Cnnqu~ of Violence 237
wcre a raw mJteri'll, the us\: ut which i~ in no WJ)' probl~mJtkJI unle~~
C ritiqUe of Violence
'1 he tJ~k o f ,I critique of VIOlence C.1Il be ~umm.HiLed .l> th.H 01 ~xpoullding
It~ rciJnon to IJw .lnd iu~ticc.l For a cau;!£,. how~v~r eitcctiw, becomes
~~1.ll, in the precl~e ~ens~ of the word, on I)' when it ~IHers into moral
relJtion~ . Th~ spher~ of th~~e reiJtions is d~fined by th~ concepts of law and
justi~.- With regard to th~ first of the~e, it is c1~ar that the most e1ememary
rdationsh~ within an)' I~gal sy~tem i~ that of ends to means, Jnd, further-
more, that violence can first be ~ought onl)' in the realm of m~an~nO{ in
the r~alm of ends. Thes~ obser\'ations provide a critique of violence with
premises that are more numerous and more vari~d than they may perhaps
appear. For if viol~nce)s a means, a criterion for criticizing it might seem
immediately availabl<.l, It imposes itself in the que~tion whether viol~nce, in
( a given case, is a means to a just or ~ unjust end. A critique of it would
then b~ implied in a system of just end). Thb, however, is nor so. F2 r what
such a system, Jssuming it to b~ ~~cur~ .lgainst all doubt, would contain is
nor a criterion for violence itself as a principle, but, rather, the criterion for
cases of its use. The qu~stion would remJin ()p~n \~lle[llervioleilce, as a
principle, could be a moral means ev~n to lu~t ends. To re~olve this que~tion
a more ~xact crit~rion is ne~ded, which would discriminate within the sphen:
of means themsd\'~s, without r~gard for the end~ they ~erve.
Th~ exclusion of this mor~ precb~ critical approach i~ perhJPs th~ pr~­
dominam teamre of a main current of legal philosoph)': natural law. It
perc~ives in th~ use of violem means to JUSt <!nds no greJter probl~m than
a man sees in his "right" to move his body in th~ direction of a desired goal.
According to this view (for which the terrorism in th~ French Revolution
provided ,In id<!ological foundation), viol~nce is .1 product of nature, as it
force is misused for unjust ends. If, according to the natural-law theory of
the state, pcople give up all th~ir \'l'Jlenc~ for the ~Jk~ of the StJt~, thi~ is
done on the assumption (which Spinm:a, for example, po~e~ ~xplicitly in hi~
Tract.lIl1s Tbeu/ogico-l'olitiClls) that th~ individuJI, before th~ conclu~ion of
this rational comr.lct, hJ~ til! jllre th~ nght to us~ at will th~ viol~nc~ that
i~ dt' /;1(/0 .H hi~ dispoS.ll. l'erhJP~ thes~ views have be~n recently rekindled
by [)arwin'~ biology, which, in a thoroughly dogmatic mann~r, r~gards
violence as the only original means, besid~s natural selection, 'lppropriate
to all the vit'll ends of namre. Popular [),Hwinistic philosophy has otten
shown how shorr a step it b from thb dogmJ of namral history to the still
crud~r one of legal philosophy, which holds that th~ violence that is, almost
alon~, appropriate w namral ~nds is ther~b r also I~gal. .
This thesis of nJtur.ll Inw, willch reg.Hds vlOl~nce as a natural datum, IS
diam~trically oppo~ed w that of positive law, which sees violcnc~ as a
produC{ of hi~tory. If natural law can judge .111 existing law only in criticizillg
it~ end~, then positive I.lw c.1n judge ,III ~\'olving law only in criticizing its
mean~. If jmnce I~ the .:r i t~r i on of ends, kgJlity is theH of me'lIls. Norwith-
stJndillg thl~ .1IHithe,i" however, both ~chools meet in their common basic
dogma : i u~t end~ CJn he :l{min~d by justified means, justified means us~d
for ju~t ~nd~. Na{llrnll.1w n{{empt~, by the justll~ss of th~ ends, to "justify"
th~ meJn~, pOSitive law to "guarJlI{e~n the ju~tIless of the ends through the
ju~tific.Hion of the mCJn,. Thi~ .lminomy would prove insoluble if the
common dogm.1tic .1~Slllnpnon wac fJbe, if ju~tified mea n~ on the one hJnd
and ju~t ends on the mher were in irreconcihlble contlic!. No in~ight into
this problem could be g.lined, howe\a, uIHil the circular argumcIH had bcen
broken, .1Ild mutu.llly independem critena bO{h of just ends and of justified
mean~ were est.lbli~hed .
The re.llIn of ~nd~, .1Ild thcrdore .1bo the qu~stion of a criterion of
justlless, .In.' exduded for the time being from this study. Inst~ad, th~ central
plJce is given (() the question of th~ ju~tificJtion of certain m~ans that
consmut~ violence. Principles of nJwr.11 law cannor decide this question,
bm can 01111' lead w bo{{omkss casuistr)'. For if positive law is blind to the
absolutcncs~ of ~nds, na{llrallaw is equally so w the conting~ncy of means.
On the other hand, th~ positiv~ th~or)' of law is acc~ptable as a h),porhetical
basis ,H the outset of this swd)', becaus~ it undertak~s a fundam~ntal dis-
tinction bctween kinds of \·iolence independ~ml)' of cases of thdr applica-
tion. This distinction b bet\Ve~n hbwricJII), acknowledg~d , so-called sanc-
tioned force Jnd ull>anctioned force . Although the [ollowing considerations
proceed fwm this distinction, it cannO{, of cours~, mean that given forms
of violence arc c1;lssitied in terms of wheth~r the)' a re sJnctioned or not. For
in a critique of violence, ,I criterioll for the la{{er in positiv~ IJW can concern
nO{ its uses but onl), its ~VJlu.Hion . The question thJt concerns us is: What
 238 Critique ot Vlolem:e
light is tlHown on the nature of violence b)' the tact thatsudl .1 criterion or
distinction can be applied ro it at all? In other words, what i~ the me'lning
of this distinction? That this distinction supplied by positive law is mean-
ingful, based on the nature of violence, and irreplaceable by any other
distim:tion will soon enough be shown, bm .It the same time hght will be
shed on the ~phere in which alone such .1 distinction can be nude. To ~u m
up: if the criterion established by positive law [0 a s~ess the legal it}' 1
violence Gill be an:llyzed with regard to its mean ing, then the sphere of i ~
application mu~t be criticized with regJrd [0 its value. For this critique .
~tJndpoint om~ide positi ve legal philosoph )' but abo outside n.uural la\\
must be found . The extem [0 which it c:ln be furnished only by a philo~ (r
phico-hi~[Orical view of law will emerge.
The meaning of the distinction between k·g itlln.He Jnd illegltimJte 1I(r
lence is not immediatc/y obvious. The nl1~under~tJnding in n.uurJI law b ~
which a distinction is drawn between violence used for just ends and
violence used for unjust ends must be emphJtlcally rejected. RJther, it hJ ~
already been indicated that positive law dcmJnds o f .111 violence a proof of
its hisrorical origin, which under certain condi tions is dedJred leg:l l, SJnc-
tioned. Since the acknowledgment of legal violence is most tangibly evident
in a ddibel'<1te submission [0 its ends, .1 hypothetic.11 distinctj on between
kind~ of violence must be based on the pre~ence or Jbsence of a generJ I
historical acknowledgmem of its ends. Euds that lack such acknowledgment
m.ly be cJlled nJtural ends; the other type may be called legal ends. The
ditfering function ot violence, depend ing on whether it serves nJtural or
leg.11 end~, ca n be most dearly traced Jgain~t .1 background of specific lega l
condition~. For the sJke of simplicity, the following d i scu~sion will relate to
contemporJry European conditions.
