secretary of Natural Resources and other Cabinet
Secretaries. Where the Executive Secretary acts "by authority of the President" his decision is
that of the President. (Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs. Pano, 21 SCRA 895).
 68

 CONSTANTINO and the FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION VS. CUISIA, et al., 472 SCRA
505
Constantino signed loans before the International Monetary Fund.
SC: A member of the cabinet is allowed to enter into a contract , such act is deemed to be the act of the
President unless the latter came into and assails that he did not authorize such transaction.
The petitioners claim that the President “alone and personally” can validly bind the country in contracting
foreign debt under Section 20 , Article VII of the Constitution. The contention is without merit. The Secretary of
Finance, as alter ego of the President regarding the “sound and efficient management of the financial resources
of the government, has the power to implement the policy which was publicly expressed by the president herself.
This is in connection with the doctrine of qualified political agency. While there are instances where the
President must act personally and not through his secretaries like the suspension of the privilege of habeas
corpus, proclamation of martial law or pardoning power [Villena vs. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451],
negotiation with foreign creditors may be done by the Secretary of Finance or the Governor of Central Bank.

 Powers which must be exercised personally by the President and could and could not be
delegated to any cabinet member

Section 18. The President shall be the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding 60 days, suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
Within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The
Congress voting jointly, , by a vote of at least a majority of all its members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside
by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner
extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within 24 hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege
of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within 30 days
from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant
the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged
for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained
shall be judicially charged within 3 days, otherwise, he shall be released.

1st sentence ( The calling out power of the President)

 ZALDY AMPATUAN VS DILG

GMA declared Maguindano under the State of Emergency. Ampatuan assailed that the proclamation is
unconstitutional under Section 23, Article VI nor Section17, Article XII.
SC: The use of the word “emergency” was not under the said provisions. It only refers to the status qou of the
place at that time. The proclamation is under Scetion 18, article VII.
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2nd sentence
During Marcos regime as based on the Old constitution, Martial law can be declared when
there is INVASION, REBELLION OR WHEN PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT.
But NOW, there must be invasion or rebellion PLUS when public safety requires it to exercise
the CALLING OUT POWER OF THE PRESIDENT.

 RANDY DAVID VS ARROYO

GMA issued a proclamation which says under its last par that she can issue executive orders, presidential
decrees, general orders in accordance of the 1st sentence of Section 18 of Article VII.
SC: She cannot use the said provision. This can be exercise under the 2nd sentence of the same section.( Yet she
cannot do it that time because she can hardly get a favorable decision of the Congress)

 The time for the Court to make decision.

TRIAL COURT – 90 days
APPELATE COURT – 1 year
SUPREME COURT – 2 years
An Exception to the rule is that SC shall decide within 30 days the constitutionality of the
declaration of Martial Law.

 When you are charged of rebellion, even there is suspension of the writ, you will not be allowed to bail.

 OLAGUER VS MILITARY COMMISSION

All convictions of the Military Courts are deemed vacated. The SC declared them NULL and VOID.

 What specific military powers are given to the President by the Constitution?
1) to call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion
2) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
3) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures,
after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of Congress.

EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY (REPRIEVE, COMMUTATION, PARDON, AMNESTY)

See Article IX-C, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution and Article 5 of the Revised Penal (Act 386)
Section 5, Art. IX-C. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for
violation of election laws, rules and regulations shall be granted by the President
without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.

 BARRIOQUINTO VS. FERNANDEZ, 82 Phil. 642

In the case of Barrioquinto vs Fernandez, the person to be given amnesty need not to admit the crime he
committed because this is an act of grace by the President. BUT in Vera vs People, the person has to admit
otherwise it means he is claiming innocence

 Distinction of Pardon and Amnesty ( Barrioquinto vs Fernandez)

PARDON AMNESTY
1) Private act of the President Public act of the President (needs the
concurrence of the Congress)

2) applies to ordinary crime Political offenses

3) There must be a final judgment Even there is no case, there is pending case or
the case is on appeal

4)looks forward Looks backward

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5) needs acceptance No need

Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon.

[1] Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded
and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by
Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the
courts should take judicial notice.

[2] Pardon is granted to one after conviction (of ordinary crimes) ; while amnesty is granted to
classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the
institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.

[3] Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which
he has been convicted, that is, it abolished or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does ""nor
work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be
expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of
the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence" article 36, Revised Penal Code). while amnesty
looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the
offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as
though he had committed no offense. (section 10[6], Article VII, Philippine Constitution; State vs.
Blalock, 62 N.C., 242, 247; In re Briggs, 135 N.C., 118; 47 S.E. 402., 403; Ex parte Law, 35 GA., 285, 296;
State ex rel AnheuserBusch Brewing Ass'n. vs. Eby, 170 Mo., 497; 71 S.W 52, 61; Burdick vs United States,
N.Y., 35 S. Ct., 267; 271; 236 U.S., 79; 59 Law. ed., 476.)

[4] Pardon is complete with the act of the President while Amnesty is valid only with the concurrence of
the majority of the members of all the members of Congress.

 VERA VS. PEOPLE, 7 SCRA 152

Before one may validly apply for executive clemency (pardon or amnesty) he MUST ADMIT HAVING
COMMITTED THE ACTS WHICH RESULTED IN HIS IMPRISONMENT.

 The Pardoning Power of the President – Power of Executive Clemency

The President cannot pardon:

1. Impeachment cases
2. Violation of Election Laws (Section 5, Article IX-C)

 MONSANTO VS FACTORAN
Salvacion Monsanto was the Assistant City Treasurer of Calbario. On March 25, 1983, she was charged
of Estafa through Falsification of Documents.
December 17, 1984, she was granted an absolute pardon. In December 21, 1984, Monsanto accepted the
pardon. After the pardon, her replacement in her position back in 1983 retired that is why she claimed that
she should be reinstated in the same position and her backwages be given to her.
SC:
1. She is not entitled to receive her backwages because the only case where backwages be granted to an
employee is when she is ILLEGALY DISMISSED.
2. She cannot go back to her office and be reinstated because she was not ILLEGALY DISMISSED.
3. BUT IF APPOINTED AGAIN, this is allowed.

 Can the President extend pardon and forward to the COMELEC for concurrence?
NO. The recommendation for pardon should come from the COMELEC.

 LLAMAS VS ORBOS
De Ocampo, Governor of Tarkac was suspended for one year. Vice Governor Llmas took the office of
Governor. In less than one month before the expiration of the one year suspension, De Ocampo went back
assailing that he was pardoned by Aquino.
SC: Pardon and Executive Clemency also apply to administrative case.
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 The Clerk of Court was discharged because of Falsification of Document. He was pardoned by the
president.
SC: 1. Administrative cases can be subject of pardon.
2. The president can only EXTEND pardon to members under his department which is the Executive
Department. The pardon granted to the clerk of court is a VIOLATION OF SEPARATION OF POWER.

 Even you are given absolute pardon, the convict can reject if he does not want to.

 In conditional pardon, the only condition that you must comply is NOT TO COMMIT ANOTHER
CRIME.
 TORRES VS SEC. NEPTALI GONZALES
Torres was sentenced to 6 years imprisonment. The President extended conditional pardon to him with
the condition that he shall not commit another crime. Later on to criminal charges were filed against him,
thus Gonzales ordered him to serve his sentence. Torres disagree.
SC: 1. The judiciary has no more business with regard to his case because it became final already. The
executive department has the power to look over on the case.
2. The charges of the prosecutor against him shows that he committed another crime, thus in violation of the
condition of the pardon granted to him.
3. Even though acquitted later on, he still violated the condition of the pardon.

SEE: Probation law.

 When a person is impeached, he cannot be pardon. But if the person is convicted

before the Sandiganbayan for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he
can be pardoned.

 Under the present Constitution, is the president immune from suit in relation to acts
performed by him or by his subordinates by virtue of his specific orders during his tenure
considering that the immunity from suit provision under the 1973 Constitution was
already deleted?

Yes, during his tenure. Although the new Constitution has not reproduced the explicit guarantee of
immunity under the previous Constitution, presidential immunity during the tenure remains as part of the
law. What has been rejected by the new Constitution is the expensive notion of immunity in the Marcos
Constitution. Once out of the office, however, even before the end of the six year term, immunity for non-
official acts is lost. Such was the case of Joseph Estrada. The case filed against him was criminal in
character. They involved plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can
these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of
immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President
to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to
hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that the
unlawful acts of the public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as
such but stands in the same footing as any other trespassers. (Estrada vs Desierto)

 The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that
being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office and may
be invoked only by the holder of the office, not by any other in the President’s behalf. Thus, an accused
in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a
defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused. Moreover, there is nothing in our
laws that would prevent the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to
the court’s jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is hers. (Soliven vs
Makasiar, Beltran vs Makasiar)

Sections 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such
limitations as may be provided for by law. The Monetary Board shall, within 30 days from the
end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its
 72

decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the government or

government owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the
foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided for by law.

 CONSTANTINO VS FREEDOM FROM DEBT

This is the application of the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency. The case talks about the subordinate
of the President under the Executive Department who contracted a lone before the International monetary
Fund. The act is deemed to be the act of the President unless the President disallows such transaction.

Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred
in by at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate.
(NOTE: Please see Section 25, Art. 18. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the
Republic of the Philippines and the USA concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that
purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.)

 NICOLAS VS SMITH
Suzette Nicolas executed an affidavit before leaving the Philippines saying that she was not really raped.
Daniel Smith is in the Philippines, in accordance of the VFA Treaty.
Is the VFA treaty Valid? Yes because:
1) it was signed by the President
2) concurred by the Senate
3) When the Congress so requires ratified by the majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum
4) recognized by the other contracting State.

Distinguish Treaty or International Agreement from Executive Agreement

TREATY EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT
Signed by the President concurred by the Senate Signed by the President

 GONZALES VS HECHANOVA
In 1962, the Congress enacted a law that they cannot import rice unless all the rice produced by Filipino
Farmers are bought. But through an executive agreement between President Macapagal and Prime Minister of
Thailand(Siam before), there was an importation of rice.
SC:
1. The Executive Agreement cannot repeal a law because this only the act of the President.
2. Treaty can repeal a law and vice versa a law can repeal a treaty. The one coming later (the one repealing
prevails)

 ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
In 1960, a Treaty of Commerce an Amity was made wherein Chinese businessmen were allowed to enter the
Philippines to establish their businesses. But in 1964, a Retail Trade Liberation Act was enacted that disallow
their entry.
SC: Retail Trade Liberation Act prevails.

Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress within 30 days from the opening of
every regular session, as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures
and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.

Section 23. The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular session. He
may also appear before it at any other time.
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ARTICLE VIII - THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such other courts as
may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

 What is judicial power? –

The courts will decide cases involving justiciable controversies involving legally demandable and enforceable
rights.
The word “legally” presupposes that there must be a law from which you will base the cause of action.

 The courts established by law – CA,RTC,MTC, MCTC, MeTC, Sandiganbayan created by 1607, CTA,
Shari’a Court in Muslim Mindanao

 Judicial power does not include political question.

 POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE

1) JAVELLANA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 50 SCRA 30
2) DE LA LLANA VS. ALBA, 112 SCRA 294
3) ALMARIO VS. ALBA, 127 SCRA 69 (When the question deals with the necessity, expediency and
wisdom of a particuar act, the same is political and not justiciable)
4. Read again ENRILE VS. JUDGE SALAZAR, June 5, 1990

1. Sanidad vs. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333 Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the
legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested
act, the matter is definitely justiciable or non-political)
1. Javellana vs. Exec. Secretary, 50 SCRA 30
2. Tanada vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil. (Political questions are questions to be answered by the people in their
sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority is vested to the executive or
legislative branch of the government)
4. Gonzales vs. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 (When the crux of the problem deals with the validity of an act, it
is justiciable)

CASES ON JUDICIAL POWER IN GENERAL

 LOPEZ VS. ROXAS, 17 SCRA 756

In 1965 during the Presidential election, Marcos won as President and Lopez as VP. Roxas filed an
election protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal(PET). Lawyer of Lopez said that the SC should
dismissed the protest of Roxas because the law creating the PET is bad.
SC said that law is unconstitutional therefore we should continue with the protest.

 The difference under 1975 Constitution: No law that PET created by Congress. But there is a law
now enacted by congress, if that law is unconstitutional and a protest for the position of
President or VP be entertained. Is that unconstitutional? – No, there should be a law (legally
demandable and enforceable rights)

 The court cannot exercise judicial power when it involves political question. But it can resolve
political question under last phrase,2nd par. of section 1: When there is a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the paret of any official in the
government, maybe branch, agency, subdivision or instrumentality of the government as long as
there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion.
 74

 SANTIAGO VS. BAUTISTA, 32 SCRA 188

Santiago was the class valedictorian from grade 1 – 5, 1-3 grading of grade six. When 4th grading came
in Grade 6, the the 2nd placer became the class valedictorian. Parents questioned it that there was a grave
abuse of discretion but lost. CA – lost then to SC.
SC: There is no way to exercise judicial power because there is no law to determine who should be the
class valedictorian. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the teachers.

Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts (or the qualification of judges) but may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the judiciary when it undermines the security of
tenure of its members.
 Congress cannot enact a law that would violate the security of tenure of judges and justices.
They cannot also lower their budget.

Section 3. The judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the judiciary may not
be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after
approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

 Does Congress(Legislative) or the President or thwe Executive department have fiscal autonomy? – None

 Article 9 – b, 9 – c, 9 – c: CSC, COMELEC and COA have also fiscal autonomy.

 “Doctrine of Executive Impoundment” – Even though a senator was allocated under the budget law if the
president did not release it, you cannot question it.

Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and 14 associate
justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of 3, 5 or seven members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof.

(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement,
or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, including those involving the
constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a
majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted thereon.

(3) Cases or matters heard by a divisions hall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a
majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least 3 of such members.
When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no
doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court en banc or in division may be modified or
reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
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 VIR-JEN SHIPPING VS. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577

This involves Filipino seafarers. There are cases involving the interpretation of their contract. One went
to the division of SC, another to the 2nd division of SC but it involves the same contract. The 1st was decided
in favor of Vir-jen shipping, 2nd division was decided in favor of Filipino seafarers.
SC said that if the decision of a division of SC is in conflict of the decision of another division, it should be
decided by the SC sitting en banc so that we will only have one jurisprudence on the matter.
 Doctrine or principle of law, it should be reversed only by the SC en banc. It cannot be
reversed with the SC division.

 RUBEN MANIAGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS,253 SCRA 674

This is a case involving an accident involving the service vehicle of Texas Instrument owned by Ruben
Maniago injuring 15 passengers. A reckless imprudence was filed against the driver resulting to multiple
physical injuries. At the middle of the trial of the criminal case, the injured victims and the owner of
passenger jeepney filed a multi million damage case against the owner. A motion todismiss was filed because
in section 1 and 3 of Rule 111 provides: separate case maybe filed in cases of reckless imprudence, estafa,
there is a need to reserve before the prosecution presenting its evidence.
Judge Ayson said No need to dismiss it, it can proceed independently.
SC said there is no need to reserve because article 33 which says it can proceed independently is a
substantive law while the rules of court is only procedural law, and procedural law could not amend
substantive law under article 8: the SC could promulgate rules and regulations but it must not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights.

 Atty Gacayan went to SC and asked that section 1 & 3 of Rule 111 be removed. In the case at bar,
they did not reserve. Then SC said they must reserve. The civil aspect shall proceed with the
criminal case. The criminal case was dismissed. Is there a need to proceed with the civil case
without reservation?
 Case was dismissed.

 LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COMELEC, December 21, 2009

Reversed 4 times. 1st case was November 2008, SC said that the law creating the 16 cities
unconstitutional because the new 16 cities were not able to meet the income requirement (100M). The SC in
their decision of November 2008 is unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection laws. The
decision was 8 – 7, the 16 new cities filed a MR and the decision was 7 – 7. The SC said said decision is final,
16 cities are unconstitutional. Atty. Mendoza representing the 16 cities wrote the SC and he captioned his
motion as “Motion for Clarification” (not MR because 2nd MR is a prohibited pleading). Then the SC after
several months 1 year after the decision has already become final reversed themselves. Under section 4,
article 8: by majority who joined the deliberation. December 21, 2009 – Constitutional. August of 2010 –
Unconstitutional and in April 2011 – SC said Constitutional.
 SC: Justification: Majority of those who joined the deliberation.

