Republic of the Philippines Martini’s employer who informed her that he had already disembarked on even
SUPREME COURT month. She soon found out that Martini was in Alabang, Muntinlupa.
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 171042 June 30, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LYNNETTE CABANTUG-BAGUIO, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
From the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu, Branch 24 nullifying the marriage of respondent, Lynnette Cabantug-
Baguio (Lynnette), to Martini Dico Baguio (Martini), the Republic through the
Office of the Solicitor General filed the present petition for review.
Lynnette and Martini contracted marriage on August 12, 1997. Less than three years
later or on October 12, 2000, Lynnette filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cebu City a complaint1 for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil
Case No. CEB 25700, on the ground of Martini’s psychological incapacity to comply
with the essential marital duties and obligations under Articles 68-702 of the Family
Code.
Despite service of summons upon Martini, he never filed any responsive pleading to
the complaint.3 No collusion was established between the parties.4 Upon the
authority of the Solicitor General, the provincial prosecutor of Cebu City appeared in
the case under the former’s supervision and control.5
From the deposition of Lynnette taken before Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Monalila
S. Tecson on January 10, 2001,6 the following are gathered:
Lynnette and Martini, a seaman working overseas, became pen pals in 1995.
In 1996, the two met in person during Martini’s vacation after the expiration of his
contract on board an ocean-going vessel.
On August 12, 1997, Martini, then 32, and Lynnette, then 34, contracted
marriage,7 following which they moved to the house of Lynnette’s parents at 33-B
La Guardia Extension, Lahug, Cebu City. Martini, however, stayed there only on
weekends, and during weekdays he stayed with his parents in Looc, Lapu-lapu City.
While Lynnette suggested that the two of them stay in the house of Martini’s parents,
Martini disagreed, claiming that there were many already living with his parents.
Lynnette noticed that every time she conversed with Martini, he always mentioned
his mother and his family, and she soon realized that he was a "mama’s boy." And
she noticed too that when she would call up Martini at his parent’s house and his
mother was the one who answered the call, she would deny that he was around.
In 1998, after Martini again returned following an almost 10-month contract
overseas,8 he stayed with Lynnette. When in 1999 Martini again disembarked, he
stayed with his parents.
On the insistence of his mother, Martini’s monetary allotment was shared equally
between her and Lynnette.
Lynnette had since January 1999 not heard from Martini. And since April 1999,
Lynnette stopped receiving her share of the allotment, drawing her to inquire from
When Lynnette and Martini finally met in Cebu City, he told her that they are not
compatible and should just part ways.
The last time the couple talked was on October 14, 1999 when Martini was at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) about to depart for abroad. Since then,
Martini never communicated with Lynnette. On investigation, Lynnette learned that
Martini declared in his employment records that he was "single" and named his
mother as principal allottee.9
Hence, Lynnette’s filing of the complaint for declaration of nullification of marriage.
Aside from her deposition,10 Lynnette presented her Certificate of
Marriage,11 Martini’s undated Seafarer Information Sheet,12 the letter of clinical
psychologist Dr. Andres S. Gerong (Dr. Gerong) to Martini requesting for a personal
interview,13 Dr. Gerong’s testimony,14 and the Psychological Evaluation
Report15 prepared by Dr. Gerong after his interview of Lynnette and her sister Dr.
Rosemarie Sistoza.16
In the Psychological Evaluation Report, Dr. Gerong noted as follows:
1. The couples [sic] were married on August 12, 1997 in Danao City, Cebu[;]
2. After the wedding the couple stayed at the petitioner’s residence, but the defendant
would always go home to his parents in Looc, Lapu-lapu City;
3. Defendant did not show any directions to establish their home, [is] happy-go-
lucky, and would just see the plaintiff for his physical and sexual needs;
4. Plaintiff felt being used, exploited, uncared for, taken for granted, abandoned;
5. Defendant’s parents appeared to control the son to the extent of meddling [with]
the finances coming from the income as a seaman;
6. Defendant never showed respect for his parents-in-law;
7. Parents of the defendant insisted [on] a co-allot[ment without] any protestations
from the plaintiff who has been generous all the time;
8. Defendant remained immature, could not stand by his wife and would still depend
upon the decisions of his parents and without any personal directions as to what to do
with his family;
9. Strictly speaking, the couple never really live[d] together as husband and wife like
any ordinary couple17(underscoring supplied),
and concluded that
Defendant shows immature personality disorder, dependency patterns, and self-
centered motives. Th[ese are] the core personality dysfunctions noted and have been
exaggeratedly expressed which are detrimental to the familial well-being;
The situation is serious, grave, existing already during the adolescent period, and
incurable because personality and character are stable whether or not it is normal and
adaptive.
xxxx
The defendant is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations in marriage and family.18 (Underscoring supplied)
Expounding on his findings, Dr. Gerong testified, thus:
ATTY. SINGCO: (To witness)
Q: In gist, what were your findings as to the psychological capacity or incapacity of
defendant Martini Dico Baguio?
A: x x x [T]o sum it up, the synopsis of the findings, the defendant husband appeared
to be [a] dependent person to his family and unable to [sever . . .] the connection
being a married man and to establish a domicile for his family and to support his
family.
xxxx
ATTY. SINGCO: (To witness)
Q: Dr. Gerong, how grave or serious is the psychological incapacity of the
defendant?
A: Being, I would say in our popular parlance, "mama’s boy" as alleged, that
will endanger the integrity of the marriage because instead of establishing a
permanent conjugal relationship with the wife the husband-defendant would remain
dependent on his family.
xxxx
ATTY. SINGCO: (To witness)
Q: Okay, in terms of the chances that this incapacity will be cured, what are the
chances, if any?
A: As to curability, since I am using a clinical term ["]personality or character
disorder or dysfunction["] and as I have said many times that the personality is stable
and pervasive over time. And if it is established as early as adolescent period and up
to the present it has remained persistent thru the years and therefore it’s a permanent
trait of the defendant-husband, therefore it’s incurable.19 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
By Decision20 of January 2, 2002, Branch 24 of the Cebu City RTC found Martini
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, and that the same incapacity existed "at the time the couple exchanged
their marriage vows."
The Solicitor General, via appeal,21 challenged before the Court of Appeals the trial
court’s decision
. . . DECLARING THE PARTIES’ MARRIAGE NULL AND VOID,
DEFENDANTS MARTINI DICO BAGUIO’S PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.22
By Decision23 of January 13, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
decision. Addressing the Solicitor General’s argument that Dr. Gerong’s testimony
failed to establish the cause of Martini’s psychological incapacity and to show that it
existed at the inception of the marriage,24 the Court of Appeals held:
x x x [I]n contradiction of the Republic’s contention and its supporting above-cited
doctrine, this Court cites the more recent jurisprudence laid down in the case
of Marcos v. Marcos,25 in which the High Tribunal has foregone with the
requirement that the defendant should be examined by a physician or psychologist as
aconditio sine qua non for declaration of nullity of marriage. It held thus:
"The x x x guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated x x x – [w]hat is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition, [f]or
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination for the person concerned
need not be resorted to."26
Therefore, the oral deposition [of Lynette] and the Psychological Evaluation
Report by Dr. Andres S. Gerong, Ph.D. as Clinical Psychologist declaring the
defendant psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations in
marriage and family life was sufficient for US to believe that undeniably the
defendant suffers psychological incapacity.27 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
On the Solicitor General’s contention that Martini’s abandonment of Lynnette is a
ground for legal separation and not for declaration of nullity of marriage, 28 and that
Martini’s alleged personality traits are not of the nature contemplated by Article 36
of the Family Code,29 the Court of Appeals declared:
x x x WE note that it was not the abandonment which was the ground relied upon by
the plaintiff-appellee but the defendant’s being a mama’s boy.30
xxxx
Being a Mama’s Boy, his uncaring attitude towards his wife, declaring himself
single and naming his mother as the beneficiary, spending more time with his
family and less with his wife and ultimately, abandoning her manifested defendant’s
psychological incapacity. These, to sum it all, to US are manifestations of severe
psychological disorder rather than a mere obstinate refusal to comply with his
marital obligations.31 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Solicitor General’s Motion for Reconsideration32 having been denied by the
Court of Appeals,33 the present petition34 was filed, faulting the appellate court to
have gravely erred:
I
. . . IN RULING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION AND TESTIMONY
OF DR. ANDRES GERONG THAT DEFENDANT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED HAVE LEGAL BASIS.
II
. . . IN FAILING TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT ABANDONMENT BY
ONE’S SPOUSE IS ONLY A GROUND FOR LEGAL SEPARATION AND NOT FOR
THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
III
. . . IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT’S BEING A MAMA’S BOY IS A
MANIFESTATION OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDER.35 (Italics in the original)
The Solicitor General’s arguments persuade.
The Solicitor General argued as follows:
Dr. Gerong merely testified that defendant’s alleged psychological incapacity (being
a mama’s boy) began in his adolescent stage and has remained persistent through the
years (p. 20, Brief). Dr. Gerong did not detail this finding. He made no effort to look
into and testify on defendant’s past life, attitudes, habits and character to explain
defendant’s alleged psychological incapacity as required by this Honorable Court in
the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1998).
Again, while it is true that Dr. Gerong testified that defendant’s alleged defect is
incurable, he failed to explain why it is clinically or medically permanent. His only
basis for saying that it is incurable is his finding that defendant has been a mama’s
boy since his adolescence (p. 7, TSN, June 19, 2001). During the trial, Dr. Gerong
also failed to explain in detail why the defendant’s alleged psychological incapacity
is grave and to discuss what kind of disorder defendant is suffering
from.36 (Emphasis in the original; italics and underscoring supplied)
On the doctor’s findings in his Report, the Solicitor General argued:
The said findings reveal nothing in defendant’s past life and acts that shows a
behavior pattern that would prove his alleged psychological incapacity. Dr. Gerong’s
finding that defendant’s parents are too controlling because they were made co-
allottees of the remittances sent by their son does not prove the alleged psychological
incapacity of defendant. The report likewise failed to explain the gravity of the
alleged psychological incapacity of defendant and state whether or not it
incapacitates defendant from carrying out the normal and ordinary duties of marriage
and family. There is likewise no explanation by Dr. Gerong why he found
defendant’s incapacity to be incurable. This Honorable Court has held that such
illness must be shown to be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligation of the marriage. Such incapacity must also be shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable and grave [Republic vs. Court
of Appeals and Molina, supra]. These Dr. Gerong failed to do.
Even when the rules have been relaxed and the personal examination of the
defendant by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, the totality of
evidence presented during trial by private respondent must stillprove the gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability of the alleged psychological
incapacity(Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 [2000]; Santos v. Court of Appeals,
240 SCRA 20 [1995]). (Emphasis in the original; italics and underscoring supplied)
In fine, the Solicitor General concluded that there was no showing that Martini’s
alleged personality traits are of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family
Code and the rulings of this Court in the cited cases,37 and that Martini’s
abandonment of Lynnette constitutes only a ground for legal separation but not for
declaration of nullity of marriage.38
Article 36 of the Family Code on which Lynnette anchors her complaint provides
that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization."
Article 36 must be read in conjunction with the other articles in the Family Code,
specifically Articles 35, 37, 38, and 41 which provide different grounds to render a
marriage void ab initio, as well as Article 45 which dwell on voidable marriages, and
Article 55 on legal separation.39 Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not to be applied indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on
the matter.40
And Article 36 should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond
at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves, nor with legal separation in
which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical
violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like. 41
"Psychological incapacity" has been elucidated on as follows:
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and
idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality
disorders, there is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. x x x [T]he root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness, and its incapacitating nature must be fully
explained x x x.42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities"
does not constitute psychological incapacity.43 Nor does failure of the parties to meet
their responsibilities and duties as married persons.
It is essential that the parties to a marriage must be shown to be insensitive
to or incapable of meeting their duties and responsibilities due to some
psychological (not physical) illness,44 which insensitivity or incapacity should have
been existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage even if it becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.45
In fine, for psychological incapacity to render a marriage void ab initio, it must be
characterized by
(a) Gravity – It must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage;
and
(c) Incurability – It must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved. 46
Dr. Gerong found that Martini’s "personality disorders" including his being a
"mama’s boy" are "serious, grave, existing already during the adolescent period and
incurable" and concluded that Martini "appeared" to be dependent upon his family
and unable "to establish a domicile for his family and to support his family."
The doctor’s findings and conclusion were derived from his interview of Lynnette
and her sister and Lynnette’s deposition. From Lynnette’s deposition, however, it is
gathered that Martini’s failure to establish a common life with her stems from his
refusal, not incapacity, to do so. It is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will,47 which renders a marriage void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. In another vein, how the doctor arrived at the conclusion,
after interviewing Lynnette and considering her deposition, that any such personality
disorders of Martini have been existing since Martini’s adolescent years has not been
explained. It bears recalling that Martini and Lynnette became pen pals in 1995 and
contracted marriage in 1997 when Martini was already 32 years old, far removed
from adolescent years.
Dr. Gerong’s citing of Martini’s appointment of his mother as a beneficiary and his
representing himself as single in his Seafarer Information Sheet, without more, as
indications of Martini’s dependence on his family amounting to his incapacity to
fulfill his duties as a married man does not logically follow, especially given that the
Seafarer’s Information Sheet is not even dated 48 and, therefore, there is no certainty
that it was prepared after Martini contracted marriage.
While the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare him/her
psychological incapacitated is not required, the root cause thereof must be
"medically or clinically identified." There must thus be evidence to adequately
establish the same. There is none such in the case at bar, however.
The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the
basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. 49 Marriage, an
inviolable institution protected by the State,50 cannot be dissolved at the whim of the
parties.51 In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to
show the nullity of marriage lies on the plaintiff.52 Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity.53
As reflected above, Lynnette failed to discharge the onus probandi. While the Court
sympathizes with her predicament, its first and foremost duty is to apply the
law.54 Dura lex sed lex.
Lynnette’s marriage with Martini may have failed then, but it cannot be declared
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity in light of the insufficient
evidence presented.55
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated January 13, 2005 isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. CEB 25700
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 24, isDISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 138509 July 31, 2000
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner,
vs.
ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce
B. Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the
same respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-
Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally
Hernandez. Based on petitioner's complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was
filed against respondent on February 25, 1998, which was docketed as Criminal Case
No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Quezon City. Sometime
thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage
license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal
case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a
prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to
suspend the criminal case in an Order dated December 29, 1998. 1 Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues that respondent should
have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before
entering into the second marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial question
justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism pursuant to
Article 40 of the Family Code.2
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the subsequent filing of a civil
action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial
question to a criminal case for bigamy.
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein.3It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.4 It must appear not only that the
civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the
resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative
of the criminal case.5 Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or
intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution
determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed. 6 Its two essential
elements are:7
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the
accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order
to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a
prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential
elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering
that the prosecution has not yet presented a single evidence on the indictment or may
not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the
ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal
charge through a non-criminal suit.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the
second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for
the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the
marriage.8Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter
of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the
second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can
successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur – two of which are a
previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it not
been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage. 9
In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of
nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to
prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too.
Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the
Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply
claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally
void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even
enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite - usually the marriage
license - and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a
declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void.
Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held
inLandicho v. Relova:10
(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the
validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second
marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for lack of a
marriage license. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that her marriage to
respondent was exempt from the requirement of a marriage license. More
specifically, petitioner claims that prior to their marriage, they had already attained
the age of majority and had been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years.11 The issue in this case is limited to the existence of a prejudicial question, and
we are not called upon to resolve the validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may,
suffice it to state that the Civil Code, under which the first marriage was celebrated,
provides that "every intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage,
the indissolubility of the marriage bonds." 12 [] Hence, parties should not be permitted
to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the same must be submitted
to the determination of competent courts. Only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists.13 No matter how obvious, manifest or patent
the absence of an element is, the intervention of the courts must always be resorted
to. That is why Article 40 of the Family Code requires a "final judgment," which
only the courts can render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova,14 he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case
may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration
of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we held that the pendency of a civil case
for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question. 15 This ruling
applies here by analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.
Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be
successfully invoked as an excuse.16The contracting of a marriage knowing that the
requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in
disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code. 17 The
legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is presumed to know the
law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of nullity when he entered
into the second marriage, why should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial
declaration in order to delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by
his own disobedience of the law? If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous
marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he presents his evidence during
the trial proper in the criminal case.
The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the second
marriage was contracted rests upon the defense,18 but that is a matter that can be
raised in the trial of the bigamy case. In the meantime, it should be stressed that not
every defense raised in the civil action may be used as a prejudicial question to
obtain the suspension of the criminal action. The lower court, therefore, erred in
suspending the criminal case for bigamy. Moreover, when respondent was indicted
for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two marriage ceremonies appeared
indubitable. It was only after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of
seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent,
therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to the civil action as a potential
prejudicial question for the purpose of frustrating or delaying his criminal
prosecution. As has been discussed above, this cannot be done.1awphi1
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having
obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to
have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage
though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry
again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void.19 The reason is that, without
a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In
the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a
married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner.20 Against
this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the
fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first
marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the
criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above, Republic of the Philippines
respondent cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal SUPREME COURT
action against him.21 Manila
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29, 1998 of THIRD DIVISION
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226 of Quezon City is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the trial court is ordered to IMMEDIATELY proceed with Criminal G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
Case No. Q98-75611. ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,
SO ORDERED. vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her
Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA, respondents.
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.

ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no grave
abuse of discretion in the lower court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which
was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that: they
were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as
evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License
No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage
with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still
existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when
Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present,
she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only
when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign
employer since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and completely
dependent upon her for support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she
purchased real and personal properties with a total amount of approximately
P350,000.00, which are under the possession and administration of Roberto;
sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was
cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that he had been disposing of
some of her properties without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about
this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to
take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession and
administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not
authorized to administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of their
marriage. The petition prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of
administration and ownership over said properties; their marriage be declared null
and void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the sole and
exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriage and such
properties be placed under the proper management and administration of the
attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of
action. The marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity
is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no
property which is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying the
motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a man with
another woman is illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145
SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void
marriage (citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v. Mendoza,
95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case there is no dispute that the second marriage
contracted by respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage with another
woman is illegal and void. However, as to whether or not the second marriage should
first be judicially declared a nullity is not an issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de
Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although
the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while
the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of its
nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous rulings of the
Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of Aragon and Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no property in his
possession is an issue that may be determined only after trial on the merits. 1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application of Vda. de
Consuegra v. GSIS 2 and the absence of justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the
marriage. On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for
reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt within which to
file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action
of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to
dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals 3 dismissed the petition. It explained that
the case of Yap v. CA 4 cited by petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon
by the lower court do not have relevance in the case at bar, there being no identity of
facts because these cases dealt with the successional rights of the second wife while
the instant case prays for separation of property corollary with the declaration of
nullity of marriage. It observed that the separation and subsequent distribution of the
properties acquired during the union can be had only upon proper determination of
the status of the marital relationship between said parties, whether or not the validity
of the first marriage is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid
duplication and multiplicity of suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be
invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and distribution of the
properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held that
private respondent's prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage may
be raised together with other incidents of their marriage such as the separation of
their properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error
in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss is merely one of law for which the remedy
ordinarily would have been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of an
adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied for lack of merit. 5
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is
necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes
of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to
recover certain real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon 6 and People
7
v. Mendoza, contends that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
and Separation of Property filed by private respondent must be dismissed for being
unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article 40
of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage is required only for purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP No.
1989-J contains no allegation of private respondent's intention to remarry, said
petition should therefore, be dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in
order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of the properties acquired
during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated
while the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still
subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning. 8Petitioner himself does
not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage. 9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are
cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that
Justice Alex Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would
be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage
was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent cases
involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its
earlier ruling in the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's order
forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed property acquired during the second
marriage, the Court stated that "if the nullity, or annulment of the marriage is the
basis for the application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial declaration
thereof, which of course contemplates an action for that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra
v. Government Service Insurance System, that "although the second marriage can be
presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras, 12 however, the Court turned around and applied
the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the prayer of the first wife
asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of the
death certificate of her deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage
that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is
null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court reverted to
the Consuegra case and held that there was "no need of introducing evidence about
the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other,
for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial
declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be
regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with
respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence
on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly
required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. 14Where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free
from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision
Committee 16 which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the
position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of
the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. This is borne
out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees where the present Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.
B. Article 39. —
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only void but
also voidable marriages. He then suggested that the above provision be modified as
follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked
only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for himself
whether or not his marriage is valid and that a court action is needed. Justice Puno
accordingly proposed that the provision be modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment
annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article
41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice Puno,
however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of annulment, they still have to
produce the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does it include
the annulment of a marriage and the declaration that the marriage is void? Justice
Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in some judgments, even if
the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno suggested that this matter
be made clear in the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first a
judicial declaration of a void marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the
other members concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable marriages are presumed
valid until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the other members affirmed.
Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the phrase "absolute nullity" can stand
since it might result in confusion if they change the phrase to "invalidity" if what
they are referring to in the provision is the declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral defense as
well as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision is
that there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage void and a party should
not declare for himself whether or not the marriage is void, while the other members
affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral
attack on that point. Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on
the assumption that the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one of
the right to raise the defense that he has no liability because the basis of the liability
is void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on
the validity or invalidity of the marriage because it will be taken up in the same
proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration that, it is a void marriage. Justice
Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision to
remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be invoked only
on the basis of final judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage, the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not solve
the objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one enters
into a subsequent marriage without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity
of a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the original
wording of the provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void, except as provided in Article 41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for
the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and
void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first
marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a necessity for a
declaration of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage before contracting
another in the recent case of Terre v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning down the
defense of respondent Terre who was charged with grossly immoral conduct
consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other
than complainant while his prior marriage with the latter remained subsisting, said
that "for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a
second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab
initio is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,
petitioner submits that the same can be maintained only if it is for the purpose of
remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to petitioner's theory, will
warrant dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of
the word "solely." As it is placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Realizing the need for careful
craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the Committee members, the
provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which
case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the
phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been correct and,
that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for
purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that
such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only
for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where
a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes
other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition,
distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an
action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the
latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier
final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the
instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains
subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is
required by law to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he
may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of
remarriage, why should the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous
marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void? Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable
social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by
the State." 20 In more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as "a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal, and family life." 21 So crucial are
marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . .
." 22 As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of
contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of
both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to the essential
requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal
effect — and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be
reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the
grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human
ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a social significant institution, an
official state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the
exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by
the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same
would be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second
sought to be contracted by one of the parties may be gleaned from new information
required in the Family Code to be included in the application for a marriage license,
viz, "If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was
dissolved and annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family
Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that private respondent's
failure to state in the petition that the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result
in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40
resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term "solely" was in fact anticipated by that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be
the members of the Committee. instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of
purposes of remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final property according to the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to
judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the basis only of a final reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is
judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal term "solely" instead of brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions
"only," which the Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied) regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the respondent court committed no
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of marriage reversible error in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of
is unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private respondent should have filed an discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties alleged to have been acquired WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent
during their union. In such an eventuality, the lower court would not be acting as a Court dated February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are
mere special court but would be clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the issues of AFFIRMED.
possession and ownership. In addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to SO ORDERED.
separate or partition as the petition admits that all the properties were acquired with
private respondent's money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other
incident of their marriage such as the separation of their properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment
therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of
their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases,
are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may
be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in
bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal
partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there
are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of
children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee
contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked
by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in
bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be
stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be
disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession.
(n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage
shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary
disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n) 26
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for
separation of property will simply be one of the necessary consequences of the
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages
contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose ―death benefits‖ is now
the subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he
married. 1âwphi1.nêt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in
toto the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil
Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two
marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño
(hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely,
Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with
respondent Susan Yee Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he
had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes
complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992,
under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both
petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance
pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan
Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from ―MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,‖ 3 while respondent Susan Yee
received a total of P21,000.00 from ―GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).‖ 4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of
sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be
ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos
(P146,000.00) collectively denominated as ―death benefits‖ which she (petitioner)
received from ―MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.‖
Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial
court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during
the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the
marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no
knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the
funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife
of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent
contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because
the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof,
respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner
which bears no marriage license number; 5 and 2) a certification dated March 9,
1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads –
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses
SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this
municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or
transcription of Marriage License number from the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cariño for whatever
legal purpose it may serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits
arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, plus attorney’s fees in the
amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS.
GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING
EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND
UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN
MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF
THE FAMILY CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from
legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 9 However,
for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an
earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. 11
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the
validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the
determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject ―death benefits‖ of the
deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage, 12 and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions, 13 renders the marriage void ab initio. 14
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A
marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This
notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the
deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage
license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court held that such a certification is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance
of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar
enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record
of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to
prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license.
Although she was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have
squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her
pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently
avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her
case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and
the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and
not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is
undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage
of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the ―death benefits‖ under
scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article
40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can
enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of
the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of
the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was
solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent
Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the
property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. 16 Considering
that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be
absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by
the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on ―Property Regime of
Unions Without Marriage.‖
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of
bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine,
relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple
alliances of the same married man, 17 -
“... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions ...”
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual
joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by
each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of
care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are
excluded in this regime. 18
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a
bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous
marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the
application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.],
NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations,
incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a
police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could
not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of
these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and
the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right
whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said ―death benefits‖ of
the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of
the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147
of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license.
Article 147 of the Family Code reads -
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed
to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted
in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent
party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by
either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and
will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and
the other did not contribute thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed ―death
benefits‖ were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147
creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half
thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the
first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject ―death
benefits‖ under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime,
and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his
legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case
of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, 20 where the Court
awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the
other half, to the second wife, holding that:
“... [S]ince the defendant’s first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void
the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the
first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the
new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him.
Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such
putative heir she has an interest in the husband’s share in the property here in
dispute....” And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that
although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial
declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the
second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, “[t]he only
just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second
wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband, and
consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first
marriage.” 21
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule
which requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is
the reason why in the said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in
accordance with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the
Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is
an all important condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a
party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has
to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she
could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void.
The same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void because the parties
are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage.
However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of
sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate
judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present
evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from
which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the
determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved
and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable
laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such
need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted
that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus
attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement
as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 136467 April 6, 2000
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner,
vs.
MARIETTA CALISTERIO, respondent.
VITUG, J.:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land
with an estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein
respondent Marietta Calisterio.
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to
James William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City. James Bounds
disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were
married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having priorly
secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead.
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister
of Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch
104, a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico
Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole
surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and
respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and thereby null
and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be appointed
administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and that the inheritance be
adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled.
Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first marriage with
James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his whereabouts being
unknown, for more than eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with
Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority
in the administration of the estate of the decedent.
On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointly Sinfroniano
C. Armas, Jr., and respondent Marietta administrator and administratrix,
respectively, of the intestate estate of Teodorico.
On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of petitioner
Antonia; it adjudged:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding for the petitioner and against
the oppositor whereby herein petitioner, Antonia Armas y Calisterio, is declared as
the sole heir of the estate of Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos. 1
Respondent Marietta appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals,
formulating that —
1. The trial court erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code in the instant
case despite the fact that the controversy arose when the New Civil Code was the law
in force.
2. The trial court erred in holding that the marriage between oppositor-appellant and
the deceased Teodorico Calisterio is bigamous for failure of the former to secure a
decree of the presumptive death of her first spouse.
3. The trial court erred in not holding that the property situated at No. 32 Batangas
Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, is the conjugal property of the
oppositor-appellant and the deceased Teodorico Calisterio.
4. The trial court erred in holding that oppositor-appellant is not a legal heir of
deceased Teodorico Calisterio.
5. The trial court erred in not holding that letters of administration should be granted
solely in favor of oppositor-appellant. 2
On 31 August 1998, the appellate court, through Mr. Justice Conrado M. Vasquez,
Jr., promulgated its now assailed decision, thus:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE, and a new one entered declaring as follows:
(a) Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico remains valid;
(b) The house and lot situated at #32 Batangas Street, San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City, belong to the conjugal partnership property with the concomitant
obligation of the partnership to pay the value of the land to Teodorico's estate as of
the time of the taking;
(c) Marietta Calisterio, being Teodorico's compulsory heir, is entitled to one half of
her husband's estate, and Teodorico's sister, herein petitioner Antonia Armas and her
children, to the other half;
(d) The trial court is ordered to determine the competence of Marietta E. Calisterio to
act as administrator of Teodorico's estate, and if so found competent and willing, that
she be appointed as such; otherwise, to determine who among the deceased's next of
kin is competent and willing to become the administrator of the estate. 3
On 23 November 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, prompting her to interpose the present appeal. Petitioner asseverates:
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing and
setting aside the decision of the trial court is not in accord with the law or with the
applicable decisions of this Honorable Court. 4
It is evident that the basic issue focuses on the validity of the marriage between the
deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta, that, in turn, would be determinative of
her right as a surviving spouse.
The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta was
solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that time was the Civil Code, not
the Family Code which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the
Family Code 5 itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby
would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of the
New Civil Code which provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of
the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be
illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the and nieces, being entitled to the other half. Nephews and nieces, however, can only
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, succeed by right of representation in the presence of uncles and aunts; alone, upon
or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally the other hand, nephews and nieces can succeed in their own right which is to say
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of that brothers or sisters exclude nephews and nieces except only in representation by
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according the latter of their parents who predecease or are incapacitated to succeed. The
to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three appellate court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion
cases until declared null and void by a competent court. of its judgment, successional rights, to petitioner's children, along with their own
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime mother Antonia who herself is invoking successional rights over the estate of her
of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first deceased brother.1âwphi1
annulled or dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions from the above rule. WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.
For the subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases therein 51574 is AFFIRMED except insofar only as it decreed in paragraph (c) of the
provided, to be held valid, the spouse present (not the absentee spouse) so dispositive portion thereof that the children of petitioner are likewise entitled, along
contracting the later marriage must have done so in good faith. 6 Bad faith imports a with her, to the other half of the inheritance, in lieu of which, it is hereby
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong — it DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedent's estate pertains solely to
partakes of the nature of fraud, a breach of a known duty through some motive of petitioner to the exclusion of her own children. No costs.
interest or ill will. 7 The Court does not find these circumstances to be here extant. SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary8 as long as
the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in
these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid
"until declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that the burden of
proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the second marriage.
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous
marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must
concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for
four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the
circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance;
(b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already
dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary
proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in
consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as
so provided in Article 41 9 , in relation to Article 40, 10 of the Family Code.
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband,
James William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven
years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico
Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the
Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been adduced
to indicate another property regime between the spouses, pertains to them in
common. Upon its dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the property should
rightly be divided in two equal portions — one portion going to the surviving spouse
and the other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse. The successional right in
intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net estate 11 of the deceased, concurring with
legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces (the latter by right of
representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the brothers and sisters or nephews
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 159614 December 9, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (TENTH DIVISION), and ALAN
B. ALEGRO, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, for the declaration of presumptive death of
his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A. Julaton.
