THE PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM

Volume XXXI. No. 1, Spring 2000

DOES THE EARTH MOVE?

A SEARCH FOR A DIALOGUE BETWEEN TWO
TRADITIONS OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

JUHA HIMANKA

INTRODUCTION

In the preface to CartesianMeditations, Edmund Husserl expresses his deep

concern about the situation of contemporary philosophy. The main problem is
that "the philosophers meet but. unfortunately, not the philosophies."' A. J. Ayer
demonstrates this when he writes in his autobiography about a meeting with
Maurice Merleau-Ponty:
it might have been expected that Merleau-Ponty and I should find some common ground for
philosophical discussion. We did indeed attempt it on several occasions, but never got very far
before we began to wrangle over some point of principle, on which neither of us would yield.
Since these arguments tended to become acrimonious, we tacitly agreed to drop them and meet
on a purely social level, which still left us quite enough to talk about.?

The reason for this shortcoming is obvious. These two philosophers come from
two different traditions of thought: Ayer is an analytical philosopher and
Merleau-Ponty a continental philosopher. Many commentators on contemporary
philosophy agree that there is hardly any real communication between analytical
and continental philosophy. 3
It is hardly a healthy situation in philosophy when such fundamental views,
those views on views on truth, being. and the good, are seen from two different
perspectives that cannot communicate with each other. 4 How could this situa-
tion then be improved? In order to understand why communication between
these traditions is so difficult, one needs to get a good grasp on both lines of
thought. However, traditions consist of so many different and even contradictory
views that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to establish a single clear

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opposition that would respect the complexity of discussions within the tradi-
tions. There is, however, another way to approach this problem.
In this essay I will start from a particular situation, with one of Ayer's attempts
to communicate with the other philosophical tradition. As shown above, this
attempt failed as the participants could not make their views understandable to
each other. The main part of this essay is concerned with widening the view-
points of this particular discussion. By elaborating the backgrounds of the par-
ticipants I hope to come closer to a real disagreement, where one opponent's
viewpoint is at least understandable to the other. Both standpoints will continue
side by side until I take up the issue of truth in the final section. I will emphasise
the difference between the phenomenological view of truth and the concept of
truth of the Vienna Circle. This general view of the lines of thought of the partic-
ipants is not a starting point but a result. This result is then tested by demonstrat-
ing how it makes the contrast between the earlier viewpoints understandable. The
essay will end with a suggestion on how to engage these traditions in a dialogue
with each other.
Ayer did not explain any further exactly how he failed to communicate philo-
sophically with Merleau-Ponty. Luckily we have another witness to a conversa-
tion between Ayer and Merleau-Ponty. This testimony by Georges Bataille will
serve us as a starting point in our search for a dialogue between these two camps
of contemporary philosophy.

THE SUN HAD BEEN THERE BEFORE MAN CAME TO EXIST

The unsuccessful debate in question took place in a Parisian bar in 1951. The
two main participants were A. J. Ayer and Georges Bataille. The next day, at the
beginning of a lecture, Bataille described the conversation: "It so happened that I
met A. J. Ayer last night, and our reciprocal interest kept us talking until about
three in the morning. Merleau-Ponty and Ambrossino also took part, and at the
end of the conversation, I think, a compromise was reached." 5 It seems that Ayer
and Bataille, who came from the opposite edges of contemporary philosophy,
found a compromise. Was the picture given in the first section of this essay too
pessimistic? The text of Bataille's lecture continues:

We finally fell to discussing the following very strange question. Ayer had uttered the very simple
proposition: the sun had been there before man came to exist. And he saw no reason to doubt
it.... 1. for my part, do not see how one can say so. This proposition is such as to indicate the
total meaninglessness that can be taken on by a rational statement. 6

According to Ayer, the sentence "the sun had been there before man came to
exist" is completely meaningful, and according to Bataille it is an example of

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 DOES THE EARTiI MOVE'?

total meaninglessness. Bataille was surprised: "I should say that yesterday's
conversation produced an effect of shock. There exists between French and Eng-
lish philosophers a sort of abyss which we do not find between French and Ger-
man philosophers."7 Bataille made his point clear in the lecture: "it is impossible
8
to consider the sun's existence without men." The reason for this is that "anv
proposition one utters theoretically implies both subject and object." whereas in
9
"the sun was there and man was not, there is a subject and no object." Before
coming back to this kind of point of view, I shall speculate on an answer to this
for Ayer.
G. E. Moore had a strong influence on analytical philosophy and particularly
on Ayer. In Moore's famous text A Defence of Common Sense we can find an
argument against Bataille's view.
Moore begins his essay by explaining what he means by "common sense."
Common sense takes for granted, for example, that my body exists and was born
at a certain time in the past. There are and have existed also many other things
having shape and size in three dimensions from which my body has been various
distances. We all know these things and many more to be true with certainty.
Moore also includes in his list a claim that "the earth had existed also for many
years before my body was born."'° This claim bears some resemblance to the
statement we are dealing with. A bit later Moore takes up the same sentence
again and admits that he is afraid that many philosophers are inclined to dispute
it. He then continues about these philosophers:
They seem to think that the questioni "Do you believe that earth has existed for mnany years past?"
is not a plain question, such as should be met either by a plain "Yes" or "No' or by a plain "i1
can't make up my mind," but is the sort of question which can be properly met by: "It all depends
on what you mean by 'the earth' and 'exists' and 'years', if you mean so and so. and so and so,
aiid so and so, then I do; but if you mean so and so.... and so and so then I don't, or at least it is
extremely doubtful." It seems to me that such a view is as profoundly mistaken as any view can
be. "The earth has existed for many years past" is the very type of an unambiguous expression,
the meaning of which we all understand. 31

Moore's standpoint is plain. The certainty and truth of some basic things are so
strong that they cannot really be questioned. There might be theoretical prob-
lems, but they do not measure up to really questioning the common-sense view.
G. H. von Wright explains Moore's position:

Suppose someone wanted to dispute some of the things Moore claimed to know for certain...
This critic would then have to adduce some evidence that Moore was mistaken. Moore agail
would have to accept this evidence, if he was going to give up his claim to knowledge. But what
could this evidence be, other than some contingent propositions which contradicted the first
2
ones.)

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 JUHA HIMANKA

There does not seem to be a place from which one can question Moore's view.
Although the sentence "the sun had been there before man came to exist" is not
included in Moore's list, it bears some resemblance to the sentence "the earth
had existed also for many years before my body was born.' 3 From the Moorean
point of view, the objection to Bataille might then be: "The statement is part of
our common sense and it cannot really be questioned any more than the exis-
tence of the outer world, for example. If there is a theoretical problem you
should think again about your theory." Yet, Ayer might just as well have given a
less foundationalistic objection: "The sentence makes sense. If we can talk about
yesterday, we can talk about the day before that, etc., until the day when there
are no humans but only the sun. Another question, then, is whether the statement
'the sun had been there before man came to exist' is true or false."
It is time to turn to the continental viewpoint.
Bataille thought that the only living philosophy of our time is phenomenol-
ogy. 4 In what follows, I will explicate his continental background in phenom-
enological terms.
In his autobiography, Ayer anticipated that Moore might be the link to phe-
nomenology and could make the conversation with continental philosophers
possible: "Though it is often conducted in terms of which it is difficult to make
much sense, the investigations of concepts by Husserl and his followers bear
some affinity to the sort of conceptual analysis that G. E. Moore engaged in."',5
However, as we saw at the beginning, Ayer and Merleau-Ponty, a follower
of Husserl, failed to enter into a philosophical discussion. Maybe the affinity
between Husserl and Moore was not so strong after all.' 6
For Moore, real philosophy began with recognising common sense as a point
of departure. Contrary to that, phenomenology begins with reduction, an act that
steps outside of what Husserl calls the natural attitude."7 This attitude includes
common sense.'8 In this light, Ayer's view of the affinity between the two think-
ers does not seem convincing. Moore and Husserl began philosophising in oppo-
site ways: Moore affirms common sense whereas Husserl renounces it. What
will happen, then, if we follow Husserl instead of Moore?
For Husserl philosophy begins when the natural attitude is set aside in the
accomplishment of reduction. What kind of a position does this lead to? In the
CartesianMeditations Husserl writes that if one has not understood his phenom-
enology as a transcendental idealism, one has misunderstood it.' 9 The normal
natural attitude is to be replaced by the standpoint of idealism. How are we then
to understand this transcendental idealism? According to Husserlian idealism the
existence of the whole world depends on transcendental subjectivity. Nature in
itself, without subjects or possible consciousness, is unthinkable. Husserl writes:
"The attempt to conceive the universe of true being as something lying outside
the universe of possible consciousness . . . is nonsensical." 2 0 Without conscious