 JUSTICE CRUZ VS. NCIP

7 – 7 votes: SC said the law is constitutional because in case of tie, it means that you are not able to
overcome the presumption of its constitutionality.(Laws are presumed to be constitutional)
Can be re-opened even after several months from the time a certificate of finality was issued because
section 4 says you can declare a law unconstitutional provided that majority of those who joined the
deliberation is obtained.

 JANDUSAY VS. CA, 172 SCRA 376

To be decided by the Supreme Court en banc

1. Involving the constitutionality of any law, treaty, etc.;

2. When there is conflict of the decisions of 2 or more divisions of the Supreme Court;
3. When a case is referred to by the division to the banc and the same was accepted by
the latter;
4. In death penalty cases;
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Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.

2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question;
b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto;
c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue;
d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher;
e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

2) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require.
Such temporary assignment shall not exceed 6 months without the consent of the judge
concerned.

3) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

4) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,

pleading , practice , and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.

5)Appoint all officials and employees of the judiciary in accordance with the civil service law.
(READ: Maniago vs. CA, 253 SCRA on the limitation of the Rules…not to diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights.

 What is the power of judicial review? What are its requisites?

Power of Judicial Review – Item #2 and so on.

 Questions involving constitutionality of a law must be decided by the SC sitting en banc.

 A SC division cannot declare a law Unconstitutional only SC sitting en banc.

 MTC/RTC (Lower courts) can declare a law Unconstitutional for 2 reasons:

1. Section 1, Article 8, 1st par. – Judicial power shall be vested in one SC and some other courts as
maybe establish by law.
Judicial review is part of Judicial Power.

Distinguish judicial power from judicial review.

2. Section 5, 2nd par. , sub-par a – The SC will R,R,R,M…..Lower courts could declare a law/treaty
unconstitutional but subject to RRRMA by the SC.

 When SC declared a law Unconstitutional or contract involving the government

unconstitutional, there must be four requisites present:
1. There must be an actual case or controversy.
2. It must be raised by the proper party.
3. Must be filed within the earliest opportunity.
4. There must be a necessity for the court to pass upon the constitutionality of the law.
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 ATTY. FORMENTO VS. JOSEPH ESTRADA, August 31, 2010

There was no actual controversy yet because Estrada has not yet been elected as President. The PET can
not yet convene because they cannot talk yet about the election return or qualification. Is is only when there
is already a proclamation that they can question that.

 DUMLAO VS. COMELEC

In 1980, BP 50 as the first local election during martial law. Re: “No one is allowed to run for the same
position that have occupied before if he is over 65 y/o”. Dumlao filed the certificate of candidacy for
Governor. He was Governor for more than 20 years before but he filed again. He questioned the validity of
that law but no one is questioning his candidacy. Was there an actual case of controversy?
SC said None. The fore requisites must be present. Except if it involves Paramount Public Interest
because if they will allow Dumlao to run as Governor he will be elected by the people and after he is elected,
the SC will say he is not qualified and that is unfair to the people of Nueva Vizcaya.

 DISOMANGCOP VS. HON. SIMEON DATUMANONG, 444 SCRA 203

The following are the requisites for the exercise of judicial power:
a. There must be before the court a case calling for the exercise of judicial review;
b. The question before the court must be ripe for judicial adjudication;
c. The person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to
challenge;
d. The question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest
opportunity; and
e. The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

 Three Functions of Power of Judicial Review

1) legitimizing function – When the SC declares a law constitutional ,it tells us that it is legitimate and it
is valid therefore we have to follow it.
2) checking function – SC tells us that a law is unconstitutional, we should not follow it and therefore
from that time on it is declared unconstitutional.
3) symbolic or educational function of the SC – The case might already be moot and academic and
normally the court should no longer decide moot cases but if there is a need to educate to teach a
lesson those lower courts, other government offices and they have to decide it.

 SALONGA VS. PANO, 134 SCRA 438

Salonga was charged of conspiracy to assassinate the President and members of his family. The main
accused was Victor Lambridge. (He was imported by the opponent of Marcos from the US, allegedly a bomb
expert and was wiring the bomb at PICC where Marcos will deliver a speech.) Unfortunately, the bomb
immaturely exploded resulting to amputation. There was so many evidence showing that while Salonga was
in the US, he was seen to be with Lambridge in a restaurant. The basis in filing a case against Salonga –
Compact Point Theory (The criminal are making use of your house as the place where they will see each
other then you must be a part of the conspiracy base on the contact point theory.)
SC said “we are deciding this case even though Marcos called already the withdrawal of the charges against
Salonga. The case had become moot and academic but SC have to decide it because they might again do it in
the future.

 JAVIER VS. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194

In 1984, Javier run for the Batasang Pambansa in Antique. He lost but according to him he was cheated.
He protested the election of Pacificador in COMELEC in division headed by Edilon. Edilon asked to inhibit
himself because he was the law partner of Pacificador for more than 20 years.
On February 10, 1986 while he was campaigning for Cory he was murdered. On February 25, 1986,
EDSA Revolution came and the first thing that Cory did was she abolished congress and the 1973
Constitution. Is there a need to determine whether Javier won the 1984 election? Is there a need to
determine whether Edillon inhibit himself?Shall the COMELEC still decide the protest?
No, he was already dead, he can no longer sit in the Batasang Pambansa. Even if he is still alive, it is not
good to tell him he won because there is no longer a Batasang Pambansa because it was abolished by Cory. It
is moot and academic. No use of deciding who won.
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On personality to sue

Is there a difference as to the "personality" requirement if the law being questioned involves disbursement
of public funds and on the other hand, if it does not .

 Personality to Sue: (two categories):

1. If it involves disbursement of public funds – it can be questioned by any taxpayer.

 PASCUAL VS. SEC. OF PUBLIC WORKS

There is a use of public money to construct a road inside a private subdivision.
 SANIDAD VS. COMELEC
President Marcos is proposing amendment to the Constitution even to those who are not authorized
under Article 17. Atty Sanidad can question it because he is a taxpayer through his CTC. If the result is
unconstitutional as a taxpayer he is injured having the capacity to sue.

2. If does not involves disbursement of public funds – it can be questioned by only those
person who are directly injured or affected by the enforcement of that law or contract
entered into by the government.

 OPOSA VS. FACTORAN

Timber Licensing is given by the government to lumber companies for different Timber licensing
agreement. No money from the government is involved. Can it be questioned by young children?
 Yes because in the cutting of trees will be prejudicial to their future. They have that
personality to sue.

 KILOSBAYAN VS. MANUEL MORATO (1991 Case)

The government entered into a contract with a firm for the operation of Lotto. The government did
not spend money but they share 35% whatever bets collected by the private firm. Can it be questioned by
Kilosbayan (NGO)?
SC by a vote of 8 – 7 said “Yes because gambling affects national interest. They have personality to
sue and we are annulling the contract with the Malaysian Trading Firm because the provisions are
disadvantageous to the people.
Government entered into another contract in 1992, when Ramos was already President questioned by
the Kilosbayan again.

 KILOSBAYAN VS. EXEC. SEC. GUINGONA

 Issue: Does Kilosbayan have the capacity to sue since the government did not disburse any
single centavo?
 SC by a vote of 8 – 7 now says, they do not have personality to sue – if you are not injured and
does not involves disbursement of public funds.
 “weather – weather lang”

 SC may decide moot and academic cases in the instances when:

1. Symbolic and academic
2. When there is a grave violation of the Constitution.

 PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS. SEC. OF ANTIPOLO

Arroyo did not release their ERA. They went to the SC. The President believes that she has the right to
withhold the ERA of LGUs because the SC validate their act of refusing to release the CDF or pork barrel of
congfressmen and senator. Before the SC could decide the case, she released it. And asked the court to
dismiss the case because it becomes moot and academic.
SC said “Valid, it is within her power of Executive Impoundment.”
But later on SC said she has no right to withhold or delay the release of their ERA.

 No fiscal autonomy on the part of congress.

 Can the President has the power to refuse to release their ERA? – No, under Article 10: LGU
has fiscal autonomy.
 79

 If it involves culminating, controlling doctrines. (Lacson vs. Exec. Sec. Perez)

 Even if cases is already moot and academic, SC can decide if it is susceptible to repetition in
the future.
 SC can declare a law unconstitutional as part of the executive function.

 Three Views on the constitutionality of a law:

1. Orthodox Theory (Norton vs. Shelby County) – An unconstitutional act is not a law, it
creates no office, it affords no protection. As if it was not enacted at all.
Effect: Useless from day one up to the court declares it unconstitutional.
2. Modern View (Sheppard vs. Barren) – The SC said if the law appears to this court as
unconstitutional, as a result, the separation of powers approved by the President and congress,
we will not directly say that it is unconstitutional. As if that law is not existing and they will
decide the case base on other precedent or other laws. (Do not insult the 2 co equal branches of
the government.)
3. Philippine View or the Operative Fact Doctrine (Agbayani vs. PNB) – from the time it
was enacted up to the time that the SC declares it as unconstitutional, that should be considered
as valid and the declaration by the SC of its unconstitutionality is the operative fact or the signal
for the people not to respect or follow that law anymore. But before the SC told that it is
unconstitutional, it is our duty to respect and obey the law.

Jan. 1, 2011 (RA 6969) Today:Sept. 19, 2011

Creating the city of aurora hill in Baguio _________________ -SC said
unconstitutional
(Operating for a long time)
Standing to question the validity of an Executive Order which does not involve disbursement of
public funds; Requisites before the President may issue executive Orders in furtherance of
police power.

 EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL. VS. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, 482 SCRA 673
On December 12, 2002, President Arroyo issued EO 156 entitled “PROVIDING FOR A
COMPREHENSIVE INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND DIRECTIONS FOR THE MOTOR VEHICLE
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AND ITS IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES.”
Under Section 3.1 of the said EO, THE IMPORTATION INTO THE COUNTRY, INCLUSIVE OF
FREEPORT, OF ALL TYPES OF USED MOTOR VEHICLES IS PROHIBITED.
The private respondent, which has a business of importing all kinds of used motor vehicles questioned
the constitutionality of said EO.

I s s u e s:

1. Does the private respondent have the personality to sue or to question the constitutionality of EO 156?
2. Does the President have the authority to promulgate EO to promote police power like in this
case?
3. Is EO 156 constitutional?

Held:

1. The private respondent has the personality to sue to question the constitutionality of an administrative
issuance because it will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Respondents would suffer a
direct injury if said EO will be implemented because in its Certificate of Registration , it is allowed
import/trade used motor vehicles and spare parts. Clearly, it would suffer prejudice if importation of all
motor vehicles, not only used cars will be prohibited.
2. The President is authorized to issue an executive order provided it complies with the following
requisites:
a. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
b. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
c. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and
d. It must be reasonable.
 80

There is no question that no less than Art. VI, Section 28 [2] of the Constitution authorizes
Congress to in turn authorize the President by law, within specified limits, and subject to such
restrictions and limitations, to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas…”. Likewise, the Tariff and
Customs Code likewise delegates to the President similar powers.

3. Is the EO prohibiting the importation of all motor vehicles, not only used cars constitutional? In this
case, while the first two requisites are present, the 3rd is not. This is so because it is not within the powers of
the President to prohibit the importation of other vehicles, not only cars, even in the Freeport Zones like
Subic which is allowed by RA 7227. The EO therefore is ultra vires or beyond the limits of the authority
conferred on the President because it tries to supplant or modify the Constitution, its enabling statute and
other existing laws.
The 4th requisite is not also present because the same is unreasonable since it likewise prohibit the entry
of used motor vehicles into the Freeport which is owed by law, RA 7227.

 TATAD VS. GARCIA, April 6, 1995, 243 SCRA 436 (Even though no public funds are involved and
that petitioner is not directly injured by the contract, he has the personality to question the same if it
involves national interest)
Tatad is questioning the contract entered into by the government(construction of MRT along Edsa)
No money from the government is involved, only the contracting party. After 25 years it becomes the
property of the government. It was questioned by Tatad because he is a taxpayer.
SC reverted to the first Kilosbayan case – it allegedly involved National Interest.

 BUGNAY CONSTRUCTION VS. LARON, 170 SCRA 240 (If the contract is for local consumption
only, and that the petitioner is not directly injured by the said contract which does not involve the
disbursement of public funds, the petitioner has no personality to sue)

 May inferior courts also exercise the power of judicial review in the light of the requirement of Section 4(2)
of Article VIII? (YNOT VS. IAC, March 20, 1987)

 Transfer of venue in criminal cases

- Power of the SC to transfer venue of criminal cases inorder to prevent miscarriage of justice.

 PEOPLE VS. GUTIERREZ, 36 SCRA 172

In 1971, When 2 barrios in Bantay, Ilocos Sur where all the houses were burned to the ground by
Vincent Crisologo. (His father and mothere lost in those two barangays). One woman died. Where shall
the trial be held? – Vigan, Ilocos Sur because it is where the CFI is located where Vincent’s parents was
elected as Governor and Congressman. No one wants to testify unless it will be transferred to San
Fernando, La Union or Baguio City.
Even if there is no law in 1971 in the change of venue, the SC came out of a new doctrine and said
“We can transfer the venue inorder to prevent miscarriage of justice and be tried in Baguio City”.
 SC can decide in Per Curiam only in death cases.

 PEOPLE VS. SOLA, 103 SCRA 393

Was charged of multiple murder. Police find bodies in his sugar plantation. The witnesses do not
want to testify. Can the private prosecutor without the participation of the fiscal asked the SC for the
transfer of venue considering 110 of criminal procedure.
SC said that rule should be considered inferior as compared with the possible miscarriage of justice
if all witnesses are afraid to testify, if the hearing will take place in the same municipality where he is a
mayor.

 Different powers of the SC:

1. Power to promulgate rules
2. Power to admit those who practice law (power to integrate the bar)
- power to admit and to remove you from roll of attorneys
 81

 IN RE CUNANAN, 94 Phil. 534

“Bar Flankers Act”. War 1941-1945
1946 – 75%
1947 – 75%
1948 – 75%
1949 – 75%
Those who failed went to congress and asked to enact a law because it is unfair to them. Congress
acceded, they enacted the Bar Flankers Act of 1950. The congress now said, in 1946 – 70% is passing, 1947 –
71%, 1948 – 72%, 1949 – 73%.As a result, the President did not sign it but it became a law. When one of
them, Cunanan appeared in a court but no roll number yet and was not being entertained. Went to the SC
and said this judge does not want me to practice.
SC said “You have no right to practice because you have no roll number, even if it is signed by the
congress, if we allow you to practice, that would violate separation of powers because only the SC has the
power to determine admission to the practice of law.

 1975 BAR Question: The Philippines and the US entered into a treaty (US is allowing Filipino lawyers
to practice law in the US and We are allowing American lawyers in the Philippines) Both ratified by the
US Senate and the Phil. Senate and the President.
 The Executive and Legislative have no business whatsoever in so far as to the admission on practice of
law. It is only the SC. (Section 5, Par. 5)

 SC has the Power to Discipline Members of the Bar.

 ZALDEVAR VS. GONZALES, Oct. 7, 1988 Re: Indefinite suspension imposed on RAUL
GONZALES)
Before 1987, the highest government official tasked to prosecute public officials in 1973 is the Tanodbayan.
1987 ratified and the one who will file cases against government official be the Ombudsman. But no
Ombudsman appointed yet by Cory, so Gonzales said “ako pa rin”. He filed an information against Gov.
Zaldevar of Antique for graft and corruption.
“ this Tanodbayan has no business filing a graft case against because we are now in the 1987 Constitution
there is no such thing as Tanodbayan.”
SC said Gonzales must wait for the President to appoint an Ombudsman for the case.
SC has the sole power over the personnel therof – all judges or justices of the SC, SC has control of
supervision over them.

 CSC VS. ANDAL, December 16, 2009

Andal is an employee of the Sandiganbayan. One day, in connection with his application for promotion in
the Sandiganbayan, he learned that one of his employees was going to CSC to get his rating and gave him his
authorization and Sandiganbayan ID. When the companion arrived in the CSC, he showed the documents.
But the picture of Andal when he took the exam is different from the picture in the ID of Mr. Andal. (It turned
out that another person took the exam for him). CSC required him to explain why he shoukd not be dismiss
as an employee of the Sandiganbayan, He never answered. He was dismissed. Went to SC. Was the CSC
correct in removing him?
SC said No. CSC can try government officials but not those within the judiciary.