In an Order1 dated April 16, 2001, the court set the petition for hearing on May 30,
2001 at 8:30 a.m. and directed that a copy of the said order be published once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks in the Samar Reporter, a newspaper of general
circulation in the Province of Samar, and
that a copy be posted in the court’s bulletin board for at least three weeks before the
next scheduled hearing. The court also directed that copies of the order be served on
the Solicitor General, the Provincial Prosecutor of Samar, and Alan, through counsel,
and that copies be sent to Lea by registered mail. Alan complied with all the
foregoing jurisdictional requirements.2
On May 28, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss3 the petition, which was, however, denied
by the court for failure to comply with Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. 4
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January 20,
1995 in Catbalogan, Samar.5 He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived
home late in the evening and he berated her for being always out of their house. He
told her that if she enjoyed the life of a single person, it would be better for her to go
back to her parents.6 Lea did not reply. Alan narrated that, when he reported for work
the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later in the
day, Lea was nowhere to be found.7 Alan thought that Lea merely went to her
parents’ house in Bliss, Sto. Niño, Catbalogan, Samar. 8 However, Lea did not return
to their house anymore.
Alan further testified that, on February 14, 1995, after his work, he went to the house
of Lea’s parents to see if she was there, but he was told that she was not there. He
also went to the house of Lea’s friend, Janeth Bautista, at Barangay Canlapwas, but
he was informed by Janette’s brother-in-law, Nelson Abaenza, that Janeth had left
for Manila.9 When Alan went back to the house of his parents-in-law, he learned
from his father-in-law that Lea had been to their house but that she left without
notice.10 Alan sought the help of Barangay Captain Juan Magat, who promised to
help him locate his wife. He also inquired from his friends of Lea’s whereabouts but
to no avail.11
Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother
asked him to leave after the town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come
home for the fiesta. Alan agreed.12 However, Lea did not show up. Alan then left for
Manila on August 27, 1995. He went to a house in Navotas where Janeth, Lea’s
friend, was staying. When asked where Lea was, Janeth told him that she had not
seen her.13 He failed to find out Lea’s whereabouts despite his repeated talks with
Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On his free time, he would
look for Lea in the malls but still to no avail. He returned to Catbalogan in 1997 and
again looked for his wife but failed.14
On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police
station.15 The police authorities issued an Alarm Notice on July 4, 2001.16 Alan also
reported Lea’s disappearance to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on July
9, 2001.17
Barangay Captain Juan Magat corroborated the testimony of Alan. He declared that
on February 14, 1995, at 2:00 p.m., Alan inquired from him if Lea passed by his
house and he told Alan that she did not. Alan also told him that Lea had disappeared.
He had not seen Lea in the barangay ever since.18 Lea’s father, who was
hiscompadre and the owner of Radio DYMS, told him that he did not know where
Lea was.19
After Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor nor the
Solicitor General adduced evidence in opposition to the petition.
On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition. The fallo of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, petitioner’s absent spouse
ROSALIA JULATON is hereby declared PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD for the
purpose of the petitioner’s subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code
of the Philippines, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said absent
spouse.
SO ORDERED.20
The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) which rendered
judgment on August 4, 2003, affirming the decision of the RTC. 21 The CA cited the
ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.22
The OSG filed a petition for review on certiorari of the CA’s decision alleging that
respondent Alan B. Alegro failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that Lea
was already dead.23 It averred that the respondent failed to exercise reasonable and
diligent efforts to locate his wife. The respondent even admitted that Lea’s father
told him on February 14, 1995 that Lea had been to their house but left without
notice. The OSG pointed out that the respondent reported his wife’s disappearance to
the local police and also to the NBI only after the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
the petition. The petitioner avers that, as gleaned from the evidence, the respondent
did not really want to find and locate Lea. Finally, the petitioner averred:
In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code
for the declaration of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence
set by this Honorable Court in the above-mentioned cases in locating the
whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied with. There have been
times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to by parties wishing to
remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well. It is
even possible that those who cannot have their marriages x x x
declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code resort to Article 41 of the
Family Code for relief because of the x x x summary nature of its proceedings.
It is the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social
institution. Marriage is the foundation of the family. Since marriage is an inviolable
social institution that the 1987 Constitution seeks to protect from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. For respondent’s failure to prove that he had a well-founded
belief that his wife is already
dead and that he exerted the required amount of diligence in searching for his
missing wife, the petition for declaration of presumptive death should have been
denied by the trial court and the Honorable Court of Appeals.24
The petition is meritorious.
Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.25
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and
that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the
present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is
meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that "es menester que su
creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales."26
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may
be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a
slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded
in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions,
attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men,
and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize
their disappearance or throw light on their intentions, 27competence evidence on the
ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether
the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present
acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the
inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made
by present spouse.28
Although testimonial evidence may suffice to prove the well-founded belief of the
present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, in Republic v. Nolasco,29 the
Court warned against collusion between the parties when they find it impossible to
dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means. It is also the maxim that
"men readily believe what they wish to be true."
In this case, the respondent failed to present a witness other than Barangay Captain
Juan Magat. The respondent even failed to present Janeth Bautista or Nelson
Abaenza or any other person from whom he allegedly made inquiries about Lea to
corroborate his testimony. On the other hand, the respondent admitted that when he
returned to the house of his parents-in-law on February 14, 1995, his father-in-law
told him that Lea had just been there but that she left without notice.
The respondent declared that Lea left their abode on February 7, 1995 after he chided
her for coming home late and for being always out of their house, and told her that it
would be better for her to go home to her parents if she enjoyed the life of a single
person. Lea, thus, left their conjugal abode and never returned. Neither did she
communicate with the respondent after leaving the conjugal abode because of her
resentment to the chastisement she received from him barely a month after their
marriage. What is so worrisome is that, the respondent failed to make inquiries from
his parents-in-law regarding Lea’s whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC.
It could have enhanced the credibility of the respondent had he made inquiries from
his parents-in-law about Lea’s whereabouts considering that Lea’s father was the
owner of Radio DYMS.
The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police authorities and the
NBI to locate Lea, but it was only an afterthought. He did so only after the OSG filed
its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC.
In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he had a
well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the RTC, that his spouse Rosalia
(Lea) Julaton was already dead.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73749
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court of
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, is ORDERED to DISMISS the respondent’s
petition.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to
SUPREME COURT respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
Manila There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage
SECOND DIVISION of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986 though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of such fact
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner, and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman
vs. at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel);
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ under the law.
WIEGEL, respondents. WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders
Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner. complained of are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent. SO ORDERED.

PARAS, J.:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff
therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978
at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila)
with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on
the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the
ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church
in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage
claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A.
Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that
ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage
(assuming the presence of force exerted against both parties): was said prior
marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting the validity of the pre-trial
order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence-
(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first
husband; and
(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married
to someone else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of
force exerted on both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing the following Orders of
therespondent Judge-
(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit
the case for resolution based on "agreed facts;" and
(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to
present evidence in her favor.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force
committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not
be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled.
Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 153206 October 23, 2006
ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, petitioner,
vs.
LUCITA G. ONG, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No. 59400 which affirmed in toto the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 41, Dagupan City granting the
petition for legal separation filed by herein respondent, as well as the Resolution 2 of
the CA dated April 26, 2002 which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita)
were married on July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin Church in Manila. They have three
children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age of
majority.3
On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55
par. (1) of the Family Code4before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City,
Branch 41 alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence,
threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct.5
Lucita claimed that: soon after three years of marriage, she and William quarreled
almost every day, with physical violence being inflicted upon her; William would
shout invectives at her like "putang ina mo", "gago", "tanga", and he would slap her,
kick her, pull her hair, bang her head against concrete wall and throw at her whatever
he could reach with his hand; the causes of these fights were petty things regarding
their children or their business; William would also scold and beat the children at
different parts of their bodies using the buckle of his belt; whenever she tried to stop
William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her and box her; on
December 9, 1995, after she protested with William’s decision to allow their eldest
son Kingston to go to Bacolod, William slapped her and said, "it is none of your
business"; on December 14, 1995, she asked William to bring Kingston back from
Bacolod; a violent quarrel ensued and William hit her on her head, left cheek, eye,
stomach, and arms; when William hit her on the stomach and she bent down because
of the pain, he hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the
house; she then went to her sister’s house in Binondo where she was fetched by her
other siblings and brought to their parents house in Dagupan; the following day, she
went to her parent’s doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzano for treatment of her injuries. 6
William for his part denied that he ever inflicted physical harm on his wife, used
insulting language against her, or whipped the children with the buckle of his belt.
While he admits that he and Lucita quarreled on December 9, 1995, at their house in
Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila, he claimed that he left the same, stayed in
their Greenhills condominium and only went back to their Tondo house to work in
their office below. In the afternoon of December 14, 1995, their laundrywoman told
him that Lucita left the house.7
On January 5, 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision decreeing legal separation, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the
legal separation of plaintiff and defendant, with all the legal effects attendant thereto,
particularly the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties, for
which purpose the parties are hereby ordered to submit a complete inventory of said
properties so that the Court can make a just and proper division, such division to be
embodied in a supplemental decision.
SO ORDERED.8
The RTC found that:
It is indubitable that plaintiff (Lucita) and defendant (William) had their frequent
quarrels and misunderstanding which made both of their lives miserable and hellish.
This is even admitted by the defendant when he said that there was no day that he did
not quarrel with his wife. Defendant had regarded the plaintiff negligent in the
performance of her wifely duties and had blamed her for not reporting to him about
the wrongdoings of their children. (citations omitted)
These quarrels were always punctuated by acts of physical violence, threats and
intimidation by the defendant against the plaintiff and on the children. In the process,
insulting words and language were heaped upon her. The plaintiff suffered and
endured the mental and physical anguish of these marital fights until December 14,
1995 when she had reached the limits of her endurance. The more than twenty years
of her marriage could not have been put to waste by the plaintiff if the same had been
lived in an atmosphere of love, harmony and peace. Worst, their children are also
suffering. As very well stated in plaintiff’s memorandum, "it would be unthinkable
for her to throw away this twenty years of relationship, abandon the comforts of her
home and be separated from her children, whom she loves, if there exists no cause,
which is already beyond her endurance.9
William appealed to the CA which affirmed in toto the RTC decision. In its Decision
dated October 8, 2001, the CA found that the testimonies for Lucita were
straightforward and credible and the ground for legal separation under Art. 55, par. 1
of the Family Code, i.e., physical violence and grossly abusive conduct directed
against Lucita, were adequately proven.10
As the CA explained:
The straightforward and candid testimonies of the witnesses were uncontroverted
and credible. Dr. Elinzano’s testimony was able to show that the [Lucita] suffered
several injuries inflicted by [William]. It is clear that on December 14, 1995, she
sustained redness in her cheek, black eye on her left eye, fist blow on the stomach,
blood clot and a blackish discoloration on both shoulders and a "bump" or "bukol" on
her head. The presence of these injuries was established by the testimonies of
[Lucita] herself and her sister, Linda Lim. The Memorandum/Medical Certificate
also confirmed the evidence presented and does not deviate from the doctor’s main
testimony --- that [Lucita] suffered physical violence on [sic] the hands of her
husband, caused by physical trauma, slapping of the cheek, boxing and fist blows.
The effect of the so-called alterations in the Memorandum/Medical Certificate
questioned by [William] does not depart from the main thrust of the testimony of the
said doctor.
Also, the testimony of [Lucita] herself consistently and constantly established that
[William] inflicted repeated physical violence upon her during their marriage and
that she had been subjected to grossly abusive conduct when he constantly hurled
invectives at her even in front of their customers and employees, shouting words
like, "gaga", "putang ina mo," tanga," and "you don’t know anything."
These were further corroborated by several incidents narrated by Linda Lim who
lived in their conjugal home from 1989 to 1991. She saw her sister after the
December 14, 1995 incident when she (Lucita) was fetched by the latter on the same
date. She was a witness to the kind of relationship her sister and [William] had
during the three years she lived with them. She observed that [William] has an
"explosive temper, easily gets angry and becomes very violent." She cited several
instances which proved that William Ong indeed treated her wife shabbily and
despicably, in words and deeds.
xxx
That the physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were brought to bear upon
[Lucita] by [William] have been duly established by [Lucita] and her witnesses.
These incidents were not explained nor controverted by [William], except by making
a general denial thereof. Consequently, as between an affirmative assertion and a
general denial, weight must be accorded to the affirmative assertion.
The grossly abusive conduct is also apparent in the instances testified to by [Lucita]
and her sister. The injurious invectives hurled at [Lucita] and his treatment of her, in
its entirety, in front of their employees and friends, are enough to constitute grossly
abusive conduct. The aggregate behavior of [William] warrants legal separation
under grossly abusive conduct. x x x11
William filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA on April 26,
2002.12
Hence the present petition where William claims that:
I conjugal properties and to transfer the same to Lucita’s family is absurd; Lucita will
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN
DISREGARDING CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THE PETITION FOR LEGAL
SEPARATION WAS INSTITUTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR
THE SOLE PURPOSE OF REMOVING FROM PETITIONER THE CONTROL
AND OWNERSHIP OF THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES AND TO TRANSFER
THE SAME TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S FAMILY.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN
DISREGARDING CLEAR EVIDENCE REPUDIATING PRIVATE
RESPONDENT’S CLAIM OF REPEATED PHYSICAL VIOLENCE AND
GROSSLY ABUSIVE CONDUCT ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.13
William argues that: the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the case is to
wrest control and ownership of properties belonging to the conjugal partnership;
these properties, which include real properties in Hong Kong, Metro Manila, Baguio
and Dagupan, were acquired during the marriage through his (William’s) sole
efforts; the only parties who will benefit from a decree of legal separation are
Lucita’s parents and siblings while such decree would condemn him as a violent and
cruel person, a wife-beater and child abuser, and will taint his reputation, especially
among the Filipino-Chinese community; substantial facts and circumstances have
been overlooked which warrant an exception to the general rule that factual findings
of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal; the findings of the trial court that he
committed acts of repeated physical violence against Lucita and their children were
not sufficiently established; what took place were disagreements regarding the
manner of raising and disciplining the children particularly Charleston, Lucita’s
favorite son; marriage being a social contract cannot be impaired by mere verbal
disagreements and the complaining party must adduce clear and convincing evidence
to justify legal separation; the CA erred in relying on the testimonies of Lucita and
her witnesses, her sister Linda Lim, and their parent’s doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzanzo,
whose testimonies are tainted with relationship and fraud; in the 20 years of their
marriage, Lucita has not complained of any cruel behavior on the part of William in
relation to their marital and family life; William expressed his willingness to receive
respondent unconditionally however, it is Lucita who abandoned the conjugal
dwelling on December 14, 1995 and instituted the complaint below in order to
appropriate for herself and her relatives the conjugal properties; the Constitution
provides that marriage is an inviolable social institution and shall be protected by the
State, thus the rule is the preservation of the marital union and not its infringement;
only for grounds enumerated in Art. 55 of the Family Code, which grounds should
be clearly and convincingly proven, can the courts decree a legal separation among
the spouses.14
Respondent Lucita in her Comment, meanwhile, asserts that: the issues raised in the
present petition are factual; the findings of both lower courts rest on strong and clear
evidence borne by the records; this Court is not a trier of facts and factual findings of
the RTC when confirmed by the CA are final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal; the contention of William that Lucita filed the case for legal
separation in order to remove from William the control and ownership of their
not just throw her marriage of 20 years and forego the companionship of William
and her children just to serve the interest of her family; Lucita left the conjugal home
because of the repeated physical violence and grossly abusive conduct of petitioner. 15
Petitioner filed a Reply, reasserting his claims in his petition, 16 as well as a
Memorandum where he averred for the first time that since respondent is guilty of
abandonment, the petition for legal separation should be denied following Art. 56,
par. (4) of the Family Code.17 Petitioner argues that since respondent herself has
given ground for legal separation by abandoning the family simply because of a
quarrel and refusing to return thereto unless the conjugal properties were placed in
the administration of petitioner’s in-laws, no decree of legal separation should be
issued in her favor.18
Respondent likewise filed a Memorandum reiterating her earlier assertions.19
We resolve to deny the petition.
It is settled that questions of fact cannot be the subject of a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The rule finds more stringent application where the
CA upholds the findings of fact of the trial court. In such instance, this Court is
generally bound to adopt the facts as determined by the lower courts. 20
The only instances when this Court reviews findings of fact are:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in
making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7)
when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and
(11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.21
As petitioner failed to show that the instant case falls under any of the exceptional
circumstances, the general rule applies.
Indeed, this Court cannot review factual findings on appeal, especially when they are
borne out by the records or are based on substantial evidence.22 In this case, the
findings of the RTC were affirmed by the CA and are adequately supported by the
records.
As correctly observed by the trial court, William himself admitted that there was no
day that he did not quarrel with his wife, which made his life miserable, and he
blames her for being negligent of her wifely duties and for not reporting to him the
wrongdoings of their children. 23
Lucita and her sister, Linda Lim, also gave numerous accounts of the instances when
William displayed violent temper against Lucita and their children; such as: when
William threw a steel chair at Lucita;24 threw chairs at their children;25 slapped
Lucita and utter insulting words at her;26 use the buckle of the belt in whipping the
children;27 pinned Lucita against the wall with his strong arms almost strangling her,
and smashed the flower vase and brick rocks and moldings leaving the bedroom in
disarray;28 shouted at Lucita and threw a directory at her, in front of Linda and the
employees of their business, because he could not find a draft letter on his table;29got
mad at Charleston for cooking steak with vetchin prompting William to smash the
plate with steak and hit Charleston, then slapped Lucita and shouted at her "putang
ina mo, gago, wala kang pakialam, tarantado" when she sided with
Charleston;30 and the December 9 and December 14, 1995 incidents which forced
Lucita to leave the conjugal dwelling.31
Lucita also explained that the injuries she received on December 14, 1995, were not
the first. As she related before the trial court:
q. You stated on cross examination that the injuries you sustained on December 14,
1995 were the most serious?
a. Unlike before I considered December 14, 1995 the very serious because before it
is only on the arm and black eye, but on this December 14, I suffered bruises in all
parts of my body, sir.32
To these, all William and his witnesses, could offer are denials and attempts to
downplay the said incidents.33
As between the detailed accounts given for Lucita and the general denial for
William, the Court gives more weight to those of the former. The Court also gives a
great amount of consideration to the assessment of the trial court regarding the
credibility of witnesses as trial court judges enjoy the unique opportunity of
observing the deportment of witnesses on the stand, a vantage point denied appellate
tribunals.34 Indeed, it is settled that the assessment of the trial court of the credibility
of witnesses is entitled to great respect and weight having had the opportunity to
observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying. 35
In this case, the RTC noted that:
William’s denial and that of his witnesses of the imputation of physical violence
committed by him could not be given much credence by the Court. Since the office
secretary Ofelia Rosal and the family laundrywoman Rosalino Morco are dependent
upon defendant for their livelihood, their testimonies may be tainted with bias and
they could not be considered as impartial and credible witnesses. So with Kingston
Ong who lives with defendant and depends upon him for support. 36
Parenthetically, William claims that that the witnesses of Lucita are not credible
because of their relationship with her. We do not agree. Relationship alone is not
reason enough to discredit and label a witness’s testimony as biased and unworthy of
credence37 and a witness’ relationship to one of the parties does not automatically
affect the veracity of his or her testimony.38 Considering the detailed and
straightforward testimonies given by Linda Lim and Dr. Vicente Elinzano, bolstered
by the credence accorded them by the trial court, the Court finds that their
testimonies are not tainted with bias.
William also posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal
separation is in order for her side of the family to gain control of the conjugal
properties; that Lucita was willing to destroy his reputation by filing the legal
separation case just so her parents and her siblings could control the properties he
worked hard for. The Court finds such reasoning hard to believe. What benefit would
Lucita personally gain by pushing for her parents’ and siblings’ financial interests at
the expense of her marriage? What is more probable is that there truly exists a
ground for legal separation, a cause so strong, that Lucita had to seek redress from
the courts. As aptly stated by the RTC,
...it would be unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty years of relationship,
abandon the comforts of her home and be separated from her children whom she
loves, if there exists no cause, which is already beyond her endurance. 39
The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his reputation and
label him as a wife-beater and child-abuser also does not elicit sympathy from this
Court. If there would be such a smear on his reputation then it would not be because
of Lucita’s decision to seek relief from the courts, but because he gave Lucita reason
to go to court in the first place.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the
family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4)
of the Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both
parties have given ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the
Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. 40 As it
was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not
constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
As a final note, we reiterate that our Constitution is committed to the policy of
strengthening the family as a basic social institution. 41 The Constitution itself
however does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage and the
family, as it remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of
marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it and put into
operation the constitutional provisions that protect the same. 42 With the enactment of
the Family Code, this has been accomplished as it defines marriage and the family,
spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married
and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those
for legal separation.43 As Lucita has adequately proven the presence of a ground for
legal separation, the Court has no reason but to affirm the findings of the RTC and
the CA, and grant her the relief she is entitled to under the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132592. January 23, 2002]
AIDA P. BAEZ, petitioner, vs. GABRIEL B. BAEZ, respondent.
[G.R. No. 133628. January 23, 2002]
AIDA P. BAEZ, petitioner, vs. GABRIEL B. BAEZ, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
These two petitions stem from the decision[1] dated September 23, 1996 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20, in Civil Case No. CEB-16765. The
first[2] seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision dated March 21, 1997,
setting aside the orders dated October 1 and November 22, 1996 of the Regional
Trial Court. The second[3] prays for the reversal of the resolution dated February 10,
1998, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-56265, denying the motion to
dismiss.
The antecedent facts, as gathered from the parties pleadings, are as follows:
On September 23, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20, decided Civil
Case No. CEB-16765, decreeing among others the legal separation between
petitioner Aida Baez and respondent Gabriel Baez on the ground of the latters sexual
infidelity; the dissolution of their conjugal property relations and the division of the
net conjugal assets; the forfeiture of respondents one-half share in the net conjugal
assets in favor of the common children; the payment to petitioners counsel of the
sum of P100,000 as attorneys fees to be taken from petitioners share in the net assets;
and the surrender by respondent of the use and possession of a Mazda motor vehicle
and the smaller residential house located at Maria Luisa Estate Park Subdivision to
petitioner and the common children within 15 days from receipt of the decision.
Thereafter, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion to modify said decision, while
respondent filed a Notice of Appeal.
The trial court granted petitioner Aida Banez urgent ex-parte motion to modify the
decision on October 1, 1996 by approving the Commitment of Fees dated December
22, 1994; obliging petitioner to pay as attorneys fees the equivalent of 5% of the total
value of respondents ideal share in the net conjugal assets; and ordering the
administrator to pay petitioners counsel, Atty. Adelino B. Sitoy, the sum of P100,000
as advance attorneys fees chargeable against the aforecited 5%.[4]
In another motion to modify the decision, petitioner Aida Baez sought moral and
exemplary damages, as well as litigation expenses. On October 9, 1996, she filed a
motion for execution pending appeal. Respondent Gabriel Baez filed a consolidated
written opposition to the two motions, and also prayed for the reconsideration of the
October 1, 1996 order.
On November 22, 1996, the trial court denied Aidas motion for moral and exemplary
damages and litigation expenses but gave due course to the execution pending
appeal. Thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, the petitioners motion to
modify decision is hereby ordered denied. But, petitioners motion for execution of
decision pending appeal is hereby granted. Consequently, let a writ of execution be
issued in this case to enforce the decision for (1) respondent to vacate the premises of
the small residential house situated in Maria Luisa Estate Park Subdivision, Lahug,
Cebu City and for (2) respondent to surrender the use and possession of said Mazda
motor vehicle together with its keys and accessories thereof to petitioner.
Atty. Edgar Gica, the Special Administrator, appointed in this case, is hereby ordered
to make the necessary computation of the value of the one-half (1/2) share of
petitioner in the net remaining conjugal assets of the spouses within 10 days from
receipt of this order.
The petitioner is hereby ordered to post a bond in the amount of P1,500,000.00 to
answer for all the damages that respondent may suffer arising from the issuance of
said writ of execution pending appeal and to further answer for all the advances that
petitioner may have received from the Special Administrator in this case pending
final termination of this present case.[5]
In turn, in a petition for certiorari, Gabriel Baez elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals. On March 21, 1997, the appellate court rendered its decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Order dated October 1, 1996 and the Omnibus Order dated
November 22, 1996, insofar as (1) it authorized the release of the sum of
P100,000.00 to private respondents counsel as the advanced share of private
respondent [Aida Baez] in the net remaining conjugal assets, and (2) granted the
motion for execution pending appeal by ordering petitioner [Gabriel Baez] to vacate
the premises of the small residential house situated in Maria Luisa Estate Park
Subdivision, Lahug, Cebu City, and to surrender the use and possession of the
Mazda Motor vehicle to private respondent are hereby SET ASIDE. The writ of
execution dated December 2, 1996 and the Order dated December 10, 1996 granting
the motion filed by the sheriff to make symbolic delivery of the subject house and
motor vehicle to the administrator of the partnership are also SET ASIDE.
As prayed for by petitioner, the Administrator of the conjugal partnership is hereby
ordered to cause the reimbursement by counsel for the private respondent [Aida
Baez] of the amount of P100,000.00 released to him as advance payment of attorneys
fees.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On February 10, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied Aidas motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the petition in G.R. No. 132592, filed by herein petitioner.
In the meantime, the trial court gave due course to Gabriels Notice of Appeal and
elevated on April 15, 1997 the entire case records to the Court of Appeals. Aida filed
with the Court of Appeals a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that Gabriel
had failed to file with the appellate court a Record on Appeal. On February 10, 1998,
the Court of Appeals decided the motion, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitionerappellants motion to dismiss filed
on November 3, 1997 is hereby DENIED. The appointment of the petitioner-appellee
as administratix of the conjugal properties is hereby AFFIRMED.
In view of petitioners Motion to Withdraw her own appeal filed on November 27,
1997, and for failing to pay the required docket fee within the prescribed period
under Rule 41, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the appeal instituted
by the petitioner Aida P. Baez is hereby DISMISSED.
In continuance of the appeal of respondent-appellant [Gabriel Baez], he is hereby
ordered to file his brief with the court within 45 days from receipt of this resolution.
The petitioner-appellee [Aida Baez] shall file her own brief with the court within 45
days from receipt of the petitioner-appellants [Gabriel Baez] brief.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The appellate court also denied herein petitioners motion for reconsideration, hence,
the petition in G.R. No. 133628.
On January 19, 2000, we consolidated the two petitions. Petitioner Aida Baez now
avers that the Court of Appeals erred:
I. G.R. No. 132592
... IN SETTING ASIDE THE GRANT OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL BY
THE TRIAL COURT OF THE PORTIONS OF ITS DECISION ORDERING
RESPONDENT TO VACATE THE SMALLER RESIDENTIAL HOUSE
LOCATED AT THE MARIA LUISA ESTATE PARK SUBDIVISION, CEBU
CITY, AND TO PAY P100,000.00 TO PETITIONERS COUNSEL AS
ATTORNEYS FEES TO BE TAKEN FROM HER SHARE IN THE NET
CONJUGAL ASSETS.[8]
II. G.R. No. 133628:
... IN NOT GRANTING PETITIONERS MOTION TO DISMISS RESPONDENTS
ORDINARY APPEAL AND/OR NOT RETURNING THE RECORDS OF CIVIL
CASE NO. CEB-16765 TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU.[9]
In G.R. No. 132592, petitioner manifested that she no longer questions the Court of
Appeals decision on the Mazda vehicle because respondent repossessed it. As to the
residential house, she claimed that being conjugal in nature, justice requires that she
and her children be allowed to occupy and enjoy the house considering that during
the entire proceedings before the trial court, she did not have the chance to occupy it.
Further, she posted a bond of P1,500,000 for the damages which respondent may
suffer.[10] For these reasons, she asked for execution pending appeal. The amount
of P100,000 as advance payment to her counsel was a drop in the bucket compared
to the bond she posted, according to her. She also suggested as an alternative that she
simply be required to put up an additional bond. She also agreed to submit to an
accounting as regular administratrix and the advance attorneys fees be charged to her
share in the net conjugal assets.
In his comment, respondent denied petitioners allegation that she did not have the
chance to occupy the residential house. He averred that she could have, had she
chosen to. According to him, as the inventory of the couples properties showed,
petitioner owned two houses and lots and two motor vehicles in the United States,
where she is a permanent resident. Respondent contended that there was no
compelling reason for petitioner to have the judgment executed pending appeal.
Essentially, the core issue in G.R. No. 132592 is whether execution of judgment
pending appeal was justified.
As held in Echaus vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 381, 386 (1991), execution
pending appeal is allowed when superior circumstances demanding urgency
outweigh the damages that may result from the issuance of the writ. Otherwise,
instead of being an instrument of solicitude and justice, the writ may well become a
tool of oppression and inequity.[11]
In this case, considering the reasons cited by petitioner, we are of the view that there
is no superior or urgent circumstance that outweighs the damage which respondent
would suffer if he were ordered to vacate the house. We note that petitioner did not
refute respondents allegations that she did not intend to use said house, and that she
has two (2) other houses in the United States where she is a permanent resident,
while he had none at all. Merely putting up a bond is not sufficient reason to justify
her plea for execution pending appeal. To do so would make execution routinary, the
rule rather than the exception.[12]
Similarly, we are not persuaded that the P100,000 advance payment to petitioners
counsel was properly granted. We see no justification to pre-empt the judgment by
the Court of Appeals concerning said amount of P100,000 at the time that the trial
courts judgment was already on appeal.
In G.R. No. 133628, petitioner Aida Baez contends that an action for legal
separation is among the cases where multiple appeals may be taken. According to
her, the filing of a record on appeal, pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court,[13] is required in this case. She concludes that respondents appeal should have
been dismissed for his failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary
period, as provided under Section 1-b, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.[14]
Petitioner likewise prays that, in the event that we do not dismiss Gabriel Baez
appeal, we should direct the appellate court to return the records of the case to the
RTC of Cebu.Thereafter, according to her, respondent should file his record on
appeal for approval and transmittal to the Court of Appeals. In the alternative, she
prays that the appellate court retain only the pleadings and evidence necessary to
resolve respondents appeal pursuant to Section 6, Rule 44[15] and Section 6, Rule
135[16] of the Rules of Court, and return the rest of the case records to the RTC.
In turn, respondent argues that Section 39 of B.P. 129 [17] expressly abolished the
requirement of a record on appeal, except in appeals in special proceedings in
accordance with Rule 109,[18] and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed.
An action for legal separation, he avers, is neither a special proceeding nor one
where multiple appeals are allowed.
Now, is an action for legal separation one where multiple appeals are allowed? We
do not think so.
In Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 186, 194
(1996), this Court held:
xxx Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in actions for recovery of
property with accounting, in actions for partition of property with accounting, in the
special civil actions of eminent domain and foreclosure of mortgage. The rationale
behind allowing more than one appeal in the same case is to enable the rest of the
case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court
and held to be final.
In said case, the two issues raised by therein petitioner that may allegedly be the
subject of multiple appeals arose from the same cause of action, and the subject
matter pertains to the same lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. Hence,
splitting the appeals in that case would only be violative of the rule against
multiplicity of appeals.
The same holds true in an action for legal separation. The issues involved in the case
will necessarily relate to the same marital relationship between the parties. The
effects of legal separation, such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and
liquidation of the absolute community or conjugal partnership, and custody of the
minor children, follow from the decree of legal separation. [19] They are not separate
or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court and become final prior to or
apart from the decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents of legal
separation.[20] Thus, they may not be subject to multiple appeals.