CharaC[eri~tic of the~e , ~o far .IS the indil'lduJI :IS legJI ~ubject is con-
cerned, I~ the tendency ro den)' the n.HurJI end~ o f such individu:lls in .111
tho~e ca se~ in which such end~ could, in .1 given situJtion, be usefull)
pursued by violence. This means: th is legJI ~)'~tem trie~ ro erect, in all area s
where indiVidual ends could be u~efully pursued by violence, legJI ends that
can be realiLed only by legal power. Indeed, the system ~trives [0 limit bj
legJI ends even those areas in which natllnll end~ are admitted in principle
within wide boundarie~, like thJt of educa tion , as ~oon as these natural ends
.Ire pur~ued with .111 excessive l11eJ~ure of violence, a ~ in the laws relating
[0 the limits of educ.uional amhorit), [0 pllll1>h. It C.111 be formulated as a
gener.llmJ xim of present-dJ)' EuropeJn leg i ~IJtlon that all the nJtural ends
of individuals must collide with legal end~ if pursued With a greater or b~er
degree of violence. (The coIHr.ldiction between this and the right [0 self-
• defen~e will be re~olycd in whJt follow~.) From this mJ xi m it follows that
/ law see~ Violence in the ha nds (~f mdlv idua b tiS a danger undermining. th~
I legJI ~ )' ~tem . As a danger nulhtYlllg IegJI end~ Jnd the legal execunve~
Critique of Violence 239
Certainl), not; for then what would be condemned would not be violence
as such but onl), that which is din:cted [0 illegal end~ . It will be argued that '
a system of legal ends cannot be maintained if natural ends are anywhere
still pursued violently. In the first place, however, this is mere dogma. To
1
counter it one might perhaps consider the surprising possibility that the law's
imerest ina mOI!QP..Qly of v!glen,,!: vis-a-vis individuals is explained not by
t e in ~tiQn of preserving legi\1 end ~ but, rather, by the intention of pre-
serving the law itself; that violence, when not in the hands of the law,
t~ ~ ~k !!Q! by the ends that it may Q1!rsu~ b.!lt by ill mere existence
outside the law. The same may be mon: drastically suggested, for one reflects
how often the figure of the "gn:at" criminal, however repellent his ends may
have been, has aroused the secret admiration of the public. This can result
not from his deed but only from the violence ro which it bears witness. In
this case, therefore, the violence that present-day law is seeking in all areas
of activity ro deny the individual appears reall), threatening, and arouses
even in defeat the sympathy of the masses against the law. By what function
violence can with reason seem so threatening [0 the law, and be so feared
by it, must be especially evident where its application, even in the present
legal system, is still permissible.
This is above all the case in the dass struggle, in the form of the workers'
guaranteed right ro strike. Today organized labor is, apart from the state,
probably the only legal subject emitled [0 exercise violence. Against this
view there is certainly the objection that an omission of actions, a nonaction,
which a strike really is, cannot be described as violence. Such a consideration
doubtless made it easier for a state power [0 concede the right [0 strike,
once this was no longer avoidable. But its truth is not unconditional, and
therefore not unrestricted. It is true that the omission of an actioQ, or service,
where it amoulHs simply [0 a "severing of relations," can be an entirely
nonviolem, pure means. And as in the view of the state, or the law, the right
to strike conceded to labor is certainly a right nO[ to exercise viol;OC'e but,
rat er;-to escae.e from a violence indirectly exercig:d by the employer, strikes
conforming to this may unaoubtedly occur from time to time and involve /
only a "withdrawal" or "estrangement" from the employer. The moment
of violence, however, is necessarily introduced, in the form of extortion, into
such an omission, if it takes place in the context of a conscious readiness
to resume the suspended actioll under certain circumstances that either have
nothing whatever to do with this aaion or only superficially modify it.
Understood in this way, the right to strike constitutes in the view of labor,
which is opposed to that of the state, the right to use force in attaining
certain ends. The antithesis between the two conceptions emerges in all its
bitterness in the face of .1 revolutionary general strike. In this, labor w ill
always appeal to its right to strike, and the state will call this appeal an
abuse (~ince the right to ~trike was not "so intended") and will take emer-
 240 ntlque ot ViolcilLe
gency l1Ie.1~ure~. for rhe ~rarc rerall1~ rhe righr (0 declare rhar .1 ~imulraneou>
u~e ot ~rrikcs in .111 indu~rrie~ i~ illegal, since rhe specific re.l~ons tor srrikes
.ldmmed by kgisl.lrion cannor be prevalenr in every workshop. In rhl~
ditierence ot II1rerprer.lrion is expres~ed rhe objecrive contr.ldicrion in rhe
leg.ll ~ituarion, whereby rhe sr,1(e acknowledges a violence whose ends, a~
narural end~, ir somerimes reg.1rd~ wirh inditten:nce bur in a crisis (rhe
rc\·olurion.lry gener.ll ~rrike) controm~ inimically. I'or however parildoxical
rhi~ 111.ly .lppear ar firsr sighr, even conducr in\'olving rhe exercise of a righr
can ne\'errheless, under cerr.lin cin:umsrances, be de~cribed .l~ violem. More
~pecifically, such conducr, when acrive, 111.ly be called violem it ir exercis<:~
.1 righr in order (0 overrhrow rhe legal ~ys((!m rhar has conterred ir; when
p.1~sive, ir is ne\'errhdes~ (0 be so described if ir consritures exrorrion in rhe
~en~e expl.lined .lbove. lr rheretore reveals an objecrive contradicrion in rhe
leg,11 situ.lrion, bur nor .1 logical comradicnon in rhe law, if under cerra in
circumsr.lnces rhe l.lw meers rhe srrikers, .IS perperr.l{()r~ of violence, wirh
violence. For in a srrike rhe srare tears above all else rh:lduncriuu.Q! violence
~ hich ir i; rhe obi~s:r ot rhis srudy (0 idenrity as rhe onl), secure found~rion
ot irs cririque.. For if 'Viol~nce were, as firsr appe,us, merely rhe means (0
secun: directly wlurever happens ro be soughr, ir could fulfill irs end as
predarory vioknce. Ir would be emirely unsuirable as a basis for, or a
modificarion (0, relarively srable condirions. The strike shows, however, rhar
ir can be so, rhar ir is able ro found and modity legal condirions, however
ottended rhe se~s~-ot j~S[i~e '~y '/i;1d irself rhereby. Ir win-be objected rhar
such .1 function ot violence is forruirous and isol.lred. Thi~ C.1I1 be rebutred
by .1 con~ider.lrion of milir.lry torce.
The po~~iblliry ot miliraq' l.lw resrs on eX.lctly rhe ~.lme objecrive comra-
dlCrion in rhe leg.ll ~iru.1(ion as does tluu ot srrike law-n.lmely, on rhe facr
, rh.lr leg.ll ~ubjech ~.lOcrion \'iolence whose ends rem.lin for rhe ~ancrioners
n.ltur.ll ends, .lnd C.ln rherefore in a crisi~ come imo conflicr wirh rheir own
legal or n.ltul';l1 ends. Adminedly, militi1ry torce is u~ed quire directly, as
pred;lrory violence, row;lrd irs ends. Yer ir is very ~rriking rhar even--or,
rilrher, precisely-in primirive condirions rIur scarcely know rhe beginnings
ot wnsrirurional relarions, and even in cases where rhe vicror has esrablished
himself in invull1l:rable possession, a peace ceremony is entirely necessary.
Inde'ed, rhe word ~peace," in rhe sense in which ir is rhe correia rive (0 rhe
word "w;lr" (tor rhere is also a quire different me;lning, similarly unmera-
phorical ;lnd polirical, rhe one uscd by Kam ill ralking of "Erernall'eace"j,
denores rhis a priori, necessary sancrioning, regardless ot all orher legal
condirions, ot every vicrory. This sancrion consisrs precisely in recognizing
rhe new condirions as a new "law," quire regardless of wherher rhey need
dt! {aclo any guaranree of rheir continuarion. If, rherdore, conclusions can
be drawn from milir;lry violence, as being primordial and paradigmaric ot
;III violence u~ed for naruml ends, rhere is a l.lwmaking characrer inherent
in .111 ~uch \ iolence. We shall rerum larer (() rhe implicarions ot rhis insighr.
Critique ot VIOlence 241
Ir expl.lIns rhe .lho\'t:mell(illncJ renden<=)- ot modern law (() divesr rhe illdi-
vidual, ar ka~r .IS a leg.ll subjecr;-ofJ1JViolenc.;, even rhar direcred only (()
natural elld~. In rhe gre;lr criminal rhis violence confronrs rhe I;lw wirh rhe
rhrear ot declaring a new bw, .1 rhrear rh.lr even roday, despire irs imporence,
in imporranr insrances horrifies rhe public as ir did in primev.1I rimes. The
srare, however. fe.us rillS violence simply tor irs lawmaking ch'1rilcter, being
obliged (() .Kknowledge ir as l.lwmaking whenever exrernal powers torce ir
(0 concede rhem rhe nghr (0 conducr warfare, and classes force ir ro concede
rhem rhe righr (() srrike.
If in rhe 1.1sr W.lr rhe critique ot nlllirar), violence was rhe sti1rring point
for a p.ls~ionare cririque of violence in gener.11-which raughr ar leasr one
rhing, rhar violence is no longer exercised and rolerared naivcIy-neverrl1t:-
less, violence was subjecr ro criricism nor onl~' tor irs lawmaking characrer
bur abo, perhaps more .1I1I11hil.lringly, for anorher of irs funcrions. For ,1
dualiry in rhe funcrion of violence is ch.lrilcrerisric ot milirarism, which could
come in(() being only rhrough general conscriprion. lVlilirarism is rhe com-
pulsor\' uni\'ersal usc of violence 'h ,1 means ro rhe ends ot rhe srare. This
compl;I~()ry 'use of violence has recently been scrurinized as closely as, or
srill more closel)' rhan, rhe use ot violence irself. In ir violen.:e shows irselt
in a funcrion quire ditterenr from irs simple applicarion for narural ends. Ir
consisrs in rhe usc ot violence as a means row'1rd leg'11 ends. For rhe
subordinarion of cirizens (0 laws"":""in rhe prcsem case, (0 rhe law ot general
cOllscriprion-i~ .1 leg.ll cndi!~ rhar firsr funcrion of violence is called . rh..£
lawmaking funcrion, rhis second will be called rhe law-prcservl11g function.
Since conscriprion is a .:ase of law-preserving violence rh.lr i~ nO( in principle
disringuished from orhers, a really cffc.:rive cririque of ir is far le~s easy rhan
rhe declamarions ot pacifisrs and acri\'isrs suggest. Rarher, such a cririque
coincides wirh rhe cririque ot all legal violence-rhar is, wirh rhe cririque ot
legal or execurive force-and cannor be performed by any le~~er program.
Nor, of course-unlcss one is prepared ro proci.lim a quire childi~h an.H-
chism-is ir achieved by retusing (0 ,]Cknowledge any consrrainr roward
persons and by declaring, "Whar pleases is permined." Such .1 maxim
merely excludes rctk'Crion on rhe moral and hisrorical spheres, and rhereb~'
on any meaning in acrion, and beyond rhis on any meaning in realiry irselt.
which cannor be consritured it "acrion" is removed from irs sphere. More
imporrant is rhe tacr rhar e\'en rhe appeal, so frequenrIr ancmpred, ro rhe
caregorical imperarive, wirh irs doubrIess inconresrable minimum program-
acr in su.:h a way rhar ar all rimes you use humaniry borh in your person
and in rhe person ot all orhers as an end, and never merely as a means-is
in irselt inadequare tor such a .:ririque.! For posirive law, if conscious ot irs
roors, will .:err.linly cI.lim ro acknowledge and promore rhe inrerc~r of
mankind in rhe person of each individual. Ir sees rhis interesr in rhe repre-
senrarion and preservarion ot an order imposed by fare. While rhis view,
which d'1ims ro preserve law in irs very basis, ':.111110( es.:ape criri.:ism,
242 Critique of Vloit:nce
nevertheless all attacks [hat are made m~rely in [he name of a formless
"freedom" without b~ing abl~ to specify [his higher order of freedom remain
impo[enr against it. And [hey are most impo[enr of all when, instead of
attacking [he legal ~ys[em roor and branch, [hey impugn particular laws or
legal practices [hat [he law, of course, takes under [he protection of irs
power, which resides in [he fact [hat [here is only one fare and [hat what
exists, and in particular what threatens, belongs inviolably to irs order. For
law-preserving violence is a threatening violence. And irs threat is nor
inrended as [he de[errenr [hat uninformed liberal theorists inrerpre[ i[ to be.
A de[errenr in [he exact sense would require a certainty [hat comradic[s [he
namre of a threat and is nor attained by any law, since [here is always hope
of eluding irs arm. This makes i[ all [he more threatening, like fare, which
determines whether [he criminal is apprehended. The deepest purpose of [he
uncertainry of [he legal threat will emerge from [he la[er consideration of
[he sphere of fare in which i[ originates. There is a useful poi mer to i[ in
[he sphere of punishmems. Among [hem, since [he validity of positive law
has been called into question, capi[al punishmenr has provoked more cri[i-
cism [han all others. However superficial [he argumenrs may in most cases
have been, [heir motives were and are roored in principle. The opponenrs
of [hes.e critics fel[, perhaps without knowing why and probably involun-
[arily, [hat an attack on capi[al~nishmenr assails nor legal measure, nor
laws, bur law i[self in irs origi2!.,..For if violence, violence crowned by fare,
is [he origin of law, [hen i[ may be readily supposed [hat where [he highest
violence, [hat over life and death, occurs in [he ~I system, [he origins of
law jut manifestly and fearsomely inro exis[encej1n agreement with [his is
[he fact [hat [he death penal[y in primitive legal systems is imposed even for
such crimes as offenses against property, to which i[ seems quire our of
"proportion." I[s purpose is nor to punish [he infringemenr of law bur to
es[ablish new law. For in [he exercise of violence over life and death, more
[han in any other legal act, [he law reaffirms i[self. Bur in [his very violence
something ronen in [he law is revealed, above all to a finer sensibility,
because [he laner knows i[self to be infini[ely remote from conditions in
which f,He might Imperiously have shown i[self in such a senrence. Reason
must, however, attempt to approach such conditions all [he more resolutely,
if i[ i~ [0 bring to a conclusion irs critique of both lawmaking and law-
pre~erving violence.
