1.

) SUNTAY III V COJUANCO-SUNTAY (2010)

DOCTRINE: While the barrier in Art. 992 remains in force, Justice Nachura sets the tone in what
could lead to a reconsideration of the ruling in Diaz v Intermediate Appellete Court, supra. Be
mindful, however, that the excerpt cited above is at best an obiter since the principal issue raised in
this case relates to the preference in the appointment of an administrator.

FACTS: On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), married to Dr.
Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay
(Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico. , Cristina was survived by her husband,
Federico, and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio
III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay.
1. During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot three
children, namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II, all surnamed
Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio I’s marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently annulled.
2. Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay
Tañedo (Nenita), by two different women, Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos,
respectively.
3. Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever since he was a mere baby,
nine months old, by the spouses Federico and Cristina and was an acknowledged natural
child of Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I and was likewise
brought up by the spouses Federico and Cristina.
4. After the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for visitation rights over his
grandchildren: respondent Isabel, Margarita, and Emilio II. Federico was allowaed a one
hour of visitation monthly, initially reduced to thirty minutes and eventually stopped
because of a manifestation filed by respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the
unwanted visits of her grandparents.
5. Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or on September 27, 1993, adopted their
illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
6. Respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor for
the administration of the estate of Cristina
7. Federico filed his opposition, disavowing the allegations of Isabel. He further alleged that
being the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of administering her estate and he
should be the one appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass of
conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal preference in the
administration thereof; that Isabel and her family had been alienated from their
grandparents for more than thirty (30) years
8. After a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings amicably, Federico filed a
Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as
administrator of the decedent’s estate on his behalf, in the event he would be adjudged as
the one with a better right to the letters of administration.
9. Emilio III filed his Opposition-In-Intervention, which essentially echoed the allegations
in his grandfather’s opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was
better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate of the decedent,
Cristina
 10. In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000, Federico died.
11. The trial court rendered a decision on November 9, 2001, appointing herein petitioner,
Emilio III, as administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate.
12. Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and
appointed respondent as administratrix of the intestate estate of the decedent, Cristina.

ISSUE: Who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is better qualified to act as administrator of
the decedent’s estate.

HELD:
The Court held that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the administration of the
decedent’s estate. As Federico’s adopted son, Emilio III’s interest in the estate of Cristina is as
much apparent to this Court as the interest therein of respondent, considering that the CA even
declared that "under the law, [Federico], being the surviving spouse, would have the right of
succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share in the
conjugal partnership."

Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article 992 of the Civil Code, the successional
bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not apply in this instance
where facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary – Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the
decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and her husband as their own son, reared from
infancy, educated and trained in their businesses, and eventually legally adopted by decedent’s
husband, the original oppositor to respondent’s petition for letters of administration.

We are not unmindful of the critiques of civilists of a conflict and a lacuna in the law concerning
the bone of contention that is Article 992 of the Civil Code, beginning with the eminent Justice
J.B.L. Reyes:

In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within the
legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child
can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother.
The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article
943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles
(990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his
own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the
illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of the
grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being
indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a
choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation,
in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify
Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude
vis-à-vis illegitimate children.23

Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate succession:

The law [of intestacy] is founded… on the presumed will of the deceased… Love, it is said, first
descends, then ascends, and, finally, spreads sideways. Thus, the law first calls the descendants,
then the ascendants, and finally the collaterals, always preferring those closer in degree to those
of remoter degrees, on the assumption that the deceased would have done so had he manifested
his last will… Lastly, in default of anyone called to succession or bound to the decedent by ties
of blood or affection, it is in accordance with his presumed will that his property be given to
charitable or educational institutions, and thus contribute to the welfare of humanity.24

Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate succession,
i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her legitimate and
illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the
status of Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar
circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the
legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism
between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.

It must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from making a final declaration
of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina and
Federico, considering that the question on who will administer the properties of the long
deceased couple has yet to be settled.

The Court reversed and set aside the CA’s ruling and declared that Letters of Administration
over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M.
Suntay III and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-
95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make a
determination and to declare the heirs of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the
actual factual milieu as proven by the parties, and all other persons with legal interest in the
subject estate. It is further directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay
with dispatch.

2.) ARELLANO V. PASCUAL, 638 SCRA 826 (2010)

FACTS: Angel Pascual died intestate and left his siblings as his heirs, namely: petitioner Amelia
Arellano who is represented by her daughters Agnes and Nona, and respondents Francisco
Pascual and Miguel Pascual

1. Respondents alleged that the parcel of land donated to Amelia during the decedent’s
lifetime should be considered as an advance legitime of petitioner

2. The probate court held that the property donated to Amelia was part of the estate of
the decedent and as such, subject to collation

ISSUES:
 1. WON the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation

2. WON the estate should be distributed equally among the parties

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: Yes.

The term collation has two distinct concepts:

1. Collation is a mere operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the
testator to the value of the hereditary estate;

2. It is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the
testator during his lifetime

The purpose of collation is to security equality among the compulsory heirs insofar as is
possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious
donations may be reduced.

Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one its purposes being to determine the
legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be
safeguarded.

CAB: The decedent did not leave any primary, secondary or concurring compulsory heirs. He
was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and are not entitle to any
legitime.

The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to legitime, he was free to
donate all of his properties even if nothing was left to his siblings. His donation to petitioner is
deemed as a donation to a stranger, chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There
being no compulsory heir, the donated property is not subject to collation.