Petitioners alternative prayers that in case we do not dismiss the appeal, we return
the records to the trial court and require respondent to file a record on appeal, or we
return the records to the trial court and retain only the pleadings and orders relevant
to the appeal, are untenable. If we grant the first, we are effectively saying that the
instant case is one involving multiple appeals, which it is not. If we allow the second,
we are effectively applying by analogy, Section 6, Rule 44 and Section 6, Rule 135
of the Rules of Court, without petitioner showing support therefor in law or
jurisprudence.[21]
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED for lack of merit. The decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42663 and CA-G.R. No.
CV-56265, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED, so that the Order dated October 1,
1996, of the Regional Trial Court authorizing the release of P100,000 to petitioners
counsel; the Omnibus Order dated November 22, 1996 granting the motion pending
appeal; the writ of execution dated December 2, 1996; and the Order dated
December 10, 1996 granting the motion by the sheriff to make symbolic delivery of
the house and vehicle are SET ASIDE. Further, the Administrator of the conjugal
partnership is ORDERED to cause the reimbursement by petitioners counsel of the
released amount of P100,000. The Court of Appeals is hereby DIRECTED to give
due course to respondents appeal, and the Division Clerk of Court of this Court is
likewise DIRECTED to promptly remand the record of these cases to the Court of
Appeals.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 3405 June 29, 1998
JULIETA B. NARAG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every member of the
bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the
Supreme Court may withdraw his or her privilege to practice law.
On November 13, 1989, Mrs. Julieta B. Narag filed an administrative complaint 1 for
disbarment against her husband, Atty. Dominador M. Narag, whom she accused of
having violated Canons 1 and 6, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Ethics for Lawyers. 2
The complainant narrated:
The St. Louis College of Tuguegarao engaged the services of Atty. Dominador M.
Narag in the early seventies as a full-time college instructor in the College of Arts
and Sciences and as a professor in the Graduate School. In 1984, Ms. Gina Espita, 17
years old and a first year college student, enrolled in subjects handled by Atty.
Narag. Exerting his influence as her teacher, and as a prominent member of the legal
profession and then member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tuguegarao, Atty. Narag
courted Ms. Espita, gradually lessening her resistance until the student acceded to his
wishes.
They then maintained an illicit relationship known in various circles in the
community, but which they managed to from me. It therefore came as a terrible
embar[r]assment to me, with unspeakable grief and pain when my husband
abandoned us, his family, to live with Ms. Espita, in utterly scandalous
circumstances.
It appears that Atty. Narag used his power and influence as a member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan to cause the employment of Ms. Espita at the
Department of Trade and Industry Central Office at Makati, Metro Manila. Out of
gratitude perhaps, for this gesture, Ms. Espita agreed to live with Atty. Narag, her
sense of right[e]ousness and morals completely corrupted by a member of the Bar.
It is now a common knowledge in the community that Atty. Dominador M. Narag
has abandoned us, his family, to live with a 22-year-old woman, who was his former
student in the tertiary level[.] 3
This Court, in a Resolution dated December 18, 1989, referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. 4
On June 26, 1990, the office of then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan received from
complainant another letter seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint. She
alleged therein that (1) she fabricated the allegations in her complaint to humiliate
and spite her husband; (2) all the love letters between the respondent and Gina Espita
were forgeries; and (3) she was suffering from "emotional confusion arising from
extreme jealousy." The truth, she stated, was that her husband had remained a
faithful and responsible family man. She further asserted that he had neither entered
into an amorous relationship with one Gina Espita nor abandoned his
family. 5 Supporting her letter were an Affidavit of Desistance 6 and a Motion to
Dismiss, 7 attached as Annexes A and B, which she filed before the IBP commission
on bar discipline. 8 In a Decision dared October 8, 1991, the IBP Board of
Governors 9 dismissed the complaint of Mrs. Narag for failure to prosecute. 10
The case took an unexpected turn when, on November 25, 1991, this
Court 11 received another letter 12 from the complainant, with her seven
children 13 as co-signatories, again appealing for the disbarment of her husband. She
explained that she had earlier dropped the case against him because of his continuous
threats against her. 14
In his Comment on the complainant's letter of November 11, 1991, filed in
compliance with this Court's Resolution issued on July 6, 1992, 15 respondent prayed
that the decision of the Board of Governors be affirmed. Denying that he had
threatened, harassed or intimidated his wife, he alleged that she had voluntarily
executed her Affidavit of Desistance 16and Motion to Dismiss, 17 even appearing
before the investigating officer, Commissioner Racela, to testify under oath "that she
prepared the Motion to Dismiss and Affidavit of Desistance on her own free will and
affirmed the contents thereof."
In addition, he professed his love for his wife and his children and denied
abandoning his family to live with his paramour. However, he described his wife as a
person emotionally disturbed, viz:
What is pitiable here is the fact that Complainant is an incurably jealous and
possessive woman, and every time the streak of jealousy rears its head, she fires off
letters or complaints against her husband in every conceivable forum, all without
basis, and purely on impulse, just to satisfy the consuming demands of her "loving"
jealousy. Then, as is her nature, a few hours afterwards, when her jealousy cools off,
she repents and feels sorry for her acts against the Respondent. Thus, when she wrote
the Letter of November 11, 1991, she was then in the grips of one of her bouts of
jealousy.18
On August 24, 1992, this Court issued another Resolution referring the Comment of
respondent to the IBP. 19 In the hearing before IBP Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose,
respondent alleged the following: 20
2. Your Respondent comes from very poor parents who have left him not even a
square meter of land, but gave him the best legacy in life: a purposeful and
meaningful education. Complainant comes from what she claims to be very rich
parents who value material possession more than education and the higher and
nobler aspirations in life. Complainant abhors the poor.
3. Your Respondent has a loving upbringing, nurtured in the gentle ways of love,
forgiveness, humility, and concern for the poor. Complainant was reared and raised
in an entirely different environment. Her value system is the very opposite.
4. Your Respondent loves his family very dearly, and has done all he could in thirty-
eight (38) years of marriage to protect and preserve his family. He gave his family
sustenance, a comfortable home, love, education, companionship, and most of all, a
good and respected name. He was always gentle and compassionate to his wife and
children. Even in the most trying times, he remained calm and never inflicted
violence on them. His children are all now full-fledged professionals, mature, and
gainfully employed. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Your Respondent subscribes to the sanctity of marriage as a social institution.
On the other hand, consumed by insane and unbearable jealousy, Complainant has
been systematically and unceasingly destroying the very foundations of their
marriage and their family. Their marriage has become a torture chamber in which
Your Respondent has been incessantly BEATEN, BATTERED, BRUTALIZED,
TORTURED, ABUSED, and HUMILIATED, physically, mentally, and emotionally,
by the Complainant, in public and at home. Their marriage has become a nightmare.
For thirty-eight years, your Respondent suffered in silence and bore the pain of his
misfortune with dignity and with almost infinite patience, if only to preserve their
family and their marriage. But this is not to be. The Complainant never mellowed
and never became gentl[e], loving, and understanding. In fact, she became more
fierce and predatory.
Hence, at this point in time, the light at the tunnel for Your Respondent does not
seem in sight. The darkness continues to shroud the marital and familial landscape.
Your Respondent has to undergo a catharsis, a liberation from enslavement.
Paraphrasing Dorfman in "Death and the Maiden", can the torturer and the tortured
co-exist and live together?
Hence, faced with an absolutely uncomprehending and uncompromising mind whose
only obsession now is to destroy, destroy, and destroy, Your Respondent, with
perpetual regret and with great sorrow, filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage,
Spl. Proc. No. 566, RTC, Branch III, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. . . .
5. Complainant is a violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending. But your
Respondent never revealed these destructive qualities to other people. He preserved
the good name and dignity of his wife. This is in compliance with the marital vow to
love, honor or obey your spouse, for better or for worse, in sickness and in health . . .
Even in this case, Your Respondent never revealed anything derogatory to his wife.
It is only now that he is constrained to reveal all these things to defend himself.
On the other hand, for no reason at all, except a jealous rage, Complainant tells
everyone, everywhere, that her husband is worthless, good-for-nothing, evil and
immoral. She goes to colleges and universities, professional organizations, religious
societies, and all other sectors of the community to tell them how evil, bad and
immoral her husband is. She tells them not to hire him as professor, as Counsel, or
any other capacity because her husband is evil, bad, and immoral. Is this love? Since
when did love become an instrument to destroy a man's dearest possession in life —
his good name, reputation and dignity?
Because of Complainant's virulent disinformation campaign against her husband,
employing every unethical and immoral means to attain his ends, Your Respondent
has been irreparably and irreversibly disgraced, shamed, and humiliated. Your
Respondent is not a scandalous man. It is he who has been mercilessly scandalized
and crucified by the Complainant. 21
To prove the alleged propensity of his wife to file false charges, respondent
presented as evidence the following list of the complaints she had filed against him
and Gina Espita:
3.1 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty . . .
3.2 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty, DILG, Adm. Case No. P-5-90. . . .
3.3 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Cagayan. I.S No.
89-114. . . .
3.4 Complaint for Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices and concubinage.
OMBUDSMAN Case No. 1-92-0083. . . .
3.5 Complaint for Civil Support. RTC, Tuguegarao, Civil Case No. 4061.
DISMISSED.
3.6 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Cagayan. I.S. No.
92-109. DISMISSED. (. . .). Complainant filed Motion for Reconsideration.
DENIED. (. . .).
3.7 Complaint for Disbarment (. . .) with S[upreme] C[ourt]. Withdrawn (. . .).
DISMISSED by IBP Board of Governors (. . .). Re-instituted (. . .).
3.8 Complaint for Disbarment, again (. . .). Adm. Case No. 3405. Pending.
3.9 Complaint for Concubinage, again (. . .). Third MCTC, Tumauini, Isabela.
Pending. . . . 22
In his desperate effort to exculpate himself, he averred:
I. That all the alleged love letters and envelopes (. . .), picture (. . .) are inadmissible
in evidence as enunciated by the Supreme Court in "Cecilia Zulueta vs. Court of
Appeals, et.al.", G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996. (. . .).
xxx xxx xxx
II. That respondent is totally innocent of the charges: He never courted Gina Espita
in the Saint Louis College of Tuguegarao. He never caused the employment of said
woman in the DTI. He never had or is having any illicit relationship with her
anywhere, at any time. He never lived with her as husband and wife anywhere at any
time, be it in Centro Tumauini or any of its barangays, or in any other place. He
never begot a child or children with her. Finally, respondent submits that all the other
allegations of Mrs. Narag are false and fabricated, . . .
xxx xxx xxx
III. Respondent never abandoned his family[.] Mrs. Narag and her two sons forcibly
drove respondent Narag out of the conjugal home. After that, Atty. Narag tried to
return to the conjugal home many times with the help of mutual friends to save the
marriage and the family from collapse. He tried several times to reconcile with Mrs.
Narag. In fact, in one of the hearings of the disbarment case, he offered to return
home and to reconcile with Mrs. Narag. But Mrs. Narag refused all these efforts of
respondent Narag. . . .
IV. Complainant Julieta B. Narag is an unbearably jealous, violent, vindictive,
scandalous, virulent and merciless wife since the beginning of the marriage, who
incessantly beat, battered, brutalized, tortured, abuse[d], scandalized, and humiliated
respondent Atty. Narag, physically, mentally, emotionally, and psychologically, . . .
V. Complainant Julieta Narag's claim in her counter-manifestation dated March 28,
1996, to the effect that the affidavit of Dominador B. Narag, Jr., dated February 27,
1996 was obtained through force and intimidation, is not true. Dominador, Jr.,
executed his affidavit freely, voluntarily, and absolutely without force or
intimidation, as shown by the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies of
Respondent Atty. Narag and Tuguegarao MTC Judge Dominador Garcia during the
trial of Criminal Case No. 12439, People vs. Dominador M. Narag, et. al., before the
Tuguegarao MTC on May 3, 1996. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
VI. Respondent Atty. Narag is now an old man — a senior citizen of 63 years —
sickly, abandoned, disgraced, weakened and debilitated by progressively
degenerative gout and arthritis, and hardly able to earn his own keep. His very
physical, medical, psychological, and economic conditions render him unfit and
unable to do the things attributed to him by the complainant. Please see the attached
medical certificates, . . ., among many other similar certificates touching on the same
ailments. Respondent is also suffering from hypertension. 23
On July 18, 1997, the investigating officer submitted his report, 24 recommending the
indefinite suspension of Atty. Narag from the practice of law. The material portions
of said report read as follows:
Culled from the voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence submitted by the
contending parties, two (2) issues are relevant for the disposition of the case, namely:
a) Whether there was indeed a commission of alleged abandonment of respondent's
own family and [whether he was] living with his paramour, Gina Espita;
b) Whether the denial under oath that his illegitimate children with Gina Espita
(Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador) as appearing on paragraph 1(g) of
respondent's Comment vis-a-vis his handwritten love letters, the due execution and
contents of which, although he objected to their admissibility for being allegedly
forgeries, were never denied by him on the witness stand much less presented and
offered proof to support otherwise.
Except for the testimonies of respondent's witnesses whose testimonies tend to depict
the complaining wife, Mrs. Narag, as an incurably jealous wife and possessive
woman suffering everytime with streaks of jealousy, respondent did not present
himself on the witness stand to testify and be cross-examined on his sworn comment;
much less did he present his alleged paramour, Gina Espita, to disprove the
adulterous relationship between him and their having begotten their illegitimate
children, namely: Aurelle Dominic N. Espita and Kyle Dominador N. Espita. Worse,
respondent's denial that he is the father of the two is a ground for disciplinary
sanction (Morcayda v. Naz, 125 SCRA 467).
Viewed from all the evidence presented, we find the respondent subject to
disciplinary action as a member of the legal profession. 25
In its Resolution 26 issued on August 23, 1997, the IBP adopted and approved the
investigating commissioner's recommendation for the indefinite suspension of the
respondent. 27 Subsequently the complaint sought the disbarment of her husband in a
Manifestation/Comment she filed on October 20, 1997. The IBP granted this stiffer
penalty and, in its Resolution dated November 30, 1997, denied respondent's Motion
for Reconsideration.
After a careful scrutiny of the records of the proceedings and the evidence presented
by the parties, we find that the conduct of respondent warrants the imposition of the
penalty of disbarment.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Thus, good moral character is not only a condition precedent 28 to the practice of law,
but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is
found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.29
Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or
shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of
the community. 30 Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral,
but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree 31 or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. 32
We explained in Barrientos vs. Daarol 33 that, "as officers of the court, lawyers must
not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral
character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not
only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses
but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
belief that he is flouting those moral standards."
Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for abandoning his family in order
to live with Gina Espita. The burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the
Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she establishes her case by clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence. 34
Presented by complainant as witnesses, aside from herself. 35 were: Charlie
Espita, 36 Magdalena Bautista, 37Bienvenido Eugenio, 38 Alice Carag, 39 Dr. Jervis B.
Narag, 40 Dominador Narag, Jr., 41 and Nieves F. Reyes. 42
Charlie Espita, brother of the alleged paramour Gina Espita, corroborated
complainant's charge against respondent in these categorical statements he gave to
the investigating officer:
Q Mr. Witness, do you know Atty. Narag?
A Yes, Your Honor, he is the live-in partner of my sister, Gina Espita.
Q If Atty. Narag is here, can you point [to] him?
A Yes, sir.
(Witness pointed to the respondent, Atty. Dominador Narag)
Q Why do you know Atty. Narag?
ATTY. NARAG:
Already answered. He said I am the live-in partner.
CONTINUATION OF THE DIRECT
A Because he is the live-in partner of my sister and that they are now living together
as husband and wife and that they already have two children, Aurelle Dominic and
Kyle Dominador.
xxx xxx xxx
During cross-examination conducted by the respondent himself, Charlie Espita
repeated his account that his sister Gina was living with the respondent, with whom
she had two children:
Q Mr. Espita, you claim that Atty. Narag is now living with your sister as husband
and wife. You claim that?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you say that?
A Because at present you are living together as husband and wife and you have
already two children and I know that is really an immoral act which you cannot just
allow me to follow since my moral values don't allow me that my sister is living with
a married man like you.
Q How do you know that Atty. Narag is living with your sister? Did you see them in
the house?
A Yes, si[r].
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said also that Atty. Narag and your sister have two children, Aurelle Dominic
and Kyle Dominador, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q How do you know that they are the children of Atty. Narag?
A Because you are staying together in that house and you have left your family. 44
In addition, Charlie Espita admitted (1) that it was he who handed to Mrs. Narag the
love letters respondent had sent to his sister, and (2) that Atty. Narag tried to
dissuade him from appearing at the disbarment proceedings. 45
Witness Bienvenido Eugenio strengthened the testimony of Charlie Espita in this
wise:
Q Mr. Witness, do you know the respondent in this case?
A I know him very well, sir.
Q Could you please tell us why do you know him?
A Because he was always going to the house of my son-in-law by the name of
Charlie Espita.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Mr. Eugenio, do you know the residence of Atty. Dominador M. Narag?
A At that time, he [was] residing in the house of Reynaldo Angubong, sir.
Q And this is located where?
A Centro Tamauini, Isabela, sir.
Q And you specifically, categorically state under oath that this is the residence of
Atty. Narag?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And under oath this is where Atty. Narag and Gina Espita are allegedly living as
husband and wife, is it not?
A Yes, sir. 46
Witness Nieves Reyes, a neighbor and friend of the estranged couple, testified that
she learned from the Narag children — Randy, Bong and Rowena — that their father
left his family, that she and her husband prodded the complainant to accept the
respondent back, that the Narag couple again separated when the respondent "went
back to his woman," and that Atty. Narag had maltreated his wife. 47
On the strength of the testimony of her witnesses, the complainant was able to
establish that respondent abandoned his family and lived with another woman.
Absent any evidence showing that these witnesses had an ill motive to testify falsely
against the respondent, their testimonies are deemed worthy of belief.
Further, the complainant presented as evidence the love letters that respondent had
sent to Gina. In these letters, respondent clearly manifested his love for Gina and her
two children, whom he acknowledged as his own. In addition, complainant, also
submitted as evidence the cards that she herself had received from him. Guided by
the rule that handwriting may be proved through a comparison of one set of writings
with those admitted or treated by the respondent as genuine, we affirm that the two
sets of evidence were written by one and the same person. 48 Besides, respondent did
not present any evidence to prove that the love letters were not really written by him;
he merely denied that he wrote them.
While the burden of proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the duty not only
to himself but also to the court to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of
the bar. Mere denial does not suffice. Thus, when his moral character is assailed,
such that his right to continue practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, he
must meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of the
investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to have his name in the Roll
of Attorneys. 49 This he failed to do.
Respondent adamantly denies abandoning his family to live with Gina Espita. At the
same time, he depicts his wife as a "violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending,"
and as an "insanely and pathologically jealous woman," whose only obsession was to
"destroy, destroy and destroy" him as shown by her filing of a series of allegedly
unfounded charges against him (and Gina Espita). To prove his allegation, he
presented ninety-eight (98) pieces of documentary evidence 50 and ten (10)
witnesses. 51
We note, however, that the testimonies of the witnesses of respondent did not
establish the fact that he maintained that moral integrity required by the profession
that would render him fit to continue practicing law. Neither did their testimonies
destroy the fact, as proven by the complainant, that he had abandoned his family and
lived with Gina Espita, with whom he had two children. Some of them testified on
matters which they had no actual knowledge of, but merely relied on information
from either respondent himself or other people, while others were presented to
impeach the good character of his wife.
Respondent may have provided well for his family — they enjoyed a comfortable
life and his children finished their education. He may have also established himself
as a successful lawyer and a seasoned politician. But these accomplishments are not
sufficient to show his moral fitness to continue being a member of the noble
profession of law.
We remind respondent that parents have not only rights but also duties — e.g., to
support, educate and instruct their children according to right precepts and good
example; and to give them love, companionship and understanding, as well as moral
and spiritual guidance. 52 As a husband, he is also obliged to live with his wife; to
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; and to render help and support. 53
Respondent himself admitted that his work required him to be often away from
home. But the evidence shows that he was away not only because of his work;
instead, he abandoned his family to live with her paramour, who bore him two
children. It would appear, then, that he was hardly in a position to be a good husband
or a good father. His children, who grew up mostly under the care of their mother,
must have scarcely felt the warmth of their father's love.
Respondent's son, Jervis B. Narag, showed his resentment towards his father's moral
frailties in his testimony:
Q My question is this, is there any sin so grievous that it cannot be forgiven, is there
a fault that is so serious that it is incapable of forgiveness?
A That depends upon the sin or fault, sir, but if the sin or fault is with the emotional
part of myself, I suppose I cannot forgive a person although am a God-fearing
person, but I h[av]e to give the person a lesson in order for him or her to at least
realize his mistakes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COMR. JOSE:
I think it sounds like this. Assuming for the sake of argument that your father is the
worst, hardened criminal on earth, would you send him to jail and have him
disbarred? That is the question.
CONTINUATION.
A With the reputation that he had removed from us, I suppose he has to be given a
lesson. At this point in time, I might just forgive him if he will have to experience all
the pains that we have also suffered for quite sometime.
Q Dr. Narag, your father gave you life, his blood runs in your veins, his flesh is your
flesh, his bones are your bones and you now disown him because he is the worst man
on earth, is that what you are saying.
A Sort of, sir.
Q You are now telling that as far [as] you are concerned because your father has
sinned, you have no more father, am I correct?
A Long before, sir, I did not feel much from my father even when I was still a kid
because my father is not always staying with us at home. So, how can you say that?
Yes, he gave me life, why not? But for sure, sir, you did not give me love. 54
Another son, Dominador Narag, Jr., narrated before the investigating officer the
trauma he went through:
Q In connection with that affidavit, Mr. Witness, which contains the fact that your
father is maintaining a paramour, could you please tell this Honorable Commission
the effect on you?
A This has a very strong effect on me and this includes my brothers and sisters,
especially my married life, sir. And it also affected my children so much, that I and
my wife ha[ve] parted ways. It hurts to say that I and my wife parted ways. This is
one reason that affected us.
Q Will you please tell us specifically why you and your wife parted ways?
A Because my wife wa[s] ashamed of what happened to my family and that she
could not face the people, our community, especially because my wife belongs to a
well-known family in our community.
Q How about the effect on your brothers and sisters? Please tell us what are those.
A Well, sir, this has also affected the health of my elder sister because she knows so
well that my mother suffered so much and she kept on thinking about my mother.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Why did your wife leave you?
A The truth is because of the things that had happened in our family, Your Honor.
Q In your wife's family?
A In our family, sir.
Q And what do you mean by that?
A What meant by that is my father had an illicit relationship and that my father went
to the extent of scolding my wife and calling my wife a "puta" in provincial
government, which my mother-in-law hated him so much for this, which really
affected us. And then my wife knew for a fact that my father has an illicit
relationship with Gina Espita, whom he bore two children by the name of Aurelle
Dominic and Kyle Dominador, which I could prove and I stand firm to this, Your
Honor. 55
Although respondent piously claims adherence to the sanctity of marriage, his acts
prove otherwise. A husband is not merely a man who has contracted marriage.
Rather, he is a partner who has solemnly sworn to love and respect his wife and
remain faithful to her until death.
We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova 56: "The moral delinquency that
affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for
instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage."
In Toledo vs. Toledo, 57 the respondent was disbarred from the practice of law, when
he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him
a child.
Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan, 58 the respondent was disbarred after the
complainant proved that he had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous
relationship with a married woman. This Court declared that respondent failed to
maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the
bar.
In the present case, the complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing
evidence, that respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for
members of the law profession. As held in Maligsa vs. Cabanting, 59 "a lawyer may
be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good
demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court."
WHEREFORE, Dominador M. Narag is hereby DISBARRED and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Decision be
in the personal record of Respondent Narag; and furnished to all courts of the land,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 115795. March 6, 1998]
JOSE S. SANTOS, JR., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, HAGONOY INSTITUTE INC., ITS DIRECTRESS, MARTA
B. ZUNIGA and PRINCIPAL B. BANAG, respondent.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
It is to state the obvious that schools, next only to the home, wield a weighty
influence upon the students, especially during the latters formative years, for it
instills in them the values and mores which shall prepare them to discharge their
rightful responsibilities as mature individuals in society. At the vanguard in nurturing
their growth are the teachers who are directly charged with rearing and educating
them. As such, a teacher serves as a role model for his students. Corollarily, he must
not bring the teaching profession into public disrespect or disgrace. [1] For failure to
live up to the exacting moral standards demanded by his profession, petitioner Jose
Santos was dismissed from his employment on the ground of immorality. We uphold
his dismissal.
The following facts are hereunder narrated.
Petitioner, a married man, was employed as a teacher by the private respondent
Hagonoy Institute Inc. from June 1980 until his dismissal on June 1, 1991. Likewise
working as a teacher for the private respondent was Mrs. Arlene T. Martin, also
married. In the course of their employment, the couple fell in love. Thereafter,
rumors regarding the couples relationship spread, especially among the faculty
members and school officials.
Concerned about the rumors, on November 3, 1990, the private respondent advised
Mrs. Martin to take a leave of absence which she ignored, as she continued to report
for work.Consequently, on November 9, 1990, she was barred from reporting for
work and was not allowed to enter the private respondents premises, effectively
dismissing her from her employment.
In view of her termination from the service, on November 13, 1990, Mrs. Martin
filed a case for illegal dismissal before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch No.
III, San Fernando, Pampanga[2] against the private respondent. After the parties had
submitted their respective evidence and position paper, Labor Arbiter Ariel Santos
rendered a decision dismissing the complaint, the dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, the complaint filed by the complainant Arlene Martin is hereby
DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
However, considering the length of service of complaint and for humanitarian reason
she would be given financial assistance based on one-month pay on every year of
service.
On appeal, the NLRC in a decision dated February 26, 1993, reversed the labor
arbiters ruling, the dispositive portion of the decision[3] reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby SET ASIDE and
VACATED. Another one ENTERED ordering respondent to pay complainant her
backwages and separation pay in the total amount of P83,392.40. Complainants other
claims are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
The reversal was anchored on the failure by the private respondent, in dismissing
Mrs. Martin, to accord her the necessary procedural due process. [4]
Meanwhile, private respondent set up a committee to investigate the veracity
of the rumors. After two weeks of inquiry, the committee rendered its report
confirming the illicit relationship between the petitioner and Mrs. Martin. [5]
In view of the committees finding, on December 19, 1990, petitioner was charged
administratively for immorality and was required to present his side on the
controversy. Five months later or in May 1991, petitioner was informed by the
private respondents Board of Directors of his dismissal effective June 1,
1991.[6] Unable to accept such verdict, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal on August 12, 1991 before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch No. III,
San Fernando, Pampanga. After a full blown trial was conducted, Labor Arbiter
Quintin C. Mendoza rendered a decision dated January 12, 1993, dismissing
petitioners complaint but at the same time awarding monetary sums as financial
assistance, the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby issued dismissing the complaint, but ordering
respondent Hagonoy Institute Inc. and/or Mrs. Elisea B. Banag (respondent
Principal) or Mrs. Marta B. Zuniga (respondent Directress) to pay complainant
(petitioner) the sum of thirteen thousand and seven hundred fifty (P13,750.00) pesos
(as financial assistance), the rest of the complaint being hereby dismissed for lack of
basis or merit.
SO ORDERED.
In an effort to seek the reversal of the labor arbiters decision, petitioner filed an
appeal before the NLRC, which, however, did not find any substantial reason to
overturn the labor arbiters ruling. Thus, in a decision[7] dated November 29, 1993,
the NLRC dismissed the appeal, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal should be, as it is hereby,
dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration suffered the same fate. [8] Thus, this petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
We hereby uphold the NLRCs finding dismissing petitioner from his employment.
The crux of the controversy is whether the illicit relationship between the petitioner
and Mrs. Martin could be considered immoral as to constitute just cause to
terminate an employee under Article 282 of the Labor Code.
We have consistently held that in order to constitute a valid dismissal, two requisites
must concur: (a) the dismissal must be for any of the causes expressed in Art. 282 of
the Labor Code, and (b) the employee must be accorded due process, basic of which
are the opportunity to be heard and defend himself. [9]
Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended, the following are deemed just
causes to terminate an employee:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders
of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties:
(c) Fraud or willfull breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his
employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorize
representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Moreover, it is provided inter alia under Section 94[10] of the Manual of Regulations
for Private Schools:
Section 94. Causes of Terminating Employment. In addition to the just cases
enumerated in the Labor Code, the employment of school personnels, including
faculty, may be terminated for any of the following causes:
xxx xxx xxx
E. Disgraceful or immoral conduct.
Private respondent, in justifying the termination of the petitioner, contends that being
a teacher, he must live up to the high moral standards required of his position. In
other words, it asserts that its purpose in dismissing the petitioner was to preserve the
respect of the community towards the teachers and to strengthen the educational
system.[11]
On the other hand, petitioner merely argues that the alleged illicit relationship was
not substantially proven by convincing evidence by the private respondent as to
justify his dismissal.
On the outset, it must be stressed that to constitute immorality, the circumstances of
each particular case must be holistically considered and evaluated in light of the
prevailing norms of conduct and applicable laws.[12] American jurisprudence has
defined immorality as a course of conduct which offends the morals of the
community and is a bad example to the youth whose ideals a teacher is supposed to
foster and to elevate,[13] the same including sexual misconduct.[14] Thus, in
petitioners case, the gravity and seriousness of the charges against him stem from his
being a married man and at the same time a teacher.
We cannot overemphasize that having an extra-marital affair is an afront to the
sanctity of marriage, which is a basic institution of society. Even our Family Code
provides that husband and wife must live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity.[15] This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. [16] Our laws, in implementing this
constitutional edict on marriage and the family underscore their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.[17]
As a teacher, petitioner serves as an example to his pupils, especially during their
formative years[18] and stands in loco parentis to them.[19] To stress their importance
in our society, teachers are given substitute and special parental authority under our
laws.[20]
Consequently, it is but stating the obvious to assert that teachers must adhere to the
exacting standards of morality and decency. There is no dichotomy of morality. A
teacher, both in his official and personal conduct, must display exemplary
behavior. He must freely and willingly accept restrictions on his conduct that might
be viewed irksome by ordinary citizens. In other words, the personal behavior of
teachers, in and outside the classroom, must be beyond reproach.
Accordingly, teachers must abide by a standard of personal conduct which not only
proscribes the commission of immoral acts, but also prohibits behavior creating a
suspicion of immorality because of the harmful impression it might have on the
students.[21] Likewise, they must observe a high standard of integrity and honesty. [22]
From the foregoing, it seems obvious that when a teacher engages in extra-marital
relationship, especially when the parties are both married, such behavior amounts to
immorality, justifying his termination from employment. [23]
Having concluded that immorality is a just cause for dismissing petitioner, it is
imperative that the private respondent prove the same. Since the burden of proof
rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal was for a just and valid
cause,[24] the same must be supported by substantial evidence.[25]
Undoubtedly, the question of immorality by the petitioner is factual in nature. Thus,
we reiterate the well-settled rule that factual findings by the NLRC, particularly
when it coincides with those by the Labor Arbiter, are accorded respect, even
finality, and will not be disturbed for as long as such findings are supported by
substantial evidence.[26] A scrutiny of the records of the instant petition leads us to
concur with the NLRCs finding that petitioner indeed entered into an illicit
relationship with his co-teacher. This fact was attested to by the testimonies of nine
witnesses (a fourth year student, a security guard, a janitor and six co-teachers)
which petitioner failed to rebut.