 JUDGE MACEDA VS. OMBUDSMAN VASQUEZ

Maceda was caught receiving a bribe by the NBI. Graft and corruption was filed in the OOmbudsman. Can
the Ombudsman investigate him for graft and corruption or bribery?
SC said No. Before he can be charge or investigated for bribery or criminal act, you must first file aan
administrative case against him in the SC. If it found guilty by the SC, that is the only time that you can
charge him criminally. Only the SC has administrative supervision over justices and judges.

 Qualifications of becoming a members of the SC – CIPI: Competence, Integrity, Probity,

Independence.

May law students practice law before the courts? Requisites?

Circular No. 19, issued by the Supreme Court on December 19,
1986
 82

 On the integration of the bar. IN RE EDILLON, 84 SCRA 554

Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof.
Read: DE GUZMAN VS. PEOPLE, 119 SCRA 337

Sections 7. (1) No person shall be appointed member of the Supreme Court or any lower
collegiate court unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. A member of the Supreme
Court must be at least 40 years of age, and must have been for 15 years or more a judge of a
lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.

(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person
may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the
Philippine Bar.

(3) A member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity and
independence.

Section 8. A judicial and bar Council---composition—Chief Justice, Secretary of Justice,

Representative of Congress, Integrated Bar, Professor of Law, retired justice and
representative of the private sector..

The regular members---term of 4 years---Commission on Appointments—

Sec. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower court shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for
every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.

For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within 90 days from the
submission of the list.
1. UY vs. Judge Capulong, April 7, 1993
2. Court Administrator vs. Judge Gines

Read: Exec. Order No.216, July 10, 1987, creating the Judicial and Bar council

Section 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and the associate justices of the Supreme Court, and
the judges of the lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their
salary shall not be decreased.

 Congressmen and senators, their salaries can not be increased during their tenure. Even if it will
increase, they will enjoy it after the term of the members approving it.
 The salary of Justices and judges may not be increased during their continuance of their office.
 The salary of Constitutional commissions can be increased and they will receive it immediately, no
prohibition.
 Congress are the one enacting laws while justices and judges is immediately executory.
 Are the salaries of justices or judges subject to tax?See Sec. 17, Art. XVIII

 NITAFAN VS. COMMISSIONER, 152 SCRA 284

RTC Judge Nitafan of Manila, was being assessed of his income tax by the BIR commissioner. Went to the
SC and said “I could not be tax because that will result in decresing my salary”.
SC: It is a violation of equal protection clause if Nitafan is exempt to pay his tax. Itdoes not amount to
diminution of their salaries.

 PERFECTO VS. MEER, 85 Phil. 552

Justice of the SC going to the SC when the BIR commissioner was asking him to pay his tax. SC said
“You cannot tax his salary because that is equivalent to decreasing it.” Congress enacted a law saying taxing
 83

the salaries of justices and judges is not tantamount to decreasing their salary because all government
officials and employees must have to pay taxes.

 ENDENCIA VS. DAVID, 93 Phil. 696

Another justice of the SC going to the SC and said that law is unconstitutional because that is equivalent
of interpreting the constitutional provision. Congress can not interpret a law only the SC could interpret it.

Section 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower court shall hold office
during good behavior until they reach the age of 70 years or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of the members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
OCAMPO VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, 51 O.G. 147
DE LA LLANA VS. ALBA, 112 SCRA 294

 JUDGE RUBEN AYSON VS. RTC OF BAGUIO

SC dismissed the Judge of RTC baguio because he has a child other than his wife even though he was
discharging his duties at that time as a judge.

Section 12. The members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
- Judges and justices should not be required to render advisory or legal opinions or to perform
administrative or non-judicial function.

 GARCIA VS. MACARAIG, 39 SCRA 106

Macaraig was appointed CFI judge in Laguna. He went to Laguna and found out that he has no
court room. Returned to Manila and stayed in the office of the Sec. of Justice who has administrative
supervision over judges and that of the SC. At the office of the Sec. of Justice, he was performing non-
judicial or administrative function. Sc said that is not allowed because judges and justices shall not be
performing non-judicial or administrative function.

 IN RE: JUDGE RODOLFO MANZANO, October 5, 1988

RTC judge of Vintar, Ilocos Norte, Judge Manzano was appointed by Gov. as a member of Peace and
Order council but Judge Manzano being a political professor in a school before accepting it wrote the SC.
SC answered that he can accept but if he accept it be considered resigned as a judge because he will be
performing non judicial function.

Sections 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en
banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a member for
the writing o f the opinion o f the court. A certification to this effect signed by the CJ----Any
member who took no part or dissented…must state the reason therefor. The same procedure in
all lower collegiate courts.

- In the SC, there should be deliberation en banc or in division. After they arrived at the decision, Ponente
– write the main opinion. If not amenable to the decision, write your dissenting opinion.

 What is a decision “Pro Hac Vice”? (Lim Cahi Chong vs. HRET)
Is Lim Chai Chong entitled to sit? Shall the case be dismissed?(If yes, because the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction after a person has been elected). But you agree that she win while you voted for her is different
from that of the majority.
 If your reason is different from the main opinion but you agreed as to the reason. Pro Hac Vice, meaning I
agree or I concur with the result.

 Period for the SC to decide cases – 24 months from the time it is submitted for decision. After the submission
of the last pleading, that is now the time that we count the 24 months period.

 Even though the constitution says “Must”, the SC says must means “May” it is merely directory.
 84

 Other collegiate courts- decide it within 12 months which is a must. It is mandatory.

 Lower courts – 90 days, it is also a “Must”. Failure on the part of CA, MTC, RTC judges to decide within the
period is equivalent to Gross Neglect of Duty. They are not allowed to receive their salaries.

Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused
due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.

 VALLADOLID VS. INCIONG, 121 SCRA 205

If the decision in a labor case, the decision would simply say..X was illegally dismissed he should be paid
his backwages. Can be? Yes because labor cases not bound to state the facts and the law applicable.

 NAPOLCOM VS. LOOD, 127 SCRA 757

A policeman is charged. Guilty or not guilty without any reasons behind the decision. Valid? Yes, guilty
or not guilty, no need to reason out. Not bound by the provision under article 8.

 BAUTISTA JR. VS. DOMOGAN

COMELEC says Domogan won the election without even stating the reason of how many votes for him.
Valid? Yes because that are not bound by the requirement stating the facts or the law applicable.

 BEDRUZ VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, 484 SCRA 452

Requirement that the decision shall state clearly and distinctly state the law and the facts on which it is
based. (Carpio-Morales, J.)
A trial court’s omission to specify the offense committed, or the specific provision of the law violated, is
not in derogation of the constitutional requirement that every decision must clearly and distinctly state the
law and the facts on which it was based or the factual and legal bases for the conclusions reached by the
trial court as long as the legal basis can be inferred from the discussion in the decision.
Further, the requirement that the “decision shall state clearly and distinctly state the law and the facts
on which it is based” applies only to a decision of a court of justice covered by Art. VIII of the Constitution],
not the Office of the Ombudsman.

 GERMAN MACHINERIES CORPORATION VS. ENDAYA, 444 SCRA 329

When Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution shall be complied with by the
courts.
Section 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides that “no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
This constitutional provision applies only to cases submitted for decision, i.e., given due course and
after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, BUT NOT WHERE A RESOLUTION IS
ISSUED DENYING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION AND STATING THE LEGAL BASIS THEREFOR
like “the petition raised are factual or there is no reversible error in the respondent’s court decision”,
there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
In this case , the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by the petitioner on the
grounds that the factual issues had already been passed upon by the NLRC, and since its factual findings are
in agreement with that of the Labor Arbiter, the same are binding and conclusive upon the Court of Appeals.
This complies with the constitutional requirement under Section 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution

Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided
or resolved within 24 months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and unless
reduced by the Supreme Court, 12 months for all lower collegiate courts, and 3 months for all
other lower courts.

(2) A case shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.

(4) Even after the lapse----the court shall still decide without further delay.
 85

Section 16. The Supreme Court shall, within 30 days from the opening of each regular session
of the Congress, submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on the operations
and activities of the judiciary.

 CORPUS VS. CA 98 SCRA 424

Re: Corpus vs. Cuaderno: Corpus was an employee of the Central Bank who was illegally dismissed. He
filed a case against the government his lawyer is Atty. Juan david knowing that Corpus has no money. David
said “I will be very happy if you remember me if we win this case”. David represented him up to the SC. In
1965, submitted a 350 pages Brief. Has a backwages of over a half million. David wrote corpus asking for
50% as atty’s fees. David filed a case before the RTC of Quezon City, he won. Corpus went to CA but CA said
David is entitled of 50%. Corpus went to SC. David being 85 y/o asked the RTC to issue a writ of execution
which was granted for him to get his atty’s fees. Corpus went to SC saying that there is no need to wait for
their decision because if you are going to decide in 2 years as if you are affirmed the lower court decision on
appeal.
SC was forced to decide it and gave only 25%.(innominate contract is the basis of attorney David to claim
his attorney’s fee.

 MALACORA VS. CA, 117 SCRA 435

Is the 24 months period mandatory – SC said that is impossible to comply with because decisions
of the Sandiganbayan, COMELEC will be elevated to the SC, decision of lower court involving question of
law be elevated to SC so how can they cope up.
SC: Not mandatory, it is merely discretionary.

 The decision must clearly and distinctively states the fact or the law applicable.

 AQUINO VS. MILITARY COMMISSION

Aquino is found guilty. Valid? Yes because the requirement that the decision shoul clearly state the law
applies only to decisions of the judges and justices covered by article 8.
 86

ARTICLE IX - CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

 A & B - Sections 1-8

 Constitutional Commissions independent with the Constitution:

1. CSC
2. COMELEC
3. COA
 They are INDEPENDENT:
- They can only be removed by impeachment.
- In the performance of their duties, they are allowed to promulgate rules.
- Their decisions could only be elevated to the SC on certiorari within 30 days unless a law
provide otherwise.(under rule 43: Decision of the CSC should be appealed to the CA.)
- The power to appoint their employees.
- Cannot decrease their salaries.

 IX – A : Requirement to be appointed as Chairman:

- College Graduate but with proven capacity for public administration.

 TWO MAIN FUNCTIONS OF THE CSC:

1. The power to approve or disapprove appointments in government office.(all branches, agencies,
subdivisions, instrumentality of the government including GOCC with original charter)
Two sets of government corporations:
a. GOCC with original charter – appointment be approved by the CSC. Cases be filed at the
CSC.
b. GOCC in accordance with BP 68 (Corporation Code) – no original charter and not covered
by the CSC. Cases be filed to the NLRC as if you are an employee in a private corporation.
2. Power to ratify or reject appointments.

 It must always be based on Merit and Fitness as far as practicable through examination except if the
position that you are being appointed is:
a. Highly technical
b. Policy Determining
c. Primarily Confidential
 Government employees cannot be removed except with just cause and due process. But if you belong to
the 3 exception, you can be removed anytime.

 CSC VS. MAGNAYE

 The former mayor appointed you in an ordinary position. Election cam, he lost. Can the new
mayor dismiss you because you are just a probationary employee?
 SC said whether probationary or permanent, still entitled to security of tenure. They can only
remove you through when there are just causes and due process.

Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case
brought before it…Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order or ruling of each commission may be brought to the SC on Certiorari by the aggrieved
party within 30 days from receipt thereof.
NOTE: Section 1, Rule 43 allows the Court of Appeals to have appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the
CSC in accordance with RA 7902)

Section 2, Article IX-B. The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the government, including government owned and controlled corporations
WITH ORIGINAL CHARTERS.

[2] Appointments in the CS shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be
determined as far as practicable, and except as to positions which are policy determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical, by competitive examination.
 87

[5] The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.

 Policy determining is one charged with laying down of principal or fundamental guidelines or rules, such
as that head of a department.

 Primarily confidential position is one denoting not only confiden

 ce in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which ensures
freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings or betrayals of the personal
trust on confidential matters of the state (Example: Chief Legal Counsel of the PNB, Besa vs. PNB, 33 SCRA
330)

 Highly technical position requires the appointee thereto to possess technical skill or training in the
supreme or superior degree.

Section 6. No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election,
be appointed to any office in the government or any government owned or controlled
corporations or any of their subsidiaries.
a. Government and controlled corporations

These cases were decided under the 1973 constitution where it was held that employees of
government owned and controlled corporations, with or without charters are within the jurisdiction of
the Civil Service Commission. Under the 1987 Constitution, there is now a distinction and only those
with original charters shall be under the CSC while those created under the Corporation Code are not.

b. Checking function of the CSC

 DE LOS SANTOS VS. MALLARE, 87 Phil. 289

Diosdado macapagal was elected and they were trying to appoint those belonging to their parties
during the election. He wanted to change all city engineers including the city of Baguio. Can he do that?
Yes if the position is highly technical because there is no security of tenure.
Question before the SC: Is the position of the City Engineer of Baguio highly technical?
SC says “the position of city engineer of Baguio if technical but not highly technical.”

 MEDENILLA CASE
Medenilla finished her engineering at UP magna cum laude, entered a department in DPWH. She is the
youngest and #65 in that department. The department head retired and she was appointed as the new
department head jumping 64 employees hoping to be the next department head.
SC said “there is no law which requires us to wait for the dead woods to retire” before we could be
appointed.

 BARROZO VS. CSC AND VALENTINO JULIAN, JUNE 25, 1991

There was a vacant seat in the office of city engineer of Baguio. The assistant city engineer was Engr.
Valentino Julian, there were 9 applicants for the position including Julian and Barrozo. Teodoro ranked #9
and Julian was #1 base on his performance, seniority..etc. But Ramon Labo Jr.(city mayor of Baguio)
appointed Barrozo. When the appointment reach CSC, they did not approved it because he must appoint
Julian because he is the next in rank. Correct? No because the appointing authority has the discretion and
the only thing that CSC could do is to see whether the appointee is qualified or not. If not qualified, reject the
appointment. If qualified even if he is #9, approved it.
CSC has no power to tell who should be appointed, they can only approve or reject.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

 One chairman and 6 commissioners for 6 years without re-appointment.

 Qualifications: Natural born citizen, 35 y/o at the time of appointment….lawyers who practice law for at
least 10 years.
 88

 RENATO CAYETANO VS. CHRISTIAN MONSOD

- Tita Cory appointed Monsod as the Chairman of the COMELEC, it was questioned by former Senator
Cayetano because he does not met the last qualification. (practice law for at least 10 years). Monsod was
actually a lawyer for more than 10 years but he never presented a single case in court, he never appeared in
court as a lawyer.
- SC said Monsod had practiced law. Practice of law is any act that will require the use of knowledge of the
law.

C, Section 1…..any appointment for any vacancy shall only be for the unexpired term…In no
case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Section 2. Powers….enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall….original jurisdiction over all contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials
and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by
courts of general jurisdiction and elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.

a. Deputize law enforcement agencies, including the ASFP..

b. Register political parties, except religious groups
c. File complaints for violation of election laws
d. Regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises for the operation of transportation and other public
utilities, media of communication..

 TERM OF COMELEC COMMISSIONERS

 BRILLANTES VS. YORAC, DEC. 18, 1991
In 1990, the chairman of COMELEC was Hilario Davide Jr.,the most senior commissioner was Heidi
Yorac. Davide was appointed by Tita Cory to lead the Commission to investigate the reasons why they have
so many coup attempts at that time of Tita Cory. Yorac was appointed by Tita Cory as acting co-chairman of
the COMELEC. Can that be done?
No because there should be no acting or temporary capacity because as a rule, if you are holding an
acting capacity you can be the subject of pressure or dictate from the appointing committee. You are forced
to decide even against the law or the Constitution.

 COMELEC is very powerful because they are independent from the executive, legislative and judiciary.
They have also Quasi-judicial function. They decide cases involving election, returns and qualifications
of candidates for provincial offices and city.

 If you are a mayor of La Trinidad election protest be filed against you at the RTC or court with general
jurisdiction in the place where your town is located.

 The decision of the RTC of who is duly elected as mayor, vice mayor or mun. councilor – appeal it to the
COMELEC whose decision is final and inappealable.

 Protest against Barangay official be filed at the Court of limited jurisdiction which has coverage over the
barangay where you belong.(Ex: MCTC)

 Decision of the MTC involving barangay officials shall be appealed to the COMELEC whose decision is
final and inappealable.

 Why is it that there are some case involving barangay officials appealed to the SC? – Because when you
go to the SC, it is not through appeal but by certiorari under rule 65.(last section, Article 9 – A)

 Power to enforce and administer laws relative to the conduct of elections.

 TICZON VS. COMELEC, 103 SCRA 671
COMELEC can also declare failure of election and another election shall be conducted.
 89

Case involving a Muslim. As a result of fraud and terrorism, the COMELEC could not determine
the real winner because of ballots were removed and replaced by armed men.

 Jurisdictions of the COMELEC Division and En Banc:

 SANDRA ERIGUEL VS. COMELEC, GR No. 190526, February 26, 2010
Eriguel was candidate for Mayor of Agoo, La Union and he won. The opponent filed a
protest at the RTC of Agoo which it held that Eriguel won. Appeal was filed – 1st Division of
COMELEC and the members are commissioner Sarmiento and 2 others. Sarmiento and Dela
Cruz inhibit themselves so only 1 commissioner left to decide. So Sarmiento said “I am
forwarding the case of Dumpit vs Eriguel to the Comelec en banc who accepted it, re counted the
vote and said Tess Dongpit won. Eriguel went to SC and said that could not be done. Can the
COMELEC en banc decide an appeal from the RTC directly to the Comelec en banc.(Decision of
RTC Agoo went directly to en banc because there is no quorum at the first division. Can that be
done?
No because it violates the constitution. The en banc can only try MR come from 1 of its
division, not to review the decision of RTC or MTC directly. It shall be recourse to one of its
division.
There can be no such thing as the COMELEC en banc deciding a case directly coming
from the court, it can only decide MR base on the decision of any of its two division not from the
court.
 It should be RTC to a division.
 If MR was filed. Who shall decide? – COMELEC en banc

 COMELEC is so powerful, they have control and supervision over the military, police during the election
period, they also have control over mass media, the power to register political parties except religious
organizations.

 Main work or function of the COMELEC: It is not only conducting election but also decide
election,referendum, plebiscite,initiative and recall.

 Recall – when you try to remove an elected official, 1 year after assuming office but not less than 1 year
from the end of his term.(Ground: Loss of confidence)

 Initiative – when there is proposal to amend the constitution through people’s initiative

 Distinguish referendum from plebiscite

 SANIDAD VS. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333

Plebiscite is binding. There is a proposed amendment to the Constitution, if it is
disapproved by the majority of the registered voter who casts their votes during plebiscite will
be binding and become part of the Constitution.
 Referendum re: 1975 – 4 years, 1965 to 1969 – 1st term of Marcos, 1969 up to Dec. 30, 1973- 2nd
term. He did not call an election declared martial law and still he was the President until 1974.
The people was asked, Do you still want Marcos to continue as President? The President wants
to know the wants of the people, their opinion but that is merely advisory, it is not binding.
 90

ARTICLE X - LOCAL GOVERNMENT

 The political subdivisions are the province, municipalities, cities, barangays and CAR,ARMM.
 Section 15 – 21: Provisions:CAR and ARMM
 LGU have local autonomy. Congress enacted the Local Government Code (RA 7160)
 Their share of the national taxes must be frankly and immediately released (ERA)

Sections 1 & 2. ..shall enjoy local/fiscal autonomy

 PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS. HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, ET AL., May 27, 2004
Local Autonomy; automatic release of funds of
Local Government Units, particularly the IRA.
The petitioner is questioning the constitutionality of the General Appropriations Act of 1999, 2000 and
2001 insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each year the amount of P5B of the Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and imposed conditions for
the release thereof.
Likewise, the President of the Philippines issued Executive Order No. 48 entitled “Establishing a
Program fro Devolution Adjustment and Equalization “ with the purpose of facilitating the process of
enhancing the capacities of LGU’s in the discharge of the functions and services devolved tot hem by the
national government agencies concerned pursuant to the Local Government Code.
Issue:

May the Congress or the President impose conditions for the use of the IRA by the different local
government units?

Held:

The provision of the GAA for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001 are unconstitutional as they encroach on
the fiscal autonomy of the local government units in violation of the Constitution. And even if this case is
already moot and academic because said provisions have been implemented, there is a possibility that the
same be incorporated in the future GAA or it is capable of repetition and as such, it must be decided before
another GAA is enacted. It behooves this Court to make a categorical ruling on the substantive issue now to
formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and the public.

Likewise, the act of the President as embodied in EO No. 48 is unconstitutional because it amounts to
control to local government units when the President’s power over local government units is confined to
general supervision, not power of control. The distinctions of the two powers were enunciated in Drilon vs.
Lim, 235 SCRA 135. Thus:

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed,
he may in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even
decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor merely
sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does
he have any discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may
order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not
prescribe his own manner of doing the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see
to it that the rules are followed.

Section 286 of the Local Government Code is very clear since it provides that the share of each local
government unit shall be released without need of any further action, DIRECTLY TO THE PROVINCIAL,
CITY, MUNICIPAL OR BARANGAY TREASURER as the case may be on a quarterly basis…and which may
not be the subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever
purpose.

Finally, Section 2, Art. X of the Constitution expressly mandates that the local government units shall
enjoy local autonomy as well as Section 25, Art. II of the Constitution.
 91

Section 3.. there shall be a LGC which shall provide a more responsive and accountable local
government with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum….
Read:
1) 1991 Local Government Code on Recall, requisites, grounds and procedures) and other important aspects.
2. Exec. Order 249

Residence requirement for local government positions.

 TESS DUMPIT-MICHELENA VS. BOADO, ET AL., 475 SCRA 290

Facts:
The petitioner who is the daughter of Rep. Tomas Dumpit, 2 nd District of La Union, filed her Certificate
of Candidacy for Municipal Mayor of Agoo, La Union for the May, 2004 elections. The respondents filed a
case for her disqualification on the ground that she is a registered voter of Naguilian , La Union and only
transferred her registration as a voter to San Julian West, Agoo, La Union, on October 24, 2003. Her
presence in San Julian West, Agoo, La Union was noticed only after her certificate of candidacy. Barangay
officials claimed in an affidavit that she is not a resident of the said Barangay.

The petitioner countered that she acquired a new domicile in San Juan West when she purchased from
her father a residential lot on April 19, 2003 and she even designated a person as caretaker of her residential
house.

Held:
While residence and domicile are synonymous, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect
a change of domicile, the following requisites must be present:

1. an actual removal or actual change of domicile;

2. a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3. acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the case of petitioner while she bought a parcel of land in San Julian West, Agoo, La Union on
April 19, 2003, property ownership is not an indicia of the right to vote or voted for an office.

To effect a change of residence, there must be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The intent to remain in the new domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time,
change of domicile or residence must be voluntary and the residence a the place chose for the new domicile
must be actual.

In the case at bar, what was constructed by the petitioner on said lot was a beach house which is at
most a temporary place of relaxation. It can hardly be considered a place of residence. Finally, in the Special
Power of attorney designating a caretaker with a monthly salary of P2,500.00, it was shown that she is a
resident of San Julian West, Agoo, La Union and No. 6 butterfly St., Valle Verde 6, Pasig, Memtro Manila.
This shows that she has a number of residences and the acquisition of another one does not automatically
make the recently acquired residence her new domicile.

Tess Dumpit-Michelena’s cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy for Municipal Mayor of Agoo, La

Union, is therefore valid.

 Recall ( What are the requisites under the Local Government Code of 1991?)
1. Garcia vs. COMELEC, October 5, 1993
2. Sanchez vs. Comelec, January 24, 1991

 Section 4. The President shall exercise general supervision over local governments…

 MONDANO VS. SILVOSA, 97 Phil. 143

Who has control over town?
– Province where it belong; Barangay – City or Town where you belong: highly urbanized city – directly
under the office of the President not the Province; ordinary cities or town – under the province where you
belong.
 92

 Sections 5.. Shall have the power to create their own revenues…
 Section 6..shall have a just share in the national taxes which shall be automatically
released to them..

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials shall be not more than 3 consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
 Maximum years – 3 years; maximum term – 3 times and voluntary renunciation shall no be considered as
voluntary committed.

 BENJAMIN BORJA VS. COMELEC, and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR., G.R. No. 133495, September 3,
1998
Similar to the case of Domogan. The mayor was disqualified so Domogan became the
mayor.
In 1992 election, he run for vice-mayor, he won. Take an oath June 30, 1992. Before June 30, 1992, the
elected mayor died. Vice Mayor is already the Mayor. He was re elected in 1995 and 1998. He was the mayor
for 9 years. Can he run again for mayor in 2001?
 Yes because he was only elected as mayor for only 2 terms.

Issue:
Whether a Vice Mayor who succeeds to the Office of the Mayor by operation of law and serves the
remainder of the term is considered to have served a term for the purpose of the three-term limit on local
officials as provided under the Local Government Code.

Held:
No.
Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution provides:
Section. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, shall be determined by
law, which shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
The above provision of the Constitution is restated in Section 43 [b] of RA No. 7160, the Local
Government Code.
The term limit for local elective officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well
as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, IT IS NOT ENOUGH THAT AN
INDIVIDUAL HAS SERVED THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS IN AN ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICE, HE
MUST ALSO HAVE BEEN ELECTED TO THE SAME POSITION FOR THE SAME NUMBER OF TIMES
BEFORE THE DISQUALIFICATION CAN APPLY.
Clearly, therefore, before the disqualification could apply, the following requisites must be present:

1. the local official must have been elected for the same position [Example: Mayor] three times; and
2. the local official must have served three consecutive terms as Mayor.

In the present case, only the 2nd requisite is present since in 1988, the private respondent was not a
candidate for Mayor in 1988 but as Vice Mayor though he succeeded the elected mayor in 1989. It was only
in 1992 and 1995 that he was a candidate for Mayor. As such, he could still be a candidate for Mayor in the
May, 1998 elections.

NOTE: Applying the above doctrine, MAYOR MAURICIO DOMOGAN of Baguio City is not
prohibited from running for City Mayor of Baguio in the 2001 elections because he was not
elected as City Mayor in 1992 though he served as City Mayor since 1992 as a result of the
disqualification of RAMON LABO, JR.. His 1992-1995 term was not by election but by operation
of law. It was only in 1995 and 1998 that he was a candidate for City Mayor (2 times) though he
served 3 TERMS as Mayor. The first requisite before the disqualification applies to him is not
present
 93

 ROMEO LONZANIDA VS. COMELEC, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 602
The petitioner was elected Mayor for three (3) consecutive terms. During his 3 rd term (1995 elections),
he was proclaimed the winner but his opponent filed an election protest and two (2) months before the next
election and 4 months before the end of his 3 rd term , the COMELEC declared his opponent to be the winner
and was able to occupy the position of Mayor for 2 months.

Is he entitled to run for the position of mayor in the election after he was declared a loser during his 3 rd
term but he almost completed 3 terms?

Held:

Yes because in order that the prohibition shall apply to him, the following requisites must be present:

1. the local official must have been elected for the same position [Example: Mayor] three times; and
2. the local official must have fully served three consecutive terms as Mayor.

In this case, he was not elected to the position 3 times because he lost during the 3 rd time though he
served the office for 2 years and 10 months. Likewise even assuming that he won the 3 rd election, he did not
fully serve the term of 3 years. It is not enough that an individual has served 3 consecutive terms in an
elective local office, he must have also been elected to the same position for the same number of times before
the disqualification can apply.

Prohibition to run for more than 3 consecutive terms.

 FEDERICO T. MONTEBON vs. COMELEC & ELEANOR ONDOY, G.R. No. 180444 , April 8,
2008
Petitioners Montebon, Ondoy and respondent Potencioso, Jr. were candidates for municipal councilor
of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections. On
April 30, 2007, petitioners and other candidates for municipal councilor filed a petition for disqualification
against respondent with the COMELEC alleging that respondent had been elected and served three
consecutive terms as municipal councilor in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. Thus, he is proscribed
from running for the same position in the 2007 elections as it would be his fourth consecutive term.
In his answer, respondent admitted that he had been elected for three consecutive terms as municipal
councilor. However, he claimed that the service of his second term in 2001-2004 was interrupted on
January 12, 2004 when he succeeded as vice mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of Vice Mayor
Petronilo L. Mendoza. Consequently, he is not disqualified from vying for the position of municipal
councilor in the 2007 elections.

In the hearing of May 10, 2007, the parties were directed to file their respective memoranda.

In petitioners’ memorandum, they maintained that respondent’s assumption of office as vice-mayor in

January 2004 should not be considered an interruption in the service of his second term since it was a
voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor. They argued that, according to the law,
voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the official concerned was elected.

On the other hand, respondent alleged that a local elective official is not disqualified from running
for the fourth consecutive time to the same office if there was an interruption in one of the previous three
terms.

On June 2, 2007, the COMELEC First Division denied the petition for disqualification ruling that
respondent’s assumption of office as vice-mayor should be considered an interruption in the continuity of
his service. His second term having been involuntarily interrupted, respondent should thus not be
disqualified to seek reelection as municipal councilor.

On appeal, the COMELEC En Banc upheld the ruling of the First Division, as follows:

Respondent’s assumption to the office of the vice-mayor of Tuburan in January 2004 during his second
term as councilor is not a voluntary renunciation of the latter office. The same therefore operated as an
effective disruption in the full service of his second term as councilor. Thus, in running for councilor again
 94

in the May 14, 2007 Elections, respondent is deemed to be running only for a second consecutive term as
councilor of Tuburan, the first consecutive term fully served being his 2004-2007 term.

Petitioner Montebon’s and Ondoy’s June 9, 2007 manifestation and omnibus motion are hereby
declared moot and academic with the instant disposition of their motion for reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on the ground that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that respondent’s assumption of
office as vice-mayor in January 2004 interrupted his 2001-2004 term as municipal councilor.

The petition lacks merit.

The 1987 Constitution bars and disqualifies local elective officials from serving more than three
consecutive terms in the same post. Section 8, Article X thereof states:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Section 43 of the Local Government Code also provides:

Sec. 43. Term of Office.

No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.

In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court held that the two conditions for the application of
the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms. In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, the Court emphasized that the term limit
for elective officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same
elective position. Thus, for the disqualification to apply, it is not enough that the official has been elected
three consecutive times; he must also have served three consecutive terms in the same position.

While it is undisputed that respondent was elected municipal councilor for three consecutive terms, the
issue lies on whether he is deemed to have fully served his second term in view of his assumption of office as
vice-mayor of Tuburan on January 12, 2004.

Succession in local government offices is by operation of law. Section 44 of Republic Act No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the
office of the vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor. Thus:

SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor.
– (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor
concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the
governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his
permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice
governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled
automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein. x x x

In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice mayor due to the retirement of Vice
Mayor Mendoza. Respondent, being the highest ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in accordance
 95

with law. It is clear therefore that his assumption of office as vice-mayor can in no way be considered a
voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor.

In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained the concept of voluntary renunciation as
follows:

The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, ‘Voluntary renunciation of
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which he was elected.’ The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to
circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the
people’s choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. (Emphasis added)

Thus, respondent’s assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an involuntary severance
from his office as municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term. It
cannot be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law. We
quote with approval the ruling of the COMELEC that –

The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether to accept the vacated post or not.
Section 44 of the Local Government Code makes no exception. Only if the highest-ranking councilor is
permanently unable to succeed to the post does the law speak of alternate succession. Under no
circumstances can simple refusal of the official concerned be considered as permanent inability within the
contemplation of law. Essentially therefore, the successor cannot refuse to assume the office that he is
mandated to occupy by virtue of succession. He can only do so if for some reason he is permanently unable
to succeed and occupy the post vacated.

Thus, succession by law to a vacated government office is characteristically not voluntary since it
involves the performance of a public duty by a government official, the non-performance of which exposes
said official to possible administrative and criminal charges of dereliction of duty and neglect in the
performance of public functions. It is therefore more compulsory and obligatory rather than voluntary.

THREE-TERM LIMIT FOR BARANGAY CAPTAINS.

 NICASIO BOLOS, JR. VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and REY ANGELES
CINCONIEGUE, G.R. No. 184082, March 17, 2009
The facts are as follows:
For three consecutive terms, petitioner was elected to the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay
Biking, Dauis, Bohol in the Barangay Elections held in 1994, 1997 and 2002.
In May 2004, while sitting as the incumbent Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, petitioner ran for
Municipal Councilor of Dauis, Bohol and won. He assumed office as Municipal Councilor on July 1, 2004,
leaving his post as Punong Barangay. He served the full term of the Sangguniang Bayan position, which
was until June 30, 2007.
Thereafter, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking,
Dauis, Bohol in the October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
Respondent Rey Angeles Cinconiegue, the incumbent Punong Barangay and candidate for the same
office, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of petitioner as candidate on the ground
that he had already served the three-term limit. Hence, petitioner is no longer allowed to run for the same
position in accordance with Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160.
Cinconiegue contended that petitioner’s relinquishment of the position of Punong Barangay in July
2004 was voluntary on his part, as it could be presumed that it was his personal decision to run as municipal
councilor in the May 14, 2004 National and Local Elections. He added that petitioner knew that if he won
and assumed the position, there would be a voluntary renunciation of his post as Punong Barangay.
In his Answer, petitioner admitted that he was elected as Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis,
Bohol in the last three consecutive elections of 1994, 1997 and 2002. However, he countered that in the May
14, 2004 National and Local Elections, he ran and won as Municipal Councilor of Dauis, Bohol. By reason of
his assumption of office as Sangguniang Bayan member, his remaining term of office as Punong Barangay,
which would have ended in 2007, was left unserved. He argued that his election and assumption of office as
 96

Sangguniang Bayan member was by operation of law; hence, it must be considered as an involuntary
interruption in the continuity of his last term of service.
Pursuant to Section 10 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8297 dated September 6, 2007, the petition was
heard by the Provincial Election Supervisor of Bohol. Upon completion of the proceedings, the evidence,
records of the case, and the Hearing Officer’s action on the matter were endorsed to and received by the
Commission on November 21, 2007.
The issue before the COMELEC was whether or not petitioner’s election, assumption and discharge of
the functions of the Office of Sangguniang Bayan member can be considered as voluntary renunciation of
his office as Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol which will render unbroken the continuity
of his service as Punong Barangay for the full term of office, that is, from 2004 to 2007. If it is considered a
voluntary renunciation, petitioner will be deemed to have served three consecutive terms and shall be
disqualified to run for the same position in the October 29, 2007 elections. But if it is considered as an
involuntary renunciation, petitioner’s service is deemed to have been interrupted; hence, he is not barred
from running for another term.
In a Resolution dated March 4, 2008, the First Division of the COMELEC ruled that petitioner’s
relinquishment of the office of Punong Barangay of Biking, Dauis, Bohol, as a consequence of his
assumption of office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, on July 1, 2004, was a voluntary
renunciation of the Office of Punong Barangay. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (First Division)

GRANTS the petition. Respondent NICASIO BOLOS, JR., having already served as
Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol for three consecutive terms is
hereby DISQUALIFIED from being a candidate for the same office in the October 29,
2007 Barangay and SK Elections. Considering that respondent had already been
proclaimed, said proclamation is hereby ANNULLED. Succession to said office shall
be governed by the provisions of Section 44 of the Local Government Code.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC en banc in a Resolution dated
August 7, 2008.

Hence, this petition for certiorari raising this lone issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISQUALIFYING
[PETITIONER] AS A CANDIDATE FOR PUNONG BARANGAY IN THE OCTOBER 29,
2007 BARANGAY AND SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN ELECTIONS AND,
SUBSEQUENTLY, ANNULLING HIS PROCLAMATION.

The main issue is whether or not there was voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong Barangay by
petitioner when he assumed office as Municipal Councilor so that he is deemed to have fully served his
third term as Punong Barangay, warranting his disqualification from running for the same position in the
October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.

Petitioner contends that he is qualified to run for the position of Punong Barangay in the October 29,
2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections since he did not serve continuously three
consecutive terms. He admits that in the 1994, 1997 and 2002 Barangay elections, he was elected as
Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms. Nonetheless, while serving his third term as Punong
Barangay, he ran as Municipal Councilor of Dauis, Bohol, and won. On July 1, 2004, he assumed office
and, consequently, left his post as Punong Barangay by operation of law. He averred that he served the full
term as member of the Sangguniang Bayan until June 30, 2007. On October 29, 2007, he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for Punong Barangay and won. Hence, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
in disqualifying him as a candidate for Punong Barangay since he did not complete his third term by
operation of law.

The argument does not persuade.

The three-term limit for elective local officials is contained in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution,
which provides:
 97

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.

David v. Commission on Elections elucidates that the Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress
from fixing any term of office for barangay officials, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix
such term in accordance with the exigencies of public service. The discussions in the Constitutional
Commission showed that the term of office of barangay officials would be “[a]s may be determined by law,”
and more precisely, “[a]s provided for in the Local Government Code.” Section 43(b) of the Local
Government Code provides that barangay officials are covered by the three-term limit, while Section 43(c)
thereof states that the term of office of barangay officials shall be five (5) years. The cited provisions read,
thus:

Sec. 43. Term of Office. –

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive
terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term
for which the elective official concerned was elected.

(c) The term of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan
shall be for five (5) years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay
officials on the second Monday of May 1997: Provided, That the sangguniang kabataan
members who were elected in the May 1996 elections shall serve until the next regular
election of barangay officials.

Socrates v. Commission on Elections held that the rule on the three-term limit, embodied in the
Constitution and the Local Government Code, has two parts:

x x x The first part provides that an elective local official cannot

serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only
consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part
states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not
interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance
from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the
service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a
continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election
for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term.

In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court stated that the second part of the rule on
the three-term limit shows the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution to bar any attempt to
circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the
people’s choice and grant their elected official full service of a term. The Court held that two conditions for
the application of the disqualification must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same government post; and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay for three consecutive
terms, satisfying the first condition for disqualification.

What is to be determined is whether petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily renounced his position as
Punong Barangay during his third term when he ran for and won as Sangguniang Bayan member and
assumed said office.

The Court agrees with the COMELEC that there was voluntary renunciation by petitioner of his
position as Punong Barangay.
 98

The COMELEC correctly held:

It is our finding that Nicasio Bolos, Jr.’s relinquishment of the office of Punong
Barangay of Biking, Dauis, Bohol, as a consequence of his assumption to office as
Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, on July 1, 2004, is a voluntary
renunciation.

As conceded even by him, respondent (petitioner herein) had already

completed two consecutive terms of office when he ran for a third term in the Barangay
Elections of 2002. When he filed his certificate of candidacy for the Office of
Sangguniang Bayan of Dauis, Bohol, in the May 10, 2004 [elections], he was not
deemed resigned. Nonetheless, all the acts attending his pursuit of his election as
municipal councilor point out to an intent and readiness to give up his post as Punong
Barangay once elected to the higher elective office, for it was very unlikely that
respondent had filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Sangguniang Bayan post,
campaigned and exhorted the municipal electorate to vote for him as such and then
after being elected and proclaimed, return to his former position. He knew that his
election as municipal councilor would entail abandonment of the position he held, and
he intended to forego of it. Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary.

Indeed, petitioner was serving his third term as Punong Barangay when he ran for Sangguniang
Bayan member and, upon winning, assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan member, thus,
voluntarily relinquishing his office as Punong Barangay which the Court deems as a voluntary
renunciation of said office.

Petitioner erroneously argues that when he assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan member, he
left his post as Punong Barangay by operation of law; hence, he did not fully serve his third term as
Punong Barangay.

The term “operation of law” is defined by the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia as “a term describing the
fact that rights may be acquired or lost by the effect of a legal rule without any act of the person affected.”
Black's Law Dictionary also defines it as a term that “expresses the manner in which rights, and sometimes
liabilities, devolve upon a person by the mere application to the particular transaction of the established
rules of law, without the act or cooperation of the party himself.”

An interruption in the service of a term of office, by operation of law, is exemplified in Montebon v.

Commission on Elections. The respondent therein, Sesinando F. Potencioso, Jr., was elected and served
three consecutive terms as Municipal Councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-
2007. However, during his second term, he succeeded as Vice-Mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of
the Vice-Mayor pursuant to Section 44 of R.A. No. 7160. Potencioso’s assumption of office as Vice-Mayor
was considered an involuntary severance from his office as Municipal Councilor, resulting in an interruption
in his second term of service. The Court held that it could not be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary
renunciation because it was by operation of law. Hence, Potencioso was qualified to run as candidate for
municipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu in the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and
Local Elections.

Further, in Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, respondent therein, Jose T. Capco, Jr., was elected as
Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending on June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989,
Capco became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco
was elected and served as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a
Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11, 1998 election. Capco’s disqualification was
sought on the ground that he would have already served as Mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30,
1998; hence, he would be ineligible to serve for another term. The Court declared that the term limit for
elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve the same
elective position. The Court held that Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the next election because
he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation
of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death,
of the deceased mayor. The vice-mayor’s assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is more a
 99

matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the application of
any term limit.

In this case, petitioner did not fill in or succeed to a vacancy by operation of law. He instead
relinquished his office as Punong Barangay during his third term when he won and assumed office as
Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed a voluntary renunciation of the Office of
Punong Barangay.

In fine, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the Resolutions dated March 4, 2008 and August 7, 2008, disqualifying petitioner
from being a candidate for Punong Barangay in the October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The COMELEC Resolutions dated March 4,

2008 and August 7, 2008 are hereby AFFIRMED.

Section 10. No province, city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged or
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the LGC and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the political units directly affected.
 Requirements: There must be a law or plebiscite.

Read: (Interpretation of the phrase “unit affected”)

 PAREDES VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 128 SCRA 6
Mayoyao, Ifugao. There are 20 barangays. A law was enacted dividing it into 2 municipalities. What are
the units affected?
SC said “only those forming part of the new local government unit”.

 LOPEZ VS. METRO MANILA COMMISSION, 136 SCRA 633

Imelda Marcos wants to be a Governor during martial law but all provinces have their governors and all
the governors are the friends of the President. Marcos created Metro Manila joining the town,cities or
adjoining provinces. Rizal in the Northe, Bulacan –south…..Metro Manila was created but most of the town
comes from the places surrounding it. Who shall join in the plebiscite?
Only those who form part of the new local government unit which is Metro Manila.

 TAN VS. COMELEC, 142 SCRA 727

If a province or town is created from an existing province or town, not only the registered voters of the
newly-created province or town shall participate but also the registered voters of the province or city where
the new local government unit was taken because they are also “directly affected”.
Still martial law. Marcos wants to give a friend a province to be a governor. He divided Negros Oriental
and Negros Occidental creating Negros Central(portion from Negros oriental and negros occidental were
taken). Who participated in the plebiscite?
All registered voters in the Negros Provinces not part of it.

 PADILLA VS. COMELEC, 214 SCRA 735

Town or municipality becoming a city: Income requirement is 100M.

 LEAGUE OF CITIES VS. COMELEC

When congress enacted into law 16 laws creating 16 cities. November 18,2008 – Unconstitutional;
December 21, 2009 – Constitutional; August 24, 2010 – Unconstitutional violating equal protection clause;
February 15, 2011 – Constitutional.
Can congress amend the local government code by enacting 16 laws allowing them to become cities even
if their income is only 25M? – Yes, they can impliedly repeal it at anytime.

 NAVARRO VS. ERMITA, February 10, 2010

They want to give a province for Ecleo. Congress enacted a law creating the Dinagat Province or Dinagat
Island. They took it from the several provincesof Surigao. Questioned by Navarro because under LGC, must
possess any two of the 3 requirements:
1. Income – 20M inorder to be considered as a province.
 100

2. Area – 2000 square km. of contiguous territory.

3. Population – 250,000 because under section 4, article 6: any province shall have at least 1 congressman.
Dinagat province has an income of 87M. Its land area is only 802 sq. km. and population is very low. SC
on Feb. 10, 2010, the law creating the Dinagat as Province of Dinagat Island is Unconstitutional. It meets
only 1 requirement. SC reversed themselves on April 11, 2011 and said “If what you are creating as a province
is composed of several islands, there is no need to comply with the 2000 sq. km. of contiguous territories.
(What ther counted only are the different islands above water, but if including below water, it will be one of
the biggest provinces of the Philippines)
SC “ as if we are talking of a province comprising of several islands, as if the requirement of 2000 sq.
km. is complied with. When the law uses the word contiguous, it applies only to provinces without water
separating them. It is Valid.

Sections 11-14
 CENIZA VS. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763
Mandaue City is a component city but the charter says they are not allowed to vote for provincial official.
(Santiago City, Isabela)
Valid because it is under the discretion of congress.

 Differentiate a highly urbanized city from a component city (See BP 337, Sections 162-168)
 Highly urbanized city – independent from the province, they have their own congressman.
Component cities – these are cities which could not survive by themselves and therefore they are still
within the control and supervision of the province and they should vote for provincial official.
 If there is a component city in which the charter says they are not allowed to vote for their provincial
official then the province has no control or supervision over them.

Sections 15-21
 Section 19 – the first congress under this constitution shall within 18 months enact a law on the
autonomous region. (there was a law)
 Can the present congress enact an autonomous region trhough the people? – Yes they will not enact but
by amending it.

Is there a Cordillera Autonomous Region?

 ORDILLO VS. COMELEC, 192 SCRA 100
If only one Province or only one city of the Cordilleras will vote in favor of autonomy, such is not enough
to constitute a Region. There must at least be two (2) provinces or one province and the City of Baguio for
form a Region)
 101

ARTICLE XI - ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Sections 1. Public Office is a public trust.

 CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA 704
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No.
455 (Senate Res. No. 455), “directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the
Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged
improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.”
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon,
wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the
resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations
and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to
deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same
time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1.
I S S U E:
Crucial to the resolution of the present petitions is the fundamental issue of whether Section 4(b) of
E.O. No. 1 is repealed by the 1987 Constitution. Assuming that it has not been repealed, is it not
inconsistent with Section 1, Art. XI which states that public office is a public trust?

The petition has no merit.

Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits the power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or
staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding, thus:
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in
any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance.
Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution stating that: “Public
office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.”
The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is invested with certain powers
and charged with certain duties pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the officer are held in
trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who
may need the intervention of the officers. Such trust extends to all matters within the range
of duties pertaining to the office. In other words, public officers are but the servants of the
people, and not their rulers.
Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public
accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other
administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public accountability, the same provision only
institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-accountability. In Presidential Commission on Good
Government v. Peña, Justice Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as “obiter” the portion of the majority
opinion barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b) of E.O. No. 1, a civil case for damages filed against the
PCGG and its Commissioners. He eloquently opined:
The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted, clearly obiter. It is important to
make clear that the Court is not here interpreting, much less upholding as valid and
constitutional, the literal terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No.1. If Section 4 (a)
were given its literal import as immunizing the PCGG or any member thereof from civil liability “for
anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order,” the constitutionality of
Section 4 (a) would, in my submission, be open to most serious doubt. For so viewed, Section 4 (a) would
institutionalize the irresponsibility and non-accountability of members and staff of the PCGG, a notion that
is clearly repugnant to both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and a privileged status not claimed by any other
official of the Republic under the 1987 Constitution. x x x.
It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or staff member of the
PCGG could not be required to testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such members were
exempted from complying with orders of this Court.
 102

Chavez v. Sandiganbayan reiterates the same view. Indeed, Section 4(b) has been
frowned upon by this Court even before the filing of the present petitions.

Sections 12--18

 IMPEACHMENT CASE
- 31 people subject of impeachment: President, Vice-President, 15 Justice of the SC,3 commissioners of the
CSC, 7 from COMELEC, 3 from the COA and the Ombudsman.
 Can congress enact a law adding officials in government to be removed by impeachment
– No.
 Who can initiate impeachment proceedings? – House of Representative. If 1/3 of the HR will
vote or sign the impeachment complaint is equivalent to article’s of impeachment and that official is
already impeached but not yet removed because under section 8, article 7: one of the grounds that the
VP will take over is when the President is removed not when he is impeached.
 Senate – 2/3 out of 24.

 Paragraph 5, Section 3, Article 11: No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of 1 year.

 GROUNDS FOR IMPEACHMENT - “Culpable violation of the constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust”
 Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification
to hold any other office under the Republic of the Philippines but shall nevertheless be liable to prosecution,
trial and punishment according to law.

 JAVELLANA VS. EXECUTIVE SEC.

A case WON the 1973 constitution was validly ratified because no plebiscite, but referendum and
included 15 years old and up. According to Marcos, it was overwhelmingly ratified. All the justices wrote
their own decision. The Chief justice summarizes it. Considering the voting, there is no legal impediment to
1973 constitution to be in force and ineffect.

 FRANCISCO VS. SPEAKER JOSE DE VENECIA, ET AL, 415 SCRA 44, November 10, 2003
Pres. Estrada. June 2003, Estrada and co. committed culpable violation of the constitution. Filed the
impeachment proceeding but when it reaches the committee of justice, it was immediately dismissed due to
insufficient in form and in substance. End because it will reach only the plenary if there is recommendation
that it is sufficient in form and in substance. In Sept. of 2003, 79 congressmen signed a complaint against
justice Davide. Can the 2nd impeachment complaint be entertained?
 An impeachment complaint is deemed instituted only if it reaches the plenary.
 HR promulgated that “Any complain that did not reach the plenary is not been initiated” and
therefore youcan file another one within the 1 year period.
 It is considered initiated if:
1. It was filed.
2. Coupled with congress taking an initial action of the said complain.

 When is an impeachment complaint deemed to be a bar to the filing of another complaint

within a 1-year period?
A verified impeachment complaint bars the filing of another complaint against an impeachable official
within a period of 1 year after the same was received by the House of Representatives and referred by the
Speaker to the appropriate committee for its study and recommendation. It is deemed initiated under Art.
XI, Section 3 [5] after the referral to the Committee by the Speaker. To “initiate” refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint COUPLED WITH CONGRESS TAKING INITIAL ACTION OF SAID COMPLAINT.”

 MERCEDITAS GUTIERREZ VS. HR COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, February 15, 2011

- July 26, 2010, opening of session. July 22, 2010, Akbayan group headed by Baraquel filed an impeachment
complaint. July 27, 2010, the day after the congress open its session, the group of bayan muna headed by
Reyes filed a second impeachment complain. When the session started, they gave it to the speaker and the
speaker on August 13 transmitted both to the Committee on Justice. CoJ deliberated on the 2 complains at
the sam time.
 103

 Is there a violation of the requirement that there should not be more than one
proceeding? – NO.
 “not more than 1 proceeding” – in the case at bar, they were filed at different dates but it
was simultaneously referred to CoJ and proceedings were done simultaneously.
 2nd issue: Her right to due process was violated because the CoJ is headed by Congressman
Tupas not expected to be Neutral or impartial and Tupas did not participate in voting.
 SC said “You cannot claim violation of your right to due process in instances where it is
involving a committee.

 As a rule, the Ombudsman shall investigate and prosecute crimes committed by public officers in connection
with the performance of their duties.
 In so far as Sandiganbayan is concern, they will only try cases of government officials from salary grade 27
and above as well as lower ranking officials in conspiracy with the official with a salary grade 27.

 CORPUZ VS. TANODBAYAN, 149 SCRA 281

- In cases of violation of election laws, rules and regulation.
- COMELEC official committed graft and corruption, bribery during election period with a salry grade 27.
Shall he be tried by the Sandiganbayan? – No. Shall he be investigated by the Ombudsman? - No.
- Who will investigate that official? – COMELEC.
- What court shall try if below SG 27? – MTC/RTC of the place where he committed the offense.

 Extent of the power of the Ombudsman in Administrative cases:

CSC usually decide cases involving government official. But if the complainant went to the Ombudsman,
The Ombudsman has the power to suspend, dismiss government official if that is first lodge to them.

 Power of the Ombudsman to suspend or dismiss public officials. Not only to recommend but
to directly dismiss or suspend public officials.

 REMIA F. BONCALON vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 171812, December 24, 2008.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On November 25, 1997, Loida C. Arabelo, the State Auditor II of Bago City, Negros Occidental,
conducted an audit on the cash accounts of Boncalon, a Cashier IV at Bago City Treasurer’s Office. The audit
revealed a cash shortage of P1,023,829.56. The state auditor also discovered, upon verification from the
depository bank, that the entry in Boncalon’s cashbook pertaining to the deposit of P1,019,535.21 on October
31, 1997 was false. Deposits totaling said amount were made only on November 25, 1997 and December 22,
1997, in the amounts of P200,000.00 and P819,535.21, respectively.
In view of the audit findings, Boncalon was administratively charged with dishonesty before the Office of
the Ombudsman (Visayas). The case was docketed as OMB-VIS-ADM-99-0488.
Boncalon denied accountability for any cash shortage and averred that she was informed by the state
auditor of the alleged shortage only on October 1, 1998, or after she had gone on a commuted leave of absence
from April 13, 1998 to July 15, 1998, wherein she was cleared of money and property accountability and paid
the corresponding money value of said leave. She also contended that had the state auditor examined her safe,
she would have found the bundles of money worth P819,535.21, which she had overlooked.
Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) I Alvin Butch E. Cañares recommended the dismissal of the case since
the questioned amounts were already accounted for. He also said that the erroneous entry of deposit in
Boncalon’s cashbook can only be considered as an administrative lapse, subject only to the admonition of
the erring public officer.
Upon review, Director Virginia Palanca-Santiago, Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), reversed the
recommendation of GIO I Cañares. She ruled that the untimely deposit of the questioned amount only
means that Boncalon was in possession of the money and had made use of it. Further, her act of falsifying
an entry of deposit in her cashbook, which is an official document, signifies want of integrity on her part as
she had the disposition to betray, cheat or defraud the government. Boncalon sought reconsideration, but to
no avail. Thus, she appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In the Decision dated February 27, 2004, the Court of Appeals found Boncalon guilty of dishonesty under
Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules on Civil Service. Citing the Cash Examination Manual, the Court of
Appeals stressed that entries in the cashbook are the direct and personal responsibility of every cash accountable
officer. And should they be duly permitted to be assisted by subordinates in case of heavy volume of work, the
work of their subordinates still remains under their close and strict supervision. The Court of Appeals also
emphasized that when Boncalon certified under oath that she “produced all her cash, treasury, warrants, checks,
 104

money orders, cash items, paid vouchers, unused accountable forms, etc. to the Auditor/Examiner on November
25, 1997,” she cannot later claim that she simply failed to notice the bundles of money in her safe. The fallo of the
decision reads,

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the finding of the Office
of the Ombudsman holding petitioner guilty of dishonesty and meting the penalty of dismissal
from government service with forfeiture of all benefits and perpetual disqualification of holding
public office is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, Boncalon filed this petition contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING PETITIONER’S
DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE OF ALL BENEFITS AND
PERPETUAL DISQUALIFICATION TO HOLD PUBLIC OFFICE ALTHOUGH THE
OMBUDSMAN HAS NO POWER TO DISMISS PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING PETITIONER’S
DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT SHE HAS NOT INCURRED
ANY SHORTAGE; THAT SHE HAS BEEN CLEARED OF MONEY AND PROPERTY
ACCOUNTABILITY; THAT SHE HAS ACCOUNTED THE FUNDS IN HER CUSTODY AND NO
DAMAGE HAS BEEN CAUSED TO THE CITY OF BAGO; and
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING PETITIONER’S
DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF BUT RELIANCE
MERELY ON PRESUMPTIONS, CONJECTURES AND INFERENCES THAT ARE MISTAKEN.

Essentially, the issues for resolution are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in upholding
Boncalon’s dismissal from service on the ground of dishonesty? and (2) Is the Ombudsman
empowered to dismiss public officials and employees in administrative cases?

Petitioner contends that the alleged shortage was already accounted for in the November 25, 1997 and
December 22, 1997 bank deposits. She explains that the late deposits of the said amounts were due to her
failure to notice the same in her safe, as they were in bundles. She also argues that the posting of entries in
her cashbook was already delegated to her subordinates due to her multifarious duties and functions as
Cashier IV. As such, the entry of deposit dated October 31, 1997 may only have been an unintended mistake
of her subordinates, considering that it was the last day of the month and holiday season followed.

She further avers that for liability to attach, notice and demand must be made upon her to afford her due
process, but to the contrary, the state auditor informed her only on October 1, 1998 or more than ten months
after the audit, and after she had gone on an approved leave of absence wherein she was cleared of money
and property accountability and paid the money value of said leave. Invoking Madarang v.
Sandiganbayan, she finally contends that mere absence of funds is not sufficient proof of conversion, nor is
her mere failure to turn over the funds at any given time sufficient to make a prima facie case, for
conversion must be affirmatively proved, either by direct evidence or by the production of facts from which
conversion necessarily follows.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for respondent Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), maintains
that the Court of Appeals did not err in upholding Boncalon’s dismissal because the cash shortage and false
entry of deposit remained undisputed. Even assuming that it was her subordinates who posted the said entry in her
cashbook, still, she should have taken the necessary precautions to verify the truthfulness of each entry therein. But
she did not. Thus, her explanation, that she overlooked the P819,535.21 inside her safe as they were in bundles, was
purely an alibi, too flimsy to accept.

After a judicious evaluation of the submissions and pieces of evidence of both parties, we are in agreement
that petitioner is, indeed, guilty of dishonesty.

First, this Court finds no basis for Boncalon’s protestations that she was deprived of due process of law
merely because the state auditor belatedly notified her of the alleged cash shortage. In administrative
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proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain
one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Here, we take
note that Boncalon was given every opportunity to explain her side in her letters to the state auditor dated
October 5, 1998, October 19, 1998 and December 10, 1998. She was further heard in person during
investigation by the graft investigating officer, as well as by the Director of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Visayas), and she was able to participate in all the stages of the administrative proceedings. Despite all
these, she could not justify the averred cash shortage as of November 25, 1997.

The Court acknowledges that indeed, as claimed by petitioner, when auditor Arabelo made her demand
on October 2, 1998 upon the petitioner to restitute P1,023,829.56 the same had already been settled and as
of the said date the discrepancies found in connection with the November 25, 1997 audit had already been
ironed out. Considering that the demand was made at the time when the amounts had already been
produced, then the prima facie evidence that missing funds were put to personal use, which presumption
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code supplies in connection with the felony of malversation, did not arise.
But the absence of the said prima facie evidence does not necessarily equate to an absence of administrative
liability on the part of petitioner.

It is undisputed that: 1) Petitioner had the duty to deposit in the bank the amount of P1,019,535.21 by
October 31, 1997; 2) Such amount was not deposited on October 31, 1997; 3) The entry in petitioner’s
cashbook of a deposit on October 31, 1997 in the amount of P1,019,535.21 is false; 4) The amount was
deposited in two tranches – P200,000 on November 25, 1997 and P819,535.21 on December 22, 1997.
These circumstances starkly speak of an irregularity that calls for an explanation on the part of the
responsible officer.

Petitioner wants to pass off the matter as an innocent error on her part. Her explanation however fails to
convince us that the subject entry was an honest mistake or innocuous error. Her claim that the cash of
P819,535.21 was in the safe when the audit was conducted on November 25, 1997, is contradicted by her
certification that she produced all her cash items, which amounted to only P47,106.14 in total, before the state
auditor on the said date. Also, her claim of having overlooked the bundles of money that were just sitting in her
safe is far too incredible to believe. Evidence, to be worthy of credit, must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but must be credible in itself. Stated otherwise, it must be natural, reasonable and probable as to
make it easy to believe. There is no test of the truth of human testimony except its conformity to human
knowledge, observation, and experience, and that whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is
outside of judicial cognizance. In the instant case, the subject “overlooked” sum would comprise, at the very least,
eight bundles of P1,000 peso bills plus other notes and coins. This stash is simply too bulky and noticeable to be
overlooked, especially in the face of an ongoing audit and cash examination. It is more reasonable to believe the
certification which states that the cash items at the time of the audit amounted to only P47,106.14.

Petitioner, by making or allowing the making of the subject false entry of deposit, made it appear that
the money was already out of her possession and that it was already in the bank, when the truth was that the
money was not yet in the bank and was actually unaccounted for. The fact that undated deposit slip/s were
used to support the entry of deposit as of October 31, 1997 in the cashbook is already irregular. The
undisputed and totally unexplained odd fact that the total amount was split into two deposits that were
separately made weeks after the entire sum was supposed to have been deposited on a single day -- October
31, 1997 -- underscores the irregularity. Such acts when connected together paint a clear picture of
deliberateness, not innocent error. The same manifests bad faith or, at the very least, each of the said acts
constitutes gross negligence amounting to bad faith. The circumstance that the entry of deposit on October
31, 1997 was never corrected to reflect the fact of non-deposit of the amount on that date and the fact of the
corresponding deposits of P200,000 on November 25, 1997 and P819,535.21 on December 22, 1997 further
underscores the conclusion that the matter was not an innocuous error.

Dishonesty is defined as “the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to

one’s office or connected with the performance of his duty.” The unsatisfactorily explained false
entry of deposit in the amount of P1,019,535.21 on October 31, 1997 clearly constitutes dishonesty.

Second, her justification that she did not prepare or post the said entry of deposit deserves scant
consideration because it appears to be a mere feeble attempt to shift the blame to her subordinates. As
 106

explicitly provided in the Cash Examination Manual, entries in her cashbook are her personal and direct
responsibility even in instances when she can delegate the task to a subordinate due to a heavy volume of
work. Moreover, it is highly unacceptable for a public officer like petitioner to attribute the lack of diligence
in work to the day of the month it was performed, i.e., last day of the month and the fact that holiday season
followed. Due diligence at work should be observed at all times.

Third, her liability cannot be mitigated, much less can she be exonerated, because no pecuniary damage
was allegedly incurred by the government on account of the late deposits of the public money in the
depository bank. As a cash-accountable officer, her duty is to immediately deposit the various funds she
received with the authorized government depositories. This duty is clearly set out in Commission on Audit
Circular No. 91-368 which states:
Sec. 465. Deposit of Collections. – The treasurer/cashier shall deposit intact
all his collections as well as all collections turned over to him by the
collectors/tellers with the authorized depository bank daily or not later than the
next banking day. He shall summarize the collections and deposits accomplishing the
Cashier/Treasurer’s Report of Daily Collections and Deposits (CTRDCD), Prov. Form No.
213(a) in three copies. The original and duplicate, together with the original and duplicate
copies of the DSCAF’s and the deposit slips and the duplicates of official receipts, shall be
submitted daily to the accountant. The third copies of the CTRDCD and the DSCAFs shall be
retained by the treasurer/cashier.
In the case of municipalities where travel time to the depository bank is more than one day,
deposit of collections shall be made at least once a week, or as soon as the collections reach
P10,000.

Clearly, petitioner is not supposed to keep funds in her custody for longer than a week. A failure to
make a timely turnover of the cash received by her constitutes, not just gross negligence in the performance
of her duty, but gross dishonesty, if not malversation.

Lastly, Madarang cannot be considered as precedent in the case at bar because the former is a criminal
case for malversation while the instant case is an administrative case for dishonesty.

It is not amiss to point out that public servants ought to exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty
and integrity, for no less than the Constitution mandates that a public office is a public trust. Public officers
and employees are accountable to the people, and must serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
and efficiency, as well as act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. These constitutionally-
enshrined principles, oft-repeated in our decisions, are not mere rhetorical flourishes or idealistic
sentiments, but they are working standards in accord with the State’s policy of promoting a high standard of
ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.

Apropos the second issue, petitioner contends in her defense that the power of the Ombudsman
concerning penalty after an investigation of public officials or employees is merely recommendatory. Thus, it
cannot directly impose sanctions against them. On the other hand, the OSG maintains that the prevailing
doctrine, as enunciated by us in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, is that the power of the
Ombudsman with regard to imposing sanctions is not merely advisory but mandatory.

On this point, we find that the stance of the OSG is correct. We have repeatedly held in a catena of
precedents, aside from Ledesma, that the Ombudsman has the power to directly impose the penalty of
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of an erring public official, other than a
member of Congress and the Judiciary, within the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority as
provided for in Section 13(3), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and Section 15(3) of Republic Act No.
6770. The clear and precise discussion of Justice Carpio on the matter in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court
of Appeals is worth repeating here, to wit:

While Section 15(3) of RA 6770 states that the Ombudsman has the power to
“recommend x x x removal, suspension, demotion x x x” of government officials and employees,
the same Section 15(3) also states that the Ombudsman in the alternative may “enforce its
disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21” of RA 6770. The word “or” in Section
 107

15(3) before the phrase “enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21” grants the
Ombudsman this alternative power.

Section 21 of RA 6770 vests in the Ombudsman “disciplinary authority over all elective
and appointive officials of the Government,” except impeachable officers, members of
Congress, and the Judiciary. And under Section 25 of RA 6770, the Ombudsman may impose in
administrative proceedings the “penalty ranging from suspension without pay for one
year to dismissal with forfeiture of benefits or a fine ranging from five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed, illegally taken or lost, or both at the discretion of the
Ombudsman x x x.”

Clearly, under Rep. Act No. 6770 the Ombudsman has the power to directly impose administrative
penalty on public officials or employees.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated February 27, 2004 and Resolution dated February 14, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71911, finding petitioner guilty of DISHONESTY and dismissing her
from government service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification to hold public
office, are hereby AFFIRMED.
 108

ARTICLE XIII - SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

 Secs. 1-19

 Adjudicatory Power of the Commission on Human Rights

 CARINO VS. CHR, DECEMBER 2, 1991

 EPZA vs. CHR, April 14, 1992
 SUMULONG VS. GUERRERO, G.R. No. L-48685, Sept. 30, 1987
 DIZON VS. GEN. EDUARDO, G.R. No. 59118, March 3, 1988

 Exec. Order No. 163, May 5, 1987, Declaring the effectivity of the creation of the Commission on Human
Rights as provided for under the 1987 Constitution.

 Memorandum Order No. 20, July 4, 1986

 109

ARTICLE XIV - EDUCATION, SCIENCE, etc..

Secs. 1-19
Read: RA 6655-The Free Secondary Education Act of 1988

Section 5 [2] Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.

What is academic freedom?

VERY IMPORTANT: (2007 BAR QUESTION)

Under the 1973 Constitution, “Academic freedom shall by enjoyed BY ALL institutions of higher
learning” while under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “Academic freedom shall be enjoyed IN ALL
institutions of higher learning.” In short, before, ONLY INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING
ENJOY ACADEMIC FREEDOM UNDER THE 1973 CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IS ALSO ENJOYED BY THE TEACHERS AND
PROFESSORS AS WELL AS STUDENTS, ASIDE FROM THE SCHOOL.

 Academic freedom; due process in disciplinary actions involving students; right to cross-
examine is not part of due process in investigations involving students.

 DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.WILFREDO D. REYES, in his

capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court of Manila, THE COMMISSION
ON HIGHER EDUCATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS,
ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE and ROBERTO
VALDES, JR., G.R. No. 127980, December 19, 2007

PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes,
Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle University (DLSU) and
College of Saint Benilde (CSB) Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement in an offensive action
causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux Fraternity.
On March 29, 1995, James Yap was eating his dinner alone in Manang’s Restaurant near La Salle,
when he overheard two men bad-mouthing and apparently angry at Domino Lux. He ignored the comments
of the two. When he arrived at his boarding house, he mentioned the remarks to his two other brods while
watching television. These two brods had earlier finished eating their dinner at Manang’s. Then, the three,
together with four other persons went back to Manang’s and confronted the two who were still in the
restaurant. By admission of respondent Bungubung in his testimony, one of the two was a member of the
Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. There was no rumble or physical violence then.
After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the fraternity through the
intercession of the Student Council. The Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was asking for an apology. “Kailangan
ng apology” in the words of respondent Aguilar. But no apology was made.
On March 25, 1995, Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m., James Yap went out of the campus
using the Engineering Gate to buy candies across Taft Avenue. As he was about to re-cross Taft Avenue, he
heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to ten guys were running towards him. He panicked. He did not
know what to do. Then, respondent Bungubung punched him in the head with something heavy in his
hands – “parang knuckles.” Respondents Reverente and Lee were behind Yap, punching him. Respondents
Bungubung and Valdes who were in front of him, were also punching him. As he was lying on the street,
respondent Aguilar kicked him. People shouted; guards arrived; and the group of attackers left. Yap could
not recognize the other members of the group who attacked him. With respect to respondent Papio, Mr. Yap
said “hindi ko nakita ang mukha niya, hindi ko nakita sumuntok siya.” What Mr. Yap saw was a long
haired guy also running with the group.
The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner James Yap and
Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the “Domino Lux Fraternity,” while the
alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and
Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of “Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity,” a rival fraternity.
The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint with the Discipline Board of DLSU
charging private respondents with “direct assault.” Similar complaints were also filed by Dennis Pascual
and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee and private respondents Valdes and Reverente. Thus, cases entitled “De
La Salle University and College of St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar (AB-BSM/9152105), James Paul Bungubung
 110

(AB-PSM/9234403), Robert R. Valdes, Jr. (BS-BS-APM/9235086), Alvin Lee (EDD/9462325), Richard

Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin A. Papio (AB-MGT/9251227)” were docketed as Discipline Case
No. 9495-3-25121.
The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents Aguilar,
Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring them to answer.
Private respondents filed their respective answers.
Said notices issued by De La Salle Discipline Board uniformly stated as follows:

Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had been constituted to
hear and deliberate the charge against you for violation of CHED Order No. 4 arising from the
written complaints of James Yap, Dennis C. Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano.

You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on April 19, 1995 at
9:00 a.m. at the Bro. Connon Hall for you and your witnesses to give testimony and present
evidence in your behalf. You may be assisted by a lawyer when you give your testimony or
those of your witnesses.

On or before April 18, 1995, you are further directed to provide the Board, through the
Discipline Office, with a list of your witnesses as well as the sworn statement of their proposed
testimony.

Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your failure to submit the list of
witnesses and the sworn statement of their proposed testimony will be considered a waiver on
your part to present evidence and as an admission of the principal act complained of.

For your strict compliance.

During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995, private respondents interposed the
common defense of alibi.
On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution finding private respondents
guilty. They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion, pursuant to CHED Order No. 4. The
dispositive part of the resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board finds respondents ALVIN
AGUILAR (AB-BSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403), ALVIN LEE
(EDD/94623250) and RICHARD V. REVERENTE (AB-MGT/9153837) guilty of having violated
CHED Order No. 4 and thereby orders their automatic expulsion.

In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB-MGT/9251227), the Board acquits

him of the charge.

SO ORDERED.

Private respondents separately moved for reconsideration before the Office of the Senior Vice-President
for Internal Operations of DLSU. The motions were all denied in a Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995.

On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed with the RTC, Manila, against petitioners a petition for
certiorari and injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74122 and assigned to
respondent Judge of Branch 36. The petition essentially sought to annul the May 3, 1995 Resolution of the
DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board and the June 1, 1995 Letter-Resolution of the Office of the Senior Vice-
President for Internal Affairs.

The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued a TRO directing DLSU, its subordinates,
agents, representatives and/or other persons acting for and in its behalf to refrain and desist from
implementing Resolution dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995 and to immediately
desist from barring the enrollment of Aguilar for the second term of school year (SY) 1995.
 111

On June 7, 1995, the CHED directed DLSU to furnish it with copies of the case records of Discipline Case
No. 9495-3-25121, in view of the authority granted to it under Section 77(c) of the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools (MRPS).

On the other hand, private respondents Bungubung and Reverente, and later, Valdes, filed petitions-in-
intervention in Civil Case No. 95-74122. Respondent Judge also issued corresponding temporary
restraining orders to compel petitioner DLSU to admit said private respondents.

On June 19, 1995, petitioner Sales filed a motion to dismiss in behalf of all petitioners, except James
Yap. On June 20, 1995, petitioners filed a supplemental motion to dismiss the petitions-in-intervention.

On September 20, 1995, respondent Judge issued an Order denying petitioners’ (respondents there)
motion to dismiss and its supplement, and granted private respondents’ (petitioners there) prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction.

Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was refused enrollment by petitioner DLSU when he
attempted to enroll on September 22, 1995 for the second term of SY 1995-1996. Thus, on September 25,
1995, Aguilar filed with respondent Judge an urgent motion to cite petitioners (respondents there) in
contempt of court. Aguilar also prayed that petitioners be compelled to enroll him at DLSU in accordance
with respondent Judge’s Order dated September 20, 1995. On September 25, 1995, respondent Judge
issued a writ of preliminary injunction, ordering d\De La Salle not to implement its decision expelling
private respondents. On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari (CA-
G.R. SP No. 38719) with prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of
respondent Judge’s September 20, 1995 Order and writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995.

On April 12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners’ prayer for preliminary injunction.

On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution No. 181-96, summarily disapproving the
penalty of expulsion for all private respondents. As for Aguilar, he was to be reinstated, while other private
respondents were to be excluded. The Resolution states:

RESOLUTION 181-96

RESOLVED THAT THE REQUEST OF THE DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY (DLSU),

TAFT AVENUE, MANILA FOR THE APPROVAL OF THE PENALTY OF EXPULSION
IMPOSED ON MR. ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, ROBERT R. VALDES, JR.,
ALVIN LEE AND RICHARD V. REVERENTE BE, AS IT IS HEREBY IS, DISAPPROVED.

RESOLVED FURTHER, THAT THE COMMISSION DIRECT THE DLSU TO

IMMEDIATELY EFFECT THE REINSTATEMENT OF MR. AGUILAR AND THE LOWERING
OF THE PENALTY OF MR. JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, MR. ROBER R. VALDEZ, JR., (sic)
MR. ALVIN LEE AND MR. RICHARD V. REVERENTE FROM EXPULSION TO
EXCLUSION.

Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner DLSU again prevented private respondent Aguilar from
enrolling and/or attending his classes, prompting his lawyer to write several demand letters to petitioner
DLSU. In view of the refusal of petitioner DLSU to enroll private respondent Aguilar, CHED wrote a letter
dated June 26, 1996 addressed to petitioner Quebengco requesting that private respondent Aguilar be
allowed to continue attending his classes pending the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of
Resolution No. 181-96. However, petitioner Quebengco refused to do so, prompting CHED to promulgate
an Order dated September 23, 1996 which states:

Acting on the above-mentioned request of Mr. Aguilar through counsel enjoining De La

Salle University (DLSU) to comply with CHED Resolution 181-96 (Re: Expulsion Case of Alvin
Aguilar, et al. v. DLSU) directing DLSU to reinstate Mr. Aguilar and finding the urgent request
as meritorious, there being no other plain and speedy remedy available, considering the set
deadline for enrollment this current TRIMESTER, and in order to prevent further prejudice to
 112

his rights as a student of the institution, DLSU, through the proper school authorities, is hereby
directed to allow Mr. Alvin Aguilar to provisionally enroll, pending the Commission’s Resolution
of the instant Motion for Reconsideration filed by DLSU.

Notwithstanding the said directive, petitioner DLSU, through petitioner Quebengco, still refused to
allow private respondent Aguilar to enroll. Thus, private respondent Aguilar’s counsel wrote another
demand letter to petitioner DLSU.

Meanwhile, on June 3, 1996, private respondent Aguilar, using CHED Resolution No. 181-96, filed a
motion to dismiss in the CA, arguing that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 rendered the CA case moot and
academic.

On July 30, 1996, the CA issued its questioned resolution granting the motion to dismiss of private
respondent Aguilar.

On October 28, 1996, petitioners requested transfer of case records to the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) from the CHED. Petitioners claimed that it is the DECS, not CHED, which has
jurisdiction over expulsion cases, thus, necessitating the transfer of the case records of Discipline Case No.
9495-3-25121 to the DECS.

On November 4, 1996, in view of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 38719 and
the automatic lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, private respondent Aguilar filed an urgent motion to
reiterate writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 before respondent RTC Judge of Manila.

On January 7, 1997, respondent Judge issued its questioned order granting private respondent Aguilar’s
urgent motion to reiterate preliminary injunction. The pertinent portion of the order reads:

In light of the foregoing, petitioner Aguilar’s urgent motion to reiterate writ of

preliminary injunction is hereby granted, and respondents’ motion to dismiss is denied.

The writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 is declared to be in force
and effect.

Hence, this case.

I S S U E S:

Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom in support of its decision to expel the
private respondents?

H E L D:
Since De La Salle University is an institution of higher learning, it enjoys academic
freedom which includes the right to determine whom to admit as its students.

Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning academic
freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its
aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when
the overriding public interest calls for some restraint. According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom
encompasses the independence of an academic institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what
may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.

While La Salle is entitled to invoke academic freedom in its actions against its students,
the penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU on private respondents is disproportionate to their
misdeed.

It is true that schools have the power to instill discipline in their students as subsumed in their academic
freedom and that “the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those
pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the
institution, but to its very survival.” This power, however, does not give them the untrammeled discretion to
 113

impose a penalty which is not commensurate with the gravity of the misdeed. If the concept of proportionality
between the offense committed and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes.
That would give rise to a due process question.

We agree with respondent CHED that under the circumstances, the penalty of expulsion is grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of the acts committed by private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes,
Jr. Each of the two mauling incidents lasted only for few seconds and the victims did not suffer any serious
injury. Disciplinary measures especially where they involve suspension, dismissal or expulsion, cut significantly
into the future of a student. They attach to him for life and become a mortgage of his future, hardly redeemable
in certain cases. Officials of colleges and universities must be anxious to protect it, conscious of the fact that,
appropriately construed, a disciplinary action should be treated as an educational tool rather than a punitive
measure.

Accordingly, petitioner DLSU may exclude or drop the names of the said private respondents from its
rolls for being undesirable, and transfer credentials immediately issued, not EXPEL.

Read:

 THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. RUBEN AYSON, August 17, 1989
- UP declared that there will be no highschool. Ayson said that act of UP is Unconstitutional and then UP
appealed to SC on questions of law alleging that they were just exercising their academic freedom.

 UP BOARD OF REGENTS VS. CA, August 31, 1999

- Academic Freedom includes the power of a University to REVOKE a degree or honor it has conferred to a
student after it was found out that the student’s graduation was obtained through fraud.
- Academic freedom is given a wide sphere of authority. If an institution of higher learning can decide on who
can and cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of
being its graduates.

Academic Freedom—

- It is an atmosphere in which there prevail the four essential freedom of a university to determine for itself
on academic grounds: (Requisites of Academic Freedom):
a. who may teach,
b. what may be taught,
c. how it shall be taught, and
d. who may be admitted to study"' (Emphasis supplied; citing Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 491,
(1962) and the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hampshire (354 US 234
[1957]).

 GARCIA VS. FACULTY ADMISSION, 68 SCRA 277

"What is academic freedom?
Briefly put, it is the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach the
truth as they see it in the field of their competence. It is subject to no control or authority except the control
or authority of the rational methods by which truths or conclusions are sought and established in these
disciplines."

"The personal aspect of freedom consists in the right of each university teacher recognized and effectively
guaranteed by society to seek and express the truth as he personally sees it, both in his academic work and
in his capacity as a private citizen. Thus the status of the individual university teacher is at least as
important, in considering academic freedom, as the status of the institutions to which they belong and
through which they disseminate their learning."

 VILLAR VS. TIP, April 17, 1985

They asked the school that they me be allowed to rally and involving the policies of the school involving
the Department of animal husbandry. The school allowed them to rally from 7 o’clock to 10 o’clock at the
gym of the school. After 10, they left the gymnasium and continued the rally infront of the school campus
 114

using megaphones that disturb the classes. The students were suspended for 1 year and not allowed to enroll
during the next semester. They went to the SC.
SC said “That suspension is too long but also the students violated the rules of the school. So the 10 days
that they were out of school shall be considered their penalty. Both the school and the students are liable.
The students were allowed to rally for a given time but they should not abuse it. The school also has a right
to impose discipline to the students but not to the extent of one year.

 ALCUAZ VS. PSBA, May 2, 1988

At first, they studied at PSBA. After 1st semester, they went to enroll in the 2nd semester. All their grades
are very high but they are quite radical, the school does not want them because they are the one leading
rallies. The school does not allow them on the 2nd semester.
Paras said “Yes, in so far as college students is concern, the contract is per semester basis”.
They file a MR. the en banc decided it and said “in so far as students is concerned obligations of
contracts is not applicable. Academic freedom dictates that the students are entitled to continue in that
school provided:
3. He meets the academic requirement.
4. He was not liable administratively.

 Even if you are outside the school campus, you committed an act during the semester;
re:De la sale vs. CA – you can be discipline by the school.

 GUZMAN VS. NU, 142 SCRA 706

Part of academic freedom on the part of students is:
1. He has the right to question the policies of the school.
2. They have the right to petition the school for redress or their grievances.
3. In all administrative cases, the student is entitled to due process.

 ANGELES VS. SISON, 112 SCRA 26

A student was always insulted by his professor during classes. One sunday he accompany him in a
drinking session and was able to revenge by boxing him. Can he be charged by the professor?
Yes because even though it’s a Sunday not a school day and not inside the school campus, the school can
continue to have control over the students while he is enrolled in that school when the semester is not yet
over.
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ARTICLE XVI - GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sections 1-12

Section 3: The state may not be sued without its consent.