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21
life there is no world, no things or even space-time. Therefore consciousness
and the world are not equally primordial. This order becomes clear from the
end of the Ideas II: "if we could eliminate all spirits from the world, then that is
the end of nature. But if we eliminate nature, "true," Objective-intersubjective
existence, there would always still remain something: the spirit as individual
spirit" (311). In other words: if we suppose that nature exists, we have already
supposed subjectivity. 2 2 What does this mean in relation to the sentence about
the sun before us?
If there were only the sun and no human beings, or to be more strict, no
transcendental consciousness, then there would be no nature and therefore also
23
no sun. (The question of the status of God or gods and animals is here left
aside.) The sun before us cannot be thought of, and according to Husserl, "what
cannot be thought, cannot be." 24
Although Husserl's standpoint in relation to the proposition concerning the
sun before subjects is now clear. this probably would not have helped Bataille or
Merleau-Ponty to convince Ayer in the debate. It is not enough just to put forth
Husserl's position; we also need to make it understandable. Here I have chosen
25
to proceed from the perspective of space or the sun's position.
Ayer could have answered Husserl's claim about the unthinkability of the
sun's existence before us: "I can think about it easily, as a matter of fact I am
thinking of it now. I see dinosaurs wandering through the savanna in bright
daylight and big trees with green leaves stretching toward the sun which shines
in the sky." How is this then unthinkable?
Let us suppose that the sun is here understood as a thing. According to
Husserl a thing always refers back to subject. He writes:

We need only cornsider how a thing exhibits itself as such. according to its essence, in order to
recognise that such an apprehension must contain, at the very outset, components which refer
back to the subject, specifically the human . . subject . 26

This means that a material thing is dependent on my qualities. The thing is

related to my lived body (Leib) and its normal sensibilities. The lived body is
necessarily involved in all perception: "In seeing, the eyes are directed upon the
seen and run over its edges, surfaces, etc. When it touches objects, the hand
27
slides over them. Moving myself, I bring my ear closer in order to hear." The
things are given in perception, and furthermore perception is necessarily con-
nected to the lived body.28 From this we can conclude with Husserl that "all that
is thingly-real in the surrounding world of the Ego has its relation to the Body
[lived body]."
However, the Ayerian objection above did not concern our surrounding world
or the world of perception. The possibility of thinking about the sun before us

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was shown by an imagined example of dinosaurs. Husserl, however, goes on to

radicalize his point to include imagination. He takes up the fact that the lived
body is the zero point of all orientation, "the bearer of the here and now." There-
fore each thing that appears has an orienting relation to the lived body. And this
does not refer only to what is actually appearing but "to each thing that is
supposed to be able to appear." The necessary involvement of the lived body is
not tied to our actual perception but plays this role also in our imagination.
Husserl's example is a centaur, but here we can replace it by a dinosaur. So, if I
am imaging a dinosaur

I cainot help but imagine it as in a certain orientation and in a particular relation to my sense
organs: it is to the right' of me; it is 'approaching' me or 'moving away'; it is 'revolving', turning
toward or away fronm 'me'-from me, i.e., from my body, from my eye, which is directed at it. 29

My eyes are with me also in my imagination; I do look at the dinosaur and

different parts of it, and the eyes of my imagination move from left to right,
upwards and downwards.
We can now summarise Husserl's problem with imagining dinosaurs. When
one imagines the sun as it existed before humans, one still and necessarily imag-
ines also the human body with its point of view. The sun is seen from some-
where, from the imagined zero-point of orientation of the lived body. However,
the debate between Ayer and Bataille dealt with the situation where there is
nobody around. From the phenomenological perspective Ayer therefore does not
take seriously enough the problems of seeing something from nowhere.
Since Ayer would probably not have accepted this objection, I will defend his
standpoint with three arguments. The first one is from Ayer's own text.

There is indeed nothing which is logically dependent for its existence on being described. The
stars pursued their courses before human beings ever began to think about them, and would have
pursued the same courses even if no creatures with conceptual systems had ever come into
existence. In this sense. the world and all the facts about it are there to be discovered.30

The sun does not need us to be. Therefore it makes sense to talk about it as exist-
ing before humans. If someone would object to this by elaborating the necessity
of the body and place for something to be, Ayer might have just asked for the
exact time. After that he could have consulted an astronomer and given the exact
location of the sun in relation to fixed stars.
The second argument comes from Bertrand Russell, whose thought influenced
Ayer greatly. According to Russell:

we know that the center of mass of the solar system at a definite instant is some definite point.
and we can affirm a number of propositions about it; but we have no immediate acquaintance
with this point. which is known to us by description.)

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 DOES THE EARTH MOVE?

We do not have to know where something is in order for it to be. Although we

do not know exactly where the center of mass of the solar system was at the first
moment of this century, we know that it was somewhere. One just denies the
connection between being and a being known.
Ayer was also strongly influenced by the Vienna Circle.32 The third argument
33
is from one of its leading figures, Moritz Schlick. He writes about verifying
the proposition, "There is a castle in the park before the town":

if someone asks us: "But was the castle there in the night as well, when nobody saw it?' we
answer: "Undoubtedly! for it would have been impossible to build it in the period from early this
morning till now, and besides, the state of the building shows that it was not only already in sinif
yesterday, but has been there for a hundred years, and hence since before we were born."34

We know the existence of the sun before mankind in the same way as we know
that the castle has been there for a long time. When the first human beings were
born, there were already plants and animals, etc., which could not have come
into existence without the sun. It seems nonsensical to suppose that food and
oxygen suddenly began to exist at the same time as humans.
Do these three arguments have anything in common? The stars pursue their
courses and the center of gravity exists, whether we are aware of them or not.
The laws of nature that deterrnine the courses of the stars do not need us. Like-
wise, we cannot build an old castle overnight because it takes time to build it and
it takes time for a building to become old. In one way or another, all three
arguments refer to the regularity of nature. Schlick explicates why these law-like
connections overcome mere perception:

That there are okapis in Africa can be established only by observing such animals. But it is not
necessary that the object or event "itself' should have to be perceived. We can imagine, for
example, that the existence of a trans-Neptunian planet might be inferred by observation of per-
turbations with just as much certainty as by direct perception of a speck of light in the telescope.
The reality of the atoni provides another example, as does the back side of the moon.
It is of great importance to state that the occurrence of some one particular experience in veri-
fying a reality-statement is often not recognized as such a verification, but that it is throughout a
question of regularities. of lan-like connections; in this way true verifications are distinguished
35
from illusions and hallucinations.

I shall return to this quotation in the last part of the essay. For now, it is enough to
see that the sentence "the sun had been there before man came to exist", makes
sense, and it even seems to be true. There is not just one law of nature that speaks
for the existence of the sun but rather the sciences as a whole, suppose that nature
follows certain laws. Therefore, in order to question the existence of the sun
before us. one must question the whole scientific worldview. Nevertheless. as we
will see further on, that is exactly what is done in phenomenological reduction.

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These arguments from both sides have not yet opened a dialogue. It has only
become clear that the participants disagree in many important respects. Neverthe-
less, we are on the edges of a dialogue about the nature of space. The phenom-
enological side claims that there can be no intuition (Anschauung) of space
itself. 3 6 Therefore space is to be understood through the lived body. Merleau-
Ponty, who also took part in this discussion, has perhaps the most radical formula-
tion of this phenomenological position: "there would be no space at all for me if
1 had no body."37 Merleau-Ponty takes a radical phenomenological view also on
the relation between being and position. According to him, "being is synonymous
with being situated."!3
Ayer would perhaps have defended the Newtonian concept of absolute space.
This in turn could have led to the renewal of the old debate between Leibniz and
the Newtonian Samuel Clarke on whether space is an entity in its own right (an
"absolute entity") or not. Our aim here, however, is not to return to an old dis-
cussion but instead to try to open up possibilities for a new one.
Another possible way to go on from here is to turn to the theme of naivete on
the opposite sides of the debate. From one side of the debate the other position is
often seen as naive. From the phenoinenological perspective the natural attitude,
the view before reduction, is the naive view. From the Ayerian side the stand-
point after reduction, which sets sciences aside, seems scientifically naive. Let
us first take a look at the phenomenological understanding of scientific naivete.
In one of his later texts, "Foundational Investigation of the Phenomenological
Origin of the Spatiality of Nature'"39 Husserl describes how one sees the world
from the point of view of laws of nature and therefore falls into natural scientific
naivetd. From this naive perspective one then can believe of the Earth that "there
was once no 'life' on it, long time-spaces were needed until highly complicated
substances were fashioned and subsequently animate life emerged on the earth"
(229). It is from this naive perspective that one also believes in the existence of
the sun before humans. Husserl continues the explication of this position, which
also
takes for granted that the earth is only one of the accidental physical bodies in the world
[Weltkarper], one among others, and that it would be well-nigh amusing to want to believe after
Copernicus that the earth is the rnidpoint of the world "merely because by accident we live on it."
favored even by its "rest" in relation to which everything movable moves. 4 0

Hlusserl is aware that it is "well-nigh amusing" to speak against the Copernican

view, but it this Copernican view that in his eyes is the naive one. This strange
pre-Copernican view of Husserl's will serve as a point of reference in the next
section of this essay. 41

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 DOES THIE EARTH MOVE?