In fact, the petitioners only recourse was to deny the accusation and insinuate that
these witnesses were coerced by the private respondent to give their
testimonies. However, under such circumstances, it is not enough for petitioner to
simply cast doubt on the motives of the witnesses; he must present countervailing
evidence to prove that no such affair took place.
In short, we cannot just ignore the witnesses affidavits and their subsequent
testimonies during the investigation as to the culpability of the petitioner on the sole
basis of the latters denial. In any event, we have held that denial, if unsubstantiated
by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence which has
no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of
credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.[27]
Further bolstering the witnesses testimonies is the the absence of any motive on their
part to falsely testify against the petitioner. Thus, since there is nothing to indicate
that the witnesses were moved by dubious or improper motives to testify falsely
against the petitioner, their testimonies are hereby accorded full faith and credit.
Likewise, petitioner cannot take comfort from the letter dated November 7, 1990
signed by 28 of his co-teachers, expressing their unequivocal support for Mrs. Arlene
Martin.[28] It must be noted that the said letter did not in any way absolve Mrs.
Martin from any wrongdoing. It merely affirmed the fact that when she was forcibly
asked to take a leave of absence on November 3, 1990 the same was done in a
precipitous manner, without the benefit of due process. Moreover, it must be stressed
that the expression of support was personal to Mrs. Martin, and the same should not
redound to the benefit of the petitioner. Indeed, if petitioner really had the support of
his peers, then it should have been easy for him to obtain a similar letter from them
in the course of his administrative investigation. However, not only did he not get
such support, but six of his co-teachers even testified against him during the inquiry.
Finally, petitioner cannot invoke in his favor the ruling in the Arlene Martin case,
wherein the NLRC ruled that her dismissal was illegal. It must be noted that the
reason for declaring Martins dismissal as illegal was the failure by the private
respondent to accord her the required due process.[29]
As aptly observed by the NLRC in its decision:[30]
In the case at bar, the complainant was amply afforded the due process requirements
of law. He was dismissed only on June 1, 1991 after an exhaustive investigation. A
committee was formed to conduct an inquiry. (Rollo, pp. 43-44) An administrative
charge for immorality was filed against him. (Rollo, p. 45) He was even required to
testify in said case. (Rollo, p. 46) He was given the opportunity to answer said
accusation. (Rollo, p. 47) He was in fact present during the hearing on January 17,
1991 and gave his side. x x x In fine, herein complainant (petitioner) cannot
successfully seek refuge in the cited case of Martin. (Rollo, pp. 48-49)
In view of our finding that petitioners dismissal was for a just and valid cause, the
grant of financial assistance by the NLRC is without any factual and legal
basis. In PLDT v. NLRC, [31]we held that:
We hold henceforth separation pay shall be as a measure of social justice only in
these instances where the employee is validly dismissed for cause other than serious
misconduct or those reflecting his moral character. Where the reason for the valid
dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral
turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relationship with a fellow worker, the employer
may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial
assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice.
The above ruling has consistently been applied in terminating an employee when it
involves his moral character.[32]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The
questioned Resolution dated March 8, 1994 and the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission dated November 29, 1993, are AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION deleting the financial assistance granted to petitioner in the
amount of P13,750.00. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 139789 July 19, 2001
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN
DOES and JANE DOES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 139808 July 19, 2001
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K.
ILUSORIO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PARDO, J.:
Once again we see the sad tale of a prominent family shattered by conflicts on
expectancy in fabled fortune.
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly
inseparable from her husband some years ago, filed a petition with the Court of
Appeals1 for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband in consortium.
On April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the
petition for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject, Potenciano Ilusorio.
Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an
appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire to have custody of her husband Potenciano
Ilusorio.2 This case was consolidated with another case3 filed by Potenciano Ilusorio
and his children, Erlinda I. Bildner and Sylvia K. Ilusorio appealing from the order
giving visitation rights to his wife, asserting that he never refused to see her.
On May 12, 2000, we dismissed the petition for habeas corpus 4 for lack of merit, and
granted the petition5 to nullify the Court of Appeals' ruling6 giving visitation rights to
Erlinda K. Ilusorio.7
What is now before the Court is Erlinda's motion to reconsider the decision. 8
On September 20, 2000, we set the case for preliminary conference on October 11,
2000, at 10:00 a. m., without requiring the mandatory presence of the parties.
In that conference, the Court laid down the issues to be resolved, to wit:
(a) To determine the propriety of a physical and medical examination of petitioner
Potenciano Ilusorio;
(b) Whether the same is relevant; and
(c) If relevant, how the Court will conduct the same.9
The parties extensively discussed the issues. The Court, in its resolution, enjoined the
parties and their lawyers to initiate steps towards an amicable settlement of the case
through mediation and other means.
On November 29, 2000, the Court noted the manifestation and compliance of the Fourth. Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles 68 and
parties with the resolution of October 11, 2000. 10 69 of the Family Code support her position that as spouses, they (Potenciano and
On January 31, 2001, the Court denied Erlinda Ilusorio's manifestation and motion Erlinda) are duty bound to live together and care for each other. We agree.
praying that Potenciano Ilusorio be produced before the Court and be medically The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe
examined by a team of medical experts appointed by the Court. 11 mutual love, respect and fidelity.20 The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual
On March 27, 2001, we denied with finality Erlinda's motion to reconsider the affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to
Court's order of January 31 , 2001.12 enforce consortium.21
The issues raised by Erlinda K. Ilusorio in her motion for reconsideration are mere Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano,
reiterations of her arguments that have been resolved in the decision. having separated from bed and board since 1972. We defined empathy as a shared
Nevertheless, for emphasis, we shall discuss the issues thus: feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous
First. Erlinda K. Ilusorio claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
with her in consortium and that Potenciano's mental state was not an issue. However, process.
the very root cause of the entire petition is her desire to have her Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor
husband's custody.13 Clearly, Erlinda cannot now deny that she wanted Potenciano gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness,
Ilusorio to live with her. conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.22
Second. One reason why Erlinda K. Ilusorio sought custody of her husband was that On June 28, 2001, Potenciano Ilusorio gave his soul to the Almighty, his Creator and
respondents Lin and Sylvia were illegally restraining Potenciano Ilusorio to Supreme Judge. Let his soul rest in peace and his survivors continue the much
fraudulently deprive her of property rights out of pure greed. 14 She claimed that her prolonged fracas ex aequo et bono.
two children were using their sick and frail father to sign away Potenciano and IN VIEW WHEREOF, we DENY Erlinda's motion for reconsideration. At any rate,
Erlinda's property to companies controlled by Lin and Sylvia. She also argued that the case has been rendered moot by the death of subject.
since Potenciano retired as director and officer of Baguio Country Club and SO ORDERED.
Philippine Oversees Telecommunications, she would logically assume his position
and control. Yet, Lin and Sylvia were the ones controlling the corporations. 15
The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the hearing at the Court of
Appeals on March 23, 1999.16Potenciano himself declared that he was not prevented
by his children from seeing anybody and that he had no objection to seeing his wife
and other children whom he loved.
Erlinda highlighted that her husband suffered from various ailments. Thus,
Potenciano Ilusorio did not have the mental capacity to decide for himself. Hence,
Erlinda argued that Potenciano be brought before the Supreme Court so that we
could determine his mental state.
We were not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to
choose whether to see his wife or not. Again, this is a question of fact that has been
decided in the Court of Appeals.
As to whether the children were in fact taking control of the corporation, these are
matters that may be threshed out in a separate proceeding, irrelevant in habeas
corpus.
Third. Petitioner failed to sufficiently convince the Court why we should not rely on
the facts found by the Court of Appeals. Erlinda claimed that the facts mentioned in
the decision were erroneous and incomplete. We see no reason why the High Court
of the land need go to such length. The hornbook doctrine states that findings of fact
of the lower courts are conclusive on the Supreme Court. 17 We emphasize, it is not
for the Court to weigh evidence all over again.18 Although there are exceptions to the
rule,19 Erlinda failed to show that this is an exceptional instance.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 70082 August 19, 1991
SPOUSES RICKY WONG and ANITA CHAN, LEONARDO JOSON,
JUANITO SANTOS, EMERITO SICAT and CONRADO
LAGMAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ROMARICO
HENSON, respondents.
Feliciano C. Tumale for petitioners.
Benjamin Dadios and Bausa, Ampil, Suarez, Paredes & Bausa for private
respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:p
Submitted for adjudication in the instant petition for review on certiorari is the issue
of whether or not the execution of a decision in an action for collection of a sum of
money may be nullified on the ground that the real properties levied upon and sold at
public auction are the alleged exclusive properties of a husband who did not
participate in his wife's business transaction from which said action stemmed.
Private respondent Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda on January 6,
1964. 1 They have three children but even during the early years of their marriage,
Romarico and Katrina had been most of the time living separately. The former
stayed in Angeles City while the latter lived in Manila. During the marriage or on
January 6, 1971, Romarico bought a 1,787 square-meter parcel of land in Angeles
City for P11,492 from his father, Dr. Celestino L. Henson 2 with money borrowed
from an officemate. His father need the amount for investments in Angeles City and
Palawan. 3
Meanwhile, in Hongkong sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered into an agreement
with Anita Chan whereby the latter consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale
valued at 199,895 Hongkong dollars or P321,830.95. 4 When Katrina failed to return
the pieces of jewelry within the 20-day period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded
payment of their value.
On September 18, 1972, Katrina issued in favor of Anita Chan a check for P55,000
which, however, was dishonored for lack of funds. Hence, Katrina was charged with
estafa before the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga and Angeles City, Branch
IV. 5 After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case on the
ground that Katrina's liability was not criminal but civil in nature as no estafa was
committed by the issuance of the check in payment of a pre-existing obligation. 6
In view of said decision, Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong filed against
Katrina and her husband Romarico Henson, an action for collection of a sum of
money also in the same branch of the aforesaid court. 7The records of the case show
that Atty. Gregorio Albino, Jr. filed an answer with counterclaim but only in behalf
of Katrina. When the case was called for pre-trial, Atty. Albino once again appeared
as counsel for Katrina only. While it is true that during subsequent hearings, Atty.
Expedite Yumul, who collaborated with Atty. Albino, appeared for the defendants, it
is not shown on record that said counsel also represented Romarico. In fact, a power
of attorney which Atty. Albino produced during the trial, showed that the same was
executed solely by Katrina. 8
After trial, the court promulgated a decisions 9 in favor of the Wongs. It ordered
Katrina and Romarico Henson to pay the Wongs HK$199,895.00 or P321,830.95
with legal interest from May 27, 1975, the date of filing of the complaint, until fully
paid; P20,000 as expenses for litigation; P15,000 as attorney's fees, and the costs of
the suit.
A writ of execution was thereafter issued. Levied upon were four lots in Angeles
City covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 30950, 30951, 30952 and 30953
all in the name of Romarico Henson ... married to Katrina Henson. 10
The public auction sale was first set for October 30, 1977 but since said date was
declared a public holiday, Deputy Sheriff Emerito Sicat reset the sale to November
11, 1977. On said date, the following properties registered in the name of Romarico
Henson "married to Katrina Henson" were sold at public auction: (a) two parcels of
land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 30950 and 30951 with respective
areas of 293 and 289 square meters at P145,000 each to Juanito L. Santos, 11 and (b)
two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 30952 and 30953
with respective areas of 289 and 916 square meters in the amount of P119,000.00 to
Leonardo B. Joson. 12
After the inscription on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 30951 of the levy on
execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 2224, the property covered by said title
was extrajudicially foreclosed by the Rural Bank of Porac, Pampanga on account of
the mortgage loan of P8,000 which Romarico and Katrina had obtained from said
bank. The property was sold by the sheriff to the highest bidder for P57,000 on
September 9, 1977. On September 14, 1978, Juanito Santos, who had earlier bought
the same property at public auction on November 11, 1977, redeemed it by paying
the sum of P57,000 plus the legal interest of P6,840.00 or a total amount of
P63,840.00. 13
About a month before such redemption or on August 8, 1 978, Romarico filed an
action for the annulment of the decision in Civil Case No. 2224 as well as the writ of
execution, levy on execution and the auction sale therein in the same Court of First
Instance. 14 Romarico alleged that he was "not given his day in court" because he
was not represented by counsel as Attys. Albino and Yumul appeared solely for
Katrina; that although he did not file an answer to the complaint, he was not declared
in default in the case; that while Atty. Albino received a copy of the decision, he and
his wife were never personally served a copy thereof; that he had nothing to do with
the business transactions of Katrina as he did not authorize her to enter into such
transactions; and that the properties levied on execution and sold at public auction by
the sheriff were his capital properties and therefore, as to him, all the proceedings
had in the case were null and void.
On November 10, 1978, the lower court issued an order restraining the Register of
Deeds of Angeles City from issuing the final bill of sale of Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 30950 and 30951 in favor of Juanito Santos and Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 30952 and 30953 in favor of Leonardo Joson until further orders of the
court. 15On January 22, 1979, upon motion of Romarico, the court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the sheriff from approving the final bill of sale of
the land covered by the aforementioned certificates of title and the Register of Deeds
of Angeles City from registering said certificates of title in the names of Santos and
Joson until the final outcome of the case subject to Romarico's posting of a bond in
the amount of P321,831.00. 16
After trial on the merits, the lower court 17 rendered a decision holding that Romarico
was indeed not given his day in court as he was not represented by counsel nor was
he notified of the hearings therein although he was never declared in default. Noting
that the complaint in Civil Case No. 2224 as well as the testimonial and documentary
evidence adduced at the trial in said case do not show that Romarico had anything to
do with the transactions between Katrina and Anita Chan, the court ruled that the
judgment in Civil Case No. 2224 "is devoid of legal or factual basis which is not
even supported by a finding of fact or ratio decidendi in the body of the decision,
and may be declared null and void ... pursuant to a doctrine laid down by the
Supreme Court to the effect that the Court of First Instance or a branch thereof, has
authority and jurisdiction to try and decide an action for annulment of a final and
executory judgment or order rendered by another court of first instance or of a
branch thereof (Gianan vs. Imperial, 55 SCRA 755)." 18
On whether or not the properties lenied upon and sold at public auction may be
reconveyed to Romarico, the court, finding that there was no basis for holding the
conjugal partnership liable for the personal indebtedness of Katrina, ruled in favor of
reconveyance in view of the jurisprudence that the interest of the wife in the conjugal
partnership property being inchoate and therefore merely an expectancy, the same
may not be sold or disposed of for value until after the liquidation and settlement of
the community assets. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiff and against all the defendants, as follows:
(a) The Decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga and Angeles City,
Branch IV, rendered in Civil Case No. 2224, entitled "RICKY WONG, ET AL. vs.
KATRINA PINEDA HENSON and ROMARICO HENSON", is hereby declared
null and void, only as far as it affects plaintiff herein Romarico Henson;
(b) The Writ of Execution, levy in execution and auction sale of the conjugal
property of the spouses Romarico Henson and Katrina Pineda Henson which were
sold at public auction on November 11, 1977, without notice to plaintiff herein, by
Deputy Sheriff Emerito Sicat, are likewise declared null and void and of no force and
effect;
(c) Defendants Emerito Sicat and Conrado Lagman, in their official capacity as
Sheriff and Register of Deeds, respectively, are enjoined permanently from issuing
and/or registering the corresponding deeds of sale affecting the property;
(d) The aforementioned buyers are directed to reconvey the property they have thus
purchased at public auction to plaintiff Romarico Henson;
(e) As far as the claim for reimbursement filed by Juanito Santos concerning the
redemption of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 30951 from
the Rural Bank of Porac, which foreclosed the same extrajudicially, is concerned,
plaintiff Romarico Henson may redeem the same within the period and in the manner
prescribed by law, after the corresponding deed of redemption shall have been
registered in the Office of the Registry of Deeds for Angeles City;
(f) Defendants Spouses Ricky Wong and Anita Chan are, with the exception of the
defendants Juanito Santos, Leonardo Joson, Sheriff and Register of Deeds, are
ordered jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff Romarico Henson the sum of
P10,000.00, corresponding to the expenses of litigation, with legal interest thereon
from the time this suit was filed up to the time the same shall have been paid, plus
P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, and the costs of suit; and
(g) The counterclaims respectively filed on behalf of all the defendants in the above-
entitled case are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
The defendants appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. In its decision of
January 22, 1985 19 the said court affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. It
added that as to Romarico, the judgment in Civil Case No. 2224 had not attained
finality as the decision therein was not served on him and that he was not represented
by counsel. Therefore, estoppel may not be applied against him as, not having been
served with the decision, Romarico did not know anything about it. Corollarily, there
can be no valid writ of execution inasmuch as the decision had not become final as
far as Romarico is concerned.
On whether the properties may be levied upon as conjugal properties, the appellate
court ruled in the negative. It noted that the properties are Romarico' s exclusive
capital having been bought by him with his own funds. But granting that the
properties are conjugal, they cannot answer for Katrina's obligations as the latter
were exclusively hers because they were incurred without the consent of her
husband, they were not for the daily expenses of the family and they did not redound
to the benefit of the family. The court underscored the fact that no evidence has been
submitted that the administration of the conjugal partnership had been transferred to
Katrina either by Romarico or by the court before said obligations were incurred.
The appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate
court but the same was denied for lack of merit on February 6, 1985. 20
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners contend that,
inasmuch as the Henson spouses were duly represented by Atty. Albino as shown by
their affidavit of August 25, 1977 wherein they admitted that they were represented
by said counsel until Atty. Yumul took over the actual management and conduct of
the case and that Atty. Albino had not withdrawn as their counsel, the lower court
"did not commit an error" in serving a copy of the decision in Civil Case No. 2224
only on Atty. Albino. Moreover, during the 2-year period between the filing of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 2224 and the public auction sale on November 11, 1977,
Romarico remained silent thereby making him in estoppel and guilty of laches.
Petitioners further aver that there being sufficient evidence that the auction sale was
conducted in accordance with law, the acts of the sheriffs concerned are presumed to
be regular and valid. But granting that an irregularity consisting of the non-
notification of Romarico attended the conduct of the auction sale, the rights of
Santos and Joson who were "mere strangers who participated as the highest bidders"
therein, may not be prejudiced. Santos and Joson bought the properties sincerely
believing that the sheriff was regularly performing his duties and no evidence was
presented to the effect that they acted with fraud or that they connived with the
sheriff. However, should the auction sale be nullified, petitioners assert that
Romarico should not be unduly enriched at the expense of Santos and Joson.
The petitioners' theory is that Romarico Henson was guilty of laches and may not
now belatedly assert his rights over the properties because he and Katrina were
represented by counsel in Civil Case No. 2224. Said theory is allegedly founded on
the perception that the Hensons were like any other ordinary couple wherein a
spouse knows or should know the transactions of the other spouse which necessarily
must be in interest of the family. The factual background of this case, however, takes
it out of said ideal situation.
Romarico and Katrina had in fact been separated when Katrina entered into a
business deal with Anita Wong. Thus, when that business transaction eventually
resulted in the filing of Civil Case No. 2224, Romarico acted, or, as charged by
petitioners, failed to act, in the belief that he was not involved in the personal
dealings of his estranged wife. That belief was buttressed by the fact that the
complaint itself did not mention or implicate him other than as the husband of
Katrina. On whether Romarico was also represented by Atty. Albino, Katrina's
counsel, the courts below found that:
... Atty. Albino filed an Answer with Counterclaims dated July 25, 1975 solely on
behalf of defendant Katrina Henson. The salutary statement in that Answer
categorically reads: ... COMES NOW THE DEFENDANT KATRINA HENSON by
and through undersigned counsel, in answer to plaintiffs' complaint respectfully
alleges: ... .
That Answer was signed by GREGORIO ALBINO, JR., over the phrase COUNSEL
FOR DEFENDANT KATRINA HENSON.
Again, when Civil Case No. 2224 was called for pre-trial on November 27, 1975,
before then Presiding Judge Bienvenido Ejercito, it is clearly stated on page 2 of the
day's stenographic notes, under "APPEARANCES that Atty. Albino, Jr. appeared as
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT KATRINA HENSON". And when the case was
called, Atty. Jose Baltazar, Sr. appeared for the plaintiffs while Atty. Albino
categorically appeared "FOR DEFENDANT KATRINA HENSON".
It might be true that in subsequent hearings, Atty. Expedito Yumul 'appeared as
counsel for the defendants,' but the whole trouble is that he never expressly
manifested to the Court that he was likewise actually representing defendant
"ROMARICO HENSON", for it cannot be disputed that Atty. Yumul only entered
his appearance in collaboration with Atty. Albino (see p. 2 tsn, January 26, 1976,
Espinosa), who in turn entered his initial appearance during the pre- trial, and
through the filing of an Answer, for defendant KATRINA HENSON. As a matter of
fact, the Power of Attorney which Atty. Albino produced during the pre-trial was
executed solely by defendant KATRINA HENSON. Accordingly, as collaborating
counsel, Atty. Yumul cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered as
duly authorized to formally appear likewise on behalf of defendant ROMARICO
HENSON for whom principal counsel of record Atty. Gregorio Albino, Jr. never
made any formal appearance. On this score, it is not amiss to state that "A spring
cannot rise higher than its source:.
Now, what about that statement in the aforementioned joint affidavit of the spouses
KATRINA HENSON and ROMARICO HENSON, to the effect that our first lawyer
in said case was Atty. Gregorio Albino, Jr., and sometime later Atty. Expedito B.
Yumul took over ...
That statement which plaintiff ROMARICO HENSON was made to sign by Atty.
Yumul on August 25,1977, after the filing of this case, allegedly for the purpose of
dissolving the writ of execution, as claimed in paragraph XIV of the complaint
herein, and is satisfactorily explained by both plaintiff herein and his wife, while on
cross-examination by Atty. Baltazar, Sr., and We quote:
Q So, the summons directed your filing of your Answer for both of you, your wife
and your good self?
A Yes, sir but may I add, I received the summons but I did not file an answer
because my wife took a lawyer and that lawyer I think will protect her interest and
my interest being so I did not have nothing to do in the transaction which is attached
to the complaint.' (TSN, Jan. 14, 1980, pp. 52-53).
That plaintiff never appeared in Civil Case No. 2224, nor was he therein represented
by counsel was impliedly admitted by defendants' counsel of records thru a question
he propounded on cross, and the answer given by Katrina Pineda, to wit:
Q How about your husband, do you remember if he physically appeared in that Civil
Case No. 2224, will you tell us if he was represented by counsel as a party
defendant?
A No, sir, he did not appear.
Q You are husband and wife, please tell us the reason why you have your own
counsel in that case whereas Romarico Henson did not appear nor a counsel did not
appear in that proceedings (TSN, Feb. 25,1980, pp. 6-7).
xxx xxx xxx
A Because that case is my exclusive and personal case, he has nothing to do with
that, sir. (TSN, Feb. 25, 1980, p. 9). (Rollo, pp. 17-20)
Hence, laches may not be charged against Romarico because, aside from the fact that
he had no knowledge of the transactions of his estranged wife, he was also not
afforded an opportunity to defend himself in Civil Case No. 2224. 21 There is no
laches or even finality of decision to speak of with respect to Romarico since the
decision in Civil Case No. 2224 is null and void for having been rendered without
jurisdiction for failure to observe the notice requirements prescribed by
law. 22 Failure to notify Romarico may not be attributed to the fact that the plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 2224 acted on the presumption that the Hensons were still happily
married because the complaint itself shows that they did not consider Romarico as a
party to the transaction which Katrina undertook with Anita Wong. In all likelihood,
the plaintiffs merely impleaded Romarico as a nominal party in the case pursuant to
the provisions of Rule 3, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
Consequently, the writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico as he has not
yet had his day in court 23and, necessarily, the public auction sale is null and
void. 24 Moreover, the power of the court in the execution of judgments extends only
over properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. 25
On the matter of ownership of the properties involved, however, the Court disagrees
with the appellate court that the said properties are exclusively owned by Romarico.
Having been acquired during the marriage, they are still presumed to belong to the Stevenson, 45 Phil. 252; Cabuhat vs. Ansery, 42 Phil. 170; Fore v. Manove, 18 Cal.
conjugal partnership 26 even though Romarico and Katrina had been living 436 and 21 Am. Jur., 140-141. Emphasis supplied.)
separately. 27 Applying this jurisprudence, execution purchasers Santos and Joson possess no
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the absence of rights which may rise above judgment debtor Katrina's inchoate proprietary rights
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to over the properties sold at public auction. After all, a person can sell only what he
prove that the properties are exclusively owned by Romarico. 28 While there is proof owns or is authorized to sell and the buyer can, as a consequence, acquire no more
that Romarico acquired the properties with money he had borrowed from an that what the seller can legally transfer. 36 But, inasmuch as the decision in Civil
officemate, it is unclear where he obtained the money to repay the loan. If he paid it Case No. 2224 is void only as far as Romarico and the conjugal properties are
out of his salaries, then the money is part of the conjugal assets 29 and not exclusively concerned, the same may still be executed by the Spouses Wong against Katrina
his. Proof on this matter is of paramount importance considering that in the Henson personally and exclusively. The Spouses Wong must return to Juanito Santos
determination of the nature of a property acquired by a person during covertrue, the and Leonardo Joson the purchase prices of P145,000 and P119,000 respectively,
controlling factor is the source of the money utilized in the purchase. received by said spouse from the public auction sale.
The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding, Katrina's indebtedness may The redemption made by Santos in the foreclosure proceeding against Romarico and
not be paid for with them her obligation not having been shown by the petitioners to Katrina Henson filed by the Rural Bank of Porac, should, however, be respected
be one of the charges against the conjugal partnership. 30In addition to the fact that unless Romarico exercises his right of redemption over the property covered by
her rights over the properties are merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 30951 in accordance with law.
conjugal partnership, the consent of her husband and her authority to incur such WHEREFORE, the decisions of the appellate court and the lower court in Civil Case
indebtedness had not been alleged in the complaint and proven at the trial. 31 No. 28-09 are hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modifications above stated. No
Furthermore, under the Civil Code (before the effectivity of the Family Code on costs.
August 3, 1988), a wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases SO ORDERED.
things necessary for the support of the family or when she borrows money for the Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
purpose of purchasing things necessary for the support of the family if the husband
fails to deliver the proper sum; 32 when the administration of the conjugal partnership
is transferred to the wife by the courts 33 or by the husband 34 and when the wife
gives moderate donations for charity. 35 Having failed to establish that any of these
circumstances occurred, the Wongs may not bind the conjugal assets to answer for
Katrina's personal obligation to them.
Petitioners' contention that the rights of Santos and Joson as innocent buyers at the
public auction sale may not be prejudiced, is, to a certain extent, valid. After all, in
the absence of proof that irregularities attended the sale, the same must be presumed
to have been conducted in accordance with law. There is, however, a peculiar factual
circumstance that goes against the grain of that general presumption the properties
levied upon and sold at the public auction do not exclusively belong to the judgment
debtor. Thus, the guiding jurisprudence is as follows:
The rule in execution sales is that an execution creditor acquires no higher or better
right than what the execution debtor has in the property levied upon. The purchaser
of property on sale under execution and levy takes as assignee, only as the judicial
seller possesses no title other than that which would pass by an assignment by the
owner. "An execution purchaser generally acquires such estate or interest as was
vested in the execution debtor at the time of the seizure on execution, and only such
interest, taking merely a quit-claim of the execution debtor's title, without warranty
on the part of either the execution officer or of the parties, whether the property is
realty or personalty. This rule prevails even if a larger interest in the property was
intended to be sold. Accordingly, if the judgment debtor had no interest in the
property, the execution purchaser acquires no interest therein." (Pacheco vs. Court of
Appeals, L-48689, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 382, 388-389 quoting Laureano vs.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding
Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report, 1 on 2
July 1991, Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro
Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. Petitioner entered Wilson St., where it is a
one-way street and started travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the
corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly
bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan
inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene. A security guard at a
nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner's car plate number. The police
arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty
shell and one round of live ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol. Verification at the
Land Transportation Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.
The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where
the suspect had come from; they were informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings
Bake Shop shortly before the shooting. The police obtained a facsimile or impression
of the credit card used by petitioner from the cashier of the bake shop. The security
guard of the bake shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he positively identified
him as the same person who had shot Maguan. Having established that the assailant
was probably the petitioner, the police launched a manhunt for petitioner.
On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to
verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by
two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting,
who was at the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the
gunman. That same day, the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated
homicide 2 against petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.
First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed
petitioner, in the presence of his lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to
preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute any such
waiver.
On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an
information could be filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot
wound(s).
Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for
frustrated homicide, filed an information for murder 3 before the Regional Trial
Court. No bail was recommended. At the bottom of the information, the Prosecutor
certified that no preliminary investigation had been conducted because the accused
did not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code.
In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the
Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and proper preliminary
investigation, 4 alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that
no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was filed.
Petitioner also prayed that he be released on recognizance or on bail. Provincial
Prosecutor Mauro Castro, acting on the omnibus motion, wrote on the last page of
the motion itself that he interposed no objection to petitioner being granted
provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00.
On 12 July 1991, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle 5 in
order to expedite action on the Prosecutor's bail recommendation. The case was
raffled to the sala of respondent Judge, who, on the same date, approved the cash
bond 6 posted by petitioner and ordered his release. 7 Petitioner was in fact released
that same day.
On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for
leave to conduct preliminary investigation 8 and prayed that in the meantime all
proceedings in the court be suspended. He stated that petitioner had filed before the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal an omnibus motion for immediate
release and preliminary investigation, which motion had been granted by Provincial
Prosecutor Mauro Castro, who also agreed to recommend cash bail of P100,000.00.
The Prosecutor attached to the motion for leave a copy of petitioner's omnibus
motion of 11 July 1991.
Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order 9 granting leave to conduct
preliminary investigation and cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until
after the prosecution shall have concluded its preliminary investigation.
On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an
Order, 10 embodying the following: (1) the 12 July 1991 Order which granted bail
was recalled; petitioner was given 48 hours from receipt of the Order to surrender
himself; (2) the 16 July 1991 Order which granted leave to the prosecutor to conduct
preliminary investigation was recalled and cancelled; (3) petitioner's omnibus motion
for immediate release and preliminary investigation dated 11 July 1991 was treated
as a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991.
On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus before the Supreme Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order,
contending that the information was null and void because no preliminary
investigation had been previously conducted, in violation of his right to due process.
Petitioner also moved for suspension of all proceedings in the case pending
resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition; this motion was, however, denied by
respondent Judge.
On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police.
By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus to the Court of Appeals.
On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an order in open court setting the
arraignment of petitioner on 23 August 1991.
On 19 August 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to restrain
his arraignment.
On 23 August 1991, respondent judge issued a Commitment Order directing the
Provincial Warden of Rizal to admit petitioner into his custody at the Rizal
Provincial Jail. On the same date, petitioner was arraigned. In view, however, of his
refusal to enter a plea, the trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty. The Trial
court then set the criminal case for continuous hearings on 19, 24 and 26 September;
on 2, 3, 11 and 17 October; and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22 November 1991. 11
On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus 12 in the Court of
Appeals. He alleged that in view of public respondent's failure to join issues in the
petition for certiorari earlier filed by him, after the lapse of more than a month, thus
prolonging his detention, he was entitled to be released on habeas corpus.
On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas corpus. 13 The
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, on the one hand, and the petition
for habeas corpus, upon the other, were subsequently consolidated in the Court of
Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution denying petitioner's
motion to restrain his arraignment on the ground that that motion had become moot
and academic.