 Three underlying principles behind the provision that the state is immune from suit:
1. By reason of sovereignty – Re: section 1, article 8, par 2. Judicial power can be invoke if there is legally
demandable and enforceable rights. Meaning if there is a law where you will base your right, then you
can sue or you can go to court. And if you want to sue the government, the government is giving you
the right to sue and then its awkward to be suing the government which is the very entity giving you
the right to sue. As a rule: We should not be allowed to be suing the state/government.
2. By reason of public policy – if all is allowed to sue the government it will prejudice the public service.
3. By reason of consent – we ratify the constitution stating that the state has immunity to suit. We have
waived that right to sue the state. (State can be sued if there is an express consent and if there is
implied consent.)

 Consent is either Express or Implied

When can there be Express consent to sue the government – When there is a law enacted by the allowing
us to sue the government then we can sue the government.

 Are there laws enated by the state allowing us to sue the government?

A. Express
1. general law
- C.A. 327
- Act 3083, Sec. 1
- Art. 2180 par. 6, New Civil Code (R.A. 386): It allows individuals to sue the government for damages
if it acts thru special agent.
- PD 1807, January 16, 1981 – The government of the Philippines is waiving its immunity from suit if
the one suing it are foreign corporations investing in the Philippines.

 The government thru congress could also enact a law allowing a person to sue it.

2. Special law

 MERRITT VS. GOVERNMENT, 34 Phil. 311

Meritt is a very rich and successful businessman in Manila. One day, he was bumped by a speeding
ambulance of PGH and both feet was amputated. He sue the government for damages for the amputation of
his feet and loss income. Court dismiss it because there was no consent given by the government. He went to
a congressman, enacting a special law stating that state is waiving state immunity allowing Meritt to sue the
government. He retuned to court for the 2nd time but was dismissed. Went to SC but was also dismiss.
Article 2180 is applicable – the state is liable when it acts trough a special agent.(not the person authorized
by the government to perform that function yet the government allowed him to do it)
Regular driver is not acting through special agent. Only the driver be held criminally and civilly liable
despite the fact that the government allowed himself to be sued.

 Distinguish suability and liability in connection of the state immunity from suit.
Suability – as a rule, you cannot sue the state but even assuming that the state allow you to sue it that does
not mean that you can collect that the state is liable.

B. Implied

1. When the government institutes a suit;

 State immunity from suit; when government officers initiate a suit against a private party,
it descends to the level of a private individual susceptible to counterclaims
 116

 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN and ROBERTO BENEDICTO, 484

SCRA 119
When the State through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed a complaint
against a private individual before the Sandiganbayan and thereafter, enters into a compromise agreement ,
it cannot later on invoke immunity from suit.

Where the State itself is no less than the plaintiff in the main case, immunity from suit cannot be
invoked because when a state, through its duly authorized officers takes the initiative in a suit against a
private party, it thereby descends to the level of a private individual and thus opens itself to whatever
counterclaims or defenses the latter may have against it. When the State enters into contract, through its
officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim or purpose and pursuant to a constitutional legislative
authority, whereby mutual and reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, the
State may be sued even without its express consent, precisely because by entering into a contract the
sovereign descends to the level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering
into such contract, breach of which on its part gives the corresponding right of the other party to the
agreement.

2. When the government engages in business or enters into a contract

 MINISTERIO VS. CFI of Cebu, 40 SCRA

The government cannot validly invoke State immunity in connection with a suit filed by individuals
whose lands were used by the government for roads to collect just compensation of their property. To do so
would be to allow the State to cause injustice to its citizen and enrich itself to the prejudice of its people.
 Extension of Osmena boulevard. People voluntarily gave their lot. 10 years later, there was still no
payment. Poor land owners went ot CFI of Cebu to collect the just compensation but was dismiss
because the government did not gave its consent.
 SC said ‘the government should be the last entity to commit an injustice to its citizen or to commit fraud
on its cictizen, to violate its implied consent within its citizen.”

 U.S. VS. RUIZ, 136 SCRA

A construction vs. US government. Contract to repair the wharves surrounding the Subic Naval Base.
After less than 1 month, US government terminated its contract with “A” Construction and replaced them. A
construction filed a damage suit against the US government it went to the sala of Judge Ruiz of Olongapo.
US government filed a motion to dismiss but was denied because there is implied consent when US
contracted with “A” Construction. Is that valid? (indespansable to the defense of the US government as well
as the Phil. Government sot it is a governmental function or jure imperii.)
 It should have been valid if the other party is the Philippine government.
 “A” Construction could not sue the government.

 Rule: Government performing governmental function, if there is a contract you can sue and
that applies here in the Philippines.

 If you are dealing with a foreign government, you can sue if it is the contract is jus gestiones. But if the
contract is jure imperii, then you cannot sue.

 Jure imperii – governmental functions. If the one involved is a foreign government where there is a
contract but that contract involves jure imperii or governmental functions, then you cannot sue that foreign
government without its consent.

 Comfort women cannot file directly against the Japanese government, they must course it to Philippine
government.

 TORIO VS. FONTANILLA, 85 SCRA 599

Local government units are liable for the death or injuries as a result of the collapse of the stage built by
the town for the town fiesta since holding of a town fiesta is in the exercise of its business or proprietary
function because there is no law that requires towns to hold an annual town fiesta.

During town fiesta in Mangatarem, Pangasinan. The province put up a stage on both sides of the road
infront of the municipal hall. In the process of viewing by the people, the stage collapsed killing Torio
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beneath the stage. He died. They sued the municipality for damages. Municipality invoke immunity from
suit.
Issue: Whether the holding of an annual town fiesta is in connection with the governmental function of the
state or proprietary function.
SC said “there is no where in the LGC or Administrative Code could we find a provision requiring on LGU to
hold an annual town fiesta.”

 MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN VS. JUDGE DUMDUM, JR., RTC 7 CEBU CITY,
March 22, 2010
Municipality of Hagonoy wanted to purchase 15 second hand truck for their garbage collection. Went to
Cebu and entered into a corporation there. They were able to bring home 15 trucks with agreement to pay
the same but they did not pay. The corporation filed a case against the Municipality of Hagonoy in RTC Cebu
where they are holding their offices. Municipality of hagonoy file a motion to dismiss invoking immunity
from suit. RTC did not dismiss it. They went to SC.
Was the RTC of Cebu correct in not dismissing the case even though it is in performance of its
governmental functions?
SC said, the court was correct because even though the municipality could validly invoke immunity from suit
in cases where it exercising governmental function, in the case at bar there is a contract and therefore there
is an implied consent.
The fact that the municipality is in bad faith, was the court correct in issuing a writ of preliminary
attachment? – SC said as a rule: If the other party was in bad faith in contracting an obligation, then it is
correct to issue a writ of preliminary attachment. But not if the respondent is any branch, agency,
subdivision or instrumentality of the government or any LGU because it is prejudicial.

Even if you have a claim against the City of Baguio, writ of preliminary attachment is not proper.

Process: Claim – decision. The judgment shall be submitted to the legislative body of the place where
you have a claim.(City of baguio – submit to Sangguniang Panglungsod) so that they will include it in their
appropriation for the next year.

Immunity from suit; effect of a void contract with the government; unjust enrichment
 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH VS. C.V. CANCHELA, et al., 475 SCRA 218
The DOH entered into three owner –consultant agreements with the private respondents covering
infrastructure projects for the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center (BGHMC), the Batangas
Regional Hospital and the Corazon L. Montelibano Memorial regional Hospital in Bacolod City.
The agreements for the three (3) projects are almost identical. This requires the private respondents to
prepare: detailed architectural and engineering design plans; technical specifications and detailed estimates
of cost of construction of the hospital, including the preparation of bid documents and requirements; and
construction supervision until completion of hand-over and issuance of final certificate.
While the Agreements were witnessed by the respective Chief Accountants of the hospitals and were
duly approved by the Department of Health, the former did not issue corresponding certificates of
availability of funds to cover the professional or consultancy fees.
The DOH through is authorized representative, wrote separate letters to the respective chiefs of
hospitals confirming the acceptance of private respondents’ complete Contract or Bid Documents for each
project and RECOMMENDED THE PAYMENT OF 7.5% OF THE PROJECT ALLOCATION TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS AS CONSULTANCY FEES.
During the construction of the projects, various deficiencies in the performance of the agreed scope of
private respondents’ work were allegedly discovered which were not communicated to the private
respondents. Due to such alleged deficiencies, petitioner withheld payment of the consultancy fees due to
private respondent. Neither did petitioner return the documents, plans, specifications and estimates
submitted by private respondents.
Considering the refusal of the DOH to pay said fees despite repeated demands, the private respondents
submitted the dispute to the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC).
After the presentation of evidence by both parties, the Arbitrator issued his decision dated March 30,
1999 sentencing the DOH to pay the private respondents to pay P3,492,713.00 for services performed and
completed for and accepted by DOH. The said amount shall earn interest at 6% per annum from the date of
the award until the decision becomes final. Thereafter, the principal and the interest accrued as of such time
shall earn interest at 12% per annum.
 118

The DOH filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 before the Court of Appeals but was dismissed for
being filed out of time. As such, on motion of the private respondents, the Arbitrator issued a Writ of
Execution .

Issue:
Whether or not the CIAC has jurisdiction to entertain the suit considering that the Agreements, being to
promote the heath and well-being of the citizens, is in furtherance of the state’s sovereign and governmental
power and therefore, IMMUNE FROM SUIT.

Held:
In their Memorandum before the Supreme Court, the DOH, for the first time, raised the nullity of the
three (3) agreements from the very beginning for failure to include therein a certification of availability of
funds which is required under existing laws, particularly the Auditing Code of the Philippines, PD 1445. As
such, the fees of the private respondents shall not be based on the project fund allocation but on the basis of
reasonable value or on the principle of quantum meruit.
While the agreement is indeed void ab initio for violation of existing laws, the DOH is liable to pay the
private respondents their consultancy services based on quantum merit to be determined by the
Commission on Audit.
The invocation of immunity from suit is without merit. This is so because the government has already
received and accepted the benefits rendered. To refuse payment as a result of the state’s immunity from suit
would be to allow the government to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of another. (Citing Eslao vs. COA,
195 SCRA 730)

 Doctrine of Quantum Merit – The government should not be allowed to cause an injustice to its
citizen.(to the extent of the services rendered).
 Even if the contract is void, can collect through Innominate Contract.
 In so far as contract with Philippines government is concern: If there is a written contract, you can sue
the government because that is considered implied consent.

 TESTS OF SUABILITY FOR INCORPORATED GOVERNMENT

 RAYO VS. CFI OF BULACAN, 110 SCRA 456

In 1976, a very strong typhoon was hitting Bulacan. NAPOCOR opened the Angat Dam. Several houses
on both sides of the dam was swept away even people. A case was filed against NAPOCOR as a result of their
opening of the dam without proper warning. What kind of function does NAPOCOR exercise? –
governmental function.CFI of Bulacan dismissed the complaint because the state is immune from suit.
(NAPOCOR is a corporation created by law, Section 5 – it can sue and be sued)
Even though it is governmental function but if it has a charter saying that it can sue and be sued, still
you can sue this corporation. (Immunity from suit does not apply if the charter provides otherwise.

 Even if the National Power Corporation is a government office performing

governmental functions [to provide electricity for the entire country and
ordinarily, it should have been immune from suit] it can be sued because its
charter mandates that it can sue and be sued.

 Are LGU immune from suit? – Yes, if they are performaing governmental function.
Re: Article 8185 of the Civil Code – provision allowing us to sue the LGU.

 Tests of Suability for an unincorporated govt. agency government agency

 SANTIAGO VS. REPUBLIC, 87 SCRA 294

Failure of the government to fulfill its obligation in connection with a lot donated by a private
individual to the government entitles the former to file a case for the revocation of the said donation. The
State cannot raise the defense of State Immunity since it should not be allowed to profit from its own
illegal act of not complying with its obligation.
Santiago said “I am donating my land to be used as a road but you have to install streetlights infront of
my house where that new road will passed. There was a deed of donation signed by the government through
the DPWH. 4 ½ years, no streetlights but the government had already constructed a road onhis lot. He went
to court to annul the donation. Government invoke immunity from suit.
 119

SC said “you cannot allow the government to raise such kind of defense because it should not be allowed
to profit from its non compliance of its part in the contract”.

 As a general rule: If the government is performing governmental function, it cannot be sued except if
there is consent. If the government is performing business/proprietary function, it can be sued unless
the charter provides otherwise.

“jure imperii”---is the same as governmental function; and

“jus gestiones”---is the same as business or proprietary function.

 LOIDA Q. SHAUF and JACOB SHAUF vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DON E. DETWILER
and ANTHONY, G.R. No. 90314 November 27, 1990
Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the
United States Air Force, applied for the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, GS 1710-9, in the Base
Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified. As found by the trial court, she
received a Master of Arts degree from the University of Sto. Tomas, Manila, in 1971 and has completed 34
semester hours in psychology-guidance and 25 quarter hours in human behavioral science; she has also
completed all course work in human behavior and counseling psychology for a doctoral degree; she is a civil
service eligible; and, more importantly, she had functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at
the GS 1710-9 level for approximately four years at the time she applied for the same position in 1976.

Contrary to her expectations, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf was never appointed to the position occupied by
Mrs. Abalateo whose appointment was extended indefinitely by private respondent Detwiler.

Feeling aggrieved by what she considered a shabby treatment accorded her, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf
wrote the U.S. Civil Service Commission questioning the qualifications of Edward Isakson. Thereafter, said
commission sent a communication addressed to private respondent Detwiler, 10 finding Edward Isakson not
qualified to the position of Guidance Counselor, GS 1710-9, and requesting that action be taken to remove
him from the position and that efforts be made to place him in a position for which he qualifies. Petitioner
Loida Q. Shauf avers that said recommendation was ignored by private respondent Detwiler and that
Isakson continued to occupy said position of guidance counselor.

Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf likewise wrote the Base Commander of Clark Air Base requesting a hearing on
her complaint for discrimination. Consequently, a hearing was held on March 29, 1978 before the U.S.
Department of Air Force in Clark Air Base.

Before the Department of Air Force could render a decision, petitioner Loida Q. Shauf filed a complaint
for damages, dated April 27, 1978, against private respondents Don Detwiler and Anthony Persi before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch LVI at Angeles City, docketed as Civil Case No. 2783, for the alleged
discriminatory acts of herein private respondents in maliciously denying her application for the GS 1710-9
position.

Private respondents, as defendants in Civil Case No. 2783, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
as officers of the United States Armed Forces performing official functions in accordance with the powers
vested in them under the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement, they are immune from suit. The
motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

Petitioners aver that private respondents are being sued in their private capacity for discriminatory acts
performed beyond their authority, hence the instant action is not a suit against the United States
Government which would require its consent.

Private respondents, on the other hand, claim that in filing the case, petitioners sought a judicial review
by a Philippine court of the official actuations of respondents as officials of a military unit of the U.S. Air
Force stationed at Clark Air Base. The acts complained of were done by respondents while administering the
civil service laws of the United States. The acts sued upon being a governmental activity of respondents, the
complaint is barred by the immunity of the United States, as a foreign sovereign, from suit without its
consent and by the immunity of the officials of the United States Armed Forces for acts committed in the
performance of their official functions pursuant to the grant to the United States Armed Forces of rights,
power and authority within the bases under the Military Bases Agreement. It is further contended that the
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rule allowing suits against public officers and employees for unauthorized acts, torts and criminal acts is a
rule of domestic law, not of international law. It applies to cases involving the relations between private
suitors and their government or state, not the relations between one government and another from which
springs the doctrine of immunity of a foreign sovereign.

The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the
1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as
part of the law of our land under Article 11, Section 2. This latter provision merely reiterates a policy earlier
embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and also intended to manifest our resolve to abide by the rules
of the international community.

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only sects against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the
damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been
formally impleaded. It must be noted, however, that the rule is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable
under all circumstances.

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts
contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director
of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen etc., et al. "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only
legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an
action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the
protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In
the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of
a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates crime invades the
personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of
authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the
State may not be sued without its consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity
cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.

They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the
public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of
protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their
individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess
of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his
personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad
faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.

The agents and officials of the United States armed forces stationed in Clark Air Base are no exception to
this rule. In the case of United States of America, et al. vs. Guinto, etc., et al., ante we declared:

It bears stressing at this point that the above observations do not confer on the United States of America
blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners
claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the
United States in the discharge of their official functions.