I have elaborated two standpoints on the question of the existence of the sun
before humankind. A phenomenologist argues that the sun could not have been
situated in space and time. could not have had a place, and therefore also could
not have existed before us. From the side of the analytical philosophy of Ayer
one might instead have referred to the scientific evidence we have of the time
before humans and to the obvious fact that if there had not been a sun before
humankind there could also not have been humans. 42

DOES THE EARTH MOVE?

I began the first section of this essay with the difference between the analytical
and phenomenological traditions with regard to common sense. In the end, how-
ever, it seemed that the difference lies instead in their relationship to science. The
phenomenological view seems understandable only if one does not pay any atten-
tion to scientific laws and results. This, however, must often seem unacceptable
from the Ayerian analytical side. 43 To clarify this situation, in this part I will
examine the two views' relationship to science.
An influential view of the relation between science and philosophy in Ayer's
background is to be found from the manifesto of the Vienna circle:
Some representatives of the scientific world-concept no longer wan, to use the term "philosophy"
for their work at all, so as to emphasize the contrast with the philosophy of (metaphysical) sys-
tem even more strongly. Whichever term may be used to describe such investigations, this much
is certain: there is no such thing as philosophy as a basic or universal science alongside or above
the various fields of the one empirical science.44

Philosophy is thus not independent of the sciences and has to take into account
their results and methods or, at least, philosophy is not entitled to bypass the
sciences completely.
In the background of continental views Husserl occupies the opposite posi-
tion. According to him science does not have any significance for philosophy.
The sciences are harmful rather than helpful on the way to strenge Wissenschaft.
This Husserlian ideal of science follows an ancient understanding of science
rather than taking its model from modem exact sciences. The full radicalism of
H-Iusserl's view becomes clear as early as in the lectures Idea of Phenomenology
in 1907.45
Husserl first describes the apparent clarity of scientific unity: "If we immerse
ourselves in the sciences of the natural sort, we find everything clear and compre-
hensible . . ." (17). Yet it soon turns out that this view is only seemingly coherent:
"whenever we reflect. we fall into errors and confusion." According to Husserl
there is no way out of this situation within the scientific view. It will only lead
into skepticism and cause "fundamentally misleading" interpretations. Therefore

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we should at the very beginning make a clear distinction between philosophy and
science in order to find the philosophical dimension, to find an "entirely new
point of departure."
The essential point to notice here is that the initial step of flusserlian phenom-
enology, reduction, not only puts outside common-sense views, but also and
foremost the (modern) scientific viewpoint. The natural attitude which is to be
left behind in this process is not a pretheoretical attitude to be overcome by more
scientific views, but is instead a scientific attitude itself. 46 Although Husserl has
here primarily in mind the natural sciences, his radicality extends through the
whole field of science: "Neither the most exact mathematics nor mathematical
natural science has here the slightest advantage over any actual or alleged cogni-
tion through ordinary experience." 47 The text also indicates that Husserl sees
even the highest stages of pure logic as part of the natural attitude to be over-
come in reduction. 4 8 Here one should not be confused by fHusserl's constant
emphasis on the importance of the ideal of strenge Wissenschaf! and confuse it
with the modern sciences. Although Husserl's followers sometimes refer to the
results of science, Husserl himself followed the method of reduction faithfully.
His investigations are strikingly free of the influence of science. 4 9
What is then the problem with the sciences according to Husserl? He
acknowledges that the sciences do achieve a higher stage of objectivity than our
daily life, 50 but this process of objectifying leads to an absurd position of "abso-
lute nature." In other words, the process of objectifying leads to a position where
the subject is excluded.51 As a result of this tendency, one then forgets the role of
the subject completely and ends in a position from which claims about things
before subjects, for example about the existence of the sun before human life,
seem like plausible sentences. This possibility is excluded in phenomenological
reduction, after which it is no longer possible to see nature as distinct from the
subject. 5 2 Therefore from the phenomenological point of view nature is not a ab-
solute entity that can stand on its own, but is instead entirely relative.53 After re-
duction, nature as it is seen from the scientific point of view, as a mere collection
of things, turns out to be unthinkable. 5 4 In his later texts Husserl writes about the
return to the lifeworld as hidden foundation of the sciences, but critique directed
against the neglect of subjectivity in the process of objectifying has a major role
in Husserl's thought from the very beginning.
This, however, does not mean that Husserl is against modern science in itself.
Rather he is against the scientific worldview, against a philosophical point of
view developed on the basis of the sciences. The natural attitude, which in itself
is not a problem, becomes nonsensical only when one begins to philosophise on
its basis.5 5
This bypassing of scientific views and methods also has consequences for
the relationship of phenomenology to the history of philosophy. From the

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phenomenological point of view the situation in philosophy has not changed

with the development of the sciences. Hence the views presented during the
history of philosophy have not been outdated by the advance of the sciences.
In contrast to Husserl's point of view, what is left after phenomenological
reduction from Ayer's point of view is good only for metaphysical speculation.
The proper starting point of philosophy, namely common sense and the sciences,
would be abolished with reduction. From this point of view, the situation in
philosophy has been changed crucially by the development of the sciences. Thus
the philosophical views presented before the knowledge of some basic discover-
ies of modem science might be interesting, but also mainly without foundation.
I have now sketched the phenomenological view of science and contrasted it
with one kind of analytical view that comes close to Ayer's thought. In order to
see what difference this makes in actual philosophical work we need an exam-
ple. It is time to turn to the Copemican theme, which appeared at the end of the
preceding section. I begin from the Ayerian side.
In his book The Central Questions of Philosophy, Ayer explains the benefits
of scientific discoveries:

Common usage is not fixed. It changes under the influence of science, though the change is not
always immediately apparent. We still speak of the motion of the sun, of its rising in the east and
setting in the west, but the meaning of these words, at least to educated people, is not what it was
before the acceptance of Copernican theory.56

Science provides us with a more advanced level of knowledge which our culture
has reached over the centuries. We know that the Earth revolves around the sunI
and not the other way around. In philosophy we can then start from this situation
and with our own contributions reach an even higher level. Russell uses the
Copemican view as an example:

E.g.. it is true (at least we will suppose so) that the earth revolves around the sun, and false that
the sun revolves around the earth: hence "the revolution of the earth round the sun" denotes an
entity. while "the revolution of the sun round the earth' does not denote an entitv.57

Russell has nevertheless included a slight reservation: "at least we will suppose
so." Schlick not only has reservations but also feels a need to defend the Coper-
nican view:

To suppose that the opponent of metaphysics is incapable, say, ot justly estimating the greatness
of Copernicus, because in a certain sense the Ptolemaic view reflects the empirical situation just
as well as the Copernican, seems to me no less strange than to believe that the 'positivist' cannot
be a good father to his family, because according to his theory his children are merely complexes
of his own sensations and it is therefore senseless to make provision for their welfare after his
5
death. "

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 JUHA HIMANKA

Since the Ptolemaic view reflects the empirical situation just as well as the
Copemican, the greatness of Copernicus is not self-evident. One can just as well
watch S going around E as E going around S.59
Copemican theory is one possible interpretation of our solar system, but it
is difficult (or impossible) to explain why it is better than, for example, the
Earth-centred view. 6 0 Therefore it is also questionable to ground philosophical
views on such a basis. However, the situation in sciences has changed. For
example, Fred Hoyle admits that today "we cannot say that the Copemican
theory is 'right' and the Ptolemaic theory 'wrong' in any meaningful physical
sense." 61 A philosopher following the development of sciences would not use it
as an example any more. 6 2
Nevertheless, even today many analytical philosophers would accept another
essential point of the Copernican view, namely that the Earth moves. 6 3 This fact
was confirmed by many empirical experiments, of which the most famous
was Foucault's demonstration in 1850.64 (Yet, attempts to measure the absolute
velocity of the Earth in space failed and, as Einstein showed, turned out to be
senseless approaches. 65 ) Here the doubts Schlick aroused are not relevant, and a
philosopher bypassing the movement of the Earth would be guilty of metaphysi-
cal speculation. Still, this is Husserl's standpoint: the Earth does not move. To
make the phenomenological standpoint clearer in opposition to the sciences, I
will clarify his view briefly.
Husserl sees a primordial distinction between a physical body (a thing) and a
lived body. A physical body is something that has a place and can move or rest.
A lived body, in contrast to that, is a zero-point of all orientation. As a point of
reference for the movement or rest of the physical bodies, a lived body does not
move in the sense physical bodies do. The movement of the physical bodies and
the "I move" of the lived body are essentially different. According to Husserl,
however, these two positions are not enough in order to understand movement.
Transcendental investigation reveals that there must also be a third possibility
which is neither a lived body nor a physical body. Husserl takes up the exarmple
of being in a railway car:

The vehicie is experienced as at rest. But when I look out the window I say that the railway car
moves ever, though I see that the countryside is in motion. I know that I have climbed into the
vehicle: I have seen such vehicles in motion and people in it. I know that they, like me, when 1
climb in. see the countryside in motion. 66

If all motion would simply happen in relation to my body, I would say that coun-
tryside is in motion. Instead I say that the railway car moves. In order for this to
be possible, there must be something else than my body in relation to which I
understand these movements and this something else cannot be just a thing.