On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced and the prosecution
presented its first witness.
On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated
decision 14 dismissing the two (2) petitions, on the following grounds:
a. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for which he was
arrested and charged had been "freshly committed." His identity had been established
through investigation. At the time he showed up at the police station, there had been
an existing manhunt for him. During the confrontation at the San Juan Police Station,
one witness positively identified petitioner as the culprit.
b. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity attending his
arrest. He waived his right to preliminary investigation by not invoking it properly
and seasonably under the Rules.
c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the 17 July 1991 Order
because the trial court had the inherent power to amend and control its processes so
as to make them conformable to law and justice.
d. Since there was a valid information for murder against petitioner and a valid
commitment order (issued by the trial judge after petitioner surrendered to the
authorities whereby petitioner was given to the custody of the Provincial Warden),
the petition for habeas corpus could not be granted.
On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the trial.
Counsel for petitioner also filed a "Withdrawal of Appearance" 15 with the trial court,
with petitioner's conformity.
On 4 October 1991, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed. On 14
October 1991, the Court issued a Resolution directing respondent Judge to hold in
abeyance the hearing of the criminal case below until further orders from this Court.
In this Petition for Review, two (2) principal issues need to be addressed: first,
whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police
in respect of petitioner Go; and second, whether petitioner had effectively waived his
right to preliminary investigation. We consider these issues seriatim.
In respect of the first issue, the Solicitor General argues that under the facts of the
case, petitioner had been validly arrested without warrant. Since petitioner's identity
as the gunman who had shot Eldon Maguan on 2 July 1991 had been sufficiently
established by police work, petitioner was validly arrested six (6) days later at the
San Juan Police Station. The Solicitor General invokes Nazareno v. Station
Commander, etc., et al., 16 one of the seven (7) cases consolidated with In the Matter
of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil, etc., v. Ramos, et al. 17 where a
majority of the Court upheld a warrantees arrest as valid although effected fourteen
(14) days after the killing in connection with which Nazareno had been arrested.
Accordingly, in the view of the Solicitor General, the provisions of Section 7, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court were applicable and because petitioner had declined to
waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, the Prosecutor was
legally justified in filing the information for murder even without preliminary
investigation.
On the other hand, petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without
warrant because he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he
had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not been "just
committed" at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers
who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly
none had the "personal knowledge" required for the lawfulness of a warrantees
arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest. Section 7, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary
investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner.
The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. Ramos is, in
the circumstances of this case, misplaced. In Umil v. Ramos, by an eight-to-six vote,
the Court sustained the legality of the warrantless arrests of petitioners made from
one (1) to fourteen days after the actual commission of the offenses, upon the ground
that such offenses constituted "continuing crimes." Those offenses were subversion,
membership in an outlawed organization like the New People's Army, etc. In the
instant case, the offense for which petitioner was arrested was murder, an offense
which was obviously commenced and completed at one definite location in time and
space. No one had pretended that the fatal shooting of Maguan was a "continuing
crime."
Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in
the instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall
be proceed against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The
"arresting" officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a),
at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected
six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the
shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b).
Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts
indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information
upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged
eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another
was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to
be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however,
constitute "personal knowledge." 18
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner
within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule
112, which provides:
Sec. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — When a person is
lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer
or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the basis
of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting office or person
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested
may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this
Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a
lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may
apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be
terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been
first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the
filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to
adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule. (Emphasis
supplied)
is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into
San Juan Police Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself
at the disposal of the police authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering"
himself, in all probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain
Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the police filed a
complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have
immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there was
probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan.
Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that
Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a
preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a
preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any
conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a
warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at
the preliminary investigation.
Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to
preliminary investigation, we note that petitioner had from the very beginning
demanded that a preliminary investigation be conducted. As earlier pointed out, on
the same day that the information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court,
petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and
preliminary investigation. The Solicitor General contends that that omnibus motion
should have been filed with the trial court and not with the Prosecutor, and that the
petitioner should accordingly be held to have waived his right to preliminary
investigation. We do not believe that waiver of petitioner's statutory right to
preliminary investigation may be predicated on such a slim basis. The preliminary
investigation was to be conducted by the Prosecutor, not by the Regional Trial Court.
It is true that at the time of filing of petitioner's omnibus motion, the information for
murder had already been filed with the Regional Trial Court: it is not clear from the
record whether petitioner was aware of this fact at the time his omnibus motion was
actually filed with the Prosecutor. In Crespo v. Mogul, 19 this Court held:
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining
whether a prima facie case exists to warranting the prosecution of the accused is
terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above
stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the
accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the
case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such
reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to
the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-
judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in
court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition
the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the
consideration of the Court. The only qualification is that the action of the Court must
not impair the substantial rights of the accused., or the right of the People to due
process of law.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed
in Court any disposition of the case [such] as its dismissal or the conviction or
acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the
fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even
while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.
The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. . .
. 20 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary
investigation and not for a re-investigation (Crespo v. Mogul involved a re-
investigation), and since the Prosecutor himself did file with the trial court, on the
5th day after filing the information for murder, a motion for leave to conduct
preliminary investigation (attaching to his motion a copy of petitioner's omnibus
motion), we conclude that petitioner's omnibus motion was in effect filed with the
trial court. What was crystal clear was that petitioner did ask for a preliminary
investigation on the very day that the information was filed without such preliminary
investigation, and that the trial court was five (5) days later apprised of the desire of
the petitioner for such preliminary investigation. Finally, the trial court did in
fact grant the Prosecutor's prayer for leave to conduct preliminary investigation.
Thus, even on the (mistaken) supposition apparently made by the Prosecutor that
Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Court was applicable, the 5-day reglementary
period in Section 7, Rule 112 must be held to have been substantially complied with.
We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary
investigation. While that right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament,
since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a component part of due process
in criminal justice. 21 The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before
being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of
incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is
a substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to prolonged
anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of expense; the right to an opportunity
to avoid a process painful to any one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a
valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to
deprive him the full measure of his right to due process.
The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a preliminary
investigation in the instant case considering that he was already arraigned on 23
August 1991. The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when
the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at
arraignment.22 In the instant case, petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his right
to preliminary investigation before his arraignment.At the time of his arraignment,
petitioner was already before the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition
and mandamusprecisely asking for a preliminary investigation before being forced to
stand trial.
Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail
petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation. In People
v. Selfaison, 23 we did hold that appellants there had waived their right to preliminary
investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to
trial "without previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary
investigation." 24 In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance
or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus
claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the
cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly,
we cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of
petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to
conduct preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner's
claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.
We would clarify, however, that contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to
accord preliminary investigation, while constituting a denial of the appropriate and
full measure of the statutory process of criminal justice, did not impair the validity of
the information for murder nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. 25
It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner was
entitled to bail. This was equivalent to an acknowledgment on the part of the
Prosecutor that the evidence of guilt then in his hands was not strong. Accordingly,
we consider that the 17 July 1991 order of respondent Judge recalling his own order
granting bail and requiring petitioner to surrender himself within forty-eight (48)
hours from notice, was plainly arbitrary considering that no evidence at all — and
certainly no new or additional evidence — had been submitted to respondent Judge
that could have justified the recall of his order issued just five (5) days before. It
follows that petitioner was entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right.
The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that, in the
instant case, trial on the merits has already commenced, the Prosecutor having
already presented four (4) witnesses, impact upon, firstly, petitioner's right to a
preliminary investigation and, secondly, petitioner's right to be released on bail?
Does he continue to be entitled to have a preliminary investigation conducted in
respect of the charge against him? Does petitioner remain entitled to be released on
bail?
Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we consider that petitioner
remains entitled to a preliminary investigation although trial on the merits has
already began. Trial on the merits should be suspended or held in abeyance and a
preliminary investigation forthwith accorded to petitioner. 26 It is true that the
Prosecutor might, in view of the evidence that he may at this time have on hand,
conclude that probable cause exists; upon the other hand, the Prosecutor conceivably
could reach the conclusion that the evidence on hand does not warrant a finding of
probable cause. In any event, the constitutional point is that petitioner
was not accorded what he was entitled to by way of procedural due
process. 27 Petitioner was forced to undergo arraignment and literally pushed to trial
without preliminary investigation, with extraordinary haste, to the applause from the
audience that filled the courtroom. If he submitted to arraignment at trial, petitioner
did so "kicking and screaming," in a manner of speaking . During the proceedings
held before the trial court on 23 August 1991, the date set for arraignment of
petitioner, and just before arraignment, counsel made very clear petitioner's vigorous
protest and objection to the arraignment precisely because of the denial of
preliminary investigation. 28 So energetic and determined were petitioner's counsel's
protests and objections that an obviously angered court and prosecutor dared him to
withdraw or walkout, promising to replace him with counsel de oficio. During the
trial, before the prosecution called its first witness, petitioner through counsel once
again reiterated his objection to going to trial without preliminary investigation:
petitioner's counsel made of record his "continuing objection." 29 Petitioner had
promptly gone to the appellate court on certiorari and prohibition to challenge the
lawfulness of the procedure he was being forced to undergo and the lawfulness of his
detention. 30 If he did not walk out on the trial, and if he cross-examined the
prosecution's witnesses, it was because he was extremely loath to be represented by
counsel de oficio selected by the trial judge, and to run the risk of being held to have
waived also his right to use what is frequently the only test of truth in the judicial
process.
In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner
remains entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. Should the evidence
already of record concerning petitioner's guilt be, in the reasonable belief of the
Prosecutor, strong, the Prosecutor may move in the trial court for cancellation of
petitioner's bail. It would then be up to the trial court, after a careful and objective
assessment of the evidence on record, to grant or deny the motion for cancellation of
bail.
To reach any other conclusions here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a
preliminary investigation and to bail were effectively obliterated by evidence
subsequently admitted into the record would be to legitimize the deprivation of due
process and to permit the Government to benefit from its own wrong or culpable
omission and effectively to dilute important rights of accused persons well-nigh to
the vanishing point. It may be that to require the State to accord petitioner his rights
to a preliminary investigation and to bail at this point, could turn out ultimately to be
largely a ceremonial exercise. But the Court is not compelled to speculate. And, in
any case, it would not be idle ceremony; rather, it would be a celebration by the State
of the rights and liberties of its own people and a re-affirmation of its obligation and
determination to respect those rights and liberties.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review
on Certiorari. The Order of the trial court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE
and NULLIFIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 September
1991 hereby REVERSED.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a
preliminary investigation of the charge of murder against petitioner Go, and to
complete such preliminary investigation within a period of fifteen (15) days from
commencement thereof. The trial on the merits of the criminal case in the Regional
Trial Court shall be SUSPENDED to await the conclusion of the preliminary
investigation.
Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a cash
bail bond of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). This release shall be
without prejudice to any lawful order that the trial court may issue, should the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the
preliminary investigation.
No pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Medialdea, Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 157767 September 9, 2004
REYNALDO BALOLOY and ADELINA BALOLOY-HIJE, petitioners,
vs.
ALFREDO HULAR, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, as amended, of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51081, which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon,
Branch 51, in Civil Case No. 93-5871.
The antecedents are as follows:
On May 11, 1993, respondent Alfredo Hular filed a complaint for quieting of title of
real property with damages against the children and heirs of Iluminado Baloloy,
namely, Anacorita, Antonio, and petitioners Reynaldo and Adelina, all surnamed
Baloloy. The respondent alleged, inter alia, in his complaint that his father,
Astrologo Hular, was the owner of a parcel of residential land located in Sitio Pagñe,
Biriran, Juban, Sorsogon, with an area of 287 square meters, and that such lot was
part of Lot No. 3347 of the Juban Cadastre. The respondent alleged that Iluminado
Baloloy, the petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, was able to secure a Free Patent
over the property through fraud on March 1, 1968, on the basis of which the Register
of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-16540 in his name. The
respondent later discovered that in the cadastral survey of lands in Juban, the
property of his father, which actually consisted of 1,405 square meters was made to
form part of Lot No. 3353, the property of Iluminado Baloloy. According to the
respondent, even if the residential land was made to form part of Lot No. 3353
registered under the name of Iluminado Baloloy, he had acquired ownership of the
property by acquisitive prescription, as he and his predecessors had been in
continuous, uninterrupted and open possession of the property in the concept of
owners for more than 60 years.
The respondent prayed for alternative reliefs that, after due hearing, judgment be
rendered in his favor, thus:
a) Declaring the plaintiff as the absolute owner of the land in question;
b) Ordering the defendants to perpetually refrain from disturbing plaintiff in his
peaceful possession in the land in question;
c) Ordering the defendants to remove their houses in the land in question, and to
declare OCT No. P-16540, and whatever paper, form, document or proceeding the
defendants may have, as null and void and without any effect whatsoever as far as
the land in question is concerned as they cast cloud upon the title of the plaintiff;
d) In the alternative, defendants be ordered to reconvey the title in favor of the
plaintiff as far as the land in question is concerned;
e) Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay the plaintiff the amount
of P50,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as attorney’s fee plus P500.00 for every
appearance or hearing of his lawyer in court; P1,500.00 as consultation
fee; P5,000.00 as incidental litigation expenses;P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
and to pay the costs.
Plaintiff further prays for such other relief [as are] just and equitable in the
premises.3
The Evidence of the Respondent
The respondent adduced evidence that the Spouses Lino and Victoriana Estopin were
the original owners of a parcel of land located in Barangay Biriran, Juban, Sorsogon,
designated as Lot No. 3347 of the Juban Cadastre. A major portion of the property,
where a house of strong materials was constructed, was agricultural, while the rest
was residential. The respondent also averred that the Spouses Estopin declared the
property in their names under Tax Declaration No. 4790. On the north of the
agricultural portion of the property was the road leading to Biriran, while north of the
residential portion was a creek (canal) and the property of Iluminado.
When Lino Estopin died intestate, his widow, Victoriana Lagata, executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale4 on November 11, 1961 over the agricultural portion of Lot No. 3347,
which had an area of 15,906 square meters, more or less, in favor of Astrologo
Hular, married to Lorenza Hular. Shortly thereafter, on November 25, 1961, Lagata
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale5 over the residential portion of the property with
an area of 287 square meters, including the house constructed thereon, in favor of
Hular. Hular and his family, including his son, the respondent, then resided in the
property. In 1961 or thereabouts, Iluminado asked Hular’s permission to construct a
house on a portion of Lot No. 3347 near the road, and the latter agreed. In l977,
Lorenza Hular, wife of Astrologo, declared the residential land in the latter’s name
under Tax Declaration No. 6841.6
Earlier, or on August 14, 1945, Irene Griarte had executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
over a coconut land located in Barangay Biriran, Juban, with an area of 6,666 square
meters in favor of Martiniano Balbedina, with the following boundaries: North,
Alejandro Gruta; South, Lino Estopin; East, River Pagñe; West, Pedro Grepal and
Esteban Grepal.7 Subsequently, after a cadastral survey was conducted on lands in
Juban, the property of Balbedina was designated as Lot No. 3353, with the following
boundaries: North: Lot No. 3353 (portion), Alejandro Gruta; South: Lino Estopin;
West: Lot No. 3349; East: creek. A trail was then established between Lot No. 3353
and Lot No. 3347 resulting in the decrease of Lot No. 3353 owned by Balbedina to
4,651 square meters. He declared the property under his name under Tax Declaration
No. 191 with the following boundaries: North: Lot No. 3353 (portion) Alejandro
Gruta; South: trail; East: creek; West: Lot No. 3349.8
On June 4, 1951, Balbedina executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot No. 3353
with an area of only 4,651 square meters in favor of Iluminado. 9 The latter declared
the property in his name under Tax Declaration No. 5359.10 Iluminado filed an
application with the Bureau of Lands for a free patent over the entirety of Lot No.
3353 on January 5, 1960.11 He indicated in his application that the property was not
occupied by any person and was disposable or alienable public land. In support
thereof, he executed an affidavit wherein he declared that he purchased about one-
half portion of the property in 1951 based on a deed of absolute sale attached to said
affidavit; that in 1957, he purchased the other one-half portion, but "for economic
reasons," no deed of sale was executed by the parties. He also alleged that the
improvements on the land consisted of coconut trees. 12 The Bureau of Lands
processed the application in due course.
In the meantime, Iluminado constructed his house on a portion of Lot No. 3353 near
the trail (road) leading to Biriran. He and his family, including his children, forthwith
resided in said house.
On March 1, 1968, the Secretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources approved
Iluminado’s application and issued Free Patent No. 384019 covering Lot No. 3353
with an area of 9,302 square meters, on the basis of which OCT No. P-16540 was
thereafter issued by the Register of Deeds on March 1, 1968.13
On August 2, 1975, Alejandro Gruta had executed a deed of absolute sale over a
portion of Lot No. 3353 with an area of 4,651 square meters in favor of Estelito Hije,
the husband of petitioner Adelina Baloloy, one of Iluminado’s children. 14
Before he left for employment in Saudi Arabia in 1979, respondent Hular had his
house constructed near the trail (road) on Lot No. 3347, which, however, occupied a
big portion of Lot No. 3353.15
Iluminado died intestate on November 29, 1985. His widow and their children
continued residing in the property, while petitioner Reynaldo Baloloy, one of
Iluminado’s children, later constructed his house near that of his deceased father.
When Astrologo died intestate on December 25, 1989, he was survived by his
children, Jose, Romeo, Anacleto, Elena, Leo, Teresita, and the respondent, among
others,16 who continued to reside in their house.17
Sometime in l991, the respondent’s house helper was cleaning the backyard, but was
prevented from doing so by petitioner Adelina Baloloy who claimed that their father
Iluminado owned the land where the respondent’s house was located. To determine
the veracity of the claim, the respondent had Lot No. 3353 surveyed by Geodetic
Engineer Rodolfo Cunanan on February 16, 1993, in the presence of Balbedina,
Antonio Baloloy and petitioner Reynaldo Baloloy. Cunanan prepared a Special
Sketch Plan of Lot No. 335318 showing that the house of Iluminado was constructed
on Lot No. 335319 near the road behind the houses owned by Astrologo and
Alfredo.20 The engineer discovered that the residential area deeded by Lagata to
Hular had an area of 1,405 square meters, instead of 287 square meters only. 21
In their Answer to the complaint, the heirs of Iluminado Baloloy averred that
Iluminado’s house was built in 1962 on a portion of Lot No. 3353, which the latter
purchased from Balbedina, and not on a portion of Lot No. 3347 which Hular
purchased from Lagata. They alleged that Hular constructed his house on a portion
of Lot No. 3353 after securing the permission of their father Iluminado, and that the
respondent had no cause of action for the nullification of Free Patent No. 384019 and
OCT No. P-16540 because only the State, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, may file a direct action to annul the said patent and title; and even if the
respondent was the real party in interest to file the action, such actions had long since
prescribed. The heirs of Baloloy prayed that judgment be rendered in their favor,
thus:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court to DISMISS
this case pursuant to paragraph 15, et seq., hereof, and/or DECIDE it in favor of the
defendants by UPHOLDING the sanctity of OCT No. P-16540 and ordering plaintiff
to:
1. RESPECT defendants’ proprietary rights and interests on the property in question
covered by OCT No. P-16540;
2. VACATE it at his sole and exclusive expense, and never to set foot on it ever
again;
3. PAY defendants:
a) MORAL DAMAGES at P50,000.00 EACH;
b) ACTUAL DAMAGES and UNREALIZED PROFITS at P1,000.00/MONTH
COMPUTED UP TO THE TIME OF PAYMENT PLUS LEGAL RATE OF
INTEREST;
c) EXEMPLARY DAMAGES of P50,000.00
d) ATTY’S FEES and LITIGATION EXPENSES of P100,000.00; and
e) THE COSTS OF THIS SUIT.
DEFENDANTS pray for all other reliefs and remedies consistent with law and
equity.22
The Evidence for the Petitioners
Sometime in 1982, Hular asked permission from Iluminado to construct his house on
Lot No. 3353 near the road leading to Biriran. Iluminado agreed, in the presence of
his daughter, petitioner Adelina Baloloy. As per the plan of Lot No. 3353 certified by
a Director of the Bureau of Lands on November 6, 1961, Lot No. 3353 had an area
of 9,302 square meters.23
As gleaned from the Sketch Plan of Lot Nos. 3347 and 3353 prepared on February 7,
1991 by Geodetic Engineer Salvador Balilo, the houses of the Baloloy siblings and
those of Astrologo and Alfredo were located in Lot No. 3353. 24 In the said sketch
plan, Lot No. 3353 had an area of 9,302 square meters, while Lot No. 3347 had an
area of 15,905 square meters. When apprised of Hular’s claim over the property, the
petitioners and their co-heirs filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with the
Municipal Trial Court of Juban, docketed as Civil Case No. 331. The case was,
however, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
On December 4, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondent.
The fallo of the decision reads:
a/ Declaring plaintiff the absolute owner of the land in question, consisting of 1,405
square meters, more or less, and entitled to the peaceful possession thereof;
b/ Ordering the defendants to reconvey the title to the plaintiff as far as the land in
question is concerned within fifteen (15) days counted from the finality of the
decision, failing in which, the Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to execute the
necessary document of reconveyance of the title in favor of the plaintiff after an
approved survey plan is made;
c/ Ordering defendants to remove their houses from the land in question at their own
expense within fifteen (15) days after the decision has become final;
d/ Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally plaintiff the amount
of P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees. P5,000.00 as incidental litigation expenses;
e/ To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.25
The trial court ruled that the property subject of the complaint, with an area of 1,405
square meters, was part of Lot No. 3347 which the Spouses Estopin owned, and
which they later sold to Astrologo Hular. The trial court also held that Iluminado
committed fraud in securing the free patent and the title for the property in question,
and that when Victoriana Lagata executed the deed of absolute sale on the residential
portion of Lot No. 3347, she did not know that it formed part of Lot No. 3353. It
further held that the action of the plaintiff to nullify the title and patent was
imprescriptible.
The petitioners filed on December 8, 1995 a motion to reopen the case to admit Tax
Declaration Nos. 6957 and 4790 covering Lot No. 3347, under the names of
Astrologo Hular and Victoriana Lagata, respectively, in which it was declared that
Lot No. 3347 was coconut land. The trial court ruled that the motion had been
mooted by its decision.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming the decision of the
trial court, and thereafter denied the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The Present Petition
The petitioners, who are still residing on the subject property, filed their petition for
review on certiorari for the reversal of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
The issues for resolution are:
(1) whether all the indispensable parties had been impleaded by the respondent in the
trial court;
(2) whether the said respondent had a cause of action against the petitioners for the
nullification of Free Patent No. 384019 and OCT No. P-16540; for reconveyance and
for possession of the subject property; and for damages; and
(3) whether the respondent had acquired ownership over the property through
acquisitive prescription.
The first issue, while not raised by the parties in the trial court and in the Court of
Appeals, is so interwoven with the other issues raised therein and is even decisive of
the outcome of this case; hence, such issue must be delved into and resolved by this
Court.26
We note that the action of the respondent in the trial court is for: (a) reinvidicatoria,
to declare the respondent the absolute owner of the subject property and its
reconveyance to him as a consequence of the nullification of Free Patent No. 384019
and OCT No. P-16540; (b) publiciana, to order the petitioners and the other heirs of
Iluminado Baloloy to vacate the property and deliver possession thereof to him; and
(c) damages and attorney’s fees.
It is the contention of the respondent that the subject property was sold by Lagata to
his father, Astrologo Hular, in 1961. He adduced evidence that when his parents died
intestate, they were survived by their children, the respondent and his siblings Elena,
Jose, Romeo, Anacleto, Leo, and Teresita. Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides
that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before
partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the
deceased. Until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined
and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership over
the pro indiviso property, in addition to the use and enjoyment of the same.
Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring an action
in ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession,
including an accion publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. A co-owner may bring
such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-
plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. 27 Any
judgment of the court in favor of the co-owner will benefit the others but if such
judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-
owners. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole
owner and entitled to the possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless he
impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.
In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership over
the subject property and praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is
no proof that the other co-owners had waived their rights over the subject property or
conveyed the same to the respondent or such co-owners were aware of the case in the
trial court. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the respondent as the sole
owner of the property and entitled to its possession, to the prejudice of the latter’s
siblings. Patently then, the decision of the trial court is erroneous.
Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent was mandated to
implead his siblings, being co-owners of the property, as parties. The respondent
failed to comply with the rule. It must, likewise, be stressed that the Republic of the
Philippines is also an indispensable party as defendant because the respondent sought
the nullification of OCT No. P-16540 which was issued based on Free Patent No.
384019. Unless the State is impleaded as party-defendant, any decision of the Court
would not be binding on it. It has been held that the absence of an indispensable
party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the
complaint including the judgment.28 The absence of the respondent’s siblings, as
parties, rendered all proceedings subsequent to the filing thereof, including the
judgment of the court, ineffective for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present.29
Even if we glossed over the procedural lapses of the respondent, we rule that he
failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint against the petitioners; and
that he is not entitled to the reliefs prayed for.
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by the requisite quantum
of evidence. If he claims a right granted as created by law or under a contract of sale,
he must prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not on the weakness or absence of the evidence of that of his
opponent.30 He who claims a better right to real estate property must prove not only
his ownership of the same but also the identity thereof. 31 In Huy v. Huy,32 we held
that where a property subject of controversy is duly registered under the Torrens
system, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given weight and in
the absence of strong and compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof
should be considered as the owner of the property until his title is nullified or
modified in an appropriate ordinary action. A Torrens Certificate is evidence of an
indefeasible title to property in favor of the person in whose name appears
therein.33 Such holder is entitled to the possession of the property until his title is
nullified.
The petitioners aver that Lot No. 3347 owned by the Spouses Estopin was coconut,
and not residential, land. The petitioners contend that, under the deed of absolute
sale, Victoriana Lagata executed on November 25, 1961 in favor of Astrologo Hular,
she sold the residential portion of Lot No. 3347; however, the latter constructed his
house on a portion of Lot No. 3353 which Iluminado had purchased from Balbedina,
now covered by OCT No. P-16540. The petitioners assert that along with their
mother Anacorita and their brother Antonio Baloloy, they constructed their houses
on a part of Lot No. 3353, titled in the name of their father Iluminado; hence, they
could not be dispossessed of the said property. The petitioners posit that, whether the
house of Hular was constructed on a portion of Lot No. 3353 of the property of
Balbedina or Gruta is irrelevant because both properties are now covered by OCT
No. P-16540 under the name of Iluminado, their predecessor-in-interest.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Victoriana Lagata owned the subject property,
which turned out to be 1,405 square meters, and sold the same to Hular. In contrast,
the RTC declared in its decision that while under the deed of absolute sale executed
by Irene Griarte in favor of Balbedina, Lot No. 3353 had an area of 6,666 square
meters, Griarte actually owned only 4,651 square meters; a portion of the lot was
actually owned by Lino Estopin. Hence, Balbedina sold only 4,651 square meters to
Iluminado34 because he was aware that he owned only 4,651 square meters of the
land. It also held that, unknown to Lagata, a portion of Lot No. 3347 was declared as
part of Lot No. 3353 when the lands in Juban were surveyed. The trial court
concluded that Lagata erroneously declared, under the deed of absolute sale executed
on November 25, 1961 in favor of Hular, that the property was part of Lot No. 3347.
The trial and appellate courts erred in their decisions.
The evidence on record shows that Irene Griarte owned a parcel of land with an area
of 6,666 square meters, more or less.35 When she sold the property to Martiniano
Balbedina on August 14, 1945, it was bounded on the south by the property of Lino
Estopin. There was no trail yet between the property of Griarte on the south and of
Lino Estopin on the north. In the meantime, however, a road (trail) leading to Biriran
was established between the property of Balbedina on the south and that of Lino
Estopin on the north. Thereafter, a cadastral survey of the lands in Juban was
conducted by the Bureau of Lands. The property of Balbedina was designated as a
portion of Lot No. 3353, while that of Estopin was designated as Lot No. 3347. The
other portion of Lot No. 3353, with an area of 4,561 square meters, belonged to
Alejandro Gruta. Because of the construction of the road, the property of Balbedina,
which was a part of Lot No. 3353, was reduced to 4,651 square meters. Balbedina
declared, under Tax Declaration No. 391, that Lot No. 3353 had an area of 4,651
square meters and was coconut land36 and that his property was bounded on the south
by a trail (road). Lino Estopin declared Lot No. 3347 under his name for taxation
purposes, in which he stated that his property was bounded on the north by the trail
going to Biriran.37Clearly, then, Lot No. 3353 and Lot No. 3347 had a common
boundary – the trail (road) going to Biriran.
Balbedina sold his property, which was a portion of Lot No. 3353, with an area of
4,651 square meters to Iluminado Baloloy on June 4, 1951. 38 Under the deed of
absolute sale, the property was bounded on the south by the trail (road) owned by
Lino Estopin.39 The English translation of the deed of sale attached as page 85 to the
RTC Records, which both the trial court and the appellate court relied upon, is
incorrect.
The original deed of absolute sale, which is in Spanish, states that the boundary of
the property on the south is "con camino, Lino Estopin," while the English version of
the deed, indicates that the property is bounded "on the south by Lino Estopin."
Being an earlier document, the deed in Spanish signed by the parties therefore should
prevail. Conformably to such deed, Iluminado Baloloy declared in Tax Declaration
No. 5359 under his name that the property is bounded on the south by a trail, 40 and
not by Lot No. 3347 owned by Lino Estopin.
The respondent failed to adduce any documentary evidence to prove how the
Spouses Estopin acquired the disputed property. The respondent’s reliance on the
testimonies of Melissa Estopin, the daughter of the Spouses Estopin, and on Porfirio
Guamos as well as the May 8, 1993 Affidavit of Martiniano Balbedina, and the deed
of sale executed by Victoriana Lagata on November 27, 1961 in favor of Astrologo
Hular to corroborate his claim over the lot in question, is misplaced.
First. Per the testimony of Porfirio Guamos, the witness of the respondent, Lino
Estopin purchased the disputed property in 1941 from Irene Griarte and insisted that
there was a deed of sale evidencing the sale:
Atty. Dealca:
Q The area of the land in question is 1,405 sq. m., you claim that way back in 1944
the owner of the land was Lino Estopin; ’41 to ’44?
A 1941.
Q And you said that Lino Estopin was able to acquire the land by purchase?
A That was very long time when Lino Estopin sold the property.
Q My question is whether you know because you testified earlier that Lino Estopin
was able to acquire the land by purchase; do you confirm that?
A Yes, Sir.
Q From whom?
A From Irene Griarte.
Q Were you present when that sale was consummated?
A I was not there.
Q So you do not know how much was it bought by Lino Estopin from Irene Griarte?
A No, Sir.
Q You do not know whether a document to that effect was actually drafted and
executed?
A There was.
Q Have you seen the document?
A I did not see but there was a document.
Q You maintain there was a document but you did not see a document, is that it?
A In my belief there was a document.
Q In your belief, how did you organize that belief when you did not see a document?
A I insist there was a document.
Q That is why, why are you insisting when you did not see a document?
A Well, during the sale that document was used.
Q How was it used when you did not see that document?
A When the deed of sale was executed I did not see the document, but I insist there
was a document.
Q That’s why, how were you able to say before the court that there was a document
when you contend that you did not see any?
A There was basis in the sale … the sale was based on a document. You cannot sell a
property without document? (sic)
Q Is that your belief?
A Yes, Sir.
Q But you did not see any document?
Atty. Diesta:
Already answered.
Witness:
A I did not see.
Atty. Dealca:
Q You said that that document was used when the property was sold by Lino Estopin
to Alfredo Hular. . .
A In 1961. Yes.41
However, the respondent failed to adduce in evidence the said deed or even an
authentic copy thereof. The respondent did not offer any justification for his failure
to adduce the same in evidence. As against the respondent’s verbal claim that his
father acquired the property from Lagata, the Torrens title of Iluminado Baloloy
must prevail.42
Second. The respondent even failed to adduce in evidence any tax declarations over
the disputed property under the name of Irene Griarte and/or Lino Estopin, or realty
tax payment receipts in their names from 1941 to November 1961. The documents
are circumstantial evidence to prove that Irene Griarte claimed ownership over the
disputed property and that Lino Estopin acquired the same from her. After all, such
tax declarations and tax receipts can be strong evidence of ownership of land when
accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for acquisitive prescription.43
Third. The respondent even failed to adduce in evidence Tax Declaration No. 4790
covering the two parcels of land under the name of Lino Estopin to prove his claim
that Lot No. 3347 consisted of agricultural and residential lands. We note that the
petitioners appended a certified true copy of Tax Declaration No. 4790 under the
name of Victoriana Lagata over Lot No. 3347 to their Motion to Reopen the Case. In
the said declaration, Lot No. 3347 was described as coconut land; this is contrary to
the respondent’s claim that the said lot was then residential, and that the boundary of
the property on the north was the road to Biriran which, in turn, is consistent with the
petitioners’ claim.44 Unfortunately, the trial court denied the said motion on the
ground that it was mooted by its decision.
Fourth. During the cadastral survey of lands in Juban, the lot of Gruta and that of
Balbedina, inclusive of the subject property, were designated as Lot No. 3353 with a
total area of 9,302 square meters under their names, while that of Lino Estopin was
designated as Lot No. 3347 with an area of 15,906 square meters. Iluminado Baloloy
applied for a free patent over Lot No. 3353, including the disputed property, under
his name. The respondent failed to adduce any evidence that the Spouses Estopin
and/or Astrologo Hular opposed Balbedina and/or Iluminado’s claim of ownership of
Lot No. 3353 during the survey and after the filing of the application. A propos is
our ruling in Urquiaga v. Court of Appeals: 45
As succinctly observed by respondent Court of Appeals in assessing the totality of
the evidence –
We do not agree with defendants that they are also the occupants and possessors of
the subject lot just because it "is adjacent to their titled property." Precisely, the
boundaries of defendants’ titled property were determined, delineated and surveyed
during the cadastral survey of Dipolog and thereafter indicated in their certificate of
title in order that the extent of their property will be known and fixed. Since the
subject lot was already found to be outside their titled property, defendants have no
basis in claiming it or other adjacent lots for that matter. Otherwise, the very purpose
of the cadastral survey as a process of determining the exact boundaries of adjoining
properties will be defeated.
Defendants’ own title, O.C.T. No. 0-357 (in the names of Jose Aguirre and Cristina
Gonzales), in fact belies their claim of occupation and possession over the adjacent
subject lot. Examining said title, we note that: (1) the cadastral survey of Dipolog
was conducted from January, 1923 to November 1925; (2) defendants’ titled
property was one of those lots surveyed and this was designated as Lot No. 2623; (3)
during the survey, it was already determined and known that Lot No. 2623 is
bounded on the northeast, southeast, southwest and west by Lot No. 4443 (as we
have seen in our narration of facts, the subject lot is a subdivision lot of Lot No. 6552
which was originally identified as Lot No. 4443-B-1, Dipolog Cadastre 85 Ext.:
hence, the subject lot is a portion of Lot No. 4443); and (4) O.C.T. No. 0-357 was
issued on October 11, 1965 on the strength of the judgment rendered on July 31 (sic),
1941 by the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte in Cadastral Case
No. 6, LRC Cadastral Record No. 756.
From the foregoing facts, we find that as early as January, 1923 when the cadastral
survey was started, the boundaries of Lot Nos. 2623 and 4443 were already
determined and delineated. Since the subject lot was surveyed to be part of Lot No.
4443, it means that during that time defendants’ predecessors-in-interest never
claimed ownership or possession over the subject lot. Otherwise, they would have
complained so that the subject lot could be excluded from Lot No. 4443 and included
in Lot No. 2623, they being adjacent lots. It is obvious then that defendants’
predecessors only claimed Lot No. 2623 and they pursued their claim in Cadastral
Case No. 6, LRC Cadastral Record No. 756 until O.C.T. No. 0-357 was issued to
them. The contention of defendants that they and their predecessors-in-interest
occupied and possessed the subject lot since time immemorial therefore is not true. 46
Fifth. Under the deed of absolute sale dated November 25, 1961, Lagata sold to
Astrologo Hular Lot No. 3347, and not Lot No. 3353. In Veterans Federation of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals,47 we ruled that:
Petitioner VFP maintains that the deed of sale was valid and enforceable and that it
was perfected at the very moment that the parties agreed upon the thing which was
the object of the sale and upon the price. The parties herein had agreed on the parcel
of land that petitioner would purchase from respondent PNR, and the same was
described therein; thus, petitioner VFP cannot conveniently set aside the technical
description in this agreement and insist that it is the legal owner of the property
erroneously described in the certificate of title. Petitioner can only claim right of
ownership over the parcel of land that was the object of the deed of sale and nothing
else.48
Sixth. Under the said deed of sale dated November 11, 1961, Victoriana Lagata sold
Lot No. 3347 which had an area of 15,906 square meters and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 4790. The deed does not state that what was sold was only a portion
of Lot No. 3347, excluding therefrom the disputed property. This is understandable,
since the subject property is a portion of Lot No. 3353 owned by Alejandro Gruta
and Iluminado Baloloy, and not of Lino Estopin and/or Victoriana Lagata. Lagata
could not have sold a portion of Lot No. 3353 which she does not own. As the Latin
adage goes: "NEMO DAT QUOD NON HABET."
Seventh. The Balbedina’s Affidavit dated May 8, 1993 offered by the respondent to
prove the contents thereof is inadmissible in evidence against the petitioners.
Balbedina did not testify; as such, the petitioners were deprived of their right to
cross-examine him. The said affidavit is thus hearsay and barren of probative weight.
The affidavit varies the contents of the deed of absolute sale which he (Balbedina)
executed in favor of Iluminado more than forty years earlier. In the said affidavit, it
was made to appear that Balbedina sold to Iluminado on June 4, 1951 only a portion
of Lot 3353 with an area of 3,333 square meters, when under the said deed of
absolute sale, the property that was sold consisted of 4,651 square meters. The
affidavit is proscribed by Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. - When the terms of an agreement have
been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and
there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
...
It bears stressing that the deed of absolute sale executed by Balbedina in favor of
Baloloy was notarized by the Justice of the Peace who was an Ex-Officio Notary
Public; hence, entitled to full probative weight.
Eighth. The Special Sketch Plan of Lot No. 3353 prepared by Geodetic Engineer
Rodolfo P. Cunanan49 cannot prevail over OCT No. P-16540. In fact, the plan even
buttressed the case for the petitioners because it shows that the subject property is a
portion of Lot No. 3353, and not of Lot No. 3347, covered by OCT No. P-16540
under the name of Iluminado Baloloy, the deceased father of the petitioners.
Ninth. The conclusion of the RTC that Lagata in fact sold a portion of Lot No. 3347
under the deed of absolute sale dated November 25, 1961, unaware that the property
was a part of Lot No. 3353, is based on mere speculations and surmises.
Iluminado Baloloy included in his application for a free patent the property of
Alejandro Gruta, and was able to secure a free patent over said property in addition
to his own. As such, Gruta, not the respondent, is the proper party to assail such free
patent, as well as OCT No. P-16540 which was issued based thereon.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of the respondent
is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 161916 January 20, 2006
ARNELITO ADLAWAN, Petitioner,
vs.
EMETERIO M. ADLAWAN and NARCISA M. ADLAWAN, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review is the September 23, 2003 Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74921 which set aside the September 13, 2002
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 7, in Civil Case
No. CEB-27806, and reinstated the February 12, 2002 Judgment 3 of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392, dismissing
petitioner Arnelito Adlawan’s unlawful detainer suit against respondents Emeterio
and Narcisa Adlawan. Likewise questioned is the January 8, 2004 Resolution 4of the
Court of Appeals which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The instant ejectment suit stemmed from the parties’ dispute over Lot 7226 and the
house built thereon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8842, 5 registered in
the name of the late Dominador Adlawan and located at Barrio Lipata, Municipality
of Minglanilla, Cebu. In his complaint, petitioner claimed that he is an acknowledged
illegitimate child6 of Dominador who died on May 28, 1987 without any other issue.
Claiming to be the sole heir of Dominador, he executed an affidavit adjudicating to
himself Lot 7226 and the house built thereon.7 Out of respect and generosity to
respondents who are the siblings of his father, he granted their plea to occupy the
subject property provided they would vacate the same should his need for the
property arise. Sometime in January 1999, he verbally requested respondents to
vacate the house and lot, but they refused and filed instead an action for quieting of
title8 with the RTC. Finally, upon respondents’ refusal to heed the last demand letter
to vacate dated August 2, 2000, petitioner filed the instant case on August 9, 2000.9
On the other hand, respondents Narcisa and Emeterio, 70 and 59 years of age,
respectively,10 denied that they begged petitioner to allow them to stay on the
questioned property and stressed that they have been occupying Lot 7226 and the
house standing thereon since birth. They alleged that Lot 7226 was originally
registered in the name of their deceased father, Ramon Adlawan 11 and the ancestral
house standing thereon was owned by Ramon and their mother, Oligia Mañacap
Adlawan. The spouses had nine12 children including the late Dominador and herein
surviving respondents Emeterio and Narcisa. During the lifetime of their parents and
deceased siblings, all of them lived on the said property. Dominador and his wife,
Graciana Ramas Adlawan, who died without issue, also occupied the
same.13 Petitioner, on the other hand, is a stranger who never had possession of Lot
7226.
Sometime in 1961, spouses Ramon and Oligia needed money to finance the
renovation of their house. Since they were not qualified to obtain a loan, they
transferred ownership of Lot 7226 in the name of their son Dominador who was the
only one in the family who had a college education. By virtue of a January 31, 1962
simulated deed of sale,14 a title was issued to Dominador which enabled him to
secure a loan with Lot 7226 as collateral. Notwithstanding the execution of the
simulated deed, Dominador, then single, never disputed his parents’ ownership of the
lot. He and his wife, Graciana, did not disturb respondents’ possession of the
property until they died on May 28, 1987 and May 6, 1997, respectively.
Respondents also contended that Dominador’s signature at the back of petitioner’s
birth certificate was forged, hence, the latter is not an heir of Dominador and has no
right to claim ownership of Lot 7226.15 They argued that even if petitioner is indeed
Dominador’s acknowledged illegitimate son, his right to succeed is doubtful because
Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana.16
On February 12, 2002, the MTC dismissed the complaint holding that the
establishment of petitioner’s filiation and the settlement of the estate of Dominador
are conditions precedent to the accrual of petitioner’s action for ejectment. It added
that since Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana, who died 10 years
thereafter, her legal heirs are also entitled to their share in Lot 7226. The dispositive
portion thereof, reads:
In View of the foregoing, for failure to prove by preponderance of evidence, the
plaintiff’s cause of action, the above-entitled case is hereby Ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.17
On appeal by petitioner, the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC holding that the
title of Dominador over Lot 7226 cannot be collaterally attacked. It thus ordered
respondents to turn over possession of the controverted lot to petitioner and to pay
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises. The decretal portion
thereof, provides:
Wherefore, the Judgment, dated February 12, 2002, of the Municipal Trial Court of
Minglanilla, Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392, is reversed. Defendants-appellees are
directed to restore to plaintiff-appellant possession of Lot 7226 and the house
thereon, and to pay plaintiff-appellant, beginning in August 2000, compensation for
their use and occupation of the property in the amount of P500.00 a month.
So ordered.18
Meanwhile, the RTC granted petitioner’s motion for execution pending
appeal19 which was opposed by the alleged nephew and nieces of Graciana in their
motion for leave to intervene and to file an answer in intervention.20 They contended
that as heirs of Graciana, they have a share in Lot 7226 and that intervention is
necessary to protect their right over the property. In addition, they declared that as
co-owners of the property, they are allowing respondents to stay in Lot 7226 until a
formal partition of the property is made.
The RTC denied the motion for leave to intervene.21 It, however, recalled the order
granting the execution pending appeal having lost jurisdiction over the case in view
of the petition filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals. 22
On September 23, 2003, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the RTC and
reinstated the judgment of the MTC. It ratiocinated that petitioner and the heirs of
Graciana are co-owners of Lot 7226. As such, petitioner cannot eject respondents
from the property via an unlawful detainer suit filed in his own name and as the sole
owner of the property. Thus –
WHEEFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated September 13, 2002
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7, in Civil Case No. CEB-27806 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Judgment dated February 12, 2002 of the
Municipal Trial Court of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392 is
REINSTATED. Costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.23
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition.
The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not petitioner can validly maintain the
instant case for ejectment.
Petitioner averred that he is an acknowledged illegitimate son and the sole heir of
Dominador. He in fact executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself the controverted
property. In ruling for the petitioner, the RTC held that the questioned January 31,
1962 deed of sale validly transferred title to Dominador and that petitioner is his
acknowledged illegitimate son who inherited ownership of the questioned lot. The
Court notes, however, that the RTC lost sight of the fact that the theory of succession
invoked by petitioner would end up proving that he is not the sole owner of Lot
7226. This is so because Dominador was survived not only by petitioner but also by
his legal wife, Graciana, who died 10 years after the demise of Dominador on May
28, 1987.24 By intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of
Lot 7226.25 The death of Graciana on May 6, 1997, did not make petitioner the
absolute owner of Lot 7226 because the share of Graciana passed to her relatives by
consanguinity and not to petitioner with whom she had no blood relations. The Court
of Appeals thus correctly held that petitioner has no authority to institute the instant
action as the sole owner of Lot 7226.
Petitioner contends that even granting that he has co-owners over Lot 7226, he can
on his own file the instant case pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code which
provides:
ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487
includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of
possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de
reivindicacion).26 A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have
been filed to benefit his co-owners. It should be stressed, however, that where the
suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and
entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should be dismissed. 27
The renowned civilist, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino, explained –
A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other
co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit
of all. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims
possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper.
(Emphasis added)28
In Baloloy v. Hular,29 respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title claiming
exclusive ownership of the property, but the evidence showed that respondent has
co-owners over the property. In dismissing the complaint for want of respondent’s
authority to file the case, the Court held that –
Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring an action
in ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession,
including an accion publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. A co-owner may bring
such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-
plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any
judgment of the court in favor of the co-owner will benefit the others but if such
judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-
owners. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole
owner and entitled to the possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless he
impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.
In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership over
the subject property and praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is
no proof that the other co-owners had waived their rights over the subject property or
conveyed the same to the respondent or such co-owners were aware of the case in the
trial court. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the respondent as the sole
owner of the property and entitled to its possession, to the prejudice of the latter’s
siblings. Patently then, the decision of the trial court is erroneous.
Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent was mandated to
implead his siblings, being co-owners of the property, as parties. The respondent
failed to comply with the rule. It must, likewise, be stressed that the Republic of the
Philippines is also an indispensable party as defendant because the respondent sought
the nullification of OCT No. P-16540 which was issued based on Free Patent No.
384019. Unless the State is impleaded as party-defendant, any decision of the Court
would not be binding on it. It has been held that the absence of an indispensable
party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the
complaint including the judgment. The absence of the respondent’s siblings, as
parties, rendered all proceedings subsequent to the filing thereof, including the
judgment of the court, ineffective for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present.30
In the instant case, it is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit for unlawful
detainer in his name alone and for his own benefit to the exclusion of the heirs of
Graciana as he even executed an affidavit of self- adjudication over the disputed
property. It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot validly maintain the instant action
considering that he does not recognize the co-ownership that necessarily flows from
his theory of succession to the property of his father, Dominador.
In the same vein, there is no merit in petitioner’s claim that he has the legal
personality to file the present unlawful detainer suit because the ejectment of
respondents would benefit not only him but also his alleged co-owners. However,
petitioner forgets that he filed the instant case to acquire possession of the property
and to recover damages. If granted, he alone will gain possession of the lot and
benefit from the proceeds of the award of damages to the exclusion of the heirs of
Graciana. Hence, petitioner cannot successfully capitalize on the alleged benefit to
his co-owners. Incidentally, it should be pointed out that in default of the said heirs
of Graciana, whom petitioner labeled as "fictitious heirs," the State will inherit her
share31 and will thus be petitioner’s co-owner entitled to possession and enjoyment
of the property.
The present controversy should be differentiated from the cases where the Court
upheld the right of a co-owner to file a suit pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code.
In Resuena v. Court of Appeals,32 and Sering v. Plazo,33 the co-owners who filed the
ejectment case did not represent themselves as the exclusive owner of the property.
InCelino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa Santiago,34 the complaint for quieting of title
was brought in behalf of the co-owners precisely to recover lots owned in
common.35 Similarly in Vencilao v. Camarenta,36 the amended complaint specified
that the plaintiff is one of the heirs who co-owns the controverted properties.
In the foregoing cases, the plaintiff never disputed the existence of a co-ownership
nor claimed to be the sole or exclusive owner of the litigated lot. A favorable
decision therein would of course inure to the benefit not only of the plaintiff but to
his co-owners as well. The instant case, however, presents an entirely different
backdrop as petitioner vigorously asserted absolute and sole ownership of the
questioned lot. In his complaint, petitioner made the following allegations, to wit:
3. The plaintiff was the only son (illegitimate) and sole heir of the late
DOMINADOR ADLAWAN who died intestate on 28 May 1987 without any other
descendant nor ascendant x x x.
xxxx
5. Being the only child/descendant and, therefore, sole heir of the deceased
Dominador Adlawan, the plaintiff became the absolute owner, and automatically
took POSSESSION, of the aforementioned house and lot x x x. (Emphasis added) 37
Clearly, the said cases find no application here because petitioner’s action operates
as a complete repudiation of the existence of co-ownership and not in representation
or recognition thereof. Dismissal of the complaint is therefore proper. As noted by
Former Supreme Court Associate Justice Edgrado L. Paras "[i]t is understood, of
course, that the action [under Article 487 of the Civil Code] is being instituted for all.
Hence, if the co-owner expressly states that he is bringing the case only for himself,
the action should not be allowed to prosper." 38
Indeed, respondents’ not less than four decade actual physical possession of the
questioned ancestral house and lot deserves to be respected especially so that
petitioner failed to show that he has the requisite personality and authority as co-
owner to file the instant case. Justice dictates that respondents who are now in the
twilight years of their life be granted possession of their ancestral property where
their parents and siblings lived during their lifetime, and where they, will probably
spend the remaining days of their life.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 23, 2003 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74921 which reinstated the February 12, 2002
Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, dismissing
petitioner’s complaint in Civil Case No. 392, and its January 8, 2004 Resolution,
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 160347 November 29, 2006
ARCADIO and MARIA LUISA CARANDANG, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF QUIRINO A. DE GUZMAN, namely: MILAGROS DE GUZMAN,
VICTOR DE GUZMAN, REYNALDO DE GUZMAN, CYNTHIA G. RAGASA
and QUIRINO DE GUZMAN, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals
Decision1 and Resolution affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision
rendering herein petitioners Arcadio and Luisa Carandang [hereinafter referred to as
spouses Carandang] jointly and severally liable for their loan to Quirino A. de
Guzman.
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts as follows:
[Quirino de Guzman] and [the Spouses Carandang] are stockholders as well as
corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System (MBS for brevity), with equities
at fifty four percent (54%) and forty six percent (46%) respectively.
On November 26, 1983, the capital stock of MBS was increased, from P500,000 to
P1.5 million and P345,000 of this increase was subscribed by [the spouses
Carandang]. Thereafter, on March 3, 1989, MBS again increased its capital stock,
from P1.5 million to P3 million, [the spouses Carandang] yet again subscribed to the
increase. They subscribed to P93,750 worth of newly issued capital stock.
[De Guzman] claims that, part of the payment for these subscriptions were paid by
him, P293,250 for the November 26, 1983 capital stock increase and P43,125 for the
March 3, 1989 Capital Stock increase or a total ofP336,375. Thus, on March 31,
1992, [de Guzman] sent a demand letter to [the spouses Carandang] for the payment
of said total amount.
[The spouses Carandang] refused to pay the amount, contending that a pre-
incorporation agreement was executed between [Arcadio Carandang] and [de
Guzman], whereby the latter promised to pay for the stock subscriptions of the
former without cost, in consideration for [Arcadio Carandang’s] technical expertise,
his newly purchased equipment, and his skill in repairing and upgrading
radio/communication equipment therefore, there is no indebtedness on their part
[sic].
On June 5, 1992, [de Guzman] filed his complaint, seeking to recover the P336,375
together with damages. After trial on the merits, the trial court disposed of the case in
this wise:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [de
Guzman]. Accordingly, [the spouses Carandang] are ordered to jointly and severally
pay [de Guzman], to wit:
(1) P336,375.00 representing [the spouses Carandang’s] loan to de Guzman;
(2) interest on the preceding amount at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum
from June 5, 1992 when this complaint was filed until the principal amount shall
have been fully paid;
(3) P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
(4) Costs of suit.
The spouses Carandang appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the same in the 22 April 2003 assailed Decision:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing the assailed Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.2
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the spouses Carandang was similarly denied
by the Court of Appeals in the 6 October 2003 assailed Resolution:
WHEREFORE, in view thereof, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED
and our Decision of April 22, 2003, which is based on applicable law and
jurisprudence on the matter is hereby AFFIRMED and REITERATED. 3
The spouses Carandang then filed before this Court the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari, bringing forth the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
MANIFEST ERROR IN FAILING TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH SECTION 16,
RULE 3 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT THERE IS AN ALLEGED LOAN FOR WHICH
PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE, CONTRARY TO EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF
BOOK IV, TITLE XI, OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE PERTAINING TO LOANS.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS WERE ABLE TO
DISCHARGE THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF, IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF
THE REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO APPLY SECTIONS 2 AND 7,
RULE 3 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
V.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PURPORTED LIABILITY OF PETITIONERS
ARE JOINT AND SOLIDARY, IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1207 OF THE
NEW CIVIL CODE.4
Whether or not the RTC Decision is void for failing to comply with Section 16, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court
The spouses Carandang claims that the Decision of the RTC, having been rendered
after the death of Quirino de Guzman, is void for failing to comply with Section 16,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. – Whenever a party to a pending action
dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to
inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to
give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of
counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint
a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order the legal representative or representatives to appear
and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the
one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the
opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or
administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear
for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment,
if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
The spouses Carandang posits that such failure to comply with the above rule renders
void the decision of the RTC, in adherence to the following pronouncements in Vda.
de Haberer v. Court of Appeals5 and Ferreria v. Vda. de Gonzales6 :
Thus, it has been held that when a party dies in an action that survives and no order
is issued by the court for the appearance of the legal representative or of the heirs of
the deceased in substitution of the deceased, and as a matter of fact no substitution
has ever been effected, the trial held by the court without such legal representatives
or heirs and the judgment rendered after such trial are null and void because the court
acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs
upon whom the trial and judgment would be binding. 7
In the present case, there had been no court order for the legal representative of the
deceased to appear, nor had any such legal representative appeared in court to be
substituted for the deceased; neither had the complainant ever procured the
appointment of such legal representative of the deceased, including appellant, ever
asked to be substituted for the deceased. As a result, no valid substitution was
effected, consequently, the court never acquired jurisdiction over appellant for the
purpose of making her a party to the case and making the decision binding upon her,
either personally or as a representative of the estate of her deceased mother. 8
However, unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter which is conferred by law and is
not subject to the discretion of the parties,9 jurisdiction over the person of the parties
to the case may be waived either expressly or impliedly. 10 Implied waiver comes in
the form of either voluntary appearance or a failure to object. 11
In the cases cited by the spouses Carandang, we held that there had been no valid
substitution by the heirs of the deceased party, and therefore the judgment cannot be
made binding upon them. In the case at bar, not only do the heirs of de Guzman
interpose no objection to the jurisdiction of the court over their persons; they are
actually claiming and embracing such jurisdiction. In doing so, their waiver is not
even merely implied (by their participation in the appeal of said Decision), but
express (by their explicit espousal of such view in both the Court of Appeals and in
this Court). The heirs of de Guzman had no objection to being bound by the Decision
of the RTC.
Thus, lack of jurisdiction over the person, being subject to waiver, is a personal
defense which can only be asserted by the party who can thereby waive it by silence.
It also pays to look into the spirit behind the general rule requiring a formal
substitution of heirs. The underlying principle therefor is not really because
substitution of heirs is a jurisdictional requirement, but because non-compliance
therewith results in the undeniable violation of the right to due process of those who,
though not duly notified of the proceedings, are substantially affected by the decision
rendered therein.12 Such violation of due process can only be asserted by the persons
whose rights are claimed to have been violated, namely the heirs to whom the
adverse judgment is sought to be enforced.
Care should, however, be taken in applying the foregoing conclusions. In People v.
Florendo,13 where we likewise held that the proceedings that took place after the
death of the party are void, we gave another reason for such nullity: "the attorneys
for the offended party ceased to be the attorneys for the deceased upon the death of
the latter, the principal x x x." Nevertheless, the case at bar had already been
submitted for decision before the RTC on 4 June 1998, several months before the
passing away of de Guzman on 19 February 1999. Hence, no further proceedings
requiring the appearance of de Guzman’s counsel were conducted before the
promulgation of the RTC Decision. Consequently, de Guzman’s counsel cannot be
said to have no authority to appear in trial, as trial had already ceased upon the death
of de Guzman.
In sum, the RTC Decision is valid despite the failure to comply with Section 16,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, because of the express waiver of the heirs to the
jurisdiction over their persons, and because there had been, before the promulgation
of the RTC Decision, no further proceedings requiring the appearance of de
Guzman’s counsel.
Before proceeding with the substantive aspects of the case, however, there is still one
more procedural issue to tackle, the fourth issue presented by the spouses Carandang
on the non-inclusion in the complaint of an indispensable party.
Whether or not the RTC should have dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of
action, considering that Milagros de Guzman, allegedly an indispensable party, was
not included as a party-plaintiff
The spouses Carandang claim that, since three of the four checks used to pay their
stock subscriptions were issued in the name of Milagros de Guzman, the latter
should be considered an indispensable party. Being such, the spouses Carandang
claim, the failure to join Mrs. de Guzman as a party-plaintiff should cause the
dismissal of the action because "(i)f a suit is not brought in the name of or against the
real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action."14
The Court of Appeals held:
We disagree. The joint account of spouses Quirino A de Guzman and Milagros de
Guzman from which the four (4) checks were drawn is part of their conjugal
property and under both the Civil Code and the Family Code the husband alone may
institute an action for the recovery or protection of the spouses’ conjugal property.
Thus, in Docena v. Lapesura [355 SCRA 658], the Supreme Court held that "x x x
Under the New Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership. In fact, he is the sole administrator, and the wife is not entitled as a
matter of right to join him in this endeavor. The husband may defend the conjugal
partnership in a suit or action without being joined by the wife. x x x Under the
Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband and
the wife jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the
consent of both spouses is required, joint management or administration does not
require that the husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may validly
exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in
proper cases as provided under Article 124 of the Family Code. x x x."
The Court of Appeals is correct. Petitioners erroneously interchange the terms "real
party in interest" and "indispensable party." A real party in interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit.15 On the other hand, an indispensable party is a party in interest
without whom no final determination can be had of an action, 16 in contrast to a
necessary party, which is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as
a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a
complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. 17
The spouses Carandang are indeed correct that "(i)f a suit is not brought in the name
of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground
that the complaint states no cause of action." 18However, what dismissal on this
ground entails is an examination of whether the parties presently pleaded are
interested in the outcome of the litigation, and not whether all persons interested in
such outcome are actually pleaded. The latter query is relevant in discussions
concerning indispensable and necessary parties, but not in discussions
concerning real parties in interest. Both indispensable and necessary parties are
considered as real parties in interest, since both classes of parties stand to be
benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit.
Quirino and Milagros de Guzman were married before the effectivity of the Family
Code on 3 August 1988. As they did not execute any marriage settlement, the regime
of conjugal partnership of gains govern their property relations. 19
All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have
been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed
to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.20Credits are personal
properties,21 acquired during the time the loan or other credit transaction was
executed. Therefore, credits loaned during the time of the marriage are presumed to
be conjugal property.
Consequently, assuming that the four checks created a debt for which the spouses
Carandang are liable, such credits are presumed to be conjugal property. There being
no evidence to the contrary, such presumption subsists. As such, Quirino de
Guzman, being a co-owner of specific partnership property,22 is certainly a real party
in interest. Dismissal on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, by reason
that the suit was allegedly not brought by a real party in interest, is therefore
unwarranted.
So now we come to the discussion concerning indispensable and necessary parties.
When an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should likewise be
dismissed.23 The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actuations
of the court void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but
even as to those present.24 On the other hand, the non-joinder of necessary parties do
not result in the dismissal of the case. Instead, Section 9, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court provides for the consequences of such non-joinder:
Sec. 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. – Whenever in any pleading
in which a claim is asserted a necessary party is not joined, the pleader shall set forth
his name, if known, and shall state why he is omitted. Should the court find the
reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of the omitted
necessary party if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained.
The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall
be deemed a waiver of the claim against such party.
The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in
the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights
of such necessary party.
Non-compliance with the order for the inclusion of a necessary party would not
warrant the dismissal of the complaint. This is an exception to Section 3, Rule 17
which allows the dismissal of the complaint for failure to comply with an order of
the court, as Section 9, Rule 3 specifically provides for the effect of such non-
inclusion: it shall not prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and the
judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary
party. Section 11, Rule 3 likewise provides that the non-joinder of parties is not a
ground for the dismissal of the action.
Other than the indispensable and necessary parties, there is a third set of parties: the
pro-forma parties, which are those who are required to be joined as co-parties in suits
by or against another party as may be provided by the applicable substantive law or
procedural rule.25 An example is provided by Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 4. Spouses as parties. – Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as
provided by law.
Pro-forma parties can either be indispensable, necessary or neither indispensable nor
necessary. The third case occurs if, for example, a husband files an action to recover
a property which he claims to be part of his exclusive property. The wife may have
no legal interest in such property, but the rules nevertheless require that she be joined
as a party.
In cases of pro-forma parties who are neither indispensable nor necessary, the
general rule under Section 11, Rule 3 must be followed: such non-joinder is not a
ground for dismissal. Hence, in a case concerning an action to recover a sum of
money, we held that the failure to join the spouse in that case was not a jurisdictional
defect.26The non-joinder of a spouse does not warrant dismissal as it is merely a
formal requirement which may be cured by amendment. 27
Conversely, in the instances that the pro-forma parties are also indispensable or
necessary parties, the rules concerning indispensable or necessary parties, as the case
may be, should be applied. Thus, dismissal is warranted only if the pro-forma party
not joined in the complaint is an indispensable party.
Milagros de Guzman, being presumed to be a co-owner of the credits allegedly
extended to the spouses Carandang, seems to be either an indispensable or a
necessary party. If she is an indispensable party, dismissal would be proper. If she is
merely a necessary party, dismissal is not warranted, whether or not there was an
order for her inclusion in the complaint pursuant to Section 9, Rule 3.
Article 108 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of
partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this
Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements.
This provision is practically the same as the Civil Code provision it superceded:
Art. 147. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of
partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this
Chapter.
In this connection, Article 1811 of the Civil Code provides that "[a] partner is a co-
owner with the other partners of specific partnership property." Taken with the
presumption of the conjugal nature of the funds used to finance the four checks used
to pay for petitioners’ stock subscriptions, and with the presumption that the credits
themselves are part of conjugal funds, Article 1811 makes Quirino and Milagros de
Guzman co-owners of the alleged credit.
Being co-owners of the alleged credit, Quirino and Milagros de Guzman may
separately bring an action for the recovery thereof. In the fairly recent cases
of Baloloy v. Hular28 and Adlawan v. Adlawan,29 we held that, in a co-ownership, co-
owners may bring actions for the recovery of co-owned property without the
necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is
presumed to have been filed for the benefit of his co-owners. In the latter case and in
that of De Guia v. Court of Appeals,30 we also held that Article 487 of the Civil
Code, which provides that any of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment,
covers all kinds of action for the recovery of possession. 31
In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest.
However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any
one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned
properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the
suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The
other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties,
for a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation,
since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.32
We therefore hold that Milagros de Guzman is not an indispensable party in the
action for the recovery of the allegedly loaned money to the spouses Carandang. As
such, she need not have been impleaded in said suit, and dismissal of the suit is not
warranted by her not being a party thereto.
Whether or not respondents were able to prove the loan sought to be collected from
petitioners
In the second and third issues presented by the spouses Carandang, they claim that
the de Guzmans failed to prove the alleged loan for which the spouses Carandang
were held liable. As previously stated, spouses Quirino and Milagros de Guzman
paid for the stock subscriptions of the spouses Carandang, amounting
to P336,375.00. The de Guzmans claim that these payments were in the form of
loans and/or advances and it was agreed upon between the late Quirino de Guzman,
Sr. and the spouses Carandang that the latter would repay him. Petitioners, on the
other hand, argue that there was an oral pre-incorporation agreement wherein it was
agreed that Arcardio Carandang would always maintain his 46% equity participation
in the corporation even if the capital structures were increased, and that Quirino de
Guzman would personally pay the equity shares/stock subscriptions of Arcardio
Carandang with no cost to the latter.
On this main issue, the Court of Appeals held:
[The spouses Carandang] aver in its ninth assigned error that [the de Guzmans] failed
to prove by preponderance of evidence, either the existence of the purported loan or
the non-payment thereof.
Simply put, preponderance of evidence means that the evidence as a whole adduced
by one side is superior to that of the other. The concept of preponderance of evidence
refers to evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing, than that which is
offered in opposition to it; it means probability of truth.
[The spouses Carandang] admitted that it was indeed [the de Guzmans] who paid
their stock subscriptions and their reason for not reimbursing the latter is the alleged
pre-incorporation agreement, to which they offer no clear proof as to its existence.
It is a basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation.
Thus, the plaintiff or complainant has to prove his affirmative allegations in the
complaints and the defendant or respondent has to prove the affirmative allegations
in his affirmative defenses and counterclaims.33
The spouses Carandang, however, insist that the de Guzmans have not proven the
loan itself, having presented evidence only of the payment in favor of the
Carandangs. They claim:
It is an undeniable fact that payment is not equivalent to a loan. For instance, if Mr.
"A" decides to pay for Mr. "B’s" obligation, that payment by Mr. "A" cannot, by any
stretch of imagination, possibly mean that there is now a loan by Mr. "B" to Mr. "A".
There is a possibility that such payment by Mr. "A" is purely out of generosity or
that there is a mutual agreement between them. As applied to the instant case, that
mutual agreement is the pre-incorporation agreement (supra) existing between Mr.
de Guzman and the petitioners --- to the effect that the former shall be responsible
for paying stock subscriptions of the latter. Thus, when Mr. de Guzman paid for the
stock subscriptions of the petitioners, there was no loan to speak of, but only a
compliance with the pre-incorporation agreement.34
The spouses Carandang are mistaken. If indeed a Mr. "A" decides to pay for a Mr.
"B’s" obligation, the presumption is that Mr. "B" is indebted to Mr. "A" for such
amount that has been paid. This is pursuant to Articles 1236 and 1237 of the Civil
Code, which provide:
Art. 1236. The creditor is not bound to accept payment or performance by a third
person who has no interest in the fulfillment of the obligation, unless there is a
stipulation to the contrary.
Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except
that if he paid without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can recover
only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the debtor.
Art. 1237. Whoever pays on behalf of the debtor without the knowledge or against
the will of the latter, cannot compel the creditor to subrogate him in his rights, such
as those arising from a mortgage, guarantee, or penalty.
Articles 1236 and 1237 are clear that, even in cases where the debtor has no
knowledge of payment by a third person, and even in cases where the third person
paid against the will of the debtor, such payment would produce a debt in favor of
the paying third person. In fact, the only consequences for the failure to inform or get
the consent of the debtor are the following: (1) the third person can recover only
insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the debtor; and (2) the third person is
not subrogated to the rights of the creditor, such as those arising from a mortgage,
guarantee or penalty.35
We say, however, that this is merely a presumption. By virtue of the parties’ freedom
to contract, the parties could stipulate otherwise and thus, as suggested by the
spouses Carandang, there is indeed a possibility that such payment by Mr. "A" was
purely out of generosity or that there was a mutual agreement between them. But
such mutual agreement, being an exception to presumed course of events as laid
down by Articles 1236 and 1237, must be adequately proven.
The de Guzmans have successfully proven their payment of the spouses Carandang’s
stock subscriptions. These payments were, in fact, admitted by the spouses
Carandang. Consequently, it is now up to the spouses Carandang to prove the
existence of the pre-incorporation agreement that was their defense to the purported
loan.
Unfortunately for the spouses Carandang, the only testimony which touched on the
existence and substance of the pre-incorporation agreement, that of petitioner
Arcardio Carandang, was stricken off the record because he did not submit himself
to a cross-examination of the opposing party. On the other hand, the testimonies of
Romeo Saavedra,36 Roberto S. Carandang,37 Gertrudes Z. Esteban,38 Ceferino
Basilio,39 and Ma. Luisa Carandang40touched on matters other than the existence and
substance of the pre-incorporation agreement. So aside from the fact that these
witnesses had no personal knowledge as to the alleged existence of the pre-
incorporation agreement, the testimonies of these witnesses did not even mention the
existence of a pre-incorporation agreement.
Worse, the testimonies of petitioners Arcadio Carandang and Ma. Luisa Carandang
even contradicted the existence of a pre-incorporation agreement because when they
were asked by their counsel regarding the matter of the check payments made by the
late Quirino A. de Guzman, Sr. in their behalf, they said that they had already paid
for it thereby negating their own defense that there was a pre-incorporation
agreement excusing themselves from paying Mr. de Guzman the amounts he
advanced or loaned to them. This basic and irrefutable fact can be gleaned from their
testimonies which the private respondents are quoting for easy reference:
a. With respect to the testimony of Ma. Luisa Carandang
Q: Now, can you tell this Honorable Court how do you feel with respect to the
Complaint of the plaintiff in this case charging you that you paid for this year and
asking enough to paid (sic) your tax?
A: We have paid already, so, we are not liable for anything payment (sic). 41
b. With respect to the testimony of Arcadio Carandang
"Q: How much?
A: P40,000.00 to P50,000.00 per month.
Q: The plaintiff also claimed thru witness Edgar Ragasa, that there were receipts
issued for the payment of your shares; which receipts were marked as Exhibits "G"
to "L" (Plaintiff).
I’m showing to you these receipts so marked by the plaintiff as their exhibits which
were issued in the name of Ma. Luisa Carandang, your wife; and also, Arcadio M.
Carandang. Will you please go over this Official Receipt and state for the records,
who made for the payment stated in these receipts in your name?
A: I paid for those shares."42
There being no testimony or documentary evidence proving the existence of the pre-
incorporation agreement, the spouses Carandang are forced to rely upon an alleged
admission by the original plaintiff of the existence of the pre-incorporation
agreement.
Petitioners claim that the late Quirino A. de Guzman, Sr. had admitted the existence
of the pre-incorporation agreement by virtue of paragraphs 13 and 14 of their
Answer and paragraph 4 of private respondents’ Reply.
Paragraphs 13 and 14 of petitioners’ Answer dated 7 July 1992 state in full:
13. Sometime in November, 1973 or thereabout, herein plaintiff invited defendant
Arcadio M. Carandang to a joint venture by pooling together their technical
expertise, equipments, financial resources and franchise. Plaintiff proposed to
defendant and mutually agreed on the following:
1. That they would organize a corporation known as Mabuhay Broadcasting
Systems, Inc.
2. Considering the technical expertise and talent of defendant Arcadio M. Carandang
and his new equipments he bought, and his skill in repairing and modifying
radio/communication equipments into high proficiency, said defendant would have
an equity participation in the corporation of 46%, and plaintiff 54% because of his
financial resources and franchise.
3. That defendant would always maintain his 46% equity participation in the
corporation even if the capital structures are increased, and that plaintiff would
personally pay the equity shares/stock subscriptions of defendant with no cost to the
latter.
4. That because of defendant’s expertise in the trade including the marketing aspects,
he would be the President and General Manager, and plaintiff the Chairman of the
Board.
5. That considering their past and trustworthy relations, they would maintain such
relations in the joint venture without any mental reservation for their common
benefit and success of the business.
14. Having mutually agreed on the above arrangements, the single proprietorship of
plaintiff was immediately spun-off into a corporation now known as Mabuhay
Broadcasting System, Inc. The incorporators are plaintiff and his family
members/nominees controlling jointly 54% of the stocks and defendant Arcadio M.
Carandang controlling singly 46% as previously agreed.43
Meanwhile, paragraphs 3 and 4 of private respondents’ Reply dated 29 July 1992
state in full:
3. Plaintiffs admits the allegation in paragraph 13.1 of the Answer only insofar the
plaintiff and defendant Arcadio M. Carandang organized a corporation known as
Mabuhay Broadcasting Systems, Inc. Plaintiff specifically denies the other
allegations in paragraph 13 of the Answer, the same being devoid of any legal or
factual bases. The truth of the matter is that defendant Arcadio M. Carandang was
not able to pay plaintiff the agreed amount of the lease for a number of months
forcing the plaintiff to terminate lease. Additionally, the records would show that it
was the defendant Arcadio M. Carandang who proposed a joint venture with the
plaintiff.
It appears that plaintiff agreed to the formation of the corporation principally because
of a directive of then President Marcos indicating the need to broaden the ownership
of radio broadcasting stations. The plaintiff owned the franchise, the radio
transmitter, the antenna tower, the building containing the radio transmitter and other
equipment. Verily, he would be placed in a great disadvantage if he would still have
to personally pay for the shares of defendant Arcadio M. Carandang.
4. Plaintiff admits the allegations in paragraph 14 of the Answer. 44
In effect, the spouses Carandang are relying on the fact that Quirino de Guzman
stated that he admitted paragraph 14 of the Answer, which incidentally contained the
opening clause "(h)aving mutually agreed on the above arrangements, x x x."
Admissions, however, should be clear and unambiguous. This purported admission
by Quirino de Guzman reeks of ambiguity, as the clause "(h)aving mutually agreed
on the above arrangements," seems to be a mere introduction to the statement that
the single proprietorship of Quirino de Guzman had been converted into a
corporation. If Quirino de Guzman had meant to admit paragraph 13.3, he could
have easily said so, as he did the other paragraphs he categorically admitted. Instead,
Quirino de Guzman expressly stated the opposite: that "(p)laintiff specifically denies
the other allegations of paragraph 13 of the Answer." 45 The Reply furthermore states
that the only portion of paragraph 13 which Quirino de Guzman had admitted is
paragraph 13.1, and only insofar as it said that Quirino de Guzman and Arcardio
Carandang organized Mabuhay Broadcasting Systems, Inc. 46
All the foregoing considered, we hold that Quirino de Guzman had not admitted the
alleged pre-incorporation agreement. As there was no admission, and as the
testimony of Arcardio Carandang was stricken off the record, we are constrained to
rule that there was no pre-incorporation agreement rendering Quirino de Guzman
liable for the spouses Carandang’s stock subscription. The payment by the spouses
de Guzman of the stock subscriptions of the spouses Carandang are therefore by way
of loan which the spouses Carandang are liable to pay.1âwphi1
Whether or not the liability of the spouses Carandang is joint and solidary
Finally, the Court of Appeals also upheld the RTC Decision insofar as it decreed a
solidary liability. According to the Court of Appeals:
With regards (sic) the tenth assigned error, [the spouses Carandang] contend that:
"There is absolutely no evidence, testimonial or documentary, showing that the
purported obligation of [the spouses Carandang] is joint and solidary. x x x
"Furthermore, the purported obligation of [the spouses Carandang] does not at all
qualify as one of the obligations required by law to be solidary x x x."
It is apparent from the facts of the case that [the spouses Carandang] were married
way before the effectivity of the Family Code hence; their property regime is
conjugal partnership under the Civil Code.
It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of conjugal partnership of
gains, an obligation entered into by the husband and wife is chargeable against their
conjugal partnership and it is the partnership, which is primarily bound for its
repayment. Thus, when the spouses are sued for the enforcement of the obligation
entered into by them, they are being impleaded in their capacity as representatives of
the conjugal partnership and not as independent debtors, such that the concept of
joint and solidary liability, as between them, does not apply. 47
The Court of Appeals is correct insofar as it held that when the spouses are sued for
the enforcement of the obligation entered into by them, they are being impleaded in
their capacity as representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as independent
debtors. Hence, either of them may be sued for the whole amount, similar to that of a
solidary liability, although the amount is chargeable against their conjugal
partnership property. Thus, in the case cited by the Court of Appeals, Alipio v. Court
of Appeals,48 the two sets of defendant-spouses therein were held liable
for P25,300.00 each, chargeable to their respective conjugal partnerships.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the judgment
rendered against the spouses Carandang, is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATION: The spouses Carandang are ORDERED to pay the following
amounts from their conjugal partnership properties:
(1) P336,375.00 representing the spouses Carandang’s loan to Quirino de Guzman;
and
(2) Interest on the preceding amount at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum
from 5 June 1992 when the complaint was filed until the principal amount can be
fully paid; and
(3) P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 187023 November 17, 2010
EVANGELINE D. IMANI,* Petitioner,
vs.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
On appeal is the July 3, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 93061, setting aside the November 22, 2005 Order 2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, Branch 64, as well as its subsequent Resolution dated March
3, 2009,3 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
On August 28, 1981, Evangeline D. Imani (petitioner) signed a Continuing
Suretyship Agreement in favor of respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company
(Metrobank), with Cesar P. Dazo, Nieves Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo, Cynthia C.
Dazo, Doroteo Fundales, Jr., and Nicolas Ponce as her co-sureties. As sureties, they
bound themselves to pay Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc.
(CPDTI) incurs, but not exceeding Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00).
Later, CPDTI obtained loans of P100,000.00 and P63,825.45, respectively. The loans
were evidenced by promissory notes signed by Cesar and Nieves Dazo. CPDTI
defaulted in the payment of its loans. Metrobank made several demands for payment
upon CPDTI, but to no avail. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit
against CPDTI and its sureties, including herein petitioner. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 15717.
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a decision4 in favor of Metrobank. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court renders a judgment in favor of
[Metrobank] ordering defendants, C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc., Cesar P. Dazo, Nieves
Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo, Evangelina D. Imani, Cynthia C. Dazo, Doroteo Fundales,
Jr., and Nicolas Ponce to pay [respondent] Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:
1. Under the First Cause of Action, the sum of P175,451.48 plus the stipulated
interest, penalty charges and bank charges from March 1, 1984 and until the whole
amount is fully paid;
2. Under the Second Cause of Action, the sum of P92,158.85 plus the stipulated
interest, penalty charges and bank charges from February 24, 1985, and until the
whole amount is fully paid;
3. The sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total amount due under the First
and Second Cause of Action; and
4. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit and expenses of litigation.
SO ORDERED.5
Therein defendants appealed to the CA. On September 29, 1997, the CA issued a
Resolution dismissing the appeal.6 Consequently, on October 22, 1997, the CA
issued an Entry of Judgment.7
Metrobank then filed with the RTC a motion for execution, 8 which was granted on
December 7, 1999.9 A writ of execution10 was issued against CPDTI and its co-
defendants. The sheriff levied on a property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-27957 P(M) and registered in the name of petitioner. A public auction
was conducted and the property was awarded to Metrobank, as the highest bidder.
Metrobank undertook to consolidate the title covering the subject property in its
name, and filed a Manifestation and Motion,11 praying that spouses Sina and
Evangline Imani be directed to surrender the owner’s copy of TCT No. T-27957
P(M) for cancellation. Petitioner opposed the motion and filed her Comment with
Urgent Motion to Cancel and Nullify the Levy on Execution, the Auction Sale and
Certificate of Sale Over TCT No. T-27957 P(M).12She argued that the subject
property belongs to the conjugal partnership; as such, it cannot be held answerable
for the liabilities incurred by CPDTI to Metrobank. Neither can it be subject of levy
on execution or public auction. Hence, petitioner prayed for the nullification of the
levy on execution and the auction sale, as well as the certificate of sale in favor of
Metrobank.
On June 20, 2005, the RTC issued an Order 13 denying Metrobank’s motion,
explaining that:
[Petitioner] Evangelina D. Imani incurred the obligation to [Metrobank] by the mere
fact that she executed the Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favor of [Metrobank].
The loan proceeds were not intended for [petitioner] Evangelina D. Imani. It cannot
therefore be presumed that the loan proceeds had redounded to the benefit of her
family. It is also worth stressing that the records of this case is bereft of any showing
that at the time of the signing of the Suretyship Agreement and even at the time of
execution and sale at public auction of the subject property, [petitioner] Evangelina
D. Imani has the authority to dispose of or encumber their conjugal partnership
properties. Neither was she conferred the power of administration over the said
properties. Hence, when she executed the Suretyship Agreement, she had placed the
Conjugal Partnership in danger of being dissipated. The law could have not allowed
this in keeping with the mandate of protecting and safeguarding the conjugal
partnership. This is also the reason why the husband or the wife cannot dispose of
the conjugal partnership properties even onerously, if without the consent of the
other, or gratuitously, as by way of donation.14
The RTC decreed that:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, [Metrobank’s] motion for issuance of an
Order directing Spouses Sina Imani and Evangeline Dazo-Imani to surrender the
owner’s copy of TCT No. T-27957 P(M) to the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan,
Bulacan for cancellation, is DENIED.
On the other hand, [petitioner’s] Motion to Cancel and Nullify the Levy on
Execution, the Auction Sale and Certificate of Sale with respect to the real property
covered by TCT No. T-27957 P(M) is GRANTED.
The Levy on Execution and the Sale by Public Auction of the property covered by
TCT No. T-27957 P(M) are nullified and the Certificate of Sale over the same
property is hereby Cancelled.
SO ORDERED.15
Metrobank filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner opposed the motion,
asserting that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership.16 Attached to her
opposition were an Affidavit17executed by Crisanto Origen, the former owner of the
property, attesting that spouses Sina and Evangeline Imani were the vendees of the
subject property; and the photocopies of the checks 18 allegedly issued by Sina Imani
as payment for the subject property.
However, despite petitioner’s opposition, the RTC issued an Order dated August 15,
2005, setting aside its June 20, 2005 Order. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED.
The Order dated June 20, 2005 is set aside. Evangelina Dazo-Imani is hereby ordered
to surrender TCT No. T-27957 P(M) to the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan,
Bulacan for cancellation.
The effectivity of the Levy on Execution, the Auction Sale and the Certificate of Sale
with respect to the real property covered by TCT No. T-27957 P(M) is reinstated.
SO ORDERED.19
But on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC issued an Order dated
November 22, 2005,20 reinstating its June 20, 2005 Order. In so ruling, the RTC
relied on the affidavit of Crisanto Origen, and declared the property levied upon as
conjugal, which cannot be held answerable for petitioner’s personal liability.
Metrobank assailed the November 22, 2005 Order via a petition for certiorari in the
CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC for annulling the levy
on execution and the auction sale, and for canceling the certificate of sale.
On July 3, 2008, the CA rendered the now challenged Decision reversing the RTC,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. ACCORDINGLY, the
Order dated November 22, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
64, is hereby REVERSED and new one is entered declaring the Levy on Execution,
Sale by Public Auction of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title T-
27957 [P](M) and the Certificate of Sale over said property as valid and legal.
SO ORDERED.21
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it on March 3,
2009.22
Hence, this recourse by petitioner, arguing that:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRS (sic) IN REVERSING THE
FINDING OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE PROPERTY IS
CONJUGAL IN NATURE BASED ON MERE SPECULATIONS AND
CONJECTURES.23
II
THE UNSUPPORTED TEMPORARY RULING THAT THE PROPERTY IS NOT
CONJUGAL AND THE SUGGESTION TO VINDICATE THE RIGHTS OF SINA
IMANI AND THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IN A SEPARATE ACTION
UNDER SEC. 16, RULE 39 ENCOURAGE MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS AND
VIOLATE THE POLICY OF THE RULES FOR EXPEDIENT AND
INEXPENSIVE DISPOSITION OF ACTIONS.
III
THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION, B[EI]NG A ROAD RIGHT OF WAY, IS NOT
SUBJECT TO EXECUTION UNDER SEC. 50, 2 ND PARAGRAPH, OF PD [NO.]
1529.24
First, the procedural issue on the propriety of the course of action taken by petitioner
in the RTC in vindication of her claim over the subject property.
Petitioner takes exception to the CA ruling that she committed a procedural gaffe in
seeking the annulment of the writ of execution, the auction sale, and the certificate of
sale. The issue on the conjugal nature of the property, she insists, can be adjudicated
by the executing court; thus, the RTC correctly gave due course to her motion. She
asserts that it was error for the CA to propose the filing of a separate case to
vindicate her claim.
We agree with petitioner.
The CA explained the faux pas committed by petitioner in this wise:
Under [Section 16, Rule 39], a third-party claimant or a stranger to the foreclosure
suit, can opt to file a remedy known as terceria against the sheriff or officer effecting
the writ by serving on him an affidavit of his title and a copy thereof upon the
judgment creditor. By the terceria, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property
and could be answerable for damages. A third-party claimant may also resort to an
independent "separate action," the object of which is the recovery of ownership or
possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arising from
wrongful seizure and detention of the property despite the third-party claim. If a
"separate action" is the recourse, the third-party claimant must institute in a forum of
competent jurisdiction an action, distinct and separate from the action in which the
judgment is being enforced, even before or without need of filing a claim in the court
that issued the writ. Both remedies are cumulative and may be availed of
independently of or separately from the other. Availment of the terceria is not a
condition sine qua non to the institution of a "separate action."
It is worthy of note that Sina Imani should have availed of the remedy of "terceria"
authorized under Section 16 of Rule 39 which is the proper remedy considering that
he is not a party to the case against [petitioner]. Instead, the trial court allowed
[petitioner] to file an urgent motion to cancel and nullify the levy of execution the
auction sale and certificate of sale over TCT No. T27957 [P](M). [Petitioner] then
argue[s] that it is the ministerial duty of the levying officer to release the property the
moment a third-party claim is filed.
It is true that once a third-party files an affidavit of his title or right to the possession
of the property levied upon, the sheriff is bound to release the property of the third-
party claimant unless the judgment creditor files a bond approved by the court.
Admittedly, [petitioner’s] motion was already pending in court at the time that they
filed the Affidavit of Crisanto Origen, the former owner, dated July 27, 2005.
In the instant case, the one who availed of the remedy of terceria is the [petitioner],
the party to the main case and not the third party contemplated by Section 16, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the one who made the affidavit is not the third-party referred to in said
Rule but Crisanto Origen who was the former owner of the land in question. 25
Apparently, the CA lost sight of our ruling in Ong v. Tating, 26 elucidating on the
applicability of Section 16 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, thus:
When the sheriff thus seizes property of a third person in which the judgment debtor
holds no right or interest, and so incurs in error, the supervisory power of the Court
which has authorized execution may be invoked by the third person. Upon due
application by the third person, and after summary hearing, the Court may command
that the property be released from the mistaken levy and restored to the rightful
owner or possessor. What the Court can do in these instances however is limited to a
determination of whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance
of his duties in the execution of the judgment, more specifically, if he has indeed
taken hold of property not belonging to the judgment debtor. The Court does not and
cannot pass upon the question of title to the property, with any character of finality.
It can treat the matter only in so far as may be necessary to decide if the Sheriff has
acted correctly or not. x x x.
xxxx
Upon the other hand, if the claim of impropriety on the part of the sheriff in the
execution proceedings is made by a party to the action, not a stranger thereto, any
relief therefrom may only be applied with, and obtained from, only the executing
court; and this is true even if a new party has been impleaded in the suit.27
The filing of the motion by petitioner to annul the execution, the auction sale, and the
certificate of sale was, therefore, a proper remedy. As further held by this Court:
Certain it is that the Trial Court has plenary jurisdiction over the proceedings for the
enforcement of its judgments. It has undeniable competence to act on motions for
execution (whether execution be a matter of right or discretionary upon the Court),
issue and quash writs, determine if property is exempt from execution, or fix the
value of property claimed by third persons so that a bond equal to such value may be
posted by a judgment creditor to indemnify the sheriff against liability for damages,
resolve questions involving redemption, examine the judgment debtor and his
debtors, and otherwise perform such other acts as may be necessary or incidental to
the carrying out of its decisions. It may and should exercise control and supervision
over the sheriff and other court officers and employees taking part in the execution
proceedings, and correct them in the event that they should err in the discharge of
their functions.28
Contrary to the CA’s advice, the remedy of terceria or a separate action under
Section 16, Rule 39 is no longer available to Sina Imani because he is not deemed a
stranger to the case filed against petitioner:
[T]he husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a "stranger" to the case
prosecuted and adjudged against his wife.29
Thus, it would have been inappropriate for him to institute a separate case for
annulment of writ of execution.
In Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals,30 we explained:
Is a spouse, who was not a party to the suit but whose conjugal property is being
executed on account of the other spouse being the judgment obligor, considered a
"stranger?" In Mariano v. Court of Appeals, we answered this question in the
negative. In that case, the CFI of Caloocan City declared the wife to be the judgment
obligor and, consequently, a writ of execution was issued against her. Thereupon, the
sheriff proceeded to levy upon the conjugal properties of the wife and her husband.
The wife initially filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals praying for
the annulment of the writ of execution. However, the petition was adjudged to be
without merit and was accordingly dismissed. The husband then filed a complaint
with the CFI of Quezon City for the annulment of the writ of execution, alleging
therein that the conjugal properties cannot be made to answer for obligations
exclusively contracted by the wife. The executing party moved to dismiss the
annulment case, but the motion was denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in
Mariano, ruled that the CFI of Quezon City, in continuing to hear the annulment
case, had not interfered with the executing court. We reversed the Court of Appeals'
ruling and held that there was interference by the CFI of Quezon City with the
execution of the CFI of Caloocan City. We ruled that the husband of the judgment
debtor cannot be deemed a "stranger" to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his
wife, which would allow the filing of a separate and independent action.
The facts of the Mariano case are similar to this case. Clearly, it was inappropriate
for petitioners to institute a separate case for annulment when they could have easily
questioned the execution of their conjugal property in the collection case. We note in
fact that the trial court in the Rizal annulment case specifically informed petitioners
that Encarnacion Ching's rights could be ventilated in the Manila collection case by
the mere expedient of intervening therein. Apparently, petitioners ignored the trial
court's advice, as Encarnacion Ching did not intervene therein and petitioners
instituted another annulment case after their conjugal property was levied upon and
sold on execution.
There have been instances where we ruled that a spouse may file a separate case
against a wrongful execution. However, in those cases, we allowed the institution of
a separate and independent action because what were executed upon were the
paraphernal or exclusive property of a spouse who was not a party to the case. In
those instances, said spouse can truly be deemed a "stranger." In the present case, the
levy and sale on execution was made upon the conjugal property.
Ineluctably, the RTC cannot be considered whimsical for ruling on petitioner’s
motion. The CA, therefore, erred for declaring otherwise.
Now, on the merits of the case.
Petitioner asserts that the subject property belongs to the conjugal partnership. As
such, it cannot be made to answer for her obligation with Metrobank. She faults the
CA for sustaining the writ of execution, the public auction, and the certificate of sale.
We sustain the CA ruling on this point.
Indeed, all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for this
presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition
sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership.31Thus, the time when the property was acquired is material.32
Francisco v. CA33 is instructive, viz.:
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife." However, the party who invokes this
presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during
the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for
the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The party who
asserts this presumption must first prove said time element. Needless to say, the
presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not
operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was
acquired.34
To support her assertion that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership,
petitioner submitted the Affidavit35of Crisanto Origen, attesting that petitioner and
her husband were the vendees of the subject property, and the photocopies of the
checks36 allegedly issued by Sina Imani as payment for the subject property.
Unfortunately for petitioner, the said Affidavit can hardly be considered sufficient
evidence to prove her claim that the property is conjugal. As correctly pointed out by
Metrobank, the said Affidavit has no evidentiary weight because Crisanto Origen
was not presented in the RTC to affirm the veracity of his Affidavit:
The basic rule of evidence is that unless the affiants themselves are placed on the
witness stand to testify on their affidavits, such affidavits must be rejected for being
hearsay. Stated differently, the declarants of written statements pertaining to disputed
facts must be presented at the trial for cross-examination. 37
In the same vein, the photocopies of the checks cannot be given any probative value.
In Concepcion v. Atty. Fandiño, Jr.38 and Intestate Estate of the Late Don Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals,39 we held that a photocopy of a document
has no probative value and is inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the CA was correct in
disregarding the said pieces of evidence.
Similarly, the certificate of title could not support petitioner’s assertion. As aptly
ruled by the CA, the fact that the land was registered in the name of Evangelina
Dazo-Imani married to Sina Imani is no proof that the property was acquired during
the spouses’ coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different
acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one
already existing.40
Indubitably, petitioner utterly failed to substantiate her claim that the property
belongs to the conjugal partnership. Thus, it cannot be rightfully said that the CA
reversed the RTC ruling without valid basis.
As a last ditch effort, petitioner asserts that the property is a road right of way; thus,
it cannot be subject of a writ of execution.
The argument must be rejected because it was raised for the first time in this
petition.lawphil.net In the trial court and the CA, petitioner’s arguments zeroed in on
the alleged conjugal nature of the property. It is well settled that issues raised for the
first time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by
estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention
of the trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal. To consider the alleged facts and arguments raised
belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and
due process.41
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93061 sustaining the validity of the writ of
execution, the auction sale, and the certificate of sale are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK, Petitioner,
vs.
MIGUELA C. DAILO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59986
rendered on June 3, 2002, which affirmed with modification the October 18,
1997 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, San Pablo City, Laguna in
Civil Case No. SP-4748 (97).
The following factual antecedents are undisputed.
Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8,
1967. During their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at
Barangay San Francisco, San Pablo City from a certain Sandra Dalida. The subject
property was declared for tax assessment purposes under Assessment of Real
Property No. 94-051-2802. The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only
in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his
wife.3
On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from
petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailo’s
house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in
the amount of P300,000.00 from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo
executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property
in favor of petitioner. The abovementioned transactions, including the execution of
the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and consent of
respondent.4
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the
extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the
highest bidder. After the lapse of one year without the property being redeemed,
petitioner, through its vice-president, consolidated the ownership thereof by
executing on June 6, 1996 an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of
Absolute Sale.5
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died on December 20, 1995. In one of her
visits to the subject property, respondent learned that petitioner had already
employed a certain Roldan Brion to clean its premises and that her car, a Ford sedan,
was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject
property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 29, San Pablo City, Civil Case No. SP-2222 (97) for Nullity of Real
Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership,
Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Damages against petitioner. In the latter’s Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question
was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision on October 18, 1997. The
dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff having proved by the preponderance of evidence the
allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds for the plaintiff and hereby orders:
ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. The declaration of the following documents as null and void:
(a) The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated December 1, 1993 executed before
Notary Public Romulo Urrea and his notarial register entered as Doc. No. 212; Page
No. 44, Book No. XXI, Series of 1993.
(b) The Certificate of Sale executed by Notary Public Reynaldo Alcantara on April
20, 1995.
(c) The Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed by the defendant
(c) The Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed by the defendant over the
residential lot located at Brgy. San Francisco, San Pablo City, covered by ARP No.
95-091-1236 entered as Doc. No. 406; Page No. 83, Book No. III, Series of 1996 of
Notary Public Octavio M. Zayas.
(d) The assessment of real property No. 95-051-1236.
2. The defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this complaint to the
plaintiff.
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
1. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P40,000.00 representing the value of
the car which was burned.
ON BOTH CAUSES OF ACTION
1. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P25,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
2. The defendant to pay plaintiff P25,000.00 as moral damages;
3. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. To pay the cost of the suit.
The counterclaim is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.6
Upon elevation of the case to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the
trial court’s finding that the subject property was conjugal in nature, in the absence
of clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the subject property
acquired during the marriage of spouses Dailo belongs to their conjugal
partnership.7The appellate court declared as void the mortgage on the subject
property because it was constituted without the knowledge and consent of
respondent, in accordance with Article 124 of the Family Code. Thus, it upheld the
trial court’s order to reconvey the subject property to respondent.8 With respect to
the damage to respondent’s car, the appellate court found petitioner to be liable
therefor because it is responsible for the consequences of the acts or omissions of the
person it hired to accomplish the assigned task.9 All told, the appellate court affirmed
the trial court’s Decision, but deleted the award for damages and attorney’s fees for
lack of basis.10
Hence, this petition, raising the following issues for this Court’s consideration:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE
MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER
THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE
PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO,
JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY. 11
First, petitioner takes issue with the legal provision applicable to the factual milieu of
this case. It contends that Article 124 of the Family Code should be construed in
relation to Article 493 of the Civil Code, which states:
ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property
shall belong to both spouses jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers
of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. . . .
Petitioner argues that although Article 124 of the Family Code requires the consent
of the other spouse to the mortgage of conjugal properties, the framers of the law
could not have intended to curtail the right of a spouse from exercising full
ownership over the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to him under the
concept of co-ownership.12 Thus, petitioner would have this Court uphold the
validity of the mortgage to the extent of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.’s share in the
conjugal partnership.
In Guiang v. Court of Appeals,13 it was held that the sale of a conjugal property
requires the consent of both the husband and wife. 14 In applying Article 124 of the
Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the
entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to
the husband who contracted the sale. The same principle in Guiang squarely applies
to the instant case. As shall be discussed next, there is no legal basis to construe
Article 493 of the Civil Code as an exception to Article 124 of the Family Code.
Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. In the
absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains governed the property relations between respondent and her late
husband.15 With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4
on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to
conjugal partnership of gains already established before its effectivity unless vested
rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. 16
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent
and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. even in a suppletory manner. The regime of
conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and
wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their
separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts
or by chance.17 Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-
ownership apply in a suppletory manner,18 the conjugal partnership shall be governed
by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is
expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the
spouses in their marriage settlements.19 Thus, the property relations of respondent
and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal
Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on
partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the
Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on
the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and
consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the
subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express
provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or
written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal
property shall be void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse
who makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-
ownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the law does not
distinguish, courts should not distinguish.20 Thus, both the trial court and the
appellate court are correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the
subject property for lack of respondent’s consent.
Second, petitioner imposes the liability for the payment of the principal obligation
obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the conjugal partnership to the extent
that it redounded to the benefit of the family.21
Under Article 121 of the Family Code, "[T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable
for: . . . (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of
the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . ." For the subject
property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. There must be the
requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the
spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should
appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the
new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the
family as a unit.22
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such.23 Ei
incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must
prove).24 Petitioner’s sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt
redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not
persuade this Court. Other than petitioner’s bare allegation, there is nothing from the
records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family. Consequently, the
conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal
obligation.
In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial, petitioner
vigorously asserted that the subject property was the exclusive property of the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial court was it alleged
that the proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the family. Even on appeal,
petitioner never claimed that the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan.
When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to
change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to
the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice
and due process.25 A party may change his legal theory on appeal only when the
factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the
adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new
theory.26
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 149801 June 26, 2008
SPOUSES RENATO and FLORINDA DELA CRUZ, petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES GIL and LEONILA SEGOVIA, respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the April 17, 2001 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 64487, as reiterated in its Resolution2 of September 4, 2001, affirming
the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 44 in its Civil
Case No. 96-77509, an action for Nullity of Contract/Agreement with Damages
thereat commenced by spouses Renato and Florinda dela Cruz (petitioners) against
respondent spouses Gil and Leonila Segovia.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows.
Sometime in July 1985, petitioner Florinda dela Cruz (Florinda) wanted to purchase
two (2) parcels of land located at Paltok Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, Lot 503 with an
apartment unit erected thereon and Lot 505 with a residential house. The two lots
were being sold together for P180,000.00. Inasmuch as Florinda had
onlyP144,000.00 at hand, she asked her sister, respondent Leonila Segovia (Leonila),
to contribute P36,000.00 to complete the purchase price. The sisters agreed that Lot
503 and the apartment unit thereat would belong to Leonila upon full payment of its
purchase price of P80,000.00, while Lot 505 with a residential house would belong
to Florinda. The properties were then registered in the name of petitioner Renato dela
Cruz married to Florinda. The parties, however, verbally agreed that Leonila and her
family would stay at Lot 505 until she had fully paid for Lot 503.
Desiring to reduce the verbal agreement into writing, the parties executed and signed
a handwritten covenant entitled Note of Agreement3 dated April 28, 1990, which
read:
Ano mang oras o panahon maaring ilipat kay Mo/Gil Segovia [respondent] ang pag-
aari ng sasakyan at bahay kung mababayaran nila ang P18,000 at P34,000 na balance
sa Apt. na walang ano mang condition, interest at ano mang hangad hanggang year
1999.
Ang halagang P18,000 ay may interest na 2% hanggang sa ito ay mabayaran kay
Flor dela Cruz [petitioner]. Ang halagang P34,000 ay walang interest at ito ay
babayaran up to 1999. Ang upa sa apt. ay cocolectahin ni Flor kapalit sa residential
house.
Ang ano mang mga gastos sa papeles ay sasagutin ni Mo/Gil Segovia [respondent]
kung ililipat sa pangalan niya ang sasakyan na Pinoy Fierra-Van NEX 741. Ang
pagbili sa lupa at bahay 503 Paltok ay ganoon din. (underscoring supplied)
Sometime in 1991, Linda Duval, a sister of Florinda and Leonila, arrived from the
United States to attend their mother’s funeral. Linda noticed the strained relations
between her two siblings. When she inquired about the status of her sisters’
agreement regarding Lot 503, Leonila informed Linda that the agreement was yet to
be reduced into a formal contract. Linda offered to prepare a contract between
Florinda and Leonila who acceded to the offer. Thus, on September 9, 1991, Florinda
and Leonila signed an Agreement4 embodying the detailed scheme of payment for
the lot covered by the sisters’ agreement, to wit:
We, Gil and Leonila Segovia, husband and wife, of legal age, residing at 505 A.
Paltok Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, jointly agrees to pay Florinda dela Cruz the sum
of P34,000.00 pesos Philippine currency in the following terms and conditions:
1. All previous contract or agreement is superseded by this existing contract.
2. Payment of the said amount will be payable in installment basis; in a monthly
fashion respectively with no specific amount of payment within the period of ten
(10) years; effectively after the contract is signed by both parties. P314.81 per month
or P 3,1777.77 (sic) per year. And by the year 1999 will be P34,000.00.
3. The borrowers (Sps. Segovia) agree to put their real property located at 505 B
Paltok St., Sta. Mesa, Mla., with TCT # 177862- Registry of deeds (public
document) as guarantees for the above loan, which has a monthly rent of P1,200.00
and will be collected by the Lender (Florinda) as part of the agreement of the loan.
4. As part of the agreement, the borrowers will live in the Lender's house, located at
505 Paltok St. in exchange for her property rents.
5. The lender also agrees that the borrowers manage the collection of rents around
the house and endorse said rents to the owner who is the Lender. Lender gives her
full consent to the borrowers to sub-rent whatever rooms she chooses inside her
premises.
6. If payment was not made after ten (10) years, the Lender will take ownership of
the property described above.
7. If payment is made on or before the due date of the agreement, the Lender shall
immediately take care of all the necessary action with regards to impediment,
attachment, encumbrances to the property.
xxx
After the Note of Agreement of April 28, 1990 and Agreement of September 9,
1991, Leonila continued paying the balance she owed Florinda. Particularly, she paid
the amount of P10,000.00 in September 1990 and P7,555.44 on May 16, 1995.
Finally, in October 1995, Leonila attempted to pay the remaining balance
of P26,444.56 in full satisfaction of her obligation but Florinda refused to accept the
same on the ground that, the ten-year period for the payment of the balance,
reckoned from July 1985, the alleged date of the verbal agreement between them,
had already expired. Thereafter Florinda demanded that Leonila and her family
vacate the house at 505 Paltok Street, which prompted respondents to consign
the P26,444.56 in court.5
On March 8, 1996, petitioners filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 44, a complaint
for Nullity of Contract/Agreement with Damages on the ground that the Agreement
executed on September 9, 1991 did not contain the true intention of the parties
because Florinda’s consent thereto was vitiated by mistake. Allegedly, Florinda did
not know that the agreement provided that the ten-year period for payment of the
balance commenced from September 1991 and not from July 1985 which was her
true intention.
On May 5, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for Nullity
of Contract/Agreement with Damages and declaring the subject Agreement valid and
subsisting. The decision’s dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations and a thorough examination
of the evidence, and the pleadings together with the supporting documents, this
Court finds the Agreement valid and subsisting – thus, the complaint filed by
plaintiffs on March 8, 1996 is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of merit.
The defendants are hereby ordered to pay the amount of P26,000.00 which is the
remaining balance to complete the purchase price of the 503 Paltok Street, Sta.
Mesa, Manila property to the plaintiffs afterwhich the latter and all the persons
claiming under them, to surrender the ownership of 503 Paltok Street, Sta. Mesa,
Manila, vacate and to surrender possession thereof.
The plaintiffs are hereby ordered to pay defendants attorney’s fees in the amount
of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs.
The counterclaim is denied.
SO ORDERED.6
In arriving at its decision, the RTC explained:
Granting arguendo, that Florinda dela Cruz’s allegation that she has not read the
Agreement is true, signing a contract without fully knowing the stipulations does not
vitiate consent. Prudence dictates that Florinda dela Cruz who presented the
agreement for signature should acquaint herself first with the "fine prints" of a
contract before stamping her approval thereto. As it is, the fact remains that Florinda
dela Cruz signed the agreement voluntarily on September 9, 1991 binding
themselves that the balance of P34,000.00 be paid in installments within ten (10)
years upon signing the agreement or until 1999. Indeed, the evidence will show that
Florinda dela Cruz voluntarily entered into the Agreement and participated in the
preparation thereof and after it has been prepared, the same was read to and by the
parties themselves including Florinda dela Cruz and later voluntarily affixed her
signature. Renato dela Cruz was also present at the time of the signing of the
Agreement and presented a copy thereof.
A further reading of the complaint in paragraph 7 thereof, it is clear from the
allegations that the Agreement is a valid existing contract only it did not express the
intention of the parties, which may be a ground for reformation of contract only
under Article 1359 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides that "when,
there having been a meeting of the minds of the parties to a contract, their true
intention is not expressed in the instrument purporting to embody the agreement, by
reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, one of the parties may ask
for the reformation of the instrument to the end that such true intention may be
expressed."
xxx
Thus, the four year period to file the action for annulment, assuming there were
indeed mistakes therein which vitiated plaintiffs’ [petitioners] consent commenced to
run on September 9, 1991. The action had already prescribed or lapsed and plaintiffs
[petitioners] could no longer ask for the annulment of the agreement.
As to the contention that the subject agreement had no force and effect on account of
the absence of the signature of Florinda’s husband, petitioner Renato dela Cruz
(Renato), the RTC ruled to the contrary, thus:
Indeed, Renato dela Cruz did not sign the Agreement, however, he was present at the
time the Agreement was signed by the parties and their witnesses, and the same was
presented to him for his signature. In fact, attempts were even made to procure his
signature, but plaintiff wife Florinda dela Cruz insisted that her signature already
carries that of her husband Renato dela Cruz. The parties never insisted that Renato
dela Cruz sign the Agreement as the wife has spoken. It is further observed that by
his actuations Renato dela Cruz has agreed and has given his conformity to the
agreement. He also did not object to the execution of the same at the time it was
signed by his wife Florinda dela Cruz on September 9, 1991, even he was present
and he was shown and furnished a copy of the said agreement.
xxx
It must be pointed out that plaintiff Florinda dela Cruz always consult her husband,
Renato dela Cruz on all matters respecting their transactions (pp. 42-43, tsn, Sept.
13, 1996; p. 25, tsn, Aug. 15, 1997).
So that the claim of Florinda dela Cruz that she has never informed her husband
involving a very substantial property registered in his name, for ten years that it had
allegedly been in effect and that she has been regularly collecting defendants
staggered installment payments for the said property for a number of years lacks
basis.
More, Renato’s claim that he was never aware of the agreement between the parties
is doomed, since he was present at the time of the purchase of the property where he
witnessed Leonila Segovia contributed their hard earned savings in the amount
of P36,000.00 to complete their share to the purchase price ofP180,000.00 of the
properties in question, and who reminded defendants that the subject property will
ultimately be theirs upon completion of their amortizations.
Finally, the RTC ruled that the action for annulment had already lapsed when the
Complaint was filed on March 8, 1996.
The action for annulment shall be brought within four (4) years from the time of
discovery of the mistake (Art. 1391, New Civil Code of the Philippines).
On the other hand, the defendants’ [respondents’] evidence that after the preparation
by Linda Duval on September 9, 1991, the Agreement was read to and by the parties,
shown and signed by the parties and furnished each a copy of the agreement.
Therefore, it could not be said that plaintiffs [petitioners] were not aware of the terms
and conditions of the Agreement and did not discover the alleged mistakes contained
therein on September 9, 1991.
More, plaintiffs [petitioners] likewise never raise any objection nor declare that there
were mistakes in the agreement. It was only on March 8, 1996 that the present action
for annulment was filed.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed with the RTC
a Notice of Appeal.7Respondents too filed a Notice of Partial Appeal8 questioning
the dismissal of their counter-claim for damages. Accordingly, the records of the
case were elevated to the CA, where both appeals were docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 64487.
The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC in its decision, 9 promulgated on April 17,
2001. In so ruling, the CA also declared that, while the expiry date of the payment
period was an important stipulation, it could not be considered as the substance of
the contract nor the primary motivation for which the parties entered into the
agreement. The substance of the Agreement was the sale of the property at 503
Paltok Street. The "mistake" that petitioners point to pertains to their interpretation of
the contract, which is not a ground to annul the same. The CA found that the
stipulations of the written agreement, signed on September 9, 1991, clearly intended
to give the respondents ten (10) years from 1991 within which to effect payment of
the balance of the consideration for the sale of the 503 property. In view of the
explicit terms of the said written agreement, the verbal agreement of July 1985 was
already of no moment.
The motion for reconsideration of petitioners was denied by the CA in the resolution
dated September 4, 2001.
Aggrieved by the foregoing CA decision, petitioners elevated the case to this Court
raising the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS WITH DUE RESPECT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE AGREEMENT IS VALID AND SUBSISTING AND
ORDERING THE PETITIONERS TO SURRENDER OWNERSHIP OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY TO THE RESPONDENTS.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS WITH DUE RESPECT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT PETITIONER RENATO DELA CRUZ BY HIS ACTUATIONS
HAD AGREED AND HAD GIVEN HIS CONFORMITY TO THE AGREEMENT.
We deny the petition.
We agree with the two courts below when they declared that the four (4)-year period
for filing an action for annulment of the September 9, 1991 Agreement, on ground of
vitiated consent, had already lapsed when the complaint subject of the present
controversy was filed on March 8, 1996.
This is in accordance with Article 1391 of the Civil Code, which pertinently reads:
Art. 1391. The action for annulment shall be brought within four years.
This period shall begin:
xxx
In case of mistake or fraud, from the time of the discovery of the same.
xxx.
The complaint for Nullity of Contract/ Agreement with Damages was filed on March
7, 1996, while the agreement subject thereof was entered into on September 9, 1991.
The Agreement was read to the parties before they affixed their signatures thereon.
Petitioners were thereafter furnished a copy of the subject Agreement. Petitioners are
presumed to have discovered the alleged mistake on September 9, 1991. Hence, the
action for annulment which was filed four years and six months from the time of the
discovery of the mistake had already prescribed. Evidently, the Agreement could no
longer be set aside.
We also agree with the ruling that the absence of Renato’s signature in the
September 9, 1991 Agreement bears little significance to its validity. Article 124 of
the Family Code relied upon by petitioners provides that the administration of the
conjugal partnership is now a joint undertaking of the husband and the wife. In the
event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal partnership, the other spouse may assume sole powers
of administration. However, the power of administration does not include the power
to dispose or encumber property belonging to the conjugal partnership. In all
instances, the present law specifically requires the written consent of the other
spouse, or authority of the court for the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal
partnership property without which, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
The foregoing provision finds no application in this case because the transaction
between Florinda and Leonila in reality did not involve any disposition of property
belonging to any of the sisters’ conjugal assets. It may be recalled that the agreement
was for the acquisition of two lots which were being sold together for P180,000.00.
Florinda who had only P144,000.00 asked Leonila to contribute P36,000.00 to
complete the purchase price of said lots. With money pooled together, the sisters
agreed that Lot 503 be valued at P80,000.00 and Lot 505 valued at P100,000.00.
The P36,000.00 contribution of Leonila shall be applied to the 503 property which
upon full payment of the remaining balance of P44,000.00 advanced by Florinda
shall belong to Leonila. On the other hand, of Florinda’s P144,000.00
contribution, P 100,000.00 shall be considered as full payment for the purchase of
the 505 property and the P44,000.00 which was the balance of the purchase price of
Lot 503, as loan to Leonila. To secure payment of the loan, Lot 503 was
provisionally registered in the name of petitioners. Hence Lot 503 was at the outset
not intended to be part of the conjugal asset of the petitioners but only as a security
for the payment of the P44,000.00 due from respondents.
Moreover, while Florinda’s husband did not affix his signature to the above-
mentioned Agreement, we find no ground to disturb the uniform findings of the trial
court and appellate court that Renato, by his actuations, agreed and gave his
conformity to the Agreement. As found by the courts below, Renato’s consent to the
Agreement was drawn from the fact that he was present at the time it was signed by
the sisters and their witnesses; he had knowledge of the Agreement as it was
presented to him for his signature, although he did not sign the same because his
wife Florinda insisted that her signature already carried that of her husband; Renato
witnessed the fact that Leonila contributed her hard earned savings in the amount
of P36,000.00 to complete their share in the purchase price of the properties in
question in the total amount of P180,000.00. The aforesaid factual findings of the
courts below are beyond review at this stage.10
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals areAFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 169900 March 18, 2010
MARIO SIOCHI, Petitioner,
vs.
ALFREDO GOZON, WINIFRED GOZON, GIL TABIJE, INTER-
DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC., and ELVIRA GOZON, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 169977
INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
MARIO SIOCHI, ELVIRA GOZON, ALFREDO GOZON, and WINIFRED
GOZON, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
This is a consolidation of two separate petitions for review,1 assailing the 7 July 2005
Decision2 and the 30 September 2005 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 74447.
This case involves a 30,000 sq.m. parcel of land (property) covered by TCT No.
5357.4 The property is situated in Malabon, Metro Manila and is registered in the
name of "Alfredo Gozon (Alfredo), married to Elvira Gozon (Elvira)."
On 23 December 1991, Elvira filed with the Cavite City Regional Trial Court
(Cavite RTC) a petition for legal separation against her husband Alfredo. On 2
January 1992, Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, which was then annotated on TCT
No. 5357.
On 31 August 1993, while the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo and
Mario Siochi (Mario) entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell5 (Agreement)
involving the property for the price of P18 million. Among the stipulations in the
Agreement were that Alfredo would: (1) secure an Affidavit from Elvira that the
property is Alfredo’s exclusive property and to annotate the Agreement at the back
of TCT No. 5357; (2) secure the approval of the Cavite RTC to exclude the property
from the legal separation case; and (3) secure the removal of the notice of lis
pendens pertaining to the said case and annotated on TCT No. 5357. However,
despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to comply with these
stipulations. After paying the P5 million earnest money as partial payment of the
purchase price, Mario took possession of the property in September 1993. On 6
September 1993, the Agreement was annotated on TCT No. 5357.
Meanwhile, on 29 June 1994, the Cavite RTC rendered a decision6 in the legal
separation case, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the legal separation between
petitioner and respondent. Accordingly, petitioner Elvira Robles Gozon is entitled to
live separately from respondent Alfredo Gozon without dissolution of their marriage
bond. The conjugal partnership of gains of the spouses is hereby declared
DISSOLVED and LIQUIDATED. Being the offending spouse, respondent is
deprived of his share in the net profits and the same is awarded to their child
Winifred R. Gozon whose custody is awarded to petitioner.
Furthermore, said parties are required to mutually support their child Winifred R.
Gozon as her needs arises.
SO ORDERED.7
As regards the property, the Cavite RTC held that it is deemed conjugal property.
On 22 August 1994, Alfredo executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favor
of their daughter, Winifred Gozon (Winifred). The Register of Deeds of Malabon,
Gil Tabije, cancelled TCT No. 5357 and issued TCT No. M-105088 in the name of
Winifred, without annotating the Agreement and the notice of lis pendens on TCT
No. M-10508.
On 26 October 1994, Alfredo, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney 9 executed in
his favor by Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI)
for P18 million.10 IDRI paid Alfredo P18 million, representing full payment for the
property.11 Subsequently, the Register of Deeds of Malabon cancelled TCT No. M-
10508 and issued TCT No. M-1097612 to IDRI.
Mario then filed with the Malabon Regional Trial Court (Malabon RTC) a complaint
for Specific Performance and Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale, with
Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order.
On 3 April 2001, the Malabon RTC rendered a decision, 13 the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
01. On the preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction:
1.1 The same is hereby made permanent by:
1.1.1 Enjoining defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon, Inter-Dimensional
Realty, Inc. and Gil Tabije, their agents, representatives and all persons acting in
their behalf from any attempt of commission or continuance of their wrongful acts of
further alienating or disposing of the subject property;
1.1.2. Enjoining defendant Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. from entering and fencing
the property;
1.1.3. Enjoining defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon, Inter-Dimensional
Realty, Inc. to respect plaintiff’s possession of the property.
02. The Agreement to Buy and Sell dated 31 August 1993, between plaintiff and
defendant Alfredo Gozon is hereby approved, excluding the property and rights of
defendant Elvira Robles-Gozon to the undivided one-half share in the conjugal
property subject of this case.
03. The Deed of Donation dated 22 August 1994, entered into by and between
defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon is hereby nullified and voided.
04. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 26 October 1994, executed by defendant
Winifred Gozon, through defendant Alfredo Gozon, in favor of defendant Inter-
Dimensional Realty, Inc. is hereby nullified and voided.
05. Defendant Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. is hereby ordered to deliver its
Transfer Certificate of Title No. M-10976 to the Register of Deeds of Malabon,
Metro Manila.
06. The Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila is hereby ordered to cancel
Certificate of Title Nos. 10508 "in the name of Winifred Gozon" and M-10976 "in
the name of Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc.," and to restore Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 5357 "in the name of Alfredo Gozon, married to Elvira Robles" with the
Agreement to Buy and Sell dated 31 August 1993 fully annotated therein is hereby
ordered.
07. Defendant Alfredo Gozon is hereby ordered to deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of plaintiff over his one-half undivided share in the subject property and to
comply with all the requirements for registering such deed.
08. Ordering defendant Elvira Robles-Gozon to sit with plaintiff to agree on the
selling price of her undivided one-half share in the subject property, thereafter, to
execute and deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale over the same in favor of the plaintiff
and to comply with all the requirements for registering such deed, within fifteen (15)
days from the receipt of this DECISION.
09. Thereafter, plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay defendant Alfredo Gozon the
balance of Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00) in his one-half undivided share in the
property to be set off by the award of damages in plaintiff’s favor.
10. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay the defendant Elvira Robles-Gozon the price
they had agreed upon for the sale of her one-half undivided share in the subject
property.
11. Defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon and Gil Tabije are hereby ordered to
pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally, the following:
11.1 Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) as actual and compensatory damages;
11.2 One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages;
11.3 Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as exemplary damages;
11.4 Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) as attorney’s fees; and
11.5 One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as litigation expenses.
11.6 The above awards are subject to set off of plaintiff’s obligation in paragraph 9
hereof.
12. Defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon are hereby ordered to pay Inter-
Dimensional Realty, Inc. jointly and severally the following:
12.1 Eighteen Million Pesos (P18,000,000.00) which constitute the amount the
former received from the latter pursuant to their Deed of Absolute Sale dated 26
October 1994, with legal interest therefrom;
12.2 One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages;
12.3 Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
12.4 One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as attorney’s fees.
13. Defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon are hereby ordered to pay costs
of suit.
SO ORDERED.14
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Malabon RTC’s decision with
modification. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated 7 July
2005 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision dated April 3, 2001 of the
RTC, Branch 74, Malabon is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, as
follows:
1. The sale of the subject land by defendant Alfredo Gozon to plaintiff-appellant
Siochi is declared null and void for the following reasons:
a) The conveyance was done without the consent of defendant-appellee Elvira
Gozon;
b) Defendant Alfredo Gozon’s one-half (½) undivided share has been forfeited in
favor of his daughter, defendant Winifred Gozon, by virtue of the decision in the
legal separation case rendered by the RTC, Branch 16, Cavite;
2. Defendant Alfredo Gozon shall return/deliver to plaintiff-appellant Siochi the
amount of P5 Million which the latter paid as earnest money in consideration for the
sale of the subject land;
3. Defendants Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon and Gil Tabije are hereby ordered to
pay plaintiff-appellant Siochi jointly and severally, the following:
a) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
b) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c) P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
d) P20,000.00 as litigation expenses; and
e) The awards of actual and compensatory damages are hereby ordered deleted for
lack of basis.
4. Defendants Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon are hereby ordered to pay
defendant-appellant IDRI jointly and severally the following:
a) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
b) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
c) P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Defendant Winifred Gozon, whom the undivided one-half share of defendant
Alfredo Gozon was awarded, is hereby given the option whether or not to dispose of
her undivided share in the subject land.
The rest of the decision not inconsistent with this ruling stands.
SO ORDERED.15
Only Mario and IDRI appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals. In his petition,
Mario alleges that the Agreement should be treated as a continuing offer which may
be perfected by the acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn.
Since Elvira’s conduct signified her acquiescence to the sale, Mario prays for the
Court to direct Alfredo and Elvira to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the
property upon his payment of P9 million to Elvira.
On the other hand, IDRI alleges that it is a buyer in good faith and for value. Thus,
IDRI prays that the Court should uphold the validity of IDRI’s TCT No. M-10976
over the property.
We find the petitions without merit.
This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Since the disposition
of the property occurred after the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law
is the Family Code. Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property
shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision
shall prevail, subject to the recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy,
which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers
of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may
be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
(Emphasis supplied)
In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with
whom Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal property. However, as sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still
cannot sell the property without the written consent of Elvira or the authority of the
court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is void. 16 The absence of the
consent of one of the spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the
conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. 17 Even if the
other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that
other spouse’s written consent to the sale is still required by law for its
validity.18 The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was without the written
consent of Elvira. Thus, the Agreement is entirely void. As regards Mario’s
contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by
Elvira’s acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was
subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates
that the offer was already withdrawn.
However, we disagree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the one-half
undivided share of Alfredo in the property was already forfeited in favor of his
daughter Winifred, based on the ruling of the Cavite RTC in the legal separation
case. The Court of Appeals misconstrued the ruling of the Cavite RTC that Alfredo,
being the offending spouse, is deprived of his share in the net profits and the same is
awarded to Winifred.
The Cavite RTC ruling finds support in the following provisions of the Family Code:
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage
bonds shall not be severed;
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and
liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net
profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which
shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2);
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse,
subject to the provisions of Article 213 of this Code; and
The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse
by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made
in the will of the innocent spouse shall be revoked by operation of law.
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding
Article shall produce the following effects:
xxx (1) We DELETE the portions regarding the forfeiture of Alfredo Gozon’s one-half
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may undivided share in favor of Winifred Gozon and the grant of option to Winifred
be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in Gozon whether or not to dispose of her undivided share in the property; and
bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal (2) We ORDER Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon to pay Inter-Dimensional
partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there Realty, Inc. jointly and severally the Eighteen Million Pesos (P18,000,000) which
are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of was the amount paid by Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. for the property, with legal
children, the innocent spouse; (Emphasis supplied) interest computed from the finality of this Decision.
Thus, among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal SO ORDERED.
partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right
to any share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredo’s
share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of Winifred. Article 102(4) of the
Family Code provides that "[f]or purposes of computing the net profits subject to
forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall
be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the
time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution." Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredo’s share in
the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal
partnership property.
With regard to IDRI, we agree with the Court of Appeals in holding that IDRI is not
a buyer in good faith. As found by the RTC Malabon and the Court of Appeals, IDRI
had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances which should impel a reasonably
cautious person to make further inquiries about the vendor’s title to the property. The
representative of IDRI testified that he knew about the existence of the notice of lis
pendens on TCT No. 5357 and the legal separation case filed before the Cavite RTC.
Thus, IDRI could not feign ignorance of the Cavite RTC decision declaring the
property as conjugal.
Furthermore, if IDRI made further inquiries, it would have known that the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens was highly irregular. Under Section 77 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529,19 the notice of lis pendens may be cancelled (a) upon
order of the court, or (b) by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party
who caused the registration of the lis pendens. In this case, the lis pendens was
cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon the request of Alfredo. There was no court
order for the cancellation of the lis pendens. Neither did Elvira, the party who caused
the registration of the lis pendens, file a verified petition for its cancellation.
Besides, had IDRI been more prudent before buying the property, it would have
discovered that Alfredo’s donation of the property to Winifred was without the
consent of Elvira. Under Article 12520 of the Family Code, a conjugal property
cannot be donated by one spouse without the consent of the other spouse. Clearly,
IDRI was not a buyer in good faith.1avvphi1
Nevertheless, we find it proper to reinstate the order of the Malabon RTC for the
reimbursement of the P18 million paid by IDRI for the property, which was
inadvertently omitted in the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions. We AFFIRM the 7 July 2005 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74447 with the
following MODIFICATIONS: