Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
03 Introduction
Professor Stephen Smith
05 Chapter I.
Uneasy Triangle: India’s Evolving Relations
with the United States and China
Dhruva Jaishankar
14 Chapter II.
India in Maritime Asia
Darshana M. Baruah
21 Chapter III.
Strategic Convergence as Uncertainty Abounds:
New Delhi’s Ties with Tokyo and Canberra
David Lang
31 Chapter IV.
India’s ASEAN relations
Natalie Sambhi
41 Chapter V.
Transformation through Cyber-innovation:
The Great Indian Technological Leap
Ananth Padmanabhan and R. Shashank Reddy
51 Chapter VI.
RCEP: India’s economic bridge to Asia
Dr Jeffrey Wilson
61 Endnotes
PAGE 01
REALISING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
Tasks For India’s Regional Integration
FOREWORD
Author: Professor L. Gordon Flake, Chief Executive Officer at the Perth USAsia Centre
Situated as we are in Australia’s self-proclaimed For India to fully participate in emerging designs for
‘Indian Ocean Capital’, the Perth USAsia Centre has an Indo-Pacific regional order – i.e. ‘acting’, not just
a keen interest in India’s strategy toward a region ‘looking’, east – each of these positions will need
increasingly described as the ‘Indo-Pacific’. At its to be adjusted, reformulated or finessed in some
most basic level, the concept of an ‘Indo-Pacific’ is way. Which poses several questions: Can India do
driven by a need to incorporate India into the Asia- it? How will others in the Indo-Pacific accommodate
Pacific. Hence the tile of this volume, Realising the and respond to these changes? And what are the
Indo-Pacific: tasks for India’s regional integration. implications for emerging Indo-Pacific concept as it
Without a continuation of India’s economic growth does? We are fortunate to have seven outstanding
and expanded influence in the region, this construct scholars, four from India and three from Australia,
cannot be realised. help us think through these and other questions.
We are confident that you will find their analysis of
Accordingly, this volume will provide a deeper
use in understanding both the tremendous scope of
understanding and assessment of India’s much-
change that has already taken place in India, as well
discussed ‘Look East-Act East’ strategy and policies
as the challenges ahead.
related to its implementation.
In addition to exploring some of India’s primary
Integration into the Indo-Pacific will require
diplomatic relationships in the region, we have also
India to significantly reform many long-standing
included chapters on cyber and other technological
foreign policy doctrines. In its diplomatic strategy,
connections, on the evolving trade architecture
India long maintained a commitment to global
in the region, and on the maritime space which is
multilateralism, and with the exception of its
the connective tissue of the Indo-Pacific. We are
immediate neighbourhood, has avoided participation
particularly grateful to have an introduction by
in regionalism initiatives. In relation to national
Professor Stephen Smith, former Minister of
security, India’s non-alignment prevented full
Defence and former Minister of Foreign Affairs.
activity in military, intelligence and other forms
Additional thanks goes to my colleagues Reginald
of security cooperation. Likewise, in response to
Ramos, Lisa Cluett, and Natalie Sambhi (one of the
international economic trends, as a committed
chapter authors).
multilateralist, Indian trade diplomacy was directed
principally at the World Trade Organisation, and its
participation in other forms of trade or investment
agreements have been relatively limited. More
broadly, India has historically styled itself as a
leader at the global level – principally as a leader
of the non-aligned movement (1950s-80s), and,
since the end of the Cold War, as a leader of
the developing world (through the G77 and its
associated coalitions). It has not positioned itself as
a regional leader.
These are long-held and cherished Indian foreign
policy doctrines, many dating back to the anti-
colonial movement and then to the post-colonial Professor Gordon Flake
period. They have for decades constituted India’s Chief Executive Officer
‘identity’ as an international actor. Perth USAsia Centre at the University of
Western Australia
PAGE 02 Foreword
REALISING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
Tasks For India’s Regional Integration
INTRODUCTION
Author: Professor Stephen Smith, Director and Distinguished Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre
Introduction PAGE 03
REALISING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
Tasks For India’s Regional Integration
Australia’s recognition of India’s pending rise as India’s ‘Look and Act East’ must be met by an
a great power also brought with it the realisation Australia ‘Look West’.
that we had to significantly enhance the level of our
The from time-to-time 20/20 frenetic activity in
bilateral relationship with India, and bring it to a
the relationship needs to be sustained with the
much more substantial level.
patience, endurance and longevity of a test match.
Over the last decade successive Australian India, with over a billion people, and a better
governments have worked to do just this, adding to population demographic than China, is inexorably on
the respective work of their immediate predecessor. the rise. Its trajectory may be a less steep incline,
but it will end up in the same place, not a leader of
Australia and India have always had a lot in
the Non-Aligned Movement, but a great power, and
common: we are both robust democracies on the
conducting itself in global affairs accordingly.
Westminster model, both adherents to the rule of
law, the law of contract, and respect for intellectual Issues and challenges which India faces along
property. We are both world class players of cricket the way, its relationship with Australia, China,
and hockey. We are both members of the G20, the the United States, and others in our region, are
Commonwealth, the East Asia Summit, and the admirably covered by this publication, presented to
World Trade Organisation. you by the Perth USAsia Centre, Australia’s leading
Indo-Pacific think-tank.
The last decade has seen a greater proliferation of
ministerial and prime-ministerial visits, scientific
and commercial exchanges and people to people
contact, particularly through education. Australia’s
efforts in this respect have not been limited to the
purely bilateral.
Australia and India have worked hand in hand to
reshape the Indian Ocean regional architecture,
the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional
Cooperation (IOR-ARC), now IORA, the Indian Ocean
Rim Association.
The name change occurred at the IORA countries’
foreign minister’s meeting in Perth. India chaired
IORA for two years with Australia as deputy. Professor Stephen Smith
Australia then chaired with Indonesia as deputy, Board Member
ensuring three significant Indian Ocean maritime Perth USAsia Centre at the University of
powers chaired IORA over a six-year period. Western Australia
PAGE 04 Introduction
CHAPTER I.
Uneasy Triangle:
India’s Evolving
Relations with
the United States
and China
REALISING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
Tasks For India’s Regional Integration
The United States of America, the People’s The evolving global circumstances from 1949
Republic of China, and the Republic of India to the present have required India to play, at
are the world’s three largest countries by different times, the roles of mediator, balancer,
population and will soon comprise the world’s shared adversary, and promising partner to
three largest economies. Critical inflection both China and the United States. Today, New
points in their origins as modern world Delhi is possibly at another inflection point,
powers date from between 1945 and 1950. In when it will have to fundamentally reassess
the immediate aftermath of World War II, the its relations with Washington and Beijing.
United States found itself one of two global Specifically, India faces the possibility of a less
superpowers, along with the Soviet Union. open United States and, consequently, one that
In 1945, the United States’ mainland was left will struggle to retain its international primacy.
relatively unscarred; its war economy was India also confronts the reality that China plays
booming; it had a strong military presence in an unprecedented role as an influencer in the
Europe and Asia; and it had a proven atomic Indian subcontinent, in the Indian Ocean, and
weapon capability.1 Two years later, in 1947, on global issues. Beijing has also become more
India achieved independence from Britain; explicitly resistant to India’s continued rise as a
it was born a unified democracy but under great power.
the horrific and violent cloud of Partition.2 By
1950, it had cast off the last vestiges of formal Navigating this new strategic terrain will
British rule to become a republic, although it require New Delhi to continually engage both
retained many of its colonial-era administrative, China and the United States in an equal but
bureaucratic, and military structures. And in differentiated manner. With the United States,
1949, Mao Zedong ended decades of civil war by India will need to continue pushing for deeper
declaring the founding of the People’s Republic economic and people-to-people exchanges,
of China and installing a powerful revolutionary solicit support on global governance, develop
government in Beijing.3 The revolution (or greater coordination and interoperability
‘liberation’) did not end there, but continued in the Indo-Pacific, and further enhance
with the annexation of Tibet and involvement in cooperation on counterterrorism. With China,
the Korean War a year later. India will have to manage its border dispute
by negotiating from a position of strength,
The three countries, along with the Soviet contest Chinese political and military influence
Union and a divided Europe, comprised major in India’s immediate periphery, seek common
concentrations of the world’s population. ground on multilateral affairs, and develop a
All boasted large militaries, although very sustainable and mutually beneficial economic
different from each other’s in character and and commercial relationship. Achieving these
capabilities. And while China and India were objectives will require both strategic clarity –
initially impoverished and found themselves and malleability – on India’s part.
subordinate to the larger dynamics of the
US–Soviet rivalry, they nonetheless played
important roles in the competitive environment
of the Cold War.
PAGE 06 I. Uneasy Triangle: India’s Evolving Relations with the United States and China
REALISING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
Tasks For India’s Regional Integration
1950–1991: Mediator, Balancer, India’s tensions with China, however, also led
Adversary to a period of unprecedented collaboration
between India and the United States. Some in
It is rarely acknowledged today, but in 1950, Washington feared India’s fall to communism
India was the primary intermediary between and Chinese ascendancy in Asia. India’s Prime
the United States and Communist China. In the Minister Jawaharlal Nehru even turned to US
run up to the Korean War, India’s Ambassador President John F. Kennedy for help during
to Beijing, K.M. Panikkar, played the role the border war.7 But the nascent security
of mediator, communicating, among other cooperation came to an end with the 1965
things, China’s unheeded warning about the war with Pakistan, and the United States’
consequences of American forces crossing the suspension of support to both India and
Yalu River. During the subsequent conflict, India Pakistan. In the years that followed, it was
was involved in the exchange of prisoners of Pakistan that emerged as more important to
war between US-led and Communist forces. US interests. Among other things, it became a
These actions were a testament to newly- conduit for the administration of Richard Nixon
independent India’s position as a broker.4 to engage with Beijing as part of its strategy to
India had been among the first countries to split the seemingly monolithic Communist bloc.
recognise the People’s Republic of China, and There were direct costs in terms of US relations
contrary to many misconceptions about Indian with India. The Nixon Administration supported
‘nonalignment’, worked actively to establish Pakistan despite atrocities in what was then
good relations with Washington in the years East Pakistan, while condemning India’s 1971
after Independence.5 intervention that culminated in the creation of
the new country of Bangladesh.8 For its part,
This period of relative neutrality and mediation India prepared for its intervention by signing
was, however, short-lived. Beginning in the a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the
mid-1950s, India’s relations with Beijing began Soviet Union, effectively cementing an alliance
to deteriorate. China’s accession of Tibet had with Moscow.
brought it into immediate contact with India for
the first time. The boundary between the two After playing mediator and balancer, India
was poorly demarcated in colonial-era maps, suddenly found itself an adversary of both
and Beijing – motivated both by concerns over China and the United States. Between 1971
Tibetan separatism and a desire to link Tibet and 1991, India viewed both Washington and
with the rest of the country – rejected Indian Beijing with considerable suspicion, and
territorial claims. The revelation of Chinese sided more explicitly with the Soviet Union in
road building activity in Aksai Chin – territory matters of defence cooperation and diplomatic
claimed by India – further fanned nationalist coordination. The United States and China
sentiments. A failed Tibetan rebellion, were also seen as the chief external sponsors
supported by the US Central Intelligence of Pakistan, India’s regional rival. During
Agency, resulted in the Dalai Lama and many of the 1980s, the United States and Pakistan
his followers seeking asylum in India in 1959. collaborated closely in supporting mujahideen
These developments, amid a number of other against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. For its
factors, culminated in a short but sharp Sino- part, China transferred nuclear and missile
Indian border war in 1962. The result was a technology to Pakistan, activities about which
humiliating defeat for India and the suspension some in Washington had long been aware.9 In
of normal diplomatic relations between New the early and mid-1980s, China also hardened
Delhi and Beijing.6 its position on the boundary dispute with India.
While earlier countenancing the possibility of
a status quo solution, Beijing became more
assertive in its claims to territory south of the
I. Uneasy Triangle: India’s Evolving Relations with the United States and China PAGE 07
REALISING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
Tasks For India’s Regional Integration
British-era McMahon Line, which marked the considerable lobbying by India of the U.S.
de facto line of control.10 Nonetheless, despite Congress and European powers, the sanctions
these conflicting objectives during the late Cold were lifted by the Clinton Administration. This
War period, India under Rajiv Gandhi made was in recognition of India’s growing appeal as
efforts to reset ties with both the United States a market, and was helped by steps India took
and China. The prime minister made important to advance its credentials as a responsible
visits to both countries during his tenure. These nuclear power.14
efforts at improving relations, even from a low
base, were only partly successful.11 The United States also helped to facilitate
India’s progress, particularly after 1999. Initially,
this was organic, a product of India’s nascent
1991–2008: Partnerships and Growth technological prowess and a recognition by
The year 1991 resulted in compounded some US leaders of India’s market potential.
crises for India, and was arguably a political, During the George W. Bush administration, the
diplomatic, economic, and military watershed objective of facilitating India’s rise assumed
for the country. India faced a balance of a more deliberate character. The United
payments crisis and barely managed to avoid States’ ‘goal is to help India become a major
default. Its statist and autarkic economy proved world power in the 21st century’, a senior US
vulnerable to shocks, specifically rising oil official – later revealed to be State Department
prices caused by the first Gulf War. The newly- Counsellor Philip Zelikow – told journalists
elected national government of P.V. Narasimha in March 2005. “We understand fully the
Rao was weak, his Congress Party having implications, including military implications, of
benefited from sympathy votes following the that statement.”15
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. India’s domestic Other US officials and advisors offered a
security situation was equally challenging with clearer rationale. Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie
a separatist insurgency flaring in Jammu and Endowment, in testimony before the House
Kashmir, which was being actively supported Committee on International Relations, argued:
by Pakistan. Meanwhile, other violent
movements festered in Punjab and the country’s “‘Is a strong, democratic, (even if
vulnerable northeast. India was also coming perpetually) independent, India in
off a misguided intervention into Sri Lanka American national interest?’
(1987–1990) which had resulted in over 1,100 If, as I believe, this is the fundamental
Indian military deaths. Finally, the Soviet Union question and if, as I further believe, the
suddenly dissolved, leaving New Delhi without answer to this question is ‘Yes,’ then
its closest ally since the 1970s.12 the real discussion about the evolution
of the US–Indian relationship ought
However, the new, post-Cold War era soon to focus on how the United States can
presented opportunities. In the early 1990s, assist the growth of Indian power.”16
India and China began talks concerning a
boundary framework agreement. Essentially, While India benefited from a conscious decision,
the two countries decided to set their boundary even if by a handful of key American leaders,
dispute to one side, enabling them to advance to accommodate and facilitate India’s rise,
other dimensions of their relationship.13 cooperation with China assumed a different
Meanwhile, India and the United States initiated character. Following tensions in the aftermath
early defence contacts; however, this came of India’s 1998 nuclear tests – which Defence
to an end with India’s 1998 nuclear tests. The Minister George Fernandes justified, in part,
United States led other world powers in issuing by declaring nuclear-armed China as being
sanctions against both India and Pakistan. India’s ‘potential threat No. 1’17 – the countries
But after several rounds of negotiation, and sought to cooperate on two broad areas of
PAGE 08 I. Uneasy Triangle: India’s Evolving Relations with the United States and China
REALISING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
Tasks For India’s Regional Integration
convergence: trade and global governance. period. India’s economy started to grow on the
Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji’s 2002 visit to back of liberalisation, a successful services
India helped lift some of the suspicion, and sector, and renewed engagement with the
emphasised the complementarities of the Indian diaspora.22 National politics became
two fast-rising economies. “You [Indians] are more stable after 1998. The emergence of two
number one in terms of software, we [Chinese] major national parties embedded in larger
are number one in terms of hardware,” Zhu told coalitions resulted in several consecutive
an audience in Bangalore, “Together we make governments seeing through their full five-year
the world’s number one.”18 terms. Its 1998 nuclear tests established a
successful deterrent, but were quickly followed
During the early 2000s, trade relations between up by engagement with the international
India and China took off, from an almost non- community in a bid to integrate into the nuclear
existent amount to US$73.4 billion in 2012.19 mainstream.23 India managed to normalise
Two-way traffic between the two countries’ most aspects of its relations with China,
people also improved, and India and China and develop a new – and very important –
found common cause in campaigning for relationship with the United States, with which
greater representation at major multilateral it now shared both interests and core values.24
fora. The two countries shared similar concerns
about the climate regime proposed by Europe
and the United States, leading to the BASIC 2008–2014: Strategic Autonomy
coalition (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, as
being formed. Similarly, both sought greater China grew at an astonishing pace, a common
voting shares at the International Monetary underlying belief was that political liberalisation
Fund, eventually opting to collaborate on the would follow economic liberalisation. The US
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Chinese economies would become more
and BRICS New Development Bank (comprised enmeshed, generating trust, and dampening
of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South potential conflict. But there were periodic
Africa), where they could have a greater say. reminders to the contrary. The 1995–1996
At the United Nations Security Council, the Taiwan Straits crisis, the bombing of the
two countries shared similar concerns about Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and
multilateral intervention and the Responsibility the 2001 Hainan Island incident involving the
to Protect (R2P) commitment.20 mid-air collision of American and Chinese
In the quarter century since the end of the military aircraft raised the prospects of greater
Cold War, India managed to improve its ties US–China tensions. India refrained from taking
with both the United States and China. This sides, although it joined China in criticism of the
involved coming to terms with a period of US-led campaign in the Balkans.
unrivalled American international power The period following the 2008 Beijing Olympics
during the 1990s till the early 2000s, as well and the US financial crisis – and particularly
as the concurrent rise of China, which was following the ascension of Xi Jinping to China’s
historically unprecedented in manner and leadership in 2012–2013 – has renewed the
scale. Nonetheless, it was also a period in prospect of global competition between the
which India’s international standing improved. United States and China. While India anticipated
Today, India arguably has more resources, the possibility of heightened competition, it
more security, and more friends than at any initially considered the prospect of equivocating,
other point in its history.21 This is not simply a accentuating its recognition of the importance
product of good luck, but has resulted from a of good relations with both.
set of important decisions that were made by
successive governments over the intervening
I. Uneasy Triangle: India’s Evolving Relations with the United States and China PAGE 09
REALISING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
Tasks For India’s Regional Integration
This was most consciously articulated in a 2012 time, India’s ties with China held but did not
document, ‘Nonalignment 2.0’, that was drafted see considerable improvement, particularly
by a group of India’s leading intellectuals in matters of bilateral or regional security.
but based on cooperation and deliberation China used maps and visas to undermine
with members of India’s national security India’s territorial claims, and revised its
establishment. The report’s authors noted that, previously neutral stance on India’s disputes
“China and the United States will undoubtedly with Pakistan.27 Nor did India see meaningful
remain superpowers. They concluded, steps by China to right the trade imbalance
in its favour, or to support India’s rise as a
“Given that India has more interests
global power.
in ‘direct’ competition with China, and
less with the US, it may be tempting to
conclude that the US is a likely alliance After 2014: Harder Choices
partner. But this conclusion would be
Upon his election in 2014, India’s new Prime
premature … Both India and the US may
Minister Narendra Modi moved swiftly to reach
be better served by being friends rather
out to both Washington and Beijing. His visit
than allies.”25
to the United States in September 2014 was
But while cautioning a healthy distance in historic, with Modi feted in the White House
relations with the United States, the report’s and holding a high visibility event for the Indian
authors also advocated a careful balance in diaspora at Madison Square Garden in New
relations with China, stating: York. It was followed quickly by an invitation to
Barack Obama to attend India’s Republic Day,
“India’s China strategy has to strike a an honour that had never before been extended
careful balance between cooperation to a US president. This signalled a newfound
and competition, economic and political willingness of the Indian establishment to be
interests, bilateral and regional
seen publicly as a close friend of the United
contexts. Given the current and future
States. Modi and Obama also signed a Joint
asymmetries in capabilities and
Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian
influence between India and China, it
Ocean Region. The short document gave a
is imperative that we get this balance
clear strategic underpinning to US–India
right. This is perhaps the single most
bilateral relations.28
important challenge for Indian strategy
in the years ahead.”26 Between 2014 and 2016, India’s defence
cooperation with the United States intensified
These broad tenets were often reflected in
significantly along multiple dimensions. The
India’s approach to the United States and China
two countries now engage in a large number
between 2008 and 2014.
of staff talks and regular military exercises.
But this approach faced considerable criticism They also concluded a long-pending logistics
in India from voices outside of government. supply agreement in 2016. Military sales have
Opportunities to advance defence cooperation also become more routine, with major defence
with the United States were not seized, contracts extending to transportation aircraft,
preventing arms transfers and improved maritime patrol aircraft, and artillery. The two
interoperability. Washington complained of sides have also been working towards joint
India promising but not delivering. There was production and research and development
growing acrimony between India and the United of military hardware. For its part, India has
States on issues such as trade, climate change, dropped its objections to the United States as
and cyber security, and a nasty spat between a resident power in the Indo-Pacific, this move
the two governments over the detention of an corresponding with a growing recognition at the
Indian diplomat in New York proved the chief senior levels of the Indian government that a
symptom of deteriorating relations. At the same strong United States is in Indian interests. India
PAGE 10 I. Uneasy Triangle: India’s Evolving Relations with the United States and China
REALISING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
Tasks For India’s Regional Integration
has also deepened security cooperation with US strengthen its position on the boundary in order
allies, particularly Japan. Along with this, it has to better manage it. This included activating
started identifying itself in stronger terms as airfields, raising army units meant for mountain
part of a larger Indo-Pacific strategic space.29 warfare, and moving combat aircraft to the
Northeast.30 The biggest dark spot was concern
While momentum grew in relations with the about growing Chinese involvement in the
Washington, Modi did not neglect ties with Indian Ocean; ostensibly civilian infrastructure
China. Despite specific incidents and irritants projects that were potentially ‘dual use’ in
before 2014, Modi had inherited a relationship that they could be employed just as easily for
with China that was on a mostly positive footing. military as civilian commercial purposes.
The two still had a shared agenda on issues of
global governance, including climate change, Sino-Indian relations were thus a priority in
cyber security, and international financial Modi’s first year in office, although his China
institutions. The prospects of better economic agenda met with a less encouraging response
and trade relations between the two states than his US policy. Just weeks before his 2014
remained palpable. The border dispute was live visit to the United States, Modi hosted Xi Jinping
but manageable, and India had taken steps to in India, in his home state of Gujarat. The visit
I. Uneasy Triangle: India’s Evolving Relations with the United States and China PAGE 11
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Tasks For India’s Regional Integration
PAGE 12 I. Uneasy Triangle: India’s Evolving Relations with the United States and China
REALISING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
Tasks For India’s Regional Integration
Socializing the US strategic community to these challenge will be convincing China that the
realities will remain a preoccupation of India’s successful rebalancing of its economy and its
strategic establishment. ability to overcome the middle income trap
would be facilitated by the success of Indian
A bolder and more assertive China will prove industrialization and enlargement of the Indian
just as much of a challenge for India as a middle class. While New Delhi will continue
recessed United States. In the Xi Jinping to seek opportunities with Beijing, along with
era, China has shown greater activity and closer cooperation with Washington, China’s
less risk-averseness with respect to India’s assertiveness and actions will be the critical
neighbourhood, the South China Sea, the Indian variable in dictating India’s strategic orientation.
Ocean, and at multilateral venues, exposing
deeper strategic differences with India. New Over the past quarter century, India has had to
Delhi will have to remain vigilant about Chinese adjust to the changing realities of the post-Cold
activities in its smaller neighbours (Nepal, War world and an emerging era of systemic
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives), as uncertainty. For the foreseeable future, India
well as the Indian Ocean region more broadly. will have to widen its strategic horizons, place
On the disputed border, India will have to a greater focus on the Indian Ocean, prioritize
keep negotiations open while strengthening India’s neighbourhood, and deepen security
its capabilities. It will have to ‘Act East’ – partnerships with the United States and its
increase connectivity with Southeast Asia allies in the Indo-Pacific and West Asia. Seeking
and deepen security partnerships with other avenues of cooperation with both Washington
maritime powers in the Indo-Pacific – to and Beijing, while resisting the encroachment
preserve a balance of power. And it may have of both over key areas of Indian interest,
to consider asymmetric responses to China’s has been – and likely will be – a continuing
disproportionate power. preoccupation of leaders in New Delhi. To date,
India has proved mostly adept in these efforts.
But the relationship with China need not be But new developments – including the prospect
solely a confrontational or competitive one of a less open United States and new forms
for India. China remains a primary driver of of Chinese involvement in India’s immediate
the international economy, and the successful region – will challenge many of India’s
rebalancing of China’s economy – a shift longstanding assumptions.
from inward investment, manufacturing, and
exports to consumption, services, and imports
– would naturally complement efforts at
boosting manufacturing in India. A continuing
I. Uneasy Triangle: India’s Evolving Relations with the United States and China PAGE 13
CHAPTER II.
India in Maritime Asia
REALISING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
Tasks For India’s Regional Integration
(AIS) receivers along the coast, and 46 coastal Additionally, the project also set up
radars in the mainland and the islands32. Joint Operations Centres at Mumbai,
Vishakhapatnam, Kochi and Port Blair, staffed
Led by the Navy, In 2014 the Ministry of Defence at all hours by the navy, coast guard and marine
(MoD) launched the National Command Control police35. Patrolling and monitoring of coastal
Communication and Intelligence Network waters have increased along with inter-agency
(NC3I), and the Information Management coordination exercises between all stakeholders
and Analysis Centre (IMAC). This coastal for effective implementation of India’s MDA
security network Project. Today, MDA is one of the key areas of
“collates data about all ships, dhows, cooperation between India and its partners.
fishing boats and all other vessels
Having created a system to enhance its MDA
operating near [Indian] coast, from
capabilities in its coastal waters, the navy is
multiple technical sources including the
now looking to expand its MDA capabilities
AIS and radar chain. These inputs are
into the wider Indian Ocean. While the 26/11
fused and analysed at the Information
attacks were directly aimed at India, the Asian
Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC)
maritime security environment began to change
at Gurgaon, which disseminates this
compiled Common Operating Picture for post-26/11 too. The rise of tensions in the SCS
Coastal Security to all 51 nodes of the and East China Sea from 2010 onwards, the
Navy & Coast Guard spread across the docking of Chinese submarines in Sri Lankan
coast of India”.33 and Pakistani ports and increasing commercial
activities around India’s traditional sphere
Detailing the role and roadmap for the of influence began to raise concerns and
NC3I and IMAC, the government issued a suspicions in New Delhi.
statement stating:
The second shift in India’s changing maritime
“The network provides these stations outlook is highlighted by the 2015 naval
coastal surveillance information strategy. The 2015 strategy was an updated
obtained from various sensors such version of the 2007 strategy shifting its tone
as the coastal radar chain of the from ‘using’ the seas to ‘securing’ the seas. The
Indian Coast Guard and automatic strategy underlined India’s expanding interests,
tracking systems as well as electro- a new security environment and India’s
optical cameras. The network rides on aspirations to be a net security provider. The
dedicated terrestrial data circuits, as document used the term Indo-Pacific to define
well as, satellite communication, which its areas of interest for the first time, a concept
helps the stations in remote locations which is still being debated in New Delhi. The
to be networked. The IMAC is the centre 2015 strategy also stressed the need to expand
where data from various sensors and India’s naval engagements, and collaborate
databases is aggregated, correlated and with likeminded partners to shape a favourable
then disseminated to various stations for maritime environment.
enhanced awareness.
The rise of China, changing power dynamics
The NC3I network and IMAC are also linked and an extension of Sino-Indian competition to
with the prestigious National Maritime Domain the maritime domain are the key factors driving
Awareness (NMDA) project. In the NMDA India’s changing outlook. Prime Minister Modi
project, the NC3I network will function as the is committed to consolidating India’s maritime
communication backbone and the IMAC will ties and collaborating with Indian neighbours
continue to be the nodal centre but will be on maritime security. There is an acute focus
rechristened as the NMDA Centre.”34 within Modi’s government on building new
partnerships and deepening existing ties. As a
result, India today is more present in the region,
both bilaterally and trilaterally. However, while a platform for regional Navies to gather and
India aims to increase its engagements across discuss security issues. IONS aims to enhance
the domain, its presence can be divided into the inter-operability and facilitate an understanding
Indian Ocean, SCS and the Indo-Pacific. of regional challenges; traditional and non-
traditional security threats. Apart from IONS,
Indian Ocean India bilaterally conducts a range of exercises
with a number of navies across the Indian
The Indian Ocean is the primary area Ocean. At the multilateral level, the navy hosts
of importance for the Indian Navy. Any exercise MILAN for interaction among the Bay
developments in this domain directly affect New of Bengal littorals.
Delhi’s security and strategic interests. The
Indian Navy considers itself a leading power In the non-traditional security sphere, India
and commands a prominent role in the region. prides itself in being the first to respond
New Delhi has been active in initiating regional to natural calamities in the region. India’s
institutions and platforms to discuss issues preparedness to deal with natural disasters
challenging the region. India initiated IORA, at the regional level was tested during the
building a sense of community amongst the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004. Caused by a
littorals of the Indian Ocean. India also initiated 9.1 magnitude earthquake in Indonesia, the
the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS); tsunami affected most nations in the Indian
Ocean region. The destruction and dislocation of
the affected areas was at a significant high and Outside of natural disaster management, Indian
underlined the need for disaster management forces are also well prepared for evacuation
in the IOR. The Indian Navy’s ability to respond of citizens from conflict torn zones. One of the
to its neighbouring countries despite high recent and notable exercises was ‘Operation
casualties at home marked a new beginning Rahat’ to rescue citizens from war torn Yemen
in India’s High Availability Disaster Recovery in 2016. India’s success during Rahat led to
(HADR) capabilities. The Andaman and Nicobar requests from nations globally for assistance
Islands, geographically closer to the Indonesian in evacuating their own citizens. The operation
archipelago than to the Indian mainland, was led to the evacuation of 4,714 Indian and 1,947
the worst hit in India. The southern coast of foreign nationals from 48 countries.37 Rahat
India was particularly affected by the tragic echoed a resounding success placing India
loss of life and property. The Indian Navy, with as a leader in HADR operations at the region.
support from the other forces and agencies, India has also played critical and leading roles
was able to respond to the situation both at in the Maldivian water crisis in 201438 and the
home and abroad. Indian relief and support Nepal earthquake of 2015.39 On Search and
ships arrived in Sri Lanka within 12 hours and Rescue, India deployed extensive resources
the Maldives within 24 hours. India was able for the search of Malaysian Airline MH 370
to send help and assistance to Indonesia, also. across the Andaman Sea, Bay of Bengal and the
The navy’s ability to respond in a short time Indian Ocean.40
displayed its level of preparedness when the
region was caught unaware. There were no While India continues to take a lead in the
preparations with poor disaster management Indian Ocean region, its outlook has changed
mechanisms leading to massive destruction. in one front. New Delhi today is willing to break
After the initial effort of relief and rescue, out of its traditional hesitations and build new
India also extended help in restoration and partnerships to shape the regional security
construction of critical infrastructure. environment. For far too long, India ignored the
changing dynamics in the maritime domain,
The Bay of Bengal is considered one of the relying on its geographical advantages. While
most disaster prone areas in the world. Cyclone New Delhi watched closely as new actors
Nargis that hit Myanmar in 2008 was another began to enter the Indian Ocean, the political
significant natural disaster in the IOR. The class undermined its strategic implications. As
region came together in relief and restoration China began to gradually expand its footprints
operations for the country. India deployed ships across the Indian Ocean, New Delhi was certain
and sent emergency relief including medical Beijing is far from challenging India’s influence
teams, support staff and cash assistance of in the region. By the time India began to look
US$200,000. The property loss from the cyclone at the developments closely, China had made
in Myanmar is estimated around US$10 billion.36 port calls in Sri Lanka, deployed nuclear
Similarly, India led evacuation efforts during submarines to Karachi, strengthened its
the 2015 Nepal earthquake. The 7.9 magnitude security and economic ties with nations such as
earthquake caused widespread casualties with Bangladesh, Myanmar, Maldives, and Mauritius,
over 7,000 dead, and loss of property. India was and begun building economic corridors
at the forefront of HADR as well as restoration along its continental and maritime borders.
missions. During cyclone Roanut which hit Sri Although there is no debating the capabilities
Lanka and Bangladesh in 2016, India again of the Indian Navy as opposed to new players
came forward in its HADR missions affecting its in the Indian Ocean, this advantage can be
immediate neighbours. quickly overcome.
In Southeast Asia, India sent ships and relief The current Indian government understands the
materials during 2013 typhoon Haiyan which hit urgency in responding to the security changes
the coast of Philippines. in the Indian Ocean to secure its strategic
interests. New Delhi today is keen to explore and partners and re-imagine its terms of
new collaborations and partnerships to address engagements, New Delhi can emerge as a
the changing regional security environment. foundational pillar of new security architecture
Today, the Indian Navy has considerably stepped in the maritime domain.
up its engagements with the other littorals
and cooperation with these navies has become South China Sea
a critical part of India’s maritime strategy.
There is a political will within this government While the Indian Ocean is an area of primary
to explore new possibilities and push ahead interest to the Indian Navy, the South China Sea
with old ideas. New Delhi’s decision to include (SCS) is a close second. India has traditionally
Japan as a permanent participant to exercise maintained its distance from the SCS dispute
MALABAR, India’s bilateral exercise with the and refrained from making direct comments
US, White Shipping Agreements on data sharing on the issue. The current Modi government
with countries across the region, a logistic has taken an active but limited approach to
support agreement with Washington (LEMOA), the issue. While New Delhi previously did not
a greater MDA interaction and an increase raise this issue at an international level, it now
in trilateral formats and discussions are all discusses the destabilising nature of the dispute
examples of a new maritime thought in India. at bilateral meetings with countries not involved
Five years ago, many of these new initiatives in the dispute and at regional forums such as
were unthinkable under the gambit of Indian ASEAN. India was also one of the first countries
foreign policy. Today, New Delhi is willing to to issue a statement in support of UNCLOS
step out from its self-imposed restrictions, and established norms when Beijing refused
break out of its traditional approach and to recognise the verdict by the UN tribunal
embrace new ideas and possibilities. Along court in July 2016. One of India’s biggest
with a greater political will, the changing contributions is its maritime dispute resolution
security architecture has forced India to with Bangladesh. Just like the Philippines,
re-examine its maritime policies. However, Bangladesh took its boundary dispute with India
despite such a shift in its maritime approach, to the UN tribunal court and the court ruled in
India’s actions on the ground are far from favour of Dhaka. India lost a significant amount
substantial when considering the magnitude of its claimed waters but accepted the verdict,
of changes occurring in its neighbourhood. setting precedence on dispute resolution
India will have to decide on its strategy and behaviour in the maritime domain.
chart out a road map to retain its prominent
New Delhi has increased its defence and
role in the Indian Ocean region. There are
political engagements with the ASEAN nations,
massive bureaucratic challenges that could
from giving lines of credit, to patrol vessels
seriously slow down the positive momentum
and setting up satellite tracking stations in
of India’s regional engagement. New Delhi still
Vietnam. However, despite its new approach
struggles to articulate its interests and define
to the SCS dispute, the region has been
its threats- which could help the Indian Navy
disappointed in India’s role in balancing a rising
chart out a coherent strategy to play its role
China. Strategically, India has little to gain by
in the Indian Ocean. Despite positive changes,
confronting China over its actions in the South
India is struggling to develop the Andaman
China Sea. New Delhi has turned down calls
and Nicobar Islands, a geo-strategic asset
from Washington to join Freedom of Navigation
that is in urgent need of development and
patrols in the SCS but has reaffirmed its
investment. Such an approach signals a lack of
commitment to join such exercises under
a strategic vision, despite India’s political will
the UN. India recognises its limitations in the
to play a stronger security role in the Indian
Western Pacific and is unlikely to be at the
Ocean region. However, if India continues to
forefront of challenging Beijing in those waters.
tap into this momentum, engage with friends
Since his election in 2014, Prime Minister This paper takes stock of India’s strategic
Narendra Modi has brought energy and convergence with Japan and Australia at a time
dynamism to India’s international engagement, when a new US administration has cast a long
imbuing it with an appropriate sense of shadow of uncertainty across the Asia-Pacific.
purpose for these interesting times. Modi With a question-mark over the shape of US-
has been an indefatigable diplomat, racking Asia policy and in the face of China’s ongoing
up the air miles while on a mission to expand campaign to reshape the Asia–Pacific in its
his country’s strategic horizons and secure vision, America’s regional allies and partners
India’s place as a key global power. He has must now work to boost their own security by
boosted India’s annual defence budget, and underwriting a liberal and prosperous order
pledged to modernise the country’s armed and stable balance of power in the Asia-
forces. Modi has labored to carve out a role Pacific. To do so they must nurture the region’s
for India as a net security provider in the nascent multipolar architecture by evolving the
Indian Ocean, along with a greater presence in US-centric San Francisco alliance system into
Asia-Pacific, having reoriented the ‘Look East’ a modern, resilient security web that spans
policy of the 1990s into an activist ‘Act East’ the Asia-Pacific. The trilateral between India,
initiative. As part of that effort, he has sought Japan and Australia is an example of the sort
to deepen partnerships with a range of nations, of interest-based engagement Washington’s
particularly Japan, Australia, and Vietnam, and allies and partners should focus on. The paper
has spearheaded India’s exceptional outreach to advocates a range of diplomacy and defence-
the United States. focused options to expand and entrench the
trilateral, and also looks at potential ‘plus-one’
The Prime Minister’s actions have been cooperation with the United States.
driven by an acute awareness of how strategic
rivalries are heating up across the Asia-Pacific.
While visiting Japan in September 2014, Modi India and Japan: confluence and
reflected that, “Everywhere around us, we consequentiality
see an 18th century expansionist mind-set:
While the strategic relationship between India
encroaching on another country, intruding
and Japan has been tightening for the past 17
in others’ waters, invading other countries
years, prime ministers Modi and Abe have come
and capturing territory.”41 Two months later
together to build one of the region’s warmest
in a speech to the Australian Parliament,
and most consequential bilateral relationships.
Modi contended that, “historical differences
persist [in the region] despite growing
The Modi–Abe bonhomie
interdependence. The oceans are our lifelines
but we worry about access and security in our Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has
part of the world more than ever before.”42 His long advocated for closer relations between
interventions were oblique references to the Japan and India. In his 2006 book, Abe claimed
destabilising and assertive campaign Beijing (somewhat astonishingly) that it “would not
has pursued over recent years; New Delhi be a surprise if in another decade Japan-India
has watched with increasing alarm as China relationships overtook Japan-US and Japan-
has pressed on India’s northern border and China ties.”43 The following year, while on a
projected power into the Indian Ocean. state visit to India during his first term as prime
minister, Abe delivered a historic address to the
Indian Parliament where he spoke of the “need
PAGE 22 III. Strategic Convergence as Uncertainty Abounds: New Delhi’s Ties with Tokyo and Canberra
REALISING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
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for the Indian and Japanese governments to by their respective territorial disputes and
join together to shoulder more responsibility escalating strategic rivalries with China: Japan
as guardians of navigational freedom across is locked in an ongoing tussle with Beijing over
the Pacific and Indian oceans.”44 His vision was the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China
based on shared values and interests. Prime Sea, while Delhi’s attention is directed towards
Minister Abe has long been fond of saying simmering tension with Beijing at the Line of
that Japan–India relations have the greatest Actual Control in the Himalayas, a hangover
potential of any bilateral relationship in the from the 1962 Sino-Indian war. On the basis
world.45 And so the political stars were aligned of shared interests, values and concerns,
when Abe was again serving as Japan’s Prime along with a notable absence of any historical
Minister and Narendra Modi was elected to baggage, Modi and Abe see each other as
high-office in 2014. kindred spirits working to adapt their nations to
Asia’s shifting strategic landscape.
Prime ministers Modi and Abe have made haste
to fulfill the potential of Indo-Japanese strategic
and economic relations. In the process they Boosting the bilateral
have built one of the most compelling leader- The strategic connection between India and
level relationships in the Asia-Pacific. On paper Japan has been tightening since the turn of
they have a reasonable amount in common. the century. A ‘Global Partnership’ agreement
Both are conservative nationalists. Both lead signed in August 2000 provided the foundation
populous, important countries. Both came to upon which the bilateral relationship could get
power pledging substantial economic reform back on track following India’s nuclear tests in
to get their nations ‘back on track’. Both are 1998. Early in his first term as Prime Minister of
driven by a desire to restore national pride, and Japan, Shinzo Abe and his Indian counterpart,
see their countries as actors of consequence Manmohan Singh, announced a ‘Strategic and
in the Asia-Pacific. And both are troubled Global Partnership’, setting a strong upwards
III. Strategic Convergence as Uncertainty Abounds: New Delhi’s Ties with Tokyo and Canberra PAGE 23
REALISING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
Tasks For India’s Regional Integration
trajectory for the relationship. Meaningful through ministerial and official exchanges, have
security cooperation was pursued across the reflected the warmth and opportunity upon
next seven years, including the Malabar naval which Japan and India have built an increasingly
exercises (with the US, Australia and Singapore) important strategic partnership.
in 2007, a joint declaration on security
cooperation in 2008, the establishment of ‘2+2’ India and Australia: striving for
foreign and defence ministers’ meeting in 2010, substance
and the start of the Japan–India maritime
exercise in 2013. Though, as has been noted, The strategic relationship between Australia
“this period [through to 2014] was also marked and India has warmed considerably over
by a degree of hesitation, with Indian reticence the past decade as Delhi and Canberra have
about multilateral exercises in the Indian increasingly acknowledged the potential of their
Ocean and Japanese attempts at assuaging alignment. Translating rhetoric into reality is
China’s concerns.”46 the next challenge.
Prime ministers Modi and Abe have overseen India and Australia have much in common:
the most recent boost to Indo-Japanese both are English-speaking Westminster-style
cooperation, which came in 2014 when the democracies, both champion the rule of law,
relationship was elevated to a ‘Special Strategic both are Indian Ocean maritime powers, and
and Global Partnership’. Annual premier-level both maintain an interest in a stable and secure
consultations have increasingly delivered Asia–Pacific. Delhi and Canberra also sustain
substance to undergird such ambitious rhetoric. deep economic relations with China, along with
During their 2014 summit, Modi and Abe signed abiding anxieties around how Beijing wields
a Memorandum of Cooperation and Exchanges its growing power. There are also a range of
in the Field of Defence to “upgrade and other issues that drive the relationship forward,
strengthen”47 the bilateral defence relationship. including, among others:
At the end of the 2015 Modi-Abe summit, an
ambitious joint statement – India and Japan “a mutual recognition of the value of
Vision 2025 – was released to recognise the cooperation in Indian Ocean maritime
leaders’ intention to develop the relationship security; mutual objectives to build
into a “deep, broad-based and action-oriented institutions and a sense of regionalism
partnership, which reflects a broad convergence in the Indian Ocean; shared interests in
peace and political stability in Southeast
of their long-term political, economic and
Asia; opposition to violent extremism;
strategic goals.”48 The convergence was even
[and] shared interests in the security
more pronounced at the 2016 talks, where
of sea lines of communication and
India’s ‘Act East’ vision was married with
principles of freedom of navigation.”50
Japan’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy’.
The big-ticket item emerging from those The nascent strategic relationship between
talks was a long-sought agreement on civil India and Australia has been boosted by some
nuclear cooperation, a development which important state visits and defence and security
augured well for India’s nuclear energy sector agreements over the past decade. In November
and was a sizable diplomatic victory for Delhi 2009, then Australian Prime Minister Kevin
given that it is not a party to the major nuclear Rudd travelled to New Delhi where he signed
disarmament treaties.49 the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation
between Australia and India. The pact identified
While a long sought-after deal on the US-2
eight key areas of cooperation (and outlined
aircraft remains elusive, the notes struck
consultative mechanisms) on decidedly low-
by both prime ministers at premier-level
sensitivity security interests, including law
consultations since 2014, and filtered down
enforcement, terrorism, disaster management
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Tasks For India’s Regional Integration
and transnational organised crime. But it was he continued on what was the first visit to
during Narendra Modi’s first year in office that Australia by an Indian Prime Minister in 28
the relationship between Australia and India years. He spoke of a “natural partnership,
really began to develop a strategic hue. arising from our shared values and interests,
and our strategic maritime locations,”52 and
The high-water mark for the strategic noted Australia as one of India’s “foremost
relationship came in the form of reciprocal state partners” in the Asia–Pacific. One of the visit’s
visits in quick succession in 2014. Australian most notable outcomes was the signing of the
Prime Minister Tony Abbott was received in Framework for Security Cooperation, which
New Delhi in September 2014; he was Modi’s instituted annual prime ministerial summits,
first state guest. The two leaders signed an regular maritime exercises and training,
important pact on civil nuclear cooperation, and collaboration on defence technology,
and Abbott was effusive in his praise of India, counterterrorism and disarmament, among
calling it “the world’s emerging democratic other areas. All in all, the framework set out
superpower”, “a model international citizen”, a plan to mature Indo-Australian defence
and a “friend to many” that “threatens no and security engagement, and stood out as
one.”51 Come November, Modi visited Australia important symbol of an evolving strategic
for the G20 summit in Brisbane, after which relationship. The first biennial AUSINDEX
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REALISING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
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Donald Trump’s ascension to the Oval Office Reliability and presence lay at the heart of
has unnerved Washington’s regional allies and Washington’s potency and credibility as a
partners, who wait to see what ‘America First’ strategic actor. Indeed, uncertainty around
– his nationalist, isolationist and protectionist America’s leadership role could metastasise
campaign platform –has in store for the Asia- into regional instability and could even pose a
Pacific. His arrival must stimulate India and threat to the post-war global order over which
others to think anew about how to boost their the US has presided. Such developments
own security, and limit regional instability, have the potential to accelerate the decline of
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With three meetings now under their belt, military cooperation between India, Japan and
Delhi, Tokyo and Canberra should boost the Australia would be an important step for the
status of their dialogue. An easy win lays nascent trilateral, presenting opportunities to
waiting in convening a meeting of the group’s build interoperability, shared understanding,
respective foreign ministers. Such a gathering professional relationships and trust.
would be intended to complement the officials-
level meeting already in place, providing an Maturing the diplomatic and defence activities
opportunity to acknowledge the importance of of the India-Japan-Australia trilateral would
hierarchy in Asia, to build relations between the position it as an exemplar of cooperation
three chief diplomats, and to serve as a symbol between US allies and partners. Indeed, the
of the trio’s shared agenda in interesting times. group’s strength lies in the fact that the US is
(Such a move should be within the realm of not involved, so their activities are less likely
possibility—the India-Japan-US officials-level to automatically arouse suspicions in Beijing.
trilateral was boosted to a Foreign Ministers’ While the trilateral is aimed at sustaining a
meeting on the sidelines of the UN General favourable balance of power and evolving the
Assembly in 2015, continuing at the officials- region’s security architecture, there may be a
level the following round.56) There is also perception that it is aimed at Beijing. Indeed,
scope for a meeting of defence officials or at the time of the first trilateral meeting,
ministers, in order to build a parallel track of Australian Department of Foreign Affairs
engagement to accompany the foreign affairs and Trade Secretary Peter Varghese rejected
effort (though admittedly bringing a harder that the group represented an “anti-China
edge to the trilateral grouping). Regional front.”57 While the three should disabuse
forums like the East-Asia Summit could provide those proffering such a theory, to the extent
useful opportunities for agenda-setting and that the troika’s activities feed into China’s
position-coordination among the group, as well calculus about how it uses its growing power
as for discussions on the sidelines between as a stakeholder in the regional system is a
prime ministers. positive corollary.
Beyond these diplomatic activities, the three While the strategic convergence between India,
should also look to develop military-to-military Japan, and Australia is based on a range of
contacts. Such work could start with decidedly complementary factors, it is important not to
low-sensitivity defence activities. The three lose sight of the fact that the three countries
maintain strong and capable navies, which are very different beasts. While the trio coalesce
naturally opens the door to a focus on maritime around a set of shared interests, their broader
activities. Cooperation through humanitarian conception of their individual interests will
assistance and disaster-relief contingencies rarely be homogenous; indeed, they may never
would be politically straight-forward, as would perfectly align. Delhi, Tokyo, and Canberra have
information-sharing on white- and grey- different order-building traditions and maintain
shipping in the Pacific and Indian oceans. different strategic visions for the Asia-Pacific.
All three navies are well-placed to conduct Each perceives a different mixed-bag of benefits
anti-submarine warfare activities in order and risks that would come with deeper trilateral
to further develop a theatre-wide operating engagement, thanks to their varied histories,
picture and illuminate shared maritime philosophies and outlooks. Such differences
interests; such exercises might also have air will naturally burden diplomatic and defence
and underwater surveillance components. Air initiatives among the three, so to understand
defence and surface warfare are other useful and accommodate them is to give the trilateral
activities for the trio, as would be joint efforts the best chance of success.
to build contacts and capacity among other
navies in the region, particularly with Indonesia,
Vietnam and the Philippines. Building practical
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Reviving the Quad has a range of costs Regional dynamics make it necessary for
and benefits. While it would be a way to America’s allies and partners in Asia to
demonstrate to Beijing that its recent assertive conceive of creative ways to underwrite their
behaviour has been out of step with its own security. The trilateral between India,
neighbours’ expectations, there is also a real Japan, and Australia is a proactive burden-
risk that Beijing will again characterise the sharing activity for three of Asia’s maritime
initiative as containment, encirclement or as democracies to express coalescing interests
an ‘Asian NATO’. Member countries should and contribute to regional stability. Pending
resist such claims and transparently make the character of China’s contributions to the
the case, through words and actions, that the region and Washington’s appetite for strategic
grouping has been reconvened based on its signalling that comes with such baggage;
members’ shared interest in a stable, open meaningful cooperation between India, Japan
and prosperous regional order in which a and Australia would provide a sound foundation
responsible China works to the established set upon which to launch the Quad 2.0.
of rules and norms upon which Asia has grown.
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CHAPTER IV.
India’s ASEAN
relations
REALISING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
Tasks For India’s Regional Integration
India’s aspirations to engage ASEAN, and formal arrangement with the signing of various
Southeast Asian nations, was articulated as part agreements including on free trade. In fact,
of its ‘Look East’ policy of 1991. More broadly, dialogue and cooperation spans areas including
the ‘Look East’ policy was designed to boost trade, investment, people-to-people links,
India’s relevance in a post-Cold War world. At maritime issues, transport, infrastructure,
that time, individual Southeast Asian states saw technology, R&D, terrorism, tourism, climate
India as a source of investment opportunity as change, education and IT, among many more.
well as potential arms and technology supplier.
India’s ability to build its diplomatic presence
India’s relationship with ASEAN has evolved in the region has been supported by its
multiple times, beginning with Sectoral Partner interactions with ASEAN. While steadily
of ASEAN in 1992, Dialogue Partner in 1996 maturing from ‘sectoral dialogue partner’ in
and Summit Level Partner in 2002.66 In 2004, 1992, India has met the ‘Look East’ policy’s aims
India became a signatory of the ASEAN Treaty of becoming a part of regional architecture.
of Amity and Cooperation, and in 2012, India Further achievements on its diplomatic
and ASEAN released a vision statement. In scorecard include founding membership of the
2015, India opened the doors to its dedicated East Asian Summit in 2005 and the declaration
ASEAN mission in Jakarta. Since the early of India and ASEAN’s strategic partnership
2000s, India–ASEAN ties have evolved into a in 2012.
The idea of economic corridors is gaining For India, closer relations with ASEAN is also
greater traction in states and between one avenue for greater engagement with
them, with India and Southeast Asia being ASEAN–centric regional architecture such as
no exception. The benefits of such corridors the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN
include complementarity with existing Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+).
movement of people and goods and the growth Support from ASEAN states is also essential for
of specific sectors.75 The Indo-Pacific Economic entry into other significant infrastructure such
Corridor (IPEC) is a reflection of increasing as the East Asian Summit (EAS). India was a
salience of perceiving the Indian and Pacific founding member of EAS, which was launched
regions as a more interconnected entity: the in 2005. Other ASEAN–centric fora of which
Indo-Pacific. While nascent, the corridor India is a member include Extended ASEAN
can provide another focal point for economic Maritime Forum. India’s participation in these
integration should larger falter, as we have fora provide further legitimacy for the values
seen with the TPP. The challenges for such a and order-building processes they support. As
corridor are not unique, however, and reflect mentioned earlier, India signing of ASEAN’s
ongoing issues in between India and Southeast Treaty of Amity and Cooperation is both
Asia, namely, cost and difficulty of transport functional an undertaking to promote peace
infrastructure construction, security in India’s and stability, and at the same time, symbolic as
northeast and underdevelopment of the ASEAN an acceptance of ASEAN’s pre-eminent role in
Economic Community.76 Indo-Pacific norm-setting.
An initiative like the IPEC could reinforce The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) is
national approaches such as the Global another important regional grouping for India
Maritime Fulcrum vision advanced by and Southeast Asia—four out of ten ASEAN
Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo. As part of members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and
the vision, Indonesia will intensify connectivity Thailand) are members. With its focus on Indian
between its archipelagic islands by upgrading Ocean affairs and a rotating chairpersonship,
existing maritime infrastructure and building the grouping is an opportunity to build
more airports, highways and railways. It cooperation on economic issues, women’s
further envisions Indonesia becoming a empowerment and maritime security in India’s
critical regional gateway, even more than it strategic backyard. By virtue of geography,
currently is, between the major oceans of the current membership does not include China,
region. There is this opportunity to leverage the US or Russia, so avoids some of the
the appetite of both India’s and Indonesia’s traditional competition India experiences in
policymakers to cooperate in these areas from other significant fora.77
facilitating information sharing all the way to
While at times IORA and ASEAN-led groupings
joint ventures.
can be unwieldy, it remains important for
India and Southeast Asia to invest in both
building closer ties with bilateral partners
and deepening engagement in fora. The
crisscrossing network of Indian and Pacific
Ocean bilateral and multilateral interactions are
mutually reinforcing and help to keep shared
objectives on the agenda.
Defence and Security and the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines
have made headlines with bombings and
India’s ability to expand its engagement with beheadings. To address those threats, India
Southeast Asia was enabled by its post-Cold and ASEAN signed a joint declaration in
War military modernisation. In particular, the 2003 which outlines closer cooperation in
development of a blue water navy has allowed a number of areas including building ties
the sub-continent to expand its program between law enforcement agencies, improving
of naval exercises to include Southeast intelligence sharing, and strengthening capacity
Asian partners. building efforts.78
India’s boost to its ‘Look East’ policy is also a With the rise of the Islamic State, there is
response to China’s evolving role in the region. greater concern that citizens are travelling
As China seeks closer ties to partners in the to the Iraq–Syria theatre and could return
Indian Ocean region (India’s strategic backyard) to fight on the home front with new tactics
to preserve its interests in open sea lanes of and recruitment techniques. At the 2016 IISS
communication, India has in turn reached out Shangri-La Dialogue, India’s Defence Minister
to partners like Indonesia on maritime issues Manohar Parrikar stated unequivocally,
such as illegal fishing. Likewise India maintains “terrorism remains the foremost challenge to
an interest in partnering with other Southeast our region”.79 In response, the ASEAN Defence
Asian states regarding trade routes in the Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+), of which India
Western Pacific, as it seeks to build ties with is a member, includes an exercise on maritime
Japan. That said, it should be emphasised that security and counter terrorism, the most recent
India’s desire to build more varied ties in the iteration of which was held in Brunei and
region also includes better ties with China. Singapore in May 2016.80
In terms of multilateral defence cooperation,
India has been holding naval exercises known Key Bilateral Relationships
as MILAN in the Nicobar and Andaman Islands Aside from its aims to engage ASEAN as
since 1995, which have grown to include South a regional bloc, India also enjoys growing
China Sea littoral states: Brunei, Cambodia, relationships with individual Southeast
Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Asian states. While India enjoys unique
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The exercises relationships with each of its ten Southeast
also include non–ASEAN partners such as Asian partners, this paper will consider the
Australia and Bangladesh. The exercises three most important—Indonesia, Vietnam
focus on humanitarian and disaster relief but and Myanmar— based on their geopolitical
also improve communication and familiarity
In the first months of 2017, Indonesia hosted a In strategic terms, Vietnam plays an important
series of summits focused on the blue economy, role for India’s objectives in guarding sea lanes
including the World Ocean Summit in February, of communication and establishing a presence
and Indian Ocean region, importantly, the IORA in the South China Sea. In October 2011, India
Leaders’ Summit in March.82 and Vietnam signed an agreement to let the
former’s state-owned oil company conduct
India and Indonesia have the potential to expand greater exploration in Vietnam’s EEZ in the
defence cooperation. India and Indonesia South China Sea. That has been followed by
have conducted biannual coordinated patrols another agreement regarding an increase of oil
(INDINDOCORPAT) in the Six Degree Channel blocks in the same area.
in the Andaman Sea since September 2002.
During his state visit to New Delhi in December Bilateral trade relations have grown, although
2016, Jokowi held a joint press conference with remain modest. India is one of Vietnam’s
Modi during which they announced greater top ten trading partners, with the volume
efforts to prioritise defence and security of bilateral trade surpassing US$9 billion.86
relations. In February 2017, it was announced Indian investment in Vietnam has remained
that India and Indonesia would conduct their steady, with major sectors including energy,
first ever air combat exercise, as further mineral exploration, agro-processing, sugar
evidence of growing ties between their armed manufacturing, agro-chemicals, IT and auto
forces beyond naval engagement.83 components.87 Both leaders called on greater
two-way investment during Modi’s Hanoi trip.
Also significant is Indonesia’s position as India’s
largest ASEAN trading partner, with bilateral Another important source of bilateral
trade valued at US$15.9 billion in 2015–16.84 cooperation is India’s burgeoning defence
Jokowi’s December entourage also included export industry. During his visit to Hanoi in
a high-powered business delegation to boost September 2016, Modi also agreed to increase
economic engagement, while the President a line of credit for Vietnam to US$500 million.
himself met with Indian CEOs to encourage After the sale of the BrahMos supersonic
further investment.85 missile to Vietnam stalled, it was reported in
January this year that India is now “actively
Vietnam discussing” the sale of a medium-range
surface-to-air missile defence system, known
India–Vietnam ties have grown over the years as Akash, to Vietnam.88 The capability allows
from a Joint Declaration on the Framework Vietnam to target drones and helicopters to
of Comprehensive Cooperation signed by a range of 25km. The benefits also flow both
their foreign ministers in 2003, to a strategic ways; Vietnam’s role as a buyer gives India’s
partnership brokered in November 2007 to defence industry a global boost, with one
a “comprehensive strategic partnership” scholar noting that ‘Made in India’ defence
announced during Modi’s visit to Hanoi in program is “likely to be viable only if there is
September 2016. In accordance with these a significant export component to it”.89 India’s
agreements, the countries have hosted a military has also expanded training with its
number of strategic dialogues and high-level Vietnamese counterpart. Currently, India
visits by leaders. Vietnam’s Prime Minister, trains Vietnamese submariners on Kilo-class
Nguyen Tan Dung, visited New Delhi in submarines but from 2017, defence cooperation
November 2014. Bilateral cooperation has will extend to India’s air force training
largely centred on economic and defence Vietnamese pilots on Sukhoi Su-30 fighter jets.
cooperation, with key developments responding
to events in the South China Sea.
Conclusion
Looking to the future, India and Southeast Asia common ground in wanting greater connectivity,
will continue to build ties amid ever-complex two-way trade and investment, and collective
regional challenges which range from security bargaining power at regional fora. With relative
issues to environmental pressure, domestic uncertainty about the US’ role in the Indo-
political upheavals and strategic competition Pacific region, which make take a few years to
between major players. India and its Southeast take shape, as well as its position on issues
Asian partners have an enduring interest in the such as climate change and free trade, it will
peace and stability of the region, particularly be up to the region’s more active and activist
sea lanes of communication. As developing players—India and ASEAN—to work together in
states (Singapore being the exception) with sustaining diplomatic focus on these issues as
young populations with the need for further well as push for tangible results.
economic growth, India and the sub-region find
PAGE 42 V. Transformation through Cyber-innovation: The Great Indian Technological Leap
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V. Transformation through Cyber-innovation: The Great Indian Technological Leap PAGE 43
REALISING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
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It is not in the B2C space alone that Indian Policy interventions have also increasingly
companies are using cyberspace and digital to started playing an important role in the growth
innovate. While some of the Indian IT service of India’s digital economy. GoI has responded
companies – behemoths in their space – have to the sudden spurt in creative and innovative
been accused of being late in the game when activity and the potential market size that
it came to developing software products and India’s start-ups can tap into, by offering
strengthening their capabilities in a world tax concessions to start up ventures, and
increasingly moving to the cloud, new Indian announcing an INR100bn. government fund for
startups are gradually making inroads into financing tech start-ups.106 The Securities and
the enterprise software domain. Companies Exchange Board of India has also relaxed the
like Fractal and MuSigma have invested in listing norms for start-ups, making it easier
data analytics solutions, helping enterprises for them to raise capital from the public. To
better their internal processes, enhance address skilling shortages, a major problem
their productivity and tap bigger markets. when a mere 2.3% of the Indian workforce has
In a validation of domestic competence and formal skills training, GoI has been promoting
capabilities, GoI relied on an Indian startup – the Skill India Mission.107 The most important
Lucideus – to create the entire cybersecurity components of this program are providing a
framework for a recent digital payment massive unskilled workforce with skills valued
solution, Bharat Interface for Money (BHIM).105 by the industry, helping potential employers tap
into a skilled and certified talent pool for their
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organisations, and harnessing India’s youth was to provide access to a limited number
power to fill the gap of skilled professionals of websites for free, thus helping users in
in an ageing developed world. The multi-skill inaccessible regions gain a basic preview of the
institutes established on public-private- internet’s offerings. Unfortunately, regulatory
partnership mode under this program have ambiguity coupled with vocal citizen activism
been mandated with the task of imparting IT caused premature termination of zero rating
skills to the workforce. Tech giants like Intel proposals without a serious conversation on
and startups like Olacabs have partnered basic internet and novel ways to provide that
with GoI, seeking to impart skills needed for to citizens.
employability in a digital economy.
Regulatory blockages has been a big concern in
GoI and the governments of various states are other areas of the digital economy too. Certain
also betting big on the promise of information States have come down upon cab aggregator
and communications technology to transform services for offering ride-sharing services,
governance and citizen-State interaction. citing obsolete laws and regulatory frameworks.
Several studies have shown a positive GoI has gone about regulating the inflow of
correlation between ICT infrastructure and GDP foreign direct investment in online retail in
growth. As per the World Bank, 10% growth an erroneous manner. Its basic strategy has
in mobile and broadband penetration can been to cap the possibilities of this model to
increase GDP by 0.81% and 1.38% respectively the same level as physical retailers and place
in developing countries.108 In realisation of this restraints on the ability of online retailers to
fact, the Digital India program, launched by GoI use data analytics to the fullest. In all fairness,
in July 2015, is built on nine pillars: broadband regulators world over are grappling with some
for all rural and urban areas; universal of these issues. But, for a country that aspires
access to mobile connectivity; public internet to leapfrog using cyber innovations, India has
access program; e-governance; e-delivery not taken any great institutional measures
of services; information for all; domestic towards recasting its regulatory institutions as
electronics manufacturing; IT for jobs; and early facilitative actors.
harvest programs. A projected expenditure of
INR1,130 billion. is involved, but the returns can Several Indian “unicorns” are on cash burn
also be immense. mode, and have accumulated considerable
losses over the years. In the 2014-15 financial
But the digital transition has not been without year, Flipkart, Snapdeal, and Ola – three big
its share of concerns and worries. India has Indian startups – reported losses of INR20bn,
a long way to go before the benefits of digital INR13.28bn, and INR7.96bn respectively.110
transition trickle down to a majority of its Paytm, a digital wallet and e-commerce startup,
population. With the GoI’s flagship National saw its losses escalate 312% over the previous
Optic Fiber Network project (to connect all year to touch INR15.34 billion. 111The total value
villages with a 100 megabits per second of startup deals more than halved in 2016,
broadband line) proceeding tardily at present,109 coming down to US$4 billion, rendering capital
not everyone is connected to the internet access more precious than before.112 These may
through broadband or even a mobile phone. appear to be market concerns at first glance
Fewer than two in five Indian businesses have but when scrutinised more closely, present a
an online presence, and a residential broadband cautionary tale for Indian policy makers too.
service costs between six to ten times the India cannot afford to hedge all her bets in
cost in China. To address the lack of access, the start-up revolution led largely by young
particularly in rural areas, some zero-rating private entrepreneurs and venture capital funds
proposals including the controversial Facebook backing them. It is imperative to have a longer
free basics, were mooted. The essential idea vision to build an innovative society.
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The National Innovation Policy and the provision of government services. The platform
Intellectual Property Rights Policy have itself is based on biometric authentication,
recognised the need for a broader innovation and allows access to both public and private
ecosystem and emphasised the importance players. Aiming to reduce costs and increase
of measures such as tinkering labs for school efficiency in service delivery, the government is
children and faster patent grants for inventors. incentivizing the development of applications
But these measures require an attitudinal connected to the Aadhaar system. Based on
shift in the mentality of people before they can open API models, these include the Unified
achieve some success. A traditional society Payments Interface (UPI), e-Know Your
that has largely been driven by a linear notion Customer model (e-KYC), and the Aadhaar
of progress and career advancement, India has Enabled Payment System (AEPS), among
not thus far been able to create a critical mass others. This ‘Indiastack’ system, has already
of high-quality scientific and technological begun taking shape. It seeks to not only make
research institutions that would attract the governance more efficient and transparent,
best of talent. This is also why the country but also facilitate greater digital transactions
has lagged in framework technologies and between individuals or enterprises.
products- with most Indian companies limiting
their sights to market-based innovation. Unless What is even more encouraging is that
these concerns are addressed soon, India’s institutions like the Reserve Bank of India (RBI)
opportunity to make the most of the digital and the Securities and Exchange Board of India
revolution will stand seriously hampered. (SEBI) are embracing these developments. The
RBI’s Vision 2018 document commits to moving
towards a cashless economy through promotion
Techno-Diplomacy and the Indian of electronic means.113 Meanwhile, SEBI has
Potential allowed digitising equity and mutual fund
investments through the eKYC system.114 Taken
In a world shaped by constant adoption of new
together, these innovations have the potential
technologies, the technological capabilities of
to become game changers for the national
nations will continue to play an increasingly
economy. India therefore, has truly unique
important part in international relations. The
technological innovations and capabilities to
control of specific technologies and the role of
offer to the world. Its partners in the Indo-
technology in conducting foreign policy will no
Pacific region can gain from India’s experience
longer be the sole domain of governments. In
in designing and implementing these
this context, this section focuses on two sub-
solutions in a vast economy across a massive
themes: India’s unique technological solutions
demographic space.
that may benefit the global community generally
and the Indo-Pacific region specifically; and As mentioned above, technology governance
India’s role in global technology governance. is no longer the sole domain of national
governments. It is a two-way street where
India has been a major beneficiary of the
international debates and national policies
internet and mobile revolution, which has
shape each other in equal measure, and the
transformed services, processes, and
role of (and coordination between) stakeholders
workflows across sectors. The wholehearted
across industry, civil society, and government
embrace of this revolution by governments
become critical. In this scenario, as India
in India has enabled significant and unique
continues to grow, the way it responds to
innovations in the country. The most important
technology changes will be extremely important
initiative in this area is the Unique Identification
for two reasons. Firstly, the sheer economic
project (Aadhaar). The world’s largest
potential of the country, which by 2022 is
identification project, with more than a billion-
slated to be the largest in the world in terms
people enrolled, Aadhaar is set to become
of population.115 Secondly, much of India’s
the most important enabling platform for the
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economic growth is dependent on its adoption the first non-OECD country to do so.120
of new technologies and of business models This newfound energy is welcome for two
that are derived from them. significant reasons.
Historically India’s approach to debates on Firstly, the Indo-Pacific region is home to the
technology has been quite complex. On one most dynamic digital economies and companies
hand, India has generally taken a leadership in the world. With countries such as India,
position on traditional technology debates, China, Australia and Singapore and their
especially nuclear technology. On the other upward development trajectory, the potential
hand, on many of the major issues that have for future growth is immense. The future of
cropped up in the last two decades, India’s the internet will therefore be decided by the
position has tended to be reactive. There has positions taken by the nations of this region.
however been a perceptible shift in this attitude This is especially true of India, which not only
over the last three years, highlighted below. has an immense, untapped digital market,
but is also the third biggest start-up hub in
Given their military and moral implications, the the world.121
development of Lethal Autonomous Weapon
Systems (LAWS) has generated an intense and Secondly, the Indo-Pacific will be home to two
growing debate in the international community. of the biggest internet markets in the world,
India, however, has seemed to be a reluctant China and India. These two countries, however,
party to this debate. When discussions on represent two very different ideological
LAWS began under the aegis of the Convention approaches on cyberspace governance. China
on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), has been pressing for ‘national boundaries’ in
India’s role, for the most part, was perfunctory. cyberspace, with each country having complete
It is only at the most recent Review of the control over its ‘territorial’ internet. India, on
Conference of Parties to the CCW that India the other hand, supports a multi-stakeholder
made its stand clear and outlined the issues model, where the government constitutes only
important to it.116 With the CCW starting a one among several stakeholders who have a
more formal process, India has finally begun stake in how the internet is to be governed. The
taking on a more prominent role, evidenced multi-stakeholder model both preserves the
by its elevation as the chair of the Group of fundamental ideal of the internet and provides
Governmental Experts (GGE) on LAWS.117 This the necessary regulatory space for open
is indicative of a new resolve to push itself onto digital economies.
the global technology high table.
A more assertive India which is willing to take
Similarly, until recently, India punched far on a bigger international role therefore provides
below its weight in discussions on internet a fillip to the idea of a democratic internet as
governance. In spite of being one of the biggest opposed to the walled-off cyberspace that China
digital economies in the world, India had never advocates. This in turn aligns neatly with both
aimed for a leadership role. In the last couple the interests and ideals of not only India, but
of years however, India has begun waking other democratic states in the Indo-Pacific,
up from this stupor. In 2016, India hosted especially Australia and Japan.
the annual Internet Corporation of Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN) summit118 Balancing the Digital Impact
and was included as a member of the UN
GGE, assessing developments in information The immense benefits of the digital age,
and telecommunications technology within however, should not disregard the potential
the context of international security.119 India negative implications. Increasing digitization
will also host the 2017 session of the Global makes both national security and individual
Conference on Cyber Space (GCSS), becoming rights considerably more vulnerable. In this
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context, given the size and complexity of India’s 2013, the creation of the position of National
digital economy, its national cyber security Cyber Security Coordinator in 2014, and the
infrastructure is underdeveloped. Currently it is fast tracking of the National Cyber Coordination
an odd mix of at least half a dozen organizations Centre in 2016, these fall far short of what is
with ill-defined jurisdictions. While the required at this stage.
Indian Computer Emergency Response Team
(CERT-In) is the designated frontline agency, In this scenario, there exist immense
protection of critical national infrastructure possibilities for collaboration among the
falls under the jurisdiction of the National countries of the Indo-Pacific on cyber-security.
Critical Information Infrastructure Protection The rapid development of a malevolent Chinese
Centre (NCIIPC), which in turn works under cyber presence poses a significant threat to
the National Technical Research Organisation all its neighbours. With this in mind, India’s
(NTRO). Meanwhile the three armed services inadequate cyber-security infrastructure, India
have their own CERTs. The banking sector has much to learn from the other members of
has a dedicated Information Sharing and the region. Australia and Japan especially, are
Analysis Centre (ISAC), and on top of this, the significantly ahead of India in this sphere. While
government has announced the establishment India has already signed information-sharing
of a cyber security response team specifically agreements with both countries,125 there
for the financial sector. The result of such a exists significant scope to expand cooperation.
disparate structure therefore, is that India has Continuous exchange of best practices, trained
no integrated national framework to respond to personnel, and technology, coupled with
cyber-security incidents. open digital economies, would deepen the
relationship between the countries of
The lack of such an incident management the Indo-Pacific.
structure has been highlighted by multiple
cyber-attacks and data breaches in recent Concurrently, India’s data protection and
years, including on the Indian Navy’s Eastern privacy regime is below par. Without a unified
Command in 2012,122 and the top-secret regulatory framework, reliance is placed
Scorpene submarine program.123 More on disparate legislations that have limited
concerning than the attacks themselves is application. Intellectual property laws,
the apparent inability of the Indian state to consumer laws, financial and healthcare
evolve a response to such threats. The attacks sector regulations and communication network
mentioned above, along with a handful of regulations,126 all deal with data protection in
others, are among the few that are known, some form or the other. With the proposed
primarily due to third parties. When, in October ‘Privacy Bill’127 stuck in bureaucratic quagmire,
2016, information about India’s biggest data the Information Technology Act of 2000 continues
breach in the banking sector – about 3.2 to be the primary legislation for privacy and
million debit cards were compromised – came data protection issues.
to light, it also emerged that customers were The Act penalizes acts such as unauthorised
kept in the dark for quite a while about the access to a computer network and illegal
security vulnerabilities.124 The government downloading of data; imposing civil or criminal
itself refuses to divulge information regarding liability, depending on the nature of the
any cyber-attack. This makes it hard to offence. A 2008 amendment to the Act provides
accurately judge the true extent of Indian cyber- for monetary compensation for failure to
space vulnerability. protect sensitive personal data. This has been
Though a few tentative steps have been taken reinforced by the Information Technology Rules
to rectify this in recent years, including the of 2011,128 which introduced globally recognised
drafting of a National Cyber Security Policy in principles like consent, use principle, collection
PAGE 48 V. Transformation through Cyber-innovation: The Great Indian Technological Leap
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limitation etc in India. However, with limited doorstep. However, in the absence of clearly
scope and application insofar as they cover formulated laws, even court decisions dealing
only body corporates and certain kinds of with data protection and privacy have been
data (‘sensitive personal’), coupled with an ad hoc and inconsistent. While the Supreme
inadequate enforcement apparatus, these rules Court has stated that Aadhaar cannot be made
are far from the framework that India needs.129 mandatory,132 the Aadhaar Act and the frenetic
rollout without waiting for further judicial
Similarly, the Aadhaar system is not without its guidance circumvents this directive. Further, the
share of concerns. The collection and recording constitutional status of a right to privacy is still
of personal data, including biometrics, has been ambiguous, with the matter pending before the
executed arguably in disregard of established Supreme Court.133 There is also no law dealing
security and privacy standards. Indeed, a with the right to privacy against private parties,
massive number of citizens were enrolled though the Supreme Court has admitted a
without any legal or best practices framework petition, challenging Whatsapp’s updated
in place.130 The enrolment exercise started in privacy policy, that may lead to a development
September 2010 but the framework legislation in this direction.134 Though the decisions of the
came into effect only by 2016. By this time, court in these cases will be significant, we can
a billion people had already been enrolled. reasonably assume that it will be a while before
Moreover, the applications of this identity the final judgments are delivered.
number have increased manifold from when
the project was originally conceptualised. Many The growth and development of the Indian
of the new applications require the central economy is contingent on how India’s data
authority to share some of the Aadhaar data protection regime is shaped. That India’s lack of
with ‘requesting entities’, ie. private operators data security laws is a major impediment in the
who have developed solutions on top of the India-EU Free Trade Agreement, is illustrative
database. While this could pave the path for of the problems brought on by the absence of a
several efficient solutions, the gateway for data robust framework. Moreover, the idea of digital
sharing needs to be safe and secure. Whether it itself is undergoing severe transition as we
is so at the moment is a matter of concern. speak, with more big data and analytics models
evolving as a result of artificial intelligence
Serious concerns have also been raised enabled solutions. At a time when governments
regarding the absence of any security breach and industries are competing to present huge
notifications to the public. This is particularly volumes of data in indiscriminate fashion to
crucial considering the realm of information number-crunching algorithms, it is important
gathered includes core biometric features. Even to evaluate where India and the Indo-Pacific are
assuming the Aadhaar legislation131 sufficiently headed in terms of outcomes. Do we wish for a
safeguards the gathered data when kept in common future where the privacy of residents
the custody of the nodal unique identification of this part of the world are safe and secure
authority, misuse of such data by truant private and there exists full awareness of how, and in
actors is a real possibility. This is especially what way, the data shall be analysed and used?
significant given the government’s plan to Or do we allow ourselves to hurtle unplanned
diversify the use of Aadhaar via the Indiastack into a future where nations in this region battle
initiative. As there exists no opt-out mechanism with each other to establish supremacy of
for citizens under the Act, once data is parted domestic standards? There is much that India
with for purposes of enrolment, there is no can gain through cooperation with countries in
turning back. the Indo-Pacific, especially the likes of Australia
Consequently, in light of the inadequate and Singapore, which have comprehensive
statutory framework, the concerns that have information privacy and data protection policies.
arisen here have ended up at the judiciary’s The earlier we do so, the better.
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Conclusion
Predictions are rife that humankind is fast With India being one of the largest economies
approaching ‘technological singularity’ – the of the world and an innovator for increasingly
moment when humanity stands surpassed by relevant ideas such as an open cyberspace and
intelligent machines.135 In such an increasingly responsible innovation, India’s principal role in
tech-dependent world, the future of nations will the Indo-Pacific would be to foster and facilitate
surely hinge on their ability to both innovate this cooperation. India can, and must, drive
and keep pace with global conversations on such cooperation, to both shape international
technology. Given the dispersed nature of the dialogues, and create an enabling environment
digital sphere however, such innovation, and its for its innovation exports.
effects, will not be concentrated in any single
country. This necessitates closer cooperation But for the benefits of India’s transformation
among the global community in general, and to percolate to the rest of the globe, India
the countries of the Indo-Pacific in particular. needs to have regulatory frameworks that
Only through such cooperation can India and respect individual rights and liberties in the
other nations in the region live up to their digital space, and promote inclusive growth. A
digital potential. The stances of the countries consequentialist view of technology where ends
of the Indo-Pacific, and India particularly, will justify the means will not help because India’s
increasingly determine the future of cyberspace growth will at best be viewed with scepticism
and technological innovation. It is imperative and at worst, openly distrusted.
therefore that these countries begin taking on
leadership roles in the global debates on new
technologies. While India has begun doing this
recently, there exists greater scope to shape
global dialogues in a direction beneficial to the
countries of this region.
PAGE 50 V. Transformation through Cyber-innovation: The Great Indian Technological Leap
CHAPTER VI.
The Regional
Comprehensive
Economic Partnership
(RCEP): India’s
economic bridge to Asia
REALISING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
Tasks For India’s Regional Integration
For many years, India has been a relative with regional production networks in Asia;
outsider to the Asian economic region. and will for the first time formally include
Despite its geographic proximity to the fast- India in the regional economic architecture.
growing economies of East Asia, its trade But to take advantage of RCEP, the Modi
and investment ties with the region remain government will need to adjust many long-
under-developed. Nor has India been an active standing trade and foreign economic policies.
player in the intergovernmental architecture for It will need to manage challenging domestic
economic cooperation. It is absent from many policy reforms, shift its trade diplomacy from
of the region’s major economic organisations, a global to regional focus, and strike a balance
and is not densely embedded in network of between competing economic and geopolitical
bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) which imperatives. As talks move toward completion
now dominate the Asian trade system. As Asia in 2017, RCEP will prove a test for whether the
has for several decades being the most dynamic Modi government can economically re-orient
region of the global economy, India is arguably India towards new partners in Asia.
missing the economic opportunities that
would come from deeper engagement with its India’s relative absence from the
eastern neighbours. Asia-Pacific economic region
The Regional Comprehensive Economic
The Asia-Pacific is the most dynamic region
Partnership (RCEP) trade agreement promises
of the global economy. For three decades,
to end India’s economic isolation from Asia. The
the widely lauded Asian economic miracle
RCEP is one of two mega-regional FTAs – the
has delivered a consistent – and with minor
other being the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
exceptions, largely uninterrupted – period
– which have been under negotiation in Asia in
of high-speed growth, industrialisation and
recent years. It promises a new approach for
urbanisation. Like Europe’s reconstruction
the regional trade architecture, by establishing
following the Second World War, Asia’s recent
a multilateral trade bloc between Association of
economic dynamism has not been a purely
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its ‘Plus
national effort. Its economies did not grow
Six’ FTA partners. And unlike the TPP, RCEP
through closure and protectionism, but rather
offers an ‘Asian’ model for trade liberalisation,
a process of progressive opening, liberalisation
based on inclusivity, multilateralism and
and integration. There was also a regional
sensitivity to developing country concerns.
flavour to this process, with cross-border
RCEP negotiations had made slow progress
production networks – in industries as diverse
since they began in 2013, but with the collapse
as consumer goods, electronics, agro-food
of the TPP have recently attracted renewed
and machinery – linking Asia’s economies
attention. Backed by Chinese leadership, the
through inter-industry trade and investment
RCEP negotiating parties have committed to
ties136. These production networks created
finalising talks by the end of 2017.
mutually-beneficial division of labour, based
RCEP provides India an historic opportunity on ‘production sharing’ between countries with
to ‘bridge the economic gap’ with East Asia. It complementary endowments of capital, labour,
embodies a type of trade reform which is more natural resources and technology137.
consistent with India’s economic interests;
offers opportunities for Indian firms to integrate
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REALISING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
Tasks For India’s Regional Integration
Despite its geographical proximity to Asia Trade illustrates this pattern. Due to the density
and the Pacific, India has not been an active of inter-industry links in production networks,
participant in Asian economic regionalism. most economies in Asia display a strong trade
For much of its post-Independence history, bias towards regional partners. Asian countries
India adopted import-substitution economic typically conduct around half of their total
strategies that closed its economy to foreign trade with the ASEAN+6 group (Table 1). In
trade and investment. This pattern was comparison, only one-quarter of India’s two-way
reversed by the gradualist liberalising reforms trade is with Asia; while the US, EU and Middle
that have taken place since 1991, which have East are relatively more important partners.
rapidly opened India to the world economy. Nor is a significant share of the Indian economy
However, India’s economic integration with Asia coupled with the Asian region. ASEAN+6 trade
continues to be relatively under-developed. is equivalent to a paltry 8.4% of India’s GDP,
reflecting the fact that few of its industries are
integrated with regional production networks.
Indeed, India’s trade ties with Asia are weaker
than those with other regions, despite the fact
it shares land borders and low-cost maritime
links with many Asian countries.
VI. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP): India’s economic bridge to Asia PAGE 53
REALISING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
Tasks For India’s Regional Integration
India-Asia investment links are similarly under- Organization (WTO) speaks to this stance138.
developed. Overall, India has a relatively low Since independence, it has also maintained
level of inward FDI – with FDI stocks equivalent a position of non-alignment in foreign policy,
to 12.7% of GDP in 2015 – when compared which has seen it avoid participation in regional
to other economies of similar development blocs beyond those in its own neighbourhood
levels (Table 2). Relatively little of this foreign of South Asia. Unfortunately, the consequence
investment comes from Asia, with only 10.5% has been the exclusion of India from the
of India’s current FDI stocks are from Asian architecture for Asian economic integration.
PAGE 54 VI. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP): India’s economic bridge to Asia
REALISING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
Tasks For India’s Regional Integration
represented when discussions on the shape of India has not been an enthusiastic participant
regional economic cooperation occur. in this emerging bilateral architecture. It
currently only has agreements with Japan,
India’s integration with the regional trade Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore (Table 3).
system is also weak. For many years, Asian Beyond these, it relies on its ‘Plus 1’ FTA with
governments favoured multilateral trade the ASEAN bloc to govern most of its Asian
policies, which promoted liberalisation either trade. Ongoing FTA negotiations with several
globally through the WTO or regionally via regional economies have dragged on for several
APEC. However, during the 2000s, regional years, particularly talks with Australia and
governments changed their trade policy Indonesia that have been underway since 2011.
strategies. Bilateral FTAs – agreements which This reflects the fact that India’s trade strategy
preferentially lower trade barriers between has not actively targeted the Asia-Pacific
only two countries – increasingly came into region, instead favouring FTAs with partners
favour. In the year 2000, the Asia-Pacific was in its South Asian neighbourhood such as
home to only four bilateral FTAs. But the end Nepal, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, and the South
of 2015, 52 bilateral FTAs had been negotiated Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
between Asia-Pacific governments, and a (SAARC). This puts India is at a disadvantage
further 50 were signed with parties outside when attempting to build trade and investment
the region141. These agreements dramatically ties with Asia. As FTAs are positional goods –
overhauled regional trade system, from one which offer preferential market access only for
based on multilateralism to one characterised members—Indian firms face discrimination
by a patchwork of over 100 overlapping when competing with firms from countries
bilateral agreements142. whose governments are more densely
embedded in the bilateral network.
VI. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP): India’s economic bridge to Asia PAGE 55
REALISING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
Tasks For India’s Regional Integration
Relative exclusion from the Asian economic APEC in 1989143, and continued through to the
region is a missed opportunity for India. TPP agreement signed in 2015. By corollary,
It is poorly connected with the regional this regional model excluded India. RCEP
production networks that have for several breaks with this tradition by instead favouring
decades driven growth in the manufacturing an Indo-Pacific membership model144. The
sectors of Asian economies. It has not negotiating parties include ASEAN and the ‘Plus
been able to take full economic advantage Six’ countries with which it currently has FTAs:
of the huge Asian markets – for exports Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, and New
outwards, and investment inwards – that sit Zealand. RCEP therefore includes India but
on its doorstep. It is also absent from the key excludes the US.
intergovernmental organisations, depriving the
This historic shift from an Asia to
Indian government a voice in discussions for
Indo- Pacific membership model is
how the rules supporting economic integration
PAGE 56 VI. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP): India’s economic bridge to Asia
REALISING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
Tasks For India’s Regional Integration
not traditionally a matter for FTAs. These Third, RCEP provides a multilateral platform
include an upgrading of existing mechanisms for economic engagement with Asia. The
for economic and technical cooperation to proliferation of bilateral FTAs during the 2000s
narrow developmental gaps within the region, has posed what trade economists call the
alongside special and differential treatment for ‘noodle bowl problem’147. Rather than having
the least developed members. a single integrated system, the region is now
Source: RCEP Parties (2013), Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/rcep/Documents/guiding-principles-rcep.pdf)
Given that RCEP has lower reform ambitions fragmented into many bilateral deals with
than the TPP, some have criticised it as not widely differing content and rules. This leads
going far enough in liberalising trade145. But to trade diversion, where economies can gain
from an Indian perspective this is an advantage, (and lose) export markets due to the marginal
as it greatly lowers the reform costs. India effects of FTAs rather than the underlying
has long advocated for developing country patterns of comparative advantage. Businesses
interests in international trade negotiations146, face increased transaction costs, as they must
and has been particularly vocal in opposing ensure compliance with literally dozens of
intellectual property rules that may threaten different rules for each of their key markets.
its burgeoning pharmaceuticals industry. The These costs are especially prohibitive for
absence of labour, IP and ISDS provisions in small and medium enterprises, which lack the
RCEP greatly lowers the bar for developing capacity to secure the necessary commercial
economies and makes the agreement more and legal advice.
palatable to domestic constituencies. It also
means the principal focus will instead be on
lowering barriers to goods and services trade.
This is precisely where India stands to make the
greatest gains: by developing its export oriented
manufacturing and services sectors.
VI. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP): India’s economic bridge to Asia PAGE 57
REALISING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
Tasks For India’s Regional Integration
PAGE 58 VI. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP): India’s economic bridge to Asia
REALISING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
Tasks For India’s Regional Integration
Myanmar State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and India’s Prime
Minister Narendra Modi in October. Courtesy: MEA (Ministry of
External Affairs)
RCEP will also require a reorientation of participation in RCEP will require this position
India’s economic diplomacy. It has long been to change. While India can retain a commitment
committed to multilateral trade at a global to trade multilateralism, it must transition from
level, advocating for developing country a having a global to a regional focus.
interests for several decades through the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and Such a ‘regional turn’ in Indian trade policy is
WTO negotiations rounds.152 It has also taken not without complications. At its most basic,
a leadership role as a trade coalition builder, the Indian government must redirect scarce
working with Brazil to establish the G20 and negotiating resources – and the political
G33 developing nation blocs following the WTO’s capital required to push through domestic
Cancun Ministerial conference of 2003.153 The reforms – from the WTO to RCEP processes.
global orientation of its trade policy is reflected Many also blame the current crisis in the WTO
in the relatively low priority which has been on the proliferation of bilateral and regional
accorded to bilateral and regional FTAs, with FTAs, which are argued to have sucked energy
India having signed fewer of these agreements out of the Doha round. While mega-regional
than many of its peers in Asia (Table 3). Active agreements like RCEP attempt to maintain
VI. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP): India’s economic bridge to Asia PAGE 59
REALISING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
Tasks For India’s Regional Integration
the pace of trade liberalisation while the Indian involvement in RCEP is therefore an
WTO is stalled, their existence also implicitly inherently geopolitical act. While ostensibly
recognises that global level trade reform is ‘ASEAN-centred’, since negotiations began
impossible in the current political and economic in 2013 the RCEP process has been led by
climate. If India shifts from lukewarm to active China. China has also exploited the collapse
participation in the RCEP negotiations, it will to of the TPP to stake its claim to regional
some extent mark an acknowledgement of this leadership on RCEP. At the APEC Summit in
reality, and a step back from its commitment to November 2016, Xi Jinping called on partners
developing world advocacy in the WTO. Whether to support a Chinese drive to complete the
India is willing to give these longstanding RCEP negotiations by the end of 2017.156 Active
positions up and ‘go regional’ on trade is an participation in RCEP means backing a set of
open question. regional arrangements in which China is both
the lynchpin for economic integration, as well
Finally, there is also the complicating as the political driving force behind institution-
matter of geopolitical alignments in Asia. building. For India, this is not a straightforward
RCEP’s development was intimately bound move. Given its longstanding (albeit recently
up with the TPP, the other mega-regional questioned)157 commitment to non-alignment,
FTA launched in recent years. The TPP and its often-tense bilateral relationship with
and RCEP were competing proposals, with China, RCEP is an awkward fit with India’s
differing memberships and trade reform broader geopolitical considerations. India’s
ambitions. Significantly – if somewhat RCEP strategy will therefore requires striking
unfortunately – they were also dragged into a balance between economic, security and
the matter of China-US leadership rivalry. diplomatic imperatives.
The US government described the TPP as the
“economic wing” of its ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy, From India’s perspective, RCEP is both an
while President Obama argued it would ensure opportunity and challenge. It will require
the US and not China would “write the rules of significant changes in both its domestic trade
the road” for the region.154 In contrast, China politics and international posture. But it also
has been the principal advocate and driver offers an historic opportunity to end India’s
of RCEP, which has been widely understood relative economic isolation from Asia. RCEP
as an Asian and developing country-friendly promotes a form of trade liberalisation – based
alternative to the TPP. Governments in the on traditional market access exchanges –
region thus faced a situation where they had to which are consistent with India’s interests as a
choose between competing US- and China- developing country. It embodies an Indo-Pacific
backed trade proposals.155 Participation in the vision which gives India a central position in the
mega-regionals was as much about signalling Asian economic architecture. Its multilateral
allegiances between the two major powers in approach will provide a platform for Indian
Asia as it was about trade policy preferences. firms to participate in the regional production
networks that have driven Asia’s economic
dynamism. As RCEP negotiations move to
completion in 2017, India, for the first time,
finds itself at the epicentre of discussions over
the new shape of Asian economic regionalism.
PAGE 60 VI. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP): India’s economic bridge to Asia
Endnotes
REALISING THE INDO-PACIFIC:
Tasks For India’s Regional Integration
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PAGE 68 Endnotes
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