68
 DOES THE EARTH MOVE?

67
Husserl calls this reference "point" of movement the Earth. I know that in real-
ity the railway car moves in relationship to the Earth and the countryside does
not move. Yet. I might see a thing. for example a ball, moving within the coun-
tryside, moving in relation to the Earth.
According to Husserl there is a constitutive connection between the Earth and
movement. First, in relation to the Earth "motion and rest [arel given as having
their sense of motion and rest."68 Before an immobile Earth as a reference point,
movement does not have sense.
Consequently, for the Earth to move it should happen in relation to another
Earth. There must be a reference point even for the Earth to move, and that could
be only another Earth. Husserl writes:

As long as I do not have a presentation of a new basis, as a basis, from which the Earth carn have
sense in interconnected and returning locomotion as a self-contained physical body in motion
and rest, and as long as an exchange of bases is not presented such that both become physical
bodies, to that extent just the Earth itself is the basis and not a physical body. The Earth does not
69
move-perhaps I may even say that it is at rest.

Husseri then investigates the possibility of an other Earth in relation to which the
Earth could move, but ends with the conclusion that there is "only one humanity
and one Earth."70
In contrast to our contemporary Copemican view, the Earth was not originally
7
understood as a physical body or thing. 71 Husserl begins with this original idea
and discovers that there is no meaningful transition into the Copemican view
and consequently there is no sense in claiming that the Earth is a physical body
which can move. 7 2 Thereby, Husserl maintains that, there are differences in rela-
tionship to movement:
I. physical bodies can be in motion but do not move themselves;
2. a lived body moves itself but is not in motion:
3. the Earth is not in motion and does not move itself.
These differences do not exist for science, which deals only with the first case.
Anthony J. Steinbock explains how we have forgotten these differences of origi-
nal experience with the sciences:

It is only for sciences of the infinity of nature that the earth can be said to be in motion or rest,
that the earth is homogenized as an earth body amnong bodies such that there are no longer any
constitutive differences between the earth, the lived-body, and all other types, shapes and sizes
73
of physical bodies, from basketballs to stars.

The Earth, as Husserl understands it, is something that binds all human beings
75
together. 7 4 This time-honoured thought will remain hidden as long as we begin
with the Copemican view of sciences and think about: the Earth as a physical

69
 JUHIA HIMANKA

body. The phenomenological view can be brought into sight only if we begin
with reduction and bypass the scientific views.
In this section, I have considered the relation to science of Husserlian phenom-
enology and Ayerian kind of analytical philosophy. From the phenomenological
point of view., it is necessary to set the sciences aside in order to reach the truly
philosophical dimension. On the other side, it is hard to see why the great accom-
plishments of the modem sciences should not be used to benefit philosophy.
The example in this section was the question of whether the Earth moves
or not. Although we are Copernicans. the phenomenological point of view is
familiar to us all: in our daily experience, the Earth on which we walk does not
move. 7 6 If an analytical philosopher would see this as an acceptable topic for a
phi]osophical conversation, this conversation would perhaps leave my experi-
ence aside and turn to the experiments that confirm that the Earth rotates. What
would be a phenomenological response to this? In regard to Foucault's pendu-
lum it might be an another question like: "Yes, it seems that the pendulum
rotates. Did you notice that it does that in relation to the Earth? Why are you
making such a big fuss about this?" To answer this the opponent would then
have to refer to the laws of nature. The pendulum should move like this, but
instead it moves like this and this can be explained by the movement of Earth.
Here, as also with the first question. we end in the opposition between law-like
connections and direct experience givenness.7
What about the possibility of cornmunication between these views? The dif-
ference is now clearer, but one has to admit that it would be difficult to engage in
a dialogue from these positions. It would still be difficult for an Ayerian kind of
analytical thinker to see the ground on which the phenomenological claims are
based. For phenomenologists it is in turn difficult to accept scientific evidence
that does not in their eyes measure up to the level of rigorous science. 7 8 In the
following section I will turn to ask for the final source of these philosophical
standpoints: truth.

HOW ABOUT TRUTH?

I began with an unsuccessful conversation between Aver and Bataille. I then

turned to elaborate the backgrounds of these two different kinds of philosophers in
order to concretize (in the Hegelian sense) the situation. This elaboration has now
led to a contrast rather than to a contact. The contrast was thematized in relation to
two claims.
1. "The sun had been there before man came to exist" and
2. "The Earth does not move."

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 DOES THIE EARTH MOVE?

From the perspective of the Ayerian kind of analytical philosophyv the Earth
moves and it is sensible to talk about the existence of the sun before humans.
This view is supported by common sense and the sciences. In contrast to that,
from the phenomenological or Bataillian perspective it makes no sense to talk
about the sun before humans or the movement of the Earth. The viewpoint
of phenomenology becomes understandable when we see that reduction, with
which phenomenology begins, bypasses common sense and sciences and tries to
reach a fresh beginning.
The participants in the conversation with which we began could not under-
stand each other's viewpoints. Now we have gained some kind of perspective on
the backgrounds of these standpoints, but there is no conversation yet. In a way I
have only changed an argument over one point into an argument over several.
Instead of only a point of non-communication, we now face two parallel lines
of argument. How can we bring these lines to cross each other?
It is still possible for the two perspectives to avoid dialogue because we have
not dealt with the cardinal topic of philosophy, truth. One can argue whether sci-
ence and common sense are essential to philosophy, but truth is the conditio sine
qua non for philosophy. It is no longer a philosophical position to claim that
truth has no relevance to my philosophical thinking. In order to reach this per-
spective of truth we need to begin again.
According to Bataille the notion that the sun existed before humans did not
make sense, although to Ayer it made perfect sense. Earlier I bypassed the obvi-
ous question about sense or meaning. How do Bataille and Ayer understand
sense? Also here I will explain Bataille's view in Hlusserlian terms. Ayer's view
in this question approaches that of the Vienna Circle.
In his book Der Wahrheitsbegriffbei Husserl und Heidegger. Emst Tugendhat
compares the ways in which the Vienna Circle and the phenomenological
approach understand sense. At first sight the difference seems to be only termi-
nological.79 Within the Vienna Circle one writes about "verification," where
Husserl would use the word "evidence." Is there, then, more than a terminologi-
cal difference?
From the standpoint of the Circle the question about the meaning of a sen-
tence leads to the idea of verification. Ayer explains verification:

We say that a sentence is factually sigmificant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how
to verify the proposition which it purports to express-that is, if he knows what observations
would lead him, under certain conditions. to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as
being false.80

According to the initial views of logical positivism or the Vienna Circle, it must at
least be possibile to verify or falsify a proposition. Otherwise it is metaphysical.

71
 JUHA HIMAN-KA

How does Husserl's position or terminology then differ? In the Logical Inves-
tigations he writes: "we may define the possibility (reality) of a meaning by say-
ing ... that it has a fulfilling sense.. ." (§30). Fulfilment here means (adequate)
evidence.8 t This aspect of truth as fulfilment or truthfulness is not seen from the
viewpoint of verification.
The notion of evidence as fulfilment is introduced in Husserl's Logical Inves-
tigations. This book constitues, according to both Husserl and Martin Heidegger,
the "breakthrough" of phenomenology. Heidegger explains how he sees this
breakthrough in the lectures History of the Concept qf Time. He first explains
the decisive role of Husserl's exposition: "This elaboration of evidence was for
the first time brought to successful resolution by Husserl, who thus made an
essential advance beyond all the obscurities prevalent in the traditional logic and
epistemology." 8 2 It is this notion of evidence that makes the difference between
other philosophical approaches and Husserlian phenomenology. Heidegger gives
an example of the phenomenological way of seeing the evidence:

I can in an empty way now think of my desk at home simply in order to talk about it. I can fulfil
this empty intention in a way by envisaging [vergegenwdrtigen] it to myself, and finally by going
home and seeing it itself in an authentic and final experience. In such a demonstrative fulfilment
the emptily intended and the original intuited come into coincidence.83

First the table is not itself present. and we reach it by an empty intention. The
empty intention of the table then becomes fuller when the table itself is bodily
present. From this simple, everyday situation we can find a paradigmatic exam-
ple of truth. In order to understand phenomenological evidence we just repeat
this interplay between empty intention and filling presence until we can see the
fulfilment (evidence) itself. After one has understood what evidence is from
this demonstration. one can then begin a phenomenological investigation and
cornpare the given something in its presence and absence.
Although the paradigmatic example of evidence is the perception of a thing,
the same kind of evidence applies also to more "abstract" entities. J. Philip
Miller explicates the starting point of the Husserlian concept of number: "we
cannot fully explain what we mean by 'number', or clarify what numbers truly
are, unless we take account of the fact that numbers are available to us as identi-
ties in presence and absence." 84 To take an example: there is a number of apples
in a bowl but until I count them this number is absent. By the act of counting
the number then becomes present. From this interplay between presence and
absence we then see what number itself is, what it is in its constitution.
This second example also demonstrates how the phenomenological view of ev-
idence engages the subject within the process instead of trying to eliminate it in
objectification. It is in the subjective act of counting that the empty intending is

'72
 DOES THE EARTH MOVE?

fulfilled. An objectivistic scientist might have found out the correct number of
the apples by employing theoretical laws, but until the number is counted it is not
itself seen evidently. In a similar way there is a difference between just saying
"2 x 2 = 4" and really counting it. Here scientific tests and experiences are of no
use. These tests will never reveal what the number two is or what a thing is.85
The question regarding the meaning of a proposition has now led us to the
differences between views on truth. An Averian analytical philosopher under-
stands truth as connected to scientific knowledge. as verification. In contrast,
the Husserlian concept of evidence leads to the comparison between presence
and absence, which brings forth the givenness or the constitution of the object.8 6
Analytical studies of Husserl's thought do not usually emphasize this aspect, but
it is all the more important to continental interpretations of, for example, Hei-
degger and Jacques Derrida.
In itself, this difference between the concepts of truth is too abstract to be
convincing. Does this difference then correlate with concretised differences
between the analytical Ayerian and phenomenological points of view developed
in the second and third sections of this essay?
In the second section I dealt with the sentence "the sun had been there before
man came to exist." From the Ayerian point of view the sentence made sense,
as it also should from the point of view of verification. The existence of the sun
before humans is a scientific fact that can be verified. From the Husserlian point
of view the proposition is nonsensical. From the viewpoint of truth as fulfilment
this is also so. The sun before subjects was not present to anyone and evidently
could not have been seen. As the proposition stands outside the scope of possi-
ble evidence, it is nonsensical. What about the claim about the Earth, then?
From the Ayerian standpoint of verification the Earth moves. The movement
can be verified by an experiment with Foucault's pendulum. From the Hus-
serlian viewpoint of evidence the Earth does not move. This correponds to my
experience of the Earth. From the phenomenological viewpoint all things and
lived bodies move in relation to the Earth, which itself does not move. The
movement of the Earth is never present to me, and therefore the proposition 'the
Earth moves" is never fulfilled, never evident.
The lines of thought that were elaborated earlier finally crossed each other
when we turned to truth. From this crossroad I can now look back and see what
has prevented the parallel points that describe these lines of thought from
converging. The different views of truth generate the contrast developed earlier.
The contrast developed here is not the whole contrast between analytical and
continental philosophy, and the gap between these two is surely not overcome in
this essay. I have tried rather to locate one place where the gap is so narrow that
a rope can be thrown over. The last task of this essay is to test whether the
rope is anchored onto something, whether it can support a dialogue. Here (if not

73
 JUHA HIMANKA

already before) I also give up the Bataillian mask and consider the continental
side at its face value in a Husserlian context.

TOWARDS A CONVERSATION

According to Husserl, all sciences and common sense must be excluded from
philosophy from the very beginning by accomplishing reduction. From the view-
point of analytical philosophy, then. it seems that there is no alternative to meta-
physical speculation. It looks like all areas of objective thinking are excluded in
reduction, and what is left can only be a solipsist view of my unreliable subjective
thoughts. This becomes clear in the earlier quotation from Schlick:

It is of great importance to state that the occurrence of some one particular experience in verify-
ing a reality-statement is often not recognized as such ai veriflcation, but that it is throughout a
question of regularities, of law-like connections; in this way true verifications are distinguished
from illusions and hallucinations. (emphasis added)

Instead of experience we turn to regularities. An analytical philosopher (like

Ayer) might then ask the following question: since you have tumed your back on
the sources of scientific objective knowledge and law-like connections found by
the sciences, what can guarantee that the claims you are making state something
more than just your illusions or hallucinations? We can be sure that scientific
measurements and experiments are not just dreams or illusions, but how can you
be sure about your experience of the unmoving Earth'?
At the time of the Logical Investigations. Husserl did not yet see the true diffi-
culty of the question of objectivity. In dealing with the problem, he emphasised
the role of fulfilment and presence. Husserl writes:

If someone experiences the self-evidence of A. it is self-evident that no second person can expe-
rience the absurdity of this same A, for, that A is self-evident, means that A is not merely meant,
but also genuinely given, and given as precisely what it is thought to be. In the strict sense it is
itself present.S7

In contrast to Schlick, Husserl starts with experience and tries to reach for
objectivity (intersubjectivity). Also, Husserl explains the difference between
real things and illusions by presence: "The intentional character of perception,
as opposed to the mere representation of imagination, is that of becoming pres-
ent [das Gegenwdrtigen (Prdsentieren)].8 8
However, some years after the publication of the Investigations, Husserl real-
ized that the starting point that sets the objective approach of the sciences aside
leads to more difficult problems than he originally thought. In Husserl's termninol-
ogy the problem is not about objectivity but about intersubjectivity. In his eyes

74
 DOES THE EARTH MOVE?

the problem was so decisive that he did not publish anything for almost a decade.
Husserl saw that he should find a solution to these problems before publishing
again. It still took almost two decades before he finally published his views
on intersubjectivity in the Cartesian Meditations. Unfortunately this road is too
long for us to follow here. It is already clear that: Husserl was able to understand
Schlick's concern about objectivity. (Here Bataille disagrees strongly and
opposes himself to phenomenology. )89
Nowadays a philosopher often follows Schlick and begins with an objective
view in trying to reach for the truth. This is often connected to verified regulari-
ties and law-like connections. Husseri, in contrast, chose a more troublesome
way and began with his view of evidence or truth. Here experience preceeds
verified laws. The question open to conversation is whether he managed to reach
intersubjectivity or objectivity.

University of Helsinki, Finland

NOTES

I thank Leila Haaparanta. Sara lIeinanmaa. Janita Hamialidnen. I. A. Kieseppa, Hannu Sivenius, Kaisa
Sivenius. Susanna Snell, and Petri Ylikoski for their insightful comments. Very special thanks are
due to Laura Werner.
I Edmund Husserl, CartesianMeditations. An Introduction to Phenomenology (The lHague: Marti-
nus Nijhoff Publishers, 1960), 5.
2 A. J. Aver. Part ofMy Life (London: Collins, 1977), 285.
3 In his preface to Maini Currents in Contemnporary, German, Br-itish and American Philosophy,
Wolfgang Stegmiller writes that "the word 'phiiosophv' has come to have several meanings"
and reflects on the possibility of changinig the situation: "The ambiguity of the term 'philosophy'
could be reduced only if entire philosophical currents were to 'die out' altogether (of which
there are no signs), or if we should simply decide to stop referring to all of the varied things
listed above as 'philosophy' and instead reserve the term for a more or less sharply defined
activity." Wolfgang Stegmuller, Contemporary Germlan, British and American Philosophy
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969), 13. I5. Richard Rorty's view is even more pessimistic: "My hunch
is that these traditions [analytical and continental] will persist side-by-side indefinitely. I cannot
see any possibility of compromise, and I suspect that the most likely scenario is an increasing
indifference of each school to the existence of the other. In time it may seem merely a quaint
historical accident that both institutions bear the same name." Richard Rorty, Essays on
Heidegger and Others, Philosophical Papers. vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1991), 23. Michael Dummett also sees "the gulf between phenomenology and analytical philos-
ophy.... The trouble is that the gulf became so wide that it became extremely difficult to com-
municate across it.... It is obvious that philosophers will never reach agreement. It is a pity,
however, if they can no longer talk to one another or understand one another. It is difficult to
achieve such understanding, because if you think people are on the wrong track, you may have
no great desire to talk with them] or to take the trouble to criticize their views. But we have
reached a point at which it's as if we're working irndifferent subjects." Michael Duminett. "In-
terview," in Origins in Analytic Philosophy (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1993). 193.

75
 JUHA HIMANKA

Charles H. Kahn writes about "the bewildering spectacle of two philosophical traditions-
one 'analytical' and one 'continental' or 'existentialist'-which seem unable and unwilling to
communicate with one another." Charles H. Kahn, The Verb "Be' in Ancient Greek (Dordrecht:
D. Reidel, 1973j, 418. See also Simon Critchley, "What Is Continental Philosophy." Interna-
tional Journal of PhilosophicalStudies 5 (1997): 347-63, esp. 360, and David E. Cooper, "The
Presidential Address: Analytical and Continental Philosophy," Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 94 (1994): 1-18.
4 Husserl, CartesianMeditations, 5. From the point of view of the Husserlian ideal of rigorous sci-
ence, the problerm with this divided situation is ultimately that there are many truths about some-
thing. One can then choose the most suitable of those truths. There does not seem to be space.
for example, to discuss about the truth about truth: "Wollte man z. B. vom Gesichtspunkt der
Tarskischen Formel nach der Legitimitat von Heideggers Wahrheitsbegriff fragen, so waire die
Antwort von vomherein negativ, man bliebe in Wirklichkeit bei der Tarskichen Formel einfach
stehen und ware auperstande, auf die positiven Moglichkeiten von Heideggers Wahrheitsbegriff
auch nur einzugehen." Ernst Tugendhat, Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Hussert und Heidegger
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1967), 4. David Carr provides an example of a contemporary
way of communicating between traditions in his essay "Phenomenology and Fiction in Dennett":
"It is characteristic of someone like Dennett that he would have to learn something about the
'deconstructionists' not by reading their work but by reading a parody of it." David Carr. "Phe-
nomenology and Fiction in Dennett," InternationalJournal of PhilosophicalStudies 6 (1998):
331-32. The parody to which Dennett and Carr refer is David Lodge's Nice Work.
5 It is interesting that Georges Ambrossino, who was a physicist, took a phenomenological stand-
point in the conversation: "Ambrossino said that the sun had certainly not existed before the
world." Georges Bataille, "Un-knowing and Its Consequences," in October 36 (1986): 80.
6 Ibid., translation modified. In the original text the sentence in question reads: "il v avait eu
le soleil avant que les hommes existent." Georges Bataille, (E'evres Compiltes, vol. 8 (Paris:
Gallimard, 1976), 190.
7 Bataille. "Un-knowing and Its Consequences," 80.
8 Ibid.. 81.
9 Ibid., translation modified.
10 G. E. Moore. "A Defence of Common Sense," in PhilosophiualPapers (London: George Allen &
Unwin, 1959), 33.
11 Ibid.. 36-37.
12 G. H. von Wright, "Wittgenstein on Certainty," in Problerms in the Theor' of Knowledge, ed.
G. H. von Wright (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), 49.
13 There is no problem in accepting the claim "the earth has existed for many years past" from the
phenomenological point of view as long as we do not extend it also to the time before humans.
I doubt whether Moore would have agreed with this distinction.
14 In Bataille's words: "the only philosophy that lives .. . phenomenology." Georges Bataille, Inner
Experience (Albany: State University of New York Press. 1988), 8. Bataille's view of the relation
among philosophy. science, and common sense also follows Husserlian lines (cf. La valeur de
D. A. F de Sade). To be sure. there is also a great gap between Husserl and Bataille. Bataille
probably equates phenomenology more with Heideggerian than with Husserlian thinking.
15 Ayer. Part of 'My LiJe,285.
16 Moore was the chairman of one of Husserl's lectures in London in 1922, where the two philoso-
phers also had a conversation. The British audience probably understood very little of what
Husserl was trying to express. Husserl also met Moore in Cambridge on the same trip. I join
Spiegelberg in wondering whether Moore really expressed his admiration of Logical Investiga-
tions and rejection of Ideas, as W. R. Boyce Gibson's diary testifies. Herbert Spiegelberg,

76
 DOES THE EARTH MOVE?

"Husserl in England: Facts and Lessons." in Husserl, Shorter Works (Notre Dame, Ind.: Univer-
sity of Notre Dame Press. 1981), 54-65.
17 I have dealt with reduction in my papers, "Reduction in concreto, Two readings of the Idea
of Phenomenology," in Recherches Husserliennes 11 (1999), 51-78, and "Before and after
Reduction. An Interpretation of the Initial Distinction of Hlusserlian Phenomenology," forthcom-
ing in Journal of the British Society,fbr Phenomenology.
i8 The relationship between common sense and reduction comes explicitly into view in one passage
of Crisis: "The subjective part of the world swallows up, so to speak, the whole world and thus
itself too. What an absurdity! Or is this a paradox which can be sensibly resolved, even a neces-
sary one, arising necessarily out of the constant tension between the power of what is taken for
granted in the natural objective attitude (the power of 'common sense') and the opposed attitude
of the 'disinterested spectator'? The latter is, to be sure, extremely difficult to carry out in a radi-
cal way, since it is constantly threatened by misunderstandings. Furthermore. by carrying out the
epoche [the initial phase of reductioni the phenomenologist by no means straightway commands
a horizon of obviously possibly new projects." Edmund Hussert, The Crisis of European Sciences
and TranscendentalPhenomnenology. trans. David Carr (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University
Press, 1970), 180.
19 Husserl. Cartesian Meditations. 86. Ali quotations are from the standard editions of Husserl's
complete works (The Hague: Martinus Nilhoff, 1950- : and Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988- );
Husserliana is hereafter abbreviated as Hua. For the quotation from Cartesian Meditations. see
Hual, 119.
20 Husserl, C'artesian Meditations. 84; Hual, 117. See also Hua29, 145; and Husserl, Ideas
Pertaining to a Pure Phenomnenologv and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 19891. §64, hereafter Ideas 11.
21 Hua29, 334. Klaus Held writes: "For Husserlian phenomenology, the object possesses no being
in itself over and above its intentional appearing." Klaus Held, "Heidegger and the Principle of
Phenomenology," in Martin Heidegger; Critical Assessments. vol. 2, ed. Christopher Macann
(London: Routledge, 1992), 305. See also Hua4, 297: Hual9, 56; Huai3, 145: Hua29, text 11.
333.
22 In the manuscript, Husserl writes: "Elaben wir die Natur vorausgesetzm so haben wir auch
Subjektivit5t vorausgesetzt." Manuscript F 1 32, Natur und Geist, 38. The unpublished manu-
scripts of Husserl are quoted here by permission of the Hlusserl-Archives, Leuven.
23 The obvious objection would be that dinosaurs also have a body which they can orient to the sun.
According to Heidegger, that is not the case: "Der Leib des Menchen ist etwas wesentlich
anderes als ein tiericher Organismus." Martin Hleidegger. "Brief uber 'Humanismus,"' in Weg-
marken (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1967), 155-56. From Husserlian perspective.
the question is more complicated: see, for example, Hua4, 4; Hual14, text 6, Anthony J.
Steinbock, Home and Beyond. Generative Phenomenology atier HusserH (Evanston, Ill.: North-
western University Press, 1995), 225-30.
T'he problem would in any case be that I have never been in the presence of a dinosaur. Here I
leave open the question of whether some other animal, which is more familiar to us. would be
enough to provide a sense of the sun existing before humans. It seemns clear, however, that from
the point of view of Husserlian phenomenology the Sun (in some sense) is also for animals.
24 Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. Findley (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970).
445. The sentence continues: "what cannot be, cannot be thought."
25 Another obvious choice would have been to proceed from the perspective of time. Martin
Hleidegger writes: "To be sure, it is not absolutely necessary that we should be. There is a pure
possibility that man might not be at all. After all there was a time when man was not. But strictly
speaking we cannot say: There was a time when man was not. At all times man was and is and

77
 JUHIA HIMANKA

will be, because time produces itself only insofar as man is." Martin Heidegger, An Introduiction
to Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), 84. Without humans. there is no
time; therefore, there cannot be a time without humans. Accordingly, there could not have been a
time when there was the sun but no humans.
26 Hlusserl, Ideas iI. 61; Hua4, 55. In parenthesis Husseri writes, "or better: animal," making it evi-
dent that Husserl accepted animals as coconstituents of our world. Hlere, I have chosen to leave
this aspect aside.
27 Ibid.
28 This, however, does not mean that I have to perceive something here and now for it to be. The
possibility of being perceivable is enough, but in the case of the sun before humans there is not
even that possibility. As we will see later on, for Husserl objectivity does not in the first instance
refer to physical reality but instead to intersubjectivity. Therefore, even one human being, with-
out the possibility of others. cannot perceive the sun objectively. Dan Zahavi explicates the
dependence between intersubjectivity and objectivity: "Provided that the subject as subject is
directed towards objects, provided that every experience of objects is characterized by the hori-
zontal appearance of the object, where a certain aspect is present and the others are absent, and
provided that this horizontal intentionalitv, this interplay between presence and absence can only
be accounted for phenomenologically through a reference to a plurality of possible subjects, the
consequence is, that I in my being as subject is referred to Others, regardless of whether I experi-
ence them concretely or not, regardless of whether they actually exist or not." Dan Zahavi,
"Husserl's Intersubjective Transformation of Transcendental Philosophy," Journal of the British
Sociery for Phenomenologv 27 (1996): 234. See also Dan Zahavi, Husserl und die transzen-
dentale Intersubjektivitdt(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996).
29 liusserl, Ideas 11, 62.
30 A. J. Ayer, "Philosophy and Science," in Ayer, Metaphysics and Common Sense (London:
Macmillan, 1969), 92.
31 Bertrand Russell, "On Denoting," in The Philosophy of Language, ed. A. P. Martinich (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 203.
32 Merieau-Ponty writes: "The Vienna Circle ... Logical positivism of this kind is the antithesis of
Hlusserl's thought." Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London:
Routiedge & Kegan Paul, 1962), xv. R. Carnap attended Husserl's advanced seminar during
1924-1925.
33 Husserl disagreed strongly with Schlick's interpretation of his phenomenology: "Flow readily
many authors employ critical rejections, with what conscientiousness they read my writings,
what nonsense they have the audacity to attribute to me and to phenomenology, are shown in the
Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre of Moritz Schlick. On page 121 of this work it is said that my Ideas
asserts the existence of a peculiar intuition, that is not a real physical act, and that if someone
fails to find such an 'experience', which does not fall within the domain of psychology, this indi-
cates that he has not understood the doctrine, that he has not yet penetrated to the correct attitude
of experience and thought, for this requires 'peculiar, strenuous studies'. The total impossibility
that I should have beer able to utter so insane an assertion as that attributed to -meby Schick
in the above italicized sentences, and the falsity of the rest of his exposition of the meaning of
phenomenology, must be plain to anyone familiar with this meaning. Of course I have always
repeated my demand for 'strenuous studies'. But not otherwise than, e.g., the mathematician
demands them of anyone who wishes to share in talk of mathematical matters, . . . I must
expressly observe that, in the case of M. Schlick, one is not dealing with irrelevant slihs, but with
sense-distorting substitution on which all his criticism is built up." Husserl, Logical Investiga-
tions 11, 663-64. Schlick changed the text for the second edition of Aligemeine Erkenntnislehre,
and answers Husserl in a note: "Ich erwahne dies, damit es nicht scheine, als hatten diese

78
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uberscharfen Bemerkungen, die Husserl in der Vorrede zur 2. Auflage des 2. Bandes seiner
Logische Untersuchungen gegen mich richtet, mich von einer genuigend deutlichen
Kennzeichnung der phanomenologischen Methode zuruickgeschreckt. Husserl wirft mir allzu
flichtige Lektuire seines Buches vor, zitiert aber in demselben Satze das meinige falsch. Er
beklagt sich ferner daruiber, da: ich von der 'Ideation' falschlich angenommen habe, sie solle
kein realer psychischer Akt sein. Die Aufklarung dieses Mipvertsaindnisses, das dadurch
entstand, dap mir nach Volizug der pharnomenologischen 'Schau' erforderlichen
'Einklammerung' oder 'Ausschaltung' alles Wirklichen kein realer Bewu3tseinsvorgang,
sondern nur ein blopes Abstraktum ubrig zu bleiben schein, la,Bt die im Text vorgebrachten
Argumente gegen die Phanomenoiogie vtliig unberuhrt." Moritz Schlick. Allgemeine
Erkenntnislehre, Zweite Auflage (Berlin: Veriag von Julius Springer, i925), 128n.1 usserl's ci-
tation of the first (191 8) editioii seems to be correct: p. 121.
34 Schlick, Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre. 277.
35 Schlick, Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, 273 (emphasis added).
36 Hua2l. 21, 276, 284.
37 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenoiogy ofPerception, 102.
38 Ibid., translation modified.
39 Husserl. "Foundational Investigation of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature,"
trans. Fred Kersten. in Hlusserl. Shorter Works. The envelope containing the manuscript reads:
"Umsturz der kopemikanischen Lehre in der gewohlichen weltanschaulichen Interpretation. Die
Ur-Arche Erde bewegt sich nichl. Grundlegende Untersuchungen zum phanomenologischen
Ursprung der Korperlichkeit der Raumlichkeit der Natur im ersten naturwissenschaftlichen Sinne.
Alles notwendige Anfangsuntersuchungen." The German text is published in Marvin Farber, ed.,
Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1940).
40 Husserl, "Foundational Investigation of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of
Nature." 252, translation modified.
41 Alfred Schutz's comment on the continuation of Husserl's essay reveals that even he had some
difficulties in accepting Husserlts radical bypassing of the sciences: "most serious misinterpreta-
tions of Husserl's attempt at an analysis of space . . . would be the supposition that this philoso-
pher ever had the intention of substituting constructions of a primitive speculation for the
accomplishments of modem science and mathematics, which he knew as thoroughly as anyone.'
Alfred Schutz, "Editor's Preface" to Hlusserl, "Notes on Space Constitution." Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 1 (1940): 22. See also Fred Kersten, "Introduction," in Husserl,
Shorter Works. 214.
42 According to Husserl, the mistake here is to claim that the human race has a beginning in time:
"No one has ever thought of rejecting as absurd those geological and physical theories which
give the human race a beginning and an end in time. The stigma of absurdity therefore taints the
whole hypothetical statement." Husserl, Logical Investigations. 142.
43 Many analytical philosophers think that philosophy and science are separate tasks and that sci-
ence should not influence philosophical research, In that case the question of the Earth, for
example, is left to the sciences. From the phenomenological perspective of reduction and rigor-
ous science, however, one does not make such a distinction. The field of philosophy (as a first
philosophy) begins from the most general perspective. Therefore, there remains a difference in
the relationship to science between the analytical and phenomenological approaches.
44 The Vienna Circle, "The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle," in Otto
Neurath, Empiricism and Sociology (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1973), 299-318, 316. The standpoint
of the Vienna Circle towards science is certainly not commonly (if at all) accepted today among
analytical philosophers. Along with many other views of the circle. it has been criticized almost

79
 JUHA HIMANKA

from the very beginning. Nevertheless, I think there is an affinity between the present views of at
least some analytical philosophers and the Vienna Circle-at least when one compares these
views to the phenomenological view,
45 A more careful reading of the lectures can be found in my essay "Reduction in concreto:"
46 This comes to light already at the beginning of the Ideas 1, where Husserl writes about the theo-
retical attitude which we call natural. Husserl's manuscript B 1 7 ii (1930) begmns: "Die
phaenomenologische Reduktion geht aus von der naturlichen Einstellung. der Einstellung aller
positiven Wissenschaften."
47 HusserL The Idea of Phenomenology, 20.
48 Ibid., 15.
49 Husserl, however, sometimes draws a parallel to science (for example, in section 38 of Cartesian
Mediations). In the light of what follows, a more interesting example is to be found in the
Vorlesungen ilber Bedeutungslehre (1908i. There Husserl draws a parallel between the state-
ments "die Erde ist Ebene" and 2 x 2 = 5 (fHua26, 131). However, there is not an essential rela-
tionship between understanding the Earth as a physical thing and understanding that the Earth is
essentially spherical in shape, which had already been clear to the Greeks.
50 Ilusserl's manuscript F l 32 (Natur und Geist) reads: "Aber freilich die physikalisch-theoretische
(Erkenntnis) vollzieht eine hbhere Objektivierung als das gewohnliche Lehen" (42).
51 Hua9, 148.
52 In manuscript B I 7 ii (1930) Husserl writes: "die phaenomenologische Reduktion klaminert das
'Vorurteil' der an sich seienden Welt ein und der Moglichkeit einer Wissenschaft nach Art der
neuzeitlichen positiven Wissenschaft" (5).
53 Husser.. Ideas ii, 311. In manuscript F 1 32 (Natur und Geist) Elusserl writes: "So kommt es,
dass alle Erketnisse der natuirlichen Positivitat. also die aller unserer gewohnlichen Wissen-
schaften . . . den Charakter einer blossen Relativitat annehmen, der uberall ihren Sinn in Frage
stellt" (48).
54 Hua29, 145.
55 This becomes clear in section 55 of Ideas I. where HusserI deals with the origin of the counter-
sensical interpretation of the world of the natural attitude: "That interpretation sterns from a
philosophical absolutizing of the world completely alien to the natural way of considering the
world."
56 A. J. Ayer. The CentralQuestions of Philosoph) (London: Weinfeld and Nicholson, 1973), 43.
57 Russell, "On Denoting," 209.
58 Moritz Schlick, "Positivism and Realism," in PhilosophicalPapers,vol. 2 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel,
1979), 259-84, 282.
59 Fred Hoyle writes: "Let it be understood at the outset that it makes no difference, from the point
of view of describing planetary motions, whether we take the Earth or the Sun as the centre of
the solar system. Since the issue is of relative motion only, there are infinitely many exactly
equivalent descriptions referred to different centres-in principle any point will do, the Moon.
Jupiter. . . . So the passions loosed on the world by the publication of Copernicus' book, de
revolutionibus orbium caelestium libri VI, were logically irrelevant." Hoyle also commented: "At
the beginning of chapter I it was stated that we can take either the Earth or the Sun, or any other
point for that matter, as the centre of the solar system. This is certainly so for the purely kine-
matic problem of describing the planetary motions. It is also possible to take any point as the
centre even in dynamics, although the recognition of this freedom of choice had to await the
present century." Fred Hoyle, Nicolaus Copernicus (London: Heinemann Educational Books
Ltd., 1973), 1, 74. Cf. Hegel, Encyclopedia, §269.
60 According to Hoyle: "From what has so far been said it will be realized that the predictive qual-
ity of the constructions of Ptolemy and Copernicus are nearly the satne." Yet, if we bypass the

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 DOES THE EARTH MOVE"

historical perspective and turn to the modern view which includes dynamics, we can ask: "Is it
the Sun that accelerates with respect to universe, or is it the Earth?' Hoyle answers: "Neglecting
small effects. the answer is that the Earth is accelerated, not the Sun. Hence we must use the
heliocentric theory if we wish to take advantage of simple rules for the local forces. But it is not
to say that we cannot use the geocentric theory if we are willing to use more complex rules for
the forces." Hoyle, Nicolaus Copernicus. 71, 78. I doubt whether simplicity can be determined
without already choosing a perspective. Therefore it is difficult to see the heliocentric view as the
only truthful one, even in Newtonian physics. From the perspective of the physics of today it is
impossible.
61 Hoyle, Nicolaus Copernicus, 78.
62 Sometimes one gets the picture that the heliocentric view (although scientifically outdated) is a
part of the modern scientific worldview. Perhaps this has something to do with the fact that with
the heliocentric view science overcame the "prejudices" of the church and common sense. The
heliocentric view is a symbol of the new scientific perspective.
63 However, many analytical philosophers would say that this is not a philosophical topic and
should be left to sciences.
64 See Hans Blumenberg, Die Genesis der kopernikanischeni Welt, vol. I (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp. 1981), 13.
65 The most famous of the attempts to measure the movement of the Earth in space is the
Michelson-Moriey experiment. The Oxford Concise Dictionary of Phivsics (1990) explains: "An
experiment conducted in 1887 by Albert Michelson (1852-1931) and Edward Morley (1838-
1923), that attempted to measure the velocity of the earth through the ether. Using a modified
Michelson interferometer . . . they expected to observe a shift in the interference fringes formed
when the instrument was rotated 90°, showing that the speed of light measured in the direction of
earth's rotation, or orbital motion, is not identical to its speed at right angles to this direction. No
shift was observed." Einstein then claimed that it is impossible to measure the velocity of the
Earth by optics or by any other physical experiments. Yet, these views have to do only with
steady movement. In contrast to that Earth's rotation is an accelerative movement and can there-
fore be noticed by experiments (for example Foucault's pendulum). Nevertheless, in the last
instance also this also reguires the supposition of inertia coordinates. Another interesting prob-
lem, which through Ernst Mach also influenced the formation of the theory of relativity (as did
the Michelson-Morley experiment), is the example of rotating water in a bucket. If we put some
water in the bucket and spin it, the surface of the water forms a parabola. If we instead spin the
bucket, the surface stays horizontal. The problem, then, is: How does the water "know" which
one moves? If we start with the unmoving Earth. this problem does not occur.
66 Elusserl, 'Origin of the Spatiality of Nature," 224.
67 Ibid. Heidegger relates this to the Greeks (Aristotle) and claims that for "any characterization and
any estimate of movement, the Earth is the centre...." Martin Heidegger, What Is a Thing? (Chi-
cago: Henry Regnery. 1967), 85, translation modified. See Maria Villela-Petit, "Heidegger's
conception of Space," in Martin Heidegger, CriticalAssessments, vol. 1, 128.
68 Husserl, "Origin of the Spatiality of Nature" 223.
69 Ibid., 225. translation modified. Cf. "But its rest is not a mode of motion" (230).
70 Ibid., 230, translation modified. Werner Marx searches for an unmetaphysical ethics grounding
itself on the Earth (in the context of Holderlin and Heidegger) in his book, Gibi es auf Erden
ein Map, Grundbestimmungen einer nichmnetaphvsichen Ethik (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag,
1983).
71 This transition is often seen as an achievement of Galileo and his colleges. From the Hlusserlian
point of view we face also a methodological problem. Husserl's ancient ideal of strenge
Wissenchaft, in contrast to that. tries to overcome all limitations and become a universal science.

81
 JUHA HIMANKA

The difference comes into view when we think about Galileo's confrontation with the church.
According to Cardinal Oregia, who was present at a meeting between Cardinal Barberini (sOOD
to become Pope tUrban VIII) and Galileo, Barberini asked Galileo to demonstrate that stellar
motions "could not be obtained by a system different from the one you have conceived, that such
system would involve contradiction." Galileo did not have an answer: "Having heard these
words. the great scientist remained silent." Pierre Duhem, To Save the Phenomena: An Essay on
the Idea of Physical Theory from Plato to Galileo (Chicago: tUniversity of Chicago Press, 1969),
111. As Duhem. notes, Barberini "had reminded Galileo of the following truth: no matter how
numerous and exact the confirmations by experience, they can never transform a hypothesis into
certain truth." Husserl follows the old ideal of science: and therefore, his position is not limited
by the limits of experimental sciences, and he could have answered the question. According to
him, a moving Earth leads to a contradiction.
72 Of course, one can always create a system where the Earth is understood as moving, and in this
system the moving Earth has a meaning. As the original title of his manuscript suggests, Husserl
tried to overcome the Copernican doctrine in its normal sense understood as a worldview. The
astronomical system can be understood to be detached from reality: "Astronomical hypotheses
are simple devices for saving the phenomena; provided they serve this end, they need not to be
true or even likely. From the time of the publication of Copernicus' book with the preface by
Osiander up to the time of the Gregorian reform of the calendar, this was, it seems, the generally
accepted opinion of astronomers and theologians." Duhem, To Save the Phenomena. 92.
73 Steinbock, Home and Beyond, 118.
74 It is also our home; see Steinbock, Home and Beyond, 234.
75 Kahn. The Verb "Be" in Ancient Greek, 379.
76 Ludwig Landgrebe writes. "FUr unsere unmittelbare Erfahrung ist also die Erde unbewegt: das
Wissern um ihre Bewegung stammt nicht aus unmittelbarer Erfahrung. sondern ist erst durch
wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis vermittelt." Ludwig Landgrebe, "Welt als Phanomenologisches
Problem," in Der Weg der Phdioomenologie, Das Problemn einer urspriinglichen Erf hrnng
(Giitersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1963), 49. Does this not come close to common sense, from which
phenomenology parted at the outset? However, in the phenomenological approach, the immobile
Earth is not just ar. experience but an evident one. The complicated task of Lebenswelt is left out
here. I have also bypassed the problem of an earthquake. Some of us have experienced an earth-
quake and have therefore seen and felt the movement of the Earth. Eugen Filk actually compares
reduction to an earthquake; see Eugen Fink, "Reflexionen zu Hlusserls Phanomenologischer
Reduktion," in Ndhe und Distano, Phdoomenologische Vortrage und Au iitze (Mtinchen: Verlag
Karl Alber, 1976), 317. See also my "Reductio in concreto."
77 One might say that there is no real dilemma here, that there is "'theEarth" on the one hand and on
the other "ear.th." Thus one just admits that Moore was wrong when he claimed that "earth" is an
unambiguous concept. Husserl's point, however, is to object to the interpretation of the Coperni-
can view as a part of our worldview.
78 It is crucial for understanding the Husserlian concept of science to make a clear distinction be-
tween the ideal of rigorous science (strenge Wissens,waft) and the sciences to be found around
us: "And so we make a new beginning, each for himself and in himself, with the decision of phi-
losophers who begin radically: that at first we shall put out of action all the convictions we have
been accepting up to now, including all our sciences. Let the idea guiding our meditations be at
first the Cartesian idea of a science that shall be established as radically genuine, ultimateiv an
all-embracing science." Husserl, C.artesian Meditations, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hiague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1960). 7 (emphasis added). This old (ancient) ideal of science does not coin-
cide with the ideal of modern science; for example, exactness is not a part of the ideal of strenge
Wissenscaft. Cf. Hual. 31, 157, 161; Hua3, 122: Hua6, 102-03, 224, 268; Hua7, 36, 68. 74:

82
 DOES THE EARTH MOVE?

Hua8, 27. 325, 356: Hua9, 143, 148: Hutal1, 108-09. 220-21; Hual4, 396; Hual 5. 481; Hual6.
6-7; Hua24. 186. 192, 238; Hua29, 131; Cairns. "Conversations with Elusserl and Fink," 14.
Fink, Die SpdtphilosophieHusserls in der FreiburgerZeit, 103.
79 Tugendhat, Der Wahrheitsbegriffbei Husserl und Heidegger. 154.
80 A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (London: Victor Gollancz, 1962), 35.
81 flusserl has also a concept of apodictic evidence. The relationship between adequate and apodic-
tic in Husserl is a difficult research question.
82 Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, trans. Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press. 1985), 50.
83 Ibid.. 49.
84 J. Philip Miller, Numbers in Presenzce and Absence: A Study of Husserl's Philosoplh qf Mathe-
matics (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982). 65.
85 If we turn our attention to the Earth, for exampie, it is more difficult to see whether we should
tum to ask for the constitution of the Earth or whether we should consult scientific experiments.
86 Phenomenological critique of the representation theory is also to be understood from this per-
spective. Phenomenological critique claims that representational theory does not make sense
because I do not have any experience whatsoever of such a "thing.' I can create some kind of a
theoretical entity called "representation" but there still has never been a representation present to
me. I cannot make a claim for an intersubjective or objective reality of such a fictive thing-no
matter how well they would suit the generally accepted view of the world. Instead of beginning
with such theories. phenomenology claims to return to the things themselves. See Heidegger.
History of the Concept of Time, 42-43.
87 Husserl, Logical Investigations I, 769 (emphasis added).
88 Husserl, Logical Investigations I, 761, translation modified.
89 "But this phenomenology lends to knowledge the value of a goal which one attains through expe-
rience. This is an ill-assorted match." Bataille. Itiner Experience, 8.

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TITLE: Does the earth move? A search for a dialogue between

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SOURCE: Philosophical Forum 31 no1 Spr 2000
WN: 0010607019005

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