SECOND ISSUE: The decedent’s remaining estate should be partitioned equally among his heirs
who are his collateral relatives, following Art 1003 and 1004 NCC.

3.) MANUEL A. ECHAVEZ, Petitioner, vs. DOZEN CONSTRUCTION AND

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CEBU
CITY, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 192916 October 11, 2010 BRION, J.:]

TOPIC: V. Fomal Requirements of a Will – F. Pagination

DOCTRINE: the purported attestation clause embodied in the Acknowledgment
portion does not contain the number of pages on which the deed was written
FACTS:
1. Vicente Echavez (Vicente) was the absolute owner of several lots in Cebu City.
2. Vicented donated the lots to petitioner Manuel Echavez (Manuel) through a
Deed of Donation Mortis Causa which the latter accepted.
3. In March 1986: Vicente executed a Contract to Sell over the same lots in favor of
Dozen Construction and Development Corporation (Dozen Corporation).
4. October 1986: Vicente and Dozen Corp executed 2 Deeds of Absolute Sale over
the properties covered by the Contract to Sell
5. November 6, 1986: Vicente died
a. Emiliano Cabanig, Vicente’s nephew, filed a petition for the settlement of
Vicente’s intestate estate.
b. Manuel filed a petition to approve Vicente’s donation mortis causa in his
favor and an action to annul the contracts of sale Vicente executed in
favor of Dozen Corporation.
6. RTC dismissed Manuel’s petition ruling that the execution of a Contract to
Sell in favor of Dozen Corporation, after Vicente had donated the lots to Manuel,
was an equivocal act that revoked the donation.
7. CA affirmed the RTC’s decision holding that the donation in favor of Manuel
was a donation mortis causa, compliance with the formalities for the
validity of wills should have been observed.
a. CA found that the deed of donation did not contain an attestation clause
and was therefore void.
8. Hence the petition, Manuel alleged the following:
a. rule on substantial compliance in the construction of a will should be
applied
b. strict construction of a will was not warranted in the absence of any
indication of bad faith, fraud, or substitution in the execution of the Deed of
Donation Mortis Causa.
c. The Acknowledgement portion of the will contains the "import and
purpose" of the attestation clause required in the execution of wills.
BEFORE ME, Notary Public, this 7th day of September 1985 at Talisay, Cebu,
personally appeared VICENTE S. Echavez with Res. Cert. No. 16866094 issued on
April 10, 1985 at [sic] Talisay, Cebu known to me to be the same person who executed
the foregoing instrument of Deed of Donartion Mortis Causa before the Notary Public
and in the presence of the foregoing three (3) witnesses who signed this
instrument before and in the presence of each other and of the Notary Public and
all of them acknowledge to me that the same is their voluntary act and deed.

ISSUE: Whether the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa failed to comply with the
formalities prescribed by law for it to be valid?

HELD: Yes. CA decision affirmed.

9. the purported attestation clause embodied in the Acknowledgment portion
does not contain the number of pages on which the deed was written
a. Exception of this general rule cannot apply since the facts are not similar,
the number of pages was not stated in one portion of the will.
 10. an attestation clause and an acknowledgment can be merged in one statement
b. requirements of attestation and acknowledgment are embodied in two
separate provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 805 and 806, respectively)
indicates that the law contemplates two distinct acts that serve different
purposes
c. ACKNOWLEDGMENT: made by one executing a deed, declaring before
a competent officer or court that the deed or act is his own
d. ATTESTATION OF A WILL: the act of the instrumental witnesses
themselves who certify to the execution of the instrument before them and
to the manner of its execution.
11. In the present case the acknowledgement of the witnesses of the execution of
the Deed of Donation Mortis cause before the notary public is not the same
embodied in Article 805; thus no attestation clause can be deemed embodied in
the Acknowledgement of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.

4.) Cruz v. Cruz, G.R. No. 173292, September 1, 2010.

FACTS

Memoracion Z. Cruz filed with the RTC a Complaint against her son, Oswaldo Z. Cruz,
for “Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages.” After Memoracion finished
presenting her evidence in chief, she died. The RTC was informed, albeit belatedly, of
the death of Memoracion, and was supplied with the name and address of her legal
representative, Edgardo Cruz.

ISSUE

Whether or not Petition for Annulment of Deed of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages is
a purely personal action which did not survive the death of petitioner.

RULING

NO. The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the
action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong
complained [of] affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries
to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not
survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property
affected being incidental. Here, the petition for annulment of deed of sale involves
property and property rights, and hence, survives the death of petitioner Memoracion.

5.) RABADILLA v COURT OF APPEALS (2000

Johnny S. Rabadilla, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Maria Marlena Coscoluella Y
Belleza Villacarlos, respondents
DOCTRINE: Rabadilla distinguished between a conditional institution and a modal institution, It
also discussed the various forms of substitution of heirs.

Justice Purisima concluded that in case of doubt, the institution must be deemed modal and
not conditional. Following his discussion, he noted that while a modal institution obliges, it does not
suspend the effectivity of the institution. On the other hand, a conditional institution suspends the
efficacy of the institution, although it does not impose any obligation on the instituted heir.
One question that should probably be asked is: what happens to the mortgage in favor of
PNB and RPB upon the cancellation of the title of the property in the names of the heirs of Dr.
Rabadilla? If the mortgage is to be honored, the heirs of Aleja Belleza will receive the property
subject to the encumbrance. On the other hand, if the mortgage is to be cancelled, PNB and RBP
will be prejudiced.
FACTS: In a codicil (a supplement to a will; an appendix) of Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
was instituted devisee of a 511, 855 sqm. lot in Bacolod. With the obligation to deliver 100
piculs of sugar to private respondent Maria Marlena Coscoluella Y Belleza Villacarlos every year
during her lifetime.

1. The codicil provides that the obligation is imposed not only on the instituted heir but also to
his successors-in-interest and that in case of failure to deliver, private respondent shall seize
the property and turn it over to the testatrix’s “near descendants.”
2. Dr. Rabadilla died and was survived by his wife and children, one of whom is herein
petitioner.
3. Private respondent file a complaint with the RTC praying for the reconveyance of the
subject property to the surviving heirs of the testatrix. She alleged that the heirs failed to
comply with the provisions on the codicil: (a) The lot was mortgaged to PNB and RPB in
disregard of the testatrix’s specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near
descendants and sister of the testatrix; (b) Defendants-heirs failed to comply with their
obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar to private respondent from sugar crop years 1985
up to the filing of the complaint, despite repeated demands; (c) the banks failed to comply
with the Codicil which provide s that in case of the sale, lease or mortgage of the property,
the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of
sugar per crop year to private respondent.
4. During the pre-trial, a compromise agreement was concluded between the private
respondent and Alan Azurin, son-in-law of petitioner who was lessee of the property and
acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant heirs. The lessee of the property assumed the delivery
of 100 piculs of sugar to private respondent; however, only partial delivery was made.
5. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action stating that, “While there
may be the non-performance of the command as mandated, exaction from them (the
petitioners), simply because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner
of the lot in question, does not warrant the filing of the present complaint.
6. The CA, reversed the decision and held that the institution of Dr. Rabadilla is in the nature
of modal institution and a cause of action in favor of private respondent arose when
 petitioner failed to comply with their obligation under the codicil, and in ordering the
reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix.
ISSUE: WON private respondent has a legally demandable right against the petitioner, as one of the
compulsory heirs of Dr. Rabadilla

HELD: Yes

The CA found that the private respondent had a cause of action against the petitioner. The
disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the private respondent had a
legally demandable right against the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil.

The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of
succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator
states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the
testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A “mode” imposes an obligation
upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his right to succession. On the other
hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order
for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and
the mode obligates but does not suspend. To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.
In the case at bar, the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-
in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena
Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla’s inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the
performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied
with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix’s near descendants. The manner of institution
of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a
charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
Since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir
should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the
intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not
conditional.

6.) heirs of policronio ureta v. heirs of liberato ureta [2011]

doctrine

The applicability of the PER requires that the case be between parties and their successors-in-
interest. Both the Team A and Team P are successors-in-interest of the parties to the Deed of
Sale as they claim rights under Alfonso and Policronio, respectively. The PER excludingevidence
aliunde, however, still cannot apply because the present case falls under 2 exceptions to the rule,
as discussed above.

facts
 Alfonso begot 14 children, namely, Policronio, Liberato, Narciso, Prudencia, Vicente,
Francisco, Inocensio, Roque, Adela, Wenefreda, Merlinda, Benedicto, Jorge, and Andres. The
children of Policronio (Team P), are opposed to the rest of Alfonso’s children and their
descendants (Team A).
 Alfonso and four of his children, namely, Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and Francisco, met
at the house of Liberato. Francisco, who was then a municipal judge, suggested that in order to
reduce the inheritance taxes, their father should make it appear that he had sold some of his
lands to his children.
 Alfonso executed 4 Deeds of Sale covering several parcels of land in favor of
Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and his common-law wife, Valeriana Dela Cruz. The Deed of Sale
executed on Oct 25, 1969, in favor of Policronio, covered six parcels of land, which are the
properties in dispute in this case.
 Since the sales were only made for taxation purposes and no monetary consideration was
given, Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy the lands and their produce.
 Policronio died on Nov 22, 1974. Except for the said portion of parcel 5, neither Policronio
nor his heirs ever took possession of the subject lands.
 Alfonso’s heirs executed a Deed of EJP, which included all the lands that were covered by the
4 deeds of sale. Conrado, Policronio’s eldest son, representing Team P, signed the Deed of EJP in
behalf of his co-heirs.
 Team P found tax declarations in his name covering the six parcels of land. They obtained a
copy of the Deed of Sale executed on Oct 25, 1969 by Alfonso in favor of Policronio.
 Believing that the six parcels of land belonged to their late father as such, excluded from the
Partition, Team P sought to amicably settle the matter with the Team A.
 Team P filed a Complaint for Declaration of Ownership, Recovery of Possession, Annulment
of Docs, Partition against the Team A before the RTC where the ff issues were submitted:
o (1) WON the Deed of Sale was valid;
o (2) WON the Deed of EJP was valid; and

The Ruling of the RTC

deed of sale was void

 No money involved in the sale. Even granting that there was, the amount was grossly
inadequate (P2K). Team P only paid real estate taxes in 1996 and 1997.
 Policronio must have been aware that the transfer was merely for taxation purposes because
he did not subsequently take possession of the properties even after the death of his father.
deed of EJP valid
 The Deed of EJP was declared valid by the RTC as all the Team A were represented and
received equal shares and all the requirements of a valid EJP were met.

The Ruling of the CA

 Deed of Sale: ABSOLUTELY SIMULATED based on the testimony of Amparo Castillo.
 EJP: ANNULLED THE DEED OF EJP due to the incapacity of one of the parties to give his
consent to the contract. Without a SPA, it was held that Conrado lacked the legal capactiy to give
the consent of his co-heirs.
 Remanded to the RTC for the proper partition of the estate, with the option that the parties
may still voluntarily effect the partition by executing another agreement or by adopting the EJP
or through compulsory partition.

Team P

 RTC violated the BER in giving credence to the testimony of Amparo Castillo with regard to
the simulation of the Deed of Sale, and that prescription had set in precluding any question on
the validity of the contract.
 CA held that the oral testimony was admissible under Rule 130, Sec 9 (b) and (c), which
provides that evidence aliunde may be allowed to explain the terms of the written agreement if
the same failed to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto, or when the
validity of the written agreement was put in issue.
 Team P waived their right to object to evidence aliunde having failed to do so during trial and
for raising such only for the first time on appeal.
 Re prescription: action for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe
(NCC 1410)
 Team A argued that the Deed of EJP should not have been annulled, and instead the
preterited heirs should be given their share.

main issue #1: won the Deed of Sale is valid

deed of sale was absolutely simulated

 2 veritable legal presumptions bear on the validity of the Deed of Sale:
o (1) that there was sufficient consideration for the contract; and
o (2) that it was the result of a fair and regular private transaction.
o If shown to hold, these presumptions infer prima facie the transaction’s validity, except
that it must yield to the evidence adduced.
 The Deed of Sale was not a fair and regular private transaction because it was
absolutely simulated. It was made only for tax purposes. Even Policronio did not
disclose the sale to his heirs.
 For lack of consideration, the Deed of Sale is once again found to be void. It states that
Policronio paid, and Alfonso received, the ₱2K purchase price on the date of the signing of the
contract:
 Although, on its face, the Deed of Sale appears to be supported by valuable consideration,
the RTC found that there was no money involved in the sale.
PER
 Team P:
o PER and hearsay were violated by the CA in ruling that the Deed of Sale was void.
o Team A and, specifically, Amparo Castillo, were not in a position to prove the terms outside of
the contract because they were not parties nor successors-in-interest in the Deed of Sale in
question. Thus, it is argued that the testimony of Amparo Castillo violates the PER.
o PER may not be properly invoked by either party in the litigation against the other, where at
least 1 of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in
question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the
instrument or the relation established thereby.
 SC: The objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, as
soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably apparent, and if not so made, it will be
understood to have been waived. In the case of testimonial evidence, the objection must be
made when the objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given if the objectionable
features become apparent only by reason of such answer. Team P failed to timely object to the
testimony of Amparo Castillo and they are, thus, deemed to have waived the benefit of the PER.
 Granting that Team P timely objected to the testimony of Amparo, their argument would still
fail.
 The failure of the Deed of Sale to express the true intent and agreement of the parties was
clearly put in issue in the Answer of the Team A to the Complaint. The exception in par (b) is
allowed to enable the court to ascertain the true intent of the parties, and once the intent is
clear, it shall prevail over what the doc appears to be on its face.
 The VALIDITY of the Deed of Sale was also put in issue in the Answer. The operation of the
PER requires the existence of a valid written agreement. It is, thus, not applicable in a proceeding
where the validity of such agreement is the fact in dispute, such as when a contract may be void
for lack of consideration.
 The applicability of the PER requires that the case be between parties and their successors-
in-interest. Both the Team A and Team P are successors-in-interest of the parties to the Deed of
Sale as they claim rights under Alfonso and Policronio, respectively. The PER excluding evidence
aliunde, however, still cannot apply because the present case falls under 2 exceptions to the rule,
as discussed above.
hearsay evidence
 Team P: hearsay rule was violated when the testimony of Amparo was given weight in
proving that the subject lands were only sold for taxation purposes as she was a person alien to
the contract.
 GR: Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given credence for having no
probative value.
 E: This principle, however, has been relaxed in cases where, in addition to the failure to
object to the admissibility of the subject evidence, there were other pieces of evidence
presented or there were other circumstances prevailing to support the fact in issue.
 Other circumstances in this case:
o other Deeds of Sale which were executed in favor of Liberato, Prudencia, and Valeriana on the
same day as that of Policronio’s were all presented in evidence.
o all the properties subject therein were included in the Deed of EJP of the estate of Alfonso.
o Policronio, during his lifetime, never exercised acts of ownership over the subject properties
o Policronio never informed his children of the sale.
Prior Action Unnecessary
 Team P: Team A should have filed an action to declare the sale void prior to executing the
Deed of EJP. The sale should enjoy the presumption of regularity, and until overturned by a
court, the Team A had no authority to include the land in the inventory of properties of Alfonso’s
estate.
 SC: A simulated contract of sale is without any cause or consideration, and is, therefore, null
and void; in such case, no independent action to rescind or annul the contract is necessary, and
it may be treated as non-existent for all purposes. A void contract produces no effect
whatsoever either against or in favor of anyone; it does not create, modify or extinguish the
juridical relation to which it refers. It was not necessary for the Team A to first file an action to
declare the nullity of the Deed of Sale prior to executing the Deed of EJP.
Personality to Question Sale
 Team P contended that the Team A are not parties, heirs under the contemplation of law to
clothe them with the personality to question the Deed of Sale. They posited that the Team A
were not parties to the contract; neither did they appear to be beneficiaries by way of
assignment or inheritance.
 Unlike themselves who are direct Team P, the Team A are not Alfonso’s direct heirs. For the
Team A to qualify as parties, under Art 1311 of the Civil Code, they must first prove that they are
either heirs or assignees. Being neither, they have no legal standing to question the Deed of Sale.
 SC: The right to set up the nullity of a void or non-existent contract is not limited to the
parties, as in the case of annullable or voidable contracts; it is extended to third persons who are
directly affected by the contract. Team A are clearly his heirs and successors-in-interest and, as
such, their interests are directly affected, thereby giving them the right to question the legality
of the Deed of Sale.
Inapplicability of Art 842
 Art refers to the principle of freedom of disposition by will. What is involved in the case at
bench is not a disposition by will but by Deed of Sale. Team A need not first prove that the
disposition substantially diminished their successional rights or unduly prejudiced their legitimes.
Inapplicability of Art 1412
 Art 1412 is not applicable to fictitious or simulated contracts, because they refer to contracts
with an illegal cause or subject-matter.This Art presupposes the existence of a cause, it cannot
refer to fictitious or simulated contracts which are in reality non-existent.
Prescription
 As the Deed of Sale is a void contract, the action for the declaration of its nullity, even if filed
21 years after its execution, cannot be barred by prescription for it is imprescriptible.
 Furthermore, the right to set up the defense of inexistence or absolute nullity cannot be waived
or renounced.