In a far more unna[ural combmation [han in [he death penal[)" in a kind
ot specrral mlxmre, these twO forms of vioit:nce are presenr in anorher
ms[i[u[ion of [he modern stare: [he police. True, [his is'violence for legal
ends (i[ includes [he right of disposi£lon), but with [he simul[aneous uu[hor-
i[y to decide these ends i[self within wide limi[s (i[ includes [he right of
decree). The ignominy of such an au[hori[y-whkh is fel[ by few simply
because irs ordinance~ suffice only seldom, even for [he crudest acts, bur are
Cr i £lqu~ ot ViolelKc 2·B
[here fore ,III()\\ ed to 1".lmp,lge .111 [he l1Iore blindly in [hc most vulnerablc
area~ and 'Igains[ [hink(:rs, from whom [he stare is nor protected hy law-
lies in [he fact [hat in [his au[hori[)' [he separation of lawmaking and
law-preserving violence is suspended. If [he first is required [0 prove irs
worth in vic[Ory, [he second is snhjec[ [0 [he restriction [h,1[ i[ may n~[
i[self new ends. Police violence is emancipated from borh colldi[ionS':U!.is
lawmaking, hccause irs cl1<lracreris[ic function is nor [he promulga[ion of
laws bur [h(: asscrtion of legal claims for :111)' decree, and law-preserving,
because i[ is a[ [he disposal of these cnd§.~Thc asserrion [hat [he ends of
police ,'iolence arc "Iways idemical or even connected [0 [hos~ of gen~ral
law is emirdy umrue. Ra[her, [h~ "law" of [he police really marks [he poim
a[ which [he stare, wh~[her from impo[~nce or because of [h~ immanenr
connecrions within :1I1y legal system, can no longer guaramee through [he
legal sys[~m [h~ empirical ends [h:1[ i[ desires :1[ any price [0 ana in. Thcre-
fore, [hc police im.:rvcne ~for security reasons~ in countless cases wherc no
clear legal sim:l[ion ~xis[s, wh~n [hey are nor merely, wi[hol![ [he sliglues[
rda[ion [0 legal ends, accompanying [he ci[i:ten as a bru[al cncumbrance
through a life regui:ued by ordinanct"s, or simply supervising him. Unlike
lalli, whiL'h acknowledges in [he "decision" de[ermincd by place and rime a
me[aphysical category [hat gives i[ :1 claim [0 cri[ical evalua[ion, a consid-
era[ion of [he police ins[inl[ion encounters norhing esscmial a[ all. I[s power
is formless, likc irs nowhere-[:lI1gible, all-pervasive, ghostly presence in [he
life of CII ili<:ed ~[a[e~. And [hough [he police may, in particulars, appear [he
sam~ ever}'lvhere. i[ CJnno[ finally he denied [hat in absolutc monarchy,
where [her repre~elH [he power of a ruler m which legi~la[ive and e>.ecmive
suprcmaq ,Ire united, [heir ~plri[ is k~~ devastating [han in democraci~s,
where [h~ir ex b[~nce, elev:l[ed b), no sllch rcia£lon, bear~ wimes~ [0 [he
gre,l[e~[ conceiv.!hle degeneration of violence.
All "lOlcncc ,I~ a mean~ is ei[her lawm,lklllg or IJw-pre~crving . .If i[ la)'~
claim til nCI[her of these predicJ[e~, i[ forfeits .111 validi[y. I[ follow~, how-
ever, [hat ,III VIolence ,IS a meJns, even in [he mo~[ favorable casc, I>
implica[ed in [he prohlem.Hic na[Ur~ of law i[self. And it [hc import:lncc ot
these problems cannm be assessed with cer[aimy :H [hl~ S[Jgc of [he invcs-
[iga[ion, 1,Iw ne~erthde~s ,lppc:1rS, from whJ[ h,l> heen ~,Iid, in so amhiguol1~
a moral ligh[ [hat [h~ l]uc~[ion pose~ i[~elf IIIhe[h~r [here are no orher [han
violelH means for regul:uing cOlltlicting human imeres[s. We arc ahovc all
ohliga[cd [0 no[e [h:u a [O[ally nOlll'iolem resolmion .of contIic[s can n~ver J
lead [() a legal comnlc[' for [he lattcr, however peacetully I[ may havc hcen
emered imo by [he parries, leads finally [0 possihle violence. I.L~!mfers on/
each partl' [he right [0 resort [() ,'io!t:nc.: in som~ form against [h~ other,
sh~uld he' break [he ,Igreemem. NO[ only [hat; likc [he omcome, [he origin
of em )' co-mrac [ abo poil1[~ [()"',Hd viol.:nce. I[ need nO[ bc directly pre~el1[
in i[ ,IS 1,lwm,lI..ing "lOlenc.:, hut is rcpre~el1[ed in i[ lI1~oi.1r ,I~ [he power
244 Cnnque of Vi ol~IKe
th.1t guar.1met!~ .1 leg.1l comract IS, in turn, ot vlolem ongin even Ii vlOlen':t!
is not introduced into the comract itself. Wht!n the consciousne~s of the
latt!m pn:sence of violenct! in a legal institution disappears, the institution
falls into dt!cay. In our time, parliaments providt! an example of this. They
offt!r the familiar, wo('ful spt!ctacie bt!cau~t! they havt! nO[ remained con-
scious of the revolutionary forct!s [() which tht!y owe tilt!ir t!xistence. Ac·
cordingl)" in Germany in particular, the laSt m.1nift!~tation of such forces
bore no fruit for parliaments. They lack tht! ~t!n~e that they represent a
lawmaking vioknce; no wonder they cannot 'lchit!ve dt!crees worthy of this
violence, but cultivate in compromist! a suppo,edl), nonviolem mannt!r ot
dealing with political affairs. This remains, however, a "product situatt!d
within tht! ·mentalit), of violenct!, no mattt!r how it ma)' disdain all open
violenct!, becaust! the effort toward compromist! is motivated not imernall}
but from oU[sidt!, by tht! opposing effort, bec.lus,: no compromist!, however
freely accepted, is conceivable without a compulsive charactt!r. 'It would be
bettt!r mherwist!' is the:: underlying feeling in ewry compromist!. ".l-Sig-
nificantiy, the decay of parliaments has perh.lps alien.1ted .1~ many minds
from the idt!al of a nonviolent re::solution of politic.1l conflicts as wert!
anracte::d to it by tilt! war. The pacifists art! confromed b)' tilt! Bolsheviks
and Syndicalists. These have effected an annihil.1tinf( .1nd on tht! whole apt
critique of prest!nt-day parliaments. Neverthelt!~~, howeve::r desirable and
gratifying a flourishing parliament might be:: by comparison, a discussion of
means of political agreement that art! in principle:: nonviolent cannot be
concertle::d with pariiamelHarianism. for whJt a parli.1mem 'JChieves in vit.1l
affa Irs C.1n be only tho~e:: It!gal decret!s th.H in thdr origin and outcome art!
attended bv violence.
b an)' I;onviolt!nt re~olution of contlict pos~iblt!? Wi thoU[ doubt. Th~
rdanon~hips .1ITIong priv.1te person~ .Ht! full of e::x.1mples of thi~ . Nonviolt!m
agret!ment i~ po~~ i blt! whe::re::wr a civili<:ed outlook allows the u~e:: of unal-
10yt!d me.1n~ of agret!meIH. Leg.1l .1I1d illegal me.ln~ ot every kind that ar~
all the S.1mt! \'iolent m.1)' be confronted with nonvioknt Olle::S .l~ unalloyt!d
means. Courtt!~y, s)'mp.1thy, pt!.1ct!ableness, tnl~t, and wh.1te\'er else might
hert! be:: mentioned ,\rt! the ir ~ub i t!ctivt! preconditions. Tht!ir objt!ctive mani-
ft!st.1tion, however, is deto::rmined by the law (whost! enormous scope cannot
be d bcus~e::d here ) th.1t says unalloyed me.1ns are nt!vt!r those:: of direct
solution~ but .1hv.1Ys tho~e of indirect ~olutions . They therctore nevt!r appl)
dIrectly to the resolution of conflict Ix:twet!n man .1nd m.1n, but .1Pply onl),
to m.1[[C, r~ conct!rning objt!cts. The spht!n: ot IlOn violt!m me.lIb open~ up in
the re.1lm of hum.1n conflict~ rel.1ting to good~. For thi~ rea~on, tt!chnique
in the bro.1dest sense of the:: word is their most particular area. Its profound-
est eX.1mpk b perh.1ps the:: conft!rt!nce, consido::red .1S .1 te::chnique of civil
.1greemem. For in it not only is nonviolent .1gree::mem possible, but Jlso the
exclusion of vIolence In pnnciplt! is qu ite explIcitly dt!monstr.1ble by one
~ign i fic .1m f.l cmr: there b no ~u IKti()n for lying. Prob.lbly no legisl.Hion on
Critique of Violence 245
earth originally stipulated such a sanction. This makes de::ar that there is a
sphere:: of human agreement that is nonviolent [() the extent that it is wholly
inacce::ssible to violence: the proper sphe::re of "understanding," language.
Only late:: and in a peculiar proct!SS of decay has it bt!t!n pene::trated by legal
violence:: in the pt!nalt)' place::d on fraud. For whe::rt!as the legal system .1t its
origin, tru~ting to its victorious power, is comem to defeat lawbreaking
when:vt!r it happens to appt!ar, and deception, having itsdf no trace of
power about it, was, on the principle illS ciuill! uigildllliblls scriptlll1l I!st,
exempt from punbhme::m in Roman and ancit!m Germanic law, tht! law of
a late::r period, lacking .:onfideIKt! in its own violenct!, no longe::r felt itself a
match for that of all others. Rather, fear of the laner and mistrust of itself
indicate its declining vitality. It begins [() set ihelf ends, with the intention
of sparing law-preserving violence more taxing manifestations. It turns to
fraud , therdore, not out of moral consider.Hions but for fear of the violence
that it might unlt!ash in the ddrauded party. Sin.:e such fear conflicts with
the violent nature of law derived from its origins, such ends are inappropri-
ate [() the:: iustified . mean~ of l.1w. The)' retlect nO[ only the de.:ay of its own
sphert! but also a diminU[ion of pure means. For in prohibiting fraud, law
restricts tht! u~e of wholl), nonviolem means because they could produce
reactive violence. This tt:ndency of I.1W h,b .llso played a part in tilt! conces-
sion of the right to strike, which comradicts the interests of tht! state. It
grants this right because:: it forestalls violem actions the state is afraid to
oppose. Did nO[ workers pre::viously n:sort at once to sabotage:: and set fire
to fa.:torie::s?-To induce men to rccon.:ilt: their imt!rt!Sts peacefully without
im olving tilt! It!g.l I system, there is, in the end, ap.1rt from all virtues, one
eftectivt! motive th.H oiten enough puts into the most rductant hands pure
instead of violent means: it is the ft!ar of mutual disadvantages that threaten
to arise:: from violt!nt confrom.1tion, wh.He::ver the outcome:: might be. Such
motives are dt!arly visible 111 countle~~ C.1ses of conflict of inte::rests between
priv,He:: per~ons . It i~ ditie::rem when c1as~es and nations are in conflict, since
the hight!r orders that thrt!.1tt!n to overwhelm equall)' vicwr and vanquished
are hidden from the ieeling~ of most, and from the imciligt!nct! oi almost
all. Space does nO[ here permit me to tmce such higher orders and the
common II1tere~t~ corre~pond i ng [0 them, which .:onstitute the most endur-
ing motive ior .1 polic)' of purt! me.1ns. 4 We cUn tllt!rdore poim only to pure
means in politics as analogous to those which govt!rn pea.:eful intt!rcourse
bctwet!n priv.1te person~. .
As regards class strugglt!s, in them strikes must under cl!rtain conditions
be seen as .1 pure means. Two e~~entiall)' diifercll[ kinds oi strikes, the
possibilitit!s of wh ich have:: alrt!ady been con~idt!red, must now bt! more fully
characten<:ed. Sord h.l~ the credit-from politic.1l rather thun purdy theo-
retical.:onsidt!ranon~-of h:lving first di ~ tinguished them. He:: contr.1 s t~ them
as the politic.1l strike and the prolt!tari.ul ge::l1er.ll strike. They Me abo
amitilt!tical in t11t!ir n:larion [0 violence. Oi tht! parti~iln~ oi the fonner he
 246 Critique of ViolelKe
says, "The strengthening of state power is the basi~ 01 their .:onceptions; in
th~ir presem organi:lations the politicians (namely, the moder,He socialist~)
are already preparing the ground for a strong centrJli:led and disciplined
power th,H will be impervious to criticism from the opposition, and capable
I of imposing silence and is~uing its mendJcious dccree~.:" "The political
general strike demonstrates how the state willlo~e none 01 ItS strength, how
power IS tr Jnsferred frol11 the priVileged to the privilege~, ho\~ the mass 01
producers will change their masters." In comrast [0 tim polmcal gene~al
~trIke (which incidentJlly seems to htlve been ~unlllled up by the abortive
German revolution ), the proletariJn general strike ~et~ itself the ~ole task of
destroying Hate power. It "nullifies all the ideological consequence~ of ever)"
possible social policy; its partisans see even the most ?o~ular rdorms as
bonrgeoi~." "This general strike clearly announce~ It~ IIldllference toward
m,HeriJI gJin through conquest by declaring its imention [0 abolish the state;
the state was reall)' ... the basis of the existence of the ruling group, who
in all their cnterprises benefit from the burdens borne b)' the public. ~
Whereas the first forl11 of interruption of work is violem, since it CJuses onl),
an extern.ll modification of labor conditions, the second, as a pun: means,
is nonviolem. For it takes place nO[ in reaJines~ [0 re~lIme work following
external concessions and this or that modificJtion [0 working conditions,
bm in the determination to resume only a wholl)" transformed work, no
longer entorced b)' the ~tJte, an upheJval that thi~ kind ot strike not so
much causes as consummates. For this reason, the fir~t of these undertJkings
is hl\vmaking but the second anarchistic. Taking up occJ~ional statements
b)' Marx, Sorel rejects every kind of program, ot u[Opia-in a word, ot
lawmaking-for the revolutionary movement: "With the general strike, all
these fine things disappear; the revolution appears as a clear, simple revolt,
and no place is reserved either tor the sociologists or tor the elegant amateurs
ot soci'll reforms or for the intellecmals who have made it their protession
to think for the proletariat."· Against this deep, moral, and genuinely
rel'olutionM), conception, no objection can stand that seeks, on grounds ot
its possibly catastrophic consequences, [0 brand such a general strike as
violent. Even if it can rightly be said that the modern economy, seen as a
whole, rescmbles much less a machine that stands idle when abandoned by
its stoker than a beast that goes berserk as soon as its tamt:r turns his back,
nevertheless the violence of an action can be assessed no more trol11 its effects
than from its ends, but only trom the law of its me,1I1S. State power, of
course, which has eyes only for effects, opposes precisely this kind of strike
tor its alleged violence, as distinct from partial ~trike~, which Jre for the
l11o~t pJrt actually extortionate. Sorel hJ~ explained, with highl)' ingenious
argument~, the extent [0 which such J rigorous conception of the general
~trike pt:r ~e is capJble of diminishing the incidence of actual Violence In
reI olution~.-By contrJ~t, an outstanding example of violent omis~ion,
Critique of Violence 247
more immoral and cruder than the political general strike, akin to a block·
ade, is the strike by doctors, such as several German cities have seen. Here
is revealed at its most repellent an unscrupulous use of violence which is
positively depraved in a professional class that for years, without the slight·
est anempts at resistance, "secured death its prey," and then at the first
opportunity abandoned life of its own free will. More clearly than in recent
class struggles, the means of nonviolent agreement have developed in thou·
sands of years of the history of states. Only occasionally does the task of
diplomats in their transactions consist of modifying legal systems. Funda·
mentally they must, entirely on the analogy of agreement between private
persons, resolve conflicts case by case, in the name of their states, peacefully
and without contracts. A delicate task that is more robustly performed by
referees, but a method of solution that in principle is above that of the
referee because it is beyond all legal systems and therefore beyond violence.
Accordingly, like the intercourse of private persons, that of diplomats has
engendered its own forms and virtues, which were not always mere formali·
ties, even though they have become so.
Among all the forms of violence permined by both natural law and
positive law, not one is free of the gravely problematic nature, already
indicated, of all legal violence. Since, however, every conceivable solution
to human problems, not [0 speak of deliverance from the confines of all the
world·historical conditions of existence obtaining hitherto, remains impos·
sible if violence is totally excluded in principle, the question necessarily arises
as to what kinds of violence exist other than all those envisaged by legal
theory. It is at the same time a question of the truth of the basic dogma
common to both theories: just ends can be anained by justified means,
justified means used for JUSt ends. How would it be, therefore, if all the
violence imposed by fate, using justified means, were of itself in irreconcil·
able conflict with just ends, and if at the same time a different kind of
violence arose that certainly could be either the justified or the unjustified
means to those ends but was not related to them as means at all but in some
different way? This would throw light on the curious and at first discour·
aging discovery of the ultimate insolubility of all legal problems (which in
its hopelessness is perhaps comparable only to the possibility of conclusive
pronouncements on "right" and "wrong" in evolving languages). For it is
~~~er re~son that decides on the justification of means and the justm:;s; of
ends: fate·imposed 'violence decides on the former and God on the latter.
-An insight that is uncommon only because of the s;ubborn-p~evailing habit
of conceiving those JUSt ends as ends of a possible law-that is, not only as
generally valid (which follows analytically from the nature of justice) but
also as capable of generalization, which, as could be shown, contradicts the
nature of justice. For ends that in one situation are JUSt, universally accept·
able, and valid are so in no other situation, no maner how similar the
_·Hl Crltll.jlle ot Violence
,ltUdnon, may be III oth.:r rc,p.:cts.- Th~ nonmcdi.l{c function of violenc~
at is~ue here i, illu,trJted by ev~ryday experience. As regards man, he IS
1I1lpdled by anger, for ~xJmple, w th~ mosr visibl~ oU{bur,ts of J violence
thJt is not related JS a mean, to a preconcelvcd cnd. It IS not a mcans but
a manifcstation. Morcover, this violencc ha, thoroughly obiective manifes-
tations in which it can be subjected to criticism. Thesc are to be found, most
significantly, abovc all in myth. . .
Mythic violencc in its archetypal form is a mere ma~\ltc'tJnon .ot th.c god,.
Not a means to th~ir ends, scarcdy a mJnife,tJtlon of tllCIr will, but
primarily a manifestation of their cxistence. The legend of Niobe contains
an outstanding cxample of this. True, it might JppeJr th.H thc acnon ot
Apollo and Artcmis is only a punishment. But t~leir violencc e'tJblish~s a
law far more than it punishes the infringcment ot a law thJt already eXists.
Niobe's arrogance calls down bte upon her not bccaus~ ~cr arrogJ~cc
offends against the law but because it challenge, tJtc-:-to J h~IH III which
fate must triumph and can bring to light a law only 1\1 ItS triumph. How
Iittl~ such di\'ine violcncc was, to th~ ancicnts, the law-prcscrvl\1g Violence
of punishment is shown by thc ?croic. legcnd,. I\l which thc her?-for
cxamplc, Promcthcus--challenges tate With dlgmhed courage, fights It with
varying fortunes, and is not left by the legend Without hope of one da~.
bringing a n~w bw [0 mcn. It is really rhis hc~o and th~ IcgJI vlolclKC. ot
the myth native to him that the public trlCS to pICture even now In admlr\~lg
the miscrcant. Violence thcrefore bursts upon Niobc trom the uncertam,
ambiguous ,phcre of fatc. It IS nor actLIally destructi~e. Althoug~1 it brin~,
a cruel death to Niobe's childr~n, it StopS short ot c1JlI11Ing the hfc of their
mother, whom it le'lVes bchind, more guilty thJn ?cf~re through the death
of the children, both as an etcrnally mutc beJrer ot guilt Jncl as a ?ounda~)
stone on thc frontier bctwecn men and gods. II tI\lS 1\l1l1lCdlJte Violence. m
mythic manifestations proves closely related, indeed Idcm~cal, to I~wmakmg
violence, it rdlects a probl~matic light on lawmakllig vlolcncc, msofar as
the \3[[cr was characterized above, in the account of nllhtary Violence, as
mere'ly a median! violencc. At the samc timc this conncction promises to
providc further illumination of fate, '."'hich in aU. cases und~rhes legal VIO-
lence and to conclude in broad outll\1e th~ cntlquc of the la[[er. For ~hc:
function of violence in lawmaking is twofold, in the ,cn,~ thJt lawmakmg
pursucs as its end, with violence as thc means, wh'lt IS to bc estJbhshed JS
law but at the momcnt of instatcment does not dismiSS violence; rather, at
thiS' very mom~nt of lawmaking, it spccincall)' e,tabli,hes as IJW nO.t an end
unalloyed by violencc but onc nccessarlly an~ mtllllJtdy boun~ to \{, undcr
the titlc of powcr. Ll\vmaking is powenllakl\1g, assumption ?t pow~r, and
to that extcnt an il\1mcdiate manifcstation of violencc. Ju,tlCC IS the pnnclple
of all divmc endmJking, power the princi pl~ of all mythic lawmaking.
An applicJtion of the IJ[[er that has immen,.e con,e,!ucncc~ IS fowld "~
con,titutionJI IJw. for in this ,phere the e,tJbhslllng ot frontiers, thc ta,k
Critiquc ot Violence 24Y
ot -p~ace" .Itter .111 thc W.1r, of the mythic Jge, is the primal phcnomenon
of all lawmaking viol~nce. Hcre we sce most c1carly th:l[ powcr, more than -j
th~ most c~travag.~m gain in property) is what is guaranteed by all lawma~/
mg vlolenLe. Whcl c. h ontlers are decldcd, the adversary IS not Simply anlll-
hllatcd~ I\1dccd, hc IS accorded rights cven when th~ victor's supcriority in
p.ower I~ complete. And thc,e Jr.:, in .1 dcmonically ambiguous way, ~equal"
nght,: tor both partics to the treJt)', it is thc same line that may not be
cro:.:.ed. Herc appc.Hs, in a terribly primitive form, thc mythic Jmbiguity of
laws thJt HI.I)' not be "infringed"-thc SJme ambiguity to which AnJwlc
France rders satirically whcn he says, "Poor and rich are equally forbidd~n
to sp~nd thc night under the bridges." It also app~ars th'l{ Sorel touche, nO[
merdy on a cultural-hi,torical truth but also on a metaphysical truth when
he surmises that in .the beginning all right was the prerogative of kings or
nobleS-In short, ot the might)'; .\lld that, IIIl1lLllis IIIIt/lIlldis, it will remain
so as long .IS it exists. For from the point of view of violence which alonc
5~_ ~uara!!~e @w~ ,!h"cre,s nJ> cquality: hilt at t~e mos;-~quallr great
~ol~~~The act ot establishing frontiers, 11Iiwcver, is also significam for an
understanding of law in another respect. Laws and circumscribed fwmiers
~emain, at leJst il~;. primeval times, unWrl[[cn laws. A man can unwi[[ingly
mfnnge upon the!:11 and thus incur retribution . For eJch intervemion of law
that i:. provoked hy In offense Jg.1in,t the unwritten and unknown law is
called "retribution" (in comrJdi,tinction to "puni,hmem"). But however
unluckil y it mJ)' bet.11I its Il\lsl\,pecting \,i.;tim, its occurrence i, in the
~nder,t.lndil1g of the IJw, not c1IJnce, but fate showing itsdf once ~gain in
ItS dehberJte .1I11hlgUlty. Hermann Cohen, in a brief rdlection 011 the an-
ciems' conccption of fate, h'l> spoken of the "ine:.capable realization" that
~t is "fJtl"s orders .t.hemsclvc, that seem to cause and bring about this
mfnngement, thl> ottense:'- Even the modern principle that ignorancc of a
law IS not protection again,t punishmem testifies to this spirit of law, iust
as the strugglc over written law in the earl)' period of the anciell[ Greek
communities should be understood as a rebdlion against thc spirit of mythic
statutes.
Far from in.lUgurating a purcr sphcr~, the m)'thic manifestation of imme-
diate violence shows itsdf fundamemally idcmical with all legal violence
and tur.ns suspicion concerning the la[[er into certaimy of the perniciousnes~
of ~tS hlstoncal t~nnion, the destruction of which thus becomes obligatory.
ThiS v~ry task ot destruction poscs again, ultimately, the question of a pur~
lI11mcdlatc vlolcnce that might he able to call a halt to mythic vioj~nce. JUSt
a~ In all spheres God opposcs myth, mythic violence is confromcd by the
diVine. And the la[[er constinl[es its alltithesis in all respects. If m)'thic
violence is bwm.1king, divine violence IS IJw-de,troying; if thc former ,ets
boundaries, the IJ[[er houndlc:.:.I)' destroys them; if m)'thic violence bring,
at once gmlt Jnd retriblltion, divine power only expiates; if thc former
threaten" the la[[er ,trlkc,; If the former I> blood)', the latter is lethal without
;0 Cmique 01 VlOlenct:
,illing blood. Tht: legend of Niobe may bt: comnlsted with God's judgment
1 the company of Korah, as an example of such violence. God's judgment
rikes privileged Levites, strikes them without warning, without threat, and
les not Stop short of annihilation. But in annihilating it also expiate~, and
profound connection bt:tween the lack of bloodsh~d and the expiatory
laracter of this violence is unmistakable. For blood IS the symbol of mere
'e. The dissolution of legal violence stems (as cannot be shown in detail
:re) from the guilt of more natural life, which consigns the living, innocent
ld unhappy, to a retribution that "expiates" the guilt of mere life-a?d
)ubtless also purifies tht: guilty, not of guilt, however, but of law. For with
lere life, the rule of law over the living ceases. Mythic violence is blood)
Jwer over mere life for its own sake; divine violence is pure power over
I life for the sake of the living. The first demands sacrifice; the second
xep~i~ .. .. . nonexistence ot man is sOlllethlllg more tt:rrible than the (admittedly ~ub­
This divine power is not only anested by rehglous tradmon but IS also
lUnd in presem-day lite in at least one sanctioned n;'anifestation: The
iucative power, which in its perfected form stands outSide the law, .IS one
f its manifestations. Tht:se are defined, therefore, not by miracles directly
erformed by God but by the expiating moment in tht:m that strikes without
loodsht:d, and, finally, by the absence of all lawmaking. To this extent it
justifiable [0 call this violence, toO, annihilating; but it is so only relativel)",
lith regard to goods, right, life, and suchlike, never ab~olutdy, With re~~rd
1 the soul of the living.-The premise of such an extt:nslon of pure or dlvme
ower is surt: to provoke, particularly today, the most violent reactions, and
) be countered by the argumem that, if taken to its logical conclusion, it
onfers on men even lethal power against one another. This, however,
annot be conceded. For the question "Ma)' I kill?" meets its irreducible
nswer in the commandment "Thou shalt not kill." This commandment
recedt:s the deed, JUSt as God was "preventing" the deed. ~ut JUSt as it rna)"
ot bt: fear of punishmt:nt that t:nforces ob.edience, the injunction becomes
lapplicable, incommensurable, once the deed ~ aC~Ql1lpJj$h~d. No j~dg­
lent of the deed can be derived from the commandment. And so neither
he divine judgmem nor the grounds for this judgment can be known in
dvance. Those who base a condt:mmuion of all violent killing of one person
'y another on the commandment are therefore mistaken. It exists not as a
riterion ot judgment, but as a guideline tor tht: actions of persons or
ommunities who have to wrestlt: with it in solitude and, in exceptional
ases to take on themselves the responsibility of ignoring it. Thus it was
mde;stood by Judaism, which expressly rejected the condemnation of kill-
ng in sdf-ddt:nse.-But those thinkers who take the opposite view refer to
. more distant theorem, on which they possibly propose to base even the
ommandment Itself. This is the doctrine of the sanctity of life, which they
.ither apply to all ammal and even vegetable lift:, or limit to human. I~fe.
fheir argument, exemplified in an extreme case by the revolutionary klllmg
Critique 01 VIOlence 251
of the oppressor, runs as follow~: "If I do llO[ kill, I shalluc\'CL" e~t.lbli~h the .'/.
world dominion of justict: . .. that is thc argument of the intelligem terror-
is~ ... We, howcver, profess that bighc'r evt:n than the happiness and ju~tice
of exi~tence stands cxistence itscif. n, As cenainl)" as this last proposition is
fabe, indeed Ignoble, It ~ho\" the I)cce~~it), 01 ~ccklllg the rea~on for the
conllll.lI1dment no longer in what the deed docs to the victim, but in what
irdoes' [0 God .1Ild the doer. Tnt: propo~ition that t:xistence stands higher
rnan alust existt:nce is f,llse and ignominlOu~, if existence i~ to mean nothing
otht:r than mert: life-and It has thi~ mc.lIling in the argument reft:rred to.
It coma ins a might)" truth, howt:Vt:r, if "existence," or, bener, "life" (word~
whost: ambigult), i~ readily di~pdled, hke that of "freedom," when tht:y are
u~ed with reft:rcncc to two di~tinct ~phcrt:s), me.1I1~ the irreducible, total
condition that is "man"; if the propositiou is intellded to mean th.lt the
ordinate) not-yt:h)[[.lined cOllditlon 01 the ju~t 111.111. The proposition quoted
above owe~ it~ plausibility [() this ambiguity. Man cannot, at an)' price, be
said [0 cOlllcide with the mere hie in hUll, .1llY more than It C.1I1 be ~aid [0
coincidt: with .1I1Y other 01 his mndmon~ .llld qu.lhtie~, induding evt:n tht:
uniqucue~~ of hi~ hodd) per~ou. However ~.lCreJ man is (or however s.lCred
that lite in him which is idemically present in eMthly lite, Jeath, and
afterhfe), there i~ no s.lcrt:dnes~ in his (Onditioll, in his bodily life vulnerable
to injury by his fcilow men. What, then, distinguishes it csselltially from the
life of animab .lnd pi.Jms? And ewn if these were ~acred, they could nO[ be
so by virtue only 01 being .ll"'e, 01 bemg in life. It might be well worthwhile
[0 tnlck down the origin of the dogm.l of the s.lCn:dness of lite. [>erhap~,
indct:d probably, it is rdativeiy recent, thc la~t mbt.lken .)[[cmpt of the
weakt:ned Western tradition to st:ek the s.lim it has lost in cosmological
impenetr.lhility. (The .lmiyuit)' of .111 rciigious commandmellt~ againM mur-
der i~ no coumcc.lrgunu:m, b"eau~e the~c are b.l~ed on ide.» O[her than the
modern theorem.) fin.llll', this ide.l of m.IIl's sacredness gi,,:~ ground~ for
rt:flcction th.lt whJt i~ hen: pronounced ~(\cred \\'as, Jccording [() anciem
mythic thought, the m.ul-eJ be,lI·t:[ of gUilt: hfe It~cil.
.Th~ critique of violcnct: is the philoso~h)' of its history-the "pbilo~ophy"
-I
01 tillS 11I~tory bec.lU~e only the Ide.l 01 It~ dcvciopmcm m.ll-e~ posslhle a
critic.ll, discriminating, i1nd dc.:isive .lpproach to its temporill data . A gaze
directt:d only at \\ hat is dose at h'lnd can .H most percclve :l dialectical rising 4
and talllllg in tht: 1.1WIllJklllg and IJw-prescn'ing form~ of ~iolcnce. The law
governing tI~eir o~clUatlon re~t~ on the circum~tance th.1GIII:lw-pre~erving
Violence, III ItS duration, Indirectly weilken~ tI~ 1.l\vlllal-lIlg VIOlence It rep-
resent~, by ~uppn:~sing ho~tilt: count~rviolt:nc~ { (Variou~ symp[olll~ of thi~
hilve been referred [0 III the cour~e 01 thl ~ s[llcf~) TillS I.lst~ unul t:lthcr Ilew
forces or tho~c t:i1r1ier ~upprc~sed triumph over the hithcrto lawmal-lIlg
violencc .1I1d thus found a new law, destined in It~ [Urn [0 uecay. On the
breaking of thi~ c'yde maintained h) mythic fonm of law, on the ~u~pen~ion
252 Critique ot VIOlence

of law with all [he forces on which I[ depend:. as [hey depend on it, finJlly
therefore on [he aboli[ion of state power, a new historical epoch is founded.
If [he rule of myth is broken occasionally in [he present age, [he coming age
is no[ so unimaginably remote [hat an anack on law is altoge[her fu[ile. But
if [he existence of violence outside [he law, as pure immediate violence, is
as:.un:d, [his furnishes proof [hat revolu[ionary violence, [he highest mani-
fes[a[ion of unalloyed violence by man, is possible, and shows by what
means. Less possible and also 'less urgent for humankind, however, is [0
The Task of the Translator
decide when unalloyed violence has been realized in particular case:.. For
onl>' llly[hic violence, no[ divine, will be recognizJble as such with certainty,
unless i[ be in incomparable effects, because [he expiatory power of violence
is invisible [() men. Once again all [he e[ernJI forms are open [Q pure divine
violence, which myth bastardized with law. Divine violence may manifest
i[self in a [rue war exactly as i[ does in [he aowd's divine judgment on a
criminal. But all mythic, lawmaking violence, which we may call "execu-
[ive, " is pernicious. Pernicious, [QO, is [he law-preserving, "adminis[ra[ive"
violence [hat serves it. Divine violence, which is [he sign and seal but never
[he means of sacred dispatch, may be called "sovereign" violence.
III [he .1ppreL'I.Hion of .1 work of .U[ or .111 an tOl"m, con:.ldcrJuon ot [he
\\'rill"n ill In I; publish,·J in Ar.-/'il! Fir Suzi.d",issCl'S.-/'41 ,1l1.J SIl~i.Jlpo/ilik . 1921.
Tr;lllshtcJ hl' EtlmunJ JeJlII.:,m. receiver never proves frui[ful. NO[ only is 'lny reference [0 'I particular Pllblic
or I[S represema[ives misleading, but e\'en [he concept of an "ideal" receiver
is deuimemal in [he [he~lre[ical consideration of an, since all i[ posits is [he
eXls[ence and nJ[ure ot man a:. such. Art, in [he SJme \\,.1)', p<'si[:. m.m':.
Notes phY:'lc.ll.1nd :.pirim.ll existence, hut in none ot its works i:. i[ wncerned with
I. Ikuj.Hllin·s rerm is G"Il I.,,', which UleJn, horh ""wlenec " dnd "torLe." 1 he btler his anemiveness. No poem is imended for [he reader, no picture for [he
meaning sh",ud he kept iu n>ind when BcnJamm mrn:. rn reb[iOll>hlp' hetween beholder, no symphony tor [he audience.
smres.- Trillis. I,s .1 [rJn:.la[ion meJll[ for reJder:. who do nO[ understand [he original:
2. Ooe might, rurher, dOlulr wherhcr rhl> fJmou:. dem.mJ docs no[ comam [00 Till:. would :.eem [(l expl.lin adeqlloHeiy [he fJc[ [h.H [he [ransl.Hion 'lnd [he
lirtic-[ha[ is, wherher it is pcnnissihle to usc, or dHow ro he u,ed. oncself or Original h.lYe \'er> difterem S[.mdlllg in [he reollm of art. Moreover, i[ seems
anorher in any respecr as a m~ans . Vcr) good grounJs for ,uch douhr could be [~) be [he only concelvJble re.lson for :.aying "[he same [hing" over Jg.lin.
aJduced. for whJ[ does.l h[emry work "sa>"? Wh.H does i[ wmmunica[e: I[ "[ells"
" Erich Uoga, I'olilik 1ll/(1 Mel'lpil )'sik IPolinc, .Hld Merdph)slc:.I IBerlin, 1921), ver~ Imle [() [ho:.e who under:'[Jud it. I[s e:.:.emia l quali[y is no[ cOl1l111uni-
p. H. CJuon or [he llllp.lning of inform.Hion. Ye[ .1ny [ransla[ion [hat intends [0
4, Bur ,ec Uugcr, PI" I Htt.
~crtonn .1 [r.lllsmining func[ion Lmn()[ [ran:.mi[ an),[hing btl[ communiea-
). Sorci, Rcllc.\"/Ul" ,/I( 1." 'lOlcl,<"t: IRctle(l"lllu, ou Vloleu.:el, 5rh cd, 1I'3rl>, 1919),
p.25U. [lon-hence, something inessen[ial. This is [he hallmark of bad [ransla[ions.
6. Ihid., PI" 265, 195, 249, lUU, But do we no[ generally regard [hat which lies beyond conllllUnica[ion in a
7. I-krnuou Cohen, Elbik des n'i"LO' V. ·"I,·llS ll:.rhIL. of the Pure Willi, 2nd ed. li[erary work-'llld e\ en .1 poor [rolnsill[()r will oldmi[ [hat [his is its essemial
!lIcrlm, 1907), p. 362. ICohen I IS42-19IS ), J leading member of the ~Idrbnrg sub:'[Jnce-J' [he untJ[hom.lhle, [he mysterious, [he "poe[ic"? And is [his
,,,hool ()f Neo,K,mri:mb m, "omblned work on J~wish [heology and KJmian not SOme[hlllg [h.H .1 [r.lll,l.uor c.m reproduce onl), if he is also-a poet?
phllo,ophy. Hi> writings 00 plHlo:.ophy and on religion cxert~d dll Important ~uch, .l(tually, i:. [he G1U,e of .mo[her ch,u,l([eris[ic of inferior [r'lllshHion
wtluence 00 BCll jJmlll.- Trans . I which consequeml r We may define .1:' [he m.lcem.He [ran:.mi:.:.ion ot .11;
8, Kurr Hiller, "Ami-Cain,n in DlIs Zid: jubrbii.-i}(!r Ii" g"lSligc PollIlk IThe Goal: ine»emi.ll L'Oll[en[. \X/hene\ er .1 [L·Jn:.I.Hion llndertakes [0 :.er\,e [he re.ldcr,
YL'arh()ok for Spiritual Politicsl (Munich, 1919), p. 25 . I[ demonstrate:. [hl>. However, If i[ were ill[ended for [he reJdcr, [he :.ame