main issue #2: won the Deed of EJP is valid.

Unenforceability
 Team A:
o CA was mistaken in annulling the Deed of EJP due to the incapacity of Conrado to give the
consent of his co-heirs for lack of a SPA. They argue that the Deed of EJP is not a voidable or an
annullable contract, but rather, it is an unenforceable or, more specifically, an unauthorized
contract under Arts 1403 (1) and 1317 of the Civil Code. As such, the Deed of EJP should not be
annulled but only be rendered unenforceable against the siblings of Conrado.
o NCC 1317 when the persons represented without authority have ratified the unauthorized acts,
the contract becomes enforceable and binding. Team P ratified the Deed of EJP when Conrado
took possession of 1 of the parcels of land adjudicated to him and his siblings. The Deed of EJP
having been ratified and its benefits accepted, the same thus became enforceable and binding
upon them.
 Team P
o subject properties should not have been included in the estate of Alfonso, and because Conrado
lacked the written authority to represent his siblings.
o Team P denied that they ratified the Deed of EJP.

 Partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real property resulting in change
of ownership. Hence, a special power of attorney is not necessary.
 Conrado’s failure to obtain authority from his co-heirs to sign the Deed of EJP in their behalf
did not result in his incapacity to give consent so as to render the contract voidable, but rather, it
rendered the contract valid but unenforceable against Conrado’s co-heirs for having been
entered into without their authority.
 The Deed of EJP is not unenforceable but, in fact, valid, binding and enforceable against all
Team P for having given their consent to the contract.
o EJP was executed on April 19, 1989, and Team P claim that they only came to know of its
existence on July 30, 1995 through an issue of the Aklan Reporter.
o Conrado retained possession of 1 of the land adjudicated to him in the Deed of EJP.
o more than a year before they claimed to have discovered the existence of the Deed of EJP on
July 30, 1995, some of Team P executed a SPA in favor of their sister Gloria Gonzales,
authorizing her to obtain a loan from a bank and to mortgage 1 of the parcels of land
adjudicated to them in the Deed of EJP to secure payment of the loan.
o in the letter sent by the counsel of Team P to the Team there was no mention that Conrado’s
consent to the Deed of EJP was vitiated by mistake and undue influence.
 The allegation of Conrado’s vitiated consent and lack of authority to sign in behalf of his co-
heirs was a mere afterthought on the part of Team P.

Preterition

 The Team A were of the position that the absence of Team P in the partition at the very least,
in their preterition and not in the invalidity of the entire deed of partition.
 Preterition is thus a concept of testamentary succession and requires a will. In the case at
bench, there is no will involved. Therefore, preterition cannot apply.

Remand Unnecessary

Considering that the Deed of Sale has been found void and the Deed of EJP valid, with the
consent of all Team P duly given, there is no need to remand the case to the court of origin for
partition.

7.) G.R. No. 141634 February 5, 2001

Heirs of Spouses REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS and ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS SR. -- ROBERTO R.
SANDEJAS, ANTONIO R. SANDEJAS, CRISTINA SANDEJAS MORELAND, BENJAMIN R.
SANDEJAS, REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS, and heirs of SIXTO S. SANDEJAS II, RAMON R. SANDEJAS,
TERESITA R. SANDEJAS, and ELIODORO R. SANDEJAS JR., all represented by ROBERTO R.
SANDEJAS, petitioners, vs. ALEX A. LINA, respondent.

INTRODUCTION (worth-reading to give you a gist of the entire case):

A contract of sale is not invalidated by the fact that it is subject to probate court approval. The
transaction remains binding on the seller-heir, but not on the other heirs who have not given
their consent to it. In settling the estate of the deceased, a probate court has jurisdiction over
matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers. Such matters include
selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Rule 89, Section 8
of the Rules of Court, deals with the conveyance of real property contracted by the decedent
while still alive. In contrast with Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, the said provision does not
limit to the executor or administrator the right to file the application for authority to sell,
mortgage or otherwise encumber realty under administration. The standing to pursue such
course of action before the probate court inures to any person who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment or to be entitled to the avails of the suit

FACTS:
- Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition in the lower court praying that letters of administration
be issued in his favor for the settlement of the estate of his wife, REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS, who
died on April 17, 1955
- Letters of Administration were issued and he took his oath as an administrator
- On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and petition-in-intervention
was filed by [M]ovant Alex A. Lina alleging among others that on June 7, 1982, movant and
[A]dministrator Eliodoro P. Sandejas, in his capacity as seller, bound and obligated himself, his
heirs, administrators, and assigns, to sell forever and absolutely and in their entirety the
following parcels of land which formed part of the estate of the late Remedios R. Sandejas
*(intervenor filed an evidence of receipt of earnest money with promise to buy; P70,000.00 was
given as earnest money and another P100,000.00 in addition therewith)*
- "On January 7, 1985, the counsel for [A]dministrator Eliodoro P. Sandejas filed a
[M]anifestation alleging among others that the administrator, Mr. Eliodoro P. Sandejas, died
sometime in November 1984 in Canada. He also alleged, among others that the matter of the
claim of Intervenor Alex A. Lina becomes a money claim to be filed in the estate of the late Mr.
Eliodoro P. Sandejas
- Respondent Alex Lina moved for the consolidation of this civil case with the special
proceedings case: 'IN RE: INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS, SR;
- The motion was granted by the court
- Intervenor Alex A. Lina filed [a] Motion for his appointment as a new administrator of the
Intestate Estate of Remedios R. Sandejas which was granted by the court. However, Sixto, the
son of Sandejas, moved that he be the one to be assigned as the administrator; such motion
was granted by the court. Alex was replaced by Sixto

- Ruling of the Lower Court:

o The lower court upheld the sale between Sandejas and Alex Lina and directed to pay the
balance of the purchase price amounting to P729,000.00 within thirty (30) days from receipt of
this Order and the Administrator is directed to execute within thirty (30) days thereafter the
necessary and proper deeds of conveyancing

- Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

o No sale involved. The CA held that the contract between Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and
respondent was merely a contract to sell, not a perfected contract of sale.
o The CA held that Section 1, Rule 897 of the Rules of Court was inapplicable, because the lack
of written notice to the other heirs showed the lack of consent of those heirs other than
Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. For this reason, bad faith was imputed to him, for no one is allowed to
enjoyed a claim arising from one’s own wrongdoing. Thus, Eliodoro Sr. was bound, as a matter
of justice and good faith, to comply with his contractual commitments as an owner and heir.
- Petitioner files a petition before the Supreme Court; contentions:
o jurisdiction over ordinary civil action seeking not merely to enforce a sale but to compel
performance of a contract falls upon a civil court, not upon an intestate court; and (b) that
Section 8 of Rule 89 allows the executor or administrator, and no one else, to file an application
for approval of a sale of the property under administration.

ISSUE:
Whether the [trial court] acting as a probate court could approve the sale and compel the
petitioners to execute [a] deed of conveyance even for the share alone of Eliodoro P. Sandejas
Sr." YES.
RULING:

- Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86-91)
and the probate of wills (Rules 75-77) of deceased persons, including the appointment and the
removal of administrators and executors (Rules 78-85). It also extends to matters incidental
and collateral to the exercise of a probate court's recognized powers such as selling,
mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Indeed, the rules on
this point are intended to settle the estate in a speedy manner, so that the benefits that may
flow from such settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the heirs and the beneficiaries
- In the present case, the Motion for Approval was meant to settle the decedent's obligation to
respondent; hence, that obligation clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the settlement court.
To require respondent to file a separate action -- on whether petitioners should convey the title
to Eliodoro Sr.'s share of the disputed realty -- will unnecessarily prolong the settlement of the
intestate estates of the deceased spouses.
- The suspensive condition did not reduce the conditional sale between Eliodoro Sr. and
respondent to one that was "not a definite, clear and absolute document of sale," as contended
by petitioners. Upon the occurrence of the condition, the conditional sale became a reciprocally
demandable obligation that is binding upon the parties

8.) Re: Foreign Wills

IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF

RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS AND BENJAMIN GREGORIO
PALAGANAS, Petitioners, v. ERNESTO PALAGANAS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 169144, January 26, 2011

ABAD, J.:

FACTS: On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a

naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless.In the last will and testament
she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the
executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.

On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), anotherbrother of Ruperta, filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s
will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate.

On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin
Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that
Ruperta’swill should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed
it.Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Ruperta’swill could be probated in the Philippines,
it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed under duress and without the testator’s full
understanding of the consequences of such act.Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act
as administrator of the estate.

Meantime, since Ruperta’s foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on separate
occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for
leave to take their deposition, which it granted.On April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed the parties to
submit their memorandum on the issue of whether or not Ruperta’s U.S. will may be probated in
and allowed by a court in the Philippines.

On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b)
appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based
executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.

Aggrieved by the RTC’s order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court
of Appeals (CA), arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S.
cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines
although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.

RULING: Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners abroad
must first be probated and allowed in the country of its execution before it can be probated
here.This, they claim, ensures prior compliance with the legal formalities of the country of its
execution.They insist that local courts can only allow probate of such wills if the proponent
proves that: (a) the testator has been admitted for probate in such foreign country, (b) the will has
been admitted to probate there under its laws, (c) the probate court has jurisdiction over the
proceedings, (d) the law on probate procedure in that foreign country and proof of compliance
with the same, and (e) the legal requirements for the valid execution of a will.

But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the
same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution.A foreign will
can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction.Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of
an alienwho is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known
to the petitioner: (a)the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the
property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e)if the will
has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional
facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the
province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
estate he left in such province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already
been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.

In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of
California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the
reprobate of will before admitting it here.But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already
probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is
presented for the first time before a competent court.Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule
77 of the Rules of Court.Contrary to petitioners’ stance, since this latter rule applies only to
reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case.In reprobate, the local court
acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over
the matter can be established.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals
decision in CA-G.R. CV 83564 dated July 29, 2005.cralawlibrary

9.) LEO C. ROMERO and DAVID AMANDO C. ROMERO v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA
C. ROMERO and VITTORIO C. ROMERO

G.R. No. 188921; April 18, 2012

FACTS:

Petitioners allege that upon their father’s death, their mother, respondent Aurora, was
appointed as legal guardian who held several real and personal properties in trust for her
children comprising the estate of her late husband. Petitioners Leo and Amando discovered
that several Deeds of Sale in favor of their brother, Vittorio, were registered over parcels of
land that are purportedly conjugal properties of their parents.

Petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Nullification of Title, and Conveyance of
Title (Amended) against private respondents Aurora and Vittorio. Respondents filed their
Answer, arguing that the properties in question were acquired long after the death of their
father, Judge Dante Romero; hence, the properties cannot be considered conjugal, that they
were paraphernal properties of Aurora which she had mortgaged. Vittorio purportedly had to
shell out substantial amounts in order to redeem them. The lots covered by TCT Nos. 77223,
77224, and 77225 were sold by Aurora herself as attorney-in-fact of her children on 23
November 2006, since her authority to do so had never been revoked or modified.
The RTC dismissed the petitioners’ complaint since the case under Special Proceedings for the
intestate distribution and partition of the estate of their deceased father is still pending. The
RTC denied their Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners filed for certiorari under Rule 65 with
the CA but was dismissed. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners in this case may file a separate civil action for annulment of sale and
reconveyance of title, despite the pendency of the settlement proceedings for the estate of the
late Judge Dante Y. Romero.

HELD:

NO. In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of
certain of the properties involved — whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the
husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which
necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the
decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings.

In the present case, petitioners assume that the properties subject of the allegedly illegal sale
are conjugal and constitute part of their share in the estate. To date, there has been no final
inventory of the estate or final order adjudicating the shares of the heirs. Thus, only the
probate court can competently rule on whether the properties are conjugal and form part of
the estate. It is only the probate court that can liquidate the conjugal partnership and distribute
the same to the heirs, after the debts of the estate have been paid.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. As the properties herein are already subject of an
intestate proceeding.

10.) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS MA. IMELDA “IMEE” R. MARCOS-

MANOTOC

G.R. No. 171701. February 8, 2012

Succession; Hereditary estate transmitted to heirs immediately after death of decedent.

DOCTRINE: Under the rules of succession, the heirs instantaneously became co-
owners of the Marcos properties upon the death of the President. The property rights
and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted
to another through the decedent’s death. In this concept, nothing prevents the heirs
from exercising their right to transfer or dispose of the properties that constitute their
legitimes, even absent their declaration or absent the partition or the distribution of the
estate. In Jakosalem v. Rafols, the Supreme Court said: “Article 440 of the Civil Code
provides that “the possession of hereditary property is deemed to be transmitted to the
heir without interruption from the instant of the death of the decedent, in case the
inheritance be accepted.” And Manresa with reason states that upon the death of a
person, each of his heirs “becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with
respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of
ownership being thus formed among the coowners of the estate while it remains
undivided.” (3 Manresa, 357; Alcala vs. Alcala, 35 Phil. 679.) And according to article
399 of the Civil Code, every part owner may assign or mortgage his part in the common
property, and the effect of such assignment or mortgage shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted him in the partition upon the dissolution of the community.

FACTS: After the People Power Revolution in 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino created the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) that was primarily tasked to investigate
and recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth amassed by the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives and associates.

On 16 July 1987, the PCGG, acting on behalf of the Republic with the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a Complaint for Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and
Damages against Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was later substituted by his estate upon his death;
Imelda R. Marcos; and herein respondents Imee Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-Araneta,
Bongbong Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, and Gregorio Araneta III.

Four amended Complaints were thereafter filed imputingactive participation and collaboration of
another persons, viz. Nemesio G. Co and Yeungs (Kam, Ho and Fan) of Glorious Sun Fashion
Manufacturing Corporation Phils.; and, Imelda Cojuangco for the estate of Ramon Cojuangco
and Prime Holdings, in the alleged illegal activities and undertakings of the Marcoses in relation
to the ₱200 Billion Pesos ill-gotten wealth allegation.

Petitioner presented and formally offered its evidence against herein respondents. However, the
latter objected on the ground that the documents were unauthenticated and mere photocopies.

On 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a RESOLUTION ADMITTING all the documentary

exhibits formally offered by the prosecution; however, their evidentiary value was left to the
determination of the Court.

Subsequently, Imelda R. Marcos, Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr.; Irene
Marcos-Araneta and Gregorio Ma. Araneta III;Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Yeung
Chun Fan; and the PEA-PTGWO filed their respective Demurrers to Evidence.

On 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, granting all the demurrers to evidence except
the one filed by Imelda R. Marcos. The sequestration orders on the properties in the name of
Gregorio Maria AranetaIII are accordingly lifted.

With regard to Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr., Irene Marcos and Gregorio
Araneta III, the court noted that their involvement in the alleged illegal activities was never
established; neither did the documentary evidence pinpoint their involvement therein. The court
held that all presented evidence are hearsay, for being merely photocopies and that the originals
were not presented in court, nor were they authenticated by the persons who executed them.
Furthermore, the court pointed out that petitioner failed to provide any valid reason why it did
not present the originals in court. These exhibits were supposed to show the interests of Imee
Marcos-Manotoc in the media networks IBC-13, BBC-2 and RPN-9, all three of which she had
allegedly acquired illegally, her alleged participation in dollar salting through De Soleil Apparel
and to prove how the Marcoses used the Potencianos as dummies in acquiring and operating the
bus company PANTRANCO.

Meanwhile, as far as the YEUNGS were concerned, the court found the allegations against them
baseless. Petitioner failed to demonstrate howGlorious Sunwas used as a vehicle for dollar
salting; or to show that they were dummies of the Marcoses. Again, the court held that the
documentary evidence relevant to this allegation was INADMISSIBLE for being mere
photocopies, and that the affiants had not been presented as witnesses.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS IMEE, BONGBONG, AND IRENE MARCOS ARE
COMPULSORY HEIRS OF FORMER PRESIDENT MARCOS AND ARE EQUALLY OBLIGED TO RENDER
AN ACCOUNTING AND RETURN THE ALLEGED ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH OF THE MARCOSES.

HELD: The Marcos siblings are compulsory heirs.

To reiterate, in its third Amended Complaint, petitioner prays that the Marcos
respondents be made to (1) pay for the value of the alleged ill-gotten wealth with interest from
the date of acquisition; (2) render a complete accounting and inventory of all funds and other
pieces of property legally or beneficially held and/or controlled by them, as well as their legal
and beneficial interest therein; (3) pay actual damages estimated at P200 billion and additional
actual damages to reimburse expenses for the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth estimated
at P250 million or in such amount as may be proven during trial; (4) pay moral damages
amounting to P50 billion; (5) pay temperate and nominal damages, as well as attorneys fees and
litigation expenses in an amount to be proven during the trial; (6) pay exemplary damages in the
amount of P1 billion; and (7) pay treble judicial costs.[39]

It must be stressed that we are faced with exceptional circumstances, given the nature and
the extent of the properties involved in the case pending with the Sandiganbayan. It bears
emphasis that the Complaint is one for the reversion, the reconveyance, the restitution and the
accounting of alleged ill-gotten wealth and the payment of damages. Based on the allegations of
the Complaint, the court is charged with the task of (1) determining the properties in the Marcos
estate that constitute the alleged ill-gotten wealth; (2) tracing where these properties are; (3)
issuing the appropriate orders for the accounting, the recovery, and the payment of these
properties; and, finally, (4) determining if the award of damages is proper.
 Since the pending case before the Sandiganbayan survives the death of Ferdinand E.
Marcos, it is imperative therefore that the estate be duly represented. The purpose behind this
rule is the protection of the right to due process of every party to a litigation who may be affected
by the intervening death. The deceased litigant is himself protected, as he continues to be
properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his
estate.[40] On that note, we take judicial notice of the probate proceedings regarding the will of
Ferdinand E. Marcos. In Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos II,[41] we upheld the grant by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of letters testamentary in solidum to Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. and
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand E.
Marcos.

Unless the executors of the Marcos estate or the heirs are ready to waive in favor of the
state their right to defend or protect the estate or those properties found to be ill-gotten in their
possession, control or ownership, then they may not be dropped as defendants in the civil case
pending before the Sandiganbayan.

Rule 3, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as those parties-in-
interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. They are those parties
who possess such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their
rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence. Parties are indispensable if their
interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought is inextricably intertwined with
that of the other parties.[42]

In order to reach a final determination of the matters concerning the estate of Ferdinand
E. Marcos that is, the accounting and the recovery of ill-gotten wealth the present case must be
maintained against Imelda Marcos and herein respondent Ferdinand Bongbong R. Marcos, Jr., as
executors of the Marcos estate pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. According to
this provision, actions may be commenced to recover from the estate, real or personal property,
or an interest therein, or to enforce a lien thereon; and actions to recover damages for an injury to
person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executors.

We also hold that the action must likewise be maintained against Imee Marcos-Manotoc
and Irene Marcos-Araneta on the basis of the non-exhaustive list attached as Annex A to the
Third Amended Complaint, which states that the listed properties therein were owned by
Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and their immediate family.[43] It is only during the trial of Civil
Case No. 0002 before the Sandiganbayan that there could be a determination of whether these
properties are indeed ill-gotten or were legitimately acquired by respondents and their
predecessors. Thus, while it was not proven that respondents conspired in accumulating ill-gotten
wealth, they may be in possession, ownership or control of such ill-gotten properties or the
proceeds thereof as heirs of the Marcos couple. Thus, their lack of participation in any illegal act
does not remove the character of the property as ill-gotten and, therefore, as rightfully belonging
to the State.

Secondly, under the rules of succession, the heirs instantaneously became co-owners of
the Marcos properties upon the death of the President. The property rights and obligations to the
extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted to another through the decedents
death.[44] In this concept, nothing prevents the heirs from exercising their right to transfer or
dispose of the properties that constitute their legitimes, even absent their declaration or absent
the partition or the distribution of the estate. In Jakosalem v. Rafols,[45] we said:

Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that the possession of hereditary
property is deemed to be transmitted to the heir without interruption from
the instant of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance be
accepted. And Manresa with reason states that upon the death of a person, each
of his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect
to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of
ownership being thus formed among the coowners of the estate while it
remains undivided. (3 Manresa, 357; Alcala vs. Alcala, 35 Phil. 679.) And
according to article 399 of the Civil Code, every part owner may assign or
mortgage his part in the common property, and the effect of such assignment
or mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted him in the
partition upon the dissolution of the community. Hence, in the case of Ramirez
vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528, where some of the heirs, without the concurrence of
the others, sold a property left by their deceased father, this Court, speaking
thru its then Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano, said that the sale was valid,
but that the effect thereof was limited to the share which may be allotted to
the vendors upon the partition of the estate. (Emphasis